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Africa-China
Cooperation
Towards an African Policy on China?
Edited by Philani Mthembu · Faith Mabera

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Philani Mthembu · Faith Mabera
Editors
Africa-China
Cooperation
Towards an African Policy on China?
Editors
Philani Mthembu Faith Mabera
Institute for Global Dialogue, Institute for Global Dialogue,
Associated with UNISA Associated with UNISA
Pretoria, South Africa Pretoria, South Africa
ISSN 2662-2483 ISSN 2662-2491 (electronic)

International Political Economy Series
ISBN 978-3-030-53038-9 ISBN 978-3-030-53039-6 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53039-6
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Contents
1 Africa’s Changing Geopolitics: Towards an African

Policy on China? 1
Philani Mthembu and Faith Mabera
2 A Call for an African Policy Framework Towards

China 11
Bob Wekesa
3 Regionalizing Sino-African Diplomatic Engagement:

Kagame and Overcoming the ‘One and the Many’
Paradigm 31
Francis A. Kornegay Jr.
4 The Need for Africa’s Common Policy Towards

China: A Decolonial Afrocentric Perspective 57
Siphamandla Zondi
5 Pan-African Perspectives on International

Relations—Africa and China 83
Kwesi Dzapong Lwazi Sarkodee Prah
v
vi CONTENTS
6 The Role of China’s Development Finance in Africa:

Towards Enhancing African Agency? 107
Philani Mthembu
7 China’s Evolving Approach to the African

Peace and Security Agenda: Rationale, Trends
and Implications 135
Faith Mabera
8 Cultural Approaches to Africa’s Engagement

with China 163
Paul Zilungisele Tembe
9 One or Many Voices?: Public Diplomacy and Its

Impact on an African Policy Towards China 189
Yu-Shan Wu
10 The EU and Africa: A Multilateral Model

for the Future of Africa–China Relations? 215
John Kotsopoulos
Index 235
List of Contributors
Francis A. Kornegay Jr. Institute for Global Dialogue, Associated with

UNISA, Pretoria, South Africa
John Kotsopoulos Centre for the Study of Governance Innovation,
University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa
Faith Mabera Institute for Global Dialogue, Associated with UNISA,
Pretoria, South Africa
Philani Mthembu Institute for Global Dialogue, Associated with
UNISA, Pretoria, South Africa
Kwesi Dzapong Lwazi Sarkodee Prah Department of History, East
China Normal University, Shanghai, China
Paul Zilungisele Tembe Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute,
Bob Wekesa University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South
Africa
Yu-Shan Wu Africa-China Reporting Project, University of the Witwa-
tersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa
Siphamandla Zondi Department of Politics and International Relations,
University of Johannesburg, Pretoria, South Africa
vii
List of Figures
Fig. 7.1 China’s contribution to UNPKO (2007–2017) (Source

United Nations peacekeeping, ‘contributions by country’,
https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contri
butors) 136
Fig. 7.2 Assessed contributions to UN peacekeeping (Permanent
UNSC members) (Source United Nations peacekeeping,
‘How we are funded’, Effective rates of assessment for
peacekeeping operations, 1 January 2016–31 December
2018, UNGA A/70/331/Add.1, https://www.un.org/
en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/331/Add.1) 136
ix
List of Tables
Table 6.1 Ranking of African nation states in the order of strategic

importance 115
Table 6.2 Ranking of African nation states based on their human
development index (HDI) scores 119
Table 6.3 Material capabilities vs human development 123
Table 6.4 Official financial resources available to African countries
from China 125
Table 7.1 China’s current peacekeeping deployments in Africa
(June 2017) 147
Table 8.1 Forms of dualism as represented by Western and Chinese
cultures 169
xi
CHAPTER 1
Africa’s Changing Geopolitics: Towards

an African Policy on China?
Philani Mthembu and Faith Mabera
Africa’s Engagement with External Powers

Recent years have seen a greater focus on the African continent from
external powers for various geopolitical and geoeconomic reasons. While
the continent has consistently been home to six or seven of the fastest
growing economies in the world in the last two decades, it is also home
to significant demographic and technological changes that promise to
propel it towards greater strategic importance in global politics. Indeed
the population of the continent is set to grow towards two billion people
by the year 2050, making it central to some of the relocation of produc-
tion centres taking place in the global economy. Various countries have
stepped up their engagements with the continent through both bilat-
eral relations and through the now fashionable ‘Africa summits’. China,
P. Mthembu (B) · F. Mabera

Institute for Global Dialogue, Associated with UNISA, Pretoria, South Africa
e-mail: philani@igd.org.za
F. Mabera
e-mail: faith@igd.org.za
© The Author(s) 2021 1

P. Mthembu and F. Mabera (eds.), Africa-China Cooperation,
International Political Economy Series,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53039-6_1
2 P. MTHEMBU AND F. MABERA
India, Turkey, Japan, the EU and South Korea are just some of the global
actors courting the continent through Africa summits. The summits cover
a range of issue areas from the economy, international politics, migration,
climate change, development finance, peace and security, and enhancing
cultural and people to people exchanges. This phenomenon has thus
caused many on the continent to question their utility, and whether
African counterparts have actively used the summits to advance their
strategic interests and priorities.
While focused on Africa’s relations with China, the following book
is just as relevant for Africa’s engagement with other external powers
in a changing geopolitical environment. The often simplistic view of
China’s influence on the African continent often downplays the influence
of the United States and European powers on the continent, which have
maintained deep economic, political and cultural relations with African
countries after the colonial period. In an evolving multipolar world order
that is still taking shape, most African countries do not have the luxury
of choosing which relations to have, instead relying on cooperation with
countries in the global North and South (Mthembu 2020: 3). It is thus
ultimately up to African countries and institutions to use their relations
with the world to advance their development aspirations as captured in
documents such as Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want (AU Commission
2015).
As a continent playing host to the largest number of individual coun-
tries, most of which are landlocked, the question of Africa’s relations with
external powers will remain important in the years to come. While bilat-
eral relations will remain a key element of Africa’s relations with external
powers, it is important to reflect on the various possibilities available for
engaging with external powers in order to enhance African priorities as
agreed to by the various regional economic communities (RECs) and
the African Union (AU). It is argued that African countries and pan-
African institutions could use the various Africa summits to coordinate
their positions and development priorities in order to support regional
continental and maritime interconnectivity projects on the continent, thus
further catalysing regional interconnectivity and integration on the conti-
nent. The Africa summits should thus be used to enhance agreed upon
priorities articulated by the regional economic communities (RECs) and
the African Union (AU). The increased coordination would assist in
enhancing African agency and build capacity for implementing regional
1 AFRICA’S CHANGING GEOPOLITICS: TOWARDS AN AFRICAN POLICY … 3
infrastructure projects as seen through Agenda 2063 and the twelve flag-
ship projects of the AU. The first mid-year coordination meeting of the
African Union and the Regional Economic Communities was held in
July 2019 in Niger, in a move that aims to build greater cohesion and
coordination across the continent (Mthembu 2020: 2).
While the contributors to this publication do not advocate for any
singular approach or policy to govern Africa’s engagement with external
powers, they do agree on the utility of enhanced coordination between
the individual nation-states, regional economic communities and the
African Union when it comes to the continent’s relations with external
powers in an evolving multipolar world order. They also agree that greater
coordination will enhance Africa’s agency in global politics, ensuring
that the various summits converge around the implementation of Africa’s
outlined development priorities. Various authors do however disagree on
the degree to which nation-states, regional economic communities or the
African Union should take the lead. Indeed instead of embarking on a
path towards an Africa wide policy or strategy, some would prefer to see
common positions on specific issue areas or to rather see sub-regional
strategies at the level of the regional economic communities. There is also
an important debate about the role of larger African economies, and to
what extent they should be leading efforts towards continental autonomy
and better coordination. This is a healthy conversation, and one that
should involve not only the scholarly community, but also include the
various diplomatic tracks involved in Africa’s international relations.
Why the Rise of China Matters

for Africa’s Changing Geopolitics
The contemporary rise of China to assume a geopolitical position more
in line with its strong historical role in global politics and the global
economy is significant for the African continent given the exponential
growth in Africa’s relations with China on all the various diplomatic
tracks in recent decades. This is especially significant given the different
manner in which China has established and deepened relations with its
African counterparts, putting forward the mantra of win-win partnerships,
mutual benefit and the respect for principles such as sovereignty and the
non-interference in the domestic affairs of African countries, which was
welcomed on the continent (Mthembu 2018, 2020).
At a time when much of the Western world looked at Africa through

the lens of official development assistance (ODA), thus mostly relating
to it through a donor–recipient type of relationship, the Chinese state
was rolling out the red carpet for African leaders in the establishment of
the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation in Beijing in the year 2000.
This Forum was also clearly not just about development cooperation,
but about cooperation at multilateral fora, peace and security, trade and
investment, and about encouraging Chinese state and non-state enter-
prises to move beyond the border of China to seek trade and investment
opportunities on the African continent in their efforts to become not
only Chinese enterprises, but global enterprises. China thus saw various
economic and political opportunities despite the known challenges that
plagued the continent. The ascendance of China in Africa’s international
relations thus forced Western countries to refocus their gaze on Africa
since they immediately became worried about being displaced on the
continent they had long dominated (Mthembu 2018, 2020). Indeed
China’s growing role in Africa can be seen as an important factor in
providing more options for African stakeholders in their engagements
with external powers. Rather than replacing or displacing Africa’s rela-
tions with the West, it has arguably forced Western partners to think
about ways in which they can also intensify their engagements with the
continent through various economic and political tools.
China’s prominence in global affairs and the extensive reach of its polit-
ical and economic footprint reinforces its status as a global power in the
international arena. At the core of global China is a comprehensive grand
strategy that frames its economic, foreign policy and military strategies in
pursuit of great power status, as well as the advancement of national inter-
ests across a range of strategic domains. China views Africa as a pivotal
partner in the realisation of its grand strategy goals, in alignment with its
peaceful rise and proclaimed orientation as a responsible power.
A growing amount of scholarly analysis on China’s strategic thinking
highlights the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as the centrepiece of
China’s foreign policy, a transcontinental endeavour to enhance connec-
tivity across Central Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Europe. The
implementation of the BRI has seen the development of hard and soft
infrastructure, expansion of investment and promotion of cross-cultural
ties. Africa stands to benefit from the BRI given the glaring need for
infrastructure development, development cooperation, increased trade
and improved competitiveness across the continent. For China, Africa’s
geostrategic importance translates into access to the continent’s vast

natural resources and mineral wealth and harnessing opportunities for
further projection of its soft power.
China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative is set to connect over 65
countries at a cost of approximately $1 trillion, with the aim of improving
the connectivity between China, Asia, Europe, the Middle East and Africa
in a process closely linked with the domestic changes in the Chinese
economy. Proposed by President Xi Jinping in 2013, the initiative is devel-
oping a vast network of railroads and shipping lanes between China and
countries along the continental belt and maritime road (Mthembu 2020:
2). Robyn Xing, Morgan Stanley’s Chief China Economist argues that
investments in belt and road countries will increase by 14 percent annu-
ally in the period 2019–2020, with the total investment amount likely to
double to $1.2–1.3 trillion by 2027 (Xing 2018). While the onset of a
global pandemic in the form of COVID-19 has certainly impacted these
projections negatively, the medium to long term trajectory remains valid.
Since inception in 2013, the BRI has continued to receive the support
of a growing number of countries across the world, with China having
already signed 174 cooperation documents with 126 countries and having
now invested more than $90 billion (R1.3 trillion) in related projects.
During his address at a BRI seminar at the Chinese Embassy, China’s
former ambassador to South Africa, H.E. Lin Songtian, said the response
to the Second BRI Forum in Beijing, which was attended by 5000
delegates, including 37 heads of state, guests from more than 150 coun-
tries and over 90 international organisations, showed that despite some
reservations and scepticism towards the initiative, the confidence of the
international community had been growing (Boje 2019). The Ambas-
sador acknowledged that South Africa was the first African country to
sign a BRI memorandum of understanding with China, and that China
was committed to being its ‘most reliable and important cooperative part-
ner’ in achieving socio-economic transformation and development (Boje
2019).
Much of the funding for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) comes
from policy lenders, whose lending decisions are responsive to the
Chinese government’s geostrategic preferences. The more prominent
policy banks include the likes of the China Development Bank and the
Export–Import Bank of China (Exim Bank), which have committed over
$1 trillion. There is also a Silk Road Fund, which holds $40 billion in
investment funds and is supervised by China’s Central Bank. The Asia
Infrastructure Investment Bank is also an important player and has a

capital base of $100 billion. Additional funds can also be made available
through China’s foreign exchange reserves and sovereign wealth fund,
which hold $3.7 trillion and $220 billion, respectively (Nantulya 2019).
This presents opportunities for African stakeholders, who can tap into the
opportunities presented by the BRI and FOCAC in order to advance the
continents strategic priorities.
The BRI is also increasingly seen as a catalyst for African regional
economic integration and competitiveness as seen in research funded by
the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, which found that
East Africa’s exports could increase by as much as $192 million annually
if new BRI projects are used diligently (Nantulya 2019). Others caution
against what has been referred to as debt trap diplomacy, warning Africans
to not borrow from China lest their strategic assets be seized, with the
case of the port in Sri Lanka often used as an example of what may happen
to countries not able to pay their debts (Nantulya 2019).
However, it is difficult to make that argument on a continent that is
clearly in need of more infrastructure development and limited resources
to fund this much-needed priority area. The World Bank estimates that
Africa needs up to $170 billion in investment a year for 10 years to
meet its infrastructure requirements. The African Development Bank has
posited that if Africa positions itself well, it can source some of this
from the BRI and channel it to the African Union’s infrastructure master
plan, the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA)
(Nantulya 2019).
The FOCAC is the main multilateral forum for China–Africa rela-
tions. Since its establishment in 2000, FOCAC has driven strategic
engagement between China and Africa on the basis of mutual trust, win-
win cooperation, equality, mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial
integrity, mutual non-aggression and non-interference in internal affairs.
In spite of positive reviews of China–Africa cooperation over the years, the
dynamics of the relationship have been the subject of a range of critiques,
including oft-cited allegations of China’s neoimperialist designs, the lop-
sided nature of the relationship in favour of China and concerns of the
impact of debt trap diplomacy in Africa which has exposed a number of
countries to debt distress.
Nonetheless, the evolution of institutionalised China–Africa engage-
ment in the course of almost two decades warrants a critical analysis of
the constellation of interests, ideas and strategies that continue to shape
the trajectory of relations and the implications for the politics of cooper-
ation. In an attempt to address a number of defining issues pertinent to
China–Africa relations, this volume grapples specifically with the issue of
agency, partly in response to the clarion call for enhanced African agency
in the gamut of its strategic partnerships with a growing number of global
actors.
With the African Union Representative Office in Beijing now opera-
tional, the continent has added another important layer of coordination
in Africa’s relations with China that will become of greater importance
in years to come. The importance of this was made clear during the 8th
China–Africa Think Tanks Forum in 2019 as part of the process of imple-
menting the FOCAC Action Plan adopted in 2018. This is important
given the July 2019 coordination meeting of the African Union and the
Regional Economic Communities, a first of its kind and an important nod
towards greater coordination efforts on the continent. The debate over
the need for a more common and coordinated approach towards Africa’s
international relations is thus as important as ever in a changing geopo-
litical landscape where the continent must safeguard its continental and
sub-regional autonomy.
Chapter Outline
Following the opening chapter of the volume, Bob Wekesa makes the
case for a coherent African policy framework towards China based on the
historical context of Africa–China relations and the asymmetrical nature of
the partnership given Africa’s ambiguity and ambivalence since the onset
of revamped engagement in the twenty-first century. It is suggested that
Africa can enhance its agency in relations with China by following up
on the strategic fit with existing continental policies such as the African
Union (AU) Agenda 2063 and alignment of partnership initiatives with
economic, security and developmental priorities.
Francis Kornegay puts forward ‘the one and many’ paradigm in Africa’s
external relations as a key enabler of its subordinate relations with external
powers. In the context of a raft of institutional reforms under the guid-
ance of the Kagame report, Kornegay argues for reorientation of the
forces of continentalism and regionalism in favour of a proactive African
FOCAC diplomacy while strengthening the ‘common position approach’
central to Africa’s engagement with an array of strategic partners. In
Kornegay’s view, the regional economic communities of the AU have a
central role to play in regionalising Sino-African diplomatic engagement

while enhancing a distinct pan-African agency.
Siphamandla Zondi draws on a decolonial perspective to analyse
Africa–China cooperation, proposing the political idea of collective self-
reliance and the political dialogue that underpins FOCAC as useful tools
to shape the trajectory of Africa’s relations with China. By emphasising
the strategic issues of convergence between China and Africa, including
the push for global reforms, the focus on development, prioritisation
of infrastructure development and cultural dialogue, African countries
can ensure alignment with their development priorities at the national,
regional and eventually build up to a continental common African
position on cooperation with China.
Kwesi Djapong Prah weighs the possibility of ‘national extinction’
of the African state against the background of asymmetrical China–
Africa relations, considering how concepts such as national sovereignty,
national self-interest and self-determination could define a re-imagined
Africa–China partnership. He calls for a broad-based reconsideration of
pan-African identity and the overhaul of political efforts focused on
building pan-African unity.
Reflecting on China’s development finance towards Africa, Philani
Mthembu argues that the concessional and non-concessional finance
offered by China to African countries, not only offers alternative financing
pathways for development cooperation, but also opens up space for
enhanced African agency in view of the new multipolarity in development
cooperation. For Africa this would mean optimising the opportunities and
shared benefits of the FOCAC framework in a coordinated manner and
in alignment with continental development priorities.
Faith Mabera contextualises China’s emerging profile as a peace and
security actor in Africa, premised on pragmatic reorientation and reassess-
ment of its strategic peace and security objectives, in line with its
global power profile and aspirations. She asserts that China’s increased
contribution to UN peacekeeping, both in terms of troop and finan-
cial contributions, and the establishment of the China–Africa Cooperative
Partnership for Peace and Security within the FOCAC framework, are
indicative of a deepening of Chinese engagement on the African peace
and security landscape. The multi-tracked nature of China–Africa security
cooperation presents opportunities for African states, RECs and the AU
to harmonise their engagement strategies with China while leveraging the

partnership in addressing traditional and non-traditional security threats.
In calling for greater understanding of Chinese cultural concepts that
inform daily life and practices, Paul Tembe maintains that improved
African understanding of the roles of habitus in cultural practice, civiliza-
tional and cultural continuities could assist in eliminating blind spots in
Africa–China relations, as well as enhancing strategic equality in Africa’s
external partnerships with other external actors. Tembe cautions against
formulating an African policy on China based on rhetorical perspectives
such as the parallel narrative of anti-colonial struggles by the African
and Chinese people and the Western-driven anti-China rhetoric, urging
instead for a graduated differentiated but coherent regionalised strategy
vis-à-vis China.
Yu-Shan Wu explores how China’s public diplomacy, oriented towards
building a positive image of China abroad and projecting its soft power,
offers crucial insights into the complexity of crafting an African policy
on China. She maintains that in view of the heterogeneity of African
countries in terms of interests and identities, and the dual-track Chinese
engagement at both bilateral and multilateral levels, a more pragmatic
approach for the benefit of African agency would be the formulation of
several common continental and regional positions on issues of common
interest, rather than an overarching African policy on China.
Finally, by contrasting China–Africa relations and EU–Africa rela-
tions, John Kotsopoulos presents how different conceptions of African
agency have emerged within the ambit of the two cooperation models.
He argues that the FOCAC framework has played out more as quasi-
interregionalism with demonstrative preference for China’s bilateral
engagement with African states. This is in stark difference to the EU–
Africa partnership which privileges an AU lead-role as continental repre-
sentative and chief negotiator, thereby allowing more room for African
agency.
Future Research
While the research and analysis contained in this volume is primarily
focused on Africa’s relations with China, it should be seen more broadly
as related to the continent’s broader engagement with external powers in
an evolving international landscape. It should thus serve as a catalyst for
further research and dialogue on Africa’s role in a changing geopolitical

landscape, and how the continent can use its engagements with strategic
partners to advance its development priorities.
The volume should thus encourage other scholars to do more compar-
ative studies on the various Africa summits, analysing what are the
concrete deliverables and the different modalities of summit diplomacy
best suited to advance African strategic interests. This will remain impor-
tant at a time where the AU and regional economic communities are
looking to increase their level of coordination. It is thus encouraging to
see the publication of new scholarly work on Africa’s changing geopolitics
such as Africa and the World: Navigating Shifting Geopolitics co-edited
by Philani Mthembu and Francis Kornegay (2020). Unlike much of the
literature, it places Africa squarely at the centre, looking at the changing
geopolitical environment from an African vantage point. This volume also
places Africa at the centre, seeking ways to advance the individual and
collective agency of African state and non-state actors in their relations
with an important strategic partner in the form of China.
References
African Union Commission (AUC). 2015. Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want: A
Shared Strategic Framework for Inclusive Growth and Sustainable Development.
Boje, V. 26 April 2019. ‘Belt and Road Initiative a Win-Win for
Global Development’, https://www.iol.co.za/pretoria-news/belt-and-road-
initiative-a-win-win-for-global-development-21976871, accessed 1 May 2019.
Mthembu, P. 2018. China and India’s Development Cooperation in Africa: The
Rise of Southern Powers. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
Mthembu, P. 2020. China’s Belt & Road Initiative: How Can Africa
Advance Its Strategic Priorities? MISTRA Working Paper [Available
online], https://mistra.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Chpt-6_fina
lised-for-layout.pdf, accessed 27 January 2020.
Nantulya, P. 22 March 2019. ‘Implications for Africa from China’s One Belt
One Road Strategy’, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/implications-for-afr
ica-china-one-belt-one-road-strategy/, accessed 3 May 2019.
Xing, R. 14 March 2018. ‘Inside China’s Plan to Create a Modern Silk Road’,
https://www.morganstanley.com/ideas/china-belt-and-road, accessed 1 May
2019.
CHAPTER 2
A Call for an African Policy Framework

Towards China
Bob Wekesa
Context
Since the turn of the twenty-first century, Africa and China have intensi-
fied engagements, triggering an avalanche of perspectives on the impli-
cations of the relations for Africa, China and the world. Over this
short period, commentators have taken stock of multiple discrepancies
undergirding the relations. Trade and economic imbalances are largely
in favour of China, notwithstanding the benefits accruing to Africa.
China is more or less a homogenous entity (although not in perfect
harmony) against Africa’s heterogeneity borne of its 55-nation nature
not to mention internal variances. Soft power instruments and cultural
flows largely commence in China and terminate in Africa rather than the
other way round, cases in point being the establishment of Confucius
Institutes, university scholarships, launching of media outlets, people-to-
people exchanges, to mention but a few. By contrast, save for some muted
South African soft power in China such as the presence of Brand South
Africa in Beijing, state-led African soft power in China is largely absent.
B. Wekesa (B)
University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53039-6_2
12 B. WEKESA
On the global stage, China, one of the five permanent members of

the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), largely sets the agenda
with regards to Africa–China engagements with actors such as Western
powers, the UN system and in such East Asian matters as the Republic
of China (Taiwan), Tibet and the South China Sea. Indeed, one of
Africa’s historically significant allies of China, the late Tanzanian President
Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, contemplated the various layers of asymmetry
and concluded that Africa–China engagements were the “most unequal
of equal relationships” (Alden and Large 2011: 30). This assertion is as
true today as it was in the Africa-China relations of the 60s and 70s.
The rather straightforward question that academics and policymakers
and indeed African people should ask themselves is: why has the Africa–
China relationship maintained a lopsided career over the last nearly
two-decades of revamped engagement? Many thinkers have proffered
responses of varying rationality to explain the slanted balance of power,
among the more dubious ones being that China is a pernicious actor
calculating to rip off Africa through a neo-imperial agenda. The current
chapter argues that the asymmetry in the relations traversing political,
economic and cultural spheres is a reflection of Africa’s lack of a coherent
policy framework towards China while China is guided by a policy archi-
tecture that charts its highly successful strategy in and with Africa. Even
in instances where aspects of an African policy towards China can be read
in broader policies such as the Agenda 2063, Africa’s capacity for imple-
mentation is wanting. In both academic and popular narratives, one sees a
preponderance of perspectives labelled as “China’s Africa policy” but very
little on the reverse, namely, “Africa’s China policy”. If one searches for
the keywords “Africa’s policy towards China” in online search engines,
what comes up instead is, “China’s policy towards Africa”.
The pole position of academic and intellectual analyzes focused on
China’s policy towards Africa rather than the reverse merely reflects the
fact that China not only has a policy framework for engagement with
Africa, but is tangibly implementing the policy with Africa largely on the
receiving end. Even the so-called “Look East” policy said to be practiced
by African countries has been found to be nothing less that knee jerk
sloganeering rather than a well thought set of policy objectives (Zhang
Chun 2014: 22). As such, the imbalance in the relations stems from the
fact that China knows and has planned for what it wants in the relations
while Africa is beset by ambiguity and ambivalence.
2 A CALL FOR AN AFRICAN POLICY FRAMEWORK TOWARDS CHINA 13
Devolving from the problem of multifaceted imbalances between

Africa and China as emanating from a policy gap on the African end,
a key pursuit of this chapter is to argue the case for an African policy
framework towards China. However, at the outset, one must step back
and pose the question: does Africa really need a policy framework towards
China? As soon as this question is posed, the answer becomes affirmative.
For, a negative answer would suggest that Africa is satisfied with a situ-
ation in which China sets out the terms of reference in an engagement
often characterized as mutual. From the foreign policy analysis field, we
learn that foreign policy is a goal-directed action aimed at achieving the
interests of one state in another state in the international system. Thus,
since China has a documented policy framework towards Africa, it is much
more lucid on pursuing its interests in comparison to an Africa that has
no policy framework towards China.
A key point of contestation in debates about an African policy towards
China is whether Africa needs a collective policy framework towards
China or “whether individual African states should draw their indepen-
dent China policy based on their own priorities”, a split in opinion that
was on display at a recent symposium on the matter (Wits Africa China
Reporting Project 2017). A short response, fleshed out in intervening
sections of this chapter is that Africa needs, in fact, not just continent-
wide and country-level frameworks of engagement with China but also
policies from its eight official Regional Economic Communities (RECs)
(African Union Commission 2017: 128). In other words, the develop-
ment of policy at the supra-continental level should not preclude similar
initiatives at regional and national levels. Indeed, policy at the continental,
regional and national levels can be developed in tandem, drawing on each
other in a back and forth and mutually reinforcing way. This is the kind
of agency that can inspire the beginnings of strategies that would help
redress not only the Africa–China imbalance but indeed even out Africa’s
relations with other residual and emerging powers.
A caveat is worthwhile here. This chapter should not be seen as a call
to war by Africa against China. Rather, it proceeds from a gap identified
in the imbalanced nature of the relations to call for the filling of the gap
with the ultimate goal of enhancing the beneficiation of both parties.
14 B. WEKESA
African Agency and Agenda 2063

As a concept, African agency, is gaining traction as a means of advo-
cating an Afro-centric approach to understanding and advocating African
issues. In some quarters, it is seen by turns as a complimentary and
successor concept to the ideas of Pan-Africanism and African renaissance
that underpin intellectual discussions on and about Africa (for instance
Murithi 2014; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2014: 21; Tieku 2014). Its key argu-
ment is that Africa is and should be an actor rather than being acted on
in the international system (Brown and Harman 2013). It argues the case
for African solutions for African problems away from Euro-centricity, Pax
Americana or orientalism (Brown and Harman 2013; Murithi 2014). It
seeks bottom-up rather than top-down, inside-out rather than outside-
in approaches in opposition to the much-lamented ramming down the
continent’s throat of policy interventions generated from developed and
emerging economies. African agency hedges against the supposition that
Africa is a peripheral region only dictated to by powerful global actors
without a cause–effect response. Where African agency in global affairs
has failed, the concept calls for proactivity; where African agency has
succeeded it calls for enhancement, in other words, Afro-optimism rather
than Afro-pessimism.
In its conceptual and pragmatic definitions, African agency calls for
“strategic actions” from an African viewpoint and can thus function as
an African starting point in the development of an African policy frame-
work towards China. Fortuitously, Africa has a policy framework internal
to the continent, namely, the African Union’s Agenda 2063. While the
agenda is not specific to China in its foreign policy dimensions, Agenda
2063 can serve as a starting point in fashioning engagements with China.
Indeed the launch of the Agenda 2063 by African leaders in 2013 is
demonstration of some form of African agency especially considering that
it has been widely accepted as the continent’s blueprint for short, medium
and long term prosperity. As such Africa ought not to start from scratch
when formulating a policy framework towards China. While an African
agency-based policy towards China would inform the policymaking and
implementation “ground”, African agency, with Agenda 2063 at the
centre can be leveraged to the analytical processes leading to the frame-
work. African agency can provide the theoretical and conceptual tools that
can be leveraged to placing African interests at the heart of the Africa–
China engagements. In other words, as a continental roadmap, Agenda
2063 constitutes African agency in the continent’s global developmental

policy and practice arena to which any other plans are and should be
subordinated and co-opted.
It is a demonstration of agency that Africa has extracted as such bene-
fits from China as; funding for projects as alternative to Western sources,
numerous scholarships for African students, greater presence on the inter-
national stage where China has lobbied for African positions (for instance
at the G20 and in the United Nations Security Council), Chinese peace-
keeping forces in turbulent regions and others (on African agency, see
Wekesa 2017: 149; Mohan and Lampert 2012: 109–110; Chege 2008:
19). The development of an African policy framework towards China
would help enhance the power of agency building on the gains already
made. For instance, the AU established a diplomatic mission in Beijing in
2018. It would be a great case of agency if there was a policy and strategy
towards China that would guide the mission’s work.
Having argued the case for African agency and the Agenda 2063 as the
starting point in the development of an African policy framework towards
China, the next step is to firstly consider the historical Africa–China
dynamics that inform the relations, secondly, to analyze the key Chinese
policy set up as a means of exploring African agency-based policy formu-
lation pathways. A review of both China’s African policy and the FOCAC
mechanism,1 which are the key sites of Chinese policy and indeed strategy
towards Africa, is imperative if we are to develop a coherent African policy
framework. However while China’s Africa policy is the “real” policy,
FOCAC is much more established and elaborate as a strategy. I therefore
briefly discuss China’s Africa policies of 2006 and 2015 before delving
more into FOCAC. But first, the historical dimensions.
Historical Perspectives
If nothing else, and at the expense of seeming reactionary, Africa needs a
policy framework towards China because China has for a long time had
frameworks guiding its engagement with Africa. China’s present policy
framework draws immensely on history with the oft-cited aphorism being
that China has a long memory. Because of the rapid expansion in Africa–
China relations in the twenty-first century, it is often forgotten that the
relations are not just historical but actually ancient. Trawling through the
literature indicates that China has always had plans of engagement with
Africa even though some of these plans may not have been captured in
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formal documents. China made contact with Africa in the Tang Dynasty
(618–609) with further contacts made between the seventh and eleventh
centuries BC. The most cited instance of contact is the Zheng He voyages
to East Africa during the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644). One notices that
apart from the Moroccan traveler/scholar Ibn Battuta’s travels to China
around 1345 also during the Ming Dynasty (Chibundu 2000: 2; Li 2005:
60) the trajectory of contact has always been a case of China coming to
Africa rather than the other way round.
In modern times, China’s interest in Africa was kindled after the
triumph of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and establishment of
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 with founding father of
modern China, Chairman Mao Zedong commissioning in 1961 studies
on African history (Li 2005). Founding Chinese premier Zhou Enlai
made the now-iconic visit to nine African countries between December
1963 and February 1964 and this was seen to have “consolidated” rela-
tions but more importantly, introduced China’s “five principles governing
the development of relations with African countries” and “eight principles
for economic aid and technical assistance to other countries” (Hanauer
and Morris 2014: 19; Alden 2007: 10). The Chinese foreign policy enun-
ciated by Zhou Enlai in the early 1960s is still very much in vogue, primed
with succulent symbolism today as is reference to the Chinese voyages of
the fifteenth century. Fast forward to the 1990s: when former Chinese
President Jiang Zemin visited six African countries in 1996, he summoned
rubrics of historical contacts as a means of resetting the relations, leading
to the inauguration of FOCAC in 2000 (Alden 2007: 15; Fernando 2007:
369; African Union Commission 2010; Centre for Chinese Studies 2010:
4; Li et al. 2012: 13; Wekesa 2014).
The key take away from these abbreviated historical tropes is that China
had sufficient interests in Africa to fashion physical reach out to the conti-
nent while Africa—at least from the evidence that we have on record
presently—was merely on the receiving end. Equally importantly as back
up for the need for an African policy towards China, the historical contacts
and ties have been recast anew as source of raison d’être for Africa–China
relations but largely from the Chinese end towards Africa. Because the arc
in the summoning or invoking of history (Alden 2007: 17–18; Gazibo
and Mbabia 2012: 63) for present purposes bends towards Africa from
China, Africa has an opportunity to equally respond in its own interest
with a coherent “going-towards-China” framework, drawing on its rich
history.
From an African agency starting point, the question can be posed:

how can Africa summon its own history in fashioning a policy framework
towards China? Just as Chinese leaders have in the past commissioned
researches to unravel historical aspects of the relations, African leaders
can also do so, at the supra-continental level (under the AU) as well
as the national and RECs levels. Just as Chinese leaders and scholars
have pointed out Chinese assistance to Africa, African leaders can also
pinpoint instances in which the continent assisted China in one way or
another, one among many examples being Africa’s diplomatic assistance
in voting in the People’s Republic of China to replace Taiwan at the UN
in 1971. Indeed, the vast tomes of material in African museums, univer-
sities, libraries, government repositories, parliamentary records and other
places can be scoured in understanding African historical perspectives on
China.
China’s Africa Policy One to Two

If the historical dimensions in support for the need for an African policy
towards China may seem vague on account of being dated, bringing the
discussion up to speed by looking at China’s Africa policy documents can
persuade us on the need for an African policy framework towards China
in the immediate.
China announced its first Africa policy in 2006 and its second policy
in 2015. Africa has had no policy towards China over this period giving
rise to the view that the continent is lagging behind China for nearly
two decades as of 2019, a case of failure of African agency. An overall
observation is that China had a lot more to say to Africa in its 2015 policy
than in its 2006 policy. The 2006 policy is just over 3000 words while
the 2015 one is 8000-plus words. The new, 2015 policy is much more
detailed and elaborate, so much so that it begins to lose a strict policy
feel and reads like a strategy as it draws on and incorporates elements of
the FOCAC declarations and action plans. The upshot is that China has a
detailed plan towards Africa while Africa largely has none. This may in part
explain why the FOCAC mechanism is indeed “a veritable extension of
China’s Africa Policy” (Wekesa 2014: 66) rather than being a completely
equal mechanism.
China’s first policy coincided with the first FOCAC Summit in Beijing
in October 2006 while the second policy coincided with the Johannes-
burg Summit of December 2015, roughly a decade in between. Notably,
18 B. WEKESA
no major and overarching policy promulgations were made during the

seventh FOCAC conference in 2018. Rather, the decisions of the 2015
policy were affirmed and an implantation scorecard issued. To understand
the significance of the two policies, we need to consider the fact that both
were announced at heads of state and government summits rather than
at “ordinary” triennial ministers meetings or conferences. It would thus
appear that a tradition has been established where China symbolically
articulates its broad guiding principles towards Africa at “extraordinary”
heads of state and government conclaves, i.e. FOCAC summits, rather
than “ordinary” triennial ministerial FOCAC conferences. If this is the
case, it can be speculated that the next China policy on Africa will be
announced at the 2024 or 2027 conferences, which, again speculatively,
are likely to be heads of state summits. African agency would demand
that at that point in time, a firm African policy document would have
been developed.
The new, 2015 document articulates “China’s Africa policy under the
new circumstances”, just as the 2006 paper also talked of “new circum-
stances”. In 2015, China had clearly learned certain facts about engaging
with Africa over the previous fifteen years and concluded that relations
required re-engineering. Yet new circumstances would also account for
the changes in China, Africa and globally that motivated tinkering with
the original policy. So what are these changes and “new circumstances”?
It is important to understand that China has done introspection and
strategized on what it wants from Africa and what it wants to do with
Africa in the global system. For one, the Chinese economy had dramat-
ically changed over the period as witness the slowdown in its economic
growth rates from double to single digits. In another example, China’s
engagements with the United States of America had become fraught with
near Cold War rivalry. In all these and more, China was seeking alliance,
perhaps even allegiance from Africa. By contrast, it is safe to conclude
that Africa as a whole has not gone to the drawing board to explic-
itly formulate and structure what it needs from China in view of the
many dynamics inside and outside the continent. It may be argued that
individual African countries may have developed policies towards China,
but even on this score evidence is scant beyond the bilateral agreements.
What would Africa seek from China in view of the roll-out of the African
Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) in 2019?
While rhetorical statements framed as developing nation solidarity
between China and Africa as well as China’s “five principles of peaceful
co-existence” were captured in the 2006 policy, they are curiously absent
in the 2015 document. While the first policy referred often to the “long
history” of engagements, the second policy at best only alludes to this.
Nonetheless, China’s charm offensive towards Africa is as palpable as ever.
China and Africa are “good friends who stand together through thick and
thin, good partners who share weal and woe, and good brothers who fully
trust each other”. The new policy clarifies the values-laden rhetoric that
has been the mainstay of its official communication towards Africa by
explaining what is meant by “sincerity, practical results, affinity and good
faith”. Still, discourse analysis can separate the tangible economic, political
and cultural interests from the euphemism, in a manner to suggest that
the chummy language is a means to an end. As I argue in the intervening
section of this chapter, African agency in the formulation of an African
policy towards China would have to pay close attention to the deploy-
ment of linguistic devices such as metaphors and catchphrases. After all,
language is not value-neutral.
The core of the 2015 policy lies in the elevation of Africa in China’s
foreign policy pecking order. From the “new type of strategic partner-
ship” status of 2006, relations were kicked a notch higher as “compre-
hensive strategic and cooperative partnership”. Like any other country
China has foreign policy priorities. Some scholars have argued that Africa
ranks very low in China’s global foreign policy calculations faring only
better than Latin America (Yun Sun 2014: 15). Of foremost importance
to China are the “big powers”, considered “key” to Chinese foreign
policy; followed by nations in China’s periphery (East and Southeast
Asia), considered “priority”; and then Africa and other regions consid-
ered the “foundation”, interpreted to mean that Africa poses little of a
headache to Beijing’s global policy (Yun Sun 2014: 14).
What does this loaded yet seemingly amorphous phase, “comprehen-
sive strategic and cooperative partnership”, as captured in the 2015 policy
document mean? To better appreciate the import of this phrase, we can
recall former Chinese premier Wen Jiabao’s words at the launch of the
Sino-EU Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2004 (Feng Zhongping
and Huang Jing 2014).
By ‘comprehensive’, it means that the cooperation should be all-

dimensional, wide-ranging and multi-layered. It covers economic, scientific,
technological, political and cultural fields, contains both bilateral and
20 B. WEKESA
multilateral levels, and is conducted by both governments and non-

governmental groups. By ‘strategic’, it means that the cooperation should
be long-term and stable, bearing on the larger picture of China-EU rela-
tions. It transcends the differences in ideology and social system and is not
subjected to the impacts of individual events that occur from time to time.
By ‘partnership’, it means that the cooperation should be equal-footed,
mutually beneficial and win-win. The two sides should base themselves on
mutual respect and mutual trust, endeavour to expand converging interests
and seek common ground on the major issues while shelving differences
on the minor ones.
Given that the relations were framed as “strategic” without being “com-
prehensive” in the 2006 policy, Africa–China observers would do well to
consider ways in which “all-dimensional, wide-ranging and multi-layered”
aspects will be implemented. One way to look at this question is to
consider China’s designation of relations with African countries. Most
African countries seem to fall either in the “partnership” and “strategic
partnership” category while a few, such as Egypt, Nigeria, Kenya and
South Africa, fall under “comprehensive strategic partnership”. This cate-
gorization seems based on the level of economic significance of an African
country to China. The upshot is that Africa as a continent now has the
same strategic value and status as the likes of Egypt, Kenya and South
Africa, at least on paper. Although Africa has long been of strategic impor-
tance to China, the 2015 policy framing suggested that the relations
would go a notch higher still and begin approaching the importance of
the big powers (the United States and Europe) and South East Asia in
China’s foreign policy. African policymakers would need to study China’s
partnership with these powers to gain insights that can be adapted to the
Africa–China relationship.
The 2015 policy captured China’s “centenary goals”, i.e. the “Chi-
nese Dream” and building a “moderately prosperous society” by 2021.
Broadly, this is what China wants Africa to help it achieve. But in a
win-win, mutually beneficial fashion, China would reciprocate and help
Africa achieve its own long-term goals embedded in the AU’s Agenda
2063. The fact that the new policy takes cognizance of Agenda 2063
suggests that Chinese policymakers have taken careful note of it. An
African policy framework towards China would have to be feature state-
ments on how China can help Africa achieve its long term goal of “an
integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens,
representing a dynamic force in the international arena”. It would have
to link Chinese interests closely to Agenda 2063’s seven aspirations:

sustainable growth, Pan-African integration, good governance, peace and
security, African identity, people-centredness and global influence (African
Union Commission 2015).
Agenda 2063 is big on the integration of the continent politically and
economically, advocating as it does, cross-border infrastructural develop-
ment as a facilitator for the movement of people, goods and services.
Despite the Agenda talking of achieving Africa’s goals with internally
generated funding, the continent may look to China to leverage its policy
proposals which include (as stated in the policy), “comparative advantages
in development experience, applied technology, funds and market … [to
address] backward infrastructure … inadequate professional and skilled
personnel, [and to] translate its natural and human resources advantages
and potential … speeding up industrialization and agricultural modern-
ization”. All these are captured in Agenda 2063 and it is safe to say
China realizes the importance of reinforcing the African policy, seeing
Africa holistically while at the same time differentiating on a country basis;
and thus the designation “comprehensive strategic and cooperative part-
nership”. Indeed China established a mission at the AU headquarters in
Addis Ababa in 2015, and invited Africa to reciprocate, an offer that the
AU seems not to have taken up. Yet it is important to remember that
China is guided by its own interests in the face of the new circumstances,
seeking to attain the two centenary goals and dealing with “new normal”
economics.
While the 2015 policy taps opportunities in Agenda 2063, there are
instances where it somewhat diverges from it. A reading of the document
indicates that continental integration with cross-border transport infras-
tructure at the top of the agenda, while China’s new policy seems to
prioritize industrialization. It is notable that in the 2015 policy, indus-
trialization is placed at the top of the section dealing with economic and
trade matters. This prioritization speaks to China’s intent on moving some
of its over-capacity manufacturing to Africa in the “new normal” circum-
stances. The policy speaks for itself: “China will make prioritizing support
for Africa’s industrialization a key area and a main focus in its cooperation
with Africa in the new era”.
Although Agenda 2063 is bigger on cross-border infrastructure devel-
opment than it is on industrialization, China’s 2015 policy places infras-
tructure development at the third tier of importance after agriculture and
industrialization. This can be seen in the structure of the 2015 FOCAC
22 B. WEKESA
document where agriculture comes first, followed by industrialization

and then infrastructure. Space does not allow for a full-fledged discus-
sion of the sectoral prioritization but I’m convinced that the ordering of
these sectors is not accidental but based on priorities envisioned by the
Chinese framers of the policy. In a manner of speaking, China has its
eyes set on Africa’s industrialization while Africa has its eyes set on trans-
port infrastructure development—at least based on prioritization in the
AU’s Agenda 2063 and China’s Africa Policy 2015 as seen in the order
in which they appear. If the AU is to draw on its Agenda 2063 strategy
in developing a policy or engagement strategy towards China, it would
perhaps have to negotiate for the centrality of infrastructure with linkages
to industrialization, agriculture, trade and investment, human resource
development, peace and security, etc. After all, these productive sectors
are not mutually exclusive; as the Chinese saying goes, “if you want to
get rich, build a road”.
Having analyzed China’s Africa policy from an African agency perspec-
tive, the next step is to apply the same African agency analytical framework
to FOCAC, which, as earlier explained, is both a policy mechanism as well
as an implementation plan or strategy.
The FOCAC Context

In configuring an African policy framework towards China, probably the
first point of consideration is its origins as a mechanism bringing together
the continent and China (Wekesa 2014; Hanauer and Morris 2014: 20;
Gazibo and Mbabia 2012: 57). Wekesa (2014) traces the beginnings
of FOCAC to President Jiang Zemin’s historic visit to Africa in 1996.
Back up for Jiang’s 1996 visit as a marker for the movement towards
the FOCAC era is provided by Li et al. (2012: 14). There have been
counter positions on the creation of FOCAC: whether it was created at
the request of Africans, if it was the result of Chinese competition with
a similar Africa–US initiative or if it squarely is a Chinese creation (see
Li et al. 2012: 30; 2012: 16). Specifically the Africa–China relations took
shape from October 2000 when the inaugural FOCAC conference was
held in Beijing. As of this writing, the mechanism has been in place for
eighteen years. Coincidentally, at the time of the FOCAC launch, Africa’s
new direction was at its embryonic stages with the AU being established
in 2002 as a successor to the Organization of African Unity (OAU).
An African agency route to the mooting of an African policy framework
towards China would have to appraise the performance of the AU vis-

à-vis FOCAC as a means of introspection on the successes and failure,
particularly of AU’s initiatives.
In principle, two documents that speak to FOCAC as a policy mech-
anism are, the “declaration”, and the “plan of action”. These documents
were released at FOCAC conferences, namely, 2000 Beijing, 2003 Addis
Ababa, 2006 Beijing, 2009 Sharm el-Sheikh, 2012 Beijing, 2015 Johan-
nesburg and 2018 Beijing. The FOCAC mechanism remains the fulcrum
of the relations (Shelton and Paruk 2008: 2) although there is contesta-
tion as to whether the mechanism was the initiative or agency of Chinese
or African actors (Wekesa 2014: 60).
FOCAC documents are crafted in a language of altruism and prag-
matism. However, an independent analysis reveals the underlying reasons
informing its formation. For starters, FOCAC came into being in 2000
smack on the turn of the millennium. The term “globalization” (which
is replete in FOCAC documents) was omnipresent at this point in time
with some suggesting it was a replacement of the Cold War geopolitics.
FOCAC can thus be seen as China’s (and secondarily Africa’s) response
to the tectonic changes in the world—real and anticipated.
If the inaugural FOCAC seemed to test the waters, the second event,
held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in December 2003 bore confidence in
the emerging form and substance of the mechanism. The holding of the
conference on the African continent went to demonstrate the joint owner-
ship of FOCAC. In addition Addis Ababa is the seat of the African Union
and thus holding the conference there was full of symbolism. By the time
of the second FOCAC, the mechanism had established an action point
development tradition that has become its hallmark.
The 2006 FOCAC summit established a new tradition—that of the
holding heads of state summits rather than ministerial meetings. This
tradition was confirmed with the elevation of the FOCAC ministerial
meeting in Johannesburg in 2015 to heads of state summit. Observers will
have to wait and see if a tradition of holding heads of state summits after
every decade is codified into FOCAC norms. Moreover, China pledge of
$5 billion in loans established another trend in which monies allocated to
Africa are doubled at subsequent conferences (thus, $10 billion in 2009,
$20 billion in 2012 and $60 billion in 2015). This tradition seems to
have been abandoned as the 2018 financial pledges remained at the 2015
levels ($60 billion) rather a doubling to $120 billion. An important point
to note is that Agenda 2063 was captured in FOCAC VI. This is indeed
24 B. WEKESA
an instance of African agency as it speaks to African actors ensuring that

Chinese agenda embedded in FOCAC take cognizance of the continent’s
developmental roadmap.
While FOCAC is an overarching mechanism, its triennial cycle is
nuanced on the Chinese end, at the operational levels, broken down
into sub forums representing narrower interests that then interlock
with African counterparts. Its structures and processes comprise the
Chinese follow-up action committee, the line ministries (foreign affairs,
commerce and finance), auxiliary ministries, government agencies, non-
governmental agencies among others (Li et al. 2012: 20–30).
The above discussion is convincing enough about FOCAC being either
a joint mechanism between Africa and China or being more a Chinese
than African mechanism. African agency would demand that Africa creates
its own independent policy framework towards China while not aban-
doning FOCAC. In the next section, I offer some initial suggestions on
some of the pathways towards establishing an independent African policy
towards China.
Pathways for African Policy Towards China

As discussed earlier, African agency should guide the African policy
towards China agenda. The key policy site for the development of
an African policy towards China is the Agenda 2063 (African Union
Commission 2015) and its offshoot documents, especially the “first ten-
year implementation plan 2014-2023” (The African Union Commission
2015). The Agenda 2063 envisions a continent “representing a dynamic
force in the international arena” (African Union Commission 2015: 1).
In using the African policy architecture to develop an African policy
towards China, the policy community need not start from scratch. China
has reached agreements with African Union (AU), the New Partner-
ship for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and African Regional Economic
Communities (RECs) while at the same time entering specific agreements
with individual nations (Li et al. 2012: 12; CCS 2010: 16; Gazibo and
Mbabia 2012: 59; Alden 2007: 32). An African policy framework should
take cognizance of the duality of multilateral Pan-African engagements,
relations at the RECs level and the national level. In so doing, the consti-
tutive documents of the AU and the RECs such as their charter and
overarching plans such as the Agenda 2063 can provide pathways for an
African policy towards China. Notably, the AU was formally incorporated
into the FOCAC mechanism at the Johannesburg summit and this is an

instance of African agency that can be built on.
Africa aspires to be “an equal participant in global affairs [and]
multilateral institutions…” (African Union Commission 2015: 10). The
theme of an Africa with a strong and united voice on the global stage
is reflected in the ten-year implementation plan for the period 2014–
2023. Indeed, scholars have long taken cognizance of the multilateral
and international politics dimension of the engagements (for instance
Alden 2007: 27; Shelton and Paruk 2008; Gazibo and Mbabia 2012:
52). In developing an African policy towards China, Africa should
identify the priorities that can help it to raise its voice and participa-
tion in international affairs. An area in which Africa and China have
expressed mutual agreement as seen in FOCAC documents is that Africa
should have a permanent slot in the United Nations Security Council
under the rubric of the reformation of the United Nations. To my
mind this is a crucial aspiration that should be prioritized in the policy
framework as it would help “correct the historical injustice of Africa not
being represented on the Council by a permanent seat” (African Union
Commission 2015: 10). This particular aspect could be crafted in the
policy framework in such a way that China prioritizes the entry of Africa
in the United Nations Security Council within a set period of time.
Rather than being static, FOCAC is quite dynamic. In what could
amount to Deng Xiaoping’s “cross the river while feeling the stones”
aphorism, China experimented with FOCAC between its establishment
in 2000 and sometime after the second FOCAC conference of 2003.
Having gained confidence about FOCAC, the Chinese side organized the
mega event that was FOCAC III in Beijing, an event that was converted
from a mere conference to a summit. From afar, FOCAC may seem like a
mechanism that came ready-made and one that has remained fixed. Closer
examination reveals that it has been changing giving vent to anticipa-
tion of further changes going forward (Gazibo and Mbabia 2012: 55; Li
et al. 2012: 32; Centre for Chinese Studies 2010: 15). An African policy
framework towards China would have to review and understand changes
in the FOCAC set up and mechanisms as well as anticipate and influ-
ence future changes. For instance, Chinese leaders are currently focused
on promoting the Belt and Road Initiative, a major geopolitical plan in
which Africa features. Notably, the Belt and Road Initiative did not make
it into FOCAC VI documents but featured at the 2018 conference. In
Africa itself, the Agenda 2063 and its first ten-year plan as well as the
26 B. WEKESA
report by President Paul Kagame (2017) on the proposed institutional

reform of the AU speak to the kind of dynamism in Africa that should
inform an African policy framework towards China.
In developing an African policy towards China, African intellectuals
and policymakers need to take stock of the “soft power” language
deployed in FOCAC and respond appropriately. Where the language bears
hallmarks of Chinese thinking, there would be a need for an African
rhetoric based on the concepts of Pan-Africanism and African renais-
sance as used in the African Union’s constitutive documents including the
Agenda 2063 document. Indeed, borrowing from the fact that FOCAC
heavily draws on Chinese philosophy, history and foreign policy, an
African policy framework towards China can equally draw on African
thoughts such as African socialism and Ubuntuism. An authentic African
language in the framing of an African policy towards China would indeed
signal negotiation based on African and Chinese worldviews.
What can be gained from Africa’s relations with supranational organi-
zations such as UN to the benefit of FOCAC? For instance, how can
the policy framework be constructed in such a way that Africa bene-
fits from China’s involvement with the UN’s Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs)? What would be the guiding principles for Africa’s engage-
ment with China in a multipolar world in which global powers such as
the USA, EU, Japan and Russia remain hugely influential? How should
Africa’s relations be configured in such a way that the continent’s prox-
imity to China does not harm relations with emerging powers such as
India, Turkey, Singapore, South Korea and others? Can China really help
Africa to attain the longstanding clamour for a United Nations Security
Council seat as well as a greater voice in the international sphere? All these
inquisitions would guide the framing of the African policy towards China.
Conclusion
In conclusion and to re-emphasize earlier points, the absence of an African
policy speaks to the slanted nature of the relations, a fact that should
inspire corrective action. Developing an African policy should however
not be an emotional and reactive undertaking, but one that is delib-
erate and well thought. It would be important for a select team of
African scholars and intellectuals to come together to spearhead this policy
agenda before the next FOCAC conference. One of the major tasks of
the proposed African policy development group would be to undertake a
deep reflection on Africa–China engagements in the FOCAC era. This can

be done via thoroughgoing longitudinal and comparative review of official
documents, both African and Chinese. Some of the pertinent questions
leading to the formulation of an African document on China can revolve
around FOCAC: what is it in relation to Africa? What do we learn from
its language? What do it’s continental versus country-level perspectives
tell us? What impact does it have on Africa’s relations with other parts of
the world?
Note
1. China’s Africa policiesand the FOCAC documents are available at www.foc
ac.org.
References
Africa Union Commission. 2010. China and Africa: Assessing the Relationship
on the Eve of the Fourth Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC
IV), The Bulletin of Fridays of the Commission, South African Institute of
International Affairs.
African Union Commission. 2015. Agenda 2063: The Africa we Want, Addis
Ababa, Ethiopia.
African Union Commission. 2017. African Union Handbook 2017: A Guide for
Those Working with and Within the African Union, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
Alden, C. 2007. China in Africa, Zed Books, London/New York.
Alden, C and Large, D. 2011. China’s Exceptionalism and the Challenges of
Delivering Difference in Africa, Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 20, no.
68, pp. 21–38.
Brown, W and Harman, S. 2013. African Agency in International Politics, Rout-
ledge Studies on African Politics and International Relations, Routledge 2013,
USA/Canada.
Centre for Chinese Studies. 2010. Evaluating China’s FOCAC Commitments to
Africa and Mapping the Way Ahead, A Report by the Centre for Chinese
Studies Prepared for the Rockefeller Foundation, January 2010.
Chege, M. (2008). Economic Relations Between Kenya and China, 1963–
2007. In Cook, J., (ed.), US and Chinese Engagement in Africa: Prospects
for Improving US-China-Africa Cooperation, Washington, DC: Center for
Strategic Studies, pp. 12–33.
Chibundu, V. N. 2000. Nigeria–China Relations (1960–1999), Spectrum Books
Limited, Ibadan, Nigeria.
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Feng Zhongping and Huang Jing. 2014. China’s Strategic Partnership Diplo-
macy: Engaging with a Changing World, The Global Partnership Grid Series,
ESPO Working Paper 8, June 2014.
Fernando, S. 2007. Chronology of China–Africa Relations, China Report 2007,
vol. 43, p. 363.
Gazibo, M and Mbabia, O. 2012. Reordering International Affairs: The Forum
on China-Africa Cooperation. Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy &
International Relations, vol. 1, no. l, Jan–Jun 2012, pp. 51–74.
Hanauer, L and Morris, J. L. 2014. Chinese Engagement in Africa: Drivers,
Reactions, and Implications for U.S. Policy, Rand Corporation.
Li, A. 2005. African Studies in China in the Twentieth Century: A Historio-
graphical Survey, African Studies Review, vol. 48, no. 1, pp. 59–87.
Li, A. 2015. African Diaspora in China: Reality, Research and Reflection, The
Journal of Pan African Studies, vol. 7, no. 10, May 2015, pp. 10–43.
Li, A. et al. 2012. FOCAC Twelve Years Later: Achievements, Challenges and the
Way Forward, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. Lightning Source Publishers.
Mohan, G, and Lampert, B. 2012. Negotiating China: Reinserting African
Agency into China-Africa Relations, African Affairs, vol. 112, no. 446,
pp. 92–110.
Montoya, C. 2006. Do Events Matter? Critical Review of a Proposed Research
Agenda, Working Paper, Centre for International Politics, Manchester Univer-
sity, Manchester, UK.
Murithi, T. 2014. Introduction: The Evolution of Africa’s International Relations,
in Handbook of Africa’s International Relations, Routledge, London, UK.
Ndlovu-Gatsheni, J. S. 2014. Pan-Africanism and the International System. In
Murithi, T., (ed.), Handbook of Africa’s International Relations, Routledge,
London, UK, 21–29.
Shelton, G, and Paruk, F. 2008. The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation: A
Strategic Opportunity. Institute for Security Studies: Pretoria, South Africa.
Tieku, K. T. 2014. Theoretical Approaches to Africa’s International Relations. In
Murithi, T., (ed.), Handbook of Africa’s International Relations, Routledge,
London, UK.
Wekesa, B. 2014. Whose Event? Official Versus Journalistic Framing of the Fifth
Forum on China Africa Cooperation, Journal of African Media Studies, vol.
6, no. 1, pp. 57–70.
Wekesa, B. 2015. China’s Africa Policy: New Policy for New Circumstances, Wits
Africa China Reporting Project. http://china-africa-reporting.co.za/2015/
12/chinas-africa-policy-2015-new-policy-for-new-circumstances/.
Wekesa, B. 2017. Chinese Media and Diplomacy in Africa: Theoretical pathways.
In Batchelor, K and Zhang, X., (eds.), China’s Africa Relations, Routledge,
Abingdon, UK, 149–166.
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for a Common Integrated African Policy on China, 20 July 2017, accessed
September 3, 2017 at http://africachinareporting.co.za/2017/07/report-
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Relations? Occasional Paper 205, South African Institute of International
Affairs.
CHAPTER 3
Regionalizing Sino-African Diplomatic

Engagement: Kagame and Overcoming
the ‘One and the Many’ Paradigm
Francis A. Kornegay Jr.
Introduction
At the beginning of 2017 The Conversation ran a short analysis on ‘How
the African Union’s planned overhaul may affect its ties with China’,
by Yu-Shan Wu1 (italics added). Her article referenced: The Imperative
to Strengthen Our Union: Report on the Proposed Recommendations for
the Institutional Report of the African Union, 29 January 2017 .2 Known
less cumbersomely as ‘The Kagame Report’, Wu speculated on how the
report’s recommendations would impact partnership summits like the
Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and Africa’s external rela-
tions more generally with a ‘less is more’ emphasis on divisions of labour
in inter-African governance and diplomacy. The reforms, if implemented,
carry potentially major implications for regionalizing continental diplo-
macy with Africa’s major development partners. In the process, this would
F. A. Kornegay Jr. (B)

Institute for Global Dialogue, Associated with UNISA,

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53039-6_3
32 F. A. KORNEGAY JR.
move Africa away from the ‘one and the many’ paradigm in its relations
with external powers, not just China. This is the main theme of focus in
this FOCAC chapter.
However, a fitting caveat in The Conversation piece, ‘may affect’ was an
appropriate caution; that is, given past history of unimplemented reform
plans of action emanating from Addis.3 Speculation in this article on how
these latest reform proposals will affect FOCAC will be revisited more
fully later in this chapter. For now, the structural defects in Africa’s inter-
national relations are focused on in terms of the Kagame report’s findings
as prelude to honing in on the specifically FOCAC dimension in as much
as FOCAC reflects a much broader and more fundamental set of concerns
extending beyond Africa–China relations.
The Kagame report, emphasizing as it does much-needed institu-
tional consolidation at continental and regional levels, provides the point
of departure for updating a much earlier critique by this author of
Sino-African asymmetries appearing in the 2008 Stellenbosch Univer-
sity Centre for Chinese Studies (CCS) collection New Impulses From the
South: China’s Engagement of Africa.4 This monograph was compiled
and co-edited by Hanna Edinger with Hayley Herman and Johanna
Jansson. Under the heading ‘Africa’s Strategic Diplomatic Engagement
with China’ this author analysed the essentially unequally reactive African
interaction with China.5
By honing in on FOCAC, this chapter updates the CCS contribution.
It explores how, aspirationally, continentalism and regionalism illuminate
the challenge of Africa arriving at ‘common positions’ as one aspect of
the more fundamental challenge of pan-African agency. In this vein, it
bears pointing out that ever since Chris Landsberg and this author penned
‘Engaging emerging powers: Africa’s search for a “common position”’,
April 2009 in Politikon, much has changed while remaining the same.6
Indeed, this predicament defines the conundrum confronting the
Kagame report. It addresses, at its heart, ‘the one and many’ paradigm
in Africa’s external relations with development partners wherein FOCAC
is emblematic in problematizing the China–Africa equation.
As such, the challenge confronting ‘common positions’ can be
approached as an aspect of more fundamental challenges confronting
regional and continental integration as this relates to institutional consol-
idation—in other words, overcoming the OAU foundational legacy of
institutionalizing the fragmenting Berlin partitioning of the continent.
This is at the heart of concerns that motivated the Kagame report. Tabled
3 REGIONALIZING SINO-AFRICAN DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT … 33
at the beginning of 2017, this report is only the latest in a succession of

such tomes on continental governance reform to have been tabled, only
to have been left to gather dust. As such, its fate is awaited with baited
breath!
As for how this relates to emerging powers between 2009 and 2017,
what obtains in terms of Sino-African relations via FOCAC, pretty
much holds for other emerging powers as well. However, because of
Beijing’s dominance relative to other external actors on the continent,
developed and developing alike, the FOCAC relationship provides a
fitting case-study in how a genuinely strategic diplomatic engagement
with external powers has and continues to elude Africa. Why this is so
speaks volumes on the debilitating impact of the continent’s fragmen-
tation within a governing superstructure comprising the African Union
(AU), regional economic communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms
(RMs), all virtually devoid of meaningful leverage over 55 heads-of-state
jealously guarding their ‘national sovereignty’ in their own personal power
interests.
This chapter seeks to critically examine FOCAC as an unequal part-
nership between Africa and China based on how it reflects ‘the one and
the many’ paradigm of Africa’s subordinate international relations with
external powers. It is argued that overcoming this predicament towards
the continent’s empowerment is contingent on advancing the very AU
continentalism via its regional pillars, the RECs, and regional mecha-
nisms as outlined in the Kagame report on institutional consolidation.
This is where The Conversation brief is instructive on its implications for
the FOCAC future.
For Africa to mount strategic diplomatic engagement with China, a
clearly delineated African strategic approach must be outlined not only
in relation to China, but traditional and other emerging powers as well.
However, with FOCAC as its focus, this treatise attempts to address
Africa’s strategic strengths and weaknesses vis-à-vis China and how these
might inform a strategic diplomatic approach towards Beijing.
One of the enduring aspects of the debate concerning China’s involve-
ment in Africa has been Africa’s virtual invisibility as a proactive actor
and the almost incidental manner in which the continent figures in this
debate. It has been a discourse focused mainly on western concerns about
Sino-African relations as reflecting the global rise of China. Mainstream
media commentary and policy discourse on ‘China–Africa’ has invariably
emphasized how China’s behaviour on the continent may or may not gain
favour in the West. Consequently, there has been an obliviousness to the

African voice regarding how opinion in the continent views Africa’s rela-
tions with China accompanied by critical appraisals of the Sino-African
relationship in terms of how it serves or compromises Africa’s interests.
Restructuring the AU
Multi-bilateral Partnership System
To a large extent, the manner in which the China–Africa debate has been
framed reflects as much, if not more on the seeming absence of strate-
gically pro-active African diplomacy as it has on non-African perceptions.
Here, one can venture this is a predicament embedded in Africa’s frag-
mented political map with all the disadvantages it imposes on Africa’s
international relations in coherent continental governance terms; that is,
the fact that in the European debate on how much ‘Europe’ in relation to
European Union (EU) member states is optimum in carrying forward the
EU’s agenda, the same applies to Africa and the AU—the fact that there
simply is not nearly enough Africa viz-a-viz each of 55 sovereign inde-
pendent AU member states to enable Africa to proactively overcome the
continent’s reactive ‘one and the many’ asymmetry in its external relations
with the world’s major powers.
It is this predicament that the Kagame report is intended to redress
in tandem with efforts aimed at enabling the AU to lessen depen-
dency on the external financing of its operations. This latest continental
blueprint and the extent to which it is implemented holds important
implications in how Sino-African relations are conducted within the multi-
bilateral framework of FOCAC; this is in as much as the aim of Kagame
is to substantially redress the asymmetry in this framework by intro-
ducing more ‘Africa’ and less individual AU member state bilateralism
in Sino-African equations.
While FOCAC no longer remains outside the AU official partnership
framework, the Kagame report would further elevate the role of the AU
and it’s regional economic communities as the mediating institutional
layer in the overall partnership system.7 All external actors, including
China, would have to engage the continental African agenda via the
RECs. Here, it is instructive to revisit the earlier critique of the Sino-
African relationship by this author under the subheading, ‘Fashioning an
AU Strategy: In search of African unity and unity of approach’.8
3 REGIONALIZING SINO-AFRICAN DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT … 35
This section served as the departure point for exploring AU–REC rela-
tions in navigating Sino-African relations. This was based on reporting
on a conference jointly organized by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES)
and the Consumer Unity Trust Society with the coordination and liaison
manager of the AU’s Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). It
emerged from these discussions that the AU had been directed by its
Summit to play a bigger role in Africa’s relations with India, Brazil
and Turkey besides China, although the Sino-African dimension was the
conference focus.9
It was pointed out that a coordinating role for the AU would be in
the interest of ‘not only African countries but also China’, and would
provide for a ‘greater opportunity for a more focused and better orga-
nized engagement with China’,10 Of particular importance in light of
the AU’s ninth summit’s ‘US of Africa’ decision in 2007 to strengthen
and rationalize the REC pillars of the AU, was the continental body’s
stated intent to ‘co-ordinate and guide Africa’s regional economic blocs
and member states in coming up with a multilateral approach to doing
business with the main emerging world powers’.11
This prospect posed a question: if such a joint AU–REC coordinating
framework for engaging China and other emerging powers was to inform
a new African diplomacy, how might such a framework be structured?
Here, the article did not spell out such details as may have emerged
from the conference. However, the fact that the conference involved
FES as a major German donor was seen at the time as indicative of the
EU’s concern about emerging power involvement in the continent rather
than how Africa itself engages with already established developed Western
powers like Germany. However, as the AU/DTI approach to coordi-
nating Africa’s international economic relations was going to be crafted,
it would have to address developed and developing world partners alike.
Under the subheading ‘Regionalizing Sino-African diplomatic Engage-
ment’ an illustrative architecture for coordinating multilateral engagement
was suggested as a strategy that future African summits might adopt. This
would call for FOCAC to be broken down into joint AU–REC summits
with FOCAC along such lines as: AU/SADC-FOCAC; AU/ECOWAS-
FOCAC; AU/EAC-FOCAC, etc. Alternatively, these might, in ‘bottom-
up’ fashion, serve as preparatory AU–REC consultations feeding into
a smaller delegation of REC representivity at the FOCAC partnership
summit level.12
Hence, for example, a SADC-FOCAC forum (or an ECOWAS-

FOCAC Forum, etc.) involving the facilitating coordination of the AU’s
DTI might allow for sub-regional engagements with China at the REC
level or as in preparatory prelude to the actual summit. In this manner,
more regionally focused and relevant Sino-African economic relations
would inform the FOCAC agenda.
Continental Regionalism in Limbo

I: The Missing REC Pillar
These could be capped off by periodic Africa-wide AU-FOCAC summits.
The fact that the grand Beijing summit of FOCAC on 4 November 2006,
with all of Africa’s leaders apparently did not feature a central coordi-
nating role for the AU was seen as indicative of what has been lacking
in terms of strategic equality between China and Africa. This principle
mandates the central role that should be played by the AU in conjunc-
tion with the RECs involving all such summits. Whereas, at the time, the
AU was side-lined from its rightful coordinating role, this arrangement
allowed for non-AU member Morocco to participate in FOCAC.
This concession essentially disrespected the AU in deference to
Morocco. Rabat had withdrawn from the body over the unresolved
issue of Western Sahara. Though this issue remains unresolved Morocco
returned to the AU fold in 2017, thereby changing the circumstances
marginalizing the AU in China’s FOCAC calculus.
Yet Beijing rigidly mandates a ‘One China’ conditionality in all its
diplomatic relations without exception. Moreover, joint AU–REC diplo-
macy towards China and other major powers, including the developed
countries, would add a crucial dimension and incentive for the AU to
begin, in earnest, the difficult and complicated but necessary rationaliza-
tion of the multiplicity of RECs into the AU’s five regions.
Africa was, at the time, already under pressure in this regard in terms
of implementing the EU’s Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs)
wherein the regional/sub-regional boundaries of such agreements needed
to be delineated. At a July 2007 conference in Cape Town, then South
African Finance Minister Trevor Manuel warned that Africa had to be in
the driver’s seat in determining such boundaries.13
Here was an excellent example of why AU/REC diplomacy regarding
China and other major powers needed to factor in the EU and, at the
time, and the G8 generally. For a regionally-based AU/REC strategy
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
CAPITULO XX
Como fue convertido en rana y lo

que le sucedio de allí.
Gallo.—Yo ahogado á la verdad

no me pesó, por dejar tanto
trabajo y mala compañia que me
llevaba. Plugo á Dios que me
dieron por complida la penitencia
por las deudas de Epulon é fuí
convertido allí en rana.
Micillo.—Cuentame ¡oh
Pitágoras! qué vida hacias
cuando eras rana.
Gallo.—Muy buena, porque
luego hice amistad con todos los
géneros de peces que alli
andaban é todos me trataban
bien; mi comer era de las ovas del
rio, é salida á la orilla saltando y
holgando con mis compañeras
pasciamos unas yerbecitas
delicadas é tiernas que eran
buenas para nuestro comer; no
teníamos fortuna, ni fuego ni
tempestad ni otro género de
acaescimiento que nos
perjudicase. Pasado ansi algun
tiempo...
CAPITULO XXI
Como fue convertido en ramera

mujer llamada Clarichea.
Pasado así algun tiempo en aquel

rio fue convertido en Clarichea,
ramera famosa.
Micillo.—¡Oh! qué admirable
transformacion; de asno en rana;
de rana en ramera galana.
Gallo.—Pues quién bastara á te
contar lo que siendo rana me
acontecio y siendo ramera la
solicitud que tenía, si no fuera por
sernos ya el dia tan cercano para
te lo contar muy por extenso, lo
qual no me da lugar; y aquel
cuidado que tenía de en adquerir
los enamorados y el trabajo que
sufria en conservar los servidores
y el astucia con que los robaba su
moneda; aquella manera de los
despedir y aquella industria de los
volver y el contino hastío que
tenia de mis afeites y
composturas de atavíos y el
martirio que pasaba mi rostro y
manos con las mudas; aquel sufrir
de pelar las cejas, que con cada
pelo que sacaba se me arrancaba
el alma de dolor, y con los afeites
y adobos, pues todo mi cuerpo
con los baños y ungüentos y otras
muchas cosas que aplaciese á
todos los que me querian; y aquel
sufrir de malas noches y malos
días, no tengo ya fuerza para te lo
contar por extenso. Despues...
CAPITULO XXII
Como fue convertido en gañan

del campo como servio á un
avariento y despues fue
tornado pavon é otras muchas
cosas.
Después desto fue convertido en

gañan del campo, adonde de
contino con mucho trabajo sin
reposo ninguno ni nunca entrar en
poblado pasaba muy triste vida.
Vine á servir y ser criado de un
mísero avariento que me mataba
de hambre, de lo cual no te doy
entera cuenta lo que en este caso
me sucedio, y fue transformado
en pavon y agora gallo. ¡Oh!
Micillo, si particularmente te
hobiese de decir la vida y trabajos
que he pasado en cada uno
destos míseros estados no
bastarían cien mill años que no
hiciese sino contártelo. Por eso ya
viene la mañana, por lo qual
quiero concluir porque vayas al
trabajo, porque en esperanza de
tu sueño no moramos de hambre,
que creo que desde las diez
encomenzamos la prática sin
nada nos estorbar y son dadas
cinco horas.
Micillo.—Admirado me tienen
los trabajos desta vida, ¡oh Gallo!
Pues dime ahora lo que me
prometiste, que deseo mucho
saber: ¿cual estado te paresció
mejor?
Gallo.—Entre los brutos cuando
era rana; entre los hombres
siendo un pobre hombre como tú,
porque tú no tienes que temer
próspera ni adversa fortuna, ni te
pueden perjudicar, no estás á la
luz del mundo porque nadie te
calunie; solo vives sin perjuicio de
otro, comiendo de tu sudor
ganado á tu placer, sin usuras ni
daño de tu ánima; duermes sueño
seguro, sin temer que por tu
hacienda te hayan de matar ni
robar; si hay guerra no hacen
cuenta de tí; si préstamos ó
censuras no temes que te ha de
caber nada. En conclusion que
bienaventurado el que vive en
pobleza si es prudente en la
saber sollevar.
Micillo.—¡Oh! mi buen Gallo, yo
conozco que tienes mucha razon
y pues es venido el día quiero ir al
trabajo y por el buen consuelo
que me has dado en tu comer te
lo agradeceré, como por la obra lo
verás. Quédate con Dios, que yo
me voy á trabajar.
FIN DEL DIALOGO DE LAS

TRANSFORMACIONES
EL CROTALON
DE
CHRISTOPHORO
GNOSOPHO
Natural de la insula Eutrapelia,
una de las insulas Fortunadas.
PROLOGO DEL AUCTOR

AL LECTOR CURIOSO
Porque cualquiera persona en

cuyas manos cayere este nuestro
trabajo (si por ventura fuere digno
de ser de alguno leydo) tenga
entendida la intincion del auctor,
sepa que por ser enemigo de la
oçiosidad, por tener esperiençia
ser el oçio causa de toda maliçia;
queriendose ocupar en algo que
fuesse digno del tiempo que en
ello se pudiesse consumir; pensó
escreuir cosa que en apazible
estilo pudiesse aprouechar. Y ansi
imaginó como debajo de vna
corteça apazible y de algun sabor
diesse á entender la maliçia en
que los hombres emplean el dia
de oy su viuir. Porque en ningun
tiempo se pueden más á la
verdad que en el presente
verificar aquellas palabras que
escriuió Moysen en el
Genessi [294]: «Que toda carne
mortal tiene corrompida y errada
la carrera y regla de su viuir».
Todos tuerçen la ley de su
obligaçion. Y porque tengo
entendido el comun gusto de los
hombres, que les aplaze más leer
cosas del donayre; coplas,
chançonetas y sonetos de placer,
antes que oyr cosas graues,
prinçipalmente si son hechas en
reprehension, porque á ninguno
aplaze que en sus flaquezas le
digan la verdad; por tanto procuré
darles esta manera de doctrinal
abscondida y solapada debajo de
façeçias, fabulas, nouelas y
donayres: en los quales tomando
sabor para leer vengan á
aprouecharse de aquello que
quiere mi intincion. Este estilo y
orden tuuieron en sus obras
muchos sabios antiguos
endereçados en este mesmo fin;
Como Ysopo y Caton, Aulo gelio,
Juan bocacio, Juan pogio
florentin; y otros muchos que
seria largo contar. Hasta
Aristoteles, Plutarco, Platon. Y
Cristo enseñó con parábolas y
exemplos al pueblo y á sus
discípulos la dotrina celestial. El
título de la obra es Crotalon[295]:
que es vocablo griego; que en
castellano quiere decir; juego de
sonajas, ó terreñuelas, conforme
á la intinçion del auctor.
Contrahaze el estilo y inuençion
de Luciano; famoso orador griego
en el su gallo: donde hablando vn
gallo con vn su amo çapatero
llamado Miçilo reprehendió los
viçios de su tiempo: y en otros
muchos libros y dialogos que
escriuió. Tambien finge el auctor
ser sueño imitando al mesmo
Luçiano que al mesmo dialogo del
gallo llama sueño. Y hazelo el
auctor porque en esta su obra
pretende escreuir de diuersidad
de cosas y sin orden: lo qual es
proprio de sueño: porque cada
vez que despierta tornandose á
dormir sueña cosas diversas de
las que antes soñó. Y es de notar
que por no ser traduçion a la letra
ni al sentido le llama contrahecho:
porque solamente se imita el
estilo. Llama a los libros o
diversidad de dialogos, canto:
porque es lenguage de gallo
cantar. O porque son todos
hechos al canto del gallo en el
postrero sueño a la mañana:
donde el estomago hace la
verdadera digestion: y entonces
los vapores que suben al çerebro
causan los sueños: y aquellos son
los que quedan despues. En las
transformaciones de que en
diuersos estados de hombres y
brutos se escriuen en el proceso
del libro imita el auctor al heroico
poeta Ouidio en su libro del
Methamorphoseos: donde el
poeta finge muchas
transformaciones de vestias,
piedras y arboles en que son
conuertidos los malos en pago de
sus viçios y peruerso viuir.
En el primero canto el auctor
propone de lo que ha de tratar en
la presente obra: narrando el
primer nacimiento del gallo, y el
suceso de su vida.
En el segundo canto el auctor
imita á Plutarco en vn dialogo que
hizo entre Ulixes y vn griego
llamado grilo: el qual hauia cyrçes
conuertido en puerco: y no quiso
ser buelto a la naturaleza de
hombre, teniendo por mas feliçe
el estado y naturaleza de puerco.
En esto el auctor quiere dar a
entender que quando los hombres
estan ençenagados en los vicios,
y principalmente en el de la carne
son muy peores que brutos. Y avn
hay muchas fieras que sin
comparaçion los exceden en el
vso de la virtud.
En el tercero y quarto cantos el
auctor trata vna mesma materia:
porque en ellos imita a Luçiano en
todos sus dialogos: en los quales
siempre muerde a los philosophos
y hombres religiosos de su
tiempo.
Y en el quarto canto
espresamente le imita en el libro
que hizo llamado Pseudomantis:
en el qual descriue
marauillosamente grandes
tacañerias, embaymientos y
engaños de vn falso religioso
llamado Alexandro: el qual en
Maçedonia (Traçia), Bitinia y parte
de la Asia fingio ser propheta de
esculapio, fingiendo dar
respuestas ambiguas y
industriosas para adquirir con el
vulgo credito y moneda.
En el quinto, sexto y septimo
cantos el auctor debajo de una
graciosa historia imita la parabola
que Cristo dixo por san Lucas en
el capitulo quinze del hijo prodigo.
Alli se verá en agraciado estilo vn
vicioso mancebo en poder de
malas mugeres, bueltas las
espaldas a su honra, a los
hombres y a dios, disipar todos
los doctes del alma que son los
thesoros que de su padre dios
heredó, y veráse tambien los
hechizos, engaños y
encantamientos de que las malas
mugeres usan por gozar de sus
laciuos deleites por satisfacer a
sola su sensualidad.
En el octauo canto por auer el
auctor hablado en los cantos
precedentes de los religiosos,
prosigue hablando de algunos
intereses que en daño de sus
conciencias tienen mugeres que
en titulo de religion estan en los
monesterios dedicadas al culto
divino[296]. Y en la fabula de las
ranas imita a Homero.
En el nono y decimo cantos el
auctor imitando a Luciano en el
dialogo llamado Toxaris en el qual
trata de la amistad. El auctor trata
de dos amigos fidelissimos, que
en casos muy arduos aprobaron
bien su intincion y en Roberto y
Beatriz imita el auctor la fuerça
que hizo la muger de Putifar a
Joseph.
En el honceno canto el auctor
imitando a
Luçiano en el libro que intitulo de
luctus, habla de la superfluidad y
vanidad que entre los cristianos
se acostumbra hazer en la muerte
entierro y sepultura, y descriuesse
el entierro del marques del Gasto
Capitan general del Emperador
en la ytalia: cosa muy de notar.
En el duodeçimo canto el auctor
imitando a Luçiano en el dialogo
que intituló Icaromenipo finge
subir al cielo y descriue lo que allá
vio açerca del asiento de dios, y
orden y bienauenturança de los
angeles y santos y de otras
muchas cosas que agudamente
se tratan del estado celestial.
En el deçimo terçio canto
prosiguiendo el auctor la subida
del cielo finge auer visto en los
ayres la pena que se da a los
ingratos y hablando
marauillosamente de la ingratitud
cuenta vn admirable
aconteçimiento digno de ser oydo
en la materia.
En el deçimo quarto canto el
auctor concluye la subida del
cielo: y propone tratar la bajada
del infierno declarando lo que
acerca del tuuieron los gentiles: y
escriuieron sus historiadores y
poetas.
En el deçimo quinto y deçimo
sexto cantos imitando el auctor á
Luçiano en el libro que intituló
Necromançia finge desçender al
infierno, donde descriue las
estancias, lugares y penas de los
condenados.
En el deçimo sexto canto el
auctor en Rosicler hija del Rey de
Syria descriue la feroçidad con
que vna muger acomete
qualquiera cosa que le venga al
pensamiento si es lisiada de vn
lasçiuo interes. y concluye con el
desçendimiento del infierno
imitando a Luçiano en los libros
que varios dialogos intituló.
En el deçimo septimo canto el
autor sueña auerse hallado en
vna missa nueua: en la qual
descriue grandes acontecimientos
que comunmente en semejantes
lugares suelen passar entre
sacerdotes.
En el deçimo octauo canto el
auctor sueña vn acontecimiento
graçioso: por el qual muestra los
grandes daños que se siguen por
faltar la verdad del mundo dentre
los hombres.
En el decimo nono canto el auctor
trata del trabajo y miseria que hay
en el palacio y servicio de los
principes y señores, y reprehende
á todos aquellos que teniendo
algun offiçio en que ocupar su
vida se privan de su
bienaventurada libertad que
naturaleza les dió, y por vivir en
vicios y profanidad se subjetan al
servicio de algun señor[297].
En el vigesimo y vltimo canto el
auctor describe la muerte del
gallo.
NOTAS:
[294] Nota al margen: genes. cap. 6.
[295] Nota al margen. Crotalon idem est quod instrumentum
musicum quo in deorum ceremoniis vtebantur antiqui.
[296] En el códice que fué de Gayangos se añade, á modo de
aclaración, monjas.
[297] En el códice de Gayangos esta rúbrica está muy abreviada:
«y reprehende a aquellos que pudiendo ser señores, viviendo de
algun offiçio, se privan de su libertad».
SIGUESSE EL «CROTALON DE
CHRISTOPHORO
GNOSOPHO:» EN EL QUAL
SE CONTRAHAZE EL
SUEÑO, O GALLO DE
LUÇIANO FAMOSO ORADOR
GRIEGO.
ARGUMENTO
DEL PRIMER
CANTO DEL
GALLO
En el primer canto que se sigue el

auctor propone lo que ha de
tratar en la presente obra:
narrando el primer naçimiento
del gallo y el suceso de su
vida.
DIALOGO.—INTERLOCUTORES
MIÇILO çapatero pobre y vn
GALLO suyo.
O líbreme Dios de gallo tan

maldito y tan bozinglero. Dios te
sea aduerso en tu deseado
mantenimiento, pues con tu ronco
y importuno bozear me quitas y
estorbas mi sabroso y
bienauenturado sueño, holganza
tan apazible de todas las cosas.
Ayer en todo el dia no leuanté
cabeça trabajando con el alesna y
cerda: y avn con dificultad es
passada la media noche y ya me
desasosiegas en mi dormir. Calla,
sino en verdad que te dé con esta
horma en la cabeça; que mas
prouecho me harás en la olla
quando amanezca, que hazes ay
bozeando.
Gallo.—Marauillome de tu
ingratitud, Miçilo, pues a mí que
tanto prouecho te hago en
despertarte por ser ya hora
conveniente al trabajo, con tanta
cólera me maldizes y blasfemas.
No era eso lo que ayer dezias
renegando de la pobreza, sino
que querias trabajar de noche y
de dia por auer alguna riqueza.
Miçilo.—O Dios inmortal, ¿qué
es esto que oyo? ¿El gallo habla?
¿Qué mal aguero o monstruoso
prodigio es este?
Gallo.—¿Y deso te
escandalizas, y con tanta
turbasion te marauillas, o Miçilo?
Miçilo.—¿Pues, cómo y no me
tengo de marauillar de vn tan
prodigioso aconteçimiento? ¿Qué
tengo de pensar sino que algun
demonio habla en ti? Por lo qual
me conuiene que te corte la
cabeça, porque acaso en algun
tiempo no me hagas otra mas
peligrosa ylusion. ¿Huyes? ¿Por
qué no esperas?
Gallo.—Ten paçiençia, Miçilo, y
oye lo que te diré: que te quiero
mostrar quán poca razon tienes
de escandalizarte, y avn confio
que despues no te pessará
oyrme.
Miçilo.—Agora siendo gallo,
dime ¿tu quién eres?
Gallo.—¿Nunca oyste dezir de
aquel gran philosopho Pithagoras,
y de su famosa opinion que tenia?
Miçilo.—Pocos çapateros has
visto te entender con filosofos. A
mi alo menos, poco me vaga para
entender con ellos.
Gallo.—Pues mira que este fué
el hombre mas sabio que huuo en
su tiempo, y este afirmo y tuvo
por çierto que las almas después
de criadas por Dios passauan de
cuerpos en cuerpos. Probaua con
gran efficaçia de argumentos: que
en qualquiera tiempo que vn
animal muere, está aparejado otro
cuerpo en el vientre de alguna
hembra en dispusiçion de reçibir
alma, y que a este se passa el
alma del que agora murió. De
manera, que puede ser que una
mesma alma auiendo sido criada
de largo tiempo haya venido en
infinitos cuerpos, y que agora
quinientos años huuiese sido rey,
y despues vn miserable
azacan [298], y ansi en vn tiempo
vn hombre sabio, y en otro vn
neçio, y en otro rana, y en otro
asno, cauallo o puerco. ¿Nunca tu
oyste dezir esto?
Miçilo.—Por çierto, yo nunca oy
cuentos ni musicas mas
agraçiadas que aquellas que
hazen entre si quando en mucha
priesa se encuentran las hormas
y charanbiles con el tranchete.
Gallo.—Ansi parece ser eso.
Porque la poca esperiençia que
tienes de las cosas te es ocasion
que agora te escandalizes de ver
cosa tan comun a los que leen.
Miçilo.—Por çierto que me
espantas de oyr lo que dizes.
Gallo.—Pues dime agora, de
dónde piensas que les viene á
muchos brutos animales hazer
cosas tan agudas y tan

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Africa-China Cooperation: Towards an

African Policy on China? 1st ed. Edition

Edited by Philani Mthembu · Faith Mabera

More information about this series at

ISSN 2662-2483 ISSN 2662-2491 (electronic)

Cover credit: © Rob Friedman/iStockphoto.com

1 Africa’s Changing Geopolitics: Towards an African

2 A Call for an African Policy Framework Towards

3 Regionalizing Sino-African Diplomatic Engagement:

4 The Need for Africa’s Common Policy Towards

5 Pan-African Perspectives on International

6 The Role of China’s Development Finance in Africa:

7 China’s Evolving Approach to the African

8 Cultural Approaches to Africa’s Engagement

9 One or Many Voices?: Public Diplomacy and Its

10 The EU and Africa: A Multilateral Model

Francis A. Kornegay Jr. Institute for Global Dialogue, Associated with

Fig. 7.1 China’s contribution to UNPKO (2007–2017) (Source

Table 6.1 Ranking of African nation states in the order of strategic

Africa’s Changing Geopolitics: Towards

Philani Mthembu and Faith Mabera

Africa’s Engagement with External Powers

P. Mthembu (B) · F. Mabera

© The Author(s) 2021 1

Why the Rise of China Matters

At a time when much of the Western world looked at Africa through

geostrategic importance translates into access to the continent’s vast

Infrastructure Investment Bank is also an important player and has a

central role to play in regionalising Sino-African diplomatic engagement

to harmonise their engagement strategies with China while leveraging the

further research and dialogue on Africa’s role in a changing geopolitical

A Call for an African Policy Framework

© The Author(s) 2021 11

On the global stage, China, one of the five permanent members of

Devolving from the problem of multifaceted imbalances between

African Agency and Agenda 2063

2063 constitutes African agency in the continent’s global developmental

From an African agency starting point, the question can be posed:

China’s Africa Policy One to Two

no major and overarching policy promulgations were made during the

By ‘comprehensive’, it means that the cooperation should be all-

multilateral levels, and is conducted by both governments and non-

to link Chinese interests closely to Agenda 2063’s seven aspirations:

document where agriculture comes first, followed by industrialization

The FOCAC Context

towards China would have to appraise the performance of the AU vis-

an instance of African agency as it speaks to African actors ensuring that

Pathways for African Policy Towards China

into the FOCAC mechanism at the Johannesburg summit and this is an

report by President Paul Kagame (2017) on the proposed institutional

deep reflection on Africa–China engagements in the FOCAC era. This can

Wits Africa China Reporting Project. 2017. Report: Symposium—High Time

Regionalizing Sino-African Diplomatic

Francis A. Kornegay Jr.

F. A. Kornegay Jr. (B)

© The Author(s) 2021 31

at the beginning of 2017, this report is only the latest in a succession of

favour in the West. Consequently, there has been an obliviousness to the

Hence, for example, a SADC-FOCAC forum (or an ECOWAS-

Continental Regionalism in Limbo

Como fue convertido en rana y lo

Gallo.—Yo ahogado á la verdad

Como fue convertido en ramera