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INTEREST GROUPS, ADVOCACY
AND DEMOCRACY SERIES
SERIES EDITOR: DARREN HALPIN
Achieving Democracy
Through Interest
Representation
Interest Groups in
Central and Eastern Europe
Patrycja Rozbicka · Paweł Kamiński

Meta Novak · Vaida Jankauskaitė
Interest Groups, Advocacy and Democracy Series
Series Editor
Darren Halpin
Research School of Social Sciences
Australian National University
Canberra, Australia
The study of interest groups and their role in political life has under-
gone somewhat of a renaissance in recent years. Long standing scholarly
themes such as interest groups influence mobilization, formation, and
‘bias’, are being addressed using new and novel data sets and methods.
There are also new and exciting themes, such as the role of ICTs in
enabling collective action and the growth of global advocacy networks, are
being added. Contemporary debates about the role of commercial lobby-
ists and professionalized interest representation are also highly salient.
Together, they draw an ever larger and broader constituency to the study
of interest groups and advocacy. This series seeks to capture both new
generation studies addressing long standing themes in new ways and
innovate scholarship posing new and challenging questions that emerge
in a rapidly changing world. The series encourages contributions from
political science (but also abutting disciplines such as economics, law,
history, international relations and sociology) that speak to these themes.
It welcomes work undertaken at the level of sub-national, national and
supra-national political systems, and particularly encourages comparative
or longitudinal studies. The series is open to diverse methodologies and
theoretical approaches. The book series will sit alongside and complement
the Interest Groups & Advocacy journal.
More information about this series at

http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14850
Patrycja Rozbicka · Paweł Kamiński ·
Meta Novak · Vaida Jankauskaitė
Achieving Democracy
Through Interest
Representation
Interest Groups in Central
and Eastern Europe
Patrycja Rozbicka Paweł Kamiński
School of Social Sciences Polish Academy of Sciences
and Humanities Institute of Political Studies
Aston University Warsaw, Poland
Birmingham, UK
Vaida Jankauskaitė
Meta Novak Faculty of Social Sciences, Arts
Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities
University of Ljubljana Kaunas University of Technology
Ljubljana, Slovenia Kaunas, Lithuania
Interest Groups, Advocacy and Democracy Series

ISBN 978-3-030-55520-7 ISBN 978-3-030-55521-4 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-55521-4
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
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Preface
This book assesses the quality of democracy through the study of orga-
nized interests in post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)
from the collapse of the Communism in 1989 up to the 2018. It presents
an in-depth, an empirically grounded study comparing interest groups in
Central and Eastern Europe. Drawing on democratic theory and compar-
ative analysis, the book puts forward an evaluation of the effects of a
legal framework, political and social context, on the interest representa-
tion in the post-Communist era. The book is an important contribution
to debates on the performance of the young democracies in Central and
Eastern Europe, where scholars argue that there is a ‘democratic crisis’
and democratic fatigue while the interest group system is labelled as weak
and, in some cases, underdeveloped. This volume offers a much-needed
comprehensive look into formal interest representation in the CEE coun-
tries, contrasting it with the model of Western democracies. Although
great efforts have been made to deepen our understanding of interest
organization and lobbying tools, the current literature fails to provide
a comprehensive answer on influence of unsupportive environment on
population ecology. The case of CEE countries shows significant effects
v
vi PREFACE
of the political and social contexts on interest representation, stimulating

a debate about the quality of democratic institutions after the collapse of
communism.
Birmingham, UK Patrycja Rozbicka

Warsaw, Poland Paweł Kamiński
Ljubljana, Slovenia Meta Novak
Kaunas, Lithuania Vaida Jankauskaitė
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank following colleagues: Paulina Pośpieszna and

Aleksandra Galus from the Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan,
Poland, for help in data collection; Patricia Correa Vila, Balázs Szent-
Iványi, Jörg Mathias and Luke John Davies, Aston University, Birm-
ingham, UK, Alenka Krašovec, Damjan Lajh and Matevž Malčič, Univer-
sity of Ljubljana, Slovenia, for constructive comments. We would also like
to thank our families for their support, and Dr. Kamiński would like to,
in particular, thank his wife Natalia and his son Jan.
We also would like to acknowledge that part of this research was
financed by the following: Research Foundation-Flanders, Grant No:
G032814N, Slovenian Research Agency, Grant No: N5-0023 and Grant
No: P5-0136; and the Research Council of Lithuania, Grant No:
MIP030/15.
vii
Contents
1 Achieving Democracy Through Interest Representation:

Interest Groups in Central and Eastern Europe
in a Comparative Perspective 1
1.1 Interest Representation and Its Importance
for Democracy 4
1.1.1 From Pluralism and Corporatism
to Neo-Pluralism 5
1.1.2 Democratic Theory 7
1.2 Why Study Interest Groups in the Post-Communist
Countries? Our Exemplary Case Studies 12
1.3 Research, Methodology and the Book’s Structure 15
Bibliography 18
2 Interest Organizations in Central and Eastern Europe:

Evaluating Population Ecology 25
2.1 Explaining the Density and Diversity of Interest Group
Systems 28
2.1.1 The Lithuanian Interest Group System
and Punctuated Past 29
2.1.2 The Polish Interest Groups and Economic Shock
Therapy 30
2.1.3 The Slovenian Europeanized Interest Group
System 32
ix
x CONTENTS
2.2 Defining Interest Organizations in the Post-Communist

Context 34
2.3 Population Ecology: Density 39
2.4 Population Ecology: Diversity 40
2.5 Conclusions 48
Appendix 49
Bibliography 53
3 Organized Interest in the Policy-Making Process 59

3.1 A Framework of Interest Representation in the CEE
Counties 59
3.1.1 The Heritage of the Old System 60
3.1.2 The Europeanization Process 61
3.1.3 Characteristics of Interest Group Systems
in CEE Countries 63
3.2 Legal, Institutional and Political Determinants 66
3.2.1 The Executive 66
3.2.2 The Parliament 69
3.2.3 The Economic and Social Committees 73
3.2.4 Other Forms of Inclusion in Policy-Making 75
3.2.5 The Legal Basis for Interest Groups 80
3.2.6 Regulation of Lobbying 81
3.3 Comparisons Between Post-Communist Countries
and Western Democracies 83
3.4 Conclusions 85
Bibliography 87
4 The Drivers Behind Relations Between Interest

Organizations and Political Parties in the CEE
Countries 91
4.1 Discussing Interest Organizations and Parties’
Positions 91
4.2 The Post-Communist Transformation 92
4.3 Conceptualizing the Relationship Between Parties
and Groups 95
4.4 Who Contacts Whom and Why? 97
4.5 Access Points: Lobbing Government vs Lobbing Parties 99
4.6 Analysis 102
CONTENTS xi
4.7 What Explains Party—Group Interactions? 105

4.8 Conclusions 108
Bibliography 109
5 The Organizational Development of Nongovernmental

Organizations in Central and Eastern Europe 115
5.1 Post-Communist Transformation 116
5.2 Mushrooming of NGOs 118
5.3 Analysis 120
5.4 Case Studies 125
5.5 Discussion and Conclusions 132
Bibliography 133
6 The Significance of Trade Unions in the CEE

Countries: Beyond Corporatism and Pluralism? 137
6.1 Trade Unions and Political Parties: Western Europe vs
CEE Countries 137
6.2 Transition, Shock Therapy, Political Turmoil 140
6.3 Setting the Stage for Industrial Relations After 1989 143
6.3.1 Foundation of the First Post-Communist Trade
Unions in Poland, Slovenia and Lithuania 143
6.3.2 Economic Shock and Public Discontent 147
6.3.3 The Changing Political Paradigm
and Challenges to Trade Unions 148
6.4 Distrust Towards Trade Unions and Their
Diminishing Political Base 150
Bibliography 156
7 Seeking Access to Policy Stakeholders: Business

‘Lobbying’ vs Others 161
7.1 Venue Shopping in the CEE Political Systems 161
7.2 Strategies of Inside Lobbying 164
7.3 Explaining Access Goods 169
7.3.1 Data and Methodology 171
7.3.2 Results 172
Bibliography 177
xii CONTENTS
8 Interest Organizations in CEE Countries

and the European Policy Process 181
8.1 The Effects of EU Accession on Population
Ecology—Diversity, Structure and Numbers 183
8.2 EU Funding 186
8.3 Activity at the National vs European Level 189
8.3.1 Access to European Decision-Makers 190
8.3.2 Access to National Decision-Makers 193
8.4 Membership in European Umbrella Organizations 196
Bibliography 202
9 Conclusions: The Future of Lobbying in the CEE

Countries 209
9.1 Regime Change and the New Realities of Interest
Groups’ Systems in the CEE Countries 213
9.2 Continued Effects of the EU Accession? 214
9.3 Lobbying in the CEE Countries in the Next Decade? 215
9.3.1 Future Research 216
Bibliography 218
Index 221
About the Authors
Patrycja Rozbicka Associate Professor in Politics and International Rela-

tions at Aston University, Birmingham (Aston Centre for Europe). Her
main areas of interest and publications include: participation of interest
groups in the EU political system; coalitions and networks studies; and
regulation of the music industry.
Paweł Kamiński Adjunct at the Institute of Political Studies, Polish

Academy of Sciences His main areas of interest and publications include:
political parties and civil society in Central Eastern Europe; and the
relationships between political parties and interest groups.
Meta Novak Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Social Sciences,

University of Ljubljana, and a researcher at the Centre for Political Science
Research at the same faculty. Her research interests include interest
groups, lobbying, civil society, political knowledge and opinion gaps.
Vaida Jankauskaitė, Ph.D. is a Researcher at the Faculty of Social

Sciences, Arts and Humanities, Kaunas University of Technology. Her
main research interests include interest groups, lobbying, party-interest
group relationship and political financing.
xiii
Abbreviations
CEE Central and Eastern Europe

CIGs Comparative Interest Groups Survey
CNVOS Centre for Information, Cooperation and Development of Non-
Governmental Organizations
DGs Directorate-General
DOPPS Društvo za opazovanje in proučevanje ptic Slovenije
EU European Union
KNSS Confederation of New Trade Unions of Slovenia
LDF Lithuanian Work Federation (LDF)
LDS Lithuanian Workers Union
LGM Lithuanian Green Movement
LPSS Lithuanian Trade Union Centre (LPSC), the Lithuanian Trade Union
Alliance
LSDP Lithuanian Social Democratic Party (LSDP)
MEPs Members of the European Parliament
MPs Members of Parliament
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPZZ All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions
PHARE Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies
PiS Law and Justice Party
PO Civic Platform Party
SLD The Polish Democratic Left Alliance Party
xv
List of Figures
Fig. 2.1 Year of establishment 44

Fig. 3.1 Frequency of contacts with national institutions, mean
value (1—we did not seek access, 5—at least once a week)
(Source: CIG survey) 71
Fig. 3.2 Involvement in other activities of policy-making, mean
value (1—we did not do this, 5—at least once a week)
(Source: CIG survey) 79
Fig. 4.1 Seeking access to different governmental institutions 100
Fig. 4.2 Contacts with political parties 103
Fig. 4.3 Average marginal effects for contacting political parties 106
Fig. 5.1 The number of NGOs in Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia
since 1989, controlling for demographics 119
Fig. 5.2 The year each organization was founded 121
Fig. 5.3 The composition of NGOs’ budgets 122
Fig. 5.4 The source of NGOs’ budget 123
Fig. 5.5 Membership size of NGOs in Lithuania, Poland
and Slovenia 125
Fig. 6.1 Trade union density by country (Data
OECD. Stat., accessed in November, 2019
[https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=TUD]) 152
Fig. 6.2 Trust in trade unions over the years by country (Source
Eurobarometer) 155
Fig. 7.1 Time allocated between direct and indirect strategies, mean
value 165
xvii
List of Tables
Table 2.1 An overview of organizations’ typology 37

Table 2.2 CIGs countries—Comparison of interest organizations
per country size and population 41
Table 2.3 Lithuanian, Polish and Slovenian national interest groups
dataset, by type 42
Table 2.4 Interest groups’ diversity by declared area of activity
(policy areas aggregated) 46
Table 2.5 Interest groups diversity by declared area of activity 50
Table 3.1 Trust in certain forms of interest groups (answer tend
not to trust) 65
Table 4.1 Impact of interest groups contacting political parties 104
Table 5.1 Types of organizations analyzed 120
Table 7.1 Strategies applied by interest groups, percentages 166
Table 7.2 Inside lobbying venues used by business and non-business
groups, mean values (scale 1–5) 168
Table 7.3 Inside lobbying venues for countries, mean values (scale
1–5) 169
Table 7.4 Linear regression analysis—factors of inside lobbying
in different venues 173
Table 8.1 Period of establishment of interest groups from CEE
countries 185
Table 8.2 Financing of interest groups from EU projects
and programmes 188
Table 8.3 Interest for EU policies 189
xix
xx LIST OF TABLES
Table 8.4 Frequency of contacts with EU institutions, mean value

(1—we did not seek access, 5—at least once a week) 192
Table 8.5 Frequency of contacts with national political institutions,
mean value (1—we did not seek access, 5—at least
once a week) 195
Table 8.6 Percentage of members to EU organizations 198
CHAPTER 1
Achieving Democracy Through Interest

Representation: Interest Groups in Central
and Eastern Europe
in a Comparative Perspective
The study of interest group politics—the organization, aggregation, artic-

ulation and intermediation of societal interests that seek to shape public
policies (Beyers et al. 2008: 1104)—is a relatively small field within polit-
ical science. When compared to studies of electoral systems, legislatives
and party politics, the research on interest groups (organized groups
which represent the interests of their members and supporters and are
politically active) remains under-published due to a much smaller schol-
ars’ community working on the topic. Nevertheless, during the last
20 years, interest in group politics has grown. This is evidenced by
numerous empirical studies, both qualitative and quantitative, within the
fields of European Union (EU) studies (see for example: the results of
the INTEREURO Project1 ), European politics, and American politics
(see, in particular, publications in the dedicated ‘Interest and Advo-
cacy’ Journal2 ). In recent years, interest groups scholars have moved
beyond the Olsonian collective action paradigm and there has been
growth in the importance of large-scale empirical research projects (e.g.
1 http://www.intereuro.eu/public/. Accessed 17 October 2019.

2 https://link.springer.com/journal/41309. Accessed 17 October 2017.
© The Author(s) 2021 1

P. Rozbicka et al., Achieving Democracy Through Interest Representation,
Interest Groups, Advocacy and Democracy Series,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-55521-4_1
2 P. ROZBICKA ET AL.
Advocacy and Public Policy Project3 ). In particular, the European schol-

arship on interest groups has become more empirical, systemic and
has drawn increasingly on sophisticated methodological techniques and
consistent theoretical approaches (Coen 2007). The majority of the schol-
arly research has analysed interest groups’ activities in one political system.
Studies have chiefly focused on the EU, the UK, Germany, Belgium,
the Netherlands, and France; with the later addition of Sweden (e.g.
Naurin and Boräng 2012), England (e.g. Mohan 2012), and Denmark
(e.g. Chiristiansen 2012).
This volume takes on board the vast accomplishments of the interest
groups literature, explored theories, methodological and normative issues
related to the study of political interests in the EU and elsewhere
and applies them to a new area, the post-Communist democracies of
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). The intellectual principle here is
that understanding interest group systems remains crucial to under-
standing the functioning of advanced democracies, especially in areas
which have undergone a democratization process only within the last
30 years. The pluralist argument that without groups there would be
no democracy retains much plausibility and finds a resonance in social
capital research (Putnam 2000; Beyers et al. 2008). Due to the transfor-
mation of the European national state and the declining importance of
electoral and party politics in the Western democracies (Bartolini 2005;
Mair 2006), more and more attention has been paid to the prominent
position of interest groups within policy networks and policy negotiation.
The neo-Tocquevillian approach emphasizes the importance of internal
aspects of associational life for the proper functioning of democracy and
democratization (Kaufman 1999). From that perspective, interest organi-
zations are central democratic partners in the policy process enhancing its
open, transparent and participatory character. The emergence of interest
groups in the post-Communist countries should be treated as one of the
prerequisites of successful democratization.
In post-Communist CEE countries, contrary to Western democracies,
the emergence of modern civil society and the political system was not
the effect of a century-long process, but rather rapid and unexpected
regime change in the 1980s and 1990s. This regime change created
opportunities for interest communities in several countries to emerge
3 http://lobby.la.psu.edu/. Accessed 17 October 2019.

1 ACHIEVING DEMOCRACY THROUGH INTEREST REPRESENTATION … 3
in similar, but somewhat idiosyncratic environments as there had been

substantial variations in introducing democratic and economic reforms.
The regime change allows scholars to study interest groups’ popula-
tion in these countries—deriving from population ecology (i.e. Gray and
Lowery 2000)—almost as a living organisms’ life cycle. The population
ecology theory explains that density and diversity of interest groups in any
given system is more dependent on political and organizational environ-
ments than on micro-level decisions among groups themselves. It could
certainly be the case for CEE countries, where groups initially struggled
not only with a lack of supportive social infrastructure, but also a scarcity
of resources and chaotic political actors.
We explore in the book an essential question: which factors influence
interest groups in the CEE countries, their populations and organiza-
tional behaviour? Following Crawford and Lijphart (1995), we argue
that the collapse of Communism and transition to democracy introduced
a set of internal and external factors, which have characteristics that influ-
ence the formation and maintenance of groups’ populations. Fink-Hafner
(2011) contended that, in particular, an institutional choice in the tran-
sition to democracy (internal factor) was not only about the relations
between the democratic opposition and the old regime, but also formed
idiosyncratic opportunity structures which influenced the early processes
of interest group formation (in particular, the socio-economic partner-
ships). In the case of external factors, the key aspect was the process
of Europeanization (Berglund 2003; Maloney et al. 2018). The CEE
countries, due to external pressure, implemented reforms to meet various
economic and democratic criteria, including the Copenhagen Criteria to
join the EU, as well as the liberalization process along the lines of the
Washington Consensus, to have access to the World Bank and IMF credit
lines (Bohle and Greskovits 2007). The implementation of these was
viewed by observers as symptoms of emerging democracies and moves
towards the creation of a functional and representative civil society. While
the transition took place over 30 years ago, authors agree that changes
within interest groups’ population ecology and organizational behaviour
are slow and it takes major focus events to alter them (Gray and Lowery
2000). The type of events which alter these factors do not have to be of
an explosive nature but rather, similar to the changes themselves, they can
take place over an extended period.
The assessment of the quality of democracy through the study of

organized interests in the post-Communist CEE remains vastly unex-
plored. This is an apt time for an in-depth analysis and reflection on the
population of interest groups in the CEE region, especially in a compar-
ative perspective to their West European counter parts. The aim of this
volume is to lay down a sound basis and empirical data for such future
research. Taking its theoretical, conceptual and methodological basis from
existing Western democracies’ research, the volume avoids the risk of
heroic empiricism. Moreover, the research on CEE countries in a compar-
ative perspective is relatively fragmented and the integration and exchange
among various strands of the research in this book will contribute to a
more robust and consistent research agenda.
This introductory chapter outlines in detail interest representation
and its importance for democracy, underlining the place of this discus-
sion in a broader political science debate. In particular, we focus on an
evolution from the pluralist and corporatist perspective to neo-pluralism.
We consider different elements of the participatory, representative and
associative democracy. And, further support the argument by reference
to Tocqueville’s associanalism. We focus on our intellectual principle of
interest representation as a necessary element of democracy and elabo-
rate on a comparative yardstick of functional representation. We further
explain the focus on the post-Communist CEE countries. As the empir-
ical results presented in this volume are based on extensive qualitative
and quantitative research in the methodology section we introduce the
Comparative Interest Groups Survey Project (CIGs) and more in-depth
information on the data collection in the countries selected for the
analysis. In an overview of the volume’s structure, we conclude the
introduction with a brief discussion of the key arguments and result.
1.1 Interest Representation

and Its Importance for Democracy
Until the mid-twentieth century, research on interest groups participa-
tion in the decision-making process did not consider the question of the
impact on democracy (Jordan and Maloney 2007). The initial wave of
positive research on the topic was linked with the pluralist celebration of
groups as a means of face-to-face interaction to enhance social integra-
tion and direct democracy itself. Since then, however, the debate on the
democratic deficit and questions regarding the role citizens participation
should play in the political process has given way to a more norma-
tive body of literature on the role of ‘organized civil society’ (Saurugger
2008). Following Tocqueville’s approach, the new approach has consid-
ered interest groups as crucial actors in truly democratic systems. The
discussion below critically analyses the potential contribution that interest
groups make to improvement of the democratic character of political
system, potentially addressing the democratic deficit.
1.1.1 From Pluralism and Corporatism to Neo-Pluralism

No matter their differences with regard to group involvement in the polit-
ical system, in their perception of the balance of power between groups,
or whether or not such associations enhance or undermine governance
solutions, both pluralism and corporatism cast interest groups in a signifi-
cant role as a part of democratic life. To pluralists, interest groups are core
legitimate actors in the policy-making process. They consider politics to
be a competition between freely organized interest groups in society that
compete for access to a government that is unbiased and willing to listen
to different voices. In contrast to critical political economy approaches,
pluralists assume that no single interest, elite or class is able to dominate
society (Hosli et al. 2004: 46). Instead, policy-making is competitive and
fragmented. The state is a mere arena for the struggle between different
interest groups (Williamson 1989: 55), where the free interplay of interest
groups leads to a system of ‘checks and balances’, preventing the poten-
tial dominance of a particular societal group, or of a powerful state. Policy
is made within a ‘social equilibrium’ (Bentley 1908). Interest groups are
assumed to contribute to a more reasonable process of policy-making,
especially by providing information and analysis based on a multitude
of different perspectives (Watts 2007: 14–21). In the pluralist heaven,
effective interest representation is enabled by the mobilization and repre-
sentation of a plurality of social and economic interests that organize in
interest associations (Dahl 1961; Truman 1958). Far from posing any
form of threat, these groups’ existence serves to enhance democracy.
Indeed, they are the very substance of the democratic process (Watts
2007).
The corporatist perspective favours a strong role for interest groups
in policy-making, but only under the overarching leadership role of
the state (Hosli et al. 2004: 46–47; Molina and Rhodes 2002: 316).
The overall aim of corporatist initiatives is economic growth and a fair
share in its rewards. Due to increased demands, the state depends on

the assistance of societal actors in formulating and implementing poli-
cies (Lehmbruch 1979: 52). In particular, there is a demand on the
part of public actors for the expertise and compliance of private actors
(Wonka and Warntjen 2004: 17). Interest groups gain access to the formal
decision-making process, when they provide compliance with the agree-
ments reached and thereby add to the overall steering capacity of the state
(Rasmussen and Gross 2015; Bouwen 2004; Klüver 2013; Flöthe 2020).
Groups’ eagerness to engage derives from a consensus that is reached
on the formulation level, which realizes the interests of a larger number
of actors. The output of democracy is being enhanced (Schmalz-Bruns
2002; Heinelt et al. 2002: 17–18).
Pluralism and corporatism are widely discussed, however more and
more attention is being given in the literature to normative questions,
such as the general desirability of interest groups, the potential biases
in access, the attention different societal interests gain, and the societal
consequences generated by interest group activities. Interest groups are
often perceived as advocating for the interests of powerful business or
small sections of the public which are in conflict with the public good
or the preferences of the majority of citizens (Flöthe and Rasmussen
2018; Schattschneider 1948). More recently, questions have been raised
regarding the transparency, accountability and representative character
of interest groups. Given that interest groups lack an electoral mandate
or formal authorization from a clearly defined constituency (Halpin
2006), it remains a tricky question what their substantive representation
should look like (Pitkin 1967: 115). When acting in the interest of their
represented constituents, who are interest groups actually representing?
In response, neo-pluralism, while not entirely discarding its prede-
cessor, acknowledges that the mobilization of groups is not a one-
dimensional process and it often involves competition between the
groups themselves (Saurugger 2008). Interest groups interact with policy-
makers, but also organize themselves into stable or more ad hoc coalitions
(Gray and Lowery 2000). The influence production process is not unidi-
rectional—there are significant feedback mechanisms among and between
different stakeholders. As Saurugger (2008: 1277) underlines, neo-
pluralist research concludes that organized interests are only imperfectly
constrained by democratic politics. They still have ample opportunities
to influence politics in ways that may not fully reflect the democratic
conceptions of the pluralist ‘heavenly chorus’. Neo-pluralism takes into
account that not all policy issues might be equally represented and some
of them might indeed be mostly biased towards elites. From that perspec-
tive it abandons the pluralist equality of interest representation. Last,
but not least, the neo-pluralist perspective assumes that there are polit-
ical contexts and constraints in policy influence that groups face. Here,
the neo-pluralist research’s overarching narrative focuses on what specific
aspects of legal, social and political factors have a bearing on how and to
what extent interest groups participate in the democratic policy creation
process. Neo-pluralism thus encourages empirical research, which looks
beyond the groups themselves and asks scholars to study the context in
which groups are placed and act.
1.1.2 Democratic Theory

Could organized interests provide a core contribution to the reduction
of the democratic deficit? Schmalz-Bruns (2002: 59) concludes that the
direct inclusion and involvement of citizens, both individually and collec-
tively (through associations), is an obvious solution to the deficit of
democracy. He suggests there is a direct and mutually reinforcing link
between the virtues of direct participation on the one hand, and the
efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability of policies that emerge under
the structural shortcomings of representative institutions within a system
characterized by dispersion, poli-centricity and fragmentation on the
other (whether we look at it from the pluralist, corporatist or neo-pluralist
perspective). Three arguments support his assertion. The growing depen-
dency of policy success on the willing acceptance and active support
of those whom it affects. The inclusion of those directly affected not
only by a policy measure, but also by the problems which the policy is
intended to solve widens and improves the infrastructure of knowledge
upon which policy-decisions are based, helping to produce better results
(Lindblom 1965). The interchange of views between different ‘holders’
of rights and claimants to participation improves the sustainability of the
policy (because of complex negotiation and intermediation between those
factors that drive political action—interest, power, values and knowledge).
From a more ethical perspective, the experience of a plurality of views on
a subject matter is expected to heighten participants’ awareness of differ-
ences and thus their moral sensitivity towards each other. This could have
the effect of a willing identification not just to a particular project and
group, but also with wider and more encompassing concerns and the
activities in which they are embedded (Schmalz-Bruns 2002: 59).
From that perspective, interest groups are seen as a substitute for other
forms of democratic legitimization, ensuring that different types of inter-
ests are taken into account in policy-making (Greenwood 2007; Heritier
1999). In national contexts, it is a commonly held assumption that group
involvement in policy-making boosts legitimacy. The literature on public
consultations has even argued that, in some respects, interest groups can
serve as a surrogate for the public in the policy process (Lundberg and
Hysing 2016).
Although democratic legitimacy is a core concept in political science
research, it is certainly not the only relevant or possible criterion for
normative evaluation. According to Knill and Lehmkuhl (2002), private
governance contributions might compensate for the decreasing capacities
of national governments in defining and providing public goods in light
of the internationalization of markets and the emergence of transnational
information and communication networks (Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002:
85). The limited problem-solving capability of authoritative regulation
(and technological solutions) creates the need for a more cooperative,
consensual and inclusive policy style. This style should be aimed at
gaining the acceptance and input of business actors and ordinary citizens,
which are both concerned with policy objectives and their responsi-
bility to the collective good (Lenschow 1999: 42). The perception that
successful policy depends on economic and private actors ‘internalizing’
their responsibility has further consequences for the choice of policy
instruments, implying a more limited role for top-down regulatory instru-
ments and a more prominent role for market-oriented, self-regulatory as
well as informational and communicative instruments (Lenschow 1999:
42). Decision-makers and legislators may have their own views on issues
of broad community benefit, but on matters involving technical under-
standing and perhaps help in the implementation of policy they are
reliant on the advice and assistance of well-resourced groups (Watts 2007:
78–79).
A cornerstone of any democratic society is the capacity for its citi-
zens to have a political voice so that citizens ‘can express their views,
preferences, and interests towards political institutions and hold public
officials to account’ (Fraussen and Halpin 2016: 476). Although political
representation is achieved through voting for or joining and supporting
political parties, elections are irregular occurrences and scholars ques-

tion the participatory character of parties (e.g. Marsh 2006). The
well-documented debate regarding the transformation of party political
systems in Western democracies (expressed through electoral volatility and
the fragmentation of party landscapes) and dissatisfaction with the repre-
sentative system of government, has pushed scholars to explore the role
of interest groups as mechanisms of political expression enhancing the
quality and breadth of political participation (e.g. Fraussen and Halpin
2016 but also: Klüver 2015; van Biezen and Poguntke 2014). Here
in particular we focus on the principles of associative, deliberative and
participatory democracy.
Associative democracy incorporates the neo-Tocquevillian approach
emphasizing the importance of internal aspects of associational life
for the proper functioning of democracy and democratization, viewing
interest organizations as central democratic partners in the policy process
enhancing its open, transparent, and participatory character. From this
perspective voluntary associations become the basis of contemporary
conceptions of a third sector between the market and the state. Berger
and Neuhaus (1977) used the neo-Tocquevillian notion of non-profit and
civil society organizations as intermediate social institutions whose func-
tion is to mediate between citizens and government. These associations
provide information to policy-makers on members preferences, equalizing
representation, they promote citizens education (by acting as schools of
democracy) and offer alternative implementation, governance and admin-
istration functions. The associonalist further acknowledge that for their
system to work, the state has to monitor the functions and composition
of associations (Hirst 1994; Cohen and Rogers 1995a). However, they
disagree with regards to the ‘sponsoring’ of organizations. Cohen and
Rogers (1995b) favour the option where the state has a role in supporting
groups to emerge where they would do not so naturally. Hirst (1994)
and Carter (2002) challenge this artifactual approach and conclude that,
by default, the state’s sponsorship will build weaker organizations, depen-
dent on the state’s favouritism. Despite those doubts, the principles of
associative democracy see organized interest groups as actors in the demo-
cratic system responsible for the provision of information and expertise to
policy-makers, the representation of excluded and marginalized groups,
and democratic capacity building.
The discussion on alternatives to diminishing citizens’ participation

has been greatly enhanced by focusing on deliberative democracy. Delib-
erative democracy understands the democratic policy process differently
under different concepts: from the Rawlsian theory of public reason,
Dahl’s non-participatory pluralism, Arrow’s social choice, Riker’s rational
choice and the Habermasian theory of communicative action (or the
discursive account of decision-making; Zeleznik 2016). The analysts of
deliberative democracy indicate numerous attempts at improving the
quality of political participation; from the involvement of deliberation
in well-constituted forums which responds to the critique by encour-
aging participants to take a broader perspective on questions of common
interest (Gutmann and Thompson 2004: 10) to ‘macro deliberative’
theorist contributions to improve the quality of political participation.
In principle, however, deliberative democracy is about communication
and willingness of different sides to change their views (Dryzek 2000).
What is crucial to deliberative democracy is that through discussion and
deliberation citizens have the potential to move beyond their individual
preferences. Within an engaged, ‘deliberating’ society, Habermas (1996)
distinguishes between groups that engage in ‘clientele bargaining’ with
the state, such as business associations, trade unions and ‘supplier’ groups.
Supplier groups give voice to social problems, make broad demands,
articulate public interests or needs and attempt to influence the political
process from a normative point of view. The border between two groups
is however blurry, as even suppliers groups often represent the interests
of their constituencies, while ‘clientele bargaining’ can be extended to
debates on common goods.
According to Fung (2005: 671) deliberative democratic mechanisms
are a crucial component for the democratic policy process, but they are
not sufficient, and participation needs to be improved. A response to
that seems to be provided by participatory democratic theory, which
understands democratic notions in terms of direct empowerment vs repre-
sentation. Out of the three indicated approaches, participatory democracy
is the most concerned with a political system built on equality of voices. It
addresses the imperative for group empowerment and representation, but
also the need to focus on democratic procedures that facilitate inclusion
(Cunningham 2002). Among others, the Baker et al.’s (2009) characteris-
tics of participatory democracy include: widespread political participation
through different forms of association, which has to be diverse and repre-
sentative (including marginalized groups), committed to a democratic
ethos and open to deliberation. It is based on a qualified delegate model,

with an assumption of accountability. The delegate acts in the interest
of its broadly defined constituency, consults with them when necessary,
but also provides leadership, by inspiration and the transparency of infor-
mation. In practice that means within the assigned mandate and always
within the perceived interests of their membership. Baker et al. (2009)
primarily apply this qualified delegate model to the role of elected repre-
sentatives and political parties, but this approach also offers insights for
how interest groups might establish their representative legitimacy. In
practice, this approach means that leaders within interest organizations
should operate within the framework of the agreed values and mission of
their organizations, provide their members with opportunities to engage
in ongoing reflections and deliberation and ensure that their members
are adequately resourced and supported to avail of these opportunities.
Interest organizations serve here as spaces for deliberation, where inter-
ests can be articulated, developed and negotiated to later be passed and
negotiated within the local and national state institutions (Wainwright
2003: 188). Groups can be a mechanism by which citizens can hold
governments accountable for their actions and strengthen democratic
structures. This way, interest organizations are acknowledged as making a
contribution to participatory democracy.
In the above understanding, the three concepts (associative, deliber-
ative and participatory democracy) should be incorporated equally and
in mutually comprehensive terms within the institutions of represen-
tative democracy to fully grasp the importance of interest groups for
democracy. Interest groups can hold the democratic state accountable;
they can act as advocates for better democracy; can build democratic
capacity (enhancing citizens’ indirect participation); can create spaces for
discussion, debate and deliberation; facilitate representation of excluded
communities; and, can provide expertise to policy-makers. It is not
however without limitation or necessary control. The regulation of access
is one of the central arguments stressed by the theorists of associative
and participatory democracy (Saurugger 2008: 1277). Contrary to classic
pluralist assumptions, public intervention is necessary to guarantee the
equal representation of all groups. Secondly, resources (understood in a
very broad sense) are crucial for interest groups to intervene in the public,
political and private debates to the degree required by the three models.
Throughout this section, we have provided a broad overview of the
role interest groups can play in the enhancement of a democratic state.
Neo-pluralism and participatory democracy in particular have offered

frameworks to analyse the democratic legitimacy of interest groups partic-
ipation in the different Western political systems. While neo-pluralism
acted till now as a framework to structure empirical research on normative
premises within a number of those democracies, participatory democ-
racy approaches have led to a large number of normative studies on
how interest groups can and must participate in decision-making to
increase the democratic nature of a system in which they partake. While
analysts use an increasingly critical tone when studying the involvement of
interest groups and civil society organizations in various governance struc-
tures (e.g. Fraussen and Halpin 2018), a large-scale comparative research
design is still missing which would allow for a comparison of those in the
CEE countries.
1.2 Why Study Interest Groups

in the Post-Communist Countries?
Our Exemplary Case Studies
Against the above background, the emergence of interest groups poli-
tics can be perceived as one of the decisive factors in the democratic
transformation of post-Communist societies. CEE countries and their
accelerated transition to a market economy provide a ‘fast-forward’ study
of advanced post-Communist societies that enables us to anticipate the
social structures and issues shaping interest groups politics in the new
democracies.
Although all the CEE communist countries have undergone demo-
cratic transformations, the region is characterized by a high degree of
political diversity, with considerable cross-national variations in the exis-
tence and pace of the transformation process. The theoretical explanations
of differences in the trajectory of democratization in those countries
is linked to a number of factors. Socio-economic developments across
the region (Huntington 1991; Lipset et al. 1993) it is argued explain
a growth in the scale and complexity of government and an accompa-
nying diffusion of political power. The diffusion of power brought in its
wake a more open and participatory political style conductive to associa-
tional activity. This perspective brings a sharper focus on the relationship
between the economy and democracy, locating the socio-economic foun-
dations of associational activity in patterns of social stratification generated
by market relations. Following this perspective, we would expect to find

correlation between pluralism and the more rapid market transition found
in Poland and the Czech Republic. Stunted economic transformation
in the Balkan countries, by contrast, can be expected to constrain the
pluralists’ developments. In comparison, Szablowski and Derlien (1993)
suggested that variation between post-Communist countries comes from
the different patterns of elite interactions that accompanied regime
change. They argued that the transition process left economic elites rela-
tively undisturbed and the associational order was likely to be marked
by the persistence of old structures and modes of behaviour. Where
regime change was done through negotiations between Communists and
counter-elites, as in Poland and Hungary, interest groups politics can be
expected to assume a dual character, with familiar patterns of association
persisting alongside emergent pluralist forms. When the democratiza-
tion process was a result of the collapse of old regime and involved a
radical elite turnover, as in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, we might
expect a cleaner break with the past. When we add to the combination
ethno-linguistic conflict, as in the Balkans, associational activity on socio-
economic lines is likely to be darkened by more fundamentalist forms of
mobilization.
While the analysis in this book is attentive to these differences, a
comprehensive and systemic cross-national comparison of interest groups
activity across the region is beyond its scope. Rather than a more general
comparative study of the diverse characteristics of group activity in all
post-Communist societies, this volume focuses on interest groups in three
example CEE countries: Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia, in a compara-
tive perspective to their West European counterparts. The comparison of
Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia is a good sample for the CEE countries
as it includes one Višegrad country, one ex-Yugoslavian country and one
Baltic state, giving the reader a solid snapshot of the region. Between the
selected countries, we can find similarities as well as differences.
All three countries have non-federal/centralized systems, albeit to a
different degree (Poland, for example, due to its size shows signs of signif-
icant decentralization). Some differences are also observable (beyond the
obvious difference of the size of the country). In Poland, the transition to
a capitalist economy and new liberal-democratic order was done through
economic shock therapy, in contrast to, for example, a much smoother
process in Slovenia (Maloney et al. 2018). In terms of the vibrancy of the
interest groups system, both Lithuania and Poland are quite dissimilar
to their West European peers with extremely low numbers of associa-

tional engagement. In Poland the associational engagement in voluntary
organizations did not reach 25% within the last decade, nor in a broader
understanding, recording only 34% at its heyday in 2013 (Adamiak 2013).
And in Lithuania civil society is judged to be weak and poorly empow-
ered (see for example: Freedom House 2018; Sustainable Governance
Indicators 2016). While Slovenia is neo-corporatist, Poland incorporates
a mixture of neo-corporatist traditions—through, for example, the socio-
economic councils—but tries to maintain a pluralist approach, through
public consultations. In contrast, Lithuania does not show much evidence
of neo-corporatism as it is more common in other European countries. In
2008, Hrebenar et al. concluded that the Lithuanian system could evolve
eventually into a modified form of ‘corporatism without labour’ as labour
is very weak in Lithuania, however for now it remains, at least in general
terms, a pluralist model with minor elements of the corporatist set up
(Hrebenar et al. 2008: 62).
The previous research on the three selected countries leaves us with a
number of clues but is also quite inconclusive. The edited compendiums
on lobbying and/or interest representation in Europe usually include
single chapters on instances of lobbying in Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia
(see for example: edited by Bitonti and Harris [2017] chapters on
Poland by Michałek, Spurga on Lithuania and Fink-Hafner on Slovenia).
However, Michałek himself concludes that studies on Polish lobbying,
and by proximity those within the CEE countries, are extremely lacking
and are rarely conducted in a comprehensive and comparative way
(Michałek 2017: 268). Fink-Hafner did pioneer work in the compara-
tive study of civil society and interest groups in countries of the Former
Yugoslavia such as an edited volume in 2015 and a special issue of the
Journal of Public Affairs edited with Thomas (Fink-Hafner and Thomas
2019). However, both publications limit their study only to the region of
ex-Yugoslavia. The second set of publications incorporates interest orga-
nizations into a larger discussion on civil society in the post-Communist
countries (see for example: Jacobsson and Korolczuk 2017). However,
the editors explicitly point to the fact that they look at political activism
outside of formal participation in policy processes, excluding insider
lobbying, which is the main focus of our work. The third set consists
of texts written in the national languages. While those are useful and
provide us with a solid base to work on, their common pitfall is a
lack of translation into English limiting their usefulness for compara-

tive study. There is also quite a variety between available publications
from the studied countries. In the case of Poland, two existing publica-
tions explicitly dealing with interest representation by Polish organizations
focus on: (1) the early evaluation of the effects of Poland’s accession to
the European Union in 2004 (Jasiecki 2011), which requires an update
(while published in 2011, as mentioned above, it explicitly dealt with
the immediate effects of the 2004 Polish accession to the EU), or (2)
prioritize the European context and concentrate on business organiza-
tions, rather than more broadly understood interest organizations (which
would include also NGOs, trade unions and professional associations;
Kurczewska 2016). In the case of Slovenia, the unparalleled sources of
information are texts by Fink-Hafner (Fink-Hafner 1998, 2011; Fink-
Hafner and Krasovec 2005). Worthy of notice is the fact that uniquely
the texts on Slovenia are also available in English. The majority of the
publications are, however, limited to journal articles and single country
case studies, leaving more elaborate and comparative analysis unattended.
The research on Lithuanian interest groups is fragmented, episodic and
mostly focused on case analyses. Meanwhile, the interest group system is
still not a popular research object per se and publications existing to date
are exclusively in the Lithuanian language.
1.3 Research, Methodology

and the Book’s Structure
The empirical base of the book is data collected within the Compara-
tive Interest Groups Survey Project (CIGs; https://www.cigsurvey.eu/),
expanded further by a comprehensive analysis of the existing literature and
qualitative interviews. While a lot of the analysis is rooted in secondary
sources, the core of the book is based on mapping and surveying exer-
cises conducted in Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia from 2016 to 2017 as
part of the CIGs. Up till the present date, the CIGs Project covered one
other post-Communist country (Montenegro), two post-authoritarian
ones (Spain, Italy) and three established democracies (Sweden, Belgium
and the Netherlands), with study in the Czech Republic ongoing.
Similar attempts, but to a much smaller degree, were attempted within

the INTEREURO Project4 (locating, among many others, Polish and
Slovenian interest groups active in the European level consultations
between 2008 and 2010) and EUROLOB II5 (investigating, among
others, Polish business associations’ activities in policy-making between
2010 and 2016). Poland was one of the main case studies in the
EUROLOB II but focus there was explicitly only on business groups thus
studying only one type of group within the whole population. Slovenia
was one of the comparative case studies in the INTEREURO, but there
the focus was only on groups’ engagement within EU policy-making,
leaving all the national activities unexplored. Our results are informed
by these attempts but go far beyond their initial exploration.
The CIGs project followed a joined uniform definition of interest
group. We defined them as: organized groups which have some sort of
constituency either in the form of supporters or members and which
represent the interests of their members and supporters or the interests
of others who cannot represent themselves, such as children, animals, and
the environment. These groups are either politically active or their polit-
ical activity is dormant (they have an interest in being active and a capacity
to act, but most of the time their activity is not political; when they
encounter a new political issue of interest, they may become politically
active). This definition of interest groups includes trade unions, societies
and religious groups. We excluded law firms, consultancy firms, and all
types of private companies. We only took into consideration national level
groups and excluded those from the regional and local levels.
The first step in our approach has been an extensive mapping exer-
cise of all national level interest organizations (for details see Chapter 2).
Priory to mapping, we had asked the question of whether the system
of interest groups is capable of ensuring the representation of a variety
of public and private interests. Addressing this conundrum required data
that maps the essential traits of the population of organized interests—
its density and diversity in a given country. Thus, we focused on the
previously unexplored system-level approach that delivered important
insights into the nature of the Lithuanian, Polish and Slovenian interest
4 http://www.intereuro.eu/public/.
5 http://www.mzes.uni-mannheim.de/d7/en/projects/eurolob-ii-europeanization-of-
interest-intermediation.
group systems, as well as providing a framework for subsequent work

conceptualizing advocacy activities or lobbying dynamics in specific policy
domains.
In the second step, we surveyed a sample of groups focusing on a
number of issues related to interest group activity. The translated versions
of the same questionnaire have been circulated to all surveyed groups
(Beyers et al. 2016; preceded by official invite letter and followed by email
with the link leading to the online survey). The invitation was sent to 905
organizations in Lithuania, 1369 in Poland and 1203 in Slovenia. The
response rate differed per country, with 41% in Lithuania, 28% in Poland
and 36% in Slovenia.
In the survey, we asked various sets of questions. Those sets informed
further qualitative research and evidenced comparative trends we iden-
tified in the existing research on West European interest organizations.
A major focus in the survey was on the participation of interest groups
in the policy-making process. We explore those in Chapter 3, where we
further ask about the provisions within political systems in the CEE coun-
tries that stimulate interest groups’ engagement in them. We pay attention
here to both attitudes seen at the micro-level of individual participation
in interest groups, but also macro-level patterns of political competition,
where structural political factors affect organized interest groups. The
survey also looked into groups’ interactions with specific stakeholders.
Chapter 4 analyses factors informing the relations between interest
organizations and political parties in Lithuania, Poland, and Slovenia.
The fundamental question there is whether these young democracies,
using Western democracies as established benchmarks, have been able
to develop complex linkages involving parties and interest organizations.
Chapter 5 explores the organizational development of nongovernmental
organizations and their organizational capacity to interact with various
stakeholders. Chapter 6 focuses on trade unions’ activities. We point
there to the fact that unions in the studied CEE countries did not build
stable and long-term relationships with political parties as are observed
in the Western democracies. We further explored groups’ strategies and
lobbying activities. Chapter 7 analyses the differences in strategies for
inside lobbying (i.e. direct interactions with policy-makers or participation
in policy consultations) between business and non-business organizations
in studied countries in a comparative perspective. The results indicate
that lobbying is concentrated on the government and national ministries,
interestingly omitting the interactions with directly elected representa-

tives. Chapter 8 looks into different forms of engagement in the European
policy process, both at the European and national levels, analysing the
existing institutional framework for consultations in the European policy
process.
We summarize the results of research conducted for this book in
Chapter 9. We revisit there the three themes that flow throughout the
book, the effects of legal, social and political contexts on interest orga-
nizations’ population and activities in the CEE countries. Coming back
to our theoretical framework, we view those effects through a prism of
internal and external factors that explain the trajectories of regime and
system change.
The book is an important contribution to debates on the performance
of new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, where scholars argue
that there is a ‘democratic crisis’ and democratic fatigue. By focusing
on associational vibrancy, we look into the possibility of CEE organiza-
tions bridging the ‘democratic deficit’ by bringing citizens closer to their
policy-makers. This volume offers a much-needed comprehensive look
into formal interest representation in the CEE countries, contrasting the
model of Western democracies. Although great efforts have been made
to deepen our understanding of interest organizations and lobbying tools,
the current literature fails to provide a comprehensive answer on the influ-
ence of and importance of a supportive environment within a population
ecology. The book picks up on the tension between a ‘liberal’ and ‘plural-
ist’ idea of democracy in which interest groups can thrive and, in contrast,
also a more ‘plebiscitarian’ and ‘populist’ idea of democracy, which sees
interest groups as enemies of the people. The book is addressed to both
scholars of comparative politics, interest groups and civil society organi-
zations, experts working for interest groups, as well as those who wish to
explore the realities of post-Communist democracy in more detail.
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CHAPTER 2
Interest Organizations in Central and Eastern

Europe: Evaluating Population Ecology
A cornerstone of any democratic society is the capacity for its citizens to

have a political voice, so that citizens ‘can express their views, preferences,
and interests towards political institutions and hold public officials to
account’ (Fraussen and Halpin 2016: 476). Although political represen-
tation is achieved through voting for or joining and supporting political
parties, elections are irregular occurrences (every 4 years in Lithuania,
Poland and Slovenia) and scholars question the participatory character
of parties (e.g. Marsh 2006). The well-documented debate regarding
the transformation of party political systems in Western Democracies
(expressed through, for example, electoral volatility and the fragmenta-
tion of party landscapes) and dissatisfaction with the representative system
of government, has pushed scholars to explore the role of interest groups
as mechanisms of political expression (e.g. Fraussen and Halpin 2016; but
also: Klüver 2015; van Biezen and Poguntke 2014).
Against this background, a crucial inquiry is the potential of the
interest group system to address these democratic challenges and whether
it can ensure the representation of a variety of public and private inter-
ests. The composition of the group system—its density and diversity—is
an important way to judge such questions. The study of the essen-
tial traits of populations of organized interests has grown steadily since
1995 (Gray and Lowery 2000; Berkhout et al. 2015). Inspired by core
theories of population biology and organization ecology, the research
© The Author(s) 2021 25

P. Rozbicka et al., Achieving Democracy Through Interest Representation,
Interest Groups, Advocacy and Democracy Series,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-55521-4_2
within this area has been applied to a wide range of political systems.
The largest concentration of studies focused on analysis of the United
States (see for example: Nownes 2015; Walker and McCarthy 2010;
Brulle et al. 2007; Nownes 2004), Western European countries (e.g.
Van Waarden 1992, in the Netherlands; Naurin and Boräng 2012, in
Sweden; Mohan 2012, in England; Klüver 2015, in Germany; Fisker
2013, and Christiansen 2012, in Denmark) and in the EU (see for
example: Berkhout 2015; Berkhout and Lowery 2010; Coen and Katsaitis
2013). The notable publications on the composition of organized interest
‘systems’ in the post-Communist democracies include: Slovenia (Fink-
Hafner 1998, 2011; Maloney et al. 2018), Lithuania (Hrebenar et al.
2008), Czech Republic (Císař and Vráblíková 2010, 2012; Císař 2013),
and the Western Balkan countries (Cekik 2017). While these countries
have established democratic elections, modern judicial systems and insti-
tutions of representative government, most of the literature agrees that
successful democratization requires the construction of a civil society
provided with functional channels of interest representation (see espe-
cially: Hrebenar et al. 2008). Studies of interest organizations in the
post-Communist countries are still a rarity and they are primarily based
on normative assessment and lack an empirical base (Dobbins and Riedel
2018).
The lack of study of groups’ populations from Central and Eastern
Europe is surprising as it would provide a unique opportunity to observe
a new environment—created by the extended focus events: the collapse
of Communism and transition to democracy. Distinctively, those realities
introduced a set of internal and external factors, which have characteris-
tics that influence the formation and maintenance of groups’ populations
(Crawford and Lijphart 1995). Fink-Hafner (2011) contended that, in
particular, an institutional choice in the transition to democracy (internal
factor) was not only about relations between the democratic opposition
and the old regime, but it also formed idiosyncratic opportunity struc-
tures which influenced the early processes of interest group formation
(in particular, the socio-economic partnerships). In the case of external
factors, the key aspect was the process of Europeanization (Berlung
2003; Maloney et al. 2018). Due to external pressure countries from
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) implemented reforms to meet various
economic and democratic criteria, including the Copenhagen Criteria to
join the European Union (EU), as well as the liberalization process along
the lines of the Washington Consensus, to have access to the World Bank
2 INTEREST ORGANIZATIONS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE … 27
and IMF credit lines (Bohle and Greskovits 2007). The implementa-
tion of these was viewed by outside observers as symptoms of emerging
democracies and moves towards the creation of a functional and represen-
tative civil society. Yet, studies dealing with population ecology in those
countries are still a rarity, despite the fact that they present a unique case
that could explain drivers behind a population’s growth and downfall due
to internal and external factors. To strengthen the argument here, while
we are talking about events that took place over 30 years ago, authors
agree that changes within population ecology are slow and it takes major
focus events to alter them (Gray and Lowery 2000). The events altering
the population do not have to be of an explosive nature, rather, similar to
the change itself, they can take place over an extended time period.
The challenge is how we can build on these research foundations in
such a way as to say something more concrete about the size (density) and
composition (diversity) of the aggregate systems. First, we report on the
construction and content of the interest groups’ datasets for Lithuania,
Poland and Slovenia that capture the density and diversity of the group
systems. This will enable a better sense of their scale and composition.
We use this data to answer some fundamental questions such as how
big are the systems and what are the balances between different types
of interests. These questions relate to major topics within interest groups
research, namely representation and bias. Without system-level data, these
topics cannot be fully explored. The second objective is to offer a basis for
further research on the interest groups populations in our three studied
countries. Our aims, while we engage in a pioneering systemic study, are
to report a small number of facts about a large number of groups.
The chapter starts from a look at Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia
through a prism of their historical legacies and changes triggered by the
liberalization of their economies. We explore here, after Crawford and
Liphart (1995), factors that influenced the development of and changes
within population ecology establishing a firm ground from which to move
to the analysis of the current populations. We continue with informa-
tion on data collection and an evaluation of available sources from which
we obtained the material to reconstruct interest groups’ populations.
Related work in other countries participating in the Comparative Interest
Groups Survey Project (CIGs)1 that our three cases were part of, mostly
1 http://www.cigsurvey.eu.
utilized lobby data or information available on stakeholders participating

in national consultations, or relies on data from formal associational regis-
ters. As no equivalent, ready-made dataset concerning advocacy activity
existed for all three cases, we utilized a number of resources and contrast
them with sources available in other countries to provide a reliability
check. As will become evident, we argue that different sources have to
be cross-checked and require an intervention. We outline the modifi-
cations, coding decisions and conceptual distinctions required to make
those sources work for the larger research community within the CIGs
Project. After clarifying how we used sources to provide an estimate of
the interest populations for the three countries, we provide an analysis of
the size, composition and diversity of their interest group systems. More
specifically, we consider the balance between different organizational types
(including resource levels) and the age dimension of the interest group
system. We also look into the size of the population from a comparative
perspective and areas of the groups’ activity. In the conclusion, we high-
light our main findings and suggest some promising avenues for future
research.
2.1 Explaining the Density

and Diversity of Interest Group Systems
After Crawford and Liphart (1995), we argue in the Introduction to this
book, that to fully understand the current ‘realities’ of post-Communist
countries, the legacy of the countries’ past (transformation to democracy)
and essentials of liberalization (transformation to a capitalist economy
and accession to the EU) have to be taken into consideration. In no
country could upheavals equivalent to those that occurred to the formerly
Communist states of Europe fail to leave a lasting impact on different
aspects of its society and this is certainly true in the cases of Lithuania,
Poland and Slovenia and the emergence and modification of their interest
groups populations. Their experiences however have not been universal
and we must analyse each in turn to understand how the dynamics played
out and draw common threads from them, turning first to the case of
Lithuania.
2 INTEREST ORGANIZATIONS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE … 29
2.1.1 The Lithuanian Interest Group System and Punctuated Past

In Lithuania, civil society and the associational organizations that form its
structure have evolved in several stages. The modern system of Lithua-
nian interest groups essentially consists of three types of organizations:
the restored organizations that were operating in the interwar period,
organizations that were founded in the Soviet era and de-nationalized
at the dawn of independence and modern interest groups, formed during
liberal democracy. The origins of the system of Lithuanian interest groups
lie in interwar Lithuania (1918–1940), when the first civil society orga-
nizations were founded. At that time various student fraternities, creative
societies and unions appeared and operated. At the same time, some of
the largest and most important civil organizations, such as the Lithuanian
Riflemen Union, the Lithuanian Catholic Federation ‘Ateitis’ and others,
were founded. After the Second World War, the Soviet regime essentially
exterminated civil society, completely taking control of the space between
society and the individual (Auers 2015: 121).
Nonetheless, as Krupavičius (1999) observes, it is not that there were
no interest groups in Lithuania during this period: various professional
associations, creative societies and trade unions functioned as pseudo or
even semi-interest groups during the communist period. However, these
organizations, although similar to interest groups in their structure, did
not have autonomy and were largely controlled by the state apparatus.
On the other hand, during transition from the Communist regime to
liberal authoritarianism some semi-interest organizations gradually gained
wider autonomy and new organizations. Those groups in particular had
a better link with the new social movements that highlighted issues in
European civil society at that time: various environmental organizations,
human rights and equal opportunities groups.
After the restoration of Lithuanian independence, significant progress
was made during the first decade in creating representative government
institutions, a multi-party system as well as civil rights and freedoms
aiming at the consolidation of a pluralistic political culture (Hrebenar
et al. 2008: 52). However, the process was rather monopolized by the
emergence of newly formed political parties, leaving interest groups on
the periphery of the political process. During the early years of indepen-
dence, Lithuanian interest groups were at the stage of interest formation
and in search of an identity (Krupavičius 1999), while the relationship
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From a Sketch by Major Denham. Engraved by E. Finden.
ABDEL GASSAM. A BORNOUESE.
A FELLATAH FROM
ON A JOURNEY.
TIMBOCTOO.
Published Feb. 1826, by John Murray, London.
We made a long march to Dummasak, when we halted until the

afternoon of the next day. The army here dispersed, and the
Shouaas and Kanemboo went off to their respective homes.
By daylight we began to move. The sheikh sent for us to ride near
him, and, accompanied by nearly all the people who had remained
behind, and who came out thus far to welcome the successful return
of their prince, we arrived once more at the capital, amidst the
shouts of the men, and the shrieks of the women, to take possession
of our old habitations.
The kafila which came from Soudan during this expedition brought
a young fighi from Timboctoo, the son of a Felatah chief of D’jennie,
named Abdel Gassam ben Maleky. He was on his way to Hage, and
had left Timboctoo, as is the custom, without any thing beyond the
shirt on his back, the rags of which he exchanged on the road for a
sheep’s skin, subsisting entirely on charity. He was a very fine and
intelligent lad, of about sixteen, of a deep copper colour, but with
features extremely handsome and expressive. He was five months
from D’jennie, and greatly exhausted by fatigue and the want of
nourishing food: his whole wardrobe was his sheep’s skin; and
although the sheikh gave him a tobe, he said he almost thought it a
sin to indulge in the luxury of putting it on. We were on the expedition
to Munga when he arrived, and about the time of our evening meal,
Abdel Gassam generally made his appearance at our tents: bad as
the fare was, he found it preferable to the cold mess of flour and
water he got elsewhere. He knew little or nothing of the road by
which he had come to Kano, not even the names of the places he
had halted at. Abdel Gassam said he could scarcely believe such
good people as we were could be any thing but Moslem: but he had
heard of Christians before; and when I asked how, and where, he
gave the following account:—
“Many years ago, before I was born, white men, Christians, came
from Sego to D’jennie, in a large boat, as big as two of our boats.
The natives went out to them in their canoes; they would not have
done them any harm, but the Christians were afraid, and fired at
them with guns, and killed several in the canoes that went near their
boat: they proceeded to Timboctoo, and there the sultan sent to
them one of his chiefs, and they held a parley. The Christians
complained that the people wanted to rob them. The sultan was kind
to them, and gave them supplies. Notwithstanding this, they went off
suddenly in the night, which vexed the sultan, as he would have sent
people with them, if they had not been afraid of them a little: and he
now sent boats after them, to warn them of their danger, as there
were many rocks in the belly of the river, all pointed. However the
Christians went on, and would not suffer the sultan’s people to come
near them, and they all perished.” My informant never heard that any
thing belonging to them was saved, but remembers himself seeing a
man often with his father, who was in one of the canoes that followed
them, and who had seen them strike against the rocks—indeed he
brought the news to Timboctoo. Their appearance excited a great
sensation amongst the people;—had frequently heard people talk
about the Christians, and the large boat, for a whole day, at his
father’s;—to this day they talk about them. They had guns fixed to
the sides of the boat, a thing never seen before at Timboctoo, and
they alarmed the people greatly.
Abdel Gassam was a sort of prodigy, and could repeat the Koran
from the beginning to the end. I repeatedly asked him what they
would do to us, if we were to go to Timboctoo? “Why,” answered he,
“do by you as you now do by me, feed you. The sultan is a great
man, with a large heart, and is kind to strangers. Many whites, but
not like those in the great boat, come to D’jennie, and also the
servants of these people, who he thinks were Christians, but they do
not go to Timboctoo: they come from the great water; and the
Felatahs at D’jennie, by their means, supply Timboctoo with cloth
and silk, yellow and red, and guns, which are much sought after.
Does not know what these white people take back, but always
heard, slaves and gold dust. The sultan of Timboctoo is a very great
man, never goes out to ghrazzie; but his slaves go, and bring back
many slaves, mostly females, from the Kerdy countries, by which he
is surrounded. At D’jennie and Melli, which are both subject to
Timboctoo, the population is mostly Felatah. The whole road to
Timboctoo is inhabited by Moslems; but to the north and south of the
route are Kerdies, who sometimes attack kafilas; but they are very
much afraid of Bello, who protects merchants. Kashna, Kano,
Houssa,—one language; Timboctoo, D’jennie,—one language; but
they also speak Felatah. At Sego the population is Negro, Kerdy,
Kaffir. All communication between Sego, D’jennie, and Timboctoo, is
by water: the river is very large, and called Qualla; and Kabra is the
place where every thing going from, or coming to, Timboctoo, is
embarked or disembarked. Kabra is five hours distant only from
Timboctoo: always understood that this great river, which has many
names and branches, went from Nyffé south, between high
mountains. The river at Kano is not the same; indeed, believes it is
only a lake, and no river.”
This information, as far as it goes, may, I conceive, be relied on.
Unlike nearly all the Moorish traders, who are often tutored by
others, who have been rewarded for describing probably what even
they never saw, and come prepared to say any thing that will best
please you, this lad undoubtedly had never been questioned by any
one previous to his answering my inquiries: he knew but little Arabic,
and had scarcely been noticed in his long journeys, during which he
had been handed over from one kafila to another.
He left Kouka in the month of August, in company with an old
fighi, for Waday, with a small leather bag of parched corn, and a
bottle for his water. I gave him a dollar to pay for his passage across
the Red Sea, which he sewed up in his sheep’s skin: I however
heard afterwards, that he had been drowned in crossing one of the
branches of the Tchad. My informant was a Waday Shouaa: but if
they found out that he had the dollar, he was most likely murdered
for the sake of such a booty.
FOOTNOTES:
[28]Gaadeen, kafir.
[29]The feudal law exists here in full force; and a man unwilling
to serve, provides one or more substitutes according to his
means.
[30]Birnie means Medina, the capital, in the Bornou language.
[31]From these ruins the sheikh procures the greater part of
the nitre used in preparing his gunpowder.
[32]There are two species of the bamboo, one called Kayay,
and the other Gummary.
[33]This fighi was a most extraordinary person, and his fame
for knowledge and charm-writing was by some thought to exceed
that of the sheikh himself, of whom he was jealous to a degree.
He had passed years amongst the Kerdies to the south, and
knew
“· · · · · · · · · · · · ·The dreadful art

To taint with deadly drugs the barbed dart.”
He was now, however, about to be humbled.

CHAPTER V.
RAINY SEASON AT KOUKA.
The sheikh gave us an interview in his garden this afternoon: the

lemon and fig trees exhibited some fruit, the appearance of which
was gratifying. Knowing we had news from England, he asked
several questions about the Morea, where the Greeks and Turks had
been fighting. He had read some account of the former splendour of
that country, and he was pleased with some of the corroborations we
gave him of their truth. He again started the subject of the shape of
the globe, and wished to be acquainted with the method in which its
shape had been ascertained: some of his books, he said, made it
square. A phosphorus box, which had been brought him from Tripoli,
and of which he knew not the use, was now produced, and on the
match coming out lighted, himself and all the spectators were
delighted beyond measure. I was this morning going on a hunting
excursion to the Tchad with some Shouaas of Beni Hassan, but as it
was Sunday I postponed my sport: they however went, and brought
back a very young elephant, not more than two feet and a half high,
and yet so powerful, that three men were obliged to hold him for the
purpose of pouring a little milk down his throat. Achmet-ben-
Sheneen, an Arab of Augela, a wretched sufferer, came constantly to
the Doctor for medicine; and on seeing him we could not refrain from
blessing God’s providence in our misery, for sparing us from such
afflictions as had fallen upon him. Nearly two years before, in an
action with La Sala Shouaas, whom the sheikh conquered, this poor
fellow had received three dreadful wounds; one in the head, which
had left a deep scar; another in the arm, which, as the spear was
poisoned, had never healed, but was still an open wound, extending
several inches from the elbow downwards; and in the third, the spear
had gone in at his mouth as he lay on the ground, and carrying away
part of the jaw and teeth, had penetrated quite through his cheek. A
short time after his return from the expedition, he was seized with
what the Doctor called the Greek leprosy, covering great part of his
body with a foul black eruption, and from which he was now
suffering, accompanied by an irritation almost insupportable.
Doctor Oudney and Hillman were now both too ill to join us at
meal times; the heat of the day, and dampness of the evenings,
affected us all greatly. I used, notwithstanding, to go out in the
morning and shoot a couple of ducks or a goose, which helped us
out at dinner, although they were dreadfully tough and fishy. The
country was now assuming a more interesting appearance from the
crops of gussub that had sprung up all round Kouka, on which the
slaves of all the inhabitants had been busily employed during the last
month, as they sow at the commencement of the rainy season.
In a country where so little is cultivated, there is always an
abundant choice of land; and a planter takes possession of any spot
that has not been occupied the preceding year, and it then becomes
exclusively his property. In two months from the time of sowing they
gather the harvest, and this is the only labour of the year.
We had a curious trial this morning before the sheikh, the result of
which furnishes a singular proof of his simplicity and submission to
the word of the Prophet. The circumstances were these: a Shouaa
had stabbed a man the night before, upon some disagreement, and
death was the consequence. The brother of the defunct demanded
blood, and on application to the kadi, it came out in evidence that the
Shouaa had desired the deceased to quit his door, three several
times, if he had any faith in the Prophet; but he still continued to
resist, and aggravate him, till at last he stabbed him in six places.
The kadi’s decision was, that upon so solemn a caution, the
unfortunate man should have retired;—that his not doing so was a
proof he had no faith in the Prophet; was a Kafir, and was the cause
of his own death, and therefore that the murderer should not suffer
punishment. The accuser, however, appealed to the sheikh, who told
him, that, certainly, by God’s law, communicated to the Prophet, and
written in the g’tab (the book), an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth,
and life for life, should be given—but recommended his taking a fine
instead of blood. The sturdy Arab, however, was unmoved, and
called loudly for justice; and the sheikh then said, he had the law in
his own hands, and he might do as he pleased. The prisoner was
then taken outside of the walls, and the brother of the deceased beat
his brains out with an iron-headed club, which the Shouaas
sometimes carry. This was considered a very extraordinary
occurrence in Bornou.
I continued to work at the Arabic and Bornou languages; and,
besides this, I usually visited Barca Gana two or three times a week,
and sometimes he came to me, so that my time rarely hung heavy
on my hands; but he always came mounted, and with so many
attendants, that my little hut was put in disorder for the whole day
after. I believe he entered no person’s habitation in the town but my
own, except the sheikh’s. No great man here ever visits his inferior,
or moves from his own house to the sheikh’s, without a retinue
agreeable to his rank; and the kashella, on remonstrating with me for
coming through the streets alone, was surprised when I told him that
even our king did the same; and, often habited like his subjects, rode
attended only by a single servant. Convinced as he was before of his
importance, this astonished him greatly. “Why,” said he, “were the
sheikh to do so, nobody would respect him:”—and replied I, “in
England the oftener the king does this the more he is both loved and
respected.”
Two decisions of the sheikh lately had created a considerable
emotion amongst the people. The slave of one man had been caught
with the wife of another, a free man, and the injured husband
demanded justice. The sheikh condemned both the man and the
woman to be hanged side by side: the owner of the slave, however,
remonstrated, and said that the decision, as far as respected the
woman, was just; for she was always endeavouring to seduce his
slave from his work, and that if he (the sheikh) condemned his slave
to death, the man, whose wife was the cause of it, ought to give him
the value of his slave, as he was poor: this the husband objected to.
“Ah!” exclaimed the sheikh, “how often is a man driven to his
destruction by woman; yet of all his happiness, she is the root, or the
branch.” He himself paid the value of the slave to the owner, and the
next morning the guilty pair were suspended outside the walls.
August 8.—Last night a man brought a large bird, called oubara, a
smaller species of which the bashaw’s sons hunt daily, in the
neighbourhood of Tripoli, with their hawks: this was exceedingly
large, weighing as much as twelve pounds; and we gave him about
two shillings for his present, in coarse cloth (gubbuk); and before
breakfast this morning, he brought another still larger; but finding we
had spoiled the market, for this I only gave him half as much. These
birds are peculiar for the brilliancy of their large eyes, which exceeds
that of the gazelle[34], and the flesh very much resembles our
pheasants in flavour.
In these southern climes, all matters of business, as well as
pleasure, are transacted before the generality of people in England
have well finished their night’s rest, and this morning I rode out by
daylight to see the ceremony of a Bornou wedding. The lady was
from Angornou; and the bridegroom’s friends, to the number of
twenty or thirty, all mounted and in their best clothes, went to give
her welcome: she was mounted on a bullock, whose back was
covered with blue and white turkadees, and followed by four female
slaves, laden with straw baskets, wooden bowls, and earthen pots;
while two other bullocks carried the rest of the dowry, which
consisted of a certain number of turkadees and tobes. She was
attended by her mother, and five or six young ladies, who acted as
bride’s maids. We galloped up to them repeatedly, which is the mode
of salutation. The women cover their faces, and scream their thanks;
the men, however, wheel their horses quickly, and return with their
eyes cast to the ground, it being considered as extremely indelicate
for them to look upon the bride. The lady, after this, proceeds to the
bridegroom’s house with her mother, and there remains shut up until
the evening, when she is handed over to her justly impatient lord: for
the whole day he is obliged to parade the streets with a crowd after
him, or sit on a raised seat, à la sultan, in his house, dressed in all
the finery he can either borrow or buy; while the people crowd in
upon him, blowing horns, beating drums, and crying “Engouboron
degah! Alla Kabunsho! Alla Kiara!” “May you live for ever! God
prosper you! Grey hairs to you!” to all which he makes no answer;
but looks more foolish than one could suppose it possible for any
man in so enviable a situation as that of a bridegroom to do.
August 11.—The sheikh sent this morning to say, that, as we
mentioned yesterday the state of our funds, any money that we
stood in need of he would immediately furnish us with—that while we
were under his protection, we should want for nothing: we, however,
said with every feeling of gratitude, that, as we were not quite
pennyless, we would wait a few days, until all the people arrived
from Soudan.
It is quite impossible to describe the value of his kindness to us on
all occasions; and this last proof of his liberality to poor wanderers,
whose country he scarcely knew the name of before our arrival,
surpassed all we could have expected. Knowing us through the
medium of the bashaw of Tripoli only, his disinterested conduct could
have been alone the dictation of a generous confidence; and his own
penetration and sagacity had long since convinced him of the perfect
innocence of our intentions in visiting his country, notwithstanding
the injurious reports to the contrary, which had been communicated
to his subjects, through the ill will or ignorance of some of the
Fezzan merchants: he had sent me apparel from his own house on
hearing the news of my forlorn state, after escaping out of the hands
of the Felatahs, and had astonished the people about him by his
exclamations of sorrow on the first report reaching him of my death.
Kaffir as they thought me, he mentioned my escape in his letter to
Barca Gana—which met us on our return—as a proof of the
protection of God’s providence, in a manner which made a visible
alteration in the conduct, not only of the chief, but of the whole army,
towards me; and every part of his conduct tended to convince us,
that his protection and confidence proceeded more from the opinions
he had formed of the grandeur and generosity of the English nation
(and, we were willing to flatter ourselves, from his approbation of our
conduct), than from any hope of repayment or remuneration from his
ally the bashaw.
The constant sickness of Doctor Oudney, who, nearly ever since
our return from Munga, had been confined to his hut;—Hillman’s
frequent attacks of ague and delirium, and the uncertainty as to the
manner in which any supplies were to be obtained, to enable us
either to proceed or return, tended but little to keep up our spirits;—
my eyes had for some months been too weak to allow of my reading
in the evening, or, indeed, of bearing the light in the hut for any
length of time together; and we separated, from a mutual
repugnance to conversation, from the dreariness of our prospects,
almost immediately after our evening meal.
We had frequent and violent showers of rain, with thunder, and
most vivid lightning; the waters covered the face of the country in
extensive lakes, and our excursions in search of game were now
confined to the immediate neighbourhood of our residence. The
gussub had increased in height greatly; and, at this season of the
year, there are other reasons besides the falls of rain which induce
people to remain in their habitations—when the great lake overflows
the immense district which, in the dry season, affords cover and food
by its coarse grass and jungle to the numerous savage animals with
which Bornou abounds, they are driven from these wilds, and take
refuge in the standing corn, and sometimes in the immediate
neighbourhood of the towns. Elephants had already been seen at
Dowergoo, scarcely six miles from Kouka; and a female slave, while
she was returning home from weeding the corn to Kowa, not more
than ten miles distant, had been carried off by a lioness: the hyænas,
which are every where in legions, grew now so extremely ravenous,
that a good large village, where I sometimes procured a draught of
sour milk on my duck-shooting excursions, had been attacked the
night before my last visit, the town absolutely carried by storm,
notwithstanding defences nearly six feet high of branches of the
prickly tulloh, and two donkies, whose flesh these animals are
particularly fond of, carried off in spite of the efforts of the people. We
constantly heard them close to the walls of our own town at nights,
and on a gate being left partly open, they would enter, and carry off
any unfortunate animal that they could find in the streets.
There are a particular class of female slaves here, to whom the
duty of watching and labouring in the fields of grain is always
allotted. I have before said, that all laborious work is performed by
that sex we consider as the weakest, and whom we employ in the
more domestic duties only—and it is to them this perilous work is
assigned. The female slaves from Musgow, a description of whom I
have somewhere else given, are never bought by the Tripoli or
Fezzan traders: their features, naturally large and ugly, are so much
disfigured by the silver stud which they wear in the under lip, that no
purchaser would be found for them; besides the loss of the two front
teeth, which are punched out to make way for the silver which goes
quite through into their mouths, the weight of the metal, after a year
or two, drags the lip down so as to make it quite lie on the chin, and
gives a really frightful appearance to the face: these poor creatures,
therefore, who are generally of a strong make, and patient under
their sufferings, guard the crops, and collect the harvest, and a year
seldom passes without several of them being snatched away by the
lions, who, crouching under cover of the ripening corn, spring on
their prey and bear it off.
August 18.—The twelfth day of the new moon, which was the 17th
of the month, was a day of general feasting and rejoicing. Garments,
according to the estimation in which the giver holds the receiver, are
distributed by all great people to their followers: the sheikh gave
away upwards of a thousand tobes, and as many bullocks and
sheep. It is the custom, on the morning of the Aid-Kebir[35], for the
sovereign with his suite to mount, and, after praying at a certain
distance from the town, to return to it with all his people skirmishing
before him. The sheikh had been suffering from an attack of the
ague, and, therefore, this ceremony did not take place; the people,
however, drew bad omens from the circumstance, and said, that the
sheikh not having mounted and prayed with his people was not right.
On the day after, the sheikh sent us word that Hadgi Ali Boo-
Khaloom was on his way from Kano, and within two or three days of
Kouka: this was the most gratifying intelligence that could have
reached us, as our funds were all but exhausted, and we lived
entirely on the provisions furnished us by the sheikh, with the
exception of a little milk and a few fowls, which we purchased. On
the 21st he arrived, and very much altered in appearance for the
worse, as well as most of the people who had accompanied him; the
Fezzaneers had all suffered exceedingly from the ague and fever,
which disorders had carried off a greater number of the Fezzan and
Tripoli merchants than any preceding year. The sheikh appeared
pleased at Hadgi Ali’s return, said he hoped all would be now soon
arranged, and that the courier from Tripoli would not long delay
making his appearance; he had calculated upon his returning by the
Aid-Kebir, and his non-arrival gave him uneasiness on many
accounts. Private information, it was said, had by several channels
reached the sheikh, that the bashaw had it in contemplation to send
an expedition for the purpose of taking possession of Bornou, under
the joint command of Mukni the late, and Mustapha the present,
sultan of Fezzan: this intelligence was also accompanied by an
assurance, that while the English remained he was safe. Scarcely
any line of policy could be more injurious to the interests of the
bashaw of Tripoli, or his subjects, than a measure of this nature. He
obtained slaves almost exclusively through the medium of the
sheikh’s territory, which, since he had held the reins of government,
was sufficiently safe for travellers, to induce merchants with large
capitals for this country to proceed by way of Bornou to Soudan. The
numbers of kafilas between that country and Fezzan had, within the
last five years, greatly exceeded any former period; and in an equal
proportion did the respectability of those traders who now
accompanied them exceed that of the merchants previously in the
habit of passing through Bornou. By an intercourse with these
travellers, a great variety of merchandise was brought into the
interior—the ideas of the natives became enlarged, and,
consequently, their desires increased. Trade was, in fact, but just
beginning to be prosecuted with vigour by the inhabitants of eastern
Soudan. European goods of all descriptions, used by the
Soudanees, were becoming every day in greater request, and the
whole of their country might, by the bashaw’s constantly keeping up
an amicable understanding with the sheikh, have been supplied
exclusively by the Tripoli merchants.
With a knowledge of these facts, it was almost impossible to
believe that the reports of the bashaw of Tripoli’s intended expedition
could have any real foundation; yet the report, credited as it was by
the majority of the Bornou people, was of itself sufficient to excite in
us excessive alarm, both for our own safety, as well as for the
success of our mission. The sheikh caused it to be understood, both
here and at Angornou, that the kafila, about to leave Kouka for
Fezzan, would be the last in the present state of affairs; at the same
time, he relaxed nothing of his personal kindness and attention to us.
The violent rains and stormy nights continued, as did our sickness
and loss of appetite. Hillman and myself were suffering constantly
from a prickly heat upon the skin, which was almost insufferable
during the day, and prevented our sleeping at night. All the
quadrupeds, as well as bipeds, transplanted from the countries
bordering upon the great ocean, appeared to suffer alike. Within the
last ten days, three of our camels, Doctor Oudney’s mule and his
horse, the last of our Tripoli animals but one, had died, and the
remaining three camels, out of the nineteen we brought here, were
turned into the inclosure to take their chance, while the man was
discharged who had hitherto been paid for taking care of them.
August 27.—These things were cheerless and discouraging
indeed. We had still excessive rains; and notwithstanding the great
power of the sun for some hours in the middle of the day, so damp
was the air, that for several days together my blankets were never
dry, the rain always coming through the roof of the cousie (hut) at
night.
I had been for some time waiting for a favourable day to
accompany two or three Shouaas of Tirab to the Tchad, in search of
buffalos: they went several times, and usually killed one, although I
never could persuade them to bring me the head: some of the meat,
and a piece of the skin, was all they would load their horses with for
so many miles. Their manner of killing these animals is curious, and
rather perilous—they chase them in the swamps, where they now
feed, in preference to nearer the lake, and as their horses are trained
so as to go quite close to them as they run, the rider is enabled to
get his foot well fixed on the buffalo’s back: with singular skill, he
then strikes, just behind the animal’s shoulder, one or two spears, if
he can place them; pierced with these, the animal is able to run but a
short distance, then, with the assistance of his companion, but
frequently alone, he dismounts and despatches his prey: it
sometimes happens, that the buffalo, by quickly turning his head
before they strike, oversets both horse and rider. A Shouaa friend of
mine had his horse completely ripped open, and killed on the spot,
only a few days since, by the sudden twist which the animal gave his
head, catching the horse with his pointed horn. Yesterday I was
again disappointed, from the badness of the weather: three Shouaas
went, and narrowly escaped being caught by the Biddomahs—as
two hundred boats made their appearance at different places on the
banks of the Tchad, carrying from ten to fifteen men each, and the
sportsmen were very nearly caught by the crews of two that came
near the town of Koua. News came in this morning that they had
carried off upwards of thirty persons from the neighbourhood of
Woodie, and amongst them the nephew of the sheikh-el-Blad
(governor of the town). On these occasions, when any person of
rank gets into their hands, they demand a ransom of from two to
three thousand bullocks, or a proportionate number of slaves. No
sultan has any power over these islanders; they will pay no tribute to
any one, nor submit to any prescribed government: some of them
lately paid a visit to the sheikh, and although they brought him only a
few slaves, that they had stolen from the Begharmi side of the water,
yet he received them kindly, and gave them fine tobes and red caps.
Their visit was principally to see if the reports of the sheikh’s power
were true; but notwithstanding their kind reception, on returning they
carried off three girls from within ten miles of Kouka. These islands
lie on the eastern side of the Tchad, and on embarking from the
west, they described the voyage as five days of open sea previous to
arriving at the islands, which are numerous; the two largest are
named Koorie and Sayah. They have a language of their own,
although resembling that of Kanem. Their arms are spears and
shields, and they fight with every body around them, Waday,
Begharmi, and Bornou. They believe in a divine power, which rules
every thing, but are not Musselmans. They have a strong arm, they
say, and a cunning head, instead of a large country, and much cattle;
therefore they must take from those who are richer than themselves.
The Bornou people say, “the waters are theirs; what can we do?” It is
said they have nearly one thousand large canoes. They are not a
sanguinary or cruel people; and when prisoners are taken in battle
and wounded, they do not kill, but cure them; and if no ransom is
offered, they give them wives, and they remain as free as
themselves.
Aug. 30.—Hadgi Ali Boo-Khaloom had been now returned more
than a week, and nothing satisfactory had ever been extracted from
him as to the money left in his brother’s hands. I had great fears of
his honesty from the first, and urged the necessity of our taking
some decided measures with him. We accordingly summoned him to
appear before the sheikh; the result of which was, our failure for
want of sufficient documents, and the tergiversation of the Arabs.
The official document of this trial, translated from the Arabic, will be
found in the Appendix.
We received visits of condolence from several of our Bornou
friends, who were all extravagant in their abuse of Hadgi Ali. “Are
these your Mourzuk friends,” said they, “who were to assist you with
every thing? Why, this is robbing you. However, they called God to
witness to a lie, and they will die soon: only wait a day or two.”
Sept. 1.—Dr. Oudney now cupped himself on the chest for the
second time, and found some little relief. Feeling that our situation
required an appearance of spirit and determination, I sent for Abdal
Wahad, an Arab of Zehren, distantly related to Boo-Khaloom, and to
whom, on two occasions of distress, I had been kind, and upbraided
him with his falsehood and ingratitude; nor was my remonstrance
altogether without effect. He acknowledged that “his heart had been
too big for his stomach ever since he left the palace: that his eyes
had been dim, and he had enjoyed no rest; for,” said he, “I swore to
myself to be as faithful to you as to a brother!” “All this is very fine,”
said I; “but what proof will you give of this remorse?” “Every proof,”
he replied; “Hadgi Ali will come this very day and acknowledge the
debt—that must be the consequence. I have been to the sheikh, and
said how you had assisted me; and that I had sworn, and could not
see you wronged.” Even as Abdal Wahad predicted, so it happened.
Karouash came in the course of the day to say that Abdal Wahad
had been at his house, and told him the debt was just, and that he
had reported the conversation to the sheikh. The sheikh’s answer
was, “He is quite right; after what the rais Khaleel said, every one
would have known where the justice lay; for the English have not
many words, but they are true; and the Arabs, you know, will lie a
little (kidip shouie shouie).”
In the evening Hadgi Ali came himself; he made, however, but a
blundering excuse, saying he had never inquired into it—did not
even know whether we gave any money or not to Boo-Khaloom; but
that now he knew, and God forbid he should ever be otherwise than
friendly with the English, and that not only two, but five thousand
dollars were at our service. All this, however, ended in his begging
us to wait until he had sent off his kafila to Mourzuk, and that then he
would try to give us eight hundred or one thousand dollars in tobes,
or gubbuk[36], for not ten dollars in money had he; and the rest he
hoped we would wait for, until he sent to Soudan. Unsatisfactory as
this was, we thought it better not to make objections, merely saying
that we were without money, and begging that he would settle it as
soon as he possibly could.
Mr. Clapperton was again seized with fever, so violent as to give
us all great uneasiness, and render him delirious for twenty-four
hours; and from an idea that the disorder was infectious, the Bornou
people could scarcely be persuaded to come near our huts. Doctor
Oudney each day became weaker and weaker; Hillman was gaining
a little strength: while I might be considered as the best of the party,
although often suffering from headaches, and pains in the chest, with
what gave me more uneasiness than all, increasing dimness of sight.
I, however, kept up my spirits, visited Barca Gana and Mai Meigamy,
nearly every day; and found amusement in entering into all their
troubles and fears lest the bashaw should send a ghrazzie into the
country.
Since the feast day of the Aid Kebir there had been on an evening
an assembly of persons before the sheikh’s gate; when the most
athletic and active of the slaves came out and wrestled in the
presence of their masters, and the sheikh himself, who usually took
his post at a little window over the principal gate of the palace. Barca
Gana, Ali Gana, Wormah, Tirab, and all the chiefs, were usually
seated on mats in the inner ring, and I generally took my place
beside them. Quickness and main strength were the qualifications
which ensured victory: they struggled with a bitterness which could
scarcely have been exceeded in the armed contests of the Roman
gladiators, and which was greatly augmented by the voices of their
masters, urging them to the most strenuous exertion of their powers.
A rude trumpet, of the buffalo’s horn, sounded to the attack; and the
combatants entered the arena naked, with the exception of a
leathern girdle about the loins; and those who had been victorious on
former occasions were received with loud acclamations by the
spectators. Slaves of all nations were first matched against each
other; of these the natives of Soudan were the least powerful, and
seldom victors. The most arduous struggles were between the
Musgowy and the Begharmi negroes: some of these slaves, and
particularly the latter, were beautifully formed, and of gigantic stature;
but the feats of the day always closed by the matching of two
Begharmis against each other—and dislocated limbs, or death, were
often the consequence of these kindred encounters. They
commence by placing their hands on each other’s shoulders; of their
feet they make no use, but frequently stoop down, and practise a
hundred deceptions to throw the adversary off his guard; when the
other will seize his antagonist by the hips, and after holding him in
the air, dash him against the ground with stunning violence, where
he lies covered with blood, and unable to pursue the contest. A
conqueror of this kind is greeted by loud shouts, and several vests
will be thrown to him by the spectators; and, on kneeling at his
master’s feet, which always concludes the triumph, he is often
habited by the slaves near his lord in a tobe of the value of thirty or
forty dollars; or, what is esteemed as a still higher mark of favour,
one of the tobes worn by his chief is taken off, and thrown on the
back of the conqueror. I have seen them foam and bleed at the
mouth and nose from pure rage and exertion, their owners all the
time vying with each other in using expressions most likely to excite
their fury: one chief will draw a pistol, and swear by the Koran that
his slave shall not survive an instant his defeat, and, with the same
breath, offer him great rewards if he conquers. Both of these
promises are sometimes too faithfully kept; and one poor wretch,
who had withstood the attacks of a ponderous negro, much more
than his match, from some country to the south of Mandara, for more
than fifty minutes, turned his eye reproachfully on his threatening
master, only for an instant; when his antagonist slipped his hands
down from the shoulders to the loins, and by a sudden twist raised
his knee to his chest, and fell with his whole weight on the poor slave
(who was from Soudan), snapping his spine in the fall. Former feats
are considered as nothing after one failure; and a slave, that a
hundred dollars would not purchase to-day, is, after a defeat, sold at
the fsug, maimed as he is, for a few dollars, to any one who will
purchase him.
The skin of a noble lion was sent me by the sheikh, which had
been taken near Kabshary, measuring from the tail to the nose
fourteen feet two inches. He had devoured four slaves, and was at
last taken by the following stratagem: the inhabitants assembled
together, and with loud cries and noises drove him from the place
where he had last feasted; they then dug a very deep blaqua, or
circular hole, armed with sharp pointed stakes; this they most
cunningly covered over with stalks of the gussub; a bundle of straw,
enveloped in a tobe, was laid over the spot, to which a gentle
motion, like that of a man turning in sleep, was occasionally given by
means of a line carried to some distance. On their quitting the spot,
and the noise ceasing, the lion returned to his haunt, and was
observed watching his trap for seven or eight hours—by degrees
approaching closer and closer,—and at length he made a dreadful
spring on his supposed prey, and was precipitated to the bottom of
the pit. The Kabsharians now rushed to the spot, and before he
could recover himself, despatched him with their spears.
Mr. Clapperton’s illness had increased to an alarming height: he
had upwards of twenty-four hours’ fever, and delirium without
cessation. These attacks, just about the time the rainy season is at
an end, are very prevalent, and often fatal to the white people from
the sea, as the Arabs are called. How much more violently must they
effect the natives of more temperate lands?
Mr. Hillman was again assailed by ague, and disordered intellect,
which threw him back into his former state of weakness. For two
days out of the last three, I had alone appeared at our mess bench
for the evening meal. Two of my companions were quite delirious in
bed; and Dr. Oudney, who had for a month taken nothing but a little
sour milk, three times a day, never left his hut except from necessity.
These were very trying moments, and sufficient to destroy the
appetite of a more healthy person than myself: still I had much to be
thankful for, and I endeavoured to bless God, and ate with
cheerfulness.
We had now been five days without rain; the thermometer was as
high as 89° in the middle of the day in the shade, and we began to
think summer was again coming. It may appear incredible, that with
such a temperature we should wish for an increase of heat; but the
dampness of the atmosphere, and the millions of flies and
musquitoes, beyond all conception, that accompanied it, rendered it
almost impossible to enjoy any thing like repose, either by day or
night. The annoyance of these insects I had experienced at Lisbon,
Naples, and in the other parts of Italy and Sicily, but neither in
numbers, nor in peace-disturbing powers, were they to be compared
with these. Towards the evening, a fire in the hut, made of damp
straw and weeds, was sometimes the means of procuring a few
hours’ tranquillity; but the remedy was in itself so disagreeable, that it
was only resorted to in despair: a fire of this kind, however, seldom
fails to expel the intruders, from the thick and suffocating vapours
which arise from it.
The horses also suffered dreadfully from the same annoyance;
and to keep them from injuring themselves, wherever they can reach
with their teeth, the negroes are obliged to keep a fire the greater
part of the day, particularly at the hours of feeding, close to their
heads; and notwithstanding the natural dislike those animals have to
flames and smoke, they will hang their heads over the fire, so as to
suffer themselves to be all but scorched, in order to obtain a little rest
from their persecutors. Of scorpions we had seen but few, but the
white and black ants were like the sands in number: the white ones
made their way into every trunk, of whatever sort of wood they were
made, as if it had been paper. And on the late expedition, during a
halt of three days, in a spot where they were more than usually
numerous, a mat and a carpet on which I slept were completely
destroyed by them. They tell a story of an Arab having lain down to
sleep near old Birnie, just over a nest of these destructive insects,
covered up in a barracan, and that in the morning he found himself
quite naked, his covering having been eaten to the last thread. The

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Achieving Democracy Through Interest

Representation: Interest Groups in

Patrycja Rozbicka · Paweł Kamiński

More information about this series at

Interest Groups, Advocacy and Democracy Series

Cover illustration: Martin Barraud/Getty Images

of the political and social contexts on interest representation, stimulating

Birmingham, UK Patrycja Rozbicka

We would like to thank following colleagues: Paulina Pośpieszna and

1 Achieving Democracy Through Interest Representation:

2 Interest Organizations in Central and Eastern Europe:

2.2 Defining Interest Organizations in the Post-Communist

3 Organized Interest in the Policy-Making Process 59

4 The Drivers Behind Relations Between Interest

4.7 What Explains Party—Group Interactions? 105

5 The Organizational Development of Nongovernmental

6 The Significance of Trade Unions in the CEE

7 Seeking Access to Policy Stakeholders: Business

8 Interest Organizations in CEE Countries

9 Conclusions: The Future of Lobbying in the CEE

Patrycja Rozbicka Associate Professor in Politics and International Rela-

Paweł Kamiński Adjunct at the Institute of Political Studies, Polish

Meta Novak Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Social Sciences,

Vaida Jankauskaitė, Ph.D. is a Researcher at the Faculty of Social

CEE Central and Eastern Europe

Fig. 2.1 Year of establishment 44

Table 2.1 An overview of organizations’ typology 37

Table 8.4 Frequency of contacts with EU institutions, mean value

Achieving Democracy Through Interest

The study of interest group politics—the organization, aggregation, artic-

1 http://www.intereuro.eu/public/. Accessed 17 October 2019.

© The Author(s) 2021 1

Advocacy and Public Policy Project3 ). In particular, the European schol-

3 http://lobby.la.psu.edu/. Accessed 17 October 2019.

in similar, but somewhat idiosyncratic environments as there had been

The assessment of the quality of democracy through the study of

1.1 Interest Representation

1.1.1 From Pluralism and Corporatism to Neo-Pluralism

share in its rewards. Due to increased demands, the state depends on

1.1.2 Democratic Theory

political parties, elections are irregular occurrences and scholars ques-

The discussion on alternatives to diminishing citizens’ participation

ethos and open to deliberation. It is based on a qualified delegate model,

Neo-pluralism and participatory democracy in particular have offered

1.2 Why Study Interest Groups

by market relations. Following this perspective, we would expect to find

to their West European peers with extremely low numbers of associa-

lack of translation into English limiting their usefulness for compara-

1.3 Research, Methodology

Similar attempts, but to a much smaller degree, were attempted within

group systems, as well as providing a framework for subsequent work

interestingly omitting the interactions with directly elected representa-

Bartolini, S. (2005). Restructuring Europe: Centre Formation, System Building,

Cunningham, F. (2002). Theories of Democracy: A Critical Introduction. London:

Greenwood, J. (2007). Organized Civil Society and Democratic Legitimacy in

Common Goods: Reinventing European and International Governance.

Rasmussen, A., & Gross, V. (2015). Biased Access? Exploring Selection to

Interest Organizations in Central and Eastern

A cornerstone of any democratic society is the capacity for its citizens to

© The Author(s) 2021 25

utilized lobby data or information available on stakeholders participating

2.1 Explaining the Density

2.1.1 The Lithuanian Interest Group System and Punctuated Past