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Simulation and Wargaming
Simulation and Wargaming
Edited by
Charles Turnitsa
Regent University
Virginia Beach, USA
Curtis Blais
Naval Postgraduate School MOVES Institute
Monterey, USA
Andreas Tolk
The MITRE Corporation
Charlottesville, USA
This edition first published 2022
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10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
This text is dedicated to Dr. Stuart H. Starr (1942 to 2018), a mentor, colleague,
and friend. He devoted his life to military operations research and analysis,
including pushing wargaming towards new horizons. His work made him a Fellow
of the Military Operations Research Society and was recognized by the Clayton
J. Thomas Award as well as the Vance R. Wanner Memorial Award, but far more
worth and longer lasting than his many recognitions are the impressions that his
personality left on all of us: his openness and willingness to step in and educate and
support everyone on the team to create new insights. He truly will be missed.
vii
Contents
Foreword xv
Preface xxiii
List of Contributors xxv
Author Biography xxix
Prologue xli
Part I Introduction 1
Finite Size 17
Number of Pieces/Entities 17
Terrain 18
Rules 18
Movement 18
Attack 19
Adjudication 19
Victory Conditions 19
Summary 20
Campaign Analysis 20
Conclusion 21
Experimentation 196
Building Portfolios 196
Conclusion 199
Epilogue 407
Index 411
xv
Foreword
Reiner K. Huber
I was pleased to receive, and gladly accepted, the invitation to contribute the
foreword to the timely book “Wargaming and Simulation” dedicated to Stuart
Starr. I have known Stuart since the 1970s when we met at many professional
and project meetings and discussions on transatlantic defense issues related,
among others, to modeling and simulations in the context of assessment studies
to support military and political decision-makers during the Cold War and the
decade thereafter. The product of the last project in which both of us partici-
pated actively, from 2000 to 2003, was a revised version of the Code of Best
Practice for C2 Assessment1 that NATO had laid out in a technical report in
1999. Considering this report “a framework for thinking about the changing
nature of war gaming,” Stuart developed a highly interesting paper on how the
sophisticated tools of collaboration technology emerging may revolutionize
wargaming.2
Wargaming and simulation accompanied my professional life as a military OR/
SA analyst and an academic teacher in one way or another. It began with an epi-
sode of what wargamers want from OR models, which are on the heart of simula-
tion. I was a junior OR analyst and captain of the German Air Force (GAF) Reserve
when, in the mid-1960s, I was called up for a wargame by the Air Staff in the
Defense Ministry. It was the first time I participated in a two-sided map display
manual wargame for estimating success and losses to be expected in counter-air
operations against well-defended Warsaw Pact (WP) airbases. Most of the players
were fighter bomber pilots, some of them with WW 2 combat experience, and
GAF air defense-officers familiar with the WP’s air defense capabilities. OR
1 It was a project of NATO’s Research and Technology Organization sponsoring the research
task group SAS-026 chaired by Dr. David S. Alberts. It was published first by the Pentagon’s C2
Research Program in 2002.
2 Starr, Stuart H. (2001) ““Good Games” – Challenges for the War-Gaming Community,” Naval
War College Review: Vol. 54: no.2, Article 9.
xvi Foreword
analysts of the Air OR Group of IABG3 followed the players’ mission plans calcu-
lating the attack aircraft lost and the damage caused to the targets using the
respective mathematical models taken from IABG’s air war model.4 Never have I
forgotten the disputes between players and OR analysts. The blue players consid-
ered the target damage calculated as too low and the loss of their air sorties as too
high. In the midst of the game they suggested that the analysts manipulate the
“critical” inputs of the assessment models so that the outputs would be closer to
their judgment. Not surprisingly, the analysts rejected the suggestion arguing that
rather than manipulating the game halfway, to improve its results for Blue, it
would make more sense to end the game and, thereafter, revisit its data and the
assumptions underlying the assessment models. That is what we did.
On the basis of the air war model the Air OR group then developed, together
with the military advisory group associated with IABG’s Study Division, an
interactive wargame that was successfully tested within a high-level planning
exercise of the GAF in 1970. In 1972 I became head of IABG’s System Studies
Division that included OR/SA support for all three service branches of the
Bundeswehr. In a discussion with STC’s Andreas Mortensen5, about the upcoming
issue of modeling in support of overall force capability assessment, we agreed that
the most difficult and least documented aspect of military OR/SA seems to be the
land war. Thus we felt that a scientific conference on land battle systems modeling
would not only contribute to a better understanding of the implications of
different modeling approaches, but also help preclude undesirable redundancy
through better familiarity with models available elsewhere.
The Special Program Panel of Systems Science of the NATO Scientific Affairs
Division6 accepted and funded, together with the German Ministry of Defense,
3 Founded in 1962, IABG became, in addition to its engineering facilities for testing military
hardware designs, the principal Operations Research and Defense Analysis Institution of
West-Germany’s Defense Ministry.
4 The mathematical air war model had been developed, together with analysts of the RAND
Corporation and the USAF Systems Command, by IABG’s Air OR group for the assessment of
combat aircraft designs proposed by industry.
5 At the time, Mortensen, a senior member of the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment,
was head of STC’s OR division.
6 The Special Program Panel on Systems Science (SPOSS) was the follow-on of the Advisory Panel
on Operations Research (APOR), which was established by the NATO Science Committee in 1958
tasked to organize conferences and symposia, develop educational programs, and award
scholarships for study visits to spread methods and applications of operational research in WW 2
and thereafter, thus facilitating the buildup of both NATO and national military institutions to
support defense planners and militaries in sustaining a NATO force structure capable of deterring
a Soviet aggression. The initial Chairman of APOR was Prof. Phillip Morse, a pioneer of OR
research in WW 2 and chairman of the US Navy’s Anti-Submarine Warfare Operations Research
Group (ASWORG). In 1973, the Science Committee replaced APOR by SPOSS arguing that, after
15 years, APOR has accomplished its mission and a reorientation of its effort was necessary
toward applying previously developed techniques und theories to deal with real large-scale
systems continuing, however, along the high scientific standards of APOR and its chairmen.
Foreword xvii
As we are less and less able to rely on historical European combat data and as
we see more and more the necessity of evaluating issues in large contexts,
gaming and simulation emerge perhaps as the only tools able to organize
large quantities of information and discipline our thinking and communica-
tion about them.8
7 The War Gaming Center evolved from a classical manual “Kriegspiel” group set up by retired
German Army officers in the mid-1960s, and the Air OR Group mentioned above, to eventually
develop air/land games and simulations for investigating force structure and theater-wide
defense operations.
8 Reiner K. Huber, Lynn F. Jones, Egil Reine (Eds.): Military Strategy and Tactics – Computer
Modeling of Land War Problems. 1974 Plenum Press, New York, pp. 9–12.
9 Dr. Payne was a pioneer in army operations research and pre-eminent leader in the field for
more than three decades. He began his career in 1955 as an analyst at the Army Operation
Research Office at Johns Hopkins University to eventually become the first deputy under
secretary of the Army Operations Research from 1968 to 1975 and the first director of the
systems analysis activity of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) from
1975 to 1986. In 1990, the Department of the Army Systems Analysis Award became the
Dr. Wilbur B. Payne Memorial Award for Excellence in Analysis in order to honor the memory
and contributions of Dr. Payne to the Operations Research field.
xviii Foreword
changing the structure and tactics of defense forces to improve their deterrent
capability. This was exactly the idea of a group of German political scientists and
retired military officers who proposed, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, that
Germany’s all-active armored defense forces be supplemented by reactive forces
thus improving the chance that an eventual attack by WP forces could be stopped
at the demarcation line, between East and West, without NATO having to employ
nuclear weapons.10 The sometimes bitter debates between the retired military
members of the group and their active peers in the Ministry of Defense, on the
pros and cons of the group’s proposals, were characterized by arguments based
mostly on military judgement rather than analysis.
Therefore, together with my colleague Prof. Hans Hofmann of the Institute of
Applied Systems and Operations Research (IASFOR) at the Bundeswehr
University in Munich11, we initiated a project to take a look at the arguments of
both sides on the basis of the outcomes of battle simulations involving 12 reactive
defense options of four categories12 using the Monte Carlo-type model BASIS. In
cooperation with the military authors of the options, this model was developed by
Hofmann and his research assistants over a period of three years, accounting, in
great detail, all essential interactions affecting the dynamics and outcome of
ground battles, for the simulation of battles between battalion-sized German
ground forces defending against a sequence of regimental-sized Soviet attacking
10 The terms “reactive” and “active” were used as defined by Saadia Amiel to characterize two
complementary land force elements within the framework of a defensive strategy. In contrast to
the all armor general-purpose forces of the Cold War designed to fight in both, the reactive and
active mode, Amiel proposed a land force structure “. . .of two components: one consisting of
defensive combined arms teams committed to reactive defense where precise and high firepower is
at a premium, and the second of offensive combined arms formations where maneuverability is at
a premium.” [Amiel, Sadia: “Deterrence by Conventional Forces”. Survival March, April 1978.
pp. 56–64].
11 Initially, the Bundeswehr Universities in Munich and Hamburg were founded in 1973
primarily as academic institutions to meet the significant deficit of officer candidates at the time
by preparing them for professional carriers after leaving the military. As one of the institutes of
the computer science departments in Munich, IASFOR’s teaching and research emphasized
defense and security issues as applications for computer science.
12 The categories of reactive defense include: 1) Static Area Defenses characterized by small
combat teams fighting from a network of prepared positions and field fortification; 2) Dynamic
Area Defenses fighting a mobile attrition-oriented delaying battle by falling back through a
series of prepared and partially reinforced positions; 3) Continuous Fire Barrier Defenses
feature a fire belt along the demarcation line acting as a barrier that the enemy has to penetrate;
4) Selective Barrier Defenses are implemented depending on the tactical situation by “barrier
brigade” composed of thee infantry battalions and one engineer battalion deployed to fight the
initial forward defense battle from prefabricated field fortifications set up prior for the
opponents expected assault. The brigades are manned largely by reservists living in the vicinity
of their battalions.
Foreword xix
forces supported by organic and higher level fire support on both sides. More than
500 battle simulation experiments were conducted in different type of terrain and
visibility to generate sufficient data for a detailed analysis of each of the 12 reac-
tive options.13
The results were discussed at a Workshop with international experts organized
by the German Strategy Forum on “Long-Term Development of NATO’s Forward
Defense,” held 2–4 December, 1984, in Bad Godesberg/Bonn. The overall
conclusion of the analysis suggested that properly equipped and trained reactive
defense forces being available on short notice might be an effective and efficient
tool to absorb the initial attack by fighting, at the demarcation line, an attrition-
oriented delaying battle thus providing the time for the active defenses to deploy
at the points of the enemy’s main thrusts and for counterattacks into the enemy’s
exposed flanks. The main reason why the Bundeswehr and its NATO partners did
not consider following up the options investigated by IASFOR was that
restructuring the all-active forces, deployed at the time, in the Central Region
close to the demarcation line, would involve some time of conventional weakness
and strategic risk considering the strategic situation in the 1970s and 1980s.
However, given today’s strategic situation between NATO and Russia, it seems
that NATO partners in the East might well revisit some of the reactive options
investigated by IASFOR for their territorial defense forces.
Comparing the proceedings14 of the follow-on conference held in Brussels
under the aegis of Panel 7 of the Defense Research Group (DRG)15 – eight years
later – with the proceedings of the conference in Ottobrunn (see footnote 8), both
published by Plenum Press, the number of papers that addressed inter-active and
computer simulation models had increased by 36% and their average length of
papers by 60% suggesting that battle simulation modeling had expanded and
13 For a detailed description of BASIS the reader is referred to Hans W. Hofmann, Reiner
K. Huber and Karl Steiger: “On Reactive Defense Options – A Comparative Systems Analysis
for the Initial Defense Against the first Strategic Echelon of the Warsaw Pact in Central
Europe,” Modeling and Analysis of Conventional Defense in Europe (Huber, Ed.). 1986 Plenum
Press, New York. pp. 97–139.
14 Reiner K. Huber (Ed.): Systems Analysis and Modeling in Defense. 1984 Plenum Press,
New York.
15 In 1976, after the mandate of SPOSS was widened to cover scientific and environmental
affairs, the NATO Science Committee decided to terminate supporting System Science and OR/
SA altogether feeling that military applications should fall within the realms of other more
endowed NATO divisions and directorates concerned with armaments and defense research
such as the DRG and its Panel 7 (on Defense Applications of Operations Research) that adopted
the members of SPOSS. DRG had been established in 1967 by the NATO Military Committee
with the mandate to specific problems that NATO militaries may be faced with.
xx Foreword
intensified significantly in the eight years between the two conferences.16 And
this expansion went on with the reorganization of NATO in 1998 when the former
DRG panel 7 established, parallel to its System Analysis and Studies Group (SAS),
the Modeling and Simulation Group (MSG).17 While the mandate of SAS did not
change, MSG’s primary mission areas include standardization of modeling and
simulation (M&S), and education and associated science and technology “to pro-
mote co-operation among Alliance Bodies, NATO Member and Partner Nations to
maximize the efficiency with which M&S is used.”
Concerning wargaming at the Brussels conference, I well remember G. G. Armstrong
of the Directorate of Land Operations Research and Analysis Establishment
(DLOR) in Ottawa, who discussed Canada’s evolutionary army wargaming
approach that is in fact a package of simulations in either training game or
research game formats together with an experience in playing wargames.18 The
research game was a manual game with the purpose to produce data from which
the sponsor’s questions may be answered involving a great deal of computer assis-
tance required to carry out the assessments and record the data that the games
produce. The training wargames were carried out by the same people who create
the research wargames with the purpose to exercise staff colleges and formations
thus exposing DLOR’s methods and findings throughout the Canadian army. It
seems that the Canadian approach was a good fertilizer for today’s renaissance of
manual wargaming in most NATO nations.
Armstrong ended his talk by emphasizing that civilian scientist and military
officers must work together. “An all-scientist war game can easily become a ‘black
box mathematician’s delight’ which is tactically ridiculous. Conversely, an all-
military wargame can very easily become an exercise carried out without regard to
its purpose.”
16 Therefore, many of the participants of the Brussels conference suggested that, in order to
keep up with state of the art of scientific military modeling and analysis, a time interval
between meetings of five years would be more appropriate than the eight years since the
Ottobrunn conference in 1974.
17 As part of the reorganization of NATO in 1998, NATO’s Research and Technology
Organization (RTO) was created through the merger of DRG and AGARD (Advisory Group for
Aerospace Research and Development founded in 1952 as an agency of the NATO Military
Committee). Among others, RTO reorganized, not without some controversy, DRG’s Panel 7 by
establishing two panels, the new “Modeling and Simulation Group” (MSG) and the panel
“System Analysis and Studies” (SAS). Both, SAS and MSG build on the methodological legacy of
the Science Committee’s APOR/SPOSS and DRG’s Panel 7, albeit pursuing different objectives.
Finally, in 2012, RTO was replaced by the NATO Science and Technology Organization (STO)
“with a view to meeting, to the best advantage, the collective needs of NATO, NATO Nations
and partner Nations in the fields of [military] Science and Technology.”
18 G.G. Armstrong: “Canadian Land Wargaming.” Systems Analysis and Modeling in Defense
(Huber, Ed.). 1984 Plenum Press, New York, pp. 171–179.
Foreword xxi
At the end of this Foreword, let me come back to Stuart Starr’s initially
entioned paper on the changing nature of wargaming by the emergence of
m
sophisticated collaboration tools allowing geographically dispersed individuals to
participate fully in the deliberation and decisions in a wargame. Contrary to
delegating the participation to subordinates because of short of time, this would
allow actual decision-makers (commanders, heads of agencies, senior executives)
to participate and play personally in wargames, thus increasing both the fidelity of
the games and the real value of the entire activity by educating the decision-
makers directly about the intricacies and nuances of the problems being
considered. In the long term, Stuart was convinced that the state of the art of col-
laboration technology had already advanced to the point of integrating the avail-
able standalone collaboration tools into “virtual buildings” in which participants
interact “face to face” in real time. In fact, decision-makers would, in a crisis, be
able to play relevant wargames practically ad hoc provided, however, the military
wargaming community had generated, together with battle simulation institu-
tions, the respective data and gaming rules.
Thus, Stuart Starr’s foreseen challenges are facing both of the communities, the
War-Gaming and the Simulation.
Reiner K. Huber
Emeritus Professor
University of the German Armed Forces
Preface
List of Contributors
Author Biography
model Operation Desert Storm, which earned him the CAA Director’s Award for
Excellence and his first Dr. Wilbur B. Payne Memorial Award for Excellence in
Analysis. He served as the director of the TRADOC Analysis Center-Monterey,
supervising the creation of advanced simulation techniques and models, to
include leading the Land Warrior Training Initiative project that converted a
COTS first-person shooter (Delta Force 2) into a training simulation for the US
Army’s Land Warrior program. He served at the TRADOC Analysis Center-
WSMR, supervising the use of the combat simulation CASTFOREM and the
human-in-the-loop simulation JANUS for the Future Combat Systems (FCS)
Analysis of Alternatives (AoA), earning his second Wilbur Payne Award. He
served at TRAC-FLVN, where he continued supervising FCS AoA update analyses
using Vector-In-Command (VIC) at FLVN and CASTFOREM and JANUS at
WSMR. He then finished his army career as the deputy to the TRAC director
where he was one of the lead architects of the TRAC Irregular Warfare Tactical
Wargame, earning the 2011 Army Modeling and Simulation Team Award
(Analysis). He has been a senior lecturer in the NPS Operations Research Faculty
since 2009. He teaches the Wargaming Applications, Combat Modeling, and
Advanced Wargaming Applications resident courses at NPS. He also teaches
week-long Basic Analytic Wargaming Mobile Education Team (MET) courses for
US and international sponsors around the world. In 2016, he earned the Richard
W. Hamming Faculty Award for Interdisciplinary Achievement. Along with Dr.
Rob Burks, Jeff directs the activities of the NPS Wargaming Activity Hub.
Curtis L. Blais is on the research faculty in the Naval Postgraduate School’s
Modeling, Virtual Environments, and Simulation (MOVES) Institute, Monterey,
California. He holds a PhD in MOVES from the Naval Postgraduate School and
bachelor and master of science degrees in mathematics from the University of
Notre Dame. Dr. Blais has over 45 years of experience in all phases of modeling
and simulation development, from requirements definition through test and
employment of simulation systems for training and analysis. He has served in
various levels of software engineering management and develops and delivers
modeling and simulation education. His research interests include agent-based
simulation, interoperability across command and control systems, simulation sys-
tems, and unmanned systems, and semantic web technologies for knowledge rep-
resentation. Dr. Blais serves in various positions in the Simulation Interoperability
Standards Organization (SISO) and the Military Operations Research Society
(MORS), and is a member of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
(IEEE) and the Society for Modeling and Simulation International (SCS).
Karsten Brathen is a chief scientist at FFI, Norwegian Defence Research
Establishment, Kjeller, Norway. He holds a siv. ing. degree in engineering cyber-
netics from the Norwegian Institute of Technology, Trondheim, Norway. His
Author Biograph xxxi
Prize of the German Society for Defense Technology for his Master Thesis, and the
Böttcher Prize for the Best Student of the Year 2016. In 2016 he became a mainte-
nance officer at the Tactical Air Wing 71 “Richthofen” in Wittmund, Germany.
After his training as a systems engineer for Eurofighter at AIRBUS Defence and
Space in Manching, Germany in 2018, he was deployed as maintenance opera-
tions officer in the technical group of the Tactical Air Wing 71 “Richthofen.” Since
2019 he is a weapon system officer for the Eurofighter at the Air Force Forces
Command in Cologne, Germany.
Andrzej Najgebauer is professor of computer and information systems and the
chair of the Modelling and Simulation for Decision Support in Conflict and Crisis
Situations Team at the Military University of Technology in Warsaw, Poland. He is
also Polish member of STO/NATO Modelling and Simulation Group. He held the
position of Dean of Cybernetics Faculty and vice president of the University for
scientific affairs. He holds MSc and PhD in computer science from the Military
University of Technology of Poland. He also holds a doctor of science in computer
science, decision support systems from Warsaw University of Technology. His sci-
entific, professional, and educational activities are mainly focused on artificial
intelligence, modeling and simulation, designing of military decision support sys-
tems, threat prediction, wargames designing, cybersecurity and cyberwar. He was
project leader of Polish Army Simulation System for CAXes and many Polish or
international projects on DSS in the area of security and defense. He is the mem-
ber of IFORS and member of Polish Society of Operations Research and Systems
Analysis, vice president of Polish Society of Computer Simulation, the supervisor
of 10 doctorates and general chair or co-chair of many international scientific
conferences in the area of MCIS and AI, and author of 5 books and over than 130
publications. He is a member of special group of analysts, who participated in the
evaluation of possible results of international war games for eastern Europe. He is
an expert in the Strategic Defense Review of Polish Armed Forces.
Ernest H. Page is the DARPA portfolio manager at The MITRE Corporation.
Previously he served as chief engineer within the Modeling, Simulation,
Experimentation and Analytics Technical Center, and founding Director of
MITRE’s Simulation Experimentation and Analytics Lab (SEAL). He holds a PhD
in computer science from Virginia Tech. With a research interest in simulation
modeling methodology, and distributed systems, he has served as principal inves-
tigator on numerous government-funded and Independent Research and
Development (IR&D) projects. He has held a variety of senior advisory roles,
including: technical advisor for the U.S. Army Model and Simulation Office, chief
scientist for the U.S. Army Future Combat Systems (FCS) Modeling Architecture
for Research and Experimentation (MATREX), and member of the Defense
Science Board Task Force on Gaming, Exercising and Modeling and Simulation.
Author Biograph xxxvii
Dr. Page has published over 50 peer-reviewed articles in the areas of simulation
modeling methodology, and parallel and distributed systems. He served as the
chair of the Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) Special Interest Group
on Simulation (SIGSIM), the Board of Directors of the Winter Simulation
Conference (WSC), and serves on the editorial boards of Transactions of the
Society for Modeling and Simulation International, Journal of Defense Modeling
and Simulation, and Journal of Simulation.
Paul Vebber, CDR, USNR (ret), leads wargaming efforts at the Naval Sea Systems
Command Warfare Centers. He has an MS in applied science – undersea warfare
from the Naval Postgraduate School and a BS in history of science from the
University of Wisconsin-Madison. He is active in the wargaming communities of
practice associated with the US Navy and the Military Operations Research
Society. He is one of the instructors for the wargaming certificate course affiliated
with MORS and Virginia Tech University, with nearly 40 years of wargaming
experience in the military, contractor, government and hobby sectors. He was one
of the founders of www.matrixgames.com and part of the team that won the 2000
Charles S. Roberts award for Best 20th Century Computer wargame for “Steel
Panthers: World at War.” He is active in the Connections wargaming conference
organizing committee and has participated as a player, umpire, or analyst in war-
games sponsored by a variety of US Navy and DoD organizations for over 20 years.
Introduction
A Simulationist’s Perspective
Modern wargaming centers provide at least three components to support the
wargame, namely the operational components, analysis component, and the sim-
ulation component. The operations components prepare, conduct, and evaluate
the wargame. Since wargames have been conducted, this group has been the
important counterpart to the subject matter experts who participate in the war-
game itself. To make a wargame successful, it needs to be defined, planned,
designed, developed, rehearsed, and finally conducted. The operations group is
responsible for all these tasks, from the first ideas to the detailed game plan.
During and after the game, they must analyze the results and prepare evaluation
reports, outbrief presentations, etc. Some of them may be given as interim reports
to the subject matter experts, others are collected to provide the overarching
insights captured in the final reports about the wargame. In the earlier days of
wargaming, the experts analyzed the situation by themselves, very much like they
would do in headquarters. With the increasing complexity of the situation on the
battlefield and a more complex solution space, more professional support needed
Prologue to Wargaming and Simulation – An Introduction to the Viewpoints and Challenge xliii
Title: Saaristoväkeä
Novelleja
Language: Finnish
Novelleja
Kirj.
YRJÖ KOSKELAINEN
SISÄLLYS:
Kehto
Kalle-Kustaan tupa
Mestarivaras
Uskovaisia
Simsörin Johannes
Naapurit
KEHTO
I.
Mutta eilen kun hänen hätäpäätä oli korjattava purjetta, olisi hän
tarvinnut yhden niistä messinkiväkipyöristä, joita Sälskärin
hylkyhuutokaupassa oli ostanut kokonaisen kimpun, mutta sai koluta
aitat ja vinnit löytämättä mitään. Hän muisti hämärästi ripustaneensa
ne johonkin naulaan, mutta mihin naulaan, sitä ei olisi tiennyt sanoa
kukaan muu kuin Rosina. Ja Rosina oli maannut haudassa jo viime
vapusta vuoden…
Hamberg olisi tänään jatkanut pitemmällekin muistojaan, ellei
hänen apumiehensä, Janne, olisi tullut tupaan saamaan osaansa
päivän ansioista. Hamberg tyhjensi pöydälle kissan viereen kuluneen
kukkaronsa sisällyksen. Rahat, joita oli hopeita ja kuparia lajiteltiin,
laskettiin ja jaettiin kolmeen läjään, joista yhden sai Janne, kaksi
taas pyyhkäisi Hamberg suureen kouraansa vieden ne tuvan sivussa
olevaan kamariin. Nurkassa siellä sängyn takana oli raudoitettu
punainen kirstu, jonka hän avasi jykevällä avaimella ja erotettuaan
hopeat vanhaan tupakkapussiin ja kuparit sikarilaatikkoon, jälleen
huolellisesti sulki. Avain pantiin lasi-oviseen seinäkaappiin, jossa
punaisessa nauhassa hohti pari hopeamitalia »ihmishengen
pelastamisesta», vanhanaikuinen umpikuorinen kello ja pieni
hopeapikari palkintona kilpapurjehduksesta.
*****
Oli vielä täysi yö merellä, kun Hamberg tunsi ruumiissaan että oli
aika nousta. Tuuli oli kääntynyt pohjoiseen ja ajanut taivaankannen
täyteen hallahtavia pilvenhattaroita, vesi näytti joka taholla kylmältä
ja harmaalta. Aamuvilu hyrisytti verkkomiehiä, he kohoutuivat
istualleen ja asettuivat hitaasti airoihin Hambergin hilatessa jo
veneeseen ensimäistä verkon päätä.
II.
Kirje oli nyt valmis. Rivit tosin nousivat ja laskivat kuin laineet
myrskyssä, mutta Hamberg oli täysin tyytyväinen siihen. Kun oli
loppuun pantu joukko tervehdyksiä nimitetyille henkilöille, piirrettiin
alle Petter Valfrid Hamberg ja varmuudeksi otti Hamberg vielä kynän
tukevaan kouraansa ja piirsi puumerkkinsä q W H, johon sisältyi
kaikki, mitä hän tiesi jalosta kirjoitustaidosta.
*****
*****