Aristotelica Studies On The Tex of Aristotle Eudemian Ethics

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 04/08/23, SPi
Aristotelica
Aristotelica
Studies on the Text of Aristotle’s
Eudemian Ethics
C H R I S T O P H E R R OW E
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Contents
Introduction vii
Eudemian Ethics I 1
Eudemian Ethics II 22
Eudemian Ethics III 71
Eudemian Ethics VII/IV 102
Eudemian Ethics VIII/V 180
Appendix 228
Index 256
Introduction
The following Studies are designed primarily to explain the reasoning

behind the choices that, line by line, shaped the text of the Eudemian
Ethics (EE) printed in the accompanying Oxford text (OCT). As is well
known, the transmitted text of EE is in many places highly corrupt. The
studies below attempt to justify the solutions I have adopted to the prob-
lems of the text and explain why I have rejected rival solutions; they lay
no claim to exhaustiveness (not all available solutions are considered),
but rather constitute a record of the route by which I arrived at my deci-
sion in each case, in conversation mostly with others, in many cases long
since gone, sometimes with myself. A secondary function of these Studies
is to provide more complete information about the Greek manuscripts
than is given in the apparatus.1 An Appendix, at the end of the present
volume, brings together full sets of data, for the four primary manu-
scripts, that reveal not only the relationships between these four manu-
scripts but also the idiosyncrasies of the three copyists involved, and the
typical errors that we tend to find from time to time in all of them.
Information about such errors is particularly important insofar as it
provides a warning against relying too heavily on ‘what the manuscripts
say’, even when there is unanimity between them. True, since the manu-
scripts represent the only primary evidence we have (with a little help,
for two small portions of the text, from Latin translations), we should
not be too ready to deviate from them. But they do go wrong, in
1 Frequent references will be found, in the following studies, to ‘the B copyist’. This designa-
tion is shorthand for ‘the copyist of B and/or the copyist(s) of any manuscript(s) that may have
preceded in the line of descent from the hyparchetype α´ ’: for all we know, either part or indeed
all of what I attribute to the activity of the B copyist might properly be attributable to an inter-
mediary or intermediaries. But since we shall presumably never know if that is the case, every-
thing in question may as well be assigned to the copyist of B, i.e. the manuscript the contents of
which are actually known to us. L itself may very well be descended directly from the archetype
ω, so that references to ‘the L copyist’ can be taken with some safety as being just that. As for P
and C, even though their antigraphon, α, is lost, the fact that they are non-identical twins
allows us considerable insight into the contributions of their copyist, Nikolaos of Messina.
Aristotelica: Studies on the Text of Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics. First Edition. Christopher Rowe,
Oxford University Press. © Christopher Rowe 2023. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192873552.001.0001
viii Introduction
predictable ways, and quite often all at the same time, as the data put
beyond question.
The Studies are intended to be read with the text and apparatus. They
started life as footnotes to a draft text; they and the apparatus may have
been separated physically from each other, but their shared origins will
be quickly apparent to the reader.
Eudemian Ethics I
[The style of the titles of the books in PCBL varies slightly: the title can
be just ‘ἠθικῶν εὐδημίων’, or ‘ἀριστοτέλους ἠθικῶν εὐδημίων’, or
‘ἠθικῶν εὐδημίων ἀριστοτέλους’; varying as it may do within a single
MS, the style used is evidently arbitrary.]
1214a2 συνέγραψεν (PCBL) on the face of it looks unlikely, given (a)

the general pattern of usage of this compound, (b) the fact that such
usage can specifically connect it with the writing of prose (n.b. the
immediately following ποιήσας); ἀναγράϕω, by contrast, as suggested
by Richards, would be a natural choice for the present context, and
for ἀν- to become συν-, perhaps especially after the final sigma of
ἀποϕηνάμενος, would be well within the limits of the sorts of errors we
typically find in these MSS. Nevertheless, the case is still not quite
proven (see Dirlmeier1 ad loc.), and given that the policy of the present
text is to make as few changes as possible where our primary MSS are
unanimous, συνέγραψεν stands.
a5 Αmbr.’s placing of the δέ before ἥδιστον corresponds with its position

as it evidently was in the original, i.e. Theognis 256 = πρῆγμα δὲ
τερπνότατον τοῦ τις ἐρᾷ τὸ τυχεῖν, but since Aristotle has announced
the lines as poetry, they should be metrical, as they are in the different
version at NE I.8, 1099a27–8; for that to be the case, unless we read τοῦ
for οὗ, the δέ will have tο follow ἥδιστον. —ἐρᾷ τὸ Bessarion: i.e. Bessarion
in Parisinus 2042, though he also adds ται above the τὸ, then crosses ται
out. (See Preface to text: ‘Bessarion’ in the apparatus here and from now on
refers exclusively to this MS, a vast collection of Aristotelian excerpts
1 The absence of a full reference for an author and work cited indicates that bibliographical
details of the author/work appear in one or more of (1) the Preface in the sister volume of the
present Studies (hereafter ‘Preface to text’), (2) the Bibliography to that Preface, or (3) the list in
the same volume of authors that are cited in the apparatus.
2 Eudemian Ethics I
(1214a5) Cardinal Bessarion wrote out in his own hand; he certainly con-
tributed, especially in the form of marginalia, to other MSS, especially Rav.
210, Marc. 200, and Marc. 213, but since (a) it is usually hard to be sure
exactly what is attributable to him in these, and (b) it hardly matters for
my purposes, I leave him uncredited there, except in special circumstances,
in the same way that I do other named figures we know to have been
involved with our MSS, whether because they commissioned, copied, cor-
rected, or commented on them.) The Aldine later makes the correction to
ἐρᾷ τὸ independently, no doubt from direct knowledge of Theognis.
Bessarion writes out a version of Theognis’ line in the margin of Par. 2042
(πᾶσι δὲ τερπνότατον οὗ τις ἐρᾷ τὸ τυχεῖν) above and to the left of
the first line of EE, and then tries out τερπνότατον δ’ ἐστ’, apparently as a
substitute for the MSS’ ἥδιστον, in the margin opposite that.
a6 συγχωροῦμεν Laur. 81,12: an easy mistake (the ου is corrected by

another hand [= ‘Laur. 81,122’] to omega, s.l.); it might be a conjecture,
but ‘perhaps we don’t agree with him’ is not obviously an improvement
on ‘let us not. . .’.
a10 In B both μὲν here and the δὲ following have what appears to be a
double accent. Similar double accentuation, especially with μὲν, occurs
here and there in B; it is not clear why.
a10–11 καὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις τοῦ πράγματος: if there is a problem

here, Langerbeck’s solution (simply bracketing καὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις)
seems better than either of Spengel’s; the second, indeed, given that we
are actually going to talk about the κτῆσις of the πρᾶγμα in question,
seems to make matters worse. But while there may be some awkward-
ness in the Greek, it seems tolerable. Woods’s bracketing of τοῦ
πράγματος, which after all is prepared for by περὶ ἕκαστον πρᾶγμα
earlier in the sentence, seems high-handed when the context is actually
about ἕκαστον πρᾶγμα (a9). Inwood and Woolf, in their translation of
EE in the series Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy (2013:
hereafter ‘Inwood and Woolf in the Cambridge translation’), seem cov-
ertly to adopt Spengel’s first solution.
a13 Dirlmeier interprets the MSS’ ἦν as a ‘philosophical’ imperfect, tak-

ing Aristotle to be referring to things he has said prior to the EE (‘once a
Aristotelica 3
Grundsatz, always a Grundsatz’, to paraphrase Dirlmeier). That, however,

involves the unwarranted presupposition that Aristotle thinks of himself
as writing the EE as part of a collected body of work. So if it is that sort
of imperfect, we would evidently need an unusual, as it were forward-
looking, use of it, i.e. ‘whatever turns out to have been appropriate. . .’.
I prefer a suggestion by Christopher Strachan (in correspondence), who
compares Plato, Cratylus 388a10 Τί ἦν ὄργανον ἡ κερκίς; Οὐχ ᾧ
κερκίζομεν: ‘this seems to be a sort of aoristic use, akin perhaps to a
gnomic aorist designating something that is always or generally the
emendation (ὅτιπερ 〈ἂν〉 οἰκεῖον ᾖ) unnecessary.

case.’ This is surely more than plausible enough to render Richards’s
a23 With δαιμονίᾳ (CBL), the following τινὸς would be orphaned and
unexplained; the feminine dative is by attraction to the preceding
ἐπιπνοίᾳ. So P’s δαιμονίου it must surely be (presumably it is an
emendation by the copyist: δαιμονίᾳ, being in both recensiones, is likely
to have been in ω, the common source/archetype). Incidentally,
Bessarion (ap. Par. 2042) also has δαιμονίου. This is not an independent
conjecture of his: my trawl through Par. 2042 makes it almost certain
that there, throughout, he was using either (a corrected version of) P, or
more probably its descendant Pal. 165, which includes many corrections
to P: so for example in the continuation of the present sentence he reads
διὰ τὴν τύχην rather than L’s διὰ τύχην (and so he continues right to
the end of Book VIII/V). This is in one way a surprise, because Bessarion
is otherwise associated with MSS that are mostly descended from L,
i.e. that belong to the other recensio, but in another way it is not so
surprising, given that P is itself sometimes corrected from a represent
ative of the recensio Constantinopolitana; see Harlfinger 1971: 9 on the
complexity of the relationships between the extant MSS of EE.
a24 ταὐτό: C is the only one of the four primary MSS to write in the crasis
mark here (crasis marks are more often than not omitted in all four).
a25 εὐτυχείαν PC for εὐτυχίαν: ει for ι in such endings is a signature
feature of P and C.
a26 τῇ παρουσίᾳ [διὰ] τούτων, κτλ: as subject of the sentence, which

all of PCBL make it, ἡ παρουσία appears peculiarly redundant; the
4 Eudemian Ethics I
(1214a26) subject is surely εὐδαιμονία, and translators sometimes (see

e.g. Solomon [in the Oxford Translation of 1915], Woods, and Kenny [in
the Oxford World’s Classics translation]) pretend that it—εὐδαιμονία—and
not παρουσία is actually subject in the transmitted text. One possibility
would be simply to bracket ἡ παρουσία, but it would then be a mystery
how it ever got into the text. For Spengel’s proposal, i.e. to bracket διὰ
instead, and write dative for nominative, a story is much easier to con-
struct: the dative—because of its position, and the lack of an expressed
subject?—was corrupted into a nominative, but then διὰ had to be sup-
rather less well with Spengel’s alternative proposal, 〈ἡ εὐδαιμονία〉 τῇ

plied to make sense of the following genitives. (This story would work
παρουσίᾳ [διὰ] τούτων. . . .)

a29 τὶς B2: it is feature of all of PCBL that they tend to accent indefinite
τις/τι, and of B that it likes to give τίς/τί a grave accent. —συναγάγει
in Laur. 81,4, a descendant at this point from C, is corrected to
συναγάγοι (also in Marc. [descended from L], according to Harlfinger);
B too, presumably, was faced with συναγάγει, and made the same cor-
rection. All the variants offered by the MSS would, incidentally, have the
same Byzantine pronunciation. (‘Errors arising from similarity in pro-
nunciation’, comments Christopher Strachan, ‘are among the most com-
mon of all, and very frequent in these MSS.’)
b7 ἐπιστήσαντα in P is by attraction to the following ἅπαντα; the two
dots, vertically arranged, associated with the -τα ending are converted by P2
to the sign for -ας. —Woods claims that ‘ἐπιστήσαντας [sc. τὴν διάνοιαν]
with a dependent accusative and infinitive is doubtful Greek’, but while
admitting that there are no precise parallels I think it possible to construe
the noun clause, i.e. the accusative and infinitive, as being—as it were—in
the dative: ‘paying attention, in relation to these things, [to the fact] that
every person. . .’. Though strictly δεῖ in b12 might govern ἐπιστήσαντας (sc.
〈χρὴ〉 and P2’s 〈δεῖ 〉 (see next note); my own view is that the sentence
ἡμᾶς) here, it is too far away to make that entirely plausible—hence Allan’s
becomes so extended, especially with the—unexpectedly expansive?—

explanatory clause ὡς τό γε . . . σημεῖόν ἐστιν in b10–12, that Aristotle
simply forgets where he started, and in effect starts again. (Pace Woods, I see
no reason why Aristotle should not be claiming that everyone does in fact
Aristotelica 5
set themselves an end: the list of possible ends is restricted to popular-

sounding choices [n.b. also the non- technical/non-Aristotelian use of
καλῶς just before the list], and that it would be very foolish not to set one-
self an end in life [b10–12] could be taken as evidence for the claim rather
than, as Woods suggests, conflicting with it.)
b8 δεῖ post θέσθαι suppl. P2, in the margin: but pace P2, and Woods ad
loc., the point Aristotle is leading up to is that while everyone sets them-
selves an end, they need to be careful about their choice; there is no rea-
son (apart from—what some suppose to be—an orphaned infinitive) for
him to be exhorting them to set themselves an end: cf. preceding note.
b12 ‘δὴ sine causa secl. Spengel’, Susemihl, with justification. —ἐν αὑτῷ
Victorius (‘γρ.’), and then Bekker, followed by other editors: but what is
in the MSS is ἐν αὐτῷ, i.e. ‘in the matter in hand’, to be read with
πρῶτον rather than, or as much as, with διορίσασθαι.
b17 οὐ deest in P1CL: οὐ is added above line in P, surely by a later hand,
with an insertion mark. This is one of a significant number of occasions
on which B is the only one of PCBL to preserve the right reading.
b19 τῆς 〈καλῆς〉 ζωῆς Richards: but καλῆς presumably can and should
be understood in any case.
b24 περὶ πάντων: P2 writes ἴσως: περιπάτων in the margin; L’s

περιπάτων is post corr., but the corrections in L, evidently currente
calamo, are only in the formation of the iota and the alpha, and there
was evidently only ever one word.
b35 Spengel’s τῶν πολλῶν 〈ἐπισκεπτέον〉 is part of a solution to larger

problems that follow.
1215a1 εἰκῇ γὰρ Victorius (Pier Vettori), annotating one of his copies
of the Aldine edition; a brilliant emendation. (This is one of the many
conjectures/corrections of his that is not marked by a ‘fort.’ [see Preface
to text], just with a ‘γρ.’) For P2’s οἱ μηδὲν see next note.
a1–2 περὶ ἁπάντων καὶ μάλιστα περὶ ἐπισκεπτέον μόνας P1CL,

περὶ ἁπάντων καὶ μάλιστα ἐπισκεπτέον μόνας B: Chalkondyles in
6 Eudemian Ethics I
(1215a1–2) Ambr. leaves a gap after περὶ—something must be missing

after περὶ in its precursor, L (and in PC). But what? Spengel’s proposal is
pleasingly economical, proposing as it does no more than the loss of the
first part of εὐδαιμονίας, but it has its own problems, the worst of which
is that it leaves us with two different explanations (εἰκῇ γὰρ . . . a1,
ἄτοπον γὰρ . . .) for our not having to consider the views of the many,
the second of which follows as if the first was not there; the transposition
of ἐπισκεπτέον, which causes this double explanation, then also looks
questionable, and one might also ask how likely it is that εὐδαιμονίας
would be corrupted to μόνας in a context about εὐδαιμονία (even
though stranger things do happen in the text of EE). Dodds’s proposal,
for its part, has the advantage over Fritzsche’s (on which it builds, as
Fritzsche’s builds on P2’s) that it comes with a beautifully simple
explanation of how the mess in the MSS came about, i.e. through a
copyist’s eye slipping straight from περὶ to πέρι; but it too has important
weaknesses: in its prolixity and in the unclarity of the reference of the
supplied ταύτης (Fritzsche), seven lines after the περὶ αὐτῆς that might
have explained it. My own proposal for completing the sentence goes
back to P2’s οἱ (i.e., presumably, οἳ?) μηδὲν λέγουσι σχεδὸν περὶ
ἁπάντων δὲ καὶ μάλιστα περὶ τούτων τὰς τῶν σοϕῶν ἐπισκεπτέον
μόνας (written out in full in the margin of P). My first step, after accept-
ing Victorius’ εἰκῇ γὰρ before λέγουσι, is to suppress the δὲ and supply
the περὶ ὧν that is then needed to restore the syntax of the sentence.
μάλιστα περὶ 〈τούτων περὶ ὧν τὰς τῶν σοϕῶν〉 ἐπισκεπτέον μόνας,

That would give us, for the sake of argument, περὶ ἁπάντων, καὶ
which would (a) offer a solution that is more economical than either
Dodds’s or Fritzsche’s, (b) avoid the problem of the reference of (the
supplied) ταύτης, and (c) provide the sort of sense that everyone, begin-
ning from P2, thinks is required. But of course P2’s supplements have no
authority, as is confirmed by the lack of syntactical coherence in the sen-
tence he offers us here; and when Aristotle generally spends so much
time on, and attributes so much importance to, the endoxa, could he
really have announced, out of the blue, that actually it is only the σοϕοί,
the experts, that we should listen to on the subject in hand? Surely not.
In the present context, the class to be contrasted with οἱ πολλοί would
more naturally be the ἐπιεικεῖς, a fairly indeterminate group whose
Aristotelica 7
chief distinguishing feature is typically that they are not (the) many, and
καὶ μάλιστα περὶ 〈τούτων περὶ ὧν τὰς τῶν ἐπιεικῶν〉 ἐπισκεπτέον

who will make an appearance a few lines down (a12). So περὶ ἁπάντων,
μόνας—except that by borrowing an element of Dodds’s solution (see
a story about how the corruption might have started: better 〈περὶ
above), and writing περὶ τούτων, ὧν πέρι, we would begin to have
τούτων, ὧν〉 πέρι, then, since strictly it would be the first περί that was
lost; the comma, too, is important, in order to avoid the appearance of a
mere tautology. Beyond that (apart from noting the double ἐπι-, which
might help explain the loss of ἐπιεικῶν?), I merely repeat that we know
in this case—pace Spengel—that the transmitted text is lacunose. I adopt
the reconstruction proposed on three grounds: first, that it gives an
appropriate sense, i.e. one that at least does not commit Aristotle to
something he would be unlikely to say; second, that it is superior to any
alternative presently on offer (see above); and third, that it would be
unhelpful, even a dereliction, to reproduce the nonsense we find in
PCBL, or to follow Chalkondyles and print a lacuna, or indeed to deploy
the obelus, which fastidious readers can easily import for themselves if
they prefer.
a4 Jackson’s πειθοῦς for πάθους is surely implausible: does persuasion

not typically involve λόγος? The mess in L (the copyist has merely run
ἀλλὰ and πάθους together) is a lapse, and does not indicate uncertainty
around πάθους; and contra Barnes, πάθους/πάσχειν can surely be used
by Aristotle on its own to refer to a bad experience/suffering, as at Rhet.
II.5, 1382b29ff.
a5 There are some traces of a correction above βίον in P, and it is natural

to assume that the correction is to βίου, before τοῦ κρατίστου. The mis-
take, shared by all of PCL, is surprising enough to suggest that βίον was
in ω, the common source of PCBL, in which case B is evidently correct-
ing independently. Ambr. (Chalkondyles) also has βίου.
a9 〈τὴν〉 πᾶσαν σκέψιν Dirlmeier: it is true that not literally all σκέψις
has to be as specified, just ‘this whole [present] σκέψις’, but πᾶσαν σκέψιν
will naturally be read, in the context, as ‘all σκέψις of the sort we are
involved in’.
8 Eudemian Ethics I
1215a10 τῳ B (also P2, crossing out the circumflex accent) provides a

viable alternative—‘if someone should find it presumptuous . . .’—to the
impossible τῷ P1CL. Given that these MSS so regularly confuse omi-
renders Fritzsche’s compromise, τῳ 〈τὸ〉, unnecessary.

cron and omega, Victorius’ τὸ is also possible; the same consideration
a11 καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐλπίδα: P2 writes ἴσως: καὶ τὴν ἐλπίδα in margin.
a14 ἔσται ci. Walzer, for ἐστι: but we can take the reference to be to the
acquisition of τὰ διὰ τύχην ἢ διὰ ϕύσιν γινόμενα in general, rather than
to what would be true of the acquisition of εὐδαιμονία were it to be one
of these.
a19 [ἃ] τοῖς αὑτοὺς: τοῖς αὑτοὺς is all that is needed if we take κεῖσθαι
to mean ‘be available’ (‘laid up’, ‘in the bank’: see LSJ2 s.v. III); the ἃ could
perhaps be descended from an earlier dittography, i.e. αὐτοῖς for τοῖς
before αὑτοὺς. P2’s ἐν τοῖς αὐτοὺς, in margin, preceded by ἴσως,
looks a non-starter: εὐδαιμονία might lie ἐν τῷ αὐτοὺς/αὑτοὺς
παρασκευάζειν . . ., but scarcely in the individuals doing it. (Woods
accepts ἐν, taking τοῖς as neuter: ‘happiness consists in those things
which cause human beings . . . to be of a certain kind’, but this would
surely be an odd thing for Aristotle to say about happiness, if it is not
just a way of making ἐν τοῖς come to the same thing as ἐν τῷ.)
a27 τῶν μὲν 〈οὐδ’〉 Bonitz, τῶν μὲν 〈οὐκ〉 Rav.: one could try arguing
that the negative is in effect retrospectively supplied by the following
ἀλλ’ ὡς τῶν ἀναγκαίων χάριν σπουδαζομένων—‘some dispute [the
title in question] but on the grounds that they labour for the sake of the
necessaries of life [sc. and they must clearly be ruled out on the basis of
what has just been said, at some length, about the need to distinguish the
goods that constitute happiness and those that are merely its necessary
conditions]’. But this is surely too much of a stretch, and in any case no
one, or no one that mattered to Aristotle, ever suggested that the ‘vulgar’
and ‘banausic’ lives in question could claim to be best. Rav. sees the need
for a negative, but Bonitz’s emphatic οὐδ’ seems preferable.
2 A Greek–English Lexicon compiled by H. Liddell and R. Scott, revised . . . by H. Jones . . .

9th edn, with a revised supplement. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996.
Aristotelica 9
a28 In P a first correcting hand puts in an elision mark and rough

breathing over what was plainly once ἄλλως, apparently erasing an
acute accent after the initial smooth breathing; a second correcting hand
then writes ἵσως: τῶν μὲν ὡς τῶν ἀναγκαίων (not ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν ὡς,
as reported by Walzer/Mingay) in the margin. The problem is with the
ὡς in CBLP2 ἀλλ’ ὡς, which even translators who claim to retain it
appear not to translate, and not surprisingly, because it is worse than
redundant; the sentence actually works better without it. Spengel’s bril-
liant emendation—which gets some slight support from P’s original
error, i.e. ἄλλως for ἀλλ’ ὡς, the latter presumably being what was in the
common source of PCBL—gives a perfect sense: the lives in question
make no claims at all for themselves precisely because they randomly
busy themselves with the necessaries, i.e. with no reference to the larger
question ‘what is it for?’
a29 Woods’s τὰς for τῶν before περὶ χρηματισμὸν and Russell’s 〈τὰς〉
τῶν both tidy up the list, perhaps in an attempt to make it all fit better
together, but it is not clear either that they succeed in that, or that it
needs to be tidier.
a32–3 πρὸς ὠνὰς μόνον καὶ πράσεις scripsi. Ιn P, the rough breathing
over ων is apparently changed to (the sign for) -ας, though with the cir-
cumflex left in place, and ἴσως: πρὸς ὠνὰς is written either by the same
or by a different hand in the margin, apparently with the intention for it
to replace ἀγορὰς. (Harlfinger reports that πρὸς ὠν becomes πρὸς ὧν
[‘πρὸς ὧν C et p. corr. P2’]; I read the evidence differently, but it is
admittedly hard to be quite sure what the sequence of events was.) Ιn C,
the iota of πρᾶσι is overwritten with ει; in L a sigma is inserted between
πρὸ and ὧν, ὧν marked for deletion, and, if this corrector follows the
same convention as others (after all, the point is to make the Greek make
sense, and the correctors like the copyists appear generally either to
speak Greek or to know their Greek well), πράσει is by implication
changed to πράσεις. (Similarly, perhaps, with P2’s correction of πρᾶσι
to πρᾶσις; might he even be implicitly deleting ὦν, with L?) B, for his
part, if he was faced with the same mess as PCL, as he presumably was,
went straight for simplification—and interestingly both Bessarion, in
Par. 2042, and Marc. 213 independently offer the same solution as B;
10 Eudemian Ethics I
(1215a32–3) perhaps it just was the obvious way out. How to explain
the mess in PCBL themselves? My own thought is that ἀγορὰς was
originally a gloss on ὠνὰς μόνον καὶ πράσεις, but became absorbed
into the text, with μόνον corrupted to μὲν—for which, clearly, there is
no use in the context; P2’s reconstruction is consistent with this.
a33 τῶν εἰς L1, τῶν οὖν εἰς L2: L2 inserts οὖν above the line (a decent
conjecture: resumptive οὖν?).
a34–5 τῶν καὶ πρότερον . . . τοῖς ἀνθρώποις secl. Walzer: the whole
clause does have something of the feel of a gloss, and would not be missed;
on the other hand, if a gloss is what it is, or originally was, it is well adapted
to the syntax of the sentence, and there is no compelling reason to expel it.
a36 What appears here in the margin in P, i.e. τρεῖς βίοι εἰσὶν ἀρετὴς
ϕρονήσεως καὶ ἡδονής, is plainly a summary or heading, not a sugges-
tion for emending the text; L, in its margin, has a more laconic
τρεῖς βίοι.
a37 ἐπ’ ἐξουσίας τυγχάνοντες: an alternative to Spengel’s proposals
might be to suppose that an ὄντες has slipped out through haplography,
but it is easily enough understood in any case.
1215b1 The gap in B after ἀπολαυστικόν is not caused—as some gaps

are—by any fault in the parchment; a heavy dot resembling a Greek
colon appears after ἀπολαυστικόν, and the gap may just be B’s way of
indicating the beginning of—what he sees as—a new section (cf. on
b14 below).
b10 ἐρόμενον BP2, ἐρώμενον P1CL: P2 corrects omega to omicron above

the line. Either the omega was in ω, the original common source of PCBL,
and B made the correction independently, like P2, or else PCL all made
the same—very common—mistake (omega for omicron or vice versa).
b14 ὡς ἄνθρωπον εἰπεῖν: both Russell’s and Richards’s emendations are

surely unnecessary; ὡς ἄνθρωπον εἰπεῖν is perfectly intelligible for the
required sense, i.e. ‘if it’s a human being we’re talking about’. —There is
another slightly shorter gap in B here, after μακάριον εἶναι, also with
what looks like a Greek colon (cf. on b1 above).
Aristotelica 11
b19 δι’ ἃ suppl. P2/3: i.e. P2 writes ἴσως: διὰ προΐενται τὸ ζῆν οἷον νόσους
ὠδύνας χειμῶνας in the margin, and then another hand corrects διὰ
to δι’ ἃ.
b20 For P2’s ὠδύνας, see preceding note. —καὶ is surrounded in C with
four dots, indicating deletion.
b23 B2 adds a breathing over the second alpha of ἀνακάμψαι: B is often

lackadaisical about splitting words/observing gaps between words, and
here the ἀν becomes separated from the rest of the word.
b24 The μὲν after ἐχόντων is plainly superfluous, ἐχόντων μὲν being a
doublet of ἐχόντων μὲν in the next line: so, once again, is B independ
ently correcting?
b29 κἂν is in the margin in P, with insertion marks there and beside καὶ,
which is the first word in the line.
b29–30 ἀπέραντον, τί scripsi, ἀπέραντόν τι PCBL: changing the

accents—on which PCBL, as a group, are in any case less than wholly
solution than Rav.’s ἀπέραντόν τι 〈οὐ〉, adopted by editors.

reliable, especially where τις and τίς are concerned—is a more economical
b33 πορίζοι PCBL, πορίζει Bekker: the optative fits well enough, given
the context (‘who would choose . . . without whatever pleasures x, y, z . . .
might provide?’).
b34 πορίζοι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις is repeated after προτιμήσειε in P but

crossed out, whether by the original copyist, looking back, or more likely
by another hand.
b35 δῆλον appears in the left margin of C, on the first line on the page,
crammed up against the γὰρ, apparently—messily—supplied by a sec-
ond hand, with what looks like a confirmatory eta above, either from
this corrector or a third hand.
b36 διενέγκοιεν L: the -εν is added as a compendium, unusually for

this MS, above the line and above the second iota.
1216a2 μοναρχιῶν: Fritzsche and Susemihl both write μοναρχῶν, fol-

lowing Lat. (the late Latin translation), but Aristotle would surely have
(1216a2) used μόναρχος (so Rackham); but μοναρχιῶν, on which

PCBL all agree, while surprising is not terminally objectionable.
a3 ἐν τῷ: editors before Walzer/Mingay for some reason preferred τοῦ,
but the unity of PCBL around the perfectly acceptable ἐν τῷ is decisive.
—τὶ B: as observed above, there is a general carelessness in B about the
distinction between acute and grave accents, no doubt partly because of
its tendency to integrate accents with characters.
a8 καθεύδοντα δὲ: another independent correction by B (the μὲν is
nonsensical, as Rav. also sees)?
a12 B2 adds οι above the alpha of ταῦθ’.
a18 To reiterate: ‘δὴ] δὲ PCL’ indicates, by elimination, that B has the δὴ
(attributed by Walzer/Mingay to all of Marc.2, Langerbeck, and Allan); a
happy mistake, another independent correction, or did the hyparche-
type α´ reproduce a δὴ in ω?
a19 ϕαίνονται τάττειν PCL, τάττονται B: ϕαίνονται τάττοντες?
a23 ἀληθῶς: the special sign after ἀληθ in C indicating an ending in
-ως (cf. πως in b10) seems to postdate the apparently partly erased sign
for -ους.
a34 The καλῶς proposed by Bonitz for PCL’s καλὰς is found in B.
a36 A definite article before ἡδοναὶ here would not be out of place (B,
Rackham, and by implication Inwood and Woolf in the Cambridge
translation), but ‘there are other pleasures . . .’ makes perfectly good
sense, and since it appears in both recensiones we should probably
keep it.
a38 The ligature used here in B for -αρα in παρὰ is standard, and is barely
distinguishable from the one used for -ερι (see e.g. περὶ at 1217b40);
similarly with the somewhat different ligatures used by P and C, and no
doubt also ω. PCBL all not infrequently confuse the two prepositions.
1216b2 λόγου: an upsilon is introduced by a correcting hand—perhaps
contemporaneous with Rav., perhaps not—in Laur. 81,20 above the iota
of λόγοι; also by Victorius in his Aldine. (The abbreviation λόγ´ in C
Aristotelica 13
[see Walzer/Mingay] indicates that it has the same ending as the previ-
ous word, so: λόγοι.)
b3 The τοῦ for τὸ, before γινώσκειν, preferred by B2 (introducing a

ligature for ου over the tau) is an interesting variation.
b7 P2 changes the breathing but as usual leaves the other part of the
correction—ὥστ’ to ὥσθ’—to be understood.
b8 The μὲν is omitted/deleted in Marc., then by Bekker; Susemihl

restores it.
b12 τέλος post ἕτερον suppl. Casaubon: we certainly cannot under-

stand τέλος, but nor should we; the sense is ‘there is nothing else
belonging to astronomy. . . ’.
b19 The acute accent on ἤ in B suggests but does not quite make it cer-
tain (given B’s sometimes cavalier relation to accents) that the grave on
τι is a later addition.
b23 ἀνδεῖοι P1: the rho is supplied above by P2 with an insertion mark.
b27 Spengel’s conjecture τούτων πάντα (with πάντα as masculine sin-

gular) starts from the order τούτων πάντων preferred, without justifi-
cation, by e.g. Oxon., the Aldine, Bekker, and Rackham, and supposes/
explains χρώμενον in the line below; but Spengel himself remains
undecided between τούτων πάντα (χρώμενον) and τούτων πάντων
(χρωμένους).
b28 P2 writes ἴσως: χρωμένους in the margin.
b35 γνωριμώτατα ends in B in what is apparently a version of the

shorthand used for τατα in MSS like P and C; there is a mark below the
line of a sort apparently used elsewhere (e.g. at 1217a36) to indicate
separation between words, which perhaps suggests that one reader might
have wanted to read the τατα as ταῦτα. —Richards’s ἀντὶ would be in
keeping with Aristotle’s general usage, and I know of no parallels for
μεταλαμβάνειν as it would be used here, with acc. and plain gen., of
taking one thing in exchange for another; nevertheless to print the ἀντὶ
would be to close the door on the possibility that the verb could have
(1216b35) been used in such a way, when PBCL are unanimous in pro-
posing that it can.
b38 The genitive τῶν πολιτικῶν, pace Victorius (‘fort. τὸν πολιτικὸν’ in
margin), looks sound enough, with τὴν τοιαύτην θεωρίαν, and though we
might have expected Aristotle to refer to the politician per se, there is no
reason why he should not for once be referring to politicians in general.
b40 For Fritzsche’s ϕιλοσόϕου, cf. 1217a1; and the difference between
-ον and -ου, when they are written out, is minuscule. However the copy-
ists of PCBL all evidently had ϕιλόσοϕον before them, and it looks
viable enough.
1217a6 τῶν μήτ’ ἐχόντων B, ὑπὸ τούτων τῶν μήτ’ ἐχόντων PCL:
translators (Solomon, Woods, Kenny, Inwood/Woolf), reading ὑπὸ
τούτων τῶν μήτ’ ἐχόντων, take the preceding ὧν (ὑϕ’ ὧν) as referring
to ‘reasons’ given or ‘arguments’ made by the subject of the preceding
ποιοῦσιν, i.e. the τινες of a1, but this is awkward, because it leaves us
with ὑπό occurring twice, in the same sentence less than ten words
apart, with the causation/agency assigned to two different things. The
difference between them could perhaps be elided, since after all the
arguments will belong to the τινες. But in my view it would be more
natural to take ὧν itself to refer to the τινες (given that they are the
subject of the main verb of the present sentence), in which case ὑπὸ
τούτων τῶν κτλ would be epexegetic of ὑϕ’ ὧν; and then ὑπὸ τούτων
appears out of place, insofar as Aristotle now introduces a further
description of the people already being referred to in the clause (I note
that none of the translators mentioned above appears to translate
τούτων). Langerbeck recognizes the problems and recommends sur-
gery, cutting out the whole of ὑπὸ τούτων τῶν . . . 7 ἢ πρακτικήν (per-
haps as a gloss?). But the lack of ὑπὸ τούτων in B—whether by chance
or by judgement: presumably the copyist of B had the same text in front
of him as those of PCL—offers a more economical solution, namely to
take τῶν μήτ’ ἐχόντων κτλ itself as straightforwardly in apposition to
the relative ὧν; I surmise that the relatively unexpected, though per-
fectly regular nature of the construction led to the introduction of ὑπὸ
τούτων as a false correlative of ὑϕ’ ὧν.—ἔχειν post μήτε suppl. Ross:
Aristotelica 15
Dirlmeier is probably right to say that ἔχειν is to be (and can be) under-
stood. It would certainly have been easier on the eye if Aristotle had
written in the ἔχειν, but that is not always his way in EE, even in its
more fluent parts.
a12 πάντως Langerbeck: but πάντα, ‘in everything’, is surely better.
a14 καὶ διότι is the pair of a11 διά τε τὸ ῥηθὲν ἀρτίως. This edition
does without parenthesizing brackets, chiefly on the grounds that
Aristotle’s parentheses tend to be part of the forward sweep of his argu-
ment: that is, rather than being hermetically sealed units, like their
modern counterparts, they can include elements that are indispensable
to the onward movement of the surrounding argument. That may not be
quite the case here, and brackets would in this instance certainly make
the text more immediately readable; thus Bekker, then Susemihl and
Walzer/Mingay, all bracketing off a13–14 νῦν δ’ . . . τοῖς εἰρημένοις. But
in following his train of thought Aristotle quite often writes unwieldy
sentences, and if brackets make them more reader-friendly, they often
unhelpfully obscure the argument in the process; even here, a13–14 is
actually of a piece with what precedes it. In extreme cases, where a
parenthesis actually interrupts the syntax, I use dashes.
a19 δὲ: καὶ L; δὲ καὶ Ald., and then also Walzer/Mingay, attributing
it to Walzer. The crucial question, introduced by L’s καὶ, is how far
back the proemion is meant to stretch; I take it to be just to the begin-
ning of the last paragraph, which looks to be a proemion par excel-
lence, and so prefer PCB’s δὲ. Walzer/Mingay’s δὲ καὶ derives
immediately from Susemihl’s ‘δὲ om. [Oxon. Marc.] // καὶ secl.
Spengelius Susem.’ Bekker also had δὲ καὶ (‘δὲ om. [Marc.]’). But
PCB all have just δὲ, and I see no compelling reason to combine this,
as the expected connective (though connectives are not infrequently
missing in EE), with L’s καὶ.
a21 ἐπὶ τῷ σαϕῶς (B): i.e. ‘for the sake of clarity’ (see LSJ s.v. ἐπί
Β.ΙΙΙ.2), picking up on the σαϕῶς of 1216b34, with εὑρεῖν not part of
a noun clause (i.e. τῷ σαϕῶς εὑρεῖν) but rather a straightforward
infinitive after ζητοῦντες; το (PCL) for τω and vice versa is a stand-
ard error.
1217a34–5 οὐδὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν: I understand ‘so not participating in the

relevant goods either (i.e. those involving movement, as πρακτὰ ἀγαθά
do)’—another example of the often elliptical style of EE.
a38 What B writes here is apparently πράξεως; it is hard, at any rate, to
see what else it could be (at first sight it seems to end -κης, but the accent
is against it, appearing as it does over what ought to be a preceding
alpha). The mess may reflect the copyist’s own uncertainty about what
was in his source.
b5 Bessarion evidently saw there was something wrong with τῷ αἴτιῳ,
but changed the wrong word. —The same correction he then makes of
ἀγαθοῦ to ἀγαθοῖς is also later made by Victorius (with a ‘γρ.’).
b10 ἐκείνης: the ἐκείνοις in B is corrected with an eta above the οι.
b21 ἰδέας: editors adopt Marc.’s ἰδέαν (also proposed by Victorius, with
a ‘γρ.’), not knowing of B’s ἰδέας—which Bessarion also reads, it seems
independently, in Par. 2042.
b22 B has a wavy line under the ουο of ὁτουοῦν, perhaps signalling
(wrongly) a need for correction; cf. L at b27.
b27 τῷ ὄντι ἀγαθόν: the evidence overall suggests that ω, the common
source of PCBL, lacked the definite article before ἀγαθόν; P inserts it,
while B adds a τὸ in a different place, creating a new and different, and
wrong, sense. Cf. 1218a14–15 πᾶσι γὰρ ὑπάρχει κοινόν, another exactly
parallel case where we might have expected the article; perhaps also
1218a21, 38 (L has a wavy line under the omega and omicron of τωόντι,
evidently indicating the need for correction; cf. B at b22).
b29 πρός τι for πότε in Marc., as reported by Walzer/Mingay (I have
not checked), would presumably be attraction to the following πρὸς
(τούτοις).
b33 〈τὸ〉 διδασκόμενον is preferred by editors, but the omission of the
second article under these conditions is common in EE. (Walzer/
Mingay attributes the article to Rav., while Susemihl, saying that P and
Pal. 165 omit it, implies that C, Marc., and Oxon. also have it. C does not;
Marc., copying from Rav., presumably does have it, and it would not be
particularly striking, or interesting, if Oxon. supplied it independently.)
Aristotelica 17
b34 παρὰ: B here, unusually, mimics the shorthand for παρά found in
MSS like P and C, which the L copyist presumably misread in ω.
1218a2 Bessarion’s πρῶτον for πρότερον is perhaps just an error of tran-

scription (but cf. Spengel at 1217b13); he goes on to write προτέρου for
πρῶτου in the next line, as does Spengel, independently, and πρῶτον for
πρότερον in a8, all of which plays havoc with the argument (this is a rare
lapse on his part). Spengel himself then writes πρότερον for πρῶτον in a5
and a6; it is not clear whether his version does any better than Bessarion’s.
a8 Barnes calls Rassow’s conjecture of ἔτι for the MSS’ εἰ ‘palmary’, but
(a) the ἢ both provides the required connective and suitably introduces
a new (step in the) argument: ‘or else τὸ κοινὸν turns out to be the ἰδέα’,
i.e. in all cases, whereas we have just been considering the cases ἐν ὅσοις
ὑπάρχει τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον; (b) ἤ and εἰ are not infrequently
confused, because the ligature for εἰ in these MSS is close in shape to ἤ,
while being clearly distinguishable from ἔτι, which is always written out
in full. The latter is not a decisive consideration on its own, but provides
support for (a), if (a) holds.
a14 Susemihl, and then Walzer/Mingay, accept Rassow’s supplement

(τὸ ἀγαθὸν μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸν τῷ ἀίδιον εἶναι· οὐδὲ) between οὐδὲ and
δὴ, but such a conclusion is surely obvious enough not to need stating
(and in any case one would have expected οὔτε . . . οὔτε . . . rather than
οὐδὲ . . . οὐδὲ . . .). Woods, in his commentary ad loc., thinks even more is
missed out, sketching what he thinks needs to be added to make a
decent argument. But I propose that a satisfactory sense can be made of
what the MSS give us. Just as we can easily supply the conclusion that
the good is not made more of a good by being ἀΐδιον, so we can supply
‘and if the [form of] the good is more of a good’ to complete what fol-
lows: ‘and so (ὥστε), sc. if the ἰδέα is more of a good, then neither
(οὐδὲ) is τὸ κοινὸν ἀγαθὸν ταὐτὸ τῇ ἰδέᾳ (the hypothesis we were
working with: a8–9 ἢ συμβαίνει τὸ κοινὸν εἶναι τὴν ἰδέαν, κτλ [hence
οὐδὲ δὴ]), because it—a15 κοινόν = τὸ κοινόν, subject—belongs to
every good [sc. which the form will not if it is somehow more of a good
than other goods]’. This is standard Eudemian ellipse. —ταὐτὸ: C alone
has the crasis mark.
1218a15 ‘γρ. ἢ ὡς’, then (a17) ‘γρ. ἀνομολογουμένων’, Victorius.

a23 τάξις καὶ ἠρεμία: or should we read τάξεις καὶ ἠρεμίαι, rather
than accepting B’s τάξις—which appears in Rav., Matr. 4627, and
Ambr., all independently, it seems, of B—in the same phrase? After all,
we have just had τάξεις . . . καὶ ἀριθμοί (a19), as part of the same dialectical
argument. On the other hand, the plural there could be the cause of the
plural τάξεις here in PCL. —P2’s ἀριθμοί, in the margin, prefaced with
ἴσως, continues the process, substituting for ἠρεμία because of the
plural τάξεις, and in imitation of a19.
a27 γρ: τοῦτο P2 in margin. Τhe γρ is followed by something super-
script; probably αι, as Harlifinger says, so γρ[άϕετ]αι, but possibly (see
on a38 below) -ον, so γρ[απτέ]ον.
a29 ἀλόγοις L: an easy error, perhaps, after the ending -εν. (It is perhaps
worth recording that P, for instance, has two separate ligatures/marks
for -ως, one of which lends itself easily to being confused with that for
-ου; both appear, I notice, in this stretch in P, apparently with no rule as
to when or why one might be preferred over the other.)
a36–7 Cook Wilson actually proposed to bracket a37–8 ἔτι οὐ πρακτόν
as well, but that seems a step too far; it is ἔτι καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ
γεγραμμένον, ἢ γὰρ . . . ἢ πάσαις ὁμοίως that is suspect, for the follow-
ing reasons. Aristotle is summing up (ἔχει ἀπορίας τοιαύτας, κτλ).
Now ἔτι καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ γεγραμμένον . . . either (a) refers back, or
(b) refers to some other work. If (a), then he has no need for τὸ ἐν τῷ
λόγῳ γεγραμμένον; the point in question has been made (at consider-
able length, if only implicitly) in 1217b24–1218a1, and the ones men-
tioned in the last sentence were already similarly ἐν τῷ λόγῳ
γεγραμμένα—why, then, describe this point thus and not the others?
So—if it is a backward reference—τὸ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ γεγραμμένον must
have been written by someone else. If (b), i.e. if the reference is supposed
to be to some other work, its form is too vague for Aristotle to think it
could be useful to a reader, or perhaps even to himself (we should not,
I think, rule out the possibility that he could indulge on occasion in
notes to himself ); indeed, it would not even be useful to the glossator.
I conclude that the sentence in question refers back to the discussion we
Aristotelica 19
have just had, and that it was written by someone other than Aristotle; it
was a glossator’s amplification of Aristotle’s own summing up, and got
itself incorporated into it in the process of transmission.
a38 αὐτοαγαθόν B2: there is what looks like a circumflex over the final
letter of αὐτὸ and the gap between it and ἀγαθόν, probably intended to
indicate that the two words should rather be one. Aristotle presumably
cannot be saying that τὸ κοινὸν ἀγαθόν is not itself good, and while
αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν could possibly be Eudemian Greek for αὐτὸ τἀγαθόν
(P2, regularizing, writes in the margin γρ[απτέ]α: οὔτε αὐτὸ τἀγαθὸν
ἐστὶ or ἔστι: the α, or what looks like α, is superscript: Harlfinger reads
γρ[άϕετ]αι), it seems reasonable, in the absence of the definite article
from all of PCBL before corrections, to accept the gift from B2,
αὐτοαγαθόν being an Aristotelian formation (Met. 998a28). (We might
have wished for a definite article with αὐτοαγαθόν itself, but so too we
might have wished for one in 1217b27.) The crasis mark on P2’s
τἀγαθόν appears to be written twice, probably as a result of his moving
it so that it is more clearly over the first alpha: either that, or P2 intends
τ’ ἀγαθόν, which seems unlikely, although oddly Walzer/Mingay prints
it in the text.
1218b2 ὑπάρξη CBL: the final character in B is actually somewhat
ambiguous; it is probably an eta, but is nonetheless close in some
respects to the ligature for ει—thus illustrating the ease with which the
mistake, eta for ει, can be made.
b5 πρακτὸν2 in B is split πρα-κτὸν between two lines, and there is what
looks like a hyphen before the second part.
b6 τοῦτο Laur. 81,42 (and Spengel): but see e.g. 1219a24.
b8 L puts a heavy stop after ϕανερὸν (accenting -ὸν), seemingly taking
it as marking the end of the previous sentence, which suggests how a
connective could have fallen out (and οὖν [Brandis] would perhaps be
the most at risk after -ὸν). Connectives are sometimes absent in EE, but
probably not here, where Aristotle is announcing the conclusion of a
major set of arguments.
b15 τοιαῦτ’/τοιαῦτα is quite defensible, if we take Aristotle to be saying
‘by their being things of such a sort’, i.e. each such as to be something, in
(1218b15) its own way, κύριον πασῶν, sc. ἐπιστήμων. L’s τοιαύτας looks
like a dittography after ἄλλας, which Bekker then makes into proper Greek.
b18 τἄλλα CB1L: B2 adds what looks like a second crasis mark but which
is probably a signal to split up τἄλλα into τὰ ἄλλα.
b19 τοῦ P1CBL, τὸ1 P2: there are clear signs of an erasure after the τὸ in
P; the likelihood is that there was originally a τοῦ, as in CBL, mimicking
the following οὗ. —τοῦ P1CBL, τὸ2 P2: here the correction in P is
achieved by crude overwriting.
b21 Woods adopts Ross’s καίτοι, translating ‘but an efficient cause of

health’s existence, not of its being good’, but (a) this would perhaps be an
unusual way to use καίτοι; (b) ‘not of . . .’ suggests καὶ οὐ rather than
ἀλλ’ οὐ, and (c) τόδε, picking up αἴτιον, as it does, is both a more eco-
nomical solution for the impossible τότε and makes perfect sense.
b28 [μετὰ ταῦτα ἄλλην λαβοῦσιν ἀρχήν]: Aristotle might have c hosen
to finish a book with the same words he would use to start the next one
(minus the connective, which of course won’t fit here), as a way of
marking the continuity between Book I and Book II, but it seems more
likely that someone else did it. (P has the title of the following book,
‘ἠθικῶν εὐδημίων – – – – β´ ’ starting a line and λαβοῦσιν ἀρχήν, offi-
cially the last two words of Book I, ending the same line, an arrangement
that perhaps suggests the same idea, i.e. that the repetition is there sim-
ply to link the two books.) Susemihl’s proposal to bracket either the
whole of the last sentence of Book I or the first sentence of Book II is
probably excessive, although it must be said that even without μετὰ
ταῦτα ἄλλην λαβοῦσιν ἀρχήν, the end of Book I as the MSS preserve
it, with its threefold ἄριστον, is distinctly problematical (‘turbata quae-
dam in his verbis esse monet Bu[ssemaker]’, Susemihl). Allan’s supple-
ment of καὶ after ποσαχῶς gives the sentence a better structure, but it is
not clear that Book II actually does examine ‘in how many ways τὸ ὡς
τέλος ἀγαθὸν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τὸ ἄριστον τῶν πρακτῶν is also τὸ
ἄριστον πάντων’—if that is what Allan intends. Not dissimilar prob-
lems arise with the last full sentence of EE VIII/V: there in EE VIII/V
I emend, and it may be that surgery is needed here too, but it is hard to
see exactly where to begin the cutting. (I might start with the definite
Aristotelica 21
article before the second ἄριστον, and perhaps the one before the first;
but this would be no more than tinkering.) —Against Dirlmeier’s πῶς
for ποσαχῶς in b26 there is the previous use of ποσαχῶς at 1217b1,
where he mistakenly translates λέγεται ποσαχῶς as ‘wie viele
Bedeutungen das Wort hat’, when the reference is plainly to three differ-
ent views (‘Meinungen’) people take, and/or might take, of τὸ ἄριστον
(hence Kenny’s more neutral ‘in how many senses the expression is used’
[Oxford World’s Classics]); in the present context too, in the first few
lines of Book II, Aristotle will reintroduce the main three main views on
the nature of εὐδαιμονία (ϕρόνησις . . . καὶ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡδονή, ὧν ἢ ἔνια
ἢ πάντα τέλος εἶναι δοκεῖ πᾶσιν: Ι.1, 1218b34–6), between which he
will choose. So ποσαχῶς fits; πῶς will fit too, but not so obviously bet-
ter as to justify the emendation.
Eudemian Ethics II
1218b30 In B, the ordinal number of the book, β-ον, is curiously filled

out as βιβλίον, presumably by a later hand, since the superscript -ον is
still in place.
b31 μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα: PCBL all have ταῦτα (i.e. without elision) here as
well as in b27, which this line echoes; editors from Bekker onwards print
μετὰ ταῦτα there, but μετὰ . . . ταῦτ’ here.
b32 〈ἐν〉 ψυχῇ: P2 writes πάντα ἀγαθὰ ἢ ἐκτὸς ἢ ἐν ψυχῇ in the mar-
gin, perhaps merely picking out something memorable in the text, but
surely indicating that he felt the need for an ἐν. In any case, since ἐκτὸς
is presumably said with reference to the soul (with no mention of body,
ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ will have to include bodily ones), and relevant goods that
are not ἐκτὸς τῆς ψυχῆς will be in it, ‘in the soul’ must be meant, and
that cannot be expressed by a plain dative. Bessarion writes ἐν ψυχῇ in
Par. 2042.
b38 The colon (or perhaps a comma, as in Rackham) after ὑποκείσθω
is implicitly introduced by translators (Woods, Kenny, Inwood/Woolf),
and looks necessary.
1219a16 ὑγεία B: perhaps part of the ligature for ει has accidentally

coincided with the iota, but this mistake has occurred in B before.
—ὑγίασις/ὑγίανσις: the latter is what P presumably had before it was
‘corrected’ (by erasure of the nu and extension of the alpha) to ὑγίασις.
a20 Neither ταὐτὸ nor αὐτὸ is needed; the sense clearly is ‘the ἔργον of
the thing [is] also [the ἔργον] of the ἀρετὴ [of the thing]’.
a25 τοῦ: I retain the MSS’ τοῦ—as referring to ζῆν—because (a) it is

quite possible Greek: cf. e.g. 1218b6–7 οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τὸ (τοῦτο Spengel)
ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις, and Plato, Symposium 173a, 211a; and (b) because, if
Aristotelica 23
it is possible, it is lectio difficilior, or at least less expected. Woods objects

that with the reading τοῦ (or τούτου) ‘Aristotle will be saying that the
ἔργον of soul is to produce life, and the ἔργον of living is, in its turn, an
employment and waking state. What seems to be needed is some pre-
miss applying the doctrine that, in the case of some things, their ἔργον
is their χρῆσις itself, and not something over and above it.’ Why is ‘the
ἔργον of living is . . . an employment and waking state’ not such a
premiss?
a26 ἡσυχεία P2: an original iota is overwritten with ει.
a27 καὶ2 is inserted above the line in P, probably by the original hand.
a31–2 ταῦτα δὲ ἢ ἕξεις ἢ ἐνέργειαι scripsi. Susemihl prints ** αὐτὴ, κτλ

(where the αὐτὴ comes from Bekker, who apparently got it from Marc., or
jecture, 〈τὰ ἐν〉 αὐτῇ: he quite often employs lacunas in this way, in order
possibly Oxon.), which is presumably an invitation to adopt his own con-
to avoid committing himself and the reader to a particular conjecture.

Walzer/Mingay then behaves even more conservatively than Susemihl,
throwing in the towel and printing †αὕτη† δὲ ἢ ἕξις ἢ ἐνέργεια. Bekker
presumably understood ‘and it / εὐδαιμονία itself [is . . .]’; and what it
would be being said to be can be inferred, at any rate, from the ὑποκείμενα
mentioned in 1219a30, the specific reference being perhaps to 1218b32–7.
But this is not quite satisfactory; we would rather expect something pick-
ing up the preceding τὰ δὲ τέλη, κτλ, as with either of Spengel’s proposals
or with Susemihl’s (Mingay’s ἀρετὴ is ingenious, but fails to carry convic-
tion). But the singular ἢ ἕξις ἢ ἐνέργεια then looks intolerable. I propose,
and print, ταῦτα (Spengel) δὲ ἢ ἕξεις ἢ ἐνέργειαι (Ross): after ταῦτα
had been corrupted to αὕτη (why, in these MSS, is a question that often
cannot be answered), the change from plural to singular would be
natural enough.
a35 ἔσται scripsi: εἶναι PCBL; ἀνάγκη post εἶναι suppl. P2, writing
ἴσως: ἀνάγκη, in the margin, with insertion marks, in order to explain
εἶναι (the beginning of the entry in the Walzer/Mingay apparatus for
a33, ‘ἀνάγκη τῆς ἀρετῆς mg. P2, addito ἴσως’, is wrong: ‘εἶναι ἀνάγκη
P2, addito ἴσως’ would be right, except that only ἀνάγκη is in the mar-
gin, with an insertion mark there and a matching one after εἶναι
24 Eudemian Ethics ii
(1219a35) in the text). Bonitz’s, Fritzsche’s, and Ross’s proposals similarly

aim to explain the infinitive. Aristotle is here reaching an interim con-
clusion, either that ‘the activity of the virtue of the soul’ (Woods, Kenny;
thing of (?) the soul (with Ross’s ἐνέργειαν 〈τὸ〉). The latter interpretation
similarly Inwood/Woolf) is best, or that the activity of virtue is the best
does not strictly require Ross’s extra definite articles (τὴν, τὸ), and
indeed their main function is probably to impose his interpretation on
the text; but it is surely unattractive in any case, not least given the work
that has to be done to accommodate it. If we settle, then, on the other
interpretation, the immediate question is how to explain the infinitive
εἶναι with which the sentence ends in the MSS. Retaining the infinitive
requires at least two emendations, i.e. Bonitz’s ἐνέργειαν for ἐνέργεια ἡ
(which might possibly be intended by P2 as a consequence of his supple-
ment of ἀνάγκη), and either Fritzsche’s supplement of δεῖ or P2’s of
ἀνάγκη; the only alternative is to suppose, with Inwood/Woolf, that the
accusative and infinitive is governed by δῆλον back in a29, and against
this is not only the distance of that δῆλον but the fact that δῆλον is typ
ically followed by a ὄτι-clause rather than an accusative and infinitive.
(The distance problem would be mitigated if we were to bracket a30–2 ἦν
μὲν γὰρ . . . ἢ ἕξεις ἢ ἐνέργειαι, on the grounds that it not only breaks
up the flow of the sentence, but also perhaps is dispensable—after all, it
spells out what we know already. But so does what follows a30–2 [i.e.
this is not intrusive material, as at 1220b10–12, 1225b3–6, or 1228a14:
qqv.]; Aristotle is formally setting out the argument leading to a big con-
clusion, and a30–2 includes parts of that argument.) If, on the other
hand, we retain the MSS’ nominative, ἐνέργεια, with ἡ, of which L’s ἢ is
surely a corruption, the only change required is from εἶναι to ἔσται,
and the Greek will be on any account rather easier to construe. While I
cannot explain how the corruption of ἔσται to εἶναι could have
occurred, or provide any precise parallels, it is, plainly, much easier to
defend ἐνέργεια ἡ than it is to defend εἶναι. That is not to say that
Bonitz, and P2, may not have been right (if the latter really did intend
ἐνέργειαν for ἐνέργεια ἡ), and after all, as noted before, Aristotle in EE
is not obviously much concerned with making things easy for the reader.
But in such cases the more economical solution must, I think, be held to
trump the less; we do not need to make Eudemian style spikier than it
Aristotelica 25
already is, any more than we need to make it less spiky. (An alternative
would be to obelize εἶναι, with ἔσται as a conjecture in the apparatus;
but that then entails keeping ἐνέργεια ἡ, which would more or less
compel the reader to accept ἔσται in any case, and would amount to
using the obelus in the way Susemihl uses the lacuna: see previous note.
The only real alternative to emending εἶναι is to obelize the whole of
ἐνέργεια ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ἄριστον εἶναι, and that seems like overkill if the
only obvious problem is with εἶναι.)
a40 κατὰ ἀρετὴν BL, κατ’ ἀρετὴν PC: the reading in BL is preferred
according to the rule I have adopted, that if the arguments for each of
two readings are equally balanced, the one that figures in both recen-
siones is to be adopted.
1219b12 ὁποῖός τις ἐστίν: τίς in P is inserted above the line by a

later hand.
b16 τοῦ post ἔπαινος suppl. Bonitz: this supplement would be neces-
sary in most other texts, and every second time I return to this passage
I find the omission of the definite article disturbing. That means, how-
ever, that I also find no conclusive case for inserting it, in the notori-
ously laconic EE (note the following τέλους without article, though that
is much less surprising). Cf. Fritzsche’s description of b5 μίαν ἡμέραν
εἶναι as ‘mutilata’, which is surely a reaction to its brevity; his proposals
for rewriting (reported by Susemihl) miss the point.
b18 Walzer/Mingay’s reference to Denniston 186 in defence of the δέ

(secl. Langerbeck) deals with only half of the issue, i.e. the placing of the
δέ after the participle; the other half is the question why we should need
δέ as well as καὶ. The answer is that καὶ is ‘also’; its position, at the
beginning of the sentence, perhaps itself causes the displacement of the
δέ. —ποθὲν οὐθὲν CB: an easy dittography; hardly a significant shared
error. (Pace Walzer/Mingay, P has ποτ’, like L.)
b20 καθεύδονται BLC2: the ending in both P and C appears above the
οντ; in P it is an unambiguous (shorthand) -ες, while in C there is a
mess that is legible as -αι: this I take to be a ‘correction’ against another
manuscript of an original -ες as in P. By contrast with the last, this is an
(1219b20) interesting shared error. Both B and L are interpreting hands,

like that in PC, that use shorthand, and the shorthand for -ες is nothing
like αι; in addition to which, is the middle of καθεύδειν attested any-
where? Either the B and L copyists just happened to make the same
strange error, or καθεύδονται was in ω, the common source of PCBL, and
PC καθεύδοντες is a correction, perhaps made in α. (Or, if -αι in C is
after all original, then καθεύδονται was in α too, and Nikolaos is mak-
ing the correction in P but not in C.)
b22 τῆς ψυχῆς P1: P2 marks τῆς for deletion by surrounding it with
four dots.
b25 Rackham’s supplement of the definite article before ὀρεκτικὸν

would be right, e.g. for NE; for EE it is unnecessary (albeit the
αἰσθητικὸν and the ὀρεκτικὸν are different things).
b30 εἶναι post ψυχῆς suppl. Russell: another example of unnecessary
regularizing or filling out of Aristotle’s Greek.
b35 καὶ secl. Ross: Walzer/Mingay’s reference to Denniston 319, for this
καὶ, is helpful; ‘it has different δυνάμεις all the same, (and) actually τὰς
εἰρημένας’.
b36 καμπύλῳ: P2 writes στρεβλῷ above καμπύλῳ; perhaps a gloss
rather than an emendation? B has what is by now clearly to be taken as a
separation mark (B2, presumably) below the line between καμπύλῳ
and the following τὸ, B being particularly inclined to run words
together.
b37–8 ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς: ‘but [it is white] κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς’

works well enough for us not to need Richards’s ἀλλ’ ἢ (but see
1221a23, which if we followed Spengel would be another case of the
corruption of ἀλλ’ ἢ to ἀλλά). —οὐκουσία vel οὐκουσιᾳ P (iota sub-
script [never adscript] generally being omitted in these MSS): the way
in which P preserves the necessary οὐκ suggests how it might
have fallen out of the others, i.e. by haplography; in C the process may
have been helped by the fact that the preceding καὶ is the last word in
the line (so, was οὐκ at least in α; even in α´ and ω too?). —τοῦ for τῇ
Aristotelica 27
before αὑτοῦ is a standard error. Bonitz’s οὐσίᾳ τὀ αὐτό is a possibility,

but leaves the MSS’ genitive unexplained and gives a less good sense: ‘the
straight is not white but [only] κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς, and [it is] not the
same thing [as it is] οὐσίᾳ’? —ἀϕῃρήσθω Fritzsche: but it is a fact that
the μέρος ἀϕῄρηται (b32–3).
b39 Victorius’ conjecture (very necessary correction) is once again pre-

ceded by γρ.
b40 Susemihl’s γὰρ for δὲ, adopted by Walzer/Mingay, comes from the
late Latin translation (‘In.’), and is unnecessary; Ross’s supplementary
negative, also adopted by Walzer/Mingay, completely ruins the sense
(see Donini’s note ad loc.).
b41 καὶ αὐξητικοῦ Bonitz, καὶ ὀρεκτικοῦ PCBL: the question is whether
an appearance of τὸ ὀρεκτικόν here can be squared with Aristotelian doc-
trine as both (a) usually understood and (b) reflected in the EE itself. If the
answer is no, as I think (Aristotle’s very next sentence surely proves it), then
unless we bracket the words, as Susemihl hesitantly suggests, we have little
option but to accept Bonitz’s emendation. These copyists, and evidently
their predecessors, do make mistakes for no presently observable reason,
and this is surely one such case. —εἰ ᾗ ἄνθρωπος: i.e. ‘if [a human being is
being considered] as a human being’. The reader is here being asked to sup-
ply quite a lot, but not, I think, impossibly much. Dodds’s supplement of
ἀνθρώπου would make life easier, and ἀνθρώπου could well have dropped
out before the following ἄνθρωπος, but εἰ ᾗ ἄνθρωπος as it stands seems
to me viable (Eudemian) Greek. Deleting εἰ, with Ross, is another option,
but how then did the εἰ get in? Perhaps by reduplication (η and ει are some-
times confused), but then the story is already too complicated if the trans-
mitted text works. I note that whatever text we adopt, the sense has to be the
same, and that is itself reason enough for changing as little as possible.
(Walzer/Mingay claims that C has ᾗ, PL ᾖ, Susemihl that P has ᾖ—Susemihl
then proceeding to attribute ᾗ to Bonitz; in fact C and L both have ᾗ, of
course without the iota subscript, as does B, and there is less doubt about
the breathing in P than about the eta itself, which is a bit of a mess. The
problems may start with Bekker, who reads ᾖ without comment.)
1220a1 ἐκεῖναι CB: it is difficult to be quite certain about what B offers;

probably ἐκ- rather than ἐν-, but the case shows how easily they are con-
fused. —Walzer/Mingay reports that Ross thought καὶ πρᾶξιν corrupt,
and Allan’s ὄρεξιν for πρᾶξιν is more than a little tempting: after all,
πρᾶξις is not exactly an ingredient in the mix (whatever mix it is) in the
same way as λογισμός, and palaeographically speaking the distance
between πρᾶξις and ὄρεξις is not great. On the other hand, reading
ὄρεξιν here would render the conclusion in a2–3, ἀνάγκη ἄρα ταῦτ’
ἔχειν τὰ μέρη, somewhat lame, and it is certainly true that πρᾶξις con-
stitutes the general context within which the relevance or otherwise of
the various parts of the soul is being judged.
1220a15 ἀνῆκται/ἀνῆκον: for ἀνήκω, cf. NE VIII.1, 1155b10; it may

also be read at IX.6, 1167b4.
a18 Richards’s τὸ καὶ is perhaps right, but the MSS’ reading is perfectly
defensible.
intolerable without a verb, then prima facie Dirlmeier’s 〈ἔχοιμεν〉

a19–20 ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ καὶ ὑγίειαν: if we conclude that the clause is
πάντες; but ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ 〈ἔχοιμεν〉 καὶ ὑγίειαν ὅτι would only work
might be the favourite, because it picks up a17 ἔχοντές τι ζητοῦσι
if we accepted Dirlmeier’s bizarre claim ‘dass ἔχειν = εἰδἐναι ist’.

(Besides, we have just had ἔχειν in a quite different sense.) I propose we
should understand, but not print, ζητοῦντες ἔχοιμεν, i.e. ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ
καὶ ὑγίειαν [ζητοῦντες ἔχοιμεν] ὅτι, κτλ. (To deploy the obelus, with
Walzer/Mingay, or with Allan suppose a lacuna, which probably comes
to the same thing, is to suggest a locus desperatus; that it surely is not.)
a28 πὼς/πῶς: this is actually a distinction without a difference, given

that some modern editors, e.g. Bywater in NE, prefer to write πῶς
instead of πώς in such cases. (Walzer/Mingay curiously leaves out the
accent altogether; so too in a33.)
a33 καὶ2 deest in BL: and also in PC, except that what follows, 34–5 πρὸς
ταῦτα ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῆς ὑϕ’ ὧν καὶ αὔξεται καὶ ϕθείρεται (not καὶ πρὸς
ταῦτα . . . ϕθείρεται, as reported by Walzer/Mingay), occurs twice in both,
linked with a καί. Thus the necessary καὶ before the πρὸς in 34
does appear the second time round. How this bizarre state of affairs came
Aristotelica 29
about is a mystery; it originated, presumably, in α, the source MS for P and

C, since Nikolaos would surely not have created an identical mess for him-
self on both occasions. There is a gap in P, between the first αὐτῆς and the
first ὑϕ’ ὧν, in which there are signs of deletion.
a34 ταὐτὰ Bussemaker: but ταῦτα is a perfectly decent antecedent for the
following relatives.
B2; καὶ πρὸς ἃ 〈καὶ〉 Russell. B2—or is it the original hand?—adds πως
a35 καὶ πρὸς ἃ Langerbeck: πως ἃ PC; καὶ ἃ B1; πρὸς ἃ L; πως καὶ ἃ
over line between the preceding ϕθείρεται and καὶ, and the necessary
extra accent to ϕθείρεται. I refrain from treating the καὶ before πρὸς as
a supplement because the spread of the MSS readings suggests that καὶ
πρὸς ἃ, in whatever order, could well have been in their common
source, ω; it is in any case clearly what is needed.
a35–40 σημεῖον . . . δῆλον secl. Allan: a strange proposal, unless σημεῖον

δ’ ὅτι is taken as ‘And there is a proof that . . .’, instead of ‘And there is
proof [of what we have just said], namely. . .’.
1220b1 ὅτι secl. Russell (having bracketed the preceding ἐστὶ too): but
the ὅτι is surely unproblematic, as Susemihl saw; pace Susemihl, so is
the following τὸ [sc. ἐθιζόμενον] ὑπ’ ἀγωγῆς μὴ ἐμϕύτου. On this last
(and on other issues), see P. Ferreira, ‘EE 1220a39–b6’, Archai 20, May–
Aug. 2017: 123–40.
b3 τὸ ἐνεργητικόν: keeping the τὸ, I construe ‘that is how [we] already

[get] the [whatever it may be that is] capable of acting [in accordance
one for Aristotle’s Greek/the Greek of EE. Allan’s 〈αὐ〉τὸ is problematic

with the acquired ἦθος]’, which is a stretch but not, I think, too much of
to the extent that ‘it’ should have a clear reference, which (so far as I can
see) it does not.
b5 τοῦτο μὴ PCL, τοῦτον B: B2 inserts ὴ over the end of a flowery nu

that already resembles a mu.
b5–6 ψυχῆς κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον δυναμένου [δ’ ] ἀκολουθεῖν

[τῷ λόγῳ] ποιότης scripsi: Fritzsche’s supplement of τοῦ ἀλόγου μὲν
after λόγον, enabling the retention of the following δέ (Bonitz’s vari
ation on this, λογικοῦ μὲν οὐ for λόγον δυναμένου, is ingenious but
(1220b5–6) leaves κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν up in the air), makes this account

of ἦθος mimic the description of the ethical ἀρεταί only a few lines
before (1220a10–11) even more closely than the patently corrupted text
in the MSS (ψυχῆς κατὰ/καὶ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον/ων δυναμένου δ’
ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ ποιότης) already does. I speculate that the trans-
mitted text has its origin in a gloss referring back to those lines, a pro-
cess that Fritzsche’s supplement would in effect complete. The proposed
reading strips back the account of ἦθος to the bare essentials, as well as
avoiding the anyway odd repetition of λόγος and the partial reduplica-
tion involved in κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον . . . ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ.
(The Aldine, incidentally, omits τῷ λόγῳ; Victorius restores it in the
margin, at the same time as correcting the Aldine’s δυνάμει to
δυναμένου.) We end up, on this reading, with just ‘a ποιότης of [that
part of] soul that is capable of following according to reason’ (for
ἀκολουθεῖν used without a following dative and with a prepositional
phrase, see 1233b33–4); except for his retention of τῷ λόγῳ this is also
Dirlmeier’s solution. The shorthand δυναμένου (sc. μέρους) might look
unlikely on its own, but is well prepared for by a9–11, of which the pre-
sent passage (I propose) is a summary. (Perhaps a truly conservative edi-
tor might declare the passage a locus desperatus. But stripping away a
redundant δέ to restore sense, and a hardly less redundant τῷ λόγῳ,
belongs to a different order of intervention from Fritzsche’s/Bonitz’s
remedies by speculative supplement.) —δυναμένη, in the margin of P,
marked as a replacement for δυναμένου, is well worth considering.
(There is also a mark beneath the δ’, in P, possibly indicating deletion;
nor would it be unusual for a corrector to make a partial correction and
leave the rest to be understood. But can a ποιότης have capacities?)
Ross’s own δυναμένης is probably a bridge too far, just after a separate
part of the soul has been identified as capable of following reason, i.e. in
1220a8–11. Finally: B too makes a mess of it, but it is perhaps worth
noticing that he puts in a mark resembling a Greek colon after ψυχῆς,
which seems to indicate that he tried to make sense of his καὶ by taking
ψυχῆς with (what on his reading is) the immediately preceding ἦθος.
b7 Spengel’s ποιότης τὰ for ποί’ ἄττα is perhaps neat, but unnecessary.

(Editors write ποῖ ’ ἄττα, like B, but ποί’ ἄττα, i.e. ποιὰ ἄττα, is surely
Aristotelica 31
the right accentuation: see Plato, Republic 438b1, etc.) The sense is ‘what
it is in the soul that makes our character traits to be of a particular kind’
(Kenny, in the Oxford World’s Classics translation); another example of
Eudemian brevity.
1220b10–12 μετὰ ταῦτα ἡ διαίρεσις ἐν τοῖς ἀπηλλαγμένοις τῶν

παθημάτων καὶ τῶν δυνάμεων καὶ τῶν ἕξεων secl. Barnes (CR 42.1
[1992]: 29). A plainly intrusive sentence; either an editorial note (as
Barnes suggests), or a marginal gloss. For the phrasing cf. 1221b34–5
τῶν διαιρέσεων τῶν περὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις καὶ τὰς ἕξεις.
b11 ἀπηλαγμένοις P1: P2 adds a second lambda over the first.
b13 ἐπι το πολὺ –––– L: there is no accent on either of the first two
words (if the second is meant to be separated from the third: το ends the
line). A slightly uneven line under the tau apparently indicates the need
for correction; there then follows a gap, half filled by an extended line
itself about four characters long.
b15 ποιός τις as against ποιότης PCBL: ποιός τις is preferable here
to ποιότης insofar as it helps explain the following ἀλλὰ πάσχει,
called by Rackham ‘pravum glossema’. I construe ‘[a person] is not of
a certain sort κατὰ ταῦτα but [merely] πάσχει’. The της and the τις
in (ποιό)της and (ποιός) τις are distinguished in the context of an
MS like P and C, and probably also in the MSS that the copyists of B
and L had before them, only by the presence or absence of a pair of
dots (indicating an iota) above a sigma over the tau, the space between
ποιός and τις often being hardly greater than that between ποιό and
της (as in P here); and that ποιότης and ποιός τις can actually be
confused is shown by the fact that BL have the first and PC the sec-
ond at the end of this very sentence—either BL get it the wrong way
round there, or PC do. We do not have ποιότης twice in all four MSS,
nor do I think we want it twice; and where we need ποιός τις is here
before ἀλλὰ πάσχει and not where PC have it, at the end of the
sentence.
b16 τὰς secl. Susemihl: the term being explained might normally come
without the definite article, but since Aristotle has just said τὰς
(1220b16) δυνάμεις, λέγω . . . τὰς δυνάμεις looks unobjectionable (a copyist

might once have mistakenly repeated the article, but we shall never know).
b16–17 Ross’s emendation seems to me to miss the point: κατὰ τὰ

πάθη goes first with λέγονται, and only then with οἱ ἐνεργοῦντες.
b25 The elongation of the alpha in ὁποιᾳοῦν in P suggests the origin of
the stray nu in B’s ὁποιανοῦν.
b26 It is tempting to interpret B’s καὶ ἀν as καὶ αὖ, but it is more likely
to be a careless repetition of καὶ ἀν(επιστημονικῇ) in the line before.
b34 B’s ἄττα is split after the alpha between two lines; B2 mistakenly
adds an extra tau at the end of the line.
1220b38–1221a12: for the bracketing of the third item in each group,

see on 1221a12.
1221a9 κακ ρία B1, καρτερία B2: the copyist of B seems to have written
κακ, followed by a gap, then ρία; then someone else wrote τε over the
gap and a rho before that, the rho ending up more over the alpha than
the second kappa.
a12 The arrangement of the foregoing list in columns is down to editors

(in the MSS, the gap between one trio and the next is the same as that
between the items in each trio), but the reference to a ὑπογραϕή is
enough to justify it. —Christof Rapp proposed, in discussion (in Athens,
in 2017), to follow Spengel and bracket the last trio on the basis that it is
too intellectual, and is in danger of duplicating the earlier trio κέρδος
ζημία δίκαιον, but the list is probably already problematic enough to
make it unsafe to start ridding ourselves of particular items or groups of
items. The biggest problem is that Aristotle will immediately say ‘all
[these πάθη and suchlike, τὰ . . . πάθη ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα . . . πάντα]
λέγεται τὰ μὲν τῷ ὑπερβάλλειν τὰ δὲ τῷ ἐλλείπειν, which is plainly
untrue of the third member of each group. If we were to put every third
member in square brackets, as somebody’s, probably not Aristotle’s,
spelling out of the μεσότης to which each successive pair relates, then
that might remove the first of Rapp’s problems and mitigate the second:
this is Allan’s suggestion, in his review of Dirlmeier, Gnomon 38 (1966),
Aristotelica 33
at 148 (‘I think there would be a strong temptation for a shallow sys-
tematizer to interpolate the list of virtues, having failed to observe that
this would be premature, and that the passage is of a different kind from
the comprehensive sketch in E.N. 2, 7’). Allan may well be right; at any
rate, given what (according to our MSS) Aristotle says in a13–14, an edi-
tor who prints a13–14 as transmitted, i.e. with that πάντα, surely cannot
avoid following Allan’s lead. (At any rate δίκαιον in a4 is surely a mis-
take by someone: δίκαιον may be by far the commonest term for justice
in EE, but it does not refer to the inner state of a person, rather to the
state of affairs between persons.) Can we really leave him saying, for
example, that πανουργία, εὐήθεια, and ϕρόνησις are related to each
other in terms of excess and defect? The idea of the middle or mean will
not be (re-)introduced until later, as Allan notes (‘. . . this would be pre-
mature’). Round brackets might be of marginal help, insofar as it would
allow for the possibility that it was Aristotle himself who indicated the
μεσότης to which each successive pair relates, but I have forsworn
round brackets in general; and if it was Aristotle, he would not have
used them either.
a13 Walzer/Mingay’s reference to Denniston 473 (‘[ο]ὖν emphasising a

prospective μέν’), in response to Ross’s supplement of οὖν, is puzzling;
Ross is surely only proposing to supply a connective. But connectives in
EE do quite frequently go missing. —τὰ τοιαῦτα: Walzer/Mingay fol-
lows Bekker and Susemihl in omitting the τὰ despite having access to
the full range of MSS: only P of the primary MSS leaves it out, so it will
presumably have been in ω. Given that the items that have just been
listed might appear (mostly?), at least prima facie, not to be πάθη in the
sense defined just before, at 1220b12–14, the τὰ could be important,
insofar as it might allow the subject of the sentence to range wider than
πάθη, were that to be desirable. In any case there are no obvious grounds
for suppressing the article. (Further on πάθη here: one of the most strik-
ing points thrown up in a virtual workshop on EE III held in July 2021—
based in Dublin, with Giulio di Basilio and Margaret Hampson as
organizers—was that the descriptions of the ἀρεταί in EE III tend to
focus rather more on πάθη of the agent, what he/she πάσχει, than on
his/her actions. Is this perhaps another special feature of EE that marks
(1221a13) it off from NE, and might it go some way towards explaining
πάθη here in 1221a13?)
a18 ὃ B1: B2 strikes through the accent.
a19 δὲ καὶ: B2 inserts καὶ above the line. —ὁ del. Bekker: this pro-
posal of Bekker’s surely represents the beginnings of a solution to the
problems of the present sentence, if we take it that ἐπιθυμητικὸς
describes someone ruled by his or her ἐπιθυμίαι, and that this is to
be taken as suggesting someone (καὶ in 20 epexegetic?) who takes all
possible opportunities for ὑπερβολή—thus making him/her like the
coward (ὁμοίως); but this then seems to make 19 καὶ2, and also
(Jonathan Barnes suggests) ὁ1 in 20, redundant. I accordingly bracket
both. Barnes’s own solution, the deletion of a19–20 καὶ ὁ ἐπιθυμητικὸς
καὶ, gives a neater outcome, but leaves the problem of explaining how
these words got in, in the first place. (Victorius suggests [‘fort.’] brack-
eting the καὶ in 20 [that is, just καὶ, not καὶ ὁ, as Susemihl reports];
Dirlmeier prefers [ὁ] ἀκόλαστος καὶ [ὁ] ἐπιθυμητικὸς [καὶ] ὁ
ὑπερβάλλων.)
a23 πλεονεκτικός, split πλεονεκ-τικός in B between lines, has (what
looks like) a hyphen both in the right-hand margin after the first part
and in the left-hand margin before the second.
a23–4 ‘An Spengel’s ἀλλ’ 〈ἢ〉 ist nicht zu denken’, says Dirlmeier, with
some justification (calling in aid Cook Wilson, ‘On the use of ἀλλ’ 〈ἢ〉
in Aristotle’, CQ 3 [1909], 121–4). The two other proposals are elegant
enough but too elaborate; Dirlmeier’s gives us all we need, and his
explanation of how the corruption might have occurred is not wholly
implausible. —There are two dots over what is probably a version of the
shorthand sign for the second δὲ (ἀλαζὼν δὲ) in B.
a25 κόραξ B1: the rho is overwritten with a lambda by B2 (or perhaps
the original hand).
a32 In the Teubner μὲν has dropped out either accidentally or because it
is missing in Marc. (but Bekker has it).
1221b1 ἐπὶ secl. Spengel: this ἐπὶ perhaps originated by false analogy
with the next one (ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίοις).
Aristotelica 35
b1–2 τοῖς ἀναξίοις εὖ πράττουσιν: there is no compelling reason to

adopt either of Spengel’s proposals for rewriting a perfectly comprehen-
sible phrase.
b7 B leaves a small gap after τὰς λογικάς, of three or four characters,
perhaps marking the beginning of a new section.
b13 Bekker leaves out ὁ before θυμώδης (with Ald.), and is followed by
Susemihl and Walzer/Mingay, Bekker and Susemihl noting that it is in
Marc. and P, Walzer/Mingay that it is in C and L too (it is also in B)—
Walzer/Mingay strangely citing the Aldine as authority for omitting it
(the Aldine does omit it, but it omits a whole lot else that it should not);
just as strangely, neither Susemihl nor Walzer/Mingay here follows their
usual practice of printing in square brackets what they are leaving out
from their primary MSS (Bekker generally does not use such brackets in
the text; maybe the others were just following him on this occasion). But
could Aristotle not be saying ‘A person is quick-tempered by virtue of
becoming angry too quickly, while the θυμώδης too is χαλεπός by
doing it for too long . . .’? In III.3 χαλεπότης takes over as the opposite
of πραότης, and covers all the varieties of anger treated here (see
1231b17–19). Admittedly we do immediately go back to the formula-
tion ‘a person is . . .’ with 14 πικρὸς δὲ . . ., but this is not a sufficient rea-
son for following Ald., Bekker, etc. and omitting the article. —τῷ] ὁ B1,
τῳ B2, writing it above the ὁ, complete with iota subscript (worth men-
tioning, because such iotas tend to be omitted).
b15 The text as it stands is surely intelligible without Susemihl’s lacuna after
τῆς ὀργῆς: the type in question is marked out by the severity of the ‘punish-
ment’ it metes out in its anger.
b16 An accent in B over the second omicron of ὀψοϕάγοι—itself added by
a later hand?—is crossed out by another hand.
b16–17 πρόσω ποτέρας P1CB: P2 corrects P1 by striking through the
omega and inserting a ὁ before ποτέρας.
b19 ἄν πως PCBL: Walzer/Mingay reports L as having ἄνπερ, but it
actually has ἄν πως, though unusually—in order to fit the word in at the
end of the line and the page—it uses the shorthand for ως (which is
(1221b19) followed by a mysterious oblique stroke, of a sort that in PC-

like MSS marks an -ον: did some later reader think L was aiming at
πότερον?). —τὸ for τῷ Richards, construing ‘if this [τὸ μᾶλλον
πάσχειν] is taken as a question of manner (πῶς)’; I prefer Kenny’s ‘if
how means experiencing to excess’ (Oxford World’s Classics).
b21 οὐκ ἔστι γὰρ is marginally to be preferred because less expected,

and also more emphatic? (For the record, Victorius seems to have
preferred it.)
b22 συνηλημμένον P1: what is apparently another hand overwrites eta

with (the sign for) ει.
b26 ἐπὶ secl. Eucken, ἔχει Ross: but ἐπὶ with accusative is not impos
sible here: see LSJ s.v. ἐπί C.I.5.
b29 διανοητικαί secl. Ross: perhaps a gloss, but the case is not
proven.
b39 πᾶσα γὰρ ψυχὴ (PCB) must surely be wrong. In order to talk
about soul in general, Aristotle needs only ψυχή, and does not need
to specify that the subject is all soul; and—assuming that ἡ ἡδονή at
the end of the sentence is to go, as it must—it cannot be soul that is
πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ περὶ ταῦτά ὑϕ’ οἵων κτλ. It seems reasonable, then,
to focus on L’s πάσα γὰρ ψυχῆς, which plainly invites us to supply a
subject to go with it (how else would the genitive arise?), and to sup-
pose that PCB’s πᾶσα γὰρ ψυχὴ was one reaction to the loss of the
a third. So πᾶσα γὰρ ψυχῆς 〈ἕξις〉 it is, ἕξις being the only candidate
subject, L2’s (πάσης γὰρ ψυχῆς) another, the introduction of ἡ ἡδονή
available (it could replace ἡ ἡδονή, as Bonitz suggests, if we adopted

PCB’s πᾶσα γὰρ ψυχὴ, but it cannot be said that the resulting sen-
tence reads convincingly, and πᾶσα remains a problem). This is
another instance where obeli might be employed (‘[s]i tratta di un
passo probabilmente guasto e variamente corretto dagli editori’,
Donini), but I think the case for the text printed is sufficiently strong
to make this unnecessary.
1222a1 ἡ ἡδονή PCBL: ‘ ἡδονή is a fairly clear case of a word sub-

stituted for the right one (here ἕξις ) through anticipation of a
Aristotelica 37
word just coming’, Richards. But ‘a word just coming’ can be

anticipated for a particular reason, for example when, as here, the
real subject—w hich is indeed ἕξις —h as dropped out earlier (see
preceding note).
a3–4 ἀπαθείας καὶ ἠρεμίας] ἀπάθειαν καὶ ἠρεμίαν L: the nouns

could have been attracted, as it were, into the plural by the following
plurals, but equally the plurals could have been changed to the more
usual and expected singulars. For a similar issue— i.e. singular or
plural?—with ἠρεμία, see on 1218a23. As I choose to print the plurals,
however, I admit that the arguments are not so far short of being equal
on both sides, which raises a recurring question: if the two recensiones,
i.e. the one represented by PCB and the one represented by L, have dif-
ferent readings that appear equally well justified, how do we choose
between them? (In the present case I am ultimately swayed by the fact
that the plural gives us slightly more; we are after all talking about [what
would be] different cases of ἀπαθεία and ἠρεμία.)
a11 τὴν καθ’ αὑτὸ ἑκάστην scripsi: τὴν καθ’ αὑτὸν ἕκαστον
PCBL. The transmitted text is surely unintelligible as it stands. The τὴν,
in the solution proposed, is in all of PCBL but omitted in all modern
editions (Susemihl says it is ‘added’ in the Aldine, ‘fors. recte’). That each
ἀρετή is a μεσότης καθ’ αὑτὸ, i.e not κατὰ συμβεβηκός, is at least to
the point, even if Aristotle has said at 1221b3–5 that it does not need
saying. With the recovery of the definite article, plus καθ’ αὑτὸ, the cor-
ruption to τὴν καθ’ αὑτὸν ἕκαστον looks more straightforward than it
would be from either Richards’s κατ’ αὐτὴν ἑκάστην or Ross’s καθ’
αὑτὴν ἑκάστην; omitting the αὐτὴν/αὑτὴν/αὑτὸν (cf. Spengel’s pro-
posal) would improve matters, that is, in the absence of the definite art
icle, but why καθ’ ἑκάστην rather than a plain ἑκάστη? If it is true that
ἕκαστος tends to come before the definite article, here I suggest it is
postponed because it belongs as much with the following μεσότητα as
with τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετὴν: in other words, Aristotle starts in general mode,
i.e. talking about ἠθικὴ ἀρετή generally, then switches with ἑκάστην to
the particular. —καὶ for ἢ: the need for Susemihl’s emendation is not clear.
The looser formulation offered by ἢ is surely unexceptionable; either
description (or both) might apply.
1222a12 The breathing on ἅττα in P has been changed from an original

smooth to rough—probably, since Nikolaos generally writes ἄττα as
ἅττα, by him; since the L copyist also has ἅττα, ἅττα was possibly in ω,
and B is making the correction to ἄττα independently.
a17–18 ἐπεὶ δ’ 〈οὐκ〉 ἔστι Dodds: but (a) there is a ἕξις τις of the sort
described (examples of this ‘ἕξις of a sort’—and it will indeed be a curi-
ous sort of ἕξις that combines contraries— will be given at III.7,
1234b3–4); in any case (b) while ἔστι τις ἕξις is a natural way of saying
‘there is a sort of ἕξις’, ‘there is not a sort of/certain ἕξις’ would be an
odd way of saying ‘there is no ἕξις’. For the argument in the sentence, see
next note but one.
a19 Allan’s τοῦτον μὲν . . . τοῦτον δὲ is surely an improvement on

Bonitz’s ὁ μὲν . . . ὁ δὲ on syntactical grounds, but no emendation is
needed in any case (οὔτε . . . οὔτε Spengel: should that not be
μήτε . . . μήτε?).
a21 πράξεις Broadie, ἕξεις PCBL: before ἕξεις in P there is (after what
appears to be a stray iota attached to τὰς/τὰσ), unusually, a gap contain-
ing an erasure, apparently of three letters, none of which is readable;
there are traces of a further mark over the third. In B too the initial
aspirated epsilon + accent occupy the space of three normal letters; they
may be written in over a prior erasure, or else the original copyist at first
left a space because he had insufficient information about how to fill it,
but then decided on the ἕ (it looks like his hand). Sarah Broadie’s
πράξεις for ἕξεις—proposed in discussion (in Athens, in 2017)—gives
a decent argument for the sentence as a whole: ‘Since there is a certain
sort of ἕξις as a result of which its possessor in one situation goes along
with (?) too much, in another too little of the same thing, necessarily, as
too much and too little are opposed to each other and to the mean, so
too [in such cases] the [relevant] actions [at least, but not the ἕξεις,
here, because there is only one] must also be opposed both to each other
and the [relevant] excellence.’ Such an argument also fits well enough
with the sentences preceding and following. Given that with ἕξεις there
is no observable argument at all (τὰς ἕξεις would suggest that there are
already at least two in play, when only one, and only τις ἕξις at that, has
Aristotelica 39
been announced), and given also the evidence of disturbance in two of

the four MSS, πράξεις looks a good bet, i.e. speculative but more than
possible—and it may not be entirely wishful thinking to suppose that
the first two erased characters in P (as I pore over these with a magnify-
ing glass) were actually pi and rho.
a23 To repeat, the Latin translation from which Ross’s ϕανερὰς derives
has no authority and is of little interest, as this case helps to confirm:
ϕανερωτέρας is evidently superior. (This is not to deny that this trans
lator might, in principle, sometimes happen to get things right inde
pendently, like the secondary Greek MSS, whether by luck or by design.)
—ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπερβολήν in P is post corr.; the copyist evidently at first left
out ἐπὶ τὴν, wrote the first four letters of ὑπερβολήν, then wrote ἐπὶ
τὴν on top of them.
a25 The various supplements suggested, by Ackrill and others, spell out
the sorts of things needing to be supplied to make this difficult sentence
work, but actually printing any of them seems a step too far. —ταὐτὰ: C
has the crasis mark; not so PBL.
a31–2 Woods appears to offer no reasons for his excision, and it is hard
to see any.
a33–4 Bonitz’s emendation might be right, but there is a switch from

ἕξεις to their possessors coming anyway.
a34 There is no trace of ἐναντίως in P, pace Walzer/Mingay.
a35 Walzer/Mingay follows Bonitz in bracketing καὶ2, but cites

Denniston 305, which seems to offer grounds for not doing so: καὶ here =
‘again, in turn’?
1222b1–2 The reading τὸ (bis) is attributed to Oxon. by Walzer/Mingay,

and accepted by them; I have not checked this, but if Oxon. does have τὸ
it will be an example of a standard error (omicron for omega); ἐπὶ τῷ =
‘in the case of ’, which is in all of PCBL, is surely not only acceptable but
more apt.
b4 οὐ κολακικὸν: ‘if [οὐ κολακικὸν] is absurd, οὐ καταλλακτικὸν

(Fritzsche) is inept’, Richards, but his οὐκ εὐκολαστὸν is if anything less
(1222b4) convincing (is there any recorded use of the word?), and οὐ
κολακικὸν is well defended by Kenny (in a note to his Oxford World’s
Classics translation) as a meiosis.
b6 καὶ αἳ scripsi: καὶ αἱ PCL, καὶ B, καθ’ 〈ἃς〉 αἱ Spengel, 〈ᾗ〉 καὶ [αἱ]
Rassow. Echoing Bonitz’s defence of καὶ αἱ, Woods claims that both αἱ
ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις and an understood (nominative) antecedent
of καθ’ ἃς stand in apposition to ἡ διαλογὴ. But (a) the διαλογὴ is
actually of these two sets of things, i.e. τῶν ἕξεων (it is ἡ διαλογὴ τῶν
ἕξεων, and they are the relevant ἕξεις, so that it would be odd to find
them in apposition to it); and (b) why are only some of the ἐναντίαι
ἕξεις (τῶν ἐναντίων ἕξεων [sc. αὗται] καθ’ ἃς) picked out as being
κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον? These ἐναντίαι ἕξεις are presumably ἐναντίαι
to the ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις, in which case it is all of them, not some
subset of them, καθ’ ἃς ‘people conform to correct reasoning’ (Kenny in
the World’s Classics translation). The received text, I conclude, is beyond
hope (Susemihl, more mildly, calls καὶ αἱ ‘haud integra’). My modest
proposal, to read the MSS’ definite article, αἱ, as the relative αἳ, is not
only the simplest expedient but gives a well-structured if complex sen-
tence: ‘the list has been assembled of the ἕξεις . . . , both [of those] that
(αἳ) [are] ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις, and of the ἐναντίαι ἕξεις, καθ’
ἃς. . . .’—even if the latter have yet to be formally introduced, as it were,
by name (see on 1221a12).
b9 Walzer/Mingay’s entry in their apparatus here, ‘ϕανερὸν ὅτι]

ϕανερὸν δ’ ὅτι Oxon. Ald., manifestum vero Λ1 : ϕανερὸν δὴ ὅτι
Sylburg’, is a relic of a time when the hierarchy among the surviving
MSS of EE was less clear than it is now, or indeed than it was when the
Walzer/Mingay edition was published; Sylburg’s δὴ is apparently an
attempt to take account of the δέ in two late MSS and as apparently read
by an even later Latin translator, and so is of even less interest than the
fact that the Oxoniensis and the Aldine misunderstand the syntax of the
present sentence.
b13–14 [αἱ] ἀρεταὶ ἢ πᾶσαι ἢ [τούτων] τινὲς Woods: Woods trans-

lates ‘So it is evident that all or some of these mean states will be virtues’.
This seems high-handed, since Aristotle can perfectly well be saying that
Aristotelica 41
the ἀρεταί will represent either all or some of ‘these’ μεσότητες; indeed
he will explicitly recognize some that are not ἀρεταί in III.7.
b16 Allan’s κινήσεως for τινὲς is clever but not compelling.
b18 The MSS’ ὂν has no observable function. The similarity between mu
and nu in these MSS gives Casaubon’s ὁμοίως the edge over Susemihl’s
hesitant proposal simply to bracket ὂν, because it suggests a cause for the
dittography that we would probably have to suppose in order to follow
Susemihl. That is: it is easier to suppose that a copyist began by mistaking
ομ for ον (with an easy change from οιως to ολως following) than that a
copyist happened to duplicate an ον before a perfectly intelligible ὅλως.
b19 ὁ γάμος P1CB, from ὁ γ’ ἀνος, with bar above ἀνος, the standard
formula for ἄνθρωπος—which duly appears in the margin of P.
b20 μόνον B, μόνων B2: B2 writes an omega over the line above the sec-
ond omicron, presumably ‘correcting’ against another MS.
b32 ἔχει τὸ B, ἔχων τὸ B2: what is probably B2’s version of the sign for
-ων appears over the ει.
b34 ὀρθὰ is at the end of the line in B, ending with a particularly florid
alpha that could be mistaken for an -ας, but is probably not that.
b35 μεταβάλλει/μεταβάλλοι: see on b37.
b36 οἷον εἰ: P2 writes οἷον ἐστὶ τοῦτο in the margin, preceded by ἴσως,
apparently meant as a substitute for οἷον εἰ because the εἰ in P is some-
thing of a mess. A small part of what looks like τοῦτο in the margin was
sliced off in the binding process, so P2 might once have said more—
perhaps οἷον ἐστὶ τοῦτο τρεῖς, which is what Walzer/Mingay errone-
ously reports as (now) being in the margin.
b37 μεταβάλλει Richards, μεταβάλλοι PCBL: the following ἐστι surely
shows that we need the indicative here; Richards is, I think, also right
that we need CB’s indicative in b34 (cf. Susemihl, who prints it without
comment).
1223a3 ὃ PCBL, ἃ Fritzsche, [ὃ] Ross: with ὃ, the following πολλὰ would
be a plural complement of a singular (‘what is up to human
(1222a3) beings . . . makes up many of such things’?), which I think is

unlikely enough, if we retain the relative, to make Fritzsche’s emendation
to ἃ inevitable—the only alternative being to treat πολλὰ as an adverb,
which would leave Aristotle ‘saying that many things that are within
human beings’ power are contingent, [when] his position surely is that
they all are’ (Woods). (Inwood and Woolf in the Cambridge translation
interpret πολλὰ as ‘most’, which might or might not help save Fritzsche’s
emendation, but is surely illegitimate.) But in any case ‘the things
that are up to human beings . . . make up many of such things . . .’ seems
an oddly convoluted way of saying ‘many are’. I therefore agree with
Woods that Ross is right to excise the relative; it is at any rate undoubt-
of πολλὰ hardly helps (and two other conjectures of his, πολλὰ 〈δὲ〉
edly true that many contingent matters are up to us. Spengel’s bracketing
and πολλὰ 〈γὰρ〉, are hard to fathom). —ἀνθρώποις is split ἀν/θρώποις

between lines in B with (what look like) hyphens in both margins. Such
marks are common enough, especially in B, not to need noticing any
further; all probably derive from a hand other than that of the original
copyist.
a3–4 τῶν τοιούτων is supplied by L2 in the margin, with two sets of

omission marks in both text and margin, one set in black, one in red—so
presumably introduced by two different readers.
a7–8 γίνεσθαι καὶ μή, ὧν γε κύριός ἐστι τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι.
ὅσα δ’ ἐϕ’ αὑτῷ ἐστι desunt in CB: is the copyist of B then after all
working from C, or did he and the copyist of C simply make the same
mistake? It would be a very common sort of mistake, i.e. by homoio-
teleuton: ἐϕ’ αὑτῷ ταῦτ’ ἐστι / ἐϕ’ αὑτῷ ἐστι, and the repetition of
γίνεσθαι καὶ μή, plus a quadruple . . . καὶ/ἢ μή might also contribute to
unsighting a copyist. It helps that for the moment at least the miscopied
version makes sense—that is, until we get to αἴτιος τούτων οὗτος, but
by then it is too late.
a11 διὰ secl. Fritzsche: with the διὰ the subject would be ‘a person’
(ψέγεται, κτλ), which is a perfectly regular phenomenon in EE, but
the switch to a neuter plural with ὅσων in the next part of the sen-
tence would be extremely harsh. Additionally, the present parenthesis
Aristotelica 43
(11 ψέγεται γὰρ . . . 14 καὶ τὸν ἔπαινον ἔχει) is explaining a point

that had a neuter plural subject. (This, incidentally, is one case where
using brackets [Bekker, Susemihl, Walzer/Mingay] is clearly unhelp-
ful, insofar as it would be hard to get to the conclusion introduced by
δῆλον ὅτι in 14 without the contents of the parenthesis—which is
not, then, quite, a parenthesis after all.) So I conclude that τὰ ἐξ
emendation/filling-out. Meineke’s οὐ 〈μὰ〉 Δία is something of a

ἀνάγκης, κτλ is the subject here, and διὰ originated as a mistaken
curiosity (A. Meineke, Hermes 3 [1869], 162); cf. Jackson at VII/IV.2,

1236a33).
a17–18 ἑκούσια καὶ κατὰ προαίρεσιν . . . ὅσα δ’ desunt in B, 17–19 καὶ
κατὰ προαίρεσιν . . . ἀκούσια desunt in PC: thus what PC omit is not
quite what B omits—and what they keep is plain nonsense, which what
B has is not. There are four possibilities: (i) the copyist of α (it being less
economical to suppose that Nikolaos made exactly the same mistake
twice over), and the B copyist had different readings in front of them; or
(ii) they had the same reading before them as the L copyist had, and
happened to mess it up in different ways; or (iii) they both had before
them the text as it appears in PC, but the B copyist changed it; or (iv)
they both had the text as B has it, but the α copyist changed it. Of these
four possibilities, (iv) seems the least likely: since the B text actually
makes sense, and the α (PC) text does not, the α copyist would have had
no reason to prefer the latter, and it is unclear how he could have done
so by accident. (i) remains a live possibility, but simply consigns the
question how the two different errors arose to the unknown past. In fact,
both could be explained by that old favourite, homoioteleuton: one cop-
yist’s eye saw a17 ἑκούσια and a19 ἀκούσια and unwittingly suppressed
the second, another’s saw them both and suppressed the first. Let us
then rule out (i), for the sake of the argument. That leaves (ii) and (iii).
The difference between these is one between chance (ii) and design (iii),
and I think the case for the latter is stronger.
a19–20 ὅσα δὲ προελόμενος καὶ ἑκὼν πάντα δηλονότι B: having
omitted one of the two preceding ὅσα clauses and introduced the sec-
ond with the μὲν that belonged to the first, B now proceeds to construct
a new answering ὅσα δὲ. . . . One has to admire his ingenuity, but his
(1223a19–20) solution fails to make sense of the following τοίνυν, as do

PCL. Marc.’s crisp . . . καὶ ἑκὼν· δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι both resolves the
problem and suggests what its origin was (the borrowing of δῆλον from
the next sentence, plus duplication of the ensuing ὅτι; after all a δῆλον
in that position, on its own at the end of a sentence, would very often be
rounded off with -οτι). Susemihl’s notes ‘19. [= my 20.] δῆλον ὅτι om.
[Marc.] // δῆλον om. [P]’, which are essentially mimicked by Walzer/
Mingay, are carried over from Bekker—the first to misreport δηλονότι
as δῆλον ὅτι; it is surprising that none of the three saw the virtues of
Marc.’s correction, when after all there is only one δῆλον/δηλον on offer
in any of the main MSS.
a22 ἆρα P: but the circumflex may be a later addition. —Here, and four
words later, B again writes τὶ for τί interrogative; it is clear by now that
this is a foible of B’s, and need not be remarked on in future (the next
but one interrogative τί in B has an acute only because followed by an
enclitic).
a25 δόξειεν 〈ἂν〉 Spengel: this kind of optative without accompanying

ἄν appears elsewhere in our manuscripts of Aristotle (see Bonitz, Index
41b6–13), and Bessarion, for one, is happy with it here, but it is of course
the exception rather than the rule, and given the ease with which ἄν can
drop out (especially after ἕν . . . δόξειεν?), as well as the number of
instances of the phenomenon in our notoriously unreliable EE MSS, it
seems reasonable to supply it here and elsewhere; if there were once
genuine instances in EE, we shall never know.
a29 τὸ post πρῶτον suppl. Casaubon: we might have expected a τὸ in

another text, another style; the lack of it is consistent with the style of EE.
a31 For the reasoning behind Urmson’s supplement, see Woods.
a33 Quotation marks, unknown to/not used by the scribes of PCΒL, are
supplied in the margin by L2, here and with other quotations (so also
sometimes C2).
a34 εἰ βίαιον] εἰ μὴ βίαιον P1C; εἴ τι βίαιον BP2: P2 writes in τι above

μὴ in the text. B and P2 both get the right sense but apparently mimic
the preceding εἴ τι λυπηρόν; meanwhile P and C, and so presumably α,
Aristotelica 45
simply make a mistake, if one that fits a certain pattern (εἰ . . ., καὶ εἰ
μή . . .) and works syntactically.
a39 B2 changes περὶ to παρὰ by writing alphas above the epsilon
and iota.
1223b1 ἀκρατὴς PC, ἀκροατὴς BL: so ἀκροατὴς was perhaps in α´,

but corrected in α?
b4 δόξειεν ἂν C2, δόξειε δ’ ἂν C1: C2 makes the change by simply

inserting a nu between δόξειε and δ’, without deleting the latter (again,
corrections in these MSS are often indicated rather than being fully car-
ried through). Pace Walzer/Mingay, L has only δόξειε δ’ ἂν, with no
correction; only B has δόξειεν ἂν, along with the corrected C (presum-
ably C2 is correcting independently, not against B; C2 and B do not regu-
larly coincide).
b5 τῶνδε: a grave accent over -δε in B is struck through.
b5–6 βουλόμενος πράττει desunt in P1CB: P2 writes ἴσως: τοῦτο καὶ

βούλεται in the margin.
b8 In B there is a presumably later separation mark below the line after
γὰρ (which is jammed up against the following παρ’ ).
b10–11 ἔτι δ’ ὁ ἀκρατὴς P1, ἴσως: ἔτι δ’ ὁ ἐγκρατὴς P2 in margin.
—Allan’s placing of the γὰρ after δικαιοπραγήσει, καὶ rather than
after the ensuing τῆς ἀκρασίας removes the awkwardness of having
Aristotle say that the ἐγκρατής will act more justly than ἀκρασία
(hardly something that can do any acting); but would anyone ever sug-
gest that ἀκρασία might actually be ἀρετή? The possibility has been
raised, if only fleetingly (b2–3), that the ἀκρατής might somehow act
justly, and with Ross’s τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς Aristotle will counter this; a
pause/comma before καὶ μᾶλλον makes it an aside, and avoids having
him say ‘even more than the ἀκρατής’, which would be at best an odd
thing for him to say. Exactly how τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς became τῆς ἀκρασίας
is unclear, but pace Dirlmeier ‘the ἐγκρατής δικαιοπραγήσει, and more
than ἀκρασία’ would, I think, be even odder (and, taking away the
comma, ‘. . . even more than ἀκρασία’ would be simply bizarre).
1223b16 περὶ/παρὰ B: B2 writes alphas above the epsilon and the iota,
as before.
b17 ἀκούσιον B1C2, ἑκούσιον PC1LB2: so, interestingly, B differs from

C, but then is ‘corrected’, reproducing C’s error, while C is actually cor-
rected and now agrees with B. In C, ἀ is introduced above ἑ, in B ἑκ
above ἀκ 1223.
b20 βίαιος/βίαιον: L’s βίαιον mimics the preceding two endings.
b21 ἀκούσιον B1: B2 writes in ἑκ above the ἀκ.
b25 τὸν αὐτὸν: for the justification for accepting C2’s τὸν αὐτὸν (nu
introduced above the line after both words, with insertion marks), see
next note.
b26 τὸ 〈αὐτὸ〉 Dirlmeier: after much resistance, I am now convinced

that this is the best solution to the problem of the corrupt, isolated τὸ in
PCBL (ἅμα τὸ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ)—superior whether to Bonitz’s καὶ for τὸ
or to the simple expedient of deleting τὸ (Russell), both of which solu-
tions would leave it unanswered how the τὸ got in (although, once more,
simple carelessness is far from unusual in these MSS). But if we have τὸ
αὐτὸ here, we must have C2’s τὸν αὐτὸν earlier in the sentence.
b29 ταὐτὸ: C marks the crasis.
b36 γε was apparently in both recensiones; γενέσθαι is unnecessary—

for EE—after ὅταν . . . γένηται. I take it that Nikolaos was correcting/
amplifying the bare γε on his own initiative when writing P, but did not
choose to do so when writing C.
1224a1 ὡς οὐκ vs οὐχ ὡς Rassow. Pace e.g. Woods, the change is

unnecessary: from τὸ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ βούλησιν here down to δέδεικται
μόνον in a3, Aristotle is summing up his treatment of τὸ κατὰ βούλησιν
in the course of the treatment of τὸ κατὰ ὄρεξιν in general, which he has
just finished, in order to go on to use what he has said about βούλησις to
deal with the κατὰ προαίρεσιν option in a3–5. ‘We showed that τὸ κατὰ
βούλησιν was not ἑκούσιον [i.e. not the same thing as τὸ ἑκούσιον];
rather, every action a person wishes is also ἑκούσιον—but the only thing
Aristotelica 47
that has [actually] been shown [sc. especially in 1223b29–36] is that it’s
possible for someone to act ἑκών even μὴ βουλόμενος’. (So τὸ ἑκούσιον
is wider than τὸ κατὰ βούλησιν; but nevertheless everything one does
βουλόμενος is ἑκούσιον, and—1224a3–5—not everything that we do
βουλόμενοι is the subject of προαίρεσις.)
a3 Susemihl reports Rieckher and Spengel too as having doubts about
μόνον; but see preceding note.
a4–5 C2 supplies προαιρεῖται δ’ οὐδεὶς οὐδὲν ἐξαίϕνης in the margin.
So C is being corrected, at some point, against a representative of the
recensio Constantinopolitana; similarly at a12–13 and a33 below,
1225a11, a18–19, a22; P, at least in the present stretch of text, rather less
frequently: see 1224a40, ?1225b16.
a9 δὲ μικρὸν: B’s free-flowing hand sometimes merges words, here δὲ

and μικρὸν; a later hand inserts a separation mark below the join.
—προαγαγόντες P post corr.: a second αγ is inserted above the line,
currente calamo?
a12–13 ἀκούσιον καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον πᾶν βίαιον is supplied by C2 in

the margin.
a16 τῇ CB: i.e. τῆ, by attraction to the preceding eta.
a20 τὴν ϕύσει καὶ καθ’ αὑτὰ ὁρμὴν: the—unacknowledged—

supplement of a second τὴν, before καθ’ αὑτὰ, by Susemihl (then by
Walzer/Mingay with a false attribution to P and L) is perhaps original to
Susemihl himself. Marc.’s ϕύσιν for ϕύσει (see the apparatus in Walzer/
Mingay) is a simple error, already in Laur. 81,4. Bekker has τὴν ϕύσει
καὶ καθ’ αὑτὰ ὁρμὴν.
a22 Pace Walzer/Mingay, the abbreviation used here in PC is for παρὰ,
not περὶ; similarly in a24, a38 . . . B, who is mainly deciphering the
shorthand of an MS like P and C, on this occasion hedges his bets by
reproducing the same abbreviation. —ἀψύχων: L2 writes an alpha above
the ἐμπ of the ἐμψύχων that is in all of PCBL (Ald. also has ἀψύχων).
ἐμψύχων is possible, if we take the following καὶ as epexegetic, but the
phrasing is against it. I construe ‘Just as with ἄψυχα [which we have
(1224a22) been talking about], so too with τὰ ζῷα, we see . . .’ (that is,
the first καὶ belongs with ὁμοίως: I construe ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ
ἀψύχων, καὶ . . . as ‘And as in the case of ἄψυχα, so . . .’). This is not to say
that the reading of PCBL is impossible, just that—as I think L2 sees—
ἀψύχων is the better fit, not least because the genitive plurals are not
quite a pair, as they would be likely to be if καὶ . . . καὶ . . . were
‘both . . . and . . .’: the second plural has an article, the first not, though
Fritzsche proposes to supply one.
a24 τι is clearly preferable to τις; there is no reason why Aristotle should

have wanted to limit external causation here to human action.
a24–5 ἐν μὲν τοῖς, κτλ: the absence of a connective here adds weight to
the argument for reading ἀψύχων instead of ἐμψύχων in a22. Aristotle
is here directly following up the pairing ἄψυχα/ζῷα, now introducing a
difference between ἄψυχα and some ζῷα.
a29 B2 adds a rough breathing over B’s ἔ, misreading ἔνεστιν as two

words; he appears to do the same—i.e. add a rough breathing—to the
following ἔν, which gets its accent from the enclitic after it. —ἐν τινὶ
ἡλικίᾳ, and not ἔν τινι, because everyone agrees that Aristotle is saying
‘at a certain age’. B2 adds a smooth breathing above the rough beside the
accent over the epsilon.
a32 πράττοντα L: πράττοντι P1C, πράττοντ B; πράττῃ P2, writing

ἴσως: διὰ λογισμὸν πράττη (= πράττῃ) in the margin, presumably in
order to explain the preceding ὅταν. That, i.e. reading ὅταν . . . πράττῃ,
would be an option, but it would leave unexplained the consensus
around at least πράττοντ between PCBL. B probably had πράττοντι
before him, written as πράττον with a tau plus two dots arranged hori-
zontally over it to signify an iota (as in both P and C here); not for the
first time he hedges his bets, on this occasion—intelligently—leaving it
ambiguous whether it should be πράττοντι or πράττοντα; the latter, in
a MS like P or C, would differ from πράττοντι by having the dots one
above the other instead of side by side.
a33 χαίρων δέ is supplied by C2 in the margin of C, with insertion

marks there and in the text.
Aristotelica 49
a36–7 τῶν ἡδέων ἐπιθυμιῶν is a beautiful example of the spareness

of Aristotle’s Eudemian style (‘. . . drags him back from his desires for
pleasant things’); neither Bekker’s nor Fritzsche’s changes are needed.
(Dirlmeier supplies a comma before Bekker’s ἐπιθυμῶν, which at
least explains how it is supposed to work; but he misconstrues the
phrase, saying ‘ἡδεῖς [i.e. ἡδεῖαι?] ἐπιθυμίαι sind unerhört’; Woods
construes correctly, but makes the same grammatical mistake as
Dirlmeier.)
a40 οὐ2 deest in P1C1, but ἴσως: ὅτι οὐ λυπηρῶς P2 in margin, οὐ C2

(with insertion marks in both cases).
1224b2 ἄγεται καὶ Apelt: ἄγει καὶ L; [ἄγει καὶ] Brown (as reported by
Woods). Accepting Lesley Brown’s suggestion, Woods comments ‘ἄγει
could easily have crept in from b[3]’, but Apelt’s proposal is simpler and
better palaeographically, and gives a good sense (which L’s active ἄγει
does not).
b4 The MSS’ reading, δοκοῦσιν οὗτοι μόνοι βίᾳ καὶ ἀκόντες ποιεῖν,
clearly cannot stand; the ἐγκρατεῖς and the ἀκρατεῖς are not thought,
or said, by anyone to be the only people who act βίᾳ καὶ ἀκόντες
(Dirlmeier’s ‘in besonders aufallender Weise’ for μόνοι is unappealing;
he provides no parallel for this construal, and the ‘besonders’ is an over-
egging of an already unsatisfactory pudding). If we do keep ἀκόντες,
Jackson’s μόνον οὐ might work, but it is hardly true, according to what
Aristotle has said, that ἐγκρατεῖς and ἀκρατεῖς ‘almost’ act βίᾳ καὶ
ἀκόντες, even if enkratic and akratic behaviour is acknowledged to have
a certain resemblance to acting under compulsion. So, pace Woods, we
need Allan’s ἑκόντες. But then, is it true that the ἐγκρατεῖς and the
ἀκρατεῖς alone δοκοῦσιν . . . βίᾳ καὶ ἑκόντες ποιεῖν? What about
people that have to do something on pain of being beaten up, imprisoned,
or killed (1225a3ff.)? Aristotle says they act ἑκόντες, and yet they are
undeniably under constraint. So now Barnes’s καὶ vel ἅμα begins to
have its attractions. But neither καὶ nor ἅμα looks palaeographically
plausible. And could it not be said—could Aristotle not be saying—that
the ἐγκρατεῖς and the ἀκρατεῖς are the only ones who genuinely do
appear, in a way, to act βίᾳ καὶ ἑκόντες, the cases introduced in
(1224b4) 1225a3ff. being typically thought of as acting ἀκόντες? There

is after all πλείστη ἀμϕισβήτησις about the matter, and Aristotle has
deployed serious argument to show that it is after all only an appear-
ance. In sum, there is no decisive argument for emending μόνοι (with
ἑκόντες for ἀκόντες; but we cannot keep both μόνοι and ἀκόντες).
b5 P’s elision, διὰ τιν’ αἰτίαν, is accidental: Nikolaos at first ran τινα
and αἰτίαν together, then went back and separated them with the
elision mark.
b7 The L copyist perhaps erased a sigma between his προ and his
κείμενον; if so, he at first correctly interpreted the convention for προς
in his source (with omicron written above the rho), and then had sec-
ond thoughts.
b9–10 ἀκρατεῖ καὶ ἐγκρατεῖ PCB, ἐγκρατεῖ καὶ ἀκρατεῖ L: L’s is prob-
ably the usual order, but actually it is the case of the ἀκρατής that is the
more immediately relevant here, so that ἀκρατεῖ might be expected to
come first.
b15 τῷ βούλεσθαι καὶ τῷ ἐπιθυμεῖν: P2 writes ‘perhaps’ τῷ βούλεσθαι

καὶ τῷ ἐπιθυμεῖν in the margin; is that because of the mess originally
made (and still visible) of the end of βούλεσθαι in P?
b16 ἐπεὶ: ἔτι C2, in the margin, with ἴσως, and editors generally prefer
ἔτι. But I think ἐπεὶ should be retained, in its (quasi-)concessive use
(‘Although . . .’: see Bonitz, Index 266a55ff., LSJ s.v. ἐπεί B.4, and EE
1225a14 for another example), because the argument now swings back
in the opposite direction to the one it has been heading in.
b22 κακῶς πράξειν Russell: but is it not a feature of κακά to have bad
consequences? We don’t need an explicit reference to the future.
b28 ἀκρατῶς, ἐγκρατῶς L1: L2 adds (the shorthand for) ου over the ῶ
of ἀκρατῶς and over the sigma of ἐγκρατῶς.
b29 ἐπεὶ] ὅτι C2 (not ἔτι, as reported by Walzer/Mingay), writing ἴσως

ὅτι above ἐπεὶ in the text. It is not clear why this intervention was felt to
be necessary, given that ὅτι would hardly change the sense—maybe this
reader misread C’s ἐπεὶ for ἐπὶ; the sign for ει is somewhat flattened out.
Aristotelica 51
Alternatively or additionally he might have been misled by the ὅτι in the

margin written by someone else and meant to substitute for ἔτι later in
the line (see next note but one, on b30 ἔτι/ὅτι); it probably postdates C2.
b30 ϕύσει ἄρχων] ϕύσει ὑπάρχει Rassow; 〈τῶν〉 ϕύσει ἀρχῶν Dodds.
There is no justification for Rassow’s emendation, since the transmitted
text makes perfectly good sense (provided that we retain the ἔτι follow-
ing in PCB: see next note), nor for Dodds’s: since ἄρχων fits, we have no
need for ἀρχῶν, especially if introducing it requires a supplement in
addition. —ὅτι L, C2/3 in margin (for ‘C2/3’: see on b29), for ἔτι: ὅτι looks
unlikely, unless the mere presence of λόγος can be the cause of its being
ϕύσει ἄρχων. I speculate that the L copyist wrote ὅτι because the follow-
ing ἐνέσται/ἔνεστι falsely suggested two parallel clauses, each starting
with ὅτι; C2/3 either had the same idea, or more likely was correcting from
L or a descendant of L. I translate the PCB text, roughly, ‘For both reason,
in its natural role as ruler—for so long as our coming into being is
uninterrupted and has not been stunted—will be in us, and desire too,
insofar as it accompanies us, i.e. is in us, from our birth onwards.’ Without
καὶ ἔνεστι the ἀκολουθεῖ might otherwise be taken as suggesting (absurdly)
that desire follows r eason—in that other use of ἀκολουθεῖν—from our
birth. (Pace Susemihl, both P and Bekker have ὅτι in b32.)
b31 ἑωμένης LC2: the smooth breathing in C seems to have a rough
breathing superimposed. Is this further evidence that C is here being
corrected (‘corrected’) against L/a descendant of L?
b34 ἑωμένης LC2: rough breathing again superimposed in C.
b36 τἄλλα P1L: P2 adds a circumflex above the crasis mark and acute
accent. —μὴ κατὰ ϕύσιν: if a supplement is needed, πως (πώς) would be
κατὰ ϕύσιν, or at the end of the present clause (Solomon); Ross’s 〈πὼς〉
the natural partner for the following ἁπλῶς; it could also come after μὴ
μὲν 〈οὐ〉 is a contender too (the μὲν for μὴ seems to have originated with
Spengel), but would be less economical, and οὐ for μή is unnecessary (‘μή
is sometimes oddly used in the Aristotelian corpus’, Richards). But I suspect
that the qualification, i.e. πως vel sim., is easily supplied in any case.
b38 περὶ1/παρὰ: P2 makes the necessary adjustment to change the
shorthand for παρὰ to περὶ. B accurately copies the shorthand he was
(1224b38) reading for περὶ—not writing out περὶ in full as he usually,

but not always, does. —ἐγκρατῆ καὶ ἀκρατῆ BL, ἀκρατῆ καὶ ἐγκρατῆ
PC: BL’s is the usual order, which is what we might expect in a summing
up; on the other hand PCB all had the ἀκρατής first in b9. But a repre-
sentative of each recensio has ἐγκρατῆ καὶ ἀκρατῆ, so (by my usual
rule) I print that.
b40 δὲ deest in P, though with a gap of the right length for a δὲ, and
I think one has been erased, perhaps in the course of an attempt to make
sense of the transmitted text. Before the beginning of the line, which
starts with καὶ ἄκοντας, there is a collection of illegible characters, tiny
and faded, perhaps part of a longer marginal entry, cut off in the process
of binding; these perhaps end βι?, and perhaps include a δ’. —ἑκούσιον
P1: corrected to ἀκούσιον by P2, who overwrites the ἑ with ἀ; ἀκούσιον
should not therefore be attributed to Bonitz as it is by Susemihl and
Walzer/Mingay.
1225a1 P2 inserts αὗται here from the margin above, this being the top
line of the page. Bonitz and Bussemaker work in the αὗται earlier on
(Bonitz as the first word of the sentence, with αἱ shifted to follow μὲν οὖν,
Bussemaker after ἀπορίαι), but if it was originally delayed to the end of
the sentence it would perhaps have been easier for it to fall out—or did
Aristotle perhaps himself forget that he needed it? Hardly, since αὗται αἱ
ἀπορίαι are the focus of the immediately following σχεδὸν δὲ ἐκ τῶν
εἰρημένων, κτλ. —δὲ deest in B: the B copyist evidently saw another way
of solving the problem of the apparently incomplete couple of lines pre-
ceding; if we supply a comma instead of a colon before the σχεδὸν, it
begins to work, but apart from problems with syntax it is probably ruled
out by a37 μὲν, which needs to be answered by δὲ here. —ἐκ BP2C2, καὶ
P1C1L: P2 changes the accented sign for καὶ, at the beginning of the line, to
a kappa, and adds ἐ outside the line; C2 writes ἐκ, with ‘perhaps’, in the
margin (Walzer/Mingay mistakenly reports L as having ἐκ).
a3 Pace Walzer/Mingay, P does not elide κατὰ, but writes it in short-

hand, ending with a superscript tau and grave accent; C’s κατὰ is writ-
ten identically, with the following τὸν written as a tau with a superscript
double \, one \ representing the accent, the other the ending, -ον; thus
Aristotelica 53
C’s τὸν represents a kind of dittography. Quite possibly, since τὸν is in B

too, the corruption occurred in α´; Nikolaos made the necessary correc-
tion in P but not in C.
a5–6 Rackham’s ἀλλὰ for ἀλλ’ ἂν is to accompany Spengel’s participial

πράττουσι following; that Spengel’s emendation seems to require this
further change does not speak in its favour.
a7 A later hand writes a Greek question mark in the margin in P, after ἢ

οὔ, which ends the line.
a8 οὗτοι τοῦτο PC, ἔτι τοῦτο B: neither is better than L’s αὐτὸ τοῦτο;
it is easy enough to see how αὐτὸ could have been corrupted to οὗτοι,
which is presumably what was in α, less easy to see how αὐτὸ could
become ἔτι. Is ἔτι perhaps a conjecture by the B copyist, for οὗτοι in α´ ?
a10 ἐϕ’ ἑαυτῷ B: B2 adds a second and clearer rough breathing.
a11 δεῖ secludendum ci. Bonitz: ἐστίν C2; 〈τούτων〉 δὴ C3/4 [for ‘C3/4’
see next note]; καὶ etiam ci. Bonitz; κεἰ Ross. Of the four latter solu-
tions (the last dependent on the bracketing of the following ὅσα),
C2’s—written, with ἴσως, over the δεῖ—gives us the same outcome as
C3’s (ἴσως: τούτων δὴ [Walzer/Mingay mistakenly reports ούτων δὴ]
in the margin: probably later than the supralinear in-text ἐστίν because
of the positioning of the insertion mark), only more economically, and
Bonitz’s second conjecture is more economical than Ross’s. So of these
four either ἐστίν or καὶ is plausible. But then the question is how either,
even in their shorthand forms, could have morphed into δεῖ, which was
evidently in ω, the common source of PCBL. Ι propose that δεῖ itself
originated in someone’s misunderstanding of the infinitive ὑπάρξαι
(that someone pre-dating ω). —ὅσα] ἑκὼν P2, erasing ὅσα and r eplacing
it with ἑκὼν, thus elegantly producing a shortened version of what
and C2 and L offer us (see next note), whether with the help of an MS
that had the full version or independently. —ἃ μὴ βούλεται ἑκὼν
πράττει is supplied in the margin of C, immediately following ἴσως:
τούτων δὴ (see last note), and by a different hand. Thus there were
three correctors at work in this one line of C, the earliest of which was
responsible for the supralinear ἐστίν just before in a10; probably the
(1225a11) hand supplying ἃ μὴ βούλεται ἑκὼν πράττει is earlier than

the one proposing τούτων δὴ, so the latter in retrospect should be
labelled C4 instead of C3.
a12 αὐτῷ B1: what seems to be a second hand adds a rough breathing
beside the smooth.
a15 ϕιλαϕῶν B1: psi is introduced over the phi by B2; as usual in these
MSS, a correction is indicated rather than being fully made (i.e. the
corrector does not here replace the iota with eta). —ἀποκτείνας /
ἀποκτείνῃ / ἀποκτείνοι: the ἀποκτείνῃ (ἀποκτείνη) in PC1L causes
editors to write εἰ for ὁ at the beginning of the sentence, in Rackham’s
and Walzer/Mingay’s case without also adopting Spengel’s ἀποκτείνοι,
perhaps through oversight. But C2—crossing out the final eta, and
replacing it with the shorthand for -ας above—gives us a better solu-
tion (‘the person who killed . . .’). B apparently reproduces the short-
hand he found in his source, with a supralinear nu followed by a mark,
above the ligature for ει, that is not totally unlike the shorthand C2 uses
for -ας, but is probably not that: he may well not have written the end-
ing at all, mimicking the convention of MSS like P and C (though not
one they use here: B’s source, I suggest, did) of not completing a word
where the manner of its completion is assured by what goes before it,
and replacing the ending with a short oblique stroke, which perhaps
typically also stands in for an accent where this is on the right syllable.
This, I believe, is what the mark in B represents, and with ὁ preceding
ἀποκτείνας would be a reasonable interpretation of what—I take it—
was in the text he was copying, i.e. α´ (when he imitates the orthography
of that source rather than spelling out the word, that typically indicates
uncertainty on his part). If the ending in α´ was not spelled out, that
would have paved the way for ἀποκτείνῃ in α, under the influence, as
it were, of the preceding ἵνα λάβῃ; since the same error occurs in L,
I suppose that α´ was itself mimicking the archetype, ω.
a16 δεῖ/δὴ: C2 writes δεῖ in the margin, with dots beneath δὴ in the text;
B2 writes the ligature for ει above δὴ.
a17 C2 deletes the μὴ (= μὴ2) with a dot beneath it and what is presum
ably a deletion mark (misinterpreted by Walzer/Mingay as εἰ: ‘εἰ mg.
Aristotelica 55
C2, ut vid.’) in the margin. C2 is surely right: Kenny (Oxford World’s

Classics), keeping μὴ, translates ‘. . . under coercion—though not by
force or in an unnatural way’, but why μή, and even if μὴ is possible,
why the immediate switch to οὐ (ἢ οὐ ϕύσει)? Inwood and Woolf (in
‘. . . by compulsion (albeit not by force), or at any rate [Russell’s 〈γε〉 in

the Cambridge translation) try to distinguish the two negatives, with
a18] not by nature’, but neither the brackets nor the ‘albeit’ for καὶ is
convincing. For further, and surely conclusive, arguments see Woods ad
loc., who ends with ‘. . . it is, in any case, clear that in this passage Aristotle
regards such cases as cases of compulsion (see 1225a21–3)’; also Donini.
a18 Russell’s supplement of γε is quite dispensable, though if it had been

in the MSS it would have fitted well.
a18–19 ἕνεκα ἢ μείζονος κακοῦ: C2 inserts ἢ μείζονος from the mar-

gin after ἕνεκα, striking through the nu of ἂν in the text.
a20 ταῦτά γε B: γε fits well enough, but is probably just a duplication of

γε at the end of the last sentence.
a22 C2 adds ἔχομεν after συγγνώμην in the margin; συγγνώμην hap-
pens to end the line.
a24–5 ἵνα μὴ χαίρῃ: against Bekker’s deletion of the negative, Hendrik

Lorenz and Ben Morison point out to me, in correspondence, that there
is someone who could be said to act regularly to avoid pleasure, i.e. the
ἐγκρατής. ‘[A]cting in avoidance of pleasure . . . contrasts most sharply
with acting in avoidance of pain. In the latter case, voluntary agency is
most compromised; in the former case, it is least compromised.’ It is true
that Aristotle just now formally completed the discussion of the
ἐγκρατής and the ἀκρατής in the context of the voluntary and invol-
untary (1224b36–1225a2), and has moved on to another way in which
λέγονται . . . βίᾳ καὶ ἀναγκασθέντες πρᾶξαι, οὐ διαϕωνοῦντος τοῦ
λόγου καὶ τῆς ὀρέξεως (1225a3–4), so that the ἐγκρατής is not likely
to be now uppermost in his mind. Nevertheless that there is someone
who can be said to act ἵνα μὴ χαίρῃ, and who some (according to the
preceding dialectical context) might say acts ἄκων, is enough to make
removing the negative unsafe.
1225a31 ἢ or καὶ? EE VIII/V.2 will introduce the thought that the ori-
gins of at least one sort of ἐνθουσιασμός actually lie in us, so the ‘or’
may be quite important.
a36–7 P2 writes ἴσως: ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἑκόντες λόγοι οὗτοι εἰσίν in the mar-
gin, with marks indicating that this is intended to replace 37 ἀλλ’
ἑκόντες, and this provides the basis for a reconstruction of the plainly
lacunose transmitted text (‘ἀλλ’ ἑκόντες in ras.’ mysteriously reports
Walzer/Mingay of P2’s intervention: this derives from Susemihl, who
says—whether correctly or not, I am not sure—that there is an erasure
under all of ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἑκόντες). I prefer to move λόγοι οὗτοι εἰσίν to an
earlier position, before the ὡς, on the grounds (a) that it makes the syn-
tax generally easier; (b) that the chances are then reduced of its appear-
ing that it is the λόγοι that are βίᾳ πράττοντες, κτλ; and (c) that ὡς
now has a clear function, i.e. that of introducing the content of the
λόγοι in question, which will be ‘things people say’ rather than ‘accounts
[sc. of τὸ ἑκούσιον καὶ ἀκούσιον]’—things, in fact, that they have just
been described as saying: see a7 ταῦτα γάρ ϕασιν ἀναγκασθέντες
πρᾶξαι, and a15–16 εἰ λέγοι ὅτι βίᾳ καὶ ἀναγκαζόμενος (to which
Aristotle’s response is ἔξεστι γὰρ μὴ ποιεῖν ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνο ὑπομεῖναι τὸ
So: οἱ γὰρ μάλιστ’ ἐμποδίζοντες τὸ ἑκούσιον 〈λόγοι οὗτοι εἰσίν〉,

πάθος [a8–9], except under certain carefully defined circumstances).
ὡς βίᾳ πράττοντες ἀλλ’ 〈οὐχ〉 ἑκόντες (for the accusative after

ἐμποδίζοντες see Top. 161a37; for such a use of ἀλλά, LSJ s.v. I.4). But
why the participle, πράττοντες (odd, even if we supply e.g. ἦσαν)?
I propose an original ἔπραττον, which became πράττοντες by attrac-
tion to the following ἑκόντες (the subject of the verb being the people
whose λόγοι are being spelled out). This is of course speculation, piling
on top of P2’s no less speculative proposal, but he was surely headed in
the right direction. Ross’s conjecture gives us much the same sense but
rather less elegantly, as does Susemihl’s but at the cost of having to sup-
ply rather more; Spengel’s and Dirlmeier’s are both too spare to be use-
ful. Absent any better solution, then, there are in my view only two
options: to go with a version of what P2 offers us, or to throw up our
hands in despair. But I find it hard to see this as a true locus desperatus;
the MSS give us too many signposts for that, however lacunose they
Aristotelica 57
(the MSS) may be here, and even if we cannot be sure if we are reading
the signposts correctly.
1225b1–2 τὰ κατὰ διάνοιαν (without τὴν, which is lacking in both B

and L, and incidentally is not in Bekker): pace Spengel and Richards, τὰ
seems right. L has in the margin the heading περὶ διανοίας, which sug-
gests, correctly, that the new topic is being understood for the moment
as being about διάνοια itself. Aristotle is proposing to get clear about τὸ
ἑκούσιον by understanding the complexities of action κατὰ διάνοιαν.
b2 ἐναντία L, ἐναντίον PCB: L’s plural is surely preferable with so many

ἐναντία about to be announced.
b3–6 The dashes I print here replace the brackets that are normally used
by editors, and are actually found, just here, in C. They are in fact the
only brackets I have found in any of PCBL, and were certainly inserted
by a later hand (the opening bracket is written over the suspended point
that quite often separates words, or possibly what are taken to be blocks
of sense [?], in P and C, sometimes B, while the closing bracket has to be
squeezed in), but their absence is certainly felt in PBL, given that what is
enclosed by them is a genuinely and irrevocably a parenthesis, actually
breaking up the syntax (see next note but one)—which is what C2’s
brackets are surely meant to indicate. In general, as noted before, I have
spurned brackets because as used by editors they frequently seem to me
to obscure the nature of Aristotle’s argument, by isolating the content of
(what we call) the parenthesis from what follows; but some means of
‘bracketing off ’ the intrusive material, without isolating/removing it
altogether from the flow of the argument, seems required, and dashes
seem the best solution (cf. Slings in the OCT of Plato’s Republic). One
might suspect the intrusion into the text of a marginal note/gloss (com-
pare 1228a14), and yet the matter introduced is so detailed, and ger-
mane, that it seems reasonable to suppose that it was Aristotle himself
who chose to interrupt his own flow.
b5 ἤτοι ᾧ scripsi: ἤτοι ὡς PCBL, ἢ τὸ ᾧ Bywater. The ᾧ is surely

needed, but there seems no good reason for abandoning the ἤτοι, which
merely marks the fact that having illustrated the first and third items in
(1225b5) the list, i.e. ὃν and οὗ ἕνεκα, Aristotle is now taking up the
second. L has ουν written in over the line (in another hand = L2), over-
lapping both ἤτοι and ὡς; does this writer intend οὖν to substitute for
the meaningless ὡς—meaningless, that is, if the following ὅτι is retained
(see next note)—thinking that the new example is a continuation of the
previous one, which he, like the original scribe, has identified as involv-
ing the daughters not of Pelias but of some unknown Polias (‘. . . or
indeed, then, . . .’, which would actually serve, implicitly, to bring in the
ᾧ)? For ἤτοι as ‘or’, emphasizing a disjunction, see Denniston 553,
which cites the present passage; although this is, admittedly, something
of a double-edged sword, since Denniston also declares the usage ‘very
rare’. —Fritzsche’s τοδὶ assumes a ὡς = ὅτι preceding.
b6 τῷ ἀγνοοῦντα/τῷ ἀγνοοῦντι: the necessary accusative inside the

noun clause introduced by τῷ is, I think, found in C—or rather, some-
one found it there (I shall explain). P, C’s twin, certainly has ἀγνοοῦντι,
with the telltale pair of dots marking the iota above the supralinear tau.
C lacks the dots, and has what looks like a circumflex in their place
above the (again supralinear) tau. Now unlike P, C does not have the
circumflex over the preceding ου, so what looks like a circumflex may
actually be one, only misplaced. There are, then, several possibilities:
(1/2) C himself wrote a circumflex over the tau, intending it as such, and
omitting either the vertically arranged dots that would signal an iota,
like P’s, or the horizontally arranged dots beside the tau and nu that
would signal an alpha, whether out of negligence, or because he was
uncertain which to write; (3) C forgot the circumflex but put in the hori-
zontal dots signalling an iota, which C2 then joined up and so altered to
a circumflex, thus simultaneously removing the iota, and so the ending
in -ντι, and supplying the missing accent; or (4) C2 found what we have
before us and interpreted it as ἀγνοοῦντα anyway. My view is that the
brackets in b3–6 (see last note but one) favour either (3) or (4), insofar
as they indicate C2’s recognition of the syntax of the sentence; once he
had recognized it, and therefore the correspondence of τῷ ἀγνοουντ
(plus ?circumflex over the tau) with τὸ εἰδότα in b2, he could hardly
read anything but ἀγνοοῦντα—thus anticipating Rieckher’s emend
ation, as necessarily adopted by subsequent editors. Bekker reads τῷ δ’
Aristotelica 59
ἀγνοοῦντι (with a full stop before it), presumably following Marc., the
descendant of L he has available to him; that he adopts L’s/Marc.’s read-
ing shows that he was way behind (my reconstruction of) C2, getting no
further than noticing that there was something odd about the construc-
tion of the sentence. (Note: that L too has the dative ἀγνοοῦντι surely
shows that that was what was in ω, which makes it less likely that C
himself intended to write ἀγνοοῦντα; he might have been uncertain
about ἀγνοοῦντι [see above], but he does not positively indicate a pref-
erence for the alternative.)
b6–7 ᾧ: C2’s ὃ, preceded by ἴσ[ως], is written above the ᾧ, which is itself

possibly in ras. —ὃ (actually ὁ, with no accent, but ὃ must be intended)
Ambr., ὅτῳ PCBL: the ὅτῳ obviously needs changing, not least if the
last item was ᾧ; L. Minio-Paluello apparently suggested ὃ καὶ τῷ, but
the direct interrogative would look even more out of place than PCBL’s
ὅτῳ, the other items being expressed by simple relatives.
b8 C2 strikes through the omega of C’s ὅσῳ, writing an alpha above it.
b11 δ’ ἀγνοῶν PL, διαγνοῶν CB. For the error in CB cf. e.g. 1248b36
δι’ αὑτὰ Bekker: δ’ αὐτὰ L; propter ipsa FL (missing in PCB); delta is
typically written with a flowing sweep downwards from the top of the
character, so that δ’ is easily confused with δι’. —ἀγνοεῖν πράττει P2:
P2 writes πράττει above the line (this is the top line on the page in P)
with an insertion mark after ἀγνοεῖν; the supplement, which Walzer/
Mingay misreports as πρῶτον (and also mislocates), is worthy but
unnecessary. —P2/P3 writes ἑκούσιον in the margin after ἐπεὶ, the last
word of the top line of the page, but it is hard to see where it is supposed
to go in—if indeed it is intended to go in at all, rather than just adverting
to τὸ ἑκούσιον τοῦτ’ ἔστιν in the line before (‘here’s where Aristotle
says what ἑκούσιον is’).
b12 τὸ] τῷ B bis, as if ἐν rather than ἕν had preceded.
b13 ὁ is inserted above the line by C2. —I suspect that B is supplying

μὲν1, but I also suspect he is right: μὲν and μὴ are very close, ortho
graphically, in shorthand manuscripts like P and C, and presumably
those being copied by B and L, and it would not be surprising if μὲν was
(1225b13) missing in ω, by haplography (for an example of confusion

between μὲν and μὴ, see 1226a25). There is even a possibility that
Nikolaos himself started writing μὲν in P before changing the super-
superscript) 〈 for εν behind/underneath the somewhat messy η.

script sign to eta; that is, there could be the beginnings of the (also
b14 An ἂν would be expected, if not indispensable, here and might eas-

ily go missing before ἀγνοῶν?
b15 P2, or possibly Nikolaos himself (it looks like his hand, and it is cer-
tainly different from the hand labelled ‘P2’ in the next note), mistakenly
inserts εἰ, above the line, between καὶ and μὴ.
b16 P2 writes ὃ ἂν ᾖ ῥᾴδιον in the margin with insertion marks there

and in the text before ἂν; C2 writes εἰ above ἦ.
b17 ἢ1 B, deest in P1CL: ἢ is inserted over the line in the text, with an
insertion mark, between ἀμέλειαν and ἡδονὴν by P2. Either α and L
each separately missed out the ἢ by haplography before ἡδονὴν, or else
ω, and α´, lacked it and B corrected independently; perhaps the second
is more likely, but it is hard to decide.
b21–4 It is hard to understand, let alone justify, Allan’s proposal to

bracket these three lines, although there are problems with the begin-
ning of the sentence in b23–4, μάλιστα δὲ λέγεται παρά τινων,
κτλ (q.v.).
b22 οὐ ταὐτὸ: οὐ τα in P at end of line; P2 attaches υτὸ beside it in the
margin. There is, then, a shared error here between C and B.
b24 B’s δόξειεν δ’ ἂν probably just reflects its usual enthusiasm for nu
ephelkustikon rather than an inherited δόξειεν. Bessarion in Par. 2042
writes δόξειε, with no ἄν, followed by what looks like a comma before
δυοῖν. This would be a possibility: as noted before, Aristotle does some-
times omit the ἄν in such cases—and could δ’ ἂν perhaps have somehow
originated in a duplication of δυοῖν? (It is something of a mystery why
Susemihl follows Bekker, and Walzer/Mingay then follows Susemihl, in
printing καὶ ζητοῦντι δόξειε δ’ ἂν; surely there is no possible case for
the δέ here?)
Aristotelica 61
b30 δὲ deest in B: and if it were not in PCL, we would hardly miss it

either (i.e. because connectives are regularly omitted in EE).
b34 προαίρεσις in B is post corr.: the second rho omitted, then supplied
above the line—perhaps by another hand.
b35 The clearly redundant ταὐτὸν and the following ἔνια appear in
reverse order in Susemihl, then in Walzer/Mingay (not in Bekker, who
omits ταὐτὸν and reports γὰρ ταὐτὸν in Marc. and P).
b37 ἃ δυνατὸν Fritzsche: Bekker prints ὃ δυνατὸν, following the Aldine,
but the Aldine itself gets it from Ambr. So the impossibility of ἀδύνατον
had been recognized before Fritzsche, but his emendation is—surely?—
as certain as any emendation can be.
1226a2 It might be a deliberate choice on B’s part to leave out the γὰρ,
given that without it and without the preceding τι (and the full stop
printed here before τῶν) but with the MSS’ following εἶναι, one gets a
sort of sense, if a highly improbable one. Not so with the version in PC
(also lacking the τι), though the following infinitive εἶναι, in all of
PCBL, still presumably arose because of οἴεται.
a4 Russell’s διάμετρον 〈ὅτι ἀ〉σύμμετρος is neither necessary nor even
elegant; the parallel with NE 1112a22 is unpersuasive, given that the text
as transmitted here in EE makes perfectly good sense.
a5 ἡ: the circumflex in B is apparently added by a different hand; per-
haps the same hand that adds a second, clearer rough breathing over the
following αὑτῷ. —δόξαν/ δόξα: P2 converts the supralinear sign for -αν
to an alpha.
a7 οὐδὲν immediately following οὐθεὶς (PCL, Susemihl, Walzer/
Mingay) looks odd; or is there a special reason why it should be οὐδὲν?
Bekker thinks not, printing οὐθεὶς . . . οὐθὲν.
a12 προαιρεῖται seclusi: the preceding sentence, as PCBL all have
it, is strange— how exactly does a person προαιρούμενος always
‘indicate’, or ‘make clear’, what and for what he or she προαιρεῖται?
What we see is the action; the information about why people do
what they do is frequently absent, for example in the context of
(1226a12) relationships—see EE itself on friendship (‘friends’ are not

always what they appear: VII.2, 1237b8–34, etc.). What is clear, and
always (ἀεί) clear, about anyone προαιρούμενος is that they
προαιρεῖται something, and for the sake of something else. Just so,
Woods translates ‘in general a man evidently always chooses some-
thing, and chooses for the sake of something’. However this cannot
be extracted from what the MSS offer us, i.e. καὶ ὅλως δηλοῖ ἀεὶ
προαιρούμενος τί τε καὶ τίνος ἕνεκα προαιρεῖται. Woods himself
implicitly claims to be following Walzer/Mingay here, which makes no
changes apart from Allan’s (unnecessary) supplement of τις after
προαιρούμενος; but what the Woods version actually translates is καὶ
ὅλως δηλοῖ ἀεὶ προαιρούμενος τί, καὶ τινὸς ἕνεκα προαιρεῖται, i.e.
with the τε suppressed, and, I suppose, a change from τίνος to τινὸς
(interrogative to indefinite τις). If we keep the τε, as I think we should
(τί and τινὸς ἕνεκα are plainly being introduced as a pair), along with
the change of accent, and read δηλοῖ, with Woods, as we then must,
as ‘is evidently / is clearly’ (for another example, see EE VII/IV.2,
1238a24), then it is the concluding προαιρεῖται that becomes redun-
dant. I speculate that someone misinterpreted τὶ and τινὸς as inter-
rogatives, supplying a marginal προαιρεῖται that then found its way
into the text. In any case, the arguments I have presented seem strong
enough to justify the small modifications to the traditional text that
Ι propose and that Woods implicitly proposed.
a13 τὶ/τί: so on my reconstruction B gets it right here, though only by

accident because he (nearly?) always writes interrogative τί as τὶ.
a15 PCBL δοξάζειν is presumably by attraction to the following infini-

tives (‘γρ. δοξάζει’ Victorius in margin).
a17–18 Pace Allan, there seems nothing wrong with βούλεσθαι

μὲν . . . οὐκ ἔστιν, except that one might have wished for a γάρ.
a24 αὐτῶν B1, αὐτῆς B2: ης is supplied by B2 above the circumflex of
αὐτῶν. So B is evidently here being ‘corrected’ against another MS; the
change would otherwise appear unmotivated. That C and L should share
the same error here is not so surprising: the difference between a shorthand
αὐτῶν (as in P) and a shorthand αὐτῆς (as in C) is small: αὐτ with a large
Aristotelica 63
circumflex-like mark over the tau (representing ων) with a circumflex

beneath the mark, as against the same mark over the tau with a minuscule
sigma beneath. Compare 1220a22, where P has αὐτῶν and C αὐτῆς, with B
and L: Nikolaos in P is there independently correcting an original αὐτῆς,
and perhaps he and the B copyist are doing the same here—or, alternatively,
Nikolaos in C and the L copyist both happen to make the same mistake.
a25 μὲν B2: ὲν supplied over the eta of μὴ. So is B here being corrected
against P or a descendant of P?
a27 οὐδ’ is in all of PCBL, pace Walzer/Mingay, and looks unobjection-
able; missing in the Teubner, presumably by accident. —B2 writes the liga-
ture for ει above the final eta of ἐγχειρήση; it is not perhaps too optimistic
to suppose he was aiming for, i.e. signalling, ἐγχειρήσειε, after ἄν.
a29 An ‘apodotic’ δέ seems quite possible; less economically, we could
accept Solomon’s ἐνίων in the preceding line.
a32–5 Susemihl follows Bonitz in transposing wholesale, ‘ut ordo mem-
brorum sit hic: [34]. τὰ–[35], ἐστίν, [32]. τὸ–πρακτόν, [33]. ᾗ–[34].
ἐστίν, [32–3]. ἀλλ’–ἁπάντων’. It is not clear that this major reorganiza-
tion benefits the argument. Woods reorganizes differently, shifting 34–5
τὰ δὲ προαιρετὰ καὶ πρακτὰ τῶν ἐϕ’ ἡμῖν ὄντων ἐστίν to follow 32
τὸ δ’ ὅλως οὐ πρακτόν: for his argument, see his notes, but why should
34–5 not be the starting-point of the following aporia? Kenny in the
Oxford World’s Classics translation seems to follow Woods, without the
usual warning of a departure from Walzer/Mingay. His revision of
Solomon in Aristotle’s Ethics (ed. Barnes and Kenny, Princeton 2014)
suggests yet another reorganization which is neither Bonitz’s/Susemihl’s
nor Woods’s, but apparently a relative of the former: ‘ἀλλ’–ἁπάντων
post [34] ἐστίν transposuerat Rassow’, Susemihl. Interestingly, Solomon’s
own original (Oxford) translation, which is based on Susemihl, renders
the transmitted and not the reorganized text, and quite successfully,
although I prefer a different punctuation from his; similarly Inwood
and Woolf.
a33 τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν C: the ἐν is marked by C2 with dots for deletion.
a34 προαιρετὰ καὶ L: προαιρετικὰ καὶ PCB by dittography.
1226a39 B’s δρῶμεν was independently suggested by Richards, claiming

that ‘ “We go wrong by doing so with our senses” is a most unlikely
expression’ (Richards, Aristotelica p. 56). But it seems more natural to
construe αὐτὸ δρῶντες as ‘doing the thing’, i.e. whatever it is we are
doing. B2 corrects to the other MSS’ δρῶντες by writing nu, then tau
plus the shorthand for ες above the μεν of δρῶμεν.
1226b2 Since we only need one ἐστι and only L has two, it seems unrea-
sonable of Walzer/Mingay to report ‘ἐστι προαίρεσις om. PC’ instead
of quietly omitting L’s second, after προαίρεσις (they are following
Susemihl’s ‘ἐστι προαίρεσις om. P’, which was at the time accurate, L
not then being in the mix). Perhaps there was a second ἐστι in ω, e.g.
ἔστιν before ὡς, and α´ omitted it, and προαίρεσις with it, while L just
changed the accent?
b4 καὶ βούλεται Ald. is a possibility, after the singular προαιρεῖται; the

switch from singular to plural is perhaps hardly noticeable with οὐθείς
as subject of the singular verb, but cf. 1226b13–15 προαιρεῖται μὲν
μηθεὶς . . . βουλεύεται δὲ.
b8 πρὸ ἑτέρου / πρὸς ἑτέρου / πρὸς ἑτέρον: I take it that Bessarion’s
πρὸ ἑτέρου, in Par. 2042, must be right, after b6 δηλοῖ δέ πως καὶ τὸ
ὄνομα αὐτό (the ὄνομα is προαίρεσις, not *προσαίρεσις, and no
amount of pleading will make it so). L’s reading, together with that of
Laur. 81,4 (which for this part of EE descends from C, and normally
reproduces it faithfully), suggests that the origin of the confusion in the
MSS may lie in a careless assimilation of πρὸ ἑτέρου to the τοῦτο that
begins the next sentence and is actually duplicated in PCB, all of which
give us πρὸς ἑτέρου τοῦτο. τοῦτο. . . . The process would have been
helped by the way in which the copyist of PC writes—and presumably
also the predecessors of BL wrote—πρός, i.e. with the omicron placed
over the pi and rho, an accent over the omicron, and suppression of the
final sigma (i.e. the standard method in PC of writing the -ος ending);
πρός and πρό are thus distinguished only by the placing of the omicron +
accent, and might then readily be confused, although there are not many
other examples of such a confusion in these MSS (one possible example
is in L at 1224b7).
Aristotelica 65
b14 μὴ is supplied by P2 in the margin.
b15–16 ἢ χεῖρον ἢ βέλτιον PCBL, εἰ χεῖρον ἢ βέλτιον Fritzsche: that

βούλευσις can be better or worse might be said to be incidental to the point
in hand, which is that no one προαιρεῖται without prior preparation in the
form of βούλευσις; the addition of (βουλευσάμενος) εἰ χεῖρον ἢ βέλτιον,
by contrast, would help justify the emphatic προαιρεῖται . . . μηθεὶς. But
since the MSS are unanimous, and the change is not necessary, stet.
b18 ἅπαντες: Bonitz’s ἅπαντα would make a pair with b20 πάντα, but
aesthetic considerations (as Hendrik Lorenz and Ben Morison remind
me) do not by themselves trump unanimity among the MSS.
b19 βουλόμεθα1/βουλευόμεθα: it must surely be βουλόμεθα (which,

pace Walzer/Mingay, is already in Ald.; Victorius merely confirms it in
the margin). Aristotle first confirms why προαίρεσις must be, not
ὄρεξις pure and simple, but ὄρεξις of a certain sort, before going on to
explain why/how it is specifically ὄρεξις βουλευτική; the shape of the
argument is obscured by the brackets introduced by Woods and by
Walzer/Mingay. —βουλόμεθα2 P1L, βουλευόμεθα CBP2: so probably
both recensiones will have read βουλόμεθα here—and should, I think,
have read that instead of βουλευόμεθα in the preceding clause too.
b24 οὐδ’ ὑπόληψις Susemihl: for οὐδὲ . . . οὔτε see Denniston 510 (Walzer/
Mingay). —τοῦ LP2, τὸ P1CB: it is hard to make out what was under the
messy τοῦ in P, but something has surely been corrected, and it can hardly
have been anything other than τὸ. —Ross’s supplement of τὸ before δοξάσαι
is not needed; the omission of the article in such cases in EE is not unusual.
b26 The στι of ἔστι is corrected above the line to τι in B; a small gap
after οὐκέτι in P is caused by a fault—actually a hole—in the parch-
ment; similarly after μία in the next line.
b28 Between ἐστὶν and ἢ in B, above the line, another hand appears to
have added an aspirated iota, the purpose of which is unclear.
b33 δι’ and ἄγνοιαν are split between two lines in B; there is what looks
like a—later—hyphen (?) in the margin after the δι’ (perhaps to indicate
that δι’ is not δ’: see on 1227b17).
1226b36 Bonitz’s supplement of ἅπαν is unnecessary, despite the fol-

lowing πάντα . . . πάντα, implying as it does a degree of stylistic con-
sciousness (cf. Dirlmeier ad loc.: ‘sorgfältig stilisiert’) that the Aristotle of
EE does not generally show. (My thanks to Friedemann Buddensiek for
insisting on this; cf. on b18 above, and Bessarion at 1227a4 below.)
b37 ἑκούσια: Susemihl prints ἀκούσια here by mistake.
b39 Neither ἀδικημάτων (Bonitz) nor ποιημάτων (Ross) is convin
cing as a substitute for παθημάτων; but in any case, since Aristotle is
talking here about ordinary, non-philosophical practice, παθήματα can
just be taken as ‘things that happen to people’. If so, Woods’s objection
that ‘the notion of a premeditated πάθημα is absurd’ misses the mark,
and παθημάτων can happily stand.
1227a4 Bessarion in Par. 2042 writes οὔτε ἁπλῶς δόξα, then thinks
better of it and crosses out the ἁπλῶς.
a6 B’s ἀεὶ ὁ βουλευόμενος ἕνεκά του βουλεύεται is an interesting vari-
ation, presumably of his own doing.
a14 Fritzsche’s τούτῳ is attractive (with no comma preceding), but
should it be τοῦτον? —ἐκ προτέρου P1, ἐκ ποτέρου P2: ἐκ ποτέρου is
written out in margin following a pair of dots; there are corresponding
dots above and below the first rho in προτέρου in the text. Allan’s
to war or not,] people deliberating about this 〈must start from some-
speculative reconstruction of a13–14 (‘[as for example, whether to go
thing prior;〉 but 〈what is αἱρετὸν〉’) expands the transmitted text

without obviously improving on it. —δὲ del. Ross, i.e. adopting P2’s ἐκ
ποτέρου.
a17 εἰ: P2 writes the ligature for ει over what is surely an erased ἢ.
a18 ᾗ αὐτὸς P2 in margin, with ‘perhaps’. Rackham’s ἢ 〈ᾗ〉 is palaeo-
graphically plausible, and tempting, but probably falls too close to what
begins to feel like a cleaning up of Aristotle’s (Eudemian) Greek; we have
only to understand a ὅ τι before αὐτὸς.
a22 παρὰ ϕύσιν: PC both have παρὰ, pace Walzer/Mingay (B misreads

the standard shorthand for παρὰ in the way these MSS often do).
Aristotelica 67
a23 διαστροϕῇ Fritzsche: διαστροϕὴν PCBL; καὶ 〈κατὰ〉 διαστροϕὴν

Sylburg; διὰ στροϕὴν Jackson. Jackson’s solution, while neat, seems
unlikely given that the noun διαστροϕὴ will indubitably figure in a31.
Fritzsche wins by a short head over Sylburg (‘alterutrum verum’, com-
ments Susemihl, while printing διαστροϕὴν) because it is marginally
less economical to suppose the loss of κατὰ—the abbreviation of which,
incidentally, in PC is clearly distinguishable from that for καί—than that
διαστροϕῇ was attracted into the case of the preceding noun. We can
see from the manner of C’s διαστροϕὴν how readily διαστροϕῆ—no
iota subscript—could have become διαστροϕὴν: the superscript short-
hand ending for ην is itself easily mistaken for a superscript eta (even if
the accent would be wrong).
a24 τὰ] τοῖς Richards. Richards is strictly right in saying we should

expect the dative, given the following χρήσασθαι. But I hesitate to
emend, construing ‘in respect of some, it is not possible to employ
[them]. . .’. —τ’ ] τε BP2: there is an original elision mark in P, and so
presumably an original tau, but it has been overwritten, with an epsilon
added, in a different ink.
a27 ἐστήμης L1: L2 writes πι above the line, overlapping the epsilon and
the sigma.
a34 There is a small gap after ἀλλ’ εἰς in P because of the hole in the
parchment (see above for the other side = P107r).
a35 ἐκβῆναι in P is split ἐκβῆ-ναι across a gap caused by the hole in the
parchment.
a42 Bekker omits the καὶ before ἄμεινον, evidently on the authority of
Marc.; Susemihl says it is missing from P too, without recording as
Bekker does that P lacks the whole of 41–2 οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει . . . καὶ τὸ
λυπηρὸν (as do CB); Walzer/Mingay then has ‘καὶ post ἥδιον add. L’,
even though it has just said ‘[41–2] οὕτω . . . λυπηρὸν om. PC’. For all we
know, the καὶ was in ω, but Marc. was in any case right to leave it out.
1227b16 τὸν λόγον B1, τῶν λόγων B2: B1 wrote τὸν, as he sometimes
likes to do, with the tau above the ον, and B2 inserts an omega between
(1227b16) them; λόγον he converts to λόγων with an omega above the

second omicron. —διαϕθείρει is split between lines in B, with a hyphen
(if that is what it is) after διαϕ in the margin.
b17 There is a similar hyphen-like mark after the second δ’ in B as it ends

the line: is a reader mistakenly interpreting the δ’, with its top extended
downwards, as δι’—by now a familiar confusion in these MSS?
b19 C has ἡ μὲν, pace Walzer/Mingay, not ὅτι. There is something before
the ἡ, which I would like to have been one of the innumerable versions
of the sign for καί, but is probably just a nu written in error after the
sign for the final -ον of αἴτιον.
b26 Editors since Bekker have preferred συλλογισμὸς (Ambr.) over

λογισμὸς (PCBL), but any modern editor, i.e. one who knows that
Ambr. is not a primary MS, must surely prefer λογισμὸς. The only prob-
lem I can see with λογισμὸς is to see how it differs, here, from λόγος
(οὐκ ἔστι λογισμὸς οὐδὲ λόγος), but then distinguishing between
συλλογισμὸς and λόγος is hardly much easier. The Ambr. copyist
(Chalkondyles) evidently just liked συλλογισμὸς better. —Since Allan’s
version, ἀλλὰ δεῖ ὥσπερ ἀρχὴν τοῦτο ὑποκεῖσθαι, actually comes to
much the same as the MSS’ ἀλλὰ δὴ ὥσπερ ἀρχὴ τοῦτο ὑποκείσθω,
there is little to be said for adopting it. A positive consideration against it
is that it would rob us of the combination ἀλλὰ δὴ (‘avversativa molto
forte’, Donini), which builds upon the emphatic τούτου οὐκ ἔστι
λογισμὸς οὐδὲ λόγος.
b32 Since δεῖ τόδε ὑγιαίνειν makes no sense (although editors print it),
the question is whether to save the δεῖ, with Rackham, or the τόδε, with
Kenny in the Oxford World’s Classics translation; cf. I.8, 1218b19–20.
I choose the latter option, for the reasons Kenny gives (Aristotle’s Theory
of the Will [London: Duckworth, 1979]: 132) and because it helps with
the general structure and shape of the surrounding sentence. —τό δε B2,
introducing δε above γε; τόδε is presumably intended, τό and γε just
happening to be on two different lines.
b40 οὗ ἕνεκα secludenda ci. Richards: in common with other editors,

including Bekker and Susemihl, Richards appears not to know about the
Aristotelica 69
following δεῖ; Walzer/Mingay reports it, in a parenthesis, as being in

only C and L, when it is in all of PCBL. But it is surely key: with Fritzsche’s
τῷ (for τὸ) προαιρεῖσθαι, it surely gives a perfectly acceptable sense, i.e.
‘. . . through [a person’s] προαιρεῖσθαι [for the sake of] what/the thing
[they] should [προαιρεῖσθαι] for the sake of ’; cf. 1227b15.
1228a1 After πράττειν here, after ἐκ τῆς in a2 and after a3 ἀλλ’ οὐ

there are small gaps in P because of another fault in the parchment.
a2 οὗ secl. Fritzsche: was οὗ introduced by someone who thought—

bizarrely, after all that Aristotle has said—that he was now saying that it
belonged to προαίρεσις to make the τέλος right? ‘The alternative,
keeping οὗ, is to read τὸ instead of τοῦ [at the beginning of the sen-
tence]’, Woods: that would give us ‘the end of the προαίρεσις’s being
ὀρθὸν [is] what ἀρετὴ is αἰτία of ’, which is a rather bizarre way of
putting what is being said more straightforwardly by the sentence as
printed. There are bizarreries in EE, but that is not a reason for adding
to their number.
a11 ‘ἑκούσια L2, ut vid.’, Walzer/Mingay, but actually L2 corrects L’s

ἑκούσια by writing the required alpha above over the epsilon.
a13 ἐιστὴν C, with tau over the sigma and an oblique stroke beside it
standing in for the ending: presumably -ην.
a14 καίτοι αἱρετώτερον ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς ἀρετῆς traieci post a15

προαιρεῖται δ’ οὐδείς: if 1225b3–6 ἐνίοτε γὰρ οἶδε . . . τὸ δ’ ἦν κώνειον
intruded into the syntax, καίτοι . . . τῆς ἀρετῆς intrudes so violently
into the sense of the surrounding sentence that it cannot plausibly even
be corralled by dashes (my preferred manner of marking parentheses)—
it is, after all, a complete sentence, which separates what comes before
from its explanation. (Translators can hide the difficulty: so Kenny
[Oxford World’s Classics], with ‘. . . we look at the choice rather than the
deeds, even though. . . . This is because. . .’. But καίτοι is not a conjunc-
tion [‘even though’: cf. Simon Slings on καίτοι in Plato, Republic VII,
511d1–2 (Slings, Critical Notes on Plato’s Politeia, ed. G. Boter and J. van
Ophuijsen, Leiden: Brill, 2005: 113–19)], and while ‘This is because’ can
easily refer back over the intervening ‘even though . . .’, the Greek it
(1228a14) translates, a bare ὅτι, cannot.) Either καίτοι αἱρετώτερον ἡ

ἐνέργεια τῆς ἀρετῆς originated as a gloss (as the five words introduced
by καίτοι at Republic 511d1–2 surely did), or it appears in the wrong
place. I have adopted the latter solution, on the grounds that the words
are immediately picked up as the first part of the conclusion in 18–19
(αἱρετώτερον μὲν οὖν ἡ ἐνέργεια), which probably itself makes it too
important, as it is in any case, to be hidden away in a parenthesis.
—B makes a mess of the beginning of αἱρετώτερον, for which either he
or someone else makes amends by inserting a supralinear αἱ before
the mess.
Eudemian Ethics III
1228a23 ἐν 〈ταῖς〉 ἀρεταῖς: at least from Bekker onwards editors have

read ἐν ταῖς ἀρεταῖς without comment, suggesting that the ταῖς is in all /
the main MSS, the exception being Walzer/Mingay, who claims that it is
(I have not checked) it is in Marc. In any case, pace Fritzsche, ἐν 〈ταῖς〉

in P; it is not in fact to be found in any of PCBL. But according to Bekker
ἀρεταῖς—or ἐν ἀρεταῖς, though the ἀρεταί seem too central to the

context to be deprived of the definite article—is what is needed, being
essential for a careful restatement of the conclusion in II.5, 1222b12–14:
not all ἀρεταί are μεσότητες, because the intellectual ones are not.
a24 αἱ ἐναντίαι κακίαι will be joint subject of the present clause with
the preceding αὗται = the μεσότητες which are in the ἀρεταί = the
relevant ἀρεταί: ‘and [that] these and the opposing κακίαι are
προαιρετικαί ’. The slight modification of the subject, I suppose, requires
the αὗται, but is not complete enough to make the τε after μεσότητες
εἰσί ‘out of place’ (Richards). Then, with the addition of the κακίαι,
the subject has changed again, necessitating a second αὗται, at the end
of the present line. An alternative might be to follow Spengel and put
L’s αἱ after ἐναντίαι, from where it might easily have fallen out by hap-
lography, in which case Aristotle would be including in his summary
(ὅτι μὲν οὖν . . . καθόλου εἴρηται) the treatment of the paradoxical
ἐναντιότης of the κακίαι, both to each other and to the μεσότητες,
that was one of the central points later on in Book II; but this is probably
implicit in any case with αἱ where it is in L (deest in PCB). —κακίας B2,
unaccountably, writing the shorthand for -ας plus acute accent over the
-αι; for confirmation, cf. the -ας in B’s ἐναντίας in 1228b2. Would we be
meant to make corresponding changes to the preceding ἐναντίαι, and
perhaps to καὶ too: κατ’ ἐναντίας κακίας? (Surely not, but something
must have been in the corrector’s mind.)
72 Eudemian Ethics III
1228a29 ἐν τῇ διαγραϕῇ: ἐκ was evidently written in error for ἐν in the

common source of PCB, i.e. α´. In C Nikolaos corrects to the genitive in
line with the ἐκ, while in P a second hand makes the same correction,
adding the required sigmas to the two original superscript etas; B or his
immediate source behaves like C but then writes γραϕῆς, perhaps in
search of sense. —πρότερον for πότερον or vice versa is a common
error in these MSS, and an easy one in the presence of the ligature of rho +
omicron—which PC usually copy (or fail to copy), while B’s and L’s prac-
tice is to break it into its constituent parts. —καὶ θράσος PC: the καὶ
printed by Walzer/Mingay, following Susemihl (Bekker notes that it is in
P, but does not print it), is not needed, and not being in B or L, was prob-
ably not in ω.
a30 ϕόβον/ϕόβος: that C was independently correcting to the accusa-

tive looks unlikely, with πότερον beginning the clause instead of πρότερον;
evidently ω had πότερον ϕόβον, and three separate copyists (Nikolaos
when writing P, and the B and L copyists) independently wrote ϕόβος
both because of πότερον and because of θράσος.
a32 οὗτος/ὁ τοιοῦτος: ὁ τοιοῦτος would probably be the less expected

reading (so preferable as lectio difficilior?); on the other hand it seems
more likely for οὗτος to be corrupted—perhaps via dittography—into ὁ
τοιοῦτος, not least with (κατὰ τὸ) τοιοῦτος following, than ὁ τοιοῦτος
into οὗτος. In any case a double τοιοῦτος would feel awkward, espe-
cially when there is actually no need for the first.
a34 B2 adds a separation mark below the line after οἷος, which ends with
an σ; such marks, as noted before, are fairly common in B.
a37 P2 overwrites the partially erased iota of ἐπὶ with the ligature for ει,
and substitutes ἡ for an erased τῇ; the rough breathing competes with
the remains of the old circumflex accent. What C has is actually ἀνδρεῖα
(i.e. with no iota subscript), so that the circumflex is (slightly) less
strange than it looks; C sometimes has ἀνδρεῖα for the nominative (e.g.
b4, 1229a2), but so too sometimes does (Nikolaos in) P.
1228b1 ταὐτὸ: C alone writes the crasis mark; so too with ταὐτὰ.
Aristotelica 73
b8 The fault in the parchment in P on f. 108r, in 1228a1–4, turns up here

on f. 108v, running down from after μεγάλα here in b8 to after b12 ϕαίη
and b13 ϕόβου.
b10 ὁποῖα P2: with omicron inserted above the pi and the circumflex
accent. —πρῶτον deest in PCB: PCB or (one of) their predecessor(s)
perhaps read πρότερον for πότερον (see on a30 above), and omitted
πρῶτον by a sort of haplography. For the record, L here, unusually,
writes πρῶτον with the ending -ον above the tau, connecting with the
circumflex accent; such a feature occurs in L, and in B, apparently at
random. —αὑτῷ: if there is a rough breathing in P, as I think there is, it
is by way of correction from a smooth, probably by the same hand.
b12 Robinson’s rewriting here—accepted by Walzer/Mingay—is impos-

sible to justify; the text as it stands makes perfectly good sense, and a
somewhat different sense from the one Robinson imposes on it. —
Walzer/Mingay reports εἴη ἂν as missing from P here; it is actually
missing from all of P, C, and B in b14, before ἰσχυρὸς.
b13 ϕοβερά. 〈τὰ δὲ ϕοβερὰ〉 ϕόβου Bonitz: that the transmitted text
(ϕοβερὰ ϕόβου) is corrupt is certain enough. How then to decide
among the solutions offered? Fritzsche’s looks like a non-starter: ϕοβερά
tic . . . μέγα. 〈τὰ δὲ〉 ϕοβερὰ), and cannot be borrowed from there. Of
is needed by the last sentence (unless we accept Bussemaker’s dras-
the others, Bonitz’s and Dirlmeier’s proposals have the edge on

Spengel’s insofar as they come with a story about how the corruption
arose (haplography), and Bonitz’s has much the better story (as for
Dirlmeier’s, why the loss of δὲ τὰ as well as of the second ϕοβερά?).
One could argue that a second ϕοβερά is unnecessary, because ϕοβερά
will be the subject of the present sentence in any case, and that all we
require is a connective: supplying δὲ after ϕόβου, we could construe
‘and they [i.e. ϕοβερά, understood from the last sentence] are ϕόβου
ποιητικὰ for each person for whom they are ϕοβερά’. Connectives,
after all, not unusually go missing in these MSS. But this is a weak jus-
tification: why should a connective get lost here? Bonitz explains why:
a copyist’s eye leapt straight to the second ϕοβερά, and took the pre-
ceding ϕοβερά. τὰ δὲ with it.
1228b14 Neither Russell’s καθ’ ὅσον nor Walzer/Mingay’s ᾗ seems a clear

improvement on ᾧ, which is in any case perfectly intelligible; ᾗ in b22
and 24, cited by Walzer/Mingay, seems to function rather differently.
b16 The emendation in the second edition of the Basle Aristotle
(ϕοβεῖσθαι), adopted by Walzer/Mingay, misses the point of ποιεῖσθαι.
There are many great ϕοβερά for the ἀνδρεῖος (b12–13), in particular
because he goes out to face them, unlike the coward; ϕοβερά are the sorts
of things to create fear for a person (b13–14); so the ἀνδρεῖος will actually
create many great fears for himself—which he ὑπομένει (b10). At any rate
such a defence of ποιεῖσθαι looks reasonable enough to make it unsafe to
print ϕοβεῖσθαι (the general sense will anyway be the same—and less
interesting with ϕοβεῖσθαι).
b21 A second breathing is apparently added above οὔ by B2.
b26 This ϕοβερὰ after ἁπλῶς might have originated as a gloss; the spare
Eudemian style might easily leave it to be supplied by the reader. But it is
probably more economical to suppose that it fell out in L (or a predeces-
sor of L, if any, that postdated ω).
b28 Allan’s supplement of ϕαίνεται is unnecessary, given that we have
been operating throughout with the idea of things’ being ϕοβερά to/for
someone.
b35 οἱ πολλοί and οἱ πλεῖστοι: οἱ πολλοί can mark out different cat
egories, either the majority or ‘the [unsophisticated/banausic] many’, in
which case we can take καὶ as epexegetic: ‘i.e. the majority’. If that is at all
possible, as it surely is, no emendation is required.
b37 οἱ δὲ P2, writing ἴσως: οἱ δὲ ὑϕ’ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ in the margin. As P2
sees, Aristotle here turns to the counterparts of the sick, the weak, and
the coward, i.e. the ἀνδρεῖος together with the strong and the healthy,
with whom he started comparing the ἀνδρεῖος in b31. The alternative,
taken by Victorius and a number of others, is to suppose a lacuna before
the καὶ ἔτι (so Susemihl); Bonitz’s proposal for filling the gap (the one
he likes, which I give in the apparatus: see Susemihl for his rejected
alternative) adds little to what P2 achieves with considerably greater
economy and even elegance.
Aristotelica 75
1229a3 τοῦτον PL, both misreading the sign for -ων as a circumflex,
and taking the reference to be to λόγος? (Or: is the reference to λόγος?)
Walzer/Mingay’s report that C has τοῦτο stems from just such a misun-
derstanding: that C intends τούτων is clear, τούτων being written as
του with tau over the upsilon and the sign for -ων above, with an acute
accent following. (Casaubon’s τοῦτο is a candidate, but it seems that a
nu was in ω.)
a5 B2 adds a nu over the sigma of μόνος.
a9 Strictly speaking, of course, it is not τὰ μεγάλα λυπηρὰ καὶ

ϕθαρτικὰ that are fine but rather the withstanding of them, but the
slight illogicality is surely permissible; there is no need to follow Allan
and emend καλὰ to καλὸν.
a11 B2 writes in ον above the ος (anticipating Rackham’s surely neces-

sary emendation).
a12–13 The loss of τὰ after ὁμοιότητα is no surprise.
a16 Bonitz’s ἴσασι, supplied after ἀλλ’ ὅτι, is easily understood in any case
(another example of EE’s telegraphic style); Jackson’s emendation, with
εἰδέναι understood at the end of the sentence, is thus simply unnecessary.
a18 τὰ ϕερόμενα = ‘whatever comes’ (Kenny); for a similar idiom see
1229b27.
a19 B2 writes in οἱ above the εἰ.
a23 καὶ is surely required: the shorthand sign for καὶ, as it is sometimes
written in MSS that use it, is not too far removed from ἢ.
a24 PL clearly write ἀποκτείνας; the error in CB, if that is what it is,
presumably originates in the similarity of the signs for -ας and -ειν, the
former in effect joining the two oblique strokes of the latter at the bot-
tom; how similar can be seen by comparing the C copyist’s -ειν in
ὑπομένειν at 1229a9 with his -ας in ἀνδρείας two lines later. (B here,
unlike C, writes out the ending, being for the most part in the business
of deciphering the shorthand, ligatures, etc. that are part of C, P, and
other MSS like them.) Or: is ἀποκτείνειν possible—Victorius prefers it
(1229a24) to ἀποκτείνας—if taken with μυθολογούμενος? Probably

not; if Theseus is ὁ ἐν Κρήτῃ μυθολογούμενος, he is hardly a tyrannicide.
a26 The acute accent on σύες in P looks original, a circumflex appar-
ently being added later—and then struck through twice (so σύες is both
P1 and P3). Is the circumflex in CB possibly a surviving trace of an ori
ginal θῆρες, as in L? Still, θῆρες is surely wrong, since θῆρες would not
need to be qualified as ἄγριοι. But perhaps we should read ὕες, which is
the usual Attic form (and the one Aristotle uses in NE).
a31 οὐδὲ μία PC: actually οὐ δὲ μία, but οὐδέ in PC is typically written
with οὐ plus the special sign for δέ, and it seems likely that this is for
convenience, here and elsewhere, rather than in order to make οὐδέ into
two words.
a37 προσδεχομένης B1: B2 introduces οι above the eta.
a41 οἱ ζηλοῦντες ἢ οἱ αἰσχυνόμενοι: it is perhaps commoner for EE
not to repeat the definite article in such cases, but since it is in a repre-
sentative of either recensio, by my rule we should include it.
a42 ὅσων B2: the mark B2 introduces over the ending of ὅσοις can only
be a version of the sign for -ων.
1229b3 Susemihl and Walzer/Mingay both follow Victorius in bracket-
ing the καί before δειλοί. But why should Aristotle not be saying that
these people are also/actually δειλοί?
b4 Bekker reports περὶ in P (i.e. τὴν περὶ τούτου), but does not print it;
Susemihl does print it, and Walzer/Mingay follows suit, saying that it is
not in L. But what is in P, and in C too, is παρὰ (as one can see by com-
paring the way περὶ is written in both just before), and παρὰ is anyway
more likely than περὶ, especially since we have just had περὶ τὸν θάνατον,
and τούτου itself presumably refers to death—which is why Bekker prob-
ably omitted (what he thought was) περὶ here. παρὰ remains a possibility,
but since the plain genitive is respectable enough and appears in B as well
as L (i.e. in a representative of each of the two recensiones), I opt for that.
b5 θερμασίας in P, written in above the line, is perhaps a gloss rather than

an emendation? Glosses, on the other hand, are usually in the margin.
Aristotelica 77
b6 τὰ τοιαῦτα B2, adding ὰ above -ὰς, alpha over -ας, and a circumflex
over the upsilon. —B’s ὑπομενητικὸς, which according to LSJ appears
as an alternative reading in several texts, might just be right; B also has
ὑπομενητικός at 1232a26, where PC have ὑπομενετικός but L has
ὑπομονητικός (so that ὑπομενητικός could have been in ω, in one or
both places).
1229b14–1230a35 τὰ μὲν οὖν ϕοβερά . . . αἰσχρὸν γάρ desunt in B: this

is an exceptionally large gap, not explainable in any of the usual ways, i.e.
haplography, dittography, homoioteleuton—or, probably, even careless-
ness of the usual sort, because, strikingly, what is missing is a whole sec-
tion, namely the last section of the discussion of courage, in which
Aristotle makes further distinctions about the causes or occasions of fear.
I call it a ‘whole section’: what I intend by this is that if we did not have
the passage in the other MSS, we would not necessarily miss it—although,
having it, we can see that it makes a number of important points, some of
which are, indeed, some of the most interesting in the whole discussion
of courage. On the other hand it is hard to see why anyone would make a
deliberate decision to leave the section out. Nor can there be any question
of the accidental loss of pages, because if the codex from which B was
copied was of the same general type as B itself, or P, C, or L (which seems
likely), individual folios are hardly more easily separable individually
than the pages of a bound modern book. (We certainly have not lost part
of B itself: the break starts after the first word of the seventh line.) The
only remaining explanation appears to be that the copyist turned two
pages at once, thus missing two sides of text, the beginning and end of
which happened to coincide with our section: so, carelessness of a differ-
ent kind from the usual. As it happens, the sixty or so missing lines do
make up roughly two sides of the dimensions we find in B, though con-
siderably less than two sides of P or C (rather more than two in L, in
which the characters are larger, lines shorter, and there are fewer lines to
the page). If there is any truth in this story, it is confirmation—if by this
stage any confirmation were needed—that the original from which B was
copied cannot have been C or P: for the record, the missing passage starts
five lines from the bottom of f. 116v in C, not at the end of a line, and
ends at the end of the seventh line of f. 117v; the picture is similar for P.
1229b15 P2 strikes through τῆς, and adds ικῆς in a curious downward

sweep beside ϕθαρτῆς—itself written with tau above the rho, and a cir-
cumflex over the tau—in the margin, ϕθαρτῆς being the last word in
the line. P is here surely being corrected against L or one of its
descendants.
b16 καὶ2 deest in PC: and dispensable?
b22 τὴν ψυχὴν 〈ἔνια〉 Robinson: perhaps superior to Ross’s supplement

of τινὰ after καὶ, but ‘some’, however it might be spelled out, can readily
be understood in any case.
b23 οὖν post οἱ μὲν suppl. Bonitz: but does an οὖν fit here? Aristotle
is now introducing a new observation, not something that obviously
derives from (what I have presented as) the preceding paragraph, or
indeed the one before that. We might miss a connective here, but which
should it be? —Susemihl writes ἐπιψεύδονται without comment (or
authority).
b32 The sign for καὶ in L is supplied by another hand above the line
between δὲ and δι’. —No nu ephelkustikon in PCL, as (nearly) always in
these MSS at the end of a sentence before another starting with a con-
sonant, even with no regular punctuation marking the end of a sentence;
B has the nu, but probably only because it has a liking for them.
b35 A διὰ (suppl. Rackham) has obviously to be understood before

ϕυγὴν in any case; I take it that after διὰ ταύτην . . . δι’ ἄλλην . . . this is
easy enough. —Here and in 1230a19 it is reasonable to suppose that
the ἂν dropped out because of the following ἀνδρεῖος, even though it
is not inevitable that it was originally in either place (see note on II.7,
1223a25).
b36 Nikolaos’ eye apparently slipped, when he was writing C, to

ἀποθνήσκειν οὐκ ὄντος ἡδέος in 38, reproducing it here; C2 (or just pos-
sibly Nikolaos himself?) then marks the three words with dots above and
below for deletion.
b40–1 P2 writes ἴ[σως] ἔχει in the margin with insertion mark in the
text between ἑτοίμως and ἀποθνήσκειν; ἔχει would explain the
Aristotelica 79
adverb, but the solution proposed by a correcting hand in Laur. 81,4

(anticipating Bekker) is more economical.
1230a12 Opposite the line ending with εἶεν and beginning with τοῦτο
ἀνδρεία there is something in the margin of P that I have not succeeded
in deciphering; there is no insertion mark in the text and it was probably
not intended as a correction.
a19 αἰτίων] ἀνδρείων Spengel. Richards apparently takes ἀνδρείων to
be original, since he says that it should be omitted: ‘Neither here nor in
the Nicom. Ethics are they held to be ἀνδρεῖοι’. But Aristotle could surely
have called the people in question ἀνδρεῖοι, as it were in scare quotes.
Still the case for ἀνδρείων is not quite made: Aristotle could, I think,
have written αἰτίων, given that all the focus of the context is on the causes/
motivation of the various types of ἀνδρεῖοι; the switch from αἴτια to
the people moved by them would not be incompatible with the kind of
shorthand we find elsewhere in EE (for a similar if less harsh switch, see
b10–11, where we move from different types of ἀκολασία in the open-
ing genitive absolute [b9] to what must be masculine plurals, ἀλλήλων
and τῶν ἄλλων). Again, ἀνδρείων looks redundant, except perhaps as a
way of explaining how αἰτίων might have made its way into the text
(but then how would ἀνδρείων have been mistaken for αἰτίων?).
Bracketing αἰτίων then looks attractive, and perhaps αἰτίων originated
as a gloss. But why would anyone feel the need to gloss πάντων τῶν
τοιούτων, which on its own would hardly be mysterious: ‘of all such
people/types . . . ’? Stet αἰτίων. —ἂν suppl. Spengel: cf. n. on 1229b35.
a22 ἐλεγχείη P1: there are, I think, traces of a nu being added over the
(already supralinear) eta by P2.
a25 P2 writes ὁμοῦ above ὁμόσε.
a26 ϕοβούμενον Casaubon, τὸ ϕοβερὸν Russell: Casaubon’s emend
ation seems right, in a context dominated by the singular, Russell’s
high-handed. Donini keeps the MSS’ ϕοβουμένους, calling Russell’s
conjecture ‘del tutto superflua e banalizzante’ (not unreasonably).
Presumably he accepts Spengel’s ἀδοξήσουσι, but actually that is a
bigger change than making a surprising plural, ϕοβουμένους, into a
singular.
1230a27 μὴ νομίζειν appears to be written over an original ἀποθανεῖσθαι

in P, quite probably by Nikolaos himself; he missed it out, going straight
to ἀποθανεῖσθαι, then realized his mistake, overwrote it with μὴ
νομίζειν, then followed it with another ἀποθανεῖσθαι. The correction
is messy, with the first theta still intact between μὴ νομίζειν; corrections
by later hands perhaps tend to be neater?
a36 B resumes here, with περὶ ποῖα μὲν οὖν.
a37 P2 writes ἴσως: ἔχει in margin, with insertion mark in text.
a40 πως/πῶς: the accent is neither here nor there, given the record of
these MSS, and ‘not subjected to κόλασις of some sort’ seems to make
perfectly good sense—κόλασις can take different forms. The only advan-
tage of Victorius’ πω would be to explain the πως, were that to be prob-
lematical, since one might say that πω is anyway already implicit in the
perfect participle.
1230b1 ἰατευόμενος C1: the rho is added in, in a lighter ink, over the line
between the tau and the epsilon. Dirlmeier’s defence of the present
ἰατρευόμενος is weak (‘not [even?] being under treatment’?); κόλασις is
not wholly appropriate to the case of the ἀκόλαστος, despite being
embedded in the name (κεκολασμένος πως), so Aristotle brings in
ἰάτρευσις in support. Dirlmeier’s argument that the form ἰατρευμένος
is not found elsewhere is particularly unconvincing: it is perfectly regular,
we do find the active ἰάτρευκα, and there will inevitably be some forms
that are missing from the limited range of Greek literature still extant.
—ὥσπερ ἄτμητος ὁ μὴ τετμημένος: translators—e.g. Kenny in the
Oxford World’s Classics translation and Inwood and Woolf in the
Cambridge translation—are obviously right to translate this as if it
were neuter, the sense being ‘not κεκολασμένος / ἰατρευμένος, just as
if we were talking about cutting’—the cutting being transferred to the
person (i.e. the one not κεκολασμένος), when the real application of
the cutting is to a thing, as the immediate switch in b2–3 to the neuter
shows; the same thing happens in reverse with b4 τὸ ἀκόλαστον, etc.,
which refers to the person (no thing was ever ἀκόλαστον). The refer-
ence of τούτων (καὶ τούτων ὁ μὲν δυνατός . . .) is to the person and the
object of the cutting. See further below on 1230b7–8.
Aristotelica 81
b2 τότε P, i.e. written as P would normally write τότε, with the second
tau over the omicron followed by an acute accent, no epsilon.
b7–8 ἔτι δ’ ἄλλον τρόπον . . . : how many types of ἀκολασία are there
supposed to be? Three, I take it: the main type is illustrated by—but not
restricted to—children (hence the colon printed after παῖδες in b6), the
other two bring those now introduced: (1) those who are hard to ‘cure’,
and (2) those whom it turns out to be impossible to cure. The latter type
may seem to reintroduce the category of the ἀδύνατον (κολάζεσθαι)
that seemed to be excluded by a39–b2, but the difference—I take it—is
that a human being is something πεϕυκὸς δέχεσθαι κόλασιν, even if
some individuals actually turn out not to be curable. (Hence the switch
to the neuter in b2.)
b12–13 διεγράψαμεν . . . μεταϕέρομεν: where exactly did we/Aristotle

do this? It is hard to understand Dirlmeier’s claim that the relevant types,
i.e. those called ἀκόλαστοι κατὰ μεταϕοράν, were ‘schematisch auf-
gezeichnet’ in III.3, 1221a19–22; or is such a reference to them meant to
be hidden in 1221a20 ὑπερβάλλων πᾶσιν ὅσοις ἐνδέχεται? Alter
natively something has been lost—in or around 1221a20, Solomon sug-
gests, reasonably enough; or Aristotle’s memory for once failed him.
—PCB’s ὄνομα seems just possible, but L’s ὀνομάζοντες is preferable.
b13 Susemihl’s δὲ for the MSS’ γὰρ seems required, unless the sort about
to be discussed, the ἀναίσθητοι, are some of the ἄλλοι from whom the
ἀκόλαστοι have just been said to differ (b11), with διεγράψαμεν . . .
μεταϕέρομεν as a parenthetical note interrupting the syntax. But οἱ
ἄλλοι (τῶν ἄλλων, b11) are rather just the general run of mankind.
b14 πρὸς ταύτας τὰς Spengel: unnecessarily: they are the same pleasures,
after all? —Rieckher proposes a lacuna after ἡδονὰς, the case for which
is unclear: if the text as transmitted gives a good sense, as it does here,
there is no point in speculating that it might once have given an even
better one.
b15 Susemihl prints τοιούτους without mentioning that this is a con-

jecture: PCBL all have the dative, as evidently does Marc., to judge by the
fact that Bekker prints it without comment. (Susemihl goes on to
(1230b15) conjecture a lacuna after τοιούτους προσαγορεύουσιν [‘〈,

οἷον **〉’], on which see Dirlmeier: ‘S. hat das Pronomen nicht
verstanden’.)
b16 ἐπι πόλεως B2: B2 writes an epsilon and a ligature for -ως above the
-αιον of ἐπιπόλαιον, thus ‘correcting’ B against an MS like P and C.
b17 πᾶσιν in B is post corr., i.e. from πᾶσαν, the body of the second
alpha being filled in, probably by the original hand.
b19 The first omicron in P’s κωμοδιδάσκαλοι is overwritten with an

omega; there are also traces of an earlier correction over the line.
b31 Both Fritzsche’s and Russell’s supplements represent further

unnecessary filling out of Aristotle’s Greek.
b35 κηλούμενοι P2: an original alpha in P is heavily overwritten with an

eta. —Walzer/Mingay wrongly reports a περὶ for παρὰ in C here.
b36 Editors typically write a full stop after Σειρῆσιν (Walzer/Mingay

even begins a new paragraph), but a comma seems better: ‘such-and-
such and such-and-such would not seem to be ἀκόλαστος, but rather
[the ἀκόλαστος is] περὶ . . . τὰ γευστὰ καὶ ἁπτά’.
b37 τἆλλα θηρία in P is written over something else, most of which was
erased but some of which is still visible—especially a rho between τἆλλα
and θηρία, which other traces beneath τἆλλα suggest may have been
the end of a ἅπερ. My diagnosis is that there was originally a dittography
in P, probably of περὶ ἅπερ, followed immediately by τἄλλα but without
θηρία (i.e. περὶ ἅπερ περὶ ἅπερ τἆλλα), all of which P2 erased and
replaced with περὶ ἅπερ καὶ τἆλλα θηρία from an MS like L; the new ἅ
and περ are separated, perhaps to make up the available space after the
suppression of the second περὶ ἅπερ. Some aspects of the above recon-
struction are admittedly speculative, but it is certain both that there was
erasure and rewriting, and that there is room for no more than one word
after the stray rho after τἆλλα and before the following μόνον. In other
words (I submit), θηρία was originally missing from P as well as
from CB.
Aristotelica 83
b39 αἰσθήσεων looks an attractive alternative to αἰσθητῶν, but we have

been talking about things sensed rather than the senses—or is this per-
haps why αἰσθήσεων got changed to αἰσθητῶν?
1231a8 Fritzsche’s supplement of μὴ before καθ’ αὑτὰς is a necessity,

with καθ’ αὑτὰς δὲ following in a10–11. —αἷς Spengel: since χαίρειν
can be used with an internal acc. of the thing enjoyed, there seems no
pressing need to accept Spengel’s emendation—however much datives
otherwise dominate in the context, and however easy it is to suppose
assimilation of the relative to the preceding -ὰς. —μὴ PCBL, ἢ Fritzsche:
for a copyist who was paying attention, μὴ for ἢ (i.e. ἢ1) might be the
natural thing to write once the preceding μὴ had been left out.
a9 Marc. has ἑτέρου for ἑτέραν, which is endorsed by Fritzsche. Now the
general policy of the present edition is only to cite derivative MSS where
there is a problem (i.e. in the primary MSS) and they have something that
helps or might help solve it; here there is no problem, and Fritzsche’s endorse-
ment of ἑτέρου dates from a time when the status of Marc. was unknown, as
does his endorsement—following Bekker and Bussemaker—of Marc.’ s surely
erroneous οἷαι for οἷον before αἱ in the next line. This might suggest a cer-
tain inconsistency: I cite more recent conjectures, so why not alternative
readings in later MSS that may themselves have been conjectures rather than
simple errors? My reply is that by and large the copyists were just that, copy-
ists, not editors, and that it is therefore reasonable—by and large—to begin
by assuming that variations in the lesser MSS are mistakes, and to call such
MSS in aid only where their primary counterparts let us down.
a11 The ἀν- of ἀνθῶν is a later correction in L, being heavily written

over something else (heavily enough to obscure it completely).
a12 τὰ Casaubon for τὰς (bis): but ὀσμάς can readily be understood
from ὄζειν. —ἐπεὶ καὶ: ‘Although in fact . . .’ (the comparison with τὰ
θηρία will only take us so far).
a14 ὅσων B2 for ὅσοις B1 (bis): on the first occasion B2 instals the short-
hand for -ων (resembling an extended circumflex, with a twirl at the
end) above the οις; on the second he writes out ων above οις.
1231a16–17 ἀλλὰ τὴν χεῖρα καὶ τὸν ϕάρυγγα γεράνου B: it would per-
haps be too hasty to write off τὴν χεῖρα (sc. μακρὰν) καὶ as an invention
by the B copyist (or a predecessor, if there was a chain leading from the
hyparchetype). There evidently was someone called Philoxenus, whose
failings were well enough known to be mentioned not only by Aristophanes
(Wasps 84, Clouds 686, Frogs 934) but by Eupolis (fr. 235). Rackham
in the Loeb translation suggests that he was a comedy character:
‘Mr Hospitable, son of Mistress Belch’ (Dorothea Frede makes the same
suggestion independently, in Aristoteles. Werke, in deutscher Übersetzung,
Band 6: Nikomachische Ethik, Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020, on 1118a32–3:
see below), on which V. Castellani comments:
Although because of his father’s improbable proper name Eruxis (genitive

Eruxios or Eruxidos), ‘Belch’, it was not unreasonable for . . . Rackham to
pronounce the gourmand ‘. . . a character of comedy, though later writers
speak of him as a real person’, evidence for an historical Philoxenos whom
not only Aristophanes . . . but also . . . Eupolis mentioned suggests that we
have not a complete fiction but a caricature. Part of the joke Aristotle
repeats for us seems to lie in an invented (?) name Eruxis (whom—or,
rather, which—the Frogs makes Philoxenos’ son); but part, I believe, also
depends upon a lost comic scene in which Philoxenos must have uttered
his grotesque and unforgettable prayer. (There is no non-comic evidence
that any person named ‘Eruxis’ ever existed; four men named ‘Eruxias’,
three of them Athenian, are attested.)
(V. Castellani, ‘Drama and Aristotle’, in J. Redmond (ed.),
Drama and Philosophy (= Themes of Drama, vol. 12),
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990: 35 n. 10)
If this is right, then it is not impossible that B’s version fills out the one we
find in the other MSS—and also, in slightly different form, in NE, which in
Bywater’s text reads ‘This is why a certain gourmandizer (τις ὀψόϕαγος
ὢν) actually prayed for a throat longer than a crane’s’ (NE III.10, 1118a32–3).
Interestingly, Philoxenus turns up in the MSS of NE too, after the τις in
1118a32, though Bywater omits it from the text itself, commenting ‘post τις
add. ϕιλόξενος ὁ ἐρύξιος KbΓ ’. Bekker’s NE apparatus suggests a much
more complicated story with the MSS, which indicates that Philoxenus was
a part of the NE tradition as well as that of EE (there is little evidence of
Aristotelica 85
cross-contamination between the two Ethics, outside their shared interest,

whatever that might have been, in the books we usually refer to as NE V–
VII). But since the name fits so badly after τις in NE, it must surely have
originated as a gloss, written by someone who could independently connect
the saying with its author, who by this stage is known only—if Castellani is
right—from his caricature. (My—highly speculative—hypothesis is that B’s
version, ‘. . . gourmands do not wish for a long tongue, but rather for a long
arm and the gullet of a crane’ is a fuller version of the original ‘grotesque
prayer’, one which might just have originated with Aristotle himself. But the
evidence of P, C, and L is probably against it.)
a17 ἐξύριδος B1: B2 inserts three dots in an inverted triangle over the
upsilon, indicating the need for correction: to what?
a25 ὅσα μὴ: P2 writes οἱ μὲν in the margin, apparently to be read after
ὅσα (or perhaps for μὴ?), to match the ensuing οἱ δ’ (an ingenious but
impossible way of construing the sentence). Walzer/Mingay’s position-
ing of the ensuing colon after ἀκρατεῖς instead of after ἐγκρατεῖς may
be a simple mistake; perhaps not, because it gives a kind of sense, but
putting it after ἐγκρατεῖς plainly works better.
a28–b2 ἀναίσθητος μὲν οὖν . . . προσαγορευομένη desunt in B: another
significant gap in B, though much shorter than the last, again for no
immediately obvious reason, although on this occasion we would have
missed the omitted section insofar as it sums up the treatment of
σωϕροσύνη and its opposing κακίαι. On the other hand, the sentence
with which B resumes fits perfectly with the one after which it breaks
off, and that presumably has something to do with the omission.
a33 We might have expected ἢ λυπεῖσθαι as in the next line but one
(or οὐδὲ?), but καὶ works if the two items are just being lumped together
as features of ἀκολασία.
1231b2 B resumes at this point, i.e. with ἀκριβέστερον δὲ.
b7 πώς: for the record, PCBL all have πῶς, which is how they write my πώς.
b10 P2 writes δουλογνώμωνα above the line over ἀνδραπωδώδη: a
gloss, not a correction? —We should not give up too easily on the MSS’
ἀνόητον, given that there is no systematic correspondence between
Book III and the list of πάθη that we actually have in Book II: so for
(1231b10) example ἀναλγησία has appeared at 1231a34 in a different

role from the one it had at 1220b38 and 1221a16, i.e. as the deficiency
corresponding to the excess labelled ὀργιλότης. If we were looking for a
substitute for ἀνάλγητον, it might be hard to resist Russell’s ἀόργητον
(which is perhaps what Rackham intended, instead of the ἀνόργητον he
prints here, having substituted ἀοργησία for ἀναλγησία in Book II: in
any case ἀνόργητος barely exists; one supposes Russell was merely
correcting Rackham). But after ἀνδραποδώδη either ἀνάλγητον or
ἀόργητον would look tame: Aristotle is already thinking about people
who easily put up with being kicked around, as the sequel shows (σχεδὸν
γὰρ ταῦτα μάλιστα καλοῦσι τοὺς . . . προπηλακιζομένους εὐχερῶς).
In which case ἀνόητον is not a bad fit; Dirlmeier is right to compare the
use of ἠλίθιος in the same context in NE (IV.5, 1126a4–5).
b13–14 B2’s modifications to the sequence τῷ . . . τὸ, τῷ . . . τὸ, τῷ . . . τὸ

seem unsystematic and anyway pointless.
b22 ἕξεις is corrected to ἕξις in B with an iota above the ligature for ει.
b39 χρημαστικήν B1: B2 writes in τι above the αστ.
1232a4 PCL’s ὑποδήματα—Walzer/Mingay makes unnecessarily heavy

weather of its report of PC here—is clearly wrong; B’s ὑποδήματι is all
that is needed (and would have been palaeographically quite respectable
as an emendation, unlike either of Robinson’s; Rackham’s supplement
of ᾗ (on which Robinson builds; but why the dative ὑποδήματι after
ᾗ in his versions?) merely spells out what is to be understood in
any case).
a12 In C there is a sign, ∞, in the margin opposite the line ending

. . . ϕειδωλὸς2, and beginning with a11 ἧττον, which seems to indicate a
curiosity/something needing attention—perhaps what PCB read as *κίβιξ.
a13 Bekker writes ἐν τῷ ὁτιοῦν προσίεσθαι for the MSS’ ἐν τῷ ὁτιοῦν

προΐεσθαι without comment, and perhaps it does not need one.
a20 Β2 writes αἴτι above εὔδι. The curious formation εὔδιον comes
close to confirming Bonitz’s highly plausible ἴδιον. How did it arise?
Was there perhaps an ἀΐδιον in ω (the common source of PCBL)?
Aristotelica 87
a21 Neither Fritzsche’s nor Ross’s supplement appears necessary, since

κατὰ τὴν γειτνίασιν κτλ can be taken with λανθάνει.
a22 ταὐτὸ: only C has the crasis mark; also in a25 (ταὐτὰ).
a24 ἐλευθερίῳ Ambr.2: the first two letters of ἀνελευθερίῳ are marked
with dots for deletion. Here as elsewhere Susemihl attributes a correc-
tion to Ald. that Ald., at least ultimately, derives from Ambr., a manu-
script evidently unavailable to Susemihl.
a24–5 P makes something of a mess of καὶ ὁ (if that is what he is writing).
a25 P2 writes what looks like ἴ[σως]: γείτονες in the margin with no
insertion marks; the ἴσως shows that γείτονες is meant as a conjecture
for ὅμοροι.
a27 ὁ μὲν ὧδε ὅδ’ ὧδε B2: writing ὅδ’ above the line between the
two ὧδεs.
a31 ἔτι Spengel: ὅτε PCBL; ὅτι ci. Susemihl; †ὅτε† et lacunam pos.
Russell. ὅτε will not work, and ὅτι is scarcely better, even if it can some-
times mean ‘because’; that (μεγαλοψυχία) πάσαις ταῖς ἀρεταῖς
ἀκολουθεῖν ϕαίνεται is hardly a reason for the apparent similarity just
mentioned. There being no grounds to suspect a lacuna (Russell) apart
from the bad fit of the MSS’ ὅτε, I see no alternative to Spengel’s ἔτι, to
which surely no one would have raised any objection had it been in the
tures δοκεῖ, 〈διὰ κοινόν τι〉 ὅ τε 〈κριτικόν ἐστι〉 καὶ, in which she is
tradition. (Mingay takes up Russell’s suggestion of a lacuna and conjec-
influenced by the following καὶ γὰρ, supposing that it needs to be pre-

ceded by some prior mention of a ‘power of discrimination’, i.e. κρῖναι;
but this is perhaps given by a30 δυνάμεως, which could reasonably be
taken, at least in retrospect, as precisely such a power [what other sort of
power/capacity would Aristotle have in mind?]. Russell is evidently con-
cerned, as perhaps is Mingay, about the unannounced switch of subject
from the μεγαλόψυχος to μεγαλοψυχία, but while this is harsh it
seems tolerable: c.f. e.g. 1233a38–b1, where similar issues arise.)
a34–5 περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα [εἶναι ἡδέα]: the deletion of εἶναι ἡδέα is attrib-
utable to Walzer/Mingay, being a combination of Spengel’s and Richards’s
proposals for remedying the text (Walzer/Mingay punctiliously but
(1232a34–5) unnecessarily prints [εἶναι] [ἡδέα]). Spengel rightly saw

ἡδέα as a doubling up of the following ἡ δὲ, while Richards says ‘εἶναι is
an erroneous repetition of the εἶναι in [the previous line]’; both things
are surely true. If Spengel meant to keep εἶναι, it is not clear what he
thought its function was, and ἡδέα as retained by Richards is either
redundant or actually out of place. (Simpson’s εἰ καὶ ἡδέα for εἶναι ἡδέα
is ingenious, but his paraphrase, designed to show how the pleasantness
of things could be relevant here, mainly serves to show that it is not.)
a37 καὶ ἡ ἀρετή is perhaps prima facie disturbing both because the main
subject of the sentence is ἡ περὶ ἕκαστον ἀρετὴ, and because αὐτῇ in the
following clause has to refer back to the special ἀρετή of μεγαλοψυχία,
something that is already difficult enough—though quite possible—after
ἡ περὶ ἕκαστον ἀρετὴ; it may also look redundant, given that ἀρετή is
already doing the judging. So perhaps Spengel is right to bracket it.
On the other hand Aristotle presumably adds ἅπερ ὁ ϕρόνιμος ἂν
κελεύσειε in order to avoid the appearance of saying that the ethical
ἀρεταί themselves do the intellectual work; might he not then have
added καὶ ἡ ἀρετή to remind us that of course ἀρετή itself is co-involved
with the operation of ϕρόνησις?
1232b1 τὰ παρὰ τὸν λόγον μεγάλα are ‘things irrationally deemed

great’ (Kenny), not ones ‘so great that reason forbids your facing them’
(Richards), which would not fit the cases that follow that of ἀνδρεία,
i.e. those of the σώϕρων and the ἐλευθέριος.
b2 μέγα γὰρ οἴεσθαι εἶναι scripsi, μέγα γὰρ οἴεται εἶναι PCBL: the
text as it stands must be corrupt, insofar as μέγα γὰρ οἴεται εἶναι τῶν
〈being afraid in the face of big dangers big〉—big among the things that
αἰσχρῶν would have to be understood as ‘for (the ἀνδρεῖος) does think
are shameful’, which is surely too much of a stretch even for ΕΕ. Jackson’s
solution is palaeographically apt, but the repetition οἴεσθαι/οἴεται looks
limp. My suggested μέγα γὰρ οἴεσθαι εἶναι τῶν αἰσχρῶν accepts the
spirit of Jackson’s emendation while (a) perhaps explaining better how
the corruption might have occurred, and (b) matching the shorthand
evident in the following πλῆθος οὐ πᾶν ϕοβερόν: ‘[the ἀνδρεῖος thinks
(a supplement justified by the fact that we are talking about attitudes)]
Aristotelica 89
too extreme/too shorthand, Solomon’s μέγα γὰρ 〈ἡγεῖσθαι〉 οἴεται εἶναι

thinking [facing dangers] a big thing is something shameful’. If this is
would be a fair alternative; Richards’s μέγα γάρ 〈τι ϕοβεῖσθαι〉 οἴεται

εἶναι looks like a shot in the dark. Dirlmeier’s τὸ αἰσχρὸν for τῶν αἰσχρῶν
offers a different, and blander, kind of solution: ‘als «gross» sieht (d)er
(Tapfere) nur das Minderwertige an’—a solution that moreover seems to
start from a misunderstanding of Jackson’s ‘for it (sc. bravery) considers
it disgraceful to hold them great’ (‘versteht also [comments Dirlmeier]
τῶν αἰσχρῶν als Neutrum. Und soweit wenigstens hat er recht’, but
Jackson is surely, and rightly, treating τῶν αἰσχρῶν as a partitive geni-
tive). On my proposal, καὶ πλῆθος οὐ πᾶν ϕοβερόν explains or expands
on μέγα γὰρ οἴεσθαι εἶναι τῶν αἰσχρῶν in the context of ἀνδρεία.
b6 It seems useful to follow Jackson in writing ὅ τι for ὅτι (which is

in all of PCBL, pace Walzer/Mingay), just to make clear that it is
‘what(ever)’.
b9 κατεψηϕισμένος gives the right sense: having been condemned by

the judges, Antiphon compliments Agathon for praising his defence speech.
(Marc. has κατεψηϕισμένως as a descendant of L, and is not a separate
witness to that reading, as Walzer/Mingay’s report might suggest.)
b10 εἶναι: sc. δοκεῖ, understood from b4; Aristotle is continuing his
account of the endoxa.
b11–12 πλούτου πὲρι σπουδάζειν C, πλούτου σπουδάζειν B: it may well
be that the accent on περι in C has drifted from the iota; if anastrophe is
intended, then the sentence in C would have the same shape as in B. C
surely had the ὧν in front of him, since P writes it (and they are working
from the same exemplar); B’s source may or may not have had περὶ
ὧν—probably it did, and B just misses it, perhaps because he is
misconstruing the sentence.
b12 ϕροντίζειν: again sc. δοκεῖ. Against Casaubon’s ϕροντίζει see the
following note.
b13 λυπεῖσθαι τ’ ἂν scripsi: PCB’s future indicative with ἂν being

impossible, and L’s λυπηθήσαι τ’ ἂν even more so, Richards’s λυπηθήσεται
looks a reasonable bet. But why the future, and why the ἄν, in all of
(1232b13) PCBL? It should rather be an optative, which would make per-

fectly good sense, and Richards agrees, preferring his other suggestion,
λυποῖτ’ ἂν. This is the best solution on offer with the optative: λυπηθήσοιτ’
ἂν, which Bekker may have got from Oxon., is according to Goodwin,
Syntax of the Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb (London: Macmillan,
1889): §203 impossible (‘. . . the future optative . . . was never used with
ἄν’, a conclusion I have no [other] evidence for rejecting); and
λυπηθήσαιτ’ ἂν and λυπήσαιτ’ ἂν, recorded by Susemihl as occurring
among the deteriores, seem scarcely more helpful. But we need the infini-
tive, in view of (a) the preceding ϕροντίζειν, (b) the following χαίρειν
(in L), and (c) the theta that is another common factor in the readings in
the primary MSS, so λυπεῖσθαι ἂν instead of λυποῖτ’ ἂν; but we should
also accommodate the tau, another common factor, which we can do by
keeping L’s τ’, which gives us ‘and [so the endoxon continues] he would
both be pained if . . . and be pleased when. . .’.
b17 In bracketing the καὶ Susemihl is following what I call ‘Lat.’, the late
Latin translation from the Aldine; so too with his δὴ for δὲ in the next
sentence. Rackham’s proposal starts from Susemihl’s, is more elegant
Greek but is even less necessary; ‘contemptuous of the many and of rep-
utation’ works quite as well in Greek as it does in English.
b22 τιμία Solomon, τιμίαν PCBL: τιμή is so firmly established as sub-
ject that we would surely expect a nominative, despite Richards’s no
doubt correct claim that the rule for such noun clauses is not always
observed. As for his own conjecture, the argument that it is ‘strange’ for
τιμή itself to be called τιμία is unconvincing, since anyone can per-
fectly well be honoured without their being worthy of it. That is surely
Aristotle’s point: τιμή will only be τιμία if there is a basis for it (if it is
‘bestowed for honourable reasons’, in Inwood and Woolf ’s helpfully free
rendering of τιμία(ν) in the Cambridge translation), and he goes on
immediately to say what constitutes such a basis.
b25 ἑκάστη1 secl. Russell: if we lost ἑκάστη, with ἑκάστη αὐτῶν in the
next clause we would scarcely miss it; but the doubling of ἑκάστη puts
the emphasis exactly where it needs to be (we might have expected
greatness to be associated with an ἀρετή that has μέγα in its name, but
actually it is associated with each and every one).
Aristotelica 91
b27 ὥσπερ: Walzer/Mingay prints ὥστε, following the Latin translation

(quare), but that is itself evidently either a slip or a deliberate conjecture
on the part of the translator.
b29 Editors print PCL’s τὰ δ’ ὡς διωρίσθη πρότερον, but this is dis-

tinctly odd, if the reference is to b17ff., i.e. to a passage that does not
‘classify’ (Kenny, Oxford World’s Classics) goods that are other than
τίμια, but rather just explains why some that might appear τίμια are
actually not. Nor is there any other discussion of τίμια in relation to
other goods that would fit the bill, either in the undisputed Eudemian
books or in the ‘common’ books (MM 1183b20–1 has a division of
goods that starts with τίμια, but that would hardly help here). But
there is also a larger problem. If πρότερον does refer to b17ff., then the
ἀγαθὰ that are τίμια will be ὅσα μεγάλα ἀληθῶς ἐστίν (b23–4); but
Aristotle is about to say (b29–30) that only some τῶν τοιούτων . . .
ἀγαθῶν, i.e. presumably, of those being said now to be τίμια (ἐστὶν
ἔνια τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν τίμια, b28–9), are μεγάλα κατ’ ἀλήθειαν—
i.e. only some of those ὅσα μεγάλα ἀληθῶς ἐστίν are μεγάλα κατ’
ἀλήθειαν. Since this is plainly nonsense, τίμια here in b29 must refer,
not to the goods Aristotle himself has just said to be such, but rather to
the ones people generally value, which is after all where we started in
b11–17. Aristotle is retracing his steps: some goods are τίμια, but only
some of these are truly so, because they have the right μέγεθος. In
short, ὡς διωρίσθη πρότερον is intrusive, despite the fact that
Aristotle is actually going back to something he said before (only not a
διορισμός). The division Aristotle is introducing now, in b28–9, is pre-
cisely not the one he has just made (so not Solomon’s τὰ δ’ οὔ, ὡς
διωρίσθη πρότερον, combining B with PCL, as it turns out)—
although a reader might easily have supposed it to be: ὡς διωρίσθη
πρότερον, I propose, originated as a gloss, starting from b18 διορίσαντας,
that somehow found its way into all of P, C, and L but not into B. That B
has οὔ in place of PCL’s ὡς διωρίσθη πρότερον could be down to the
initiative of the copyist (abridging, maybe, as he sometimes seems to do:
see e.g. b11–12), but the difficulties involved in defending the three
offending words are so great that even if he was here acting on his own,
he was right.
1232b39 All the emendations listed are unpersuasive; none does any
more than spell out the sort of thing we would need to supply in any
case to make sense of the transmitted text.
1233a3 οἷον ἀξιοῖ ἑαυτόν Spengel: according to Susemihl, Spengel only
changed ἀξιοῖ to ἀξιοῦν. As Richards says, he should have changed οἷος
to οἷον too, and it seems doubly (or triply) charitable to include that as
part of Spengel’s proposal, given both that it is unclear whether Richards
knew independently what Spengel proposed and that I myself have been
unable to check; the mistake may lie in Susemihl’s reporting.
a6–7 τῷ μεγαλοψύχῳ Fritzsche: but why not ‘and this is how we define
the μεγαλόψυχος [a regular Aristotelian usage of ἀποδίδοναι: ‘syn.
ὁρίζειν’, Bonitz, Index 80a54], and not in relation to what is useful’?
a9 περὶ Ross, with an eye to a11–12 ἡ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἄξιον ὄντα . . . ; but as
Walzer/Mingay points out, 1222a23–4 gives direct and relevant parallels
for ἐπὶ here.
a12 μικρόψυχος Fritzsche: but the following immediate change of con-
struction is not untypical of EE.
a13 B simplifies—perhaps because puzzled by ὑπαρχόντων δι’ ἃ δικαίως
ἂν ἠξιοῦντο?
a19 μεγάλῳ2 (μεγάλω) L1: nu is added between words by L2. —μικρὸν
B1: B2 writes ῶ above the omicron.
a20 P2 supplies μικρῶν from the margin (with insertion marks there
and in the text), but the supplement—pace Spengel, who proposed it
independently—is not needed, given that μικρῶν must in any case be
understood.
a20–1 Susemihl prints οὔτε τῷ μὴ μεμπτὸς εἶναι without comment;
Walzer/Mingay, omitting the μὴ, then attributes it to ‘codd.’, but it is not
in any of PCBL, or Bekker, nor do we need it. The sequence οὔτε . . . καὶ
(a21) would apparently be unparalleled in prose (see Denniston 505);
the solution attributed to Robinson by Walzer/Mingay should probably
read τῷ οὐδὲ, which might be right but is less economical than Spengel’s
and has no clear compensating advantages.
a25 P2 writes οὐκ ἀξιοῖ ἑαυτόν in the margin with an insertion mark
there corresponding to one before ἀξιοῖ; we need the negative but not
Aristotelica 93
ἑαυτόν. —εἴποι/ἐποίει: Susemihl prints ἐποίει because of Lat. faceret,

and Walzer/Mingay follows suit. But the Latin translator writes what he
does simply because he expects an imperfect indicative to match the fol-
lowing ἦν; that a correcting hand in Laur. 81,4 has the same idea does
not lend it any more authority. Since εἴποι fits, and it is in all of PCBL,
we should keep it.
a26 Having preferred P(CB)’s εἰ over L’s ἢ (which he attributes to
Marc.), Susemihl then has to follow Marc. in omitting the following
ἂν, but immediately runs into problems with the corresponding ἢ
only seven words further on; that then forces him into positing a lacuna
before it. With ἢ here (i.e. ἢ1) all is in order; difficulties only arise if like
Susemihl—and the others whose solutions to the mess then made of the
rest of the sentence he reports—we refuse L’s gift of the first ἢ.
a27 P2 writes ἂν είη in margin, with insertion marks there and in text.
Τhis ‘P2’ is a different hand from, and apparently earlier than, the one
that made the necessary supplement of οὐκ in a26.
a29 C has μέγα twice, at the end of a line and then at the beginning of
the next; either he or another hand marks the first with dots for deletion.
a38 ἔχουσι Casaubon (according to Susemihl): to emend in this way is
merely to cleanse the text of an irregularity that is too common to be
accidental, i.e. an unexpected change of subject from the ἕξις to its pos-
sessors: for a similar irregularity/looseness of construction see the next
sentence (οἷον εἰ εἰς γάμον δαπανῶν τις . . .).
1233b4 Unless the form ἀγαθοδαιμονισταί is found elsewhere (and for
what it is worth, LSJ only cites the present passage), it seems reasonable
to keep ἀγαθοδαιμονιαστὰς, with Bekker, given that this form is appar-
ently attested—in a Rhodian inscription = IG 12 (1).161. The L copyist
draws attention to it by writing it out in the margin, in the nominative,
perhaps as a curiosity?
first line on the page). —Kenny attaches his δεῖ δὲ πρέπον 〈καθ’
b8 P2 writes παρὰ above περὶ (which happens to be the first word of the
ἕκαστον〉 εἶναι to the second of Jackson’s conjectures for the reconstruc-

tion of what follows (i.e. καὶ γὰρ τοῦ πράττοντος κατ’ ἀξίαν καὶ περὶ
ὃν, b8–9).
1233b8–9 καὶ γὰρ τὸ πρέπον κατ’ ἀξίαν καὶ 〈τὸ κατ’ ἀξίαν〉 πρέπον
scripsi: καὶ γὰρ τὰ πρέποντα κατ’ ἀξίαν καὶ 〈τὸ κατ’ ἀξίαν〉 πρέπον
P2. P2’s solution has Aristotle pausing to confirm, for the sake of preci-
sion, that the relation between τὸ πρέπον and τὸ κατ’ ἀξίαν is two-way
(καὶ . . . καὶ = ‘both . . . and’; similarly with the following two καὶs, i.e. b9
καὶ περὶ ὃ and b11 καὶ αὐτῷ [the agent]). The only real alternatives,
given the difficulty of choosing between all the other proposals, each in
its way as speculative as the next (nor have I listed all those available: e.g.
there is another by Donini, based on Dirlmeier’s), are either to mark a
lacuna with Fritzsche and Susemihl, or to obelize with Walzer/Mingay;
but the economy of P2’s proposal—overwriting what was surely τοῦ
with τὰ, and inserting τὸ κατ’ ἀξίαν above the line, this being still the
top line on the page, with an insertion mark after καὶ—seems to me to
make it plainly preferable to throwing up our hands in desperation.
However in the course of mounting a defence of P2 I have in effect thrown
doubt on his τὰ πρέποντα, insofar as on my reckoning, and I imagine on
his, καὶ . . . τὰ πρέποντα κατ’ ἀξίαν will be picking up b7 τὸ πρέπον κατ’
ἀξίαν ἐστίν; why then the shift to the plural, τὰ πρέποντα? Answer:
because of that final tau, which (written above the nu) constitutes the
whole of the ending of πρέποντος as written in P and C, and as it might
well have been written in the MSS being copied by B and L too, the geni-
tive being understood from the preceding τοῦ: in other words, the dis-
tance between τοῦ πρέποντος, τὰ πρέποντα, and τὸ πρέπον is not as
great as it may seem. A number of the solutions proposed to the problems
of this sentence build on that genitive (making τοῦ πρέποντος into τοῦ
πράττοντος), but I suggest that, given the general attractiveness of P2’s
reconstruction, it will make it even more attractive to suppose that the
genitive and the tau of πρέποντ were the consequence of someone’s try-
ing to make sense of the sentence once τὸ κατ’ ἀξίαν had fallen out (τὸ,
perhaps, going first). τοῦ πράττοντος in any case looks like a false start
for any reconstruction, since the reference to the agent is already well
embedded, in the shape of b11 καὶ αὐτῷ (in the same sentence: Kenny, in
the Oxford World’s Classics translation, partially disguises the problem by
putting a full stop before καὶ αὐτῷ, and continuing ‘Moreover, it must be
appropriate . . . for the agent himself ’, even though in his reconstruction
‘. . . must be appropriate to the agent’ was already in b8–9).
Aristotelica 95
b12 ᾤοντο for ᾤετο: Spengel’s alternative and less attractive sugges-
tion is that the name of a comic writer has fallen out after ᾤετο; the
singular on its own certainly looks intolerable—as it evidently appeared
to B2, who makes Θεμιστοκλεῖ into a nominative, writing ῆς above
the εῖ. Was such an error the original cause of the preceding singu-
lar ᾤετο?
b14 ἔχει scripsi, ἔχων PCBL: I propose that ἔχει was readily corrupted
after ἔτυχεν, making nonsense of the following relative pronoun. See
next note. —ὃ] ?ἢ P2: Susemihl, followed by Walzer/Mingay, reports P as
reading ἃ, but there is beyond doubt a correction here, one that involves a
change of breathing from rough to smooth, and what is written in below
the new breathing is not an alpha. What can just be made out is more like
the squat H-shape that etas in these MSS can have, though ἢ barely makes
sense as a correction. What was underneath it was no doubt ὃ, in line with
CBL, and the corrector seems to have had the same sort of problem with ὃ
as Fritzsche, who solves it by excision, evidently following the Latin trans-
lation. But ὃ does make sense if we read ἔχει for ἔχων just before (see
preceding note: Walzer/Mingay keeps both ὃ and ἔχων, but I think the
intention must have been to bracket ὃ). I understand ‘And another sort/
person has a random attitude to worth, which none of the ones mentioned
does’, which also fits well with the following καὶ ἐπ’ ἐλευθεριότητος
ὡσαύτως κτλ.
b15 ὡς αὕτως B: ὡς ends one line, αὕτως begins the next.
b15–16 Casaubon’s reconstruction is surely right. How the first οὔτ’

became ὡς is anybody’s guess, but the corruption of οὔτ’ ἀν- to ὄταν
would be easy enough.
b19 It might seem more likely that παθηματικαί would be reduced to

παθητικαί than that παθητικαί would be expanded to παθηματικαί,
but the latter is evidently as uncommon a formation as παθητικαί is
common, especially in Aristotle.
b20 Fritzsche’s bracketing of γὰρ entails the suppression of b21 ἐστι;

when added to his ϕθονερὸς τῷ for ϕθόνος τὸ, the sum is an extrava-
gantly unnecessary intervention.
1233b22 ‘ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ corrupta’, Susemihl, and it is hard to disagree with

him. Donini retains ἐπὶ τὸ, translating ‘. . . del malevolo, che si volge agli
stessi oggetti’, and interpreting these same objects as good and bad for-
tune. But τὸ αὐτὸ is singular, and on the face of it it would have to refer
back to good fortune alone, or to those deservedly enjoying it (b21). The
ligature for στ makes ἐστι, if it is written out in full, easily corruptible
into ἐπί (and vice versa); once the corruption had taken place in this
case, a τὸ might easily find its way in. (So Spengel’s emendation should
perhaps strictly be recorded as ἐστὶ [τὸ] αὐτὸ.)
b23 ὁ χαίρων Richards, for ἐπὶ τῷ χαίρειν: with a comma preceding.
—κακοπραξίαις B: B2 adds a gamma above the xi.
b24 μεσητικὸς B1: B2 adds a supralinear νε before the με.
b27 θεὸν in Laur. 81,4 is changed by another hand to θεῶν—a reading
that might deserve a second glance, though the normal, if not universal,
use of an abbreviation for θεός would complicate any explanation of how
the corruption might have come about.
b32 ἅπασιν P2: P2 writes sigma over what was ντα, as in C, then iota
+ nu extending into margin; Bessarion removes the redundant (final)
nu. We could read ἅπασι, but there is no overwhelming case for it;
ἅπαντα, which was presumably in ω, will do perfectly well.
b34 Robinson’s supplement is perhaps on stylistic grounds, after ἅπαντα
. . . ἁπάσας . . . ἅπασαν.
b35 βέλτιστος B1: B2 adds a nu above the final sigma.
b37 ἀκαταϕρονητικὸς P1CBL: P2 has almost but not quite erased an
initial ἀ, adding a καὶ in the margin (Bessarion duly reads καὶ
καταϕρονητικὸς). A lost ἀλλὰ, as supplied by Ambr., would begin to
explain the curious ἀκαταϕρονητικὸς.
b40 The shorthand for -ους and that for -ως are very similar; ἁπλοῦς
must have been in ω, but if Nikolaos, the PC copyist, read it in the same
MS once as ἁπλοῦς and at another time as ἁπλῶς, the B copyist might
easily make the same mistake, especially since ἁπλῶς actually makes
sense. (Actually the sign in C is somewhat ambiguous, as perhaps is that
in B; and that the B copyist does not write out the ending, as he more
usually does, may signify doubt on his part.)
Aristotelica 97
1234a9 ἀλλ’ 〈ἢ〉 is attributed to Casaubon by Richards, to Richards by

Walzer/Mingay, and to Rackham by himself and by Dirlmeier; at least
Rackham and Dirlmeier must be wrong (for Casaubon I usually rely on
Susemihl, as does Walzer/Mingay; if Richards’s attribution is right, it is
surprising that Susemihl does not mention Casaubon’s supplement).
a11 τὰ δὲ μὴ καὶ PL: the καὶ is squeezed in between μή and the follow-
ing κατὰ in L, apparently by the original hand and after μὴ κατὰ had
already been written.
a13 ?μέν B: if this indeed intended to be μέν, it would be surprising (in

this position, especially with the acute accent). B will have been copying
a supralinear eta: the eta and accent appear in P and C, and no doubt in
other MSS in their tradition, above the mu, and the eta in C is quite
flamboyant, that in P even more so; perhaps, copying such an eta, and
unsure quite what it is, B ends up with what looks all too like what he
uses for -εν (with acute accent).
a15 εὐτραπελείας P (also Bessarion): the same copyist, Nikolaos, in C,

copying from the same original, shortens to εὐτραπε, with lambda plus /
above the πε; he may have intended εὐτραπελείας in C too.
a16 τοιονδί L post corr.: the iota is written heavily over something else,
presumably an epsilon.
a17 σκῶμμα: a later hand writes σῶμα opposite in the margin in P.
a18 ἀμϕότεραι/ἀμϕότεροι: B writes ἀμϕοτερ, with the tau plus ligature

for ερ above the omicron, where the accent should be, while PC have a
typical ἀμϕότερ with οι above the rho; the result, for B, if not the inten-
tion, is to leave the ending open between masculine and feminine. Β’s
behaviour here mimics that of (MSS like) P and C, which frequently
leave the endings of words to be understood; his treatment of
ἐναντίον—ἐναν, with tau + dots indicating an iota followed by an
accent floating over the αν—in b12 below is another example. The phe-
nomenon sometimes occurs at the end of a line, but as the examples
here in a18 and in b12 show, not always. Not infrequently B just prefers
not to spell things out as he normally does, in my view typically when he
is uncertain: according to the convention he is mimicking we should
(1234a18) here anyway read his ἀμϕοτερ as ἀμϕότεραι, that being the
only possible right ending, but I think it quite likely that α´ itself had
ἀμϕότεροι, which would explain both what we find in PC and the B
copyist’s ambivalence (if that is what it is).
a22 τεχθὲν B1, λεχθὲν B2: the word being split between two lines, the
first part is written as τε at the end of the first, with a lambda later added
over the tau.
a26 A definite article before ἐναντίαι κακίαι, as supplied by Ambr.
(actually added in the margin, after οὐδὲ at the end of the line: possibly
by a second hand), would surely be intrusive: οὐδ’ ἐναντίαι κακίαι =
‘nor are there opposing κακίαι/κακίαι ἐναντίαι to them’. Kenny trans-
lates, with the article, ‘and their opposites are not vices either’: this might
perhaps be idiomatic Greek, with attraction from neuter to feminine
plural before κακίαι, but it looks unnecessarily difficult—especially when
it also involves an emendation. (The issues here are somewhat reminis-
cent of those in the first sentence of Book III.)
a30–1 ϕύσει καὶ Spengel: Spengel also suggested ϕυσικὴ καὶ.
a33 δ’ suppl. Ross, καὶ ante ἡ Rackham: some sort of connective is needed,
and Rackham’s suggestion seems at first sight preferable, given the ease
with which καὶ and ἡ as written in some hands could be mistaken for
each other (so: haplography?). On the other hand, one might expect a δέ
answering a31 μέν, and ϕθόνος and νέμεσις in a way—the one paired
with injustice, the other with justice—go together, leaving αἰδὼς, as paired
with σωϕροσύνη, as a contrasting case. The next δέ, in ὁ δ’ ἀληθὴς καὶ
ψευδὴς . . ., does not seem to fit the bill, i.e. as a counterpart to a31 μέν.
1234b1 ἐν τοῖς ἄκροις C2: ἐν written in above the line with omis-
sion mark.
b5 ᾦσιν Marc.2: an original εἰ is overwritten with ᾦ.
b10 ‘γρ. οἷον ἠλιθιότης τῶν πρὸς τὰ ἡδέα’ P2 in margin, sprawling
down to b16.
b13 As Rackham says, Bonitz should have preferred θράσος to
θάρσος—the former usually indicating rashness, the latter courage; but
that looks enough to allow the reading of PCΒ, as printed, to stand.
Aristotelica 99
b16 περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης ἤδη λέξεται L: that is, the last five words
appear in L alone among our four primary MSS. Editors print λεκτέον
in the text in place of λέξεται: so Bekker, and then e.g. Rackham, helped
by Susemihl’s attribution of λέξεται to the Aldine, which implies that
λεκτέον is in other MSS (but not in P, according to Susemihl: περὶ . . .
λεκτέον, he says, is missing from there). But the Aldine only has λέξεται
because it is a descendant of L, as are all the MSS Susemihl refers to
apart from P, C, and Pal. 165; and λέξεται is missing from the latter
three because they belong to the recensio Messanensis, in which the
whole sentence is missing. Bekker’s λεκτέον is actually found only in
Marc., and thus lacks any authority, being just a regularization of L’s
Greek, in recognition of the plain fact that λέξεται would be a distinctly
odd way for Aristotle himself to announce justice as the next subject: for
after all not only is λεκτέον more Aristotelian, it is not clear that λέξεται
is classical Greek at all (moreover: does ‘[justice] will be spoken about’
not sound like a gloss?). But that then throws further doubt on the
authenticity of the whole sentence that contains it, given (a) that the
sentence, i.e. περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης ἤδη λέξεται, is absent from PCB,
(b) that the first sentence of the book that follows in L and is announced
in PC itself begins with the δέ we expect after 1234b13 μέν, and (c) that
this first sentence itself, like the last sentence of Book III, begins περὶ δὲ
δικαιοσύνης, and so looks like a doublet rather than a continuation.
I conclude that περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης ἤδη λέξεται must have been a
later addition/gloss, dating perhaps from a moment when the sequence
of books in EE was less secure than it appears from P, C, and L. So there
is no formal announcement in EE III of a following book on justice. This
gives added significance to the fact that B, which in general evidently
belongs to the same recensio as P and C, nevertheless unlike them, and
unlike L, labels the following two books—if the second of the two is to
count as a book rather than a fragment of one—as δ-ον and ε-ον: at the
beginning of B’s fourth book B2 writes a flowery Δ-ον, mirroring B1’s δ-ον,
in the margin. Without περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης ἤδη λέξεται, there is then
a smooth transition to the book on friendship in B, which starts its
Book IV/δ´ with περὶ δὲ ϕιλίας, but not so in PCL, which begin their
Book VII with no connective. In other words, B behaves for all the world
as if there is nothing between III and the book on friendship; PC do not
(1234b16) behave like that, and would not even without περὶ δὲ
δικαιοσύνης ἤδη λέξεται and the incipits of ‘IV–VI’, which now appear
in PC between Book III and the beginning of their Book VII. On the
other hand, the transition from an EE VI = NE VII to an EE VII in PC, as
in L (writing out ‘EE IV–VI’ = NE V–VII in full), would be noticeably
smoother than the transition from NE VII (περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐγκρατείας . . .
εἴρηται, . . .· λοιπὸν δὲ καὶ περὶ ϕιλίας ἐροῦμεν) to NE VIII (μετὰ δὲ
ταῦτα περὶ ϕιλίας ἕποιτ’ ἂν διελθεῖν· . . .). Or perhaps smoothness should
not be looked for in the movement between books, when what might
well be uppermost in the author’s, and/or copyists’, minds could be the
need to mark the connection between the end of one physical document
(scroll) and the beginning of another. This is acknowledged, in the pre-
sent text, by having the book end with a colon; a sentence beginning
περὶ μὲν οὖν (περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν, κτλ) cries out for a
corresponding δέ, a cry that will be answered, in different ways, both in
B and in PCL. (Compare the more problematic ‘ending’ of Book VIII/V.)
b16–17 Counting in the title of the next book of EE, which in P shares
the line before ‘EE VII’ begins with the incipit of ‘EE VI’ (in C the new
book title occupies a separate line), there are four ordinals, and P2 (though it
is just possible that Nikolaos was here himself doing the corrections:
‘P2’s’ hand is not so different) certainly changes the last two of the four:
in both cases there has plainly been erasure, and it is beyond reasonable
doubt that P originally had ϛ-ον and ζ-ον, like C and L (actually the ordinals
in L are written α´, etc.). There is no evidence that the first two of the
four ordinals in P have been changed, although they have evidently been
overwritten with a new δ and ε (the ones we see are uniform with the
following ζ and η): the red colouring that originally went with all four
numbers survives with them, whereas it has all but disappeared with the
last two. However there are clear signs of erasure before all the first three
ordinal numbers, and extending under ἠθηκῶν εὐδημίων in each case.
My proposal, as printed in the apparatus to—what I call—1234b16–17,
is that what Nikolaos wrote in P, and what P2 (perhaps Nikolaos himself)
was correcting, was ἠθικῶν νικομαχείων δ-ον: Περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης
καὶ ἀδικίας σκεπτέον, ἠθικῶν νικομαχείων ε-ον, Ἐπείδε τυγχάνομεν
πρότερον εἰρηκότες, and ἠθικῶν νικομαχείων ϛ-ον:- Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα
Aristotelica 101
ἄλλην ποιησαμένους ἀρχήν. The ἠθικῶν εὐδημίων in the fourth

title—without the errant eta for iota in the preceding three titles—is
original, and there is no reason to think that P did not have ἠθικῶν
rather than ἠθηκῶν in the first three cases too (the incipits are surely in
Nikolaos’ hand, as I think at least the original book titles would have
been, although in some other MSS, e.g. L, they were evidently entrusted
to someone else). Then ἠθικῶν . . . is erased, and the erasure extends to
the right, beyond ἠθηκῶν εὐδημίων and before the ordinals, in all three
cases by roughly the length by which νικομαχείων exceeds εὐδημίων.
In other words, I hypothesize that Nikolaos transferred the first three
book headings from NE along with the three incipits, adapting only the
numbering to fit with EE, and he or someone else later changed the book
titles (with ἠθηκῶν for ἠθικῶν, εὐδημίων for νικομαχείων), introdu
cing ζ-ον for ϛ-ον at the same time, together with ηον for ζ-ον in the title of
the new book. Appended to the three incipits in C, apparently by
Nikolaos himself (Harlfinger 1971: 38), is the helpful marginal note
ζήτει ὄπισθεν, i.e. ‘look [for these books] back [in the Nicomachean
Ethics, preceding in the codex]’, and quite possibly that was what he was
doing when he wrote the incipits in both MSS: note the bizarre Ἐπείδε
for Ἐπεὶ δὲ in the second incipit in P, which we find in the opening to NE
VI itself in P—also in the corresponding incipit in Pal. 165, a faithful
descendant of P. (Against this is that P’s NE VII opens, not with μετὰ δὲ
ταῦτα, as in the corresponding incipit here, but μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ; on the
other hand the placing of δὲ in the incipit to EE VI/NE VII is unusual,
and it would not be surprising if when writing the incipit Nikolaos put it
back in the place where it would be expected, after μετὰ.) —The entry
here in the apparatus for ‘1234b16–17’, and for ‘1234b17’ at the begin-
ning of Book VII/IV, is manufactured, insofar as in Bekker b17 (in my
numbering; actually b15–17 in Bekker’s) is just the gap between Books
III and VII, empty apart from a large eta announcing VII itself.
Eudemian Ethics VII/IV
1234b17 (the book heading): so, to follow up on the previous note, the
new book is given two different numbers by PCBL, i.e. VII (PCL) and V
(B), and in the case of PCL two different versions of the same number,
i.e. ζ´ (P1CL) and η´ (P2). The latter represent two different numbering
systems, which is of particular significance for EE: in short, the system
P1CL are using is newer than the other, and in the Aristotelian corpus
used only for the pseudo-Aristotelian Problemata and the EE: see
O. Primavesi, ‘Ein Blick in den Stollen von Skepsis: vier Kapitel zur
frühen Überlieferung des Corpus Aristotelicum’, Philologus 151 (2007):
51–77, esp. 70–3.
b18 B2 writes τίς above πῶς.
b19 Since the subject, ϕιλία, is already in the air, it seems that the
emphasis should fall, with L, on μοναχῶς (i.e. μοναχῶς should precede
λέγεται). In P, the second half of μοναχῶς, together with λέγεται,
seems to be written over something else.
b20 The supplement of εἴδη in the margin of Laur. 81,4—often quite
inaccurate, but with many intelligent corrections by one or more
hands—looks attractive: with πλεοναχῶς twice just before, it is hard to
imagine Bonitz’s/Russell’s ποσαχῶς falling out, despite Walzer/Mingay’s
imprimatur (i.e. of Russell’s version, which presumably suggests the cor-
ruption of χῶς into ἐστίν: by no means impossible, given the shorthand
used in MSS like P and C for ως and ἐστι). This would not be the only
occasion when the copyists of PCBL and/or their predecessors had
problems with εἴδη: see e.g. 1236a17, where it has certainly fallen out in
PCB. Donini is, I think, wrong to suggest that εἴδη can be easily (‘benis-
simo’) understood with πόσα, without needing to be written out, and it
certainly could not be understood in 1236a17; πόσα on its own, in the
Aristotelica 103
context, would be baffling, given that even as it is, with πόσα 〈εἴδη〉,
one has to supply ϕιλίας.
b29 ἅλις ϕίλους ποιῆσαι Jackson: Jackson’s emendation gives what is

plainly the right sense at the least cost. To keep the transmitted text one
would have to take the ἀλλά as introducing a command (see LSJ s.v.
ἀλλά II.2): ‘Well, sc. they say (from b27 δοκεῖ ), just make them into
friends!’, with imperative represented by infinitive in indirect speech; for
ποιέω εἰς, LSJ s.v. ποιέω IV. I would myself not quite rule this out; but a
defence that depends on supposing the presence together of so many
unusual features is hardly compelling; and it is worth noting that the
Byzantine pronunciation of ἅλις and ἀλλ’ εἰς would have been the same
(also: cf. 1238a3 ἁλῶν] ἄλλων P1CB).
b33 The arguments for and against B’s καὶ before τὸν ϕίλον are prob
ably about evenly balanced: it would perhaps be easier for καὶ to drop
out than to find its way in, and it looks attractive enough if taken as
emphatic; on the other hand it is hardly necessary, which counts against
it given EE’s generally economical style (similarly with L’s spelling out of
the εἶναι). So by the rule laid down before, that where two readings are
equally plausible the one found in L plus one representative of the other
recensio is to be favoured, I omit the καὶ.
1235a2 ἑταίρων/ἑτέρων: ἑτέρων would look in place were it on its

own; coming after two specified groups of others, it looks distinctly odd,
and ἑτέρων and ἑταίρων would be easily confused in a context like this
(especially since the Byzantine pronunciation of both would be the
same). Against ἑταίρων, one might say that if συγγενῶν is not to be
redundant, οἰκείων must surely already include one’s ἑταῖροι; but that,
I think, is just the point—συγγενῶν and ἑταίρων spell out the two
main types of οἰκεῖοι in question (hence my commas around ἢ μετὰ
συγγενῶν ἢ μεθ’ ἑταίρων). The real problem is with the following ἢ
τέκνων ἢ γονέων ἢ γυναικός: see next note. —ἢ τέκνων ἢ γονέων ἢ
γυναικός, coming after ἑταίρων (or ἑτέρων, for that matter), looks
misplaced, since it rather glosses συγγενῶν. Βut it would look implausible
even there, since συγγενῶν hardly needs to be explained, at least by
Aristotle. In which case I conclude it is someone else’s gloss that has got
104 Eudemian Ethics VII/IV
(1235a2) into the text but away from what it is glossing (glosses t ypically
hang loose, as it were, in the margin).
a6 Spengel’s παραλαμβάνοντες perhaps fits marginally better than

περιλαμβάνοντες in the context, and παρα and περι have been and will
be confused in these MSS many times over; but περιλαμβάνοντες is
probably to be preferred, especially given 1239b8 συμπεριλαμβανόντων,
which refers back to the present context.
a8 Either the L copyist knew his Homer, or the full line (= Odyssey
17.218) was in his source; that Nikolaos has ἀεὶ in P tends to confirm
that it, or αἰεὶ, was indeed there in ω, the common source. To judge by
the non-metrical ἀεὶ he is treating the preceding ὡς as ‘that’, so that
what is said, for him, begins with ἀεὶ or τὸν ὅμοιον. When writing C, in
effect he takes the process a stage further: since what is in question is
anyway a general rule, ἀεὶ becomes actually redundant—or else he left it
out through simple carelessness. Or perhaps αἰεὶ/ἀεὶ was neither in α´,
since B lacks it, nor in α, and ἀεὶ in P is thanks to Nikolaos’ own mem-
ory of Homer? In any case in Aristotle’s sentence ὡς serves a double
function, both as part of the original quotation (Aristotle certainly knew
his Homer), i.e. as a causal ὡς, and as ‘that’: the following καὶ γὰρ,
which pace Susemihl is not part of the next saying, operates as if the
sentence were perfectly regular, which it would not be with causal ὡς,
and the third saying, Ἔγνω δὲ, conveniently includes a connecting
particle. Here it will do no harm, if the beginnings of quotations are to
be marked at all, to simplify and pretend that the first quotation here
begins with ὡς (which it does, but also does not), but in other cases it is
not so simple.
a9 Walzer/Mingay’s report of περὶ for παρὰ in C here is mistaken.
a10 διακοσμοῦσιν: in C an extra character between the first omicron

and the sigma has been erased.
a12 PCΒL all elide κύνα; another illustration, perhaps, of the absence of
a clear demarcation between cited material and what it is embedded in.
—κεραμίδος: LSJ has ‘[κεραμ]ίς, -ίδος, . . . Ion. and later -ῖδος, Emp. ap.
Arist. EE 1235a12, MM 1208b11’, but PCBL all have κεραμίδος here (as
Aristotelica 105
does another MS of EE I have checked, at random, namely Laur. 81,12);

the circumflex appears to come from Marc. via Bekker, as it does in
MM. (Victorius also inserts it, and Susemihl has it; Walzer/Mingay cor-
rects to κεραμίδος.)
a17 C may (unusually) have an iota subscript under the alpha of ἐρᾷ,
but it is more likely a mark to separate ἐρᾶ and μὲν, which have some-
what merged.
a18 C’s way of writing τοὐναντίον, with the ligature for ου plus crasis
mark above the tau, then ναντίον after a small gap, helps to explain the
origin of the error in PCB, i.e. reading the first three letters of τοὐναντίον
as τοῦ. In P the ἐκ is mostly erased and—apparently—replaced by the
ligature for ει plus lunate sigma (so εἰς τοὐναντίον P2, ον for ου being
left to be understood); B2 goes the other way, regularizing the anomal
ous ἐκ + accusative with a ligature for ου above the already supralinear
ον of τοὐναντίον.
a19 Between κοτεέι and the sign for καὶ in C there is an emphatic mark
looking like a rough breathing, perhaps marking the end of the quotation.
a19–20 Jackson proposes reading τἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν τρεϕόμενα

πολέμι’ ἀλλήλοις ζοά, ‘a perfect trochaic’. As he says, the sentiment is
not presented as Aristotle’s own view, and he may well be right that it is a
quotation from an unknown poet; but it is perhaps a step too far to sup-
pose that Aristotle was necessarily quoting it as a line of verse, rather
than just rehearsing a ὑπόληψις that originated in such a line.
a22–3 Τῷ πλέονι δ’ αἰεὶ . . . κατάρχεται: none of the MSS seems to rec-

ognize that the quotation is in verse, let alone that it is in iambics; it
seems reasonable nonetheless to suppose that Aristotle would have
quoted the two verses as verses, and to restore them and present them as
such—after all, the copyists’ unreliability is proven, and while Aristotle
is plainly not always too concerned about accuracy in quotation, on the
whole he can be assumed to know his sources better than the copyists
evidently did.
a26–7 Aristotle knows about metre, and surely knows his Homer, while
a copyist might know neither: I have little hesitation in restoring ἔκ τ’ in
(1235a26–7) Iliad 18.107 (Rackham’s κἀξ would be a halfway house,

and perhaps palaeographically plausible).
a28 P2’s θήλεος is produced with a lambda that largely obscures an

unerased rho and iota.
a29 I resist supplying οὖν after μὲν with Susemihl, on the (usual)
grounds that EE, on the evidence we have, quite frequently omits con-
nectives where we might have expected them. —In B, instead of an alpha
in λίαν there is a gap that might accommodate two letters between the
λί and the nu; something may have been erased, but if so it has not been
replaced. There is a similar situation, on a larger scale, in a36–7 below,
though there the problems are shared with PCL.
a30 Casaubon’s supplement of καὶ is surely justified: the preceding τε

requires an answering καὶ, and κεχωρισμέναι τοσοῦτον is plainly a dif-
ferent description from λίαν καθόλου, not part of the same description.
a31 ἐγγυτέρω/ἐγγυτέραι: with other feminine plural endings in the

offing, corruption from ἐγγυτέρω (sc. ἔχουσι) to ἐγγυτέραι is more
likely than vice versa.
a32 τοὺς deest in B: B also leaves a gap after the phi of the following
ϕαύλους. There may have been some erasure and correction here: the
whole of ϕαύλους might be in a different hand.
a35 Fritzsche proposed the γοῦν found in B and generally preferred by

editors, with reason.
a37 ἄχρηστα: alpha, breathing, and acute accent in P are added later = P2,
who leaves the original grave on the final alpha. C’s χρησταὶ is probably
because of the καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται it has following. —καὶ αὐτοὶ τὰ αὑτῶν
scripsi: Sylburg’s proposal is unattractive inter alia because it fails to give
any clear sense, or point, to τοιαῦται; von Fragstein’s hardly does better
on this score (τοιαῦται on his account = concerned with usefulness: cf.
Dirlmeier’s critique of Fragstein here), and in general stretches credulity,
not least because prostitutes getting rid of unwanted hair (von Fragstein’s
idea: why not unwanted embryos?) looks an unlikely way of bringing in
Socrates’ reflection on the fate of our spittle, hair, and nails (ὥσπερ
Aristotelica 107
Σωκράτης ὁ γέρων ἔλεγε τὸν πτύελον, κτλ). What is needed is a

general statement or observation that Socrates could have made. This is
provided by Bonitz’s proposal, and from his καὶ αὐτοὶ αὑτῶν to καὶ αἱ
τοιαῦται τῶν is not a great distance. I merely question the genitive:
hence my τὰ αὑτῶν, and actually the resemblance between καὶ αὐτοὶ
τὰ αὑτῶν and καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται τῶν seems still greater. Why the gap in
the MSS? I suggest that once the corruption had taken place a subse-
quent copyist—either the ω copyist, i.e. the copyist of the common
source of PCBL, or one of his predecessors—was faced with the same
problem that Sylburg and von Fragstein were trying to solve, i.e. how to
fill out the τῶν, and just threw in the towel.
1235b8 τοῖς δὲ σπανιώτατον γνῶναι PCL, τοῖς δ’ οὐ B: another case

of B simplifying. PCL’s text certainly needs a fair bit of filling out for it to
make sense (Ross suggests the bare minimum); is this what bothered the
B copyist?
b11 P2 offers ἀποτυχίαις below the line, which happens to be the last
line on the page.
b14 Pace Walzer/Mingay, before correction Laur. 81,4 chimes with

PCBL; λόγος is inserted by another hand over the line. —τά τε P: I haz-
ard that it is less likely that three hands—one the same as P’s—should
independently omit this τε than that one should supply it. It is in equal
measure (a) an easy supplement and (b) dispensable, especially after
ἅμα; so, applying the usual rule (if the arguments are equally balanced,
print what is found in both recensiones), I omit it.
b15 μάλιστα: the final alpha is not written out in PC; if there is an eli-
sion, they would normally mark it. B probably elides because he is copy-
ing from a MS like P and C, and misinterprets the lack of the alpha.
b22 Οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἐραστὴς ὅστις οὐκ ἀεὶ ϕιλεῖ: it seems best to treat this
as a slightly misquoted but complete iambic verse with γὰρ intruding
(see n. on 1235a8). Even if Euripides did write οὐκ ἔστ’ rather than
οὐθεὶς (Troades 1051), the difference is rather small, and could well be
the result of Aristotle’s misremembering, or deliberate misquoting; we
could restore οὐκ ἔστ(ι), but this would be high-handed.
1235b25 I have noted before that EE fairly often does without connectives;
Nikolaos in P, I hazard, is going off on his own. It would in any case
perhaps be difficult to defend printing P’s δὲ here and not its τε in
b14 above.
1235b39–1236a1 Kenny (Oxford World’s Classics) reads οὔτε ὄξος

παρεγχειροῦσιν, translating ‘would not even pass up wine that is no
better than vinegar’, but that would involve an otherwise unparalleled
use of παρεγχειρεῖν (and require an οὐδέ for the MSS’ οὔτε); Robinson’s
οὗτοί γε gives much the same sense at rather less expense.
1236a5 καὶ καθεστῶτα P: is the καὶ the result of dittography? A καὶ
here would anyway be problematic.
a8 τὸ ἀγαθὸν for τὰ ἀγαθὰ, Spengel: but ‘are ἀγαθὰ’ is easily under-

stood with τὰ ἀγαθὰ.
a10 Bonitz’s ἔτι δὲ has no obvious advantage over the perfectly respect
able ἐπεὶ δὲ, nor is it clear why Walzer/Mingay prefers it, given that both
C and L have ἐπεὶ δὲ (as does B); probably they just took over Susemihl’s
reading here. P’s aberrant ἐπείδε is evidently a mistake for ἐπεὶ δὲ
rather than ἐπειδὴ (Bekker), not just because ἐπεὶ δὲ was evidently in ω
but because there is the same—curious—mistake at the beginning of P’s
NE VI, repeated in the incipit of EE V (but not in C).
a11 F. Breier proposed καὶ in a review of Bonitz 1844 (see Dirlmeier).
a13 Bekker’s use of punctuation and brackets to save the ὥσπερ in the
MSS before καὶ ἄνθρωπον self-evidently fails; the ὥσπερ derives from
〈τῷ〉 τοιόνδε Bonitz, 〈ὅτι〉 τοιόσδε vel 〈ᾖ〉 τοιόσδε Richards: Bonitz’s
a misunderstanding of the (quite complex) structure of the sentence. —
conjecture seems preferable to either of Richards’s on the grounds (a)

that it is more economical, and (b) that these MSS frequently confuse
τῶ = τῷ with τὸ, and τὸ might easily have fallen out by haplography
before τοιόνδ’. Richards’s first suggestion makes it look as if he thinks
Aristotle would be going for symmetry (with the ὅτι in the following
clauses), which is possible but hardly persuasive, while his second has
wrong to say that ‘〈τῷ〉 τοιόνδε could not stand without an εἶναι as in
nothing to recommend it except as an alternative to the first. He is surely
Aristotelica 109
[a8–9] above’; in EE, it surely can, perhaps especially if it has just

appeared with one.
a15 δὴ or δὲ? What is coming is ‘not an inference from what has been
said about ϕιλεῖν, but supplementary to it’ (Jackson); true, but δὴ can be
taken as emphatic, leaving the sentence, not unusually for EE, without a
connective. This is perhaps how Donini takes it, with ‘E diventa appunto
amico quando. . .’. Incidentally, we would get the same with Dirlmeier’s
δὲ δὴ (Donini’s notes lean heavily on Dirlmeier’s commentary); but it is
in any case natural for the translator to supply missing connectives.
a17 ‘ἴ[σως] εἴδη’ P2 in margin (Bessarion has it too, probably from Pal.
165, which includes this correction to P).
a20 Jackson is right in saying that we can do without Bonitz’s γὰρ; either
we take the καὶ before ψυχὴν as epexegetic, or we mentally supply
another ὥσπερ (which probably comes to the same thing).
a22 Bonitz’s ἐν πᾶσιν must surely be right: ἐν ἡμῖν makes no sense, the
point being that the λόγος of the πρῶτον has to be in (the λόγος of) all
the items of which the πρῶτον is πρῶτον, which will hardly be us
under any imaginable circumstances. The ἡμῖν in Richards’s proposal is
an ‘ethical’ dative (‘it would be very hard to account for ἡμῖν taking the
place of πᾶσιν’, he says; less hard, surely, than to justify an ethical dative
just here).
a24 Solomon’s supplement of a second τὸ is unnecessary given the
nature of the EE ’s style.
a25 The supplement of τὸ is again unnecessary; ‘καθόλου being (accord-
ing to them?) τὸ πρῶτον, they suppose πρῶτον καθόλου’ makes the
point snappily but perfectly well.
a26 ψεῦδος is to be preferred over PCB ψευδές in relation to general
Greek usage?
a28 Bonitz’s supplement of the article is right: we need a definite collec-
tion of ἄλλαι for the following αἱ δ’ to refer to.
a29 οἱ Victorius, αἱ PCBL: the alpha in P could possibly be taken as an
omicron, but αἱ is evidently what was in ω, the common source of
(1236a29) PCBL. —μὲν B: a superscript eta, if sufficiently flowery,

sometimes bears a resemblance to the superscript sign for -εν.
a30 οὖσα P2: the abbreviation for -αν in P is changed to an alpha. It is
tempting to write οὔσης, on the grounds that the subject of the ὡς-
clause is not strictly the object of the following main clause; however, in
a way it is (part of) the object of that clause insofar as there is an implied
‘(they say that) it would be’. The ‘correction’ to P, i.e. οὖσα, would only work
if the ὡς-clause belonged to the previous one, which it cannot. (N.b.:
I omit the comma after ἄν, introduced by Bekker, simply because I also
omit his comma after πρώτη; the main clause clearly begins with ὡς.)
a31 Spengel’s supplement of τρία would help the case for PCB’s εἴδη
(for ἤδη), impossible as it is on its own; nevertheless, the supplement looks
unattractive in itself (why the genitive τῶν γὰρ ῥηθέντων?), and it is
positively redundant with τριχῶς coming in the next clause. L’s ἤδη then
looks right, despite Russell’s doubts as reported by Walzer/Mingay (‘†τῶν . . .
ἤδη† Russell’), if we construe ‘for it was one of the things we said before’.
a34 Ross’s supplement of δ’ is perhaps right, but once again there are
too many cases in the MSS where the expected connectives are missing
to make it an easy choice to supply them. —διὰ secl. Bessarion: a simple
error on the copyists’ part, after διὰ four times in the last two lines, and
with another just coming. Jackson’s attempt to preserve a δια, with ἐστι
νὴ Δία, is inventive but unconvincing, despite the νὴ Δία attested at
Politics III.10, 1281b18. Would the observation currently being made
warrant such an exclamation, whatever one says about the Politics
context? (Note: Walzer/Mingay’s attribution of Jackson’s proposal to
Meineke is a mistake, deriving from Dirlmeier’s mistaken suggestion
[ad loc.] that Jackson ‘wiederholt dasselbe was A. Meineke . . . zu 23a11
〈μὰ〉 Δία.)
versucht hatte’; in fact what Meineke conjectured there was οὐ
a35 χρήσιμοι/χρήσιμον: the neuter singular would not need an εἶναι

following.
a37 ἔσκε/ἔστε: see LSJ, revised supplement (1996), s.v. ἔσκε, replacing
the comment under ἔστε in LSJ, which ran ‘ἔσκε . . . may be f(alsa) l(ectio)’
with ‘= εἰς ὅ κε [i.e. ἔστ’ ἄν], until, ἔσκε μάχηται Archil. 15 W’—
though ‘until’ is clearly not the sense Aristotle wants here (cf. Rackham).
Aristotelica 111
a38 Editors prefer to write γιγνώσκουσιν for the sake of the metre,
as—I suppose—Aristotle would have done; if, that is, it is verse, as it
appears to be.
b4 ὁ ϕιλούμενος Fritzsche, τῷ ϕιλουμένῳ PCBL: Fritzsche is obvi-
ously right, the point being about the difference between an object loved
and a person who is loved as a friend, the key difference being that the
friend loves you back. (An accent on the iota in B is crossed out.)
b5 ὁ ἀντιϕιλῶν B: is B trying to make the best of τῷ ϕιλουμένῳ?
b6 Russell’s proposal to change to the plural ignores the fact that in such
Eudemian contexts sudden switches from plural to singular and vice
versa are common. Without Bessarion’s μόνος the switch here would be
more difficult—and it is in any case surprising that both Susemihl and
Walzer/Mingay chose to stick with μόνον (μόνος is what most trans
lators seem to translate).
b8 P2 changes the nu at the end of ἀνθρώπων in P to a sigma, which by
the conventions apparently in play in these MSS is enough to signal an
ἀνθρώπους. Editors from Bekker onwards all print the singular, which
they claim to be in P; it is not, but it is found in Pal. 165. The copyist of
this MS generally follows P closely, and here, perhaps, he meant to do
so too, reading -ων as -ον—either because he ignores P2’s sigma, or more
likely because the sigma postdated him, as some of ‘P2’ surely did
(example: 1239b18); all of which suggests the simplest of explanations
for the original error, i.e. omega for omicron. So ἄνθρωπον it is. —ἱμέροις
P1CB2: τοῖς ἡμέροις P2 in margin; B2 adds ἱ above the line after the
rough breathing of ἡμέροις. Was he correcting against P or C—or was
he, and was the PC copyist, trying to make sense of the genitive preced-
ing? B evidently had ἡμέροις in front of him, as did L; did PC? Or was
the identity in Byzantine pronunciation between eta and iota a factor
here? —An eta is inserted in Laur. 81,4 over the line between the two
lambdas of ἄλλα; by the usual convention, the remaining part of the
correction, i.e. the addition of another lambda, is taken for granted.
b14 The double negative we find in PCL is awkward and unnecessary;
the solution in Ambr. is neat enough, but with οἱ δ’ οὖν we can explain
the origin of the οὐ—and a δ’ οὖν, for which B’s δ’ οὐ offers some sup-
port, looks in place: see Denniston 460.
1236b15 B’s omission of the οὐ after ἀλλὰ, with οἱ δ’ οὐ before it,

makes some sort of sense, if not the right one; οἱ δ’ οὖν . . . ἀλλ’ οὐ
does the job much better—and with B’s version the μέν before the
ἀλλὰ would be redundant, and the ἀλλὰ too. (It is perhaps mere
coincidence that the final alpha of the ἀλλὰ in B sprawls in such a
way as to make it look at first sight as if it was offering ἀλλ’ οὐ with-
out the elision mark.)
b16 The corruption of ὑπομένουσιν into a—wholly inappropriate—

ὑπονοοῦσιν would not be difficult, given e.g. the similarity between
mu and nu in the hand e.g. of the PC copyist Nikolaos; so, I imagine,
with a copyist predating any of our MSS. —It is hard to make sense of
ὡς here. Richards’s ἧς ἂν is ingenious, but would probably only be
preferable to Jackson’s ἕως on the basis of letter-count, which experi-
ence shows is not necessarily a prime consideration in these MSS.
b17 οὐδ’ οἱ δι’: B2 adds the οἱ over the line—without adding the
necessary extra delta, but I assume that once again a correction is
being indicated rather than being fully carried through. οὐδ’ οἱ δι’,
then, and not for the first time B seems to be being corrected from a
manuscript like P or C.
b19 βίαιος CB: hardly a significant shared error, when we reflect that
when writing P the same copyist himself read as βέβαιος what he read
as βίαιος when writing C.
b23 ἀδύνατον: it is interesting that even Bekker was content to read

δυνατόν with the MSS, which gives exactly the wrong sense. —λίπεται
P1: P2 adds the epsilon over the line.
b25 ὡς ἔτυχεν is not only in all of PCBL but is idiomatic; Susemihl’s ὡς

ἔτυχον, taken over by Walzer/Mingay—which records ἔτυχεν as only
being in C—is surely a simple slip (Bekker has ὡς ἔτυχεν).
b28 PCBL’s τις has been defended, but the cost is too high; what we
plainly need is something like ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ—which is what we get
with ἂν μή τι ἐμποδίζῃ. —Ross’s ἀληθινῶς is intended to pair with
the following ἁπλῶς, but ὁ ἀληθινὸς ϕίλος καὶ ἁπλῶς is easily read as
Aristotelica 113
ὁ ἀληθινὸς ϕίλος καὶ ἁπλῶς ϕίλος, which is just another way of saying
ὁ ἀληθινῶς καὶ ἁπλῶς ϕίλος.
b29 Ross’s ἔστιν ὁ would give us a main clause, which otherwise will
not materialize until b31, but ἔστιν ὁ τοιοῦτος ὁ δι’ αὑτὸν αὐτὸς
αἱρετός hardly follows from the preceding two premisses, as—if this is
the main clause—b27 ἐπεὶ would mean it should be. —ὁ δι’ αὑτὸν
αὐτὸς (Victorius): the long list of variations in the MSS shows how little
reliance is to be placed on breathings in such cases; I shall continue
nonetheless to record them. P3’s ὁ δὲ δι’ αὐτὸν/αὑτὸν αἱρετός appears
in the margin below the line in P, this being (the end of) the last line of P
115r. Interestingly, that proposal then becomes incorporated into the
text of Pal. 165, which intends to be as faithful a copy of P as it can be,
the result being ὁ δι’ αὐτὸν ὁ δὲ δι’ αὑτὸν αἱρετὸς; this then is itself
corrected, by what appears to be the first of two correcting hands in the
MS, through the insertion from the margin of an αὐτὸς after αὐτὸν.
I cite this as a living example, as it were, of the way marginalia can find
their way into the text (a phenomenon often called to aid in the resolution
of textual problems).
b30–1 Between the MSS’ ὡς and Spengel’s ᾧ, I prefer the former, taking
Aristotle to be saying ‘just as a person [in this sort of friendship] wishes
good things for [the friend] because of the person he [the friend] is, so
he must also choose him to be [sc. such, i.e. ἁπλῶς ἀγαθός and ἡδύς]’;
pace Kenny (Oxford World’s Classics translation) and Inwood and
Woolf, wishing the friend to continue to exist is hardly relevant to the
present argument. The unnecessary obeli in Walzer/Mingay around
αὐτὸν αἱρεῖσθαι εἶναι perhaps stem from Susemihl’s comment ‘αὐτὸν
αἱρεῖσθαι vix sana’.
b31 ὁ δ’ ἀληθινὸς ϕίλος κτλ: the δὲ is perhaps, strictly, apodotic—if the
present clause is, as I take it to be, the main clause we have been expect-
ing since b27 ἐπεὶ δ’ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸν; but so far is it from b27 that we
seem to need a connective, i.e. δὲ, here anyway.
b33–4 Delaying the γάρ until after πότερον is surely intolerable

(even in EE)?
1236b37 P2 supplies ἄν from the margin, with an insertion mark in the

text. The MSS reading invites us, impossibly, to take ἁπλῶς with κακά,
and then leaves τύχῃ without a function; Mingay’s proposal, moving
ἁπλῶς so that it qualifies ϕευκτά, also makes τύχῃ a puzzle: if it is a
dative singular, . . . ἀλλὰ κακὰ τύχῃ looks barely possible as Greek. In
short, Jackson’s emendation can scarcely be improved on.
b39 P has a small gap after the second ἀγαθά, which it chooses to fill
with four small red dots in diamond formation (letters are also often
coloured in, in red, in P, apparently on a random basis, usually initial
letters); something may well have been erased after οὕτως εἶναι ἀγαθά.
1237a2 τοῦτον is not, perhaps, quite impossible, but a switch to a per-

sonal object here would be jarring, and even if EE can make sudden
switches, they do not normally jar quite as much as this one would.
a3 B curiously separates ὅ and πως with what looks like a comma. —The
MSS’ εὐθέτως by itself surely cannot be right. With Richards’s εὔθετος,
I construe ‘[A human being is] fitted and on the way [πρὸ ὁδοῦ] [towards
〈ἔχει〉, is less economical, given the frequency with which omicron and
that end, just] qua human’. Richards’s alternative proposal, εὐθέτως δὲ
omega are interchanged in these MSS (as with Richards’s first proposal
they would have been with εὐθέτως for εὔθετος).
a4 Jackson’s supplement of ὁ before ἄνθρωπος is part of the larger pro-

posal that includes transferring a6–7 ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὰ καλὰ ἡδέα to a3,
following οἷς μήπω ἐστὶ γένηται; there seems little that is useful in the
proposal as a whole. But Jackson is surely right to dismiss the several
earlier attempts to ameliorate the passage made or reported in Susemihl’s
apparatus, which overstate the difficulties of the context, as does Dirlmeier
(and, I think, Jackson himself).
a5–6 I bracket ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀνὴρ ἀντὶ γυναικὸς καὶ εὐϕυὴς ἀϕυοῦς
on the grounds that the words are patently intrusive. (1) ‘a is x and y,
because for a by nature z, and similarly b instead of c, and d [instead
of ] e’ makes no sense: there is no comparison of one thing with another
in εὔθετος δὲ καὶ, κτλ; (2) the comparison of man and woman has
no relevance to the argument, and (3) neither has that between the
Aristotelica 115
well endowed and the poorly endowed. On the other hand it is not
difficult to imagine a reader wanting to qualify Aristotle’s quite strik-
ing claim about humankind as a whole, i.e. εὔθετος . . . καὶ πρὸ ὁδοῦ
ἄνθρωπος ὤν: wouldn’t he surely want to say that the male was superior
to the female, and that some people are better equipped to progress
than others? The answer to both questions is yes, but his general point is
what matters here, and it stands (I take it) despite both qualifications;
indeed it would be unhelpfully obscured if they were introduced here.
I conclude that the words are a gloss that came to be incorporated into
the text.
a5 ‘Pessime’, comments Susemihl on Fritzsche’s second conjecture (ἂν
ἐπιθυμῇ), and it is hard to disagree.
a5–6 Jackson explains his εὐϕυὴς εὐϕυοῦς as ‘the clever son of a clever
father’, ‘find[ing] it difficult to believe, either that εὐϕυὴς ἀϕυοῦς will
stand for εὐϕυὴς ἀντὶ ἀϕυοῦς, or that ἀντὶ has been dropped [i.e. has
〈ἀντ’〉 ἀϕυοῦς. That Aristotle should omit the ἀντὶ second time round
dropped out]’: this in response to Susemihl’s hesitant proposal of εὐϕυὴς
seems to me perfectly possible, but in any case I think the whole of

ὁμοίως δὲ . . . ἀϕυοῦς is suspect: see last note but one.
a6 καὶ ἀνάγκη scripsi: ἀνάγκη καὶ PCB; ἀνάγκη L; there is also in B
something that might—at a stretch—be interpreted as a version of the
ligature for γὰρ over καὶ (B2). We surely do need a connective: one of the
main causes of interpreters’ worries over the preceding couple of lines is
that the MSS’ plain ἀνάγκη makes it look as if it begins an apodosis—
which, as things stand, lacks a protasis (‘Spengelius . . . probe intellexit
periisse initiium protaseos’, Susemihl), and a protasis cannot easily be
engineered. But γὰρ seems wrong. I suggest, rather, that ἀνάγκη, κτλ
begins an independent sentence that builds on the new and important
statement διὰ τοῦ ἡδέος δὲ ἡ ὁδός. If so, Aristotle says, then τὰ καλὰ
had better be ἡδέα, only he chooses not to express this as a consequence,
merely as another claim. The καὶ, on this account, belongs not, as PCB
have it, after ἀνάγκη—where it has no obvious function—but before it.
a7 σπουδαῖον in the MSS is perhaps influenced by their τοῦτο just
before (or by ἀνάγκη in what I treat as the preceding sentence; the
(1237a7) accusative would make some sense if there were a comma

instead of a full stop after ἡδέα).
a13 ὀξέων P1CB: a simple transcription error, to judge by the ligature

for εξ as it appears in P, e.g. at a34 below; corrected in P with the
insertion of a tiny epsilon with rough breathing over the left-hand end
of the supralinear mark for -ων—noticed by Pal. 165, which has no
problem in reading ἕξεων.
a14 Jackson’s proposal gives the right sense, and can claim a sort of
palaeographic respectability: ‘. . . ΤΟΚΑΛ might represent ΤΟΙΔΙ:
for Κ = Ι, Α = Δ, Λ = Ι . . .’, and ΟΝΤΡΟΠΟΝΤΟ is not a world
away from ΟΝΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΝ. But it is easily demonstrable that by no
means all mistakes in these MSS go back to misreadings of uncial/
majuscule; that may be a factor, but experience shows that we also
have to allow both for simple slips even in the copying of minuscule
and for mistakes stemming directly from a misunderstanding of the
sense rather than from the shape of the characters. (This obviously
does not mean that anything goes; in a philosophical text, fortunately,
we usually have a clear steer from the surrounding context [see
Preface to text and apparatus], as we do in the present case, about the
kind of thing that is more than likely to be being said.) Thus we need
not insist e.g. that whatever underlies the corrupt τὸ καλὸν τοιοῦτον
need have occupied exactly the same space/contained the same num-
ber of characters, although it will not damage the prospects of any
solution if it does. I suspect myself that ὃν τρόπον is somewhat fancy
for the EE, and that the ubiquitous οἷον would suit its style better;
τοιοῦτον meanwhile could result from simple inversion of οἷον τὸ
after corruption had begun with the hopeless τὸ καλὸν. Combining
this with the first part of Jackson’s proposal, we then have τοισδί,
οἷον τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι. However, unless we put more weight
on Jackson’s argument (above) than I have suggested it deserves, the
plural τοισδί seems unnecessary, in a context that is following up/
developing a12 ὁ τῳδὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθόν. So: τῳδί, οἷον τὸ
γυμνάζεσθαι—almost Bonitz’s original solution, but with τῳδί for
his αὐτῷ, which seems plucked out of the air. (Dirlmeier offers an
unnecessarily expanded version of Bonitz.)
Aristotelica 117
a20 ϕιλίας C2: the sign for -ας is added after C’s superscript alpha (for
which see 1237b5); i.e. C2 changes to the genitive without erasing or over-
writing. A strange correction: was he thinking of pleasure-friendship?
a22 δὴ: it is tempting to write δὲ for δὴ (though no one seems to have

suggested it), in order to make the πότερον just coming parallel to the
last two; but actually this new question seems to be an expansion of the
second, offering an explanation as to why the answer to that previous
question should be a yes—a yes being already implied by the suppres-
sion of the expected alternative (i.e. πότερον . . . without the expected
ἢ . . .). The next sentence similarly gives us a reason for assenting to the
idea introduced by this third πότερον. —Bekker’s ἀγαθὸν (adopted by
both Susemihl and Walzer/Mingay on the basis of Lat. bonum) mistakes
the sense: ‘is it because he is good that the exercise of love seems to
involve pleasure?’, Kenny in the Oxford World’s Classics translation.
a30 P2 corrects to τελεωθέντι with the lightest of touches, converting

the top dot of the two vertically arranged dots signalling the (τ)α ending
into an iota and adding the two horizontally arranged dots above it that
typically accompany iotas.
a34 αὐτὴ (Ambr.) looks right: it is not just first ϕιλία that is the ἕξις ἀϕ’
ἧς, κτλ, but rather ϕιλία in general, which is the subject in what imme-
diately follows. This is one of a number of cases where Ambrosianus E40
sup. makes useful interventions that used to be attributed to Oxon. or
the Aldine, both of which are descended from Ambr.
a36 None of the three proposals to improve on δυνάμεως . . . πάσης,

Bonitz’s two or Richards’s, is persuasive; ἔργον is easily supplied from
a34 with the genitive, and the point is simple: ἕξεις are being distin-
guished from δυνάμεις (e.g. the capacity to heal: see Dirlmeier 397–8).
a38–9 τὸ μὲν γὰρ ϕιλεῖσθαι ϕιλητοῦ ἐνέργεια, τὸ δὲ καὶ ϕιλίας:

none of the four conjectures listed succeeds in improving on the MSS:
‘[which is why the pleasure is in loving, not in being loved,] because
[loving is the ἐνέργεια belonging to ϕιλία, and] being loved is [merely]
the ἐνέργεια of a lovable object, whereas the activity of loving belongs
to ϕιλία too [sc. as well as to the activated ϕιλητόν]’. Pace Jackson, I find
(1237a38–9) nothing ‘absurd’ about the idea that ϕιλεῖσθαι is an

ἐνέργεια, if that is taken as an activation of the lovable object. Kenny
objects, in correspondence, that ‘ἐνέργεια is an activity, not an activa-
tion’, but I think that the καὶ confirms that this is Aristotle’s intention;
Rackham’s solution, which Kenny adopts (in the Oxford World’s Classics
translation), takes no account of the καὶ.
a40 ἐπεὶ καὶ / ἐπεὶ δὲ: if ἐπεὶ introduces a new sentence here, i.e. with
δὲ, there is no main clause; in any case, the ἐπεὶ καὶ we find in CB gives
a better sense: ‘In fact, though [ἐπεὶ in its concessive use: LSJ s.v. ἐπεί
B.4, sc. despite the fact that we have been saying that active ϕιλία is in
the person loving, and so different from the realization of the δύναμις
of a beloved object], active loving still does have an outside aspect, one
relating to a ἕτερον’.
1237b1 ὅ secl. Bonitz: necessarily; the ὅ is presumably someone’s

attempt to make sense of a preceding τὸ ϕιλούμενον, itself arising from
the common confusion of omega and omicron combined with the lack
of iota subscript.
b2 While accepting τῷ for καὶ (ϕίλῳ), I acknowledge that it is an odd

mistake for a copyist to make. Should we perhaps think of reading
καὶ ϕίλος?
b4 ἄλλο/ἄλλῳ/ἄλλος: Susemihl claims that there is a correction in P
from ἄλλος to ἄλλῳ, while Walzer/Mingay claims it is the other way
round. The evidence probably favours Walzer/Mingay: one half of the
superscript omega—a squashed figure of eight on its side, one half of
which would give us the standard way of signalling an -ος ending—is
slightly fainter than the other (suggesting possible erasure), but is
undoubtedly still there. But in any case I think ἄλλος is wrong (as,
clearly, is ἄλλῳ). The sense is ‘[and not for being] something else’ (i.e.
not μουσικὸς or ἰατρικός, or . . .), as Kenny has it in the Oxford World’s
Classics translation, though without noting a change of reading from
Walzer/Mingay’s ἄλλος. Or perhaps Kenny is saying that ἄλλος itself, in
the context, can be taken as ‘something else’, that being shorthand for
‘someone with a feature/features other than the ones he has’. And maybe
he would be right, but the idea of a friend’s being ἄλλος, or ἕτερος, has
Aristotelica 119
another and more important role to play in the whole discussion of

friendship, and especially in the most recent part of it, i.e. insofar as the
separation between the one loving and the one loved is both essential
to and creates some of the problems, for Aristotle, with understanding
friendship itself. Would αὐτὸν γὰρ ϕιλεῖ, οὐχ ὅτι ἄλλος not introduce
an unnecessary ambiguity? Perhaps not. But I prefer the ἄλλο (from
a correcting hand in Laur. 81,4, and independently conjectured by
Jackson, who provides his own argument for it), not least on palaeo
graphical grounds: instances of omega for omicron (and vice versa), as
often noted, are quite common in these MSS, and the distance separat-
ing ἄλλῳ from ἄλλος, given the typical shorthand for the -ος ending, is
anyway somewhat greater than from ἄλλο to ἄλλῳ (ἄλλω). (For the
record, Donini too has ‘something else’, i.e. ‘altra cosa’, accepting ἄλλο
from Jackson.) —οὐχ is split οὐ/χ between lines in B, with a hyphen-like
sign in the margin beside the chi.
b5 δὴ P1/δεῖ P2: P2 overwrites the eta with an ει. The ει ligature, if that is
what it is, still looks remarkably like an eta, but Pal. 165, which typically
copies P with exemplary accuracy, and incorporates corrections, writes a
straightforward δεῖ. Interestingly, the roughly contemporaneous Laur.
81,4 is also corrected (= Laur. 81,42) to δεῖ, the correction here being
made to a part of the text that stems from the other recensio, i.e. (what
Harlfinger calls) the Constantinopolitana. So δὴ was in both recensiones,
but is eventually corrected in the descendants of both.
b6 εἰ γὰρ Bekker, τί γὰρ PCBL: the question that would be introduced

by τί seems to answer itself; putting the question mark after δυσώδης
instead of after λείπεται, where it would naturally be placed, leaves us
without enough to form a question at all—we would surely need τί εἰ,
but then supplying an εἰ to go with the τί is a less economical solution,
and gives a less plausible sequence, than simply substituting εἰ for τί.
b7 τῷ Fritzsche: i.e. ‘for he [the one loved] ἀγαπᾶται with [by means
of?] good will’? τὸ εὐνοεῖν is surely the subject, and ἀγαπᾶν is being
used in the sense of ‘be content with’, giving us ‘for good will is enough
[in this case]’. (If the passive is uncongenial, maybe ἀγαπᾷ γὰρ τὸ
εὐνοεῖν?) —B2 writes in the required μή above δή. Richards’s claim that
(1237b7) συζῇ δὲ μή is ‘impossible’, presumably because of the switch

from impersonal to personal subject, is unwarranted, first because such
a switch would not be so unusual for EE, and second because the subject
of συζῇ is itself close to being impersonal (‘one doesn’t . . .’). On the other
hand his—equally unnecessary—rewriting, οἷον εἰ σϕόδρα δυσώδης
γίνεται, ἀγαπᾶται γὰρ τὸ εὐνοεῖν, συζῆν δὲ μή, is more restrained
of corruptions of uncial/majuscule: τί γὰρ 〈ὁ〉 σϕόδρα δυσώδης

than Jackson’s bizarre reconstruction, based on his usual hypothesis
ϕιλεῖται; ἀγαπᾶται γὰρ τὸ εὐνοεῖν εὖ ὄζειν δὲ μή. In Jackson’s ren-

dering, or paraphrase, this gives us ‘[. . . and no attendant circumstances
should neutralize the good.] For instance, why is it that people are
fond of a σϕόδρα δυσώδης? It is because they like his good will in spite
of his infirmity.’
b11 There is an extended mark in B under the usual dots above the iota
of κεκριμμένον; its significance is unclear.
b16 B2 appears to insert an alternative ligature for -ου over the second
upsilon (= ὑποζουγίου?). —The supplement of εἶναι appears necessary
here: Dirlmeier may well be right in saying that Aristotle is capable of
leaving it out (he refers to the examples in Bonitz, Index, s.v. Ellipsis), but
the ellipse seems too harsh here: contrast the case in b22 below, where
the εἶναι is easily supplied from the following εἰσίν.
b19–20 P2 writes ἴσως: εἶναι ἀλλ’ οὐκ εἰσὶ ϕίλοι in the margin, with
an insertion mark after βούλεσθαι—evidently trying to make the best
of the loss of the negative before βούλεσθαι. I bracket the first ϕίλοι
on the grounds that it is not only not needed but is intrusive; a copyist
has, perhaps, taken a shine to βούλονται ϕίλοι in b17. Richards says
‘[εἶναι] cannot be understood’; if we keep the first ϕίλοι here, he
would be right.
b21 P2 inserts εἰ above the line, with an insertion mark in the text.
b21–2 The variant in B, οὐχ οἳ, is at least interesting.
b22 With εἰσίν coming, an εἶναι can surely be understood here, pace
Richards. —εἰσιν B: B more often deploys nu ephelkustikon than do
PCL, his habit here coinciding with modern conventions.
Aristotelica 121
b23 εὐδιάλυτοι CB: an easy mistake, perhaps; C starts to make it again

two lines further on (see next note), but recovers himself.
b25 εὐδιάβλητοι C post corr.: the copyist seems to have started writing
εὐδιάλ, as in 23, then corrected the lambda to beta, finishing with λητοι.
b26 P2 inserts a kappa above the -δὲν of οὐδὲν.
b27 αὕτη γὰρ ἄπιστος B1, ταύτῃ γὰρ ἄπιστος B2: it is hard, in fact,
from the physical evidence to see which came first. In favour of suppos-
ing it was αὕτη γὰρ ἄπιστος is (a) that we can explain how it came about,
i.e. by dittography after αὕτη ἡ ϕιλία, and (b) that αὕτη γὰρ ἄπιστος is
nonsense, so that the need for correction would be clear, and ταύτῃ γὰρ
ἄπιστος makes rather a good sense—so that the simple expedient of
adding a tau before αὕτη, as I propose B2 did, would be an advance.
b30 τὰ LP2B2: alpha and grave accent are superimposed on the οῦ in P,

alpha written in above it in B.
b32 τὰ τῶν ϕίλων CB: cf. 1238a16. —προσνέμεται: the προσ in P is

indicated by means of its—and C’s—usual convention for -ος, i.e. with
an omicron over the preceding letter, and no sigma actually marked. The
sigma is added over the omicron by B2; B himself curiously separates προ
from νέμεται, and the way in which the προσ- is marked in P too is
generally reserved for a separate πρός. Such, presumably, was the origin
of the error in CBL.
b34 P2 adds οὖν in the margin with an insertion mark, but without a
visible matching insertion mark in the text; P3 writes in ἀρα over the
gap between γίγνεται and ἡ with an insertion mark, either not noticing
or ignoring the preceding correction. Either οὖν or ἄρα will do, if we
need a connective; because connectives are so often missing in EE
I hesitate, as I have in a number of other cases, to put one in.
b36 ϕίλοι P1, ϕίλου P2: P2 changes the second iota in P1CBL ϕίλοι to
upsilon.
b37 δοκεῖν P1: P2 overwrites the double oblique stroke normally used
for -ειν, as it is here in C, with the ligature for ει. —τοῦ νοῦν ἔχοντος:
(1237b37) L’s genitive is perhaps more likely than PCB’s accusative not
just because the more idiomatic, but because τὸν for τοῦ before νοῦν,
with ἔχοντα naturally following, would be an easy mistake. If this story
is accepted, γε will be B’s own invention, and this will spare us having to
explain how it fell out independently from L and α, especially when it
looks so much in place.
1238a1 Pace Walzer/Mingay, οὐδὲ μιᾶς ἡμέρας is clearly what Nikolaos

wrote in P, though he has some trouble squeezing ἡμέρας in at the end
of the line.
a3 ἁλῶν/ἄλλων P1CB: there are signs that the breathing in P was ori
ginally smooth, and has been made rough; an acute accent on the alpha
has been turned into a circumflex bestriding the lambda, and it is also
quite likely that a second lambda has been erased. What is certain,
I think, is that P did not have ἁλῶν until P2 came on the scene. This
receives confirmation from the fact that Pal. 165, which generally follows P
faithfully and incorporates corrections (as e.g. with δεῖ at 1237b5), reads
ἄλλων here: in other words, the correction to ἁλῶν had not yet been
made. The history of the corrections to P is complex, as the example of
1237b34 (q.v.) suggests. —P2 writes τῶ in the margin, with insertion
marks there and in the text before ἁπλῶς.
a4 The cost of not accepting Bussemaker’s εἰ ὁ is that the second ϕίλος

(surely) has to go. The εἶεν in PCBL suggests that there was something
more there than εἰ, and Fritzsche’s δὴ is no more than a place-filler.
a5 δὲ2 B, deest in PCL: a connective is certainly needed here, though

Bekker does without it; Susemihl follows others in getting a δ’ from Lat.
autem. Does the B copyist supply it himself, or did α and L each inde
pendently omit it?
a6 ?ὡς P2 in margin, ?ὧν P3 above the line after ὥστε: both faint traces, but
it is worth recording that they are there, presumably as conjectures.
a7 (?) [τῷ] τοῦτο P2, [τῷ] τοῦτο 〈τῷ〉 Jackson: P2 writes τοῦτο in the
margin below τούτου (this is the last line on the page), and I believe the
intention to be for τοῦτο to replace the whole of τῷ τούτου, despite
the fact that Pal. 165, copying a corrected P, reads τῶ τοῦτο (the usual
Aristotelica 123
rule, the corrector’s aim being to get the text to make sense, is that a cor-
rection needs only to be indicated, not fully carried through, and τῷ
τοῦτο is plainly as meaningless as τῷ τούτου: in other words, Pal. 165 on
this occasion mistakes P2’s intentions). And P2 is surely right: τοῦτο is all
we strictly need. But how would τοῦτο ever have become τῷ τούτου?
From this perspective Richards’s τὸ αὐτὸ looks better; but why the geni-
tive τούτου? Jackson’s proposal comes with the advantage of a story:
τοῦτο τῷ, let us suppose, first became τῷ τοῦτο by simple inversion,
τοῦτο then being replaced by τούτου by dittography; yet his τῷ after
τοῦτο looks unconvincing when a plain ἄλλῳ follows in the next line. An
alternative would be to accept Dirlmeier’s τοιοῦτον (without the unneces-
sary supplement of καὶ, which he takes over from Spengel’s rather differ-
however (without Jackson’s 〈τῷ〉), seems to me ultimately to win out.

ent reconstruction: see on a8 below). The simplicity of P2’s solution,
—καὶ εἰ μή / εἰ δὲ μή / ἢ καὶ μή / εἰ καὶ μή: PCB’s εἰ καὶ μή, accepted by

Walzer/Mingay, looks impossible, because we need a connective. Hence
without adding an extra καὶ in the text (cf. Dirlmeier’s 〈ἢ〉 εἰ καὶ), and
Inwood and Woolf in the Cambridge translation give us ‘and even if ’, but
‘even if ’ only fits with Fritzsche’s σπουδαῖος for σπουδαίῳ in the next line
(see below). L’s ἢ καὶ is a possibility, but the following μή is in favour of
an εἰ (despite 1237b7: we should probably not multiply the unusual
unnecessarily), which leaves Richards’s εἰ δὲ and καὶ εἰ, and εἰ δὲ before
the μή looks immediately more attractive, because more familiarly
Aristotelian, than καὶ εἰ μὴ: ‘but if not, then abstractly good for the virtu-
ous man and good to another because he is useful’ (Kenny in the Princeton
Aristotle’s Ethics). (Richards’s two proposals, καὶ εἰ and εἰ δὲ, are actually
part of a larger rewriting the need for which he does not explain.)
However, I prefer καὶ εἰ because it gives us an easier path to the MSS’
readings: ω, I suppose, or one of its predecessors, inverted καὶ and εἰ, and
εἰ became ἢ in L, as it so often does in these MSS.
a8 Apparently diverging from Walzer/Mingay in adopting Fritzsche’s

σπουδαῖος for σπουδαίῳ, Kenny in the Oxford World’s Classics trans-
lates ‘Alternatively, a man may not be good in the abstract, but good for
the other by being useful’. But the sentence started with the situation
where there is συμϕωνία between being ἀγαθὸς ἁπλῶς and being
(1238a8) ἀγαθὸς τινί, and if ‘a man [is] not good in the abstract’, and
neither is the other person, we will have left that συμϕωνία behind. And
it would surely be confusing for Aristotle suddenly to use σπουδαῖος
here instead of ἀγαθός for the ἁπλῶς ἀγαθός whose goodness ἄλλῳ is
at issue; much less confusing if the σπουδαῖος is ὁ ἄλλος himself, whose
own goodness or otherwise for the ἁπλῶς ἀγαθός is not presently rele-
vant. So σπουδαίῳ is what is needed. (Fritzsche proposed σπουδαῖος
independently of Spengel’s elaborate and unhelpful reconstruction of the
〈ὅτι〉 σπουδαῖος, but then goes in for some of the same, suggesting—
sentence, i.e. ὅς ἐστιν ἁπλῶς ἀγαθός καὶ ἄλλῳ, [εἰ καὶ μὴ] ἁπλῶς μὲν
even less helpfully—ἐστι χρήσιμον for ὅτι χρήσιμος.)
a9 κωλύει: P2 changes the sign for -ειν to the ligature for -ει.
a14 Richards’s comment ‘ϕιλία is an excellence of nature’, supporting his

removal of the definite article, misconstrues: τῆς ϕύσεως is a genitive of
comparison after κάλλιον.
a15 There could be an original iota on its own under the somewhat
messy ει in P’s ἀτυχεῖαι, but ἀτυχεῖα is standard in P.
a16 P2 writes τὰ in margin, with insertion marks both there and in the
text before τῶν ϕίλων (Jackson had the same idea).
a18 καὶ δυστυχίαι scripsi, on the grounds that at least καὶ and δυστυχίαι
were in ω (given what P and L have), and that the omission of the second
αἱ (n.b. P: αἱ εὐτυχεῖαι καὶ δυστυχεῖαι) would be typical for EE.
a20 P2’s τυχόν looks not only possible, pace Dirlmeier, but perfectly
acceptable—‘what was useful, as it happened’ (so: not bad Greek for διὰ
τὸ τύχον χρήσιμον). τυχών was evidently in the common source of
PCB (beneath the mark for the -ον ending in P there are clear signs of an
erased sign for -ων), representing the typical confusion between omi-
cron and omega. L’s ἀτυχ (at the end of a line, and with what resembles
a Greek colon in the margin beside it) is evidently despairing. Once he
had started with ἀτυχ, the only possible ending that would make sense
is -οῦντας: did someone perhaps once gloss an original and corrupt
τυχών with ἀτυχοῦντας (cf. Susemihl’s τυχόντας, based on Lat. com-
paratos?), which L began incorporating before giving up?
Aristotelica 125
a23 ὄνοις P1, οἴνοις P2, adding the necessary iota above the line.
—ὀδέσμασιν C1: C2 heavily overwrites the omicron with what is pre
sumably intended as ἐ, though the result looks more like a filled-in omi-
cron with a (new) smooth breathing attached. —P adds an epsilon to
κείνων at the beginning of its (P’s) line, although the ἐ is actually
there already at the end of the last (there are other signs of such over-
correction in this stretch in P).
a24 Either the L copyist was presented with a gap and duly reproduced
it, one of his predecessors having realized something was missing and
chosen not to supply anything, or else he himself could not establish what
he should be writing (cf. on a20 above). (Ambr. reproduces the gap in L,
slightly lengthening it; Ald. then fills with ἡδὺ.) The following καὶ οὐ
γλυκύ makes much better sense if preceded by γλυκὺ here, and is per-
haps more likely—at any rate given the shaping of the characters in MSS
like P and C—to have fallen out before ταχὺ. —χρόνον/χρόνῳ: P2 erases a
superscript omega and replaces it with -ον (though there are exceptions,
the general degree and accuracy of the corrections in P, at least in Book
VII/IV, is increasingly apparent). Either B himself is correcting, or his
χρόνον was in ω, the common source of PCBL, and the copyist of PC, or
more likely α, and of L both wrote χρόνω by dittography after πλείω.
a25 καὶ3 is in P as well as the other MSS, pace Walzer/Mingay (whose
reporting of P, especially, continues to be at best patchy, though in this
case the mistake is shared by Susemihl).
a27 The nu added over the final epsilon in ὁμολογήσειε in P, plus a
dot over the preceding ει, probably indicates the correction to -αιεν.
—Neither ὅτι (Fritzsche) nor οὐχ ὅτι (Ross) seems to improve on the
MSS’ οὐκ; if I understand them, both conjectures make the argument
more difficult than it actually is.
a28 πώματος PCB1: B2 adds ό above the ώ.
a29 Jackson’s supplement of οὐ is necessary for the sake of the sense and
because of the following ἀλλὰ, which is obviously not accounted for by
the οὐχ before ἡδύ.
a30 The infinitive ἐξαπατᾶν is needed: τοῦτο . . . 〈οὐ〉 διὰ τὸ ἀποβαῖνον
οὐχ ἡδύ . . . ἐξαπατᾶν is what οἱ πολλοί say. I construe the whole
(1238a30) sentence as ‘οἱ πολλοί would agree, not on the basis of τὰ

ἀποβαίνοντα alone but just as in the case of drink they call something
“too sweet”, [saying] that this is not pleasant not because of τὸ ἀποβαῖνον
but because it/its effect does not continue, although it deceives at first’.
(‘Too sweet’: i.e. ‘sweet, yes, but just a bit too sweet’—the usual Eudemian
brevity.) This is a slightly different version of a24–5 τὸ μὲν γλυκὺ ταχὺ
δηλοῖ, πλείω δὲ χρόνον γινόμενον ἀηδὲς καὶ οὐ γλυκύ, framed now as
an endoxon. τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα may include ‘after-effects’ (Kenny, Oxford
World’s Classics), but I think they are more broadly ‘consequences’: I agree
with Dirlmeier that there is likely to be a reference to Plato’s Protagoras here,
in which οἱ πολλοί are portrayed for the sake of the argument as making
choices in full awareness of future disadvantages as well as of present bene-
fits. (Much of the rest of Dirlmeier’s analysis, however, is hard to accept.)
a31 ἡ2 P2: his correction of αἱ to ἡ is distinctly messy.
a32 τὴν/τῆς: in P, the original reading was clearly τὴν, as in C. This is
one of a number of cases where there is a reasonable case for suspecting
that P was at some point, and at least in some parts, corrected (some-
times, as here, ‘corrected’) against a manuscript like L.
a35 It might perhaps be right to supply δὲ after κακῷ, which would give
us the line as quoted—as a complete iambic line—in 1239b22. However
the line may have originated there as a gloss (see note ad loc.), and it is
quite possible, given Aristotle’s practice elsewhere in EE, and notwith-
standing my reliance elsewhere on his presumed knowledge of/sensitiv-
ity to metre, that he omitted the δὲ here because he was adapting the
line to the context, having already written a connective καὶ. —C has a
dot under the kappa of συντέκεν, indicating at least uncertainty.
—ἡδονῇ: P2 appears to apply the circumflex.
a36 οὐχ for καὶ before ᾗ ϕαῦλοι is surely indispensable (as the translator
of ‘Lat.’ saw), given the general run of sense this gives, and the follow-
ing ἀλλά.
1238b1 ᾗ: Bonitz’s proposal, ἢ 〈ᾗ〉, wins out over the others listed for
simplicity if nothing else, but is still not simple enough. Aristotle will
surely not be interested in the possibility of the ϕαῦλοι being friends on
the basis of usefulness qua ϕαῦλοι, especially after what he has said
Aristotelica 127
about them in 1237b27–34, only in the possibility of their being friends

qua neither ϕαῦλοι nor ἀγαθοί. So just ᾗ for ἢ; for a similar error in the
MSS see b6 below. Rackham oddly marks the words preceding his sup-
plement, i.e. οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν προαίρεσιν, as a parenthesis;
the only justification for that seems to be that it helps the supple-
ment work.
b2 ϕαύλῳ/ϕαύλων: a genitive might work, but in view of the χρήσιμος

following it had better be singular and not plural. L’s ϕαῦλον illustrates
the typical mix-up of omicron and omega. —χρήσιμος P/P2: P2 might
be adding a sigma to an original χρήσιμος in P, written as usual with
the omicron alone over the preceding letter, but actually the omicron
seems to be an addition as well as the sigma. So there is an erasure,
either of a sign for -ον, or else of a rightward-leaning oblique stroke after
χρήσιμ of the sort often used to cover endings where these are in any
case clear; in the latter case, and I think there is a trace of such a mark,
P2 would then be stepping in to provide the clarity which P himself did
not. There is also something else in the left-hand margin opposite the
present line in P which may or may not be connected with this correc-
tion by P2, but in any case it is presently indecipherable.
b6 Contra Rieckher, I see no objection to τὰ ἁπλᾶ [ἀγαθά] = τὰ ἁπλῶς

[ἀγαθά]. —ᾗ Susemihl: from quatenus Lat. (to which Susemihl assigns
an authority it does not have [see next note]; but ᾗ is in any case
undoubtedly right).
b6–7 ᾗ πενία συμϕέρει ἢ νόσος: pace Bussemaker (followed by Walzer/

Mingay), it is hard to extract a decent sense from the Latin version,
paupertati aut morbis (which is where Bussemaker’s datives come
from), whereas the MSS’ reading fits well, the thought being the (by the
way, Socratic) one that in certain circumstances poverty and disease
may actually be beneficial, e.g. if they stop an agent doing something
damaging to himself/herself and/or others.
b8 ποιεῖν/πιεῖν: P2 erases the omicron; B2 adds iota above the οι. —All
three suggested supplements after βούλεται—both of Fritzsche’s, and
Richards’s—fill out, unnecessarily, what has to be, and can be, under-
stood anyway.
1238b11 οἷον is supplied over the line by B2 (or just possibly by the
original hand). —The correction to ἔτι from ἐπὶ (if there is a correction,
as I think there is) in P seems to be effected by adding ink to the second
upright of the original pi. —To find ᾗ in B is slightly generous: the cir-
cumflex is certainly there, the breathing at best ambiguous—but in B it
often is, and he could hardly intend ᾖ in this position.
read ἂν καὶ 〈μὴ〉 σπουδαῖοι after it, i.e. μὴ with Bonitz and σπουδαῖοι
b12 εἶεν Ald., εἰσιν PCBL: to retain the MSS’ εἰσιν we should need to
with L, which is perfectly possible but offers what I take to be a some-

what less good sense; Aristotle is surely not inclined to make the general
claim that the non-σπουδαῖοι are not ὁμιλητικοί. P2 writes γρ.: οὕτως
in the margin, with insertion marks there and in the text after εἰσιν.
—ἂν is written in by Β2 above the ἐν. —Bonitz’s μὴ is needed if we
accept L’s σπουδαῖοι; that it would have to be supplied if we do read
σπουδαῖοι is sufficient reason for not going with L.
b16 εἰσιν ἀρετῆς: PCB’s is the more striking, i.e. unexpected, order, and
I adopt it for that (not particularly compelling) reason.
b17 It is tempting to read Fritzsche’s ὑπεροχήν for ὑπερβολήν, but

there are examples of ὑπερβολή in the sense of ‘superiority’. —[ἀρετὴ]
Rackham: evidently not knowing Rackham had anticipated him, Kassel
too (R. Kassel, ‘Peripatetica’, Hermes 91 [1963], 54) proposes to bracket
ἀρετὴ, comparing 1242a32–5 πατρὸς δὲ καὶ θεοῦ ἡ αὐτὴ [sc. ϕιλία]
ἥπερ θεοῦ πρὸς ἄνθρωπον . . . καὶ ὅλως τοῦ ϕύσει ἄρχοντος πρὸς τὸν
ϕύσει ἀρχόμενον: ‘Durch diese schlagende Parallele wird die Streichung
von ἀρετή an unserer Stelle schon fast erzwungen. Auch hier setzt
das ausweitende καὶ ὅλως voraus, dass eine bestimmte zur Gruppe
ἄρχοντος καὶ ἀρχομένου gehörige ϕιλία schon genannt worden ist,
eben θεοῦ (sc. ϕιλία) πρὸς ἄνθρωπον, von der dann auch Zeile [26] f.
ohne weiteres, als von etwas schon eingeführtem, geredet wird. . .’. This
argument is persuasive, but not quite decisive: the preceding ὥσπερ will
introduce an illustration of superiority at least as readily as, if not more
readily than, an example of friendship based on it. Kenny (Oxford
World’s Classics) demonstrates how the sentence will work, while also
Aristotelica 129
reproducing its awkwardness: ‘Another variety of friendship is based on

superiority—the kind of superiority that the virtue of a divinity has . . .’
(Inwood and Woolf ’s ‘But there is another distinction . . . , which goes
〈ἀρετής〉?). Nor would this be damagingly inconsistent with NE VII [‘=’

together with superior virtue’ would perhaps be ἡ καθ’ ὑπερβολήν
EE VI].1, 1145a25–7, adduced by Kassel: for Aristotle to say in one con-

text that the ἕξις of god is τιμιώτερον ἀρετῆς is not necessarily incon-
sistent with his saying, in another, that god’s ἀρετή is superior to that of
a human being. —I confess to finding Dirlmeier’s defence of ἀρετὴ against
Rackham and Kassel, spreading over nearly two pages, and combined with
praise for Kassel’s ‘scharfsinnige Argumentation’ (to the main part of which
he does not reply), largely incomprehensible. Rackham’s Loeb EE Dirlmeier
(122) declares in general to be ‘leider fast wertlos’; here is one place that
belies such a description. (For the only other intervention in EE in Kassel’s
Hermes piece see b9 above. The deletion of βούλεται goes with a supple-
ment of ἁπλῶς after the preceding βούλεται (b8), in which Richards
anticipates him. We can certainly do without the second βούλεται, but
that is not a reason to remove it, given that it is in all of PCBL.)
b20 ἶσον1 B2: the circumflex accent in B is added over the acute; once
again the suspicion must be that B is being corrected against (an MS
like) P or C in the way that P is against (an MS like) L. —δ’ deest CB: in
C at the end of a line. —ἶσον2 B2: circumflex is again added over acute.
b22 ἄλλη/ἄλλην/ἄλλων: B apparently misreads the sign for -ην, as in

PC, as -ων; the two signs are close to each other, the latter being larger,
the former being mostly located over the final letter of the stem.
b25 τὸ videtur defuisse in C: I think Nikolaos in C originally wrote out

ὁμοίως ἄν- (the line ends there). Another hand then writes in a ligature
for -ως above the iota and a thick, elongated character blotting out the
omega while converting the final sigma to ὸ; I can only assume that
the character substituting for the original omega is a tau, though it
would be a strange one.
b26–7 ἴσως: ἀντιϕιλεῖται ὡς ϕιλεῖ P2 in margin, presumably himself

dropping the τῷ, and choosing to save the first passive rather than the
(1238b26–7) second, but at the cost, counterintuitively, of making the

complainant rather than god the (grammatical) subject of the complaint.
Casaubon’s ἀντιϕιλεῖ is indebted to Lat.’s (the late Latin translation’s)
vicissim ipse diligat; τῶ ἀντιϕιλεῖσθαι in the MSS is presumably a cor-
rupted repetition of b25 τὸ ἀντιϕιλεῖσθαι.
b27 καὶ ἀρχομένῳ: emendation is unnecessary; ‘it would be ridiculous

if . . . , or for the ruler and the ruled’, while loose, makes good sense.
b29 The received text, καὶ ἡδονή διαϕέρει οὐδὲν ἥ τε, κτλ, surely can-
not stand, nor any version that has the two cases of pleasure being no
different from each other, (a) because they are in fact different and (b) if
they were the same there would be no point in Aristotle’s introducing the
point here (Fritzsche’s καίτοι in effect acknowledges this: ‘and yet . . .’).
Spengel’s deletion of οὐδὲν would be one way out, but raises the question
how the οὐδὲν got there in the first place. Jackson’s οὐδ’ ἓν for οὐδὲν, for its
part, is undoubtedly ingenious (Dirlmeier calls it ‘elegant’, Donini ‘brilliant’),
but one wonders why, having said that two things differ, Aristotle would
immediately add ‘and are not one thing’. By contrast Bonitz’s proposal,
keeping οὐδὲν and reading ἧττον for ἥ τε, is not only palaeographically
respectable but actually helps to cement the sentence into the context:
the person in a position of superiority loves, we have been told, in a dif-
ferent way from the corresponding inferior, and no less does the pleasure
enjoyed by the αὐτάρκης / the superior from his loving differ, whether
from his loving a possession—a slave, presumably?—or a son, from
the pleasure enjoyed by an indigent receiving bounty. (Pleasure has of
course been said to be a central ingredient in ϕιλία.) The compression is
extraordinary, but not so unusual for EE. Similarly Dirlmeier, comment-
ing on ἢ παιδί (he too accepts Bonitz’s solution): ‘. . . EE ist so reich an
herstellen zu wollen ἢ 〈τοῦ πατρὸς ἐπὶ τῷ αὑτοῦ〉 παιδί ’.

Ellipsen, dass ich auch hier eine solche vermute ohne aber im Text etwa
b32 P2 writes ἡ in the margin with insertion marks there and in the text
after ἡδονὴν: i.e. presumably, ἡ ϕιλία, given the singular verb following
in PCBL.
b37 The second accent on εὕρηκεν in P perhaps confirms what we

know already, P and C being from the same original: namely, that the
Aristotelica 131
copyist had εὑρηκέναι before him, as did B. But as Bonitz saw, it must
originally have been εἴρηκεν; then the question is who said it. Bonitz’s
ἐκεῖνος is attractively neutral, Jackson’s Αἴνικος has its palaeograph
ical attractions, but Russell’s Εὔνικος at least gives us a name of a
poet for whom we have other evidence, however little—and surely
Aristotle would have given a name. —ὁ secl. Jackson, but perhaps it
should stand, given that, as we have seen, quotations in this particular
text (and maybe more generally in Aristotle?) are not completely
separated off from the surrounding text in the way they are by the
modern convention of quotation marks; here that prevents the use
even of the modest convention I have adopted for marking at least the
beginning of a quotation, i.e. a capital letter: so ὁ ἐρώμενος, not ὁ
Ἐρώμενος. —ἐρωμένος B1: it is interesting that B has the accent
appropriate to ἐρρωμένος: is that the reason why B2 proceeds to add
in the extra rho over the line, or—again—was he correcting B against
another MS, like P or C? (In any case ἐρρωμένος was probably in the
MS B was copying; he sees the need to drop one of the rhos, but fails
to change the accentuation.)
1239a2 καὶ ante κατὰ1 suppl. Rackham: and it is true that a, b, καὶ c is
not a normal sequence, even in Aristotle; an alternative would be to sup-
press the following καὶ.
a3 In this case the circumflex on ἴσον in B seems to be original.
a4 ὑπεροχήν ἐστιν B: the copyist mistakes the ligature for ει for an

epsilon, and then the sigma is easily assimilated to the ligature for στ.
a5 A beautiful example of haplography in B (ἂν/ἀνὴρ). B2 writes in the

ligature ει above the line between γὰρ and ἀνὴρ.
a10 Spengel’s δεῖ is there to explain the following infinitive ἀξιοῦν (a11,
PCBL), but ‘one must think it right for . . .’ looks pleonastic; we need
either ‘one must . . .’ or ‘it is right for . . .’, not both. Better, then, to keep ἀεὶ,
with Bekker, Susemihl, and Walzer/Mingay, and change ἀξιοῦν to ἄξιον
with Bonitz. Spengel’s emendation is part of a larger rewriting, i.e.
ὑπεροχήν δεῖ [δὲ] τὸν ὑπερέχοντα κτλ., which avoids the pleonasm
but is anyway unnecessary.
1239a14 οὐδὲν ἰσχύει: that this is the intention of the correction in

Laur. 81,4 is clear, even if the details are not; the important novelty is a
grave accent appearing over the original epsilon. (Victorius writes ‘fort.
οὐδὲν ἰσχύει’ in the margin.) I note however that τὸν μικρὸν, written in
error for τὸ μικρὸν at the beginning of the sentence, is not corrected.
(Or is that further correction presupposed, once given the restoration of
οὐδὲν ἰσχύει?)
a21 διατί L: δια and τὶ are separated in L only because split between
lines; δια has no accent.
a23 οὐ P1, ὁ P2: most of P’s original upsilon is erased by P2, with smooth
breathing heavily altered to rough.
a28 Rackham’s ϕιλούμενος for ϕιλότιμος is entirely unnecessary:

ἐκεῖνος is naturally taken as being the one who χαίρει μᾶλλον τῷ
ϕιλεῖσθαι, and the sentence as a whole, with ϕιλότιμος, gives more or
less the same sense that Rackham claims to get from it, in a more convo-
luted way, with ϕιλούμενος.
a30 Spengel’s dative might be right, and would certainly work, but it
does no harm to have the genitive, understanding ϕίλος from just before.
a30–1 ἔνεστι γὰρ ἀνάγκῃ ἐνεργοῦντι: P2 supplies ϕιλεῖν in the mar-

gin above, this being the top line in P, with insertion marks in both the
text, after ἐνεργοῦντα, and in the margin before ϕιλεῖν. But we have no
need of the supplement: Richards’s emendation is splendidly economical,
and the result is elegantly laconic: ‘For [pleasure] is necessarily inherent
in the active exercise of love’, Kenny, translating Richards’s text, in the
Oxford World’s Classics translation.
a31 τὸ μὲν γὰρ ϕιλεῖσθαι συμβεβηκός: in P the original copyist writes

ϕιλ at the end of the line, presumably meaning to complete the word—as
ϕιλεῖν, presumably, as in CBL—in the next line, but then failing to com-
plete it; P2 adds εῖσθαι to the ϕιλ in the margin.
a34 Susemihl’s punctuation must be right (σημεῖον δέ· ἕλοιτ’ ἂν).

Victorius, who significantly increases the amount of punctuation in the
Aldine, uses a comma.
Aristotelica 133
a35–6 The MSS’ ὑπερβολαῖς is plainly hopeless; NE 1159a28–9 is prob

ably enough to justify Victorius’ conjecture of ὑποβολαῖς.
a38 With the omission of αὑτοῦ/αὐτοῦ, καὶ and ἀλλὰ μὴ ποιεῖν the
text in B still gives a sense, but an impoverished one by comparison
with PCL’s.
b1 Bekker, Susemihl, and Walzer/Mingay all by implication suggest

unanimity among the MSS around τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦ ϕιλεῖν ἕνεκα,
but PC here deserve a second look. After τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦ both have a
simple ϕι with lambda above the iota, followed by an acute accent, and
this in my view ought to be read as ϕίλου, not as ϕιλεῖν, coming as it
does after τοῦ (i.e. directly after a genitive, not after the infinitive ποιεῖν).
I also think that ϕίλου—which is also in B—gives a better sense than L’s
ϕιλεῖν, γινώσκειν . . . τοῦ ϕίλου ἕνεκα nicely contrasting with a37–8
γινώσκεσθαι αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα. B1’s τοῦ ϕιλεῖν καὶ is presumably a mistake
(B2 writes ου above the -ειν of ϕιλεῖν, but that makes things worse).
b3 In these last few lines, and indeed in the next few, B puzzlingly seems
to offer an abbreviated version of what is preserved in the other MSS; b1
is an exception.
b8 ὑπὸ: C has what could just have been read as ἀπὸ (and is so reported
by Walzer/Mingay), apart from the rough breathing; the style of the
upsilon in P has a certain similarity to C’s. On συμπεριλαμβανόντων
(‘including’), see note on 1235a6 above; emending both here and
there, Spengel presumes an identical corruption in two widely sepa
rated but connected places, which is possible but implausible when
(συμ)περιλαμβανείν will fit in any case (similarly Walzer/Mingay).
b10 καὶ περὶ τούτων desunt in B: once again, how to explain these
omissions in B? It is not a regular feature of this MS, but is especially
noticeable in the last twenty lines or so. After this, with some minor
exceptions, it begins once again to look more like the other MSS.
b14 P2 writes γρ.: ἐς ἑσπέραν in the margin.
b15 συμμεταβάλλωσιν von der Mühll: but συμβάλλειν here is ‘make

contracts’ (cf. 1237b26). —P2 conjures up οὐ out of οἱ by overwriting.
1239b18 δὲ seclusi: we surely need either the καὶ before ἕκαστον—which

must be connective?—or δὲ, not both; for straightforwardly linking two
observations καὶ is perhaps marginally preferable. (Rackham’s ‘and also
everything . . .’ would surely, in this context, be ἕκαστον δὲ καὶ . . .’?)
b19 Apelt’s διαλέξεις is a neat solution that might simultaneously help

to explain the definite article in PCB (perhaps the rarity of the word
itself help cause the corruption?). However, ἕξεις looks quite acceptable;
is it not true that people in the same family grouping who share the same
characteristics tend to take pleasure in those characteristics? Jackson’s
replacement of διὸ καὶ ϕωναὶ καὶ ἕξεις with διὸ καὶ ἐϕ’ ὧν δίκαιαι
ἕξεις is surely only worth recording as a curiosity. (συνημερεύσεις is
evidently a hapax: not just Rackham’s ‘society’, for which there are more
ordinary words; more Inwood and Woolf ’s ‘pastimes’?)
b22 Κακὸς κακῷ δὲ συντέτηκεν ἡδονῇ seclusi: that the line has no
introduction, and that the same line was cited only a few pages back
1238a35 strongly indicates that it originated, in this location, as a gloss.
b32 ὥστε Rieckher: but there is a clear sense that Aristotle is building
a case against friendship between opposites, to which the observation
introduced by ἔτι here contributes.
b36 Without Spengel’s ὄτι the sense would have to be ‘[sc. and] not in
the mean, whichever it is’, which is difficult enough without a connect
ive; but in any case since the preceding εἰ δὲ μή stands for εἰ δὲ μή εἰς
τὸ μέσον καθίστανται, the sentence has already told us that the
ἐναντία are not in the mean. What we have not been told, explicitly, is
that their not being in the mean is what causes them to be ἀεὶ ἐν
ἐπιθυμίᾳ.
b38 πᾶσι LB2, πᾶσαν P1CB1, πᾶσιν P2: the -ιν in P is surely written by a
later hand; either an original -αν has been erased (and there is perhaps a
faint trace of it), or else the P copyist was faced with πᾶσαν, knew it was
wrong but did not commit himself to an alternative, leaving a gap. This
would not be the only case of such a phenomenon in P, but in this case is
unlikely, given that with two dative masculine plurals following πᾶσιν
would be the obvious choice (so I think -αν was originally there, the nu
Aristotelica 135
encouraging the redundant nu in the new ending). In B two iotas appear

to be written above the -αν, one with and one without the two dots usu-
ally associated with iotas: so Β2 and B3?
1240a2 In B ῥαθύμοις ends the last line on the page, and the θύμοις
unusually spills out into the margin; it receives what is apparently a
modest decoration—three dots in a triangle—underneath, as it were by
way of compensation.
a4 καθ’ αὑτὸ δὲ appears in the margin of P, clearly marked as intended

to replace καὶ.
a6 Walzer/Mingay adopts a οἱ before ϕιλούμενοι that Bekker and

Susemihl get from Marc.; it is not in any of PCBL, and in EE is
not missed.
a8 C’s loss of δὲ is no doubt helped by the fact that the preceding περὶ
ends a line; the copyist’s eye slips to what περὶ governs. —Susemihl acci-
pendently checking the MSS, to comment ‘περὶ δὲ 〈τοῦ〉 seems

dentally omits the τοῦ, apparently causing Richards, who is not inde
necessary’. Walzer/Mingay wrongly claims that it is not in P.
a11 ϕίλους deest in B: in this case what is lacking in B is something that

could easily be understood.
a13 Richards deletes ἡ on the grounds that ϕιλία is the predicate, which
it is: ‘this friendship is [sc. ϕιλία] κατὰ ἀναλογίαν’; he seems to have
missed the preceding αὕτη.
a15 δι’ ὃ scripsi, δι’ ἃ PCBL: it is not the two elements involved, them-
selves, that explain what follows, but the fact that there are two elements
involved, which is what is picked up by the τῷ in the next line; as it
happens, δι’ ὃ is what all translators actually translate, and I think it
would be hard for them to do otherwise, given the logic of the sentence.
Such a corruption, i.e. δι’ ὃ to δι’ ἃ, is perhaps easy enough after ἐν
δυσὶ . . . διῃρημένοις. I write δι’ ὃ rather than διὸ on the grounds that
δι’ ὃ would have made the corruption easier (B, incidentally, omits the
elision mark, writing διἃ). —Susemihl’s supplement of ὡς is essential, as
the Latin translator saw (‘velut’), since otherwise οὕτως would be left
(1240a15) high and dry: ‘which is why a person is ϕίλος to himself

more in the way, in the case of the ἀκρατής and ἐγκρατής, we said that
they were in a way (πὼς) ἑκὼν ἢ ἄκων’. PCB’s πῶς should be taken as
πὼς, although their copyists probably took it as interrogative (but note
L’s πως), as do modern translators despite the contortions required to
do so; this is one case where accenting πὼς instead of πῶς, i.e. for ‘in a
certain way’, is helpful.
a17 With ὅμοιον, the following τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα will be an accusative

of respect: ‘and it’s similar with all such questions’ (Spengel’s ὅμοια actu-
ally resembles the sort of mistake the copyists might easily have made,
aligning the adjective with the following three neuter plurals).
a20 διῃρημένως PCBL, BL with an iota subscript: such iotas appear in

these MSS, if they do, especially when they occur in the middle of a
word rather than in the ending—and rather more frequently in B than
in PCL. —ἴ[σως]: ᾗ (= ἧ) P2 in margin; there are also signs of an earlier
correction in the text itself, though I think it may just be an alternative
ligature for ει.
a21 ἴ[σως]: ᾗ (ἧ) δ’ οὐ in right margin of P, with insertion marks there

and in the text. Bekker’s εἰ is of a pair with P1CB’s εἰ in the preceding
line; the double πως following is against him, as is the textual evidence
(ᾗ L, ἡ P1CB).
a22 The ὡς after ἕξεως is presumably by dittography. I think Bekker

(who here unusually uses square brackets rather than just omitting ὡς)
is right that we can do without a verb, but if one is needed Spengel’s
εἰσιν would be harmless; Russell’s proposal to replace the διωρισμένοι
following with διορίζονται fails to convince.
a27–8 μὴ ὅτι τὸ εἶναι, τούτον ἂν δόξειε μάλιστα ϕιλεῖν scripsi: μήτοι

τὸ εἶναι, τούτῳ ἂν δόξειε μάλιστα ϕίλος εἶναι Jackson; μὴ ὅτι τὸ
εἶναι, τούτῳ ἂν δόξειε μάλιστα ϕίλος εἶναι Dirlmeier. The MSS pre-
sent us with a mess, to which a combination of Jackson and Dirlmeier
offers a solution. Jackson’s μήτοι has the better claim paleographically,
but there are evidently no parallels for the use he has in mind (‘still less’),
in Aristotle or anywhere else: Bekker records two examples of μή τοί γε
Aristotelica 137
in Aristotle, but they are quite different, involving a quasi-imperative sense.

Dirlmeier, following Bender, proposes μὴ ὅτι, and in the absence of any
better alternative I accept that, in the sense of ‘let alone’ (Dirlmeier’s
‘geschweige denn’, nedum). What Aristotle requires is not to exclude τὸ
εἶναι specifically, only to make clear that there is no reference to τὸ
εἶναι either: some people think friendship is a matter of wishing some-
one to exist irrespective of whether the wisher is bestowing any of the
goods mentioned in the previous endoxon/τρόπος, or indeed bestowing
existence itself—well, of course people love their children. (Dirlmeier’s
own explanation of the clause, as referring to the one loving distributing
himself, i.e. between friends, as per NE 1171a3, probably makes too
much of διανέμειν as ‘distribute’, when it can be just ‘assign’; the point is
just to distinguish this τρόπος completely from the previous one; and in
any case a reference to self- distribution would be irrelevant here.)
—τούτον ἂν δόξειε: changing the MSS’ τούτῳ to τούτον is more eco-
nomical than changing ϕιλεῖν to ϕίλος εἶναι, and writing a dative
before ἂν δόξειε in error instead of the necessary accusative would be
easy enough. The gap in L, caused presumably by preceding, and irre-
trievable, corruption after the initial μὴ, amounts to nearly a line. This is
one of a handful of contexts in which Harlfinger’s hypothesis that L is a
direct descendant of ω, the common ultimate source of PCBL, comes
under significant strain.
a31 ὁ P1, οἱ1 P2: P originally started the line with ὁ; P2 erases the original
omicron, substitutes an iota and adds an omicron outside the margin.
—τὸ ἑαυτοῖς: understand ἀγαθόν (τὸ ἑαυτοῖς [ἀγαθόν]), and indeed a
lot more; another example of EE at its most succinct (cf. also next note).
a32 Fritzsche’s supplement of ἂν μὴ is unnecessary; it would be entirely

characteristic of EE to omit it the third time round.
a33 The two words ἀγαπᾶν θήσομεν are not just (1) in the wrong place
(the following example relating to slaves and their masters explains μὴ
δι’ ἕτερόν τι and not ἀγαπᾶν θήσομεν); it is also odd, as Jackson
observed, (2) that ἀγαπᾶν should suddenly be used in place of ϕιλεῖν
(notwithstanding Dirlmeier’s reference to NE 1167b32), and (3) θήσομεν
looks strangely assertive in a context that is essentially concerned with
(1240a33) endoxa, unless it is engineered, implausibly, into a question.

Susemihl’s proposal, i.e. making ἀγαπᾶν θήσομεν follow οὐ δι’ αὐτούς
in the line below, only deals with (1)—and if we are going to relocate the
words, they might fit better after συναλγεῖν (which is where Kenny’s
World’s Classics translation and Inwood/Woolf in the Cambridge transla-
tion seem covertly to place them, as perhaps Robinson does too: see next
note). I propose that the words originated as a gloss, originally inserted in
the margin by someone who thought, rightly, that the sentence was
incomplete, especially given the way it resumes, without warning, the list
of criteria people use for ϕιλία after a comment about how some of these
conflict. But such awkwardnesses are not out of character for the EE, or
indeed for the present context as a whole (for perhaps an even more
extreme case see b8 καὶ τὸ εἶναι μάλιστα, κτλ). We are required to fill
out with something like ‘[people] also [think] grieving with someone [a
feature of friendship]’, and can easily do it for ourselves. In any case as it
stands, with ἀγαπᾶν θήσομεν, the structure of the sentence (pace
runs . . . ἀγαπᾶν θήσομεν 〈οὐχ〉 οἷον οἱ δοῦλοι πρὸς τοὺς δεσπότας ὅτι
Dirlmeier) is surely unsupportable. Fritzsche’s complete proposal
χαλεποὶ ἀλγοῦντες, ἀλλ’ οὐ δι’ αὐτοὺς, 〈ἀλλ〉 ὥσπερ . . . , which either

increases the awkwardness of the sentence or just spreads it more widely.
a35 If we were to keep ἀγαπᾶν θήσομεν, and keep it where it is,

Robinson’s deletion of the negative before δι’ αὐτοὺς would probably be
necessary; by the same token, that the negative is there in the MSS con-
stitutes further evidence of the intrusiveness of ἀγαπᾶν θήσομεν.
a37 B2 corrects ὀϕείλει to ὁ ϕίλος by writing ὁ, ι and -ος above the line
in the text.
a38 εἴ τε μή Jackson: the τε is intended to pick up the MSS’ μάλιστά τε

at the beginning of the sentence, but this looks at best contrived.
a39 A supplement is certainly needed (τὸ γὰρ supplevi), but τὸ γὰρ will
be enough, leaving χαίρειν to be understood, in line with the general
succinctness of the surrounding context; that Lat. supplies it (gaudere) is no
surprise, since any translator will have to spell it out. (Putting in χαίρειν
would allow us to explain the loss of τὸ γὰρ, by homoioteleuton, but
then, τὸ γὰρ might be equally at risk without χαίρειν there to explain it.)
Aristotelica 139
1240b3 The deletion of μὴ by P2 is done inconspicuously by means of

dots beneath it.
b6 οὐδὲ χάριτος P1L, οὐ χάριτος CB: the MSS’ readings are clearly not
right. Apelt’s οὐδὲ χάριν τινός, ‘nor for the sake of something/someone’,
is palaeographically defensible but would say much the same as the
preceding διά τι ἕτερον, while Robinson’s supplement of ἔνεκα both
preserves οὐ(δὲ) χάριτος and is plausible in itself (‘to curry favour’, or
‘to return a favour’?). But Spengel’s οὐδὲ χάριτας, ‘nor [because of]
favours [being given/returned]’ gives the same sense more economically
(and succinctly). There are traces of a correction in P, possibly including
the addition of ιρ to χα´, i.e. the first part of χάριτος, that ends the line:
Susemihl reports ‘χαίρει τι (?) mg. rc. Pb [= P]’, but the τι, if that is what
it is, is floating free opposite the line above the present one (something
else was perhaps also once added after ριτος at the beginning of the
next line; or else the -ος ending is in ras.).
b7 Bonitz’s ϕιλεῖσθαι plus the Aldine’s βούλεσθαι for the following

βούλεται, giving us Susemihl’s δοκεῖ γὰρ ϕιλεῖσθαι βούλεσθαι, flow
from accepting L’s δοκεῖ at the beginning of the sentence. But as L’s own
βούλεται suggests, and as PCB confirm, δοκεῖ is a simple error. Not,
then, ‘he seems to want to be loved’, but ‘he wants to seem (δοκεῖν in
emphatic first position) to love, not actually to love’.
b7–8 P2 writes ἀλλ’ οὐ τὸ ϕιλεῖν in the margin, with marks to indicate

that it is to replace ἀλλ’ οὐ ϕιλεῖν.
b8 Russell’s συνεῖναι for εἶναι is a superficially attractive proposal, but

Aristotle is continuing to show how ἅπαντα ταῦτα ἐπαναϕέρεται
πρὸς τὸν ἕνα, and it would be a big omission if (wishing x) to exist was
missing from the list. (Besides, is there a difference between συνεῖναι
and συζῆν, which comes next in the list? Would Aristotle need both?)
b11 Contra Richards, ἴσως is a more striking way, in this context, of

saying ἔστιν ὡς; contra Rackham, the point of ἴσως—surely—is to
qualify the preceding οὕτω (in which case οὕτως for ἴσως would in a
way overturn not only what the MSS say Aristotle is saying, but what we
would expect him to be saying: we don’t actually live with ourselves).
(1240b11) Dirlmeier defends ἴσως by taking it to mean ‘on an equal

footing’ (comparing b3); in any case ἴσως must stand.
b12 There is no trace in L of the δὲ γὰρ reported by Walzer/Mingay.
b18 ὅμοιος Bekker, ὅμοιοι PCBL: Fritzsche’s ὁμοιοῖ is neat, but surely
impossible; ‘be like’ ought to be ὁμοιοῦσθαι? Simple dittography on the
part of a copyist (i.e. with ὅμοιοι)?
b19–20 γρ: ϕύσει δὲ τοιοῦτος ὁ ἀγαθός P2 in margin.
b20 B2 writes ος above the ὸν of ἀγαθὸν.
b21 ὕστερος: or should this be ὕστερον, given that five adverbs follow?
—P2 produces τῶ by adding the necessary vertical stroke in the bottom
of the ligature for τό, and converting the grave accent to a circumflex.
b22 πότερον to πρότερον: P2 converts the omicron to rho, and installs

an omicron next to it—actually in the bottom of P’s mark for -ον, the
ligature for τερ being above the original omicron. —P2 writes με above
the small gap between the ligature for ετα and the lambda of
μεταληπτικός; he does not complete the correction by changing πτ
to a simple tau, nor does he need to—Pal. 165, which is generally a
faithful copy of P, then evidently reads μεταμελητικός without
difficulty.
b23 P2 writes οὐδ’ ὥσπερ in the margin, with an insertion mark there
and above the εἰ δεῖ in the text (Susemihl mistakenly reports P2 as
supplying οὐδ’ before b22 ὥσπερ1). One can see why this reader might
have thought a negative necessary, after a string of them, but εἰ δεῖ is
‘if we really must’, i.e. bring the sophists in, ‘as with that (silly) business
of Coriscus and σπουδαῖος Coriscus’; taken with the following γὰρ-
clause, the phrasing combines brevity with a certain elegance.
b25 τὸ αὐτὸ πόσον: neither Richards’s nor Dirlmeier’s emendation is

helpful; both seem to take Aristotle here as describing the ἀκρατής,
which is surely impossible. Far from being ‘unmeaning’, τὸ αὐτὸ πόσον
looks perfectly in order (‘the same amount of [the two Coriscuses, i.e.
the person and the good person] is σπουδαῖον’).
Aristotelica 141
b26 Some translators appear unwilling to treat this talk of ‘killing them-
selves’ as literally intended; but can Aristotle not be saying that if the
good (have reason to) lay charges against themselves, they actually—
being good—do kill themselves? (Or does their being good, for Aristotle,
rule out the possibility that they could ever have reason to kill
themselves?)
b27 P2 writes τὸ εἶναι in margin, with insertion marks there and before
εἶναι in the text.
b30–1 P2 writes ἴσως: ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων οὐκ ἐστὶν ἵππος αὐτὸς
αὑτῷ οὐκ ἄρα ϕίλος in the margin; apart from the puzzling substitu-
tion of ἐστὶν for P’s οἷον, this seems to me to be right. Neither lacuna
(Susemihl) nor supplement (Rieckher, Richards, Ross) after οἷον ἵππος
αὐτὸς αὑτῷ is in my view necessary: a negative in the clause is easily
understood (‘as for example a horse is not . . .’) from the preceding οὐ as
supplied by P2, who is followed by Spengel, and a δοκεῖ, similarly, is
easily understood from the preceding μὲν-clause; then ‘is not . . .’ can be
filled out with ἀγαθός, ὀρεκτός, vel sim., without this having to be
spelled out. After all, the idea of a horse being anything itself to itself is
absurd. Given the frequently elliptical style of EE, I propose that we
should not expect an overt signal for us to go back to b26–7 ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ
πᾶς αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ἀγαθός, i.e. the beginning of the last sentence.
b33 If the MSS’ παῖς is unacceptable, as editors from Susemihl appear
generally to have agreed, then νοῦς is a possible replacement. It would
be used in a role more general than that assigned to it in NE VI ‘=’ EE V,
but such a use is familiar enough in the undisputed books of both works:
NE IX.8, 1169a17 πᾶς . . . νοῦς, called tentatively in aid by Mingay, is a
case in point. As for the question how νοῦς could have morphed into
παῖς (πᾶς νοῦς aside: ὁ πᾶς νοῦς for ὁ παῖς would sit uneasily with the
specific ἤδη γὰρ τότε), the general unreliability of the MS tradition plus
the fact that children are already the subject of the sentence might be
explanation enough. Yet the case for emendation is not yet quite made.
The context is all about individuals’ relationship to themselves: why
should Aristotle not be talking here about παῖδες—not, now, any longer
παιδία, but old enough to have a relationship with themselves by virtue
(1240b33) of their acquisition of προαίρεσις and λόγος? (This would

help meet Dirlmeier’s point that children are already the subject, so ren-
dering ὁ παῖς redundant.) The sense in any case is scarcely affected: what
διαϕωνεῖ in the παῖς will be either νοῦς or λόγος with ἐπιθυμία. But
I resist emending, partly because it would be hard to choose which to
read, νοῦς or λόγος (Fritzsche himself is undecided; προαίρεσις [von
Fragstein] could be aligned with ἐπιθυμία), but also because, as I have
suggested, παῖς might be a better fit with the context. Stet.
1241a4 ταὐτόν: only C has the crasis mark.
a7–8 I propose that once εὔνοια had usurped the place of ϕιλία after
ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ, the eye of a copyist went straight to εὔνοια τοῦ
εὐνοϊζομένου in one recensio (in fact, in α´), not in the other (i.e. in L, or
its predecessor if there was another MS between L and ω); the only
objection to this is, I think, that εὔνοια is perhaps in a strange position—
but perhaps not. P2’s δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ εὔνοια οὐ τοῦ εὐνοϊζομένου εἶναι,
written in the margin, is presumably intended as a substitute for the
mess in the text, though with no insertion marks and no prefatory ‘ἴσ.’ or
‘γρ.’ it could just be a gloss giving the main sense.
a9 εἴτε δὴ (Susemihl): copyists could well be forgiven for forgetting the

εἴτε in a6, which is naturally answered by another; the δὴ then acknow
ledges that it has been some time since that εἴτε. L perhaps understood
ἡ [εὔνοια], which is impossible; Marc. then reasonably substitutes ἦν for
L’s ἡ, but εἴτε δὴ ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἡδέος ϕιλίᾳ will suffice by itself, picking up
as it does from a5–6 οὔτ’ ἐν τῇ χρησίμῃ οὔτ’ ἐν τῇ καθ’ ἡδονήν ἐστιν
[εὔνοια], εἴτε γὰρ. . . .
a11 P2 overwrites P’s original beta in βούλεσθαι with a beta of a sort

more familiar to us, and perhaps to him.
a15 In common with von Fragstein, I see no need to posit a lacuna

before δοκοῦσι: ‘Zuvor war gesagt, die εὔνοια sei nur der Anfang der
Freundschaft . . . das soll begrundet werden: denn die “ganzen” Freunde
(man verzeihe den Ausdruck!), οἱ ϕίλοι, begnügen sich nicht mit dem
εὐνοεῖν, sondern fordern das ὁμονοεῖν. —Damit ist in eleganter Weise
der Übergang von der Eunoia zur Homonoia geschaffen . . .’ (p. 330). The
Aristotelica 143
apparatus need not be burdened with the various suggestions for filling
the supposed lacuna (see Susemihl).
a16 Dirlmeier’s οὔτε is meant to pair with the MSS’ οὔτε in a18.
a17 πρακτικὰ/πρακτὰ: P2 erases -ικὰ and substitutes ὰ.
a18 P2 writes οὐ μόνον κατὰ διάνοιαν ἢ κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἀλλὰ καὶ

κατὰ ὄρεξιν, prefaced by ἴσως, in the margin at the bottom of the page.
But such rewriting is unnecessary: presumably Aristotle means us to
understand a second μόνον with κατὰ ὄρεξιν.
a18–19 ἔστι γὰρ τἀναντία τὸ κινοῦν ἐπιθυμεῖν: the phrasing offered us

by the MSS is certainly unexpected, but I cannot see anything terminally
objectionable about it. I construe ‘for it is possible for what moves [us] to
desire in opposite ways’, ἐπιθυμεῖν being used here, as not infrequently
in Aristotle, of desire in general. Richards comments, of his own
τἀναντί’, ἂν τύχῃ, νοεῖν [presumably followed by 〈καὶ〉 ἐπιθυμεῖν]?’

proposal, that it ‘does not well account for τὸ κινοῦν. Might we think of
To which the answer is, surely not. One of Dirlmeier’s two objections to
the transmitted text, that κινεῖν does not take the infinitive, is curiously
off the mark, while his other objection, that ἐπιθυμεῖν does not take the
accusative, can be met by referring to several cases of τἀναντία in
Aristotle being used in a quasi-adverbial way (Bonitz, Index 247b26–8);
and editors retain the following τοῦτο—to what, if not to τὸ κινοῦν, will it
refer? (In common with other translators, Dirlmeier treats διαϕωνεῖ as
impersonal, and τοῦτο as accusative of respect, which is perhaps pos
sible but hardly immediately and obviously attractive.) —This is one of
those several moments where in my view it is important not to iron out
what appear to be special features of EE in order to produce uniformity
with the NE (a goal that was important only, or mainly, so long as the
authenticity of EE was suspect) and/or our general expectations of
Aristotle; fortunately, as the various suggested emendations confirm, the
broad sense, here, of what he is saying is not in doubt.
a20 οὐδ’ εἰ P2: Susemihl mentions still more proposed emendations of

οὐ δεῖ (P1CBL) than those I have listed, but they are all surely trumped
by the simplicity and elegance of P2’s (writing an elision mark above the
(1241a20) line followed by a smooth breathing superimposed on the

circumflex of οὐ δεῖ, with a confirmatory ει in the margin, probably by the
same hand), even if it requires the following change—one P2 also
makes—from ὁμονοεῖν to ὁμονοεῖ (changing the supralinear mark for
-ειν to the ligature for ει); after all, the infinitive would be a natural con-
sequence of the corruption to οὐ δεῖ. I construe ‘nor, if a person ὁμονοεῖ
κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν, will they [always] do so κατὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν too’
(cf. Rackham); Susemihl’s peremptory dismissal of P2’s proposal (‘per-
peram rc. Pb’) seems to me an unusual lapse of judgement on his part.
a21 P2’s εἴ γε in the margin may have lacked the accent; in any case
another hand seems to add a breathing and accent above the original
breathing.
a24 διὸ: Donini proposes δι’ ἣν because he cannot see how Aristotle can
say ‘which is why οἱ ϕαῦλοι cannot ὁμονοεῖν’, and then immediately go
on to say there is another sort of ὁμονοία according to which they can.
I assume that we are supposed to supply κατὰ ταύτην; in any case the
ἑτέρα ὁμονοία will be ὁμονοία of a secondary and inferior sort.
a29 ὑπάρχειν post ἀμϕοῖν suppl. P2: in the margin, with insertion
marks there and in the text.
a29–30 οἱ ὁμονοοῦντες δ’ PL, οἱ ὁμονοοῦντες C, οἱ ὁομονοοῦντες B:

because of that extra omicron it looks reasonable to suppose that B had
οἱ δ’ ὁμονοοῦντες in front of him, whereas—to judge from P—C had οἱ
ὁμονοοῦντες δ’.
a35 ϕιλοῦντες in P1CBL is presumably by attraction, as it were, to the
following participles; it has nothing to recommend it. P2 achieves
ϕιλοῦσιν by a mixture of erasure and overwriting.
a35–6 In P there appears a heading in the margin, which runs διατί
μᾶλλον ϕίλοι (unless part of the last word has been cut off in the pro-
cess of binding; probably not, because there is a clear acute accent over
the first iota of ϕίλοι) οἱ ποιήσαντες αὐτοὺς παθόντας ἢ οἱ παθόντες
ἑαυτοὺς ποιήσαντες; clearly the heading was entered before the
corrections, in the shape of P2’s οἱ ποιήσαντες εὖ τοὺς παθόντας ἢ οἱ
παθόντες εὖ τοὺς ποιήσαντας, were made to the text, in the text itself.
Aristotelica 145
This is no surprise, because the hands—and the shades of the ink—in

the marginalia, and in the corrections in the text, often differ: we are
reading the responses of multiple readers. B2 adds the sign for -ας above
the -ες of παθόντες in the text, which is a further sign of B’s being cor-
rected against (a manuscript like?) P or C. —That Bessarion in Par. 2042
reads P2’s text here is one of a number of instances that confirm he was
working from the P tradition after at least one layer of corrections;
another such case may be at 1241b9, where like P2 he supplies the article
with μήτηρ. But he is also certainly doing some correction of his own:
so e.g. at 1241b6 and 8 (see apparatus).
a37 ὑπολάβοιεν BP2: P2 adds the ligature for -εν over the iota and
marks the -μεν of ὑπολάβοιμεν (which I think must be original, despite
the unusually flamboyant -εν) for deletion.
a38 Would PL’s αὐτῷ, preferred e.g. by Susemihl and Walzer/Mingay,

not naturally refer to the recipient rather than the benefactor/lender?
—συμβαίνειν ΒP2: P2 inserts a version of the mark for -ειν over the -ει.
συμβαίνει was evidently in ω, the ultimate common source of PCBL; B,
it seems, is correcting independently (not for the first or last time).
a38–9 τῷ μὲν γὰρ Fritzsche: τὸ μὲν γὰρ P1, ὁ μὲν γὰρ P2. An erasure
certainly underlies the ὁ in P, and the signs are that what was erased was
a τὸ, as in CBL; the typical confusion of omicron for omega, then, in ω,
made worse by P2.
1241b4–5 καὶ αἱ μητέρες τῶν πατέρων is certainly out of place here;

it plainly belongs where it appears again, in b7.
b9 P2 writes the ἡ proposed by Fritzsche above the mu of (the abbrevi

ation for) μήτηρ; it is not needed.
b12 ἡ2 secl. Fritzsche: von Fragstein urges us (and more immediately,

Susemihl, who accepts Fritzsche’s deletion) to recognize the fact ‘dass
Ar. Zitaten etc. gegenüber sich recht frei verhalten kann, sie insbeson-
dere gern in einen vorhandenen syntaktischen Zusammenhang einbaut.
Hier aber wird der Artikel vor ϕιλότης als Kennzeichnung des Subjekts
geradezu verlangt durch das vorhergehende ἡ ϕιλία ἐν ἰσότητι’ (p. 332).
I am persuaded.
1241b16 ‘Perhaps the Greek should be emended to give “not similar” (to
those mentioned)’, Rackham; but there is no reason why Aristotle should
not be saying that the following pairs resemble each other—which
would be rather more to the point.
b19 Jackson’s οὐδ’ ἕν for the οὐδέν deleted by Fritzsche has the weakness
that οὐδ’ ἕν would be quite redundant. Kenny translates it ‘and has no
unity of its own’, but that somewhat fills out οὐδ’ ἕν, which on the face of
it just spells out what is already implicit in the second item’s being con-
trasted with the first. Dittography, then, before οὐδὲ (Dirlmeier), or else
οὐδέν originated in a gloss by someone thinking along the same lines as
Jackson.
b20–1 Richards claims that ἀμϕοτέρων is the predicate, but we can

surely read τὸ ἀμϕοτέρων τοῦ ἑνὸς οὗ ἕνεκά ἐστιν as τὸ ἀμϕοτέρων
οὗ ἕνεκα τοῦ ἑνός ἐστιν; this is more awkward than Richards’s rewrit-
ing, but quite workable.
b24 ἢ secl. Bonitz: pace von Fragstein, it would be odd—see e.g. Politics
IV.4—for Aristotle to say that χρηματιστικαὶ κοινωνίαι (b25) were
not μόριον τῶν τῆς πόλεως κοινωνιῶν, which is what he would be
saying with this ἢ, pairing as it would have to with the second ἢ in the
next line. Bonitz’s second suggestion, replacing ἢ with πῃ, reflects an
understandable unease—visible also in Fritzsche’s positing of a lacuna
before ἢ μόριον—both with the following singular μόριον and with the
idea that ‘the other κοινωνίαι’ are part[s] of the κοινωνίαι of the city,
when they surely themselves are those κοινωνίαι. What we might per-
haps have expected is μόρια τῆς τῆς πόλεως κοινωνίας, but that is not
what the MSS offer us. Kenny’s ‘subset’ for μόριον (in the Oxford World’s
Classics translation) mitigates the problem a little, and perhaps enough
to ward off the temptation to print μόρια τῆς τῆς. . . : ἡ τῶν ϕρατέρων
ἢ τῶν ὀργεώνων [κοινωνία] certainly suggests that we are dealing
with types of κοινωνία. —B2 supplies πο above the μο of μόλεως. —ἡ
τῶν LP2: there are clear signs of erasure beneath the P2’s clumsy ἡ, and
slightly less clear signs of the emendation of τῆς to τῶν through the
substitution of a circumflex for the usual miniature sigma over the tau
used for τῆς, the original circumflex above that miniature sigma now
Aristotelica 147
serving as the sign for ων. (These details might just be of interest in rela-
tion to the problematic τῶν τῆς πόλεως κοινωνιῶν: see above.)
b25 συγγενῶν P2, written in above ϕρατέρων, might perhaps be a gloss

rather than a correction. —ὀργέων, as gen. pl. of ὀργεύς (see the revised
supplement to LSJ [1996]) is the most economical replacement for the MSS’
ὀργίων here, but ὀργεώνων, adopted by Walzer/Mingay, remains an
option; P2’s μυστηρίων, for its part, written in above ὀργίων, may be
another gloss like his συγγενῶν. —χρηματικαὶ CBL was, evidently,
what was in ω; Nikolaos evidently corrected to χρηματιστικαὶ here in
P but not when he was writing C. Laur. 81,4, in the part ultimately
descended from L, typically repeats the original error; PCB all make the
reverse error with ἀριστοκρατική in b30, i.e. writing ἀριστοκρατιστική,
CB in b36 too—where P2 corrects ἀριστοκρατική to ἀριστοκρατιστική.
—How ἔτι πολιτεῖαι got into the text is unclear. The problems with this
sentence as a whole are sufficiently large and numerous to make it
tempting to obelize it, but the general sense is clear enough.
b26 ἐν οἰκείοις vs ἐν οἰκίαις (Fritzsche): why not ‘among family-

members’?
b27 A combination of the readings in L and P1CB gives us παρεκβάσεις

well enough. P2 corrects, and may mean to offer us παρεκβάσεις, but it
is hard to be certain about his intention; Pal. 165 (which I have not been
able to check here) might help, if it was copied after P2’s intervention.
b33 B2 writes in ει written above the ἤ of ἤδη.
b34 πολιτικὴ vs δημοκρατικὴ: some qualification of ἡ κοινωνία is

plainly required, given that we are to be told that there are some κοινωνίαι
that are not κατ’ ἀριθμόν; if the choice is between a πολιτικὴ and a
δημοκρατικὴ κοινωνία, then as Dirlmeier says, Aristotle would pre-
sumably refer to the ὀρθή version, not the παρέκβασις. —ἡ ἑτιρικὴ
(= a Byzantine ἑταιρικὴ?) is written by P2 in the margin above, this
being the top line of the page.
b36 ἀρίστη: a second hand writes in ιστ above the ετ in B’s ἀρετὴ.
The ἀρίστη is striking, but once the article is restored (Ross) there is
no reason to bracket it, with Bussemaker—who, to do him justice, was
(1241b36) only trying to save the sentence, in the absence of Ross’s sup-
plement: Aristotle and everybody else would be all too familiar with
self-declared ‘aristocracies’. —C has the crasis mark on ταὐτὸν.
1242a1 P2 evidently corrects λέγων, probably to λέγονται.
a3 καὶ υἱῶν: the corruption to πρὸς υἱόν in C and B would be easy

enough, with a dittography after the abbreviation for πατρὸς = πρς´
(with bar over), and with a typical omicron for omega. Autrement dit,
this is an interesting but not particularly significant shared error.
a4 κατ’ ἀριθμῶν B1: B2 writes what may charitably be interpreted as the

sign for -ον, plus appropriate accent, above the omega.
a6 There is a gloss on πρέσβειον in P, at the top of the page, partly cut

off in the binding process, which appears to have read πρέσβειον τὸ ἐν
τινὶ δῶρον. —The μὲν here is presumably answered by a8–9 μόνη δ’ ἡ
πολιτικὴ, κτλ.
a7 The conjecture αὐταρκεῖν for the impossible αὐτάρκει/αὐτάρκη
of the MSS, reportedly in the third edition of the Basle Aristotle, is
unattractive, despite its being enshrined in LSJ, the only other example
of αὐταρκεῖν in the required sense being from the third century ce;
and it is easily trumped by P2’s αὐτάρκεις (reported as perispomenon
by Walzer/Mingay, which might have seemed to support their adoption
of αὐταρκεῖν), with or without P3’s addition—I think it is from a differ-
ent hand—of εἶναι (an anticipation of Casaubon), which is added after
διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ αὐτάρκεις in the margin. I prefer αὐτάρκεις without εἶναι
on grounds of economy. Β2 writes an eta above B’s ligature for ει.
a8 γ’ is squeezed in between its two neighbours in L, perhaps by the ori

ginal hand.
a9 Pace Walzer/Mingay (‘ϕιλίαι] ϕιλία L’), ϕιλία is in all of PCBL. Ald.

has ϕιλίαι (a not unreasonable correction), against which, in the mar-
gin, Victorius writes ϕιλία, from his Laurentian sources (recorded by
Susemihl as ‘Cv’ = ‘codex Victori’: see Preface to text); Bekker reads
ϕιλίαι without comment; Susemihl follows Bekker while acknowledg-
ing the presence of ϕιλία in Marc.
Aristotelica 149
a10 ὡς ϕίλοι, properly understood, makes the same point as Richards’s

ὡς ἴσοι.
a11 τῷ P1: P2 overwrites the original omega (as usual the iota subscript
is not marked) with omicron.
a13 Editors have given up on ὅλον (PCBL) on the entirely reasonable

grounds that if tool and soul were declared a single whole, then πρίων
and τέχνη will have a common purpose, which has just been denied.
But οἷον, the obvious substitute (and what perhaps lies behind Lat. ut),
is not much better: there would evidently be no need for οἷον γὰρ
ὄργανον καὶ ψυχή if only Aristotle had written πρίων καὶ τεχνίτης—so
why didn’t he? Furthermore a saw is a tool, even if a τέχνη isn’t a
τεχνίτης; so why οἷον, exactly, and would we not easily read τέχνη as
standing for its possessor in any case? The solution, I propose, is to take
notice of P’s ἄν, which is evidently down to Nikolaos himself and not to
any later hand: the point is that if πρίων and τέχνη were ἕνεκα κοινοῦ
τινος, then they would be a ὅλον (which they are plainly not: a tool is
not part of the soul). Quite what would have been in ω, or in ά or α, on
this hypothesis, is unclear, but in my view the manuscript evidence so
far as it goes is consistent with the supplement (ἦν) that—I propose—is
required by the context and the argument. I have considered the possi-
bility of doing without the supplement, but rejected it, along with the
still more conservative option of obelizing ὅλον γὰρ or ὅλον ἂν
(which?); the proposed text is, after all, founded on a defence of the MSS’
ὅλον, and is to that extent—not forgetting the recognition of the pres-
ence in the MSS of both γὰρ and ἂν—already itself fairly conservative.
a15 Fritzsche might be right, and τὸ is all we actually need, but the extra
noise, as it were, in the MSS (τοῦτο) suggests that there was originally
more: so, αὐτὸ τὸ with Bonitz.
a16 Would Susemihl have suspected a lacuna if Aristotle had stuck with
the saw instead of changing the example?
a17 Susemihl and Walzer/Mingay print ἡ ἐνέργεια, but the article

does not appear in any of PCBL, or indeed in Bekker, and is not needed
(especially in the—usually, relatively—laconic EE).
1242a20 τι or τί? Given that the accentuation of τι/τί in these MSS is

wayward at best, there is perhaps little evidential value in their agreement
here; but it at least offers an opportunity to ask about the justification for
the decision by editors (including myself) to change the accentuation to
δίκαιόν τι. Could Aristotle not be saying that ζητεῖν πῶς δεῖ τῷ ϕίλῳ
ὁμιλεῖν is to look for what (the) just is, given τὸ δίκαιον ἅπαν πρὸς
ϕίλον? (Probably not.) Note: P and C both use shorthand for ἐστι, and so
neither use nor fail to write nu ephelkustikon here; since B particularly
likes it and PCL do not, I assume that he is on his own here too.
a21 B2 corrects a21 κοιρωνεις to κοινωνοῖς by writing οῖς above the

εις. A nu in an MS like P or C is not unlike a rho; B2 leaves the rho
uncorrected, presumably (by the usual convention) taking a change to
nu for granted with the correction to the ending.
a22 ὁ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος οὐ μόνον πολιτικὸν Casaubon, ὁ γὰρ ἀνθρώπου

μόνον οὐ πολιτικὸς PCBL: once the οὐ had been absorbed into the abbre-
viation for ἄνθρωπος before it, a copyist might well have felt that a negative
was needed because of the following ἀλλὰ καὶ (so, μόνον οὐ). The nomina-
tive πολιτικὸς was perhaps by attraction to the original nominative
ἄνθρωπος; more than one level of corruption is visible here (with a further
level in the Latin translation [Lat.], with homo enim solus non solum civile).
a24 συνδυάζεται, from συνδοιάζεται PCBL: or perhaps συνδυαστικὸν

(cf. NE VIII.12, 1162a17)? That would fit the syntax of the following
reconstruction better, but it would be a step too far to print it. —καὶ2
secl. Bussemaker: but why not ‘both’? The point is that the female c ouples
as temporarily as the male.
a25 ἄλλως δὲ διὰ βίου μοναυλικόν scripsi: ?ἀλλ’ εἰ? διὰ βίου
συναυλικὸν P2; ἀλλ’ αἱ διὰ δύμον αὐλικόν P1CBL; ἄλλοτε δ’ ἰδιάζει
μοναυλικόν Fritzsche; ἀλλ’ ἰδίᾳ οὐ μοναυλικόν Spengel; ἀλλὰ καὶ
λίαν οὐ μοναυλικόν Richards. Richards says ‘καὶ and λίαν often go
together’, but that hardly helps justify the λίαν itself (‘emphatically not’?
I find no parallels for this). Editors and translators like Spengel’s proposal,
perhaps faute de mieux, but ἰδίᾳ is a problem: if it means ‘in private’,
then there is a question why is it placed before the negative, and with
Aristotelica 151
μοναυλικόν there it looks redundant; if it means ‘in a special sense’

(Inwood and Woolf, in the Cambridge translation), what exactly is the
special sense? I think this just comes out as ‘emphatically’ (cf. Richards),
which seems an unlikely use of the Greek ἰδίᾳ. Kenny in the Oxford
World’s Classics translation reads ἰδίᾳ with κοινωνικόν, which does
better by ἰδίᾳ but hardly convinces, given the order (‘in a special way
not μοναυλικόν but κοινωνικόν’ (so not μοναυλικόν too ‘in a special
way’?). Fritzsche’s proposal is more straightforward, making good use of
the ποτὲ in the line before, and generally fitting the context impeccably;
palaeographically it looks respectable too. But if ἰδιάζει = ‘lives on its/
his own’, we hardly need μοναυλικόν as well. Still, μοναυλικόν is the
one item that has the full support of all of PCBL, if we set aside the fact
that they make αὐλικόν a separate word, μον part of another; ἰδιάζει is
then the problem (μοναυλικόν itself will probably be a hapax legome-
non, but cf. συνδυαστικὸν in NE, cited above, for a comparable coin-
age). Here, I think, P2 rides to the rescue with διὰ βίου, just legible, above
the line, with something illegible preceding it: a phrase that, with ἄλλως
instead of ἄλλοτε, gives full expression to the contrast Fritzsche had in
mind. Now of course Aristotle recognizes that some animals mate for
life (pigeons, for example, οὔτε συνδυάζεσθαι θέλουσι πλείοσιν, οὔτε
προαπολείπουσι τὴν κοινωνίαν πλὴν ἐὰν χῆρος ἢ χήρα γένηται: Hist.
An. 612b32–4), but what he will be saying here—given Fritzsche’s/my
reconstruction—will be true of a sufficiently large proportion of τἆλλα
ζῷα to permit it as a generalization: there are of course other similar
ities between animal and human behaviour, for example the tendency
of some animals to live in groups, but they too are irrelevant to the
comparison in hand (no other animal is κοινωνικόν in the way/to the
extent that human beings are). Now it is true that ἄλλως δὲ διὰ βίου
μοναυλικόν will be speculative, and a truly conservative approach
might confine it to the apparatus. On the other hand there seems to me
sufficient basis for the speculation to justify printing the reconstruction
(not least given the fact that in a MS like P or C, i.e. of the type from
which B and L are also likely to have been copied, only half of the char-
acters I propose were originally there between ἀλλ and μον αὐλικόν
would actually have been written out in full—in fact, not counting διὰ,
(1242a25) which I retain, only two [βι]: shorthand, as experience of

these MSS shows, is especially prone to corruption). The Spengel/
Richards version gives us the sequence οὐχ ὥσπερ τἆλλα ποτὲ
συνδυάζεται . . . , ἀλλὰ . . . οὐ μοναυλικόν, ἀλλὰ κοινωνικὸν, i.e. ‘not
pairing like the other animals, but not solitary, but rather κοινωνικὸν’,
the awkwardness of which is obscured by Kenny’s ‘. . . not like other ani-
mals who copulate. . . . No, humans are not solitary animals, but gregarious
in a special way’, or Inwood/Woolf ’s ‘Unlike other animals, a human
being does not mate . . .; but in a special sense human beings are not solitary
animals, but prone to forming a community. . .’. One strength of P2’s con-
jecture is that it avoids the οὐ—tempting as an explanation of the MSS’
δύ(μον)—that makes ἀλλ . . . μοναυλικόν refer directly to human beings
rather than an extension of the comparison with other animals. Two
successive ἀλλάs will work, but it is not clear to me that creatures that
ποτὲ συνδυάζεται καὶ τῷ τυχόντι are necessarily thereby μοναυλικά;
that is something that needs to be specified separately, in order for them
to be contrasted with the human animal as κοινωνικὸν.
a27–8 οἰκία δ’ ἐστί τις ϕιλία: ‘the expression is odd’, says Richards.
‘Should it not be ἐν οἰκίᾳ, as in [a]40?’ But the result if we read ἐν οἰκίᾳ
would be weaker still: we know that there is friendship in a household,
because we have been told so repeatedly; and why ‘a certain sort of ’
ϕιλία, τις ϕιλία, if the reference is to ϕιλία in the household, which is
of a perfectly ordinary sort?
a28 καὶ1 is added in above the line by P2.
a31 Fritzsche’s ὑικὸν is bizarre, Susemihl’s ἐπιεικὲς and Richards’s

συγγενικὸν merely bland. In any case no emendation is needed (see
Dirlmeier), this being just another example of the extreme brevity of
which Aristotle is capable in EE: health, like justice, involves balance.
a32 If ϕιλία between wife and husband is not χρήσιμον (οὐ χρήσιμον
PCB), what is it? We need a positive description.
a35 Bessarion’s τὸ (Par. 2042) would fit only in a general statement—

ὅλως—that did not apply specifically to ϕίλοι.
Aristotelica 153
a36 The definite article will apparently do the same job as Jackson’s ᾗ;
the reference is to a4–6, where we have been told that not all friendships
between brothers are κατ’ ἰσότητα (as ἡ ἑταιρικὴ is).
a37 Susemihl accepts Nauck’s restoration of αὑτὸς (Sophocles fr. 684).

The usual question whether Aristotle will have quoted Sophocles accur
ately does not arise here, since without αὑτὸς much of the point of the
quotation would disappear.
1242b6 The only way of saving the MSS’ ἀμϕισβητησάντων appears to

be to take it as referring to the Sophoclean example just cited, but this is
a stretch: how much is ‘clear’ from the particular dispute there, and why
the past tense? Bonitz’s ἀμϕισβητηθέντων puzzlingly keeps that tense
(‘things that have been disputed’?); ἀμϕισβητουμένων might be better,
but that is less convincing, palaeologically, than Fritzsche’s simple
ἀμϕισβητήσεων. How -σεων would have become -σάντων is not obvi-
ous, but much stranger things than this happen in these MSS.
b6–7 ἐν μὲν τῷ PCBL: but in P only the second time round (as it were).
After ἐν μὲν P writes γὰρ τὸ, then repeats καθ’ ὑπεροχὴν ἡ δὲ κατ’
ἰσότητά ἐστιν ἑκάστη αὐτῶν from b4; next he crosses out everything
from b5–6 τὸ δὲ δίκαιον τὸ περὶ αὐτὰς to ἑκάστη αὐτῶν, and starts
again: τὸ δὲ δίκαιον τὸ περὶ αὐτὰς ἐκ τῶν ἀμϕισβητησάντων δῆλον,
ἐν μὲν τῷ καθ’ ὑπεροχὴν ἀξιοῦται, κτλ. ἐν μὲν τῷ καθ’ ὑπεροχὴν
seems to have taken Nikolaos’ eye back to b4–5 ἡ μὲν γὰρ καθ’
ὑπεροχὴν.
b8 Marc.’s ἀντεστραμμένως for ἀνεστραμμένως, adopted by Dirlmeier,
then Walzer/Mingay, is tempting—a mark above the first epsilon in B
might possibly indicate that one reader of that MS was similarly
tempted—but the change is unnecessary (it may even be an error of
transcription).
b10 Bonitz’s διακείμενος must be right; it may be syntactically incor-

rect, but ὁ ὑπερέχων is at least the logical subject of the sentence (and
obviously in the position of ἄρχων).
b11 ἀλλὰ here is presumably apodotic (Denniston 11–13).

1242b18 ἡ vs οὐ before κοινωνία: for Fritzsche’s οὐ we are asked to

compare NE VIII.14, 1163a29, but λειτουργία ἡ ϕιλία already says
essentially the same as the Nicomachean line (which does not mention
κοινωνία). In any case, to repeat an important point, appeals to what NE
says are much less attractive now than they were in Fritzsche’s or in
Susemihl’s time, when the latter could give EE the title [Aristotelis Ethica
Eudemia] Eudemi Rhodii Ethica.
b19 B’s ἀνισῶσαι (accent omitted) is a perfectly good alternative read-

ing; Aristotle uses both verbs.
b20 It is hard not to share Russell’s doubts about καὶ θεῷ, which on the face
of it looks a bit like a gloss—or rather would, were it not that without καὶ
θεῷ there would be no role for the first καὶ (καὶ τῷ ἄρχοντι ϕύσει).
b20–1 Richards comments on his own conjecture (πρὸς τοῦ ἀρχομένου)
‘but there are parallels for the accusative. See my note on Thuc. 5.105.1
(Class. Quart. 8.75)’.
b24 ὡς vel καὶ vel τῷ post ὁμοίως Richards: but ὁμοίως surely pairs
with the καὶ after Οὐκέτι γινώσκουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι Μεγαρῆας. ‘It’s the
same with Οὐκέτι γινώσκουσιν . . . as it is with οἱ πολῖται ὅταν . . .’
(so, but more elegantly, Inwood/Woolf in the Cambridge translation):
a loose construction, maybe, but it half-acknowledges that the same
quotation has appeared a few pages before.
b25 If Aristotle wrote μεγαρῆας, correctly, last time round (i.e. at

1236a37–8), which from the evidence of the MSS seems likely, then presum
ably he did so here too, a few pages later; especially since he is, in effect,
here referring to that previous citation of the line (see preceding note).
Richards proposes εὖ ποιῇ 〈ἅτερος αὐτῶν ὥσπερ ἂν〉 ὁ θεός.

b28 Susemihl accidentally omits ὡς in the Teubner; relying on Susemihl,
b28–9 ὁ ἕτερος Ross: i.e. in order to return benefits received? The refer-
ence to god here is slightly unsettling, but he plays a noticeably more
prominent role in EE than in NE; b20 above is another place where he
pops up unexpectedly.
b29 In defence of ἢ (τῆς λειτουργίας): why not ‘an equal share of the
good or the service’, i.e. depending on whether one is looking at it from
Aristotelica 155
the point of view of the one for now ἄρχων or the one for now ἀρχόμενος?
But actually no defence is needed: Susemihl, and then Walzer/Mingay,
write καὶ only because of Lat., which here just misses the point.
b32 P2 fills the gap with εἰς τὸ (once again, P appears to be being cor-
rected against a representative of the other recensio).
b34 B2 inserts the sign for -αν above the iota of ὅτι.
1243a3–4 It is not certain that P originally had οἱ δ’ ἡμεῖς, thanks to

the completeness of P2’s overwriting, but ω—the common source of
PCBL—surely had it. The correction by P2 is made both by overwriting
in the text and with οἱ δ’ ἡδεῖς in the margin; either separate hands were
behind the two corrections, or the same hand adds the correction in the
margin to make amends for the mess he made in the text.
a5 μὴ νομικῶς καὶ ἑταιρικῶς: the sense is ‘not νομικῶς, i.e. ἑταιρικῶς’,

which would be somewhat easier with Rackham’s ἀλλ’.
a9 δὴ καὶ CBL (for δίκας)—and probably P1 too, though the overwrit-

ten correction makes it difficult to be sure.
a10–11 Richards’s attempt, with ἀλλότριον, to forge a link with Republic

405b is less than compelling. —δίκαιον looks perfectly acceptable: ‘it’s
not the nature of the good to require justice [between them]’.
a11 Ross’s οὗτοι for οἱ is unnecessary; the reference is clear enough
with οἱ δέ.
a13 Rackham suspects πῶς ἑκάτερος ἐγκαλεῖ to be a gloss (alterna-

tively proposing ἐγκαλέσει; but is not ἐγκαλεῖ a future in any case [see
Dirlmeier]?).
a15 τὸν δίκαιον (PCBL) = ‘the one in the right / with the just claim’?
Possible, but what follows focuses on the justice of the case rather than
of the person.
a16 τὸν πεπονθότα P2: P2 writes ον above the line between τῶ and
πεπονθότι, which by the usual convention indicates that πεπονθότι is
to be emended accordingly. P2’s text would then run: . . . πόσον ἢ ποῖον,
ἢ τὸν πεπονθότα, which is a possible solution, and would give us
roughly the same sense as Fritzsche’s solution.
1243a19 παιδιὰν in Ambr. is then ‘corrected’, above the line, back to

παιδείαν.
a20 εἴρηται on its own looks acceptable, the reference being to 1243a2ff.
a22 τοιοῦτον/τοιοῦτο: editors prefer τοιοῦτο (following Marc. and
Bekker), but since τοιοῦτον is another, Attic, form of the neuter singular
of τοιοῦτος, and PCBL all have it, I see no reason not to keep it.
—ὠϕέλειαν in P seems to have been completed by another hand; P1
had ὠϕέλαν, the ει being a later addition, squeezed as it is between
ὠϕέλ and the following πόσον (beneath the—original—supralinear
sign for -αν).
a23 The epsilon in ἐδύνατο in P and C seems to have been written in,
heavily, over something; what either had is unrecoverable. The double
augment in L’s ἠδύνατο is somewhat rare, and I suppose should be kept
for that reason, as lectio difficilior—in which case it is not unreasonable
to suppose that it was once in P and C. (B, then, corrected independ
ently.) N.b. at 1243b11 P writes ἠδύνατο straightforwardly, while C
again has epsilon written over something, possibly eta.
a24–5 καὶ μεταλαμβαν〈όντ〉ων [καὶ] ἀμϕιβάλλει scripsi: καὶ
μεταλαμβαν〈όντ〉ων καὶ ἀμϕιβάλλει Apelt. The transmitted text (καὶ
μεταλαμβάνων καὶ ἀμϕιβάλλει is in all of PCBL) is plainly corrupt.
Apelt’s solution is the most elegant of those available (pace Dirlmeier),
except that (a) I think the second καὶ needs to be eliminated, whatever
function it might have being already fulfilled by the first, and (b)
I would translate not ‘[auch = καὶ1] wenn sie [αὐτῶν understood] ein
Tauschgeschäft machen’ but rather ‘also when they [i.e. the people con-
cerned, whoever they are] are the recipients, there is doubt [sc. and dis-
pute]’. Inter alia, this allows a decent sense for ἀμϕιβάλλειν, in line with
its use in a12. (ὁτὲ [δέ] = ‘sometimes’, at the beginning of the sentence,
on its own is evidently rare.)
a29–30 τι ὡς Jackson, bis: the ὡς looks attractive in both cases, the τι
less so, being there only to explain how we got to πως; better then to
stick with πῶς, understanding ‘one of them thinks they should [work on
the basis of] how. . .’.
Aristotelica 157
a30 διείπωνται is in C as well as in the other MSS, pace Walzer/Mingay.
a34 P2’s ἡ δ’ ἠθικὴ ϕιλική in the margin, of which ἡ δ’ ἠθικὴ is from

a31, restores some sense to a text lacking a31–5 εἰς τὴν προαίρεσιν . . .
καλλίων μὲν ἡ ἠθικὴ, but does so in way that suggests that P2 was not
here correcting against a text that included a32–5 (other restorations in
P are plainly against a more complete MS).
a35 ἠθικοὶ ϕίλοι: Richards is probably right in saying PCB’s definite

article should be excluded; ὡς ἠθικοὶ ϕίλοι καὶ δι’ ἀρετὴν ὄντες [sc.
ϕίλοι] is all that is needed.
1243b1 P2 writes ἴσως: τὴν καλλίω ϕιλίαν in the margin, but there is
what appears to be a sigma added to the mix of the ending of ϕιλίαν,
presumably by another corrector who perhaps thought, wrongly, that a
genitive might be in order, i.e. τὴς καλλίονος ϕιλίας (the correction being
merely indicated, as so often, rather than being carried completely
through). τῆ in P1CBL = τῇ for τὴν is not so surprising given the nature
of the shorthand for τήν, which looks like a tau with a circumflex (with
grave/acute accent following); what is surprising is that the more egre-
gious error, of an accusative (καλλίω) bracketed by two datives, should
appear/survive in both recensiones.
b4 πολιτικοί: P2 adds ικ above the line.
b6 P2 inserts δὲ above the accent belonging to and following δέον (the

accent being displaced by the sign for -ον).
b7 διποντο is split δι/ποντο in P between two lines; ει is added later to

the end of the first line.
b11 I take εἰδύνατο in B to be a corruption of ἠδύνατο (the ligature for

ει and eta being regularly confused), which is what the original com-
mon source of PCB will have had; C2 writes an epsilon over what was
surely an eta. Since L too has it, ἠδύνατο was evidently in ω. —P2 writes
ἴ[σως]: ἕξει in margin, with insertion marks there and in the text.
b14 A corruption of τοῖς to ταῖς after ἐν ταῖς ϕιλίαις is easier than
vice versa.
1243b15 ‘ἰδεῖν non intellegit Spengelius’, Susemihl: why not?
b17 Defending the transmitted reading, ὡς τὸν ἡδὺν, Dirlmeier com-

pares τὸν ἡδὺν at 1244a38, but the situation there is different; more
comparable is 1243a35 ὡς ἠθικοὶ ϕίλοι. But why not understand τὸν
ἡδὺν [ϕίλον]? Fritzsche’s solution, τὸν ὡς ἡδὺν, involving simple inver-
sion, is not unattractive, if one is prepared—as Fritzsche evidently was,
and as I am—to entertain an(other) not so usual use of ὁ, ἡ, τό as a
demonstrative (cf. e.g. 1244b33), and Apelt’s ὡς τιν’ ἡδὺν (‘nicht zu
diskutieren’, Dirlmeier) is also possible; but we do not need either.
b20 παντὶ τινός/τί ἀντὶ τίνος: as Jackson saw, the pi screams out, as it
were, to be τι. (Should we keep the accent τινός as in CB, and accent τὶ
accordingly?)
b25 Marc.’s ὡμίλει seems a necessity, given that the rest of the story is in
the past tense. —P2 here writes in the margin ἴσως: ὁ δ’ ἐπεὶ ἔδει
ἀποδιδόναι αὐτὸν ὡς ἡδὺν αὐτὸν ἐποίησεν, ἔϕη οὕτω δεῖν αὐτὸν
ὑποσχόμενον ἐκείνῳ εὐϕρᾶναι δηλονότι.
b29 ἐνταῦθα/ἐνταῦθ’: if there is a natural pause following, as editors
suggest by their—rightly—printing a comma, an elision looks odd (this
is not poetry, after all). It is also tempting to bracket this καὶ ἐνταῦθα as
a doublet of the immediately preceding one. —P2 changes the ligature
for ου over the second lambda of ἀλλου to make it the negative by add-
ing elision mark and breathing (also, strangely, an accent?), and quite
possibly he intended ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὅρῳ—a correction, as often, being sig-
nalled rather than fully carried through; perhaps, then, another example
of P’s being corrected against another MS, although the unusual lack of
an accent on P’s ἀλλ- (unusual, that is, if P was writing ἄλλου), if ori
ginal, might itself have suggested the change. —λόγου B1: B2 appears to
write an omega over an original ου; the result is a mess.
b31 μὴ τῷ: μὴ appears over the τὸ in B, possibly added by a later hand.
b32–3 Walzer/Mingay’s report, ‘[32] ἰσασθήσεται] μετρεῖται C 32–3

τὰ . . . μέτρον om. C’, is misinformed: P behaves, as it does much more
often than not, in exactly the same way as C, and both leave out 32–3
ἰσασθήσεται . . . τὸ ἀνάλογον (μέτρον is not omitted, as Walzer/
Aristotelica 159
Mingay claims; a shadow of it may remain in the report ‘ἰσασθήσεται]

μετρεῖται C’). The eye of a previous copyist in this recensio—
presumably that of α´—moved from b31 τὸ ἀνάλογον (as he had it
before him: properly τῷ ἀνάλογον) here to τὸ ἀνάλογον in what was
his next line.
b32 ταῖς Rackham: in defence of the MSS’ τοῖς cf. 1243b14.
b34 τί 〈ἡ〉 σοϕία scripsi: τῇ σοϕίᾳ PCBL; τί σοϕία Bonitz. Bonitz’s τί is

surely right, given the following εἶτα τί, but the corruption would have
been easier (and this is at least a consideration) with an original τί ἡ,
combined with the absence of iota subscripts; the definite article would
itself be quite in place. —Were τὸ πλούσιον to stand, we would have to
print Rackham’s supplement of εἶναι (it seems just too much to under-
stand, here). Richards’s τὸν πλοῦτον seems preferable on grounds of
economy, and also of appropriateness: the comparison is between wis-
were, why not τὸ〈ν〉 πλούσιον?)

dom and wealth, not between wisdom and being wealthy. (And if it
b35 πρὸς ἑκάτερον: Fritzsche’s emendation to πρὸς ἑκατέρου initially

seems necessary. Why would Aristotle write δοθὲν πρὸς ἑκάτερον
instead of δοθὲν ἑκατέρῳ? But actually the πρὸς is important, because
the point is exactly about the relationship of what is δοθὲν to each of the
two sides, not just what has been given them. That may well be what edi-
assured, I think, by Richards’s τί 〈τὸ〉 δοθὲν. (Richards also suggests, as

tors have in mind when they keep ἑκάτερον, but it will only be properly
an alternative to εἶτα τί 〈τὸ〉 δοθὲν, εἶτα τἀντιδοθὲν: ingenious, but

implausible and anyway unnecessary.) —ἥμισυ may perhaps also be in
Marc., according to Susemihl.
b37 ἔστι δὲ κἀνταῦθα ἐν ἀρχῇ ἀμϕισβήτησις: at the top of the page in

P (= f. 121r.) is something, partly cut off in the process of binding, that
reads ἑκατέρων ἀμϕισβητουμένων ζήτησις; it slopes down to the
right, and there may once have been more of it to the left. It could just
possibly be a suggestion for improving ἀμϕισβήτησις, which happens
to be split between two lines (ἀμϕισβή-τησις)? More likely it is a gloss;
on the other hand some of the ‘corrections’ in P in this book are hardly
more helpful than this would be.
1243b38 ϕήσωμεν P: there are traces of something to the right of this

line in P that might possibly once have read ἂν ϕῇ ὁ.
1244a2 After χρήσιμα, in the margin, in P there is something that is

now partly illegible (?εἴπερ?), as there also is opposite the line above;
quite separately, there are three dots forming an upside-down triangle
between χρήσιμα on one line and πρόβλημα directly below it on the
next—the sort of mark that often signifies an intervention or a need for
one, though it is hard to see what difficulties anyone might find
just here.
a3 Jackson’s τῷ ἀντιποιεῖν τὰ ἴσα δυναμένῳ is elegant, but a reference

to equal return would surely be odd, given that the question is about to
be said to be the same as whether one should εὖ ποιεῖν a friend or a
good person (a person as a friend or as good); only with a certain sort
of friend (or ‘friend’?) would one look to see whether he is capable of
returning an equal amount of good. Jackson’s ἴσα is actually only there
to explain the MSS’ καὶ, retained by Walzer, and perhaps this καὶ came
to be inserted simply as a consequence of the conversion of ἀντιποιεῖν
τι into another dative participle like δυναμένῳ. Inwood and Woolf in
the Cambridge translation render Walzer’s text as ‘for someone who is
also able to reciprocate’, but that would surely be τῷ καὶ ἀντιποιεῖν τι
δυναμένῳ. Keeping the MSS’ reading, Kenny in the Oxford World
Classics translation offers ‘. . . to a person who makes a return and is in a
position of power’; that, or ‘and is in a position to do so’, would be the
only way of explaining the καὶ where the MSS have it, but whether or
not someone has power is hardly a relevant factor in the context, and
that the person is in a position to make a return is a given, if he is mak-
ing one. Thus I read Walzer’s text minus the καὶ.
a9–10 Rieckher suspects a lacuna before ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνο ἐργωδέστερον,

but it is reasonable enough to take the ἐκεῖνο as referring to the original
problem—even if this was said to be the same (sc. in some respects?) as
the one just discussed. —B2 adds οι above the iota of τι.
a11 λόγων Bussemaker: the plural is probably needed if it is to be fol-

lowed by λόγους—which itself is probably needed to explain the
Aristotelica 161
εἰσ- that has become attached to ϕέροις/ης at the end of the verse (the
two lines together = Euripides fr. 890). —There seems no particular rea-
son to accept Nauck’s conjecture of δίκαιως.
a12 δεῖ B1, δὴ B2: eta with grave accent is inserted in B above the εῖ—as
occasionally elsewhere, B looks as if it could be being corrected (here,
‘corrected’) against an MS like P or C.
a13 ἀλλ’ ἔστιν, ἄλλα δὲ τῇ μητρί: P2’s version is written out in the
margin, with insertion marks there and in the text (importantly, correct-
ing the accent on ἄλλα), and prefaced by ἴσως; its supplement of
ἃ δεῖ is not needed, because it would merely spell out what can be
understood in any case. Susemihl’s emendation, for its part, is elegant
but unnecessary.
a14 πόσας P1, πάσας P3? Here in P the original omicron of πόσας has
been changed to an alpha; there are both acute and circumflex accents
above the omicron/alpha; and the sign for the ending -ας may not be
original. One story that could be told to explain this state of affairs is
that as P ended the line with πόσ, he meant but forgot to provide the
missing ending -ας at the beginning of the next line; P2 then changed
omicron to alpha and acute to circumflex, thinking πόσ was πᾶς, but
then P3, correcting perhaps against another MS, added -ας and rein-
forced the acute accent. πάσας would then be attributable to P3. That Β
alone out of PCBL has the (obviously) required πάσας raises the usual
question: did the PC and L copyists make the same mistake independ
ently, or is B independently correcting (for the record, Ald. does so)?
a16 ἄλλα δὲ B, ἀλλὰ δὲ PC, ἄλλαι δὲ L: this spread perhaps suggests

that ἄλλα was in ω, and is preserved in B (either that, or the B copyist
happened to be more awake). —P2 merely writes the ligature for εἰ over
the iota of οὐχὶ, which happens to be at the end of the line; i.e. he does
not change the chi, that change being taken for granted as a consequence
of the εἰ.
a17 P2 writes in the margin ἴσως: οὐδ’ ᾧ τοίνυν τὸ συζῆν, τούτῳ ἃ μὴ

οὗτος δίδωσιν.
1244a18 οὗτος/οὕτως: there may be signs of a correction to the ending

in P; just possibly an original -ος has been erased and changed to -ως.
—οἱ/οἳ: only the relative, surely, will make sense, as Susemihl saw.
a19 τούτο B1: B2 adds an omega above the second omicron (so bringing
B into line with PCL). Quite possibly the τούτῳ/τοῦτο originated as a
doublet of the preceding τοῦτο. In any case even τούτῳ makes no sense,
and translators either explicitly follow Rackham in bracketing it, or fol-
low him implicitly by ignoring it. —ἐρρωμένῳ PCB2: a second rho is
added in B, as at 1238b37; a further sign of correction—or in this case
‘correction’—of B against another representative of the recensio
Messanensis. —Richards says οὐ δέον is ‘very pointless’; is it not rather
an important qualification? —Pace Walzer/Mingay, there is no δ’ pre-
ceding οὐδ’ in C, just the kind of mark these MSS often use for dividing
between words; there is no accent, which there would be if δὲ was
intended.
a24 ἄλλῳ δὲ L, ἄλλως δὲ P1CB, ἄλλως P2, ἀλλὰ δὴ Fritzsche. The con
on to suppress the next δὲ and supply 〈τῷ δὲ〉 before a25 τὸ συναλγεῖν;
nective δὲ is erased in P, leaving a tell-tale gap. Fritzsche’s proposal goes
Susemihl is surely right to describe this as ‘falsum’, along with Rieckher’s

hardly more intelligible proposal.
a25 συναγεῖν P2, erasing the second αγ of συναγαγεῖν while appar-
ently making a mess of the sign for -ειν and the circumflex above the
line. Does he do enough, under the usual convention of minimalist
correction, to signal the complete change to συναλγεῖν?
a27 οὐδείς secludendum ci. Fritzsche: but why not a double negative
(plus delayed connective) for emphasis? —Bekker reports a δ’ after
πολλοὶ in Marc., but it (or δὲ) is in all of PCBL.
a28 οὐκ ὤν: whatever it was that P had originally has been erased, and a curi-
ous amalgam of οὐκ and ὤν substituted: οὐκ with the sign for ων and a
smooth breathing, beneath that sign, above the kappa. —An original ὁ before
τοῦ εἶναι is plainly overwritten with ἡ in P, probably by the original hand.
a29 τῷ post οἱ suppl. P2: P2 writes τῷ καθ’ ὑπεροχὴν in the margin, with
insertion marks there and in the text, between οἱ and the following καθ’.
Aristotelica 163
a30 ὄντι CB, for δόντι: perhaps a significant shared mistake, given that
P has the required δόντι—or did the PC copyist, Nikolaos, correct his
source when writing P, not when writing C, while the copyist of L over-
corrected, with δίδοντι (so that ὄντι was in ω, the original common
source of PCBL)?
a32 δὲ post ἀδικοῦσι supplendum ci. Susemihl: but (by now a familiar
point) EE, as we have it, frequently introduces new material without a
connective.
a33 τὸν ἔχοντα or τοὺς ἔχοντας for τὰ ἔχοντα? Given that the first
involves only one correction, the second two, and that sudden switches
from plural to singular (and vice versa) are very common in EE, Bonitz’s
proposal trumps Casaubon’s. The word-order is slightly odd, and
Richards’s μᾶλλον αὐτοῦ ϕιλοῦσι τοῦ ἔχοντος is not unattractive, but
the EE rarely sets out to be attractive. —ϕιλεῖν κἀκείνοις scripsi: ϕιλεῖ
κἀκείνοις PCBL; ϕίλοι κἀκείνοις Bekker; ϕίλοι κἀκείνῳ Rackham.
Walzer/Mingay reports P2 as writing κἀκείνους, but though P is a little
messy here I see no trace of an -ους. So now the important question is
why the copyists should ever have written the dative κἀκείνοις, and
I propose that ϕιλεῖ is a corruption of an original ϕιλεῖν: ‘that is why
loving is for them too as when someone chooses. . .’. A substantive infini-
tive without the article in EE is not, I think, in itself, a problem (cf. e.g.
1246a29; also note on 1248a13), though it might well have been a
problem for a copyist—one copying intelligently—who suddenly came
across it. The remaining question is whether even the Eudemian
Aristotle could have used the following οἷον in the way all this would
require (‘as when’); I suggest the present context is evidence that
he could.
a34–5 Rackham treats the whole of a34–5 οἷον διότι ἡδὺς τὸν οἶνον
εἵλετο, καὶ ὅτι χρήσιμος τὸν πλοῦτον εἵλετο as a parenthesis, so that
the following χρησιμώτερος refers to the ἐκεῖνος who surfaces in his
reconstruction. This is to say the least ungainly, and why in any case
should we not take it to be the wealthy person that is chosen for his
wealth rather than for himself, because his money is more useful (as
wine is valued for its sweetness, not for its being wine)? —καὶ ὅτι
(1244a34–5) χρήσιμος τὸν πλοῦτον εἵλετο desunt in PCB: a copyist’s

eye (i.e. the eye of the copyist of α´) skipped from one εἵλετο to the next.
The words are not, pace Walzer/Mingay, supplied in the margin in P.
a35 The signs of the correction to δὴ ἀγανακτεῖ in P, through erasure

and overwriting, are clear.
a36 οἱ is written in above the ὅ in B; P2 writes ἴσως: ὧδε ἢ τόδε ἐγκαλοῦσιν

in the margin. (Walzer/Mingay reports ‘οἱ δ’ LV’, but Victorius/Vettori is
actually correcting a descendant of L [i.e. the Aldine], and L itself has ὅ
δ’; Victorius is right, but is anticipated by the hand correcting B.)
b3 εἴ τε P1, εἴ τὶ P2: once again P shows signs of having been corrected

against a representative of the other recensio, with the iota of τὶ heavily
written over what must have been an epsilon (given the accent on the
preceding εἰ); the two dots that typically go with an iota, plus what
appears to be a heavy grave accent, are added for good measure. —While
PCL all suggest a lacuna after τούτῳ, B gives no indication that any-
thing is missing, and indeed the sentence as it stands seems to make
perfectly good sense. Not only that, but it is hard to see what might be
supplied: von Fragstein’s τῷ αὐταρκεστάτῳ would be no more than a
place-filler, though better than Spengel’s ἀναγκαῖος. Because there is no
gap in one of the primary MSS, convention allows me not to mark a
lacuna in the text. But it remains a serious question why PCL should all
show a gap here. Presumably there was such a gap in ω; my hypothesis,
which will be as good as any, is that it was caused by the erasure of a
doublet. Here is a story to go with the hypothesis: the copyist of one of
PCBL’s common ancestors omitted ἔσται τούτῳ ϕίλος, passing straight
to εἰ κατ’ ἔνδειαν ζητεῖται ϕίλος, which he then repeated (the double
ϕίλος being the immediate culprit in both cases); he then went back,
erased εἰ κατ’ ἔνδειαν ζητεῖται ϕίλος in its first appearance and
replaced it with ἔσται τούτῳ ϕίλος, with the result: spatium vacuum
viginti fere litterarum (which B chooses to ignore).
b4 εἰ1 δὲ B: there are signs here, as sometimes elsewhere, that the copyist
of B or one of his predecessors is trying to make his own sense out of the
passage—here, I think, unsuccessfully, although some editors, e.g. Fritzsche
Aristotelica 165
and Susemihl, do themselves have a new sentence starting here, without

a connective. —ἢ οὐ; (von Fragstein) is surely right—how else to make
sense out of what PCL give us? For B, cf. preceding note (is the omission
of ἢ οὐ deliberate, and part of his particular attempt to make sense of
the context?). On the punctuation: I speculate that this is an instance
where the second alternative after πότερον is left to be supplied (LSJ s.v.
II.3), but a peculiar instance, in which there turns out—so far, at least—
only to be one possibility, i.e. that the self-sufficient will not need friends,
because in raising the question whether they will, Aristotle finds himself
actually giving an argument why they will not—and so breaks off (hence
my full stop before ‘Or not?’, indicating that this is not the expected
second alternative, just the negation of the first) in order to apply that
argument to the case in hand, that of the good person. —εἰ2 / ἢ / καὶ / εἰ
δ’: the repetition of ἢ (PCBL) would be surprising, given that the possi-
bility now being raised is actually the same as the one introduced by the
preceding ἢ οὐ, that is, if we accept von Fragstein’s ἢ οὔ. If we do accept
it, then Fritzsche’s proposal will not work, but Dirlmeier’s εἰ δ’ does,
though I prefer to do without the δέ—I see a snappy answer to the direct
question that broke off the indirect one. (If we reject von Fragstein’s con-
jecture [ἢ οὔ;], then the best solution might be to go with B and ignore
PCL’s ἢ ὁ, which is behind ἢ οὐ, altogether. But then how did it get
there? The sequence ἢ ὁ ἢ may be what caused one reader of P to put a
partly erased.) —ἔσται 〈ὁ〉 ἀγαθὸς Susemihl, ἐστιν 〈ὁ〉 ἀγαθὸς Spengel:
cross in the left-hand margin opposite this line: the second ἢ appears
both apparently move the ὁ from PCL’s preceding ἢ ὁ to here while

omitting that ἢ and accepting Fritzsche’s καὶ for the second ἢ; but I think
the article is needed anyway.
b5 καὶ Sylburg for εἰ PCBL: Sylburg’s own construal and punctuation of

the context were evidently much like Susemihl’s, i.e. with εἰ κατ’ ἔνδειαν
ζητεῖται ϕίλος starting a new sentence.
the following αὐταρκῶς as αὐτάρκης? —αὐταρκῶς 〈ἔχων〉 I attribute

b6 δεῖται P2: ται is written in above σθαι; perhaps this hand interpreted
to P3 because the ἔχων is evidently written—in the margin, with inser-

tion marks there and in the text—by a hand other than the one that
changed δεῖσθαι to δεῖται. (Victorius’ αὐτάρκους is written in the
(1244b6) margin without ‘γρ.’, ‘m.l.’, or any other mark [see Preface to
text]: was it, to him, so obvious a correction as to need no comment?)
Bekker surprisingly prints P’s αὐταρκῶς, which is (a) wrongly accented,
and (b) makes no sense without P3’s ἔχων.
b9 Ald., followed by subsequent editors, writes οὐδενὸς; Victorius,

above the text, notes the theta in his Laurentian source(s). —δεήσεως
L: the shorthand conventions for εως and εται, which L or its
predecessor(s) is interpreting, are easily confused; see on b16 below for
another illustration, the mistake there being the other way round.
b10 οὗ γε μηθὲν ἐνδεής ποτε Richards: this emendation of a horribly

corrupt locus is evidently superior to its rivals, which either defend the
indefensible (Décarie, developing a suggestion by G. Widmann, Autarkie
und Philia in den aristotelischen Ethiken, diss. Tübingen, 1969, p. 71) or have
Aristotle merely, and uncharacteristically, repeating himself. Richards
actually proposed ‘μηδ’ (or μηδὲν)’, but μηδὲ seems to get the emphasis
wrong—the point about the god’s lacking nothing has already been
made well enough, and Aristotle is now making an inference from it for
all time. Richards is counting characters; my adaptation of his emend
ation simply presumes haplography (μηθὲν ἐν-).
b13 ἀεὶ Spengel: δεῖ would surely be pointless after ἀνάγκη—as

would δεῖν.
b16 τοῦτο P2 for τότε, squeezing in a ῦ between το plus superscript tau =

τότε and the following ϕανερὸν. —For χρήσεται CB see on b9: either
α´ used the wrong convention for εως (quite similar in appearance),
which Nikolaos corrected when writing P; or else there were two mis-
takes involved, C and B separately misreading/misinterpreting the con-
vention for εως as that for εται.
b17 ὁ δι’ ἀρετὴν ϕίλος μόνος: we might have expected οὐ δι’ ἀρετὴν
ϕίλος μόνος (PCBL), because that is what we have previously been told,
but it would make nonsense of what follows. The definite article is
needed, and after all, so long as we do not adopt Walzer/Mingay’s full
stop after ὠϕελείας, that ὁ δι’ ἀρετὴν is ϕίλος μόνος is just part of what
ϕανερὸν ἂν εἶναι δόξειεν (b16); Aristotle is still setting up the ἀπορία
Aristotelica 167
that we are about to be told we have to look into (b22). (οὐ for ὁ is not an
unusual mistake in these MSS: cf. e.g. 1245a18.)
b18 ὦσιν P2, erasing and overwriting; another case of over-

correction of P.
b20 Susemihl attributes the obviously correct ποιήσοντας to a correct-

ing hand in Marc.; I have not checked Marc. here, but Bekker says it
originally had ποιήσαντας. —ἀμείνω P2, erasing the sign for ων above
the είν and writing in omega above the nu. —C’s κρίσις is consistent
with ἀμείνων, but hardly with the intervening ἔχομεν.
b20–1 ‘ἢ μίαν C’, Walzer/Mingay; C in fact has ἢ μετ’, like P (and B and L).
b21 Sylburg’s μάλιστά τε—or Spengel’s εἴ γε μάλιστα (less econom

ically)—gives what is surely the required sense (with a straightforward
explanation of the corruption, i.e. inversion).
b22 P2 squeezes in a tau after μεν, followed by the two dots that accom-
pany an iota, after the supralinear sign for -εν; the acute accent, belong-
ing to μὲν and following the -εν, is original, and confirms that τι
was in α.
b23 λανθάνει P2: the ει ligature is plainly added later in P by a different

hand, presumably over an erased supralinear ειν (i.e. the standard
double oblique stroke for that ending, as in C). —τὴν παραβολήν: the
comparison between the ἀγαθός and god, which has led us to leave out
the important ingredients of συναισθάνεσθαι and συγγνωρίζειν (b26).
b26–7 τὸ αὐτὸν Kosman: Kosman’s argument (Ancient Philosophy 24

[2004]: 138) that it is our own perceiving and knowing that Aristotle is
saying is most desirable to us is surely correct, but that is a point he
(Aristotle) is working up to, and will arrive at—at least as I propose to
reconstruct the text—in the next sentence (see on b30 below); in other
words both Kosman and in a different way the correcting hand in
Marcianus 213 are, I think, jumping the gun.
b27 PCB resume here, with αἱρετώτατον, a shared predecessor of

theirs (so: α´) having leapt from b25 τὸ γνωρίζειν to τὸ γνωρίζειν
(αἱρετώτατον) here.
1244b30 καὶ μὴ 〈αὐτὸν〉 scripsi: with no supplement after the καὶ μὴ,
Aristotle would be saying ‘if one . . . treated knowing and not [knowing],
itself by itself ’, which would be at best pointless; what is needed is a con-
trast, not to γινώσκειν, but to αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ. Robinson’s proposals fill
the gap in the wrong way: it is not one’s knowing oneself that is in ques-
tion, rather oneself ’s doing the knowing—for which a plain αὐτὸν will
suffice (καὶ μὴ αὐτὸν = καὶ μὴ τὸ αὐτὸν [subject: cf. Kosman ap. note
on b26–7 above] γνωρίζειν).
b30–2 ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν λανθάνει, κτλ: ‘glossam esse haud sine successu
ostendere conatus est [Cook] Wilson’, Susemihl, and I agree. There are
two particular problems: (1) what does the τοῦτο refer to (the transla-
tions I have consulted only increase the puzzle)? (2) ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν
λανθάνει, κτλ not only interrupts the sentence surrounding it, separat-
ing protasis from apodosis, but—given the lack of an obvious reference
for τοῦτο—is neither connected to that sentence nor adds anything to it.
Whoever originally wrote the gloss was perhaps identifying the present
sentence as containing (the core of?) what Aristotle said in b23 λανθάνει
us (hence ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ γέγραπται, i.e. at b23); or else he was
commenting on the whole of the present discussion, anticipating/
mirroring what Aristotle will say at 1245a28–9.
b32 P2 deletes ἢ by placing a pair of dots beneath it.
b33 τὸ δ’ [sc. ἐστιν] ὅμοιον . . . : the demonstrative use of ὁ, ἡ, τό seems

to be something of a speciality in EE. τῷ δ’ ὅμοιον τὸ ζῆν vel τὸ δ’
ὅμοιον τῷ ζῆν Spengel: but the genitive with ὅμοιος does occur.
b34 δὴ Spengel: unnecessarily; ‘but’ fits at least as well as, if not better
than, ‘then’. —τὸ ἑαυτοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ γνωρίζειν: i.e. to perceive
oneself to be perceiving and know oneself to be knowing—a move that
will be justified in what follows?
b35 καὶ is surely redundant: why should living be said to be ‘also’

αἱρετόν? A merely emphatic καὶ seems unlikely.
1244b36–1245a1 Brandis’s τὸ αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχειν τὴν τοιαύτην ϕύσιν
seems the simplest way of making sense of P1CL’s τὸ αὐτὸ τοῖς ὑπάρχειν
τὴν τοιαύτην ϕύσιν. I take it that ἡ τοιαύτη ϕύσις is one that makes us
Aristotelica 169
capable ἑαυτοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ γνωρίζειν (b34). Aristotle has set out
to show it to be εὔλογον that τὸ ἑαυτοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ γνωρίζειν
should be αἱρετώτερον, and this he does by putting together two things
that have been agreed, namely (1) that life, understood as a certain sort
of γνῶσις (b28–9) is desirable, and (2) that so too is the good (sc. for
us); from (1) and (2), i.e. b36 τούτων, it follows that (it is also desirable)
that we have the relevant sort of nature (one capable of τὸ ἑαυτοῦ
αἰσθάνεσθαι . . .), given that it has been shown that perceiving and
knowing ourselves includes perceiving ourselves perceiving and know-
ing (that, presumably, being a corollary of its being us, not someone else,
doing the perceiving and knowing). B’s ἔχουσι represents a different,
intelligent, but ultimately failed attempt to explain the meaningless τοῖς
he evidently had before him. So too P2’s version, which I reconstruct
from the barest hints, i.e. (i) a curious mark (following the slightly dis-
placed circumflex over τοῖς, and so ending up over the upsilon of
ὑπάρχει/ειν) that I very tentatively read as the sign for οις plus a rough
breathing, (ii) an -ει apparently taking the place of an erased -ειν (so:
ὑπάρχει), and (iii) a rough breathing, following another unidentified
mark, over τῆς. P2’s version, if that is indeed what he had in mind with
this even more than usually minimalist set of corrections (οἷς replacing
τοῖς, ἡ replacing τῆν, with the consequential change of τοιαύτην ϕύσιν
to the nominative assumed), would do much the same as B’s version, if
perhaps more elegantly, but fails like B’s to offer a useful sense (‘it is the
same for . . .’: what will be the same for them?). Fritzsche’s introduction
of δεῖ saves ὑπάρχειν, and the accusatives, but the resulting sense is
again implausible; similarly with Richards’s solution, and with Mingay’s
(which has other problems of its own). Dirlmeier’s reconstruction, on
the other hand, which is like Brandis’s but with τῷ in place of τὸ,
deserves attention, even if not his interpretation of it: ‘life and the good’,
he has Aristotle say, ‘[are desirable] because ἡ τοιαύτη ϕύσις αὐτοῖς
ὑπάρχει’, where αὐτοῖς is life and the good, and ἡ τοιαύτη ϕύσις is
‘jener bekannte Wertcharakter’. It will be better, I think, to take ἡ
τοιαύτη ϕύσις as suggested above (a nature capable of τὸ ἑαυτοῦ
αἰσθάνεσθαι . . .), and αὐτοῖς as referring to the agent/agents: life and
the good are desirable to them and so their (the agents’) having that sort
of nature is too.
1245a2 P2 overwrites the εὐ of εὐτυχείας with συσ, the upsilon with

οι, and appears to convert the ligature for ει into an iota, if somewhat
clumsily.
a2–3 I take καὶ τὸ γνωστὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσθητόν as beginning the apodosis

of the conditional sentence, with ἐν τῇ τοῦ αἱρετοῦ τάξει as the implied
complement of the following ἐστιν (this to explain the punctuation
I adopt, in common with other editors: colon after τῆς ὡρισμένης
ϕύσεως, full stop after a4–5 ὥστε . . . βούλεσθαί ἐστιν).
a3 αἱρετὸν P1, αἰσθητόν P2: P has αἱ at the end of one line, and ρετὸν at
the beginning of the next; P2 erases the ρε and substitutes σθη, with the
σθ outside the margin; the change to a smooth breathing is taken for
granted.
a9–10 διὰ τούτων B1, διὰ τοῦτο B2, inserting a circumflex above the
upsilon, omicron above the omega.
a13–14 τὸ συνεσθίειν ἢ τὸ συμπίνειν: pace Bonitz, it seems easy

enough to keep the accusatives and understand αἱρεῖσθαι—so long,
that is, as we do not, with Walzer/Mingay, make the whole of a12–13 ἐπὶ
τῶν κοινῶν πρῶτον καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις . . . down to a19 ἡ δ’ ὁμοιότης
ϕιλία into a parenthesis; a move that seems extraordinary in any case,
given that what ϕαίνεταί γε in a19 is surely the opposite of the idea
proposed before the supposed parenthesis?
a15 B’s εἰ at least makes syntactical if not any other sort of sense of the
following ἀναϕέρεις. This is not the first time this copyist has made his
own attempt at correction. —ἀναϕέρεις P1, ἂν ἀϕέρεις P2, ἂν ἀϕέλεις
P3: Pal. 165 reads ἂν ἀϕέρεις, which—given the profile of this copyist—
more than likely means that the breathing over the second alpha was
there in his P (i.e. enough to give ἂν ἀν-), but lambda had not yet been
substituted for the rho.
a16–17 τοῦτε . . . τοῦτε B: B2 writes (a ligature for) ου above του in both

cases, the second time with an acute accent.
a18 μανθάνειν P1, μανθάνων P2/3: what was ειν in P is marked for cor-
rection, and the correction is then carried out, probably by a different
Aristotelica 171
hand; Pal. 165 has μανθάνων, so postdating either the first or both
corrections.
a20 ἡδεῖον P1C1, ὡς B: P and C overwrite the ligature for ει with iota;
Pal. 165, copying P after its correction, has ἥδιον. B here presents an
interesting alternative reading, though how he got to it from ἥδιον, if he
did, is a mystery.
a21 Ross’s ἑκάστῳ must surely be right, not least to explain the follow-
ing three datives (a22–3 τῷ . . . τῷ . . . τῷ . . . , i.e. τῷ μὲν sc. ἐπιβάλλει
κοινωνεῖν ἡδονῆς σωματικῆς, κτλ: cf. Rackham).
a22–3 Thrice τῷ B1, thrice τὸ B2, writing ὸ above the omega on all three
occasions. B2 is rightly puzzled about the datives, which after ἔκαστον
(instead of ἑκάστῳ) in a21, then a nominative in the following relative
clause, have nothing to explain them; and τὸ μὲν . . . τὸ δὲ . . . τὸ δὲ is not
the worst solution.
a24 P2 writes μακράν in the text above τηλοῦ; a gloss on τηλοῦ rather
than an emendation? —ὡς οὐ δέον scripsi: ὡς οὐ δεῖ PCBL; ὥστ’ οὐ
δεῖ Fritzsche. The question is whether to preserve the ὡς or the δεῖ, and
I prefer the first option, on the grounds that ὥστ’ οὐ δεῖ . . . takes us back
to καὶ τὸ ἅμα δεῖ εἶναι τῷ ϕίλῳ and in effect just repeats it, while ὡς
οὐ δέον . . . at least derives the lesson from the quotation. Paleographically
there is not much to choose between the two solutions: with Fritzsche’s
the loss of a tau, with my own the change of one ending to another that,
given the signs/conventions in play, is very similar.
a25 τοῦτο γινόμενον scripsi: τούτου γινόμενον PCL, τοῦτο γενόμενον

B. B’s reading, i.e. of a perfectly regular neuter accusative absolute, per-
haps shows the origin of the apparently peculiar error in PCL (genitive
combined with accusative, the latter being original, as I suppose). B’s
γενόμενον for γινόμενον is by dittography after γενέσθαι; τοῦτο, as is
generally accepted, is friendship, with or without reference to shared activ-
ity (perhaps without, this being to all appearances a separate endoxon,
unless we accept Rackham’s δὴ in a23: ‘and so it is pleasanter . . .’). To
have two successive accusative absolutes in the same clause—the first,
δέον, admittedly a conjecture—seems unobjectionable; and there is
(1245a25) clear evidence for a neuter participle in the second case in

both recensiones, so an accusative absolute it will be by the usual and
reasonable rule (ceteris paribus, to prefer what is in both).
a26 P2 adds a supralinear οὗ after οὐχὶ, so presumably intending οὐχ οὗ,

which is a fair rival to L’s οὐχ ᾗ (with ᾗ squeezed, I think by the original
hand, between οὐχ and μάλιστα, though it cannot be ruled out that
there was originally an iota where the ᾗ now is—or indeed that the cor-
rection was made by someone else, but it looks like L’s hand).
a30 B may supply δέ (δ’ ) on his own initiative, in which case this might
be another case where EE leaves out an expected connective. But if we
are to have one, δέ fits, it is in one of the primary MSS, and it trumps
Fritzsche’s οὖν, given that the following ἔνθεν looks forward and not
backward.
a31–2 Two dots (P2) under the first ἄλλος in P seems to mark it for
deletion.
a32 Richards’s πάντα would spell out what is presumably implicit in any
case; Ross’s τὸ seems to offer us something Aristotle might have written
but apparently did not.
a38 τὸ2 PCB, τὰ L: Bekker read τὰ, which he got from Marc., while not-
ing that P had τὸ; Susemihl and Walzer/Mingay then both write τὰ
without comment. But τὸ, with the infinitive συνήδεσθαι, makes per-
fect sense, is less expected before ϕορτικὰ, and would more easily be
corrupted before ϕορτικὰ than would τὰ to τὸ; τὸ then it must be.
—οἷον τὸ ci. Spengel, for μὲν: many of Spengel’s corrections and conjec-
tures remain quite fundamental for the restoration of the text; others,
like the present one (or ἡδέα for ἡδὺ in the next line), are unnecessary,
and I have long since ceased to record them all.
a40 Robinson’s αὑτοῦ, adopted by Walzer/Mingay, is a strange proposal,

since surely one is always aware of oneself anyway in such circum-
stances; Aristotle has just said that being aware of a friend is in a way to
be aware of oneself, and now he justifies sharing vulgar pleasures with a
friend on the basis that in them one is always aware of one’s friend’s
enjoyment too (sc. and therefore [even more?] of one’s own). —P2 writes
Aristotelica 173
αἰσθάνεσθαι in the margin, with marks there and in the text to indicate
that it is to replace αἴσθησις.
1245b1 θεωρεῖ P2, overwriting the sign for ειν with the ligature for ει
and inserting a new circumflex having (partially) erased the old one.
b2 There is an insertion mark after (actually slightly under) the final,

superscript, omega of ἀγαθῷ in P, with something paired with it in the
margin that could possibly be ὁ νοῦς (the first three letters are reasonably
clear, the last two actually illegible); if so, it may be that this insertion
goes with P2’s θεωρεῖ earlier in the line, although the marginal interven-
tion is faded, in a way that the ει of θεωρεῖ is not, and may be earlier—
perhaps then motivating θεωρεῖ?
b3 εἰ δ’ αὐτὸν P2: with Fritzsche I understand ἡδύ ἐστι, from b1 ἥδιον;

there is no need for Dirlmeier’s supplement of δεῖ. The correction from
εἰ δυνατὸν in P is skilfully done, but there is enough—the formation
of the tau, and traces of erasure after it—to suggest that this was not a
brilliant conjecture by P himself, but by a later hand; certainly εἰ
δυνατὸν is what was in ω, the common ancestor of PCBL.
b4 ἡ κοινωνία P2: a smooth breathing and grave accent in P over η is

changed to a rough breathing; supralinear -αν is erased and replaced
with an alpha. The change is confirmed by ἡ κοινωνία in Pal. 165, P’s
direct, and generally slavish, descendant.
b5 Fritzsche’s supplement of δεῖ surely spoils the sense: ‘hence [= by

which reckoning] theorizing and feasting [sc. are things reasonably
enjoyed in company], not things involving [mere] feeding and other
necessities’; this is the Eudemian Aristotle at his most concise. —τὰ1 secl.
Walzer, accepting Collingwood’s supplement of γὰρ and Fritzsche’s of
δεῖ; none of the three changes is necessary, and indeed together they
play havoc with the rest of the sentence (ἀλλὰ ἀπολαύσεις at the end
becomes particularly problematic).
Of Susemihl’s two conjectures I prefer αἱ τοιαῦται 〈γὰρ οὐχ〉 ὁμιλίαι;

b6 That a γὰρ and a negative have gone missing is surely beyond doubt.
the other, αἱ τοιαῦται 〈ὁμιλίαι γὰρ οὐχ〉 ὁμιλίαι, has the advantage of
(1245b6) suggesting how γὰρ οὐ might have been lost (a copyist’s eye
moving straight to the second ὁμιλίαι), but is comparatively speaking a
shot in the dark, as are Fritzsche’s and Rackham’s versions. Just indi-
cating a lacuna in the text, with Susemihl, is respectable enough but
overly ascetic, and given that in any case αἱ τοιαῦται = αἱ τοιαῦται
ὁμιλίαι, a copyist might well have brought in ὁμιλίαι too early, then
forgotten the γὰρ οὐχ (in which case Susemihl’s other conjecture would
be an overcorrection).
b7 οὗ P2: the circumflex and rough breathing in P are clearly later additions.
b8 τέλους LP2: that P has been corrected inter alia against L or a
descendant of L is by now well beyond doubt. P2 adds a ligature for ου
above the omicron of τέλος.
b11 ϕανερόν BP2: the supralinear ον and the accent in P are plainly later
than P1. It is wrong to suggest, as does Susemihl, followed by Walzer/
Mingay, that P, i.e. Nikolaos, simply left out the ending—that is not his
way; the erasure of the original supralinear omicron and accent has just
been more complete than it often is. So now the question is how B comes
to have ϕανερόν when PCL all have ϕανερός; did the PC/α and L copy-
ists just happen to make the same mistake, or did B make the right move
independently (i.e.: was ϕανερός in ω, or not?).
b14 Rieckher’s supplement of a negative should be rejected: if as Aristotle
says the comparison/analogy is true, then the problem lies in its σύνθεσις,
i.e. the way it is put together/applied (with/to the actual case). Of course
it is true that if the σπουδαῖος human being were to be fully comparable
to a god (see note on b15 ἠξίου below), then the comparison and the
argument based on it would go through, but as Aristotle explains, he is
not, so it fails. —οὐ in P is plainly a later addition. The τοιοῦτος follow-
ing, which is the first original word in the line, is inset, and οὐ spreads
from the margin into the beginning of the gap; something, then, has
been erased, and since there is room only for one character, and C reads
ὁ, it is a sure bet that that was what Nikolaos wrote in P, having found
it in α.
b15 οἷον was perhaps what was in ω; B’s οἷος is a simple and natural
correction—so simple and natural that it is hard to see how οἷον ever
Aristotelica 175
got into the tradition. Bessarion in Par. 2042 writes οἷος. —Dirlmeier’s
ἠξίου, sc. ὁ λόγος, is simple and elegant (this is where the comparison
went wrong), but Bessarion’s ἠξίουν comes a close second.
b17 It is tempting to emend βέλτιον to βελτίων, since ὁ θέος is irrevoc
ably masculine, but βέλτιον works well enough as an adverb (‘his mode
of well-being is better . . .’).
b18 αὐτὸν αυτός P2: the supralinear ον and ος and the accents in P are
clearly later additions, over erasures; the breathing on αὐτός has also
been erased, perhaps because it was to be changed from rough
to smooth.
b23 Because of the way the right-hand side of an upsilon tends to merge
with a following sigma/ligature for στ, the difference between πλείστοις
and πλείστους is tiny and corruption from one to the other correspond-
ingly easy; Donini’s defence of the accusative is probably not worth
the gymnastics involved (understanding an ἔχειν). πλείστους P1,
πλείστων P2: this is in the first line on the page in P; P2 writes ὡς
πλείστων above the line in the top margin.
b25 πολλοῖς P1, πολλοὺς P2: the remains of the sign for οις are still
partly visible in P; the grave accent is added, the sign for ους squeezed in.
b30 ἄλλο Richards; ἀλλ’ PCBL; ἅμα Jackson. ἅμα would be redundant;
Richards’s alternative proposal, ἄλλως, might be more pleasing in
palaeographical terms (haplography before ὥσπερ), but ἄλλο fits better
after τοῦτο. Donini defends the transmitted text, translating ‘[if on the
other hand it is not possible,] per lo meno scelgono . . .’, but ἀλλά in this
case would perhaps be taking on an unusual role.
b31 Casaubon writes τὸν Ἡρακλῆ, following the Latin translation’s
Herculem, but why not a dative of advantage, with an αὐτὸν understood
after θεὸν or εἶναι? Von Fragstein evidently agrees. —C has ἢ, pace
Walzer/Mingay, like PBL.
b33 εἴποιεν: the subject, as Walzer/Mingay suggests, is b29 πάντες. In
any case ω, the common original source of PCBL, surely had εἴποιεν; P2
adds the sign for εν over the final epsilon. —The MSS’ ὃν is surely right,
as von Fragstein says (sc. λόγον, after εἴποιεν).
1245b38 ὡς ἡδὺ: three suggested emendations, and especially Fritzsche’s,

offer something rather more banal than what the MSS reading gives
us; why not ‘nothing should be as painful to a friend as his friend is a
pleasant thing’?
b40 τὰ P2: the alpha and grave accent in P evidently supersede an erased,
original mark for ων plus circumflex above the tau.
1246a1 The καὶ seems no more needed before λυπουμένου τοῦ ϕίλου
(Richards) than it is in its present position, where it seems to require an
infinitive, σκοπεῖν, to precede it rather than a participle (the friends in
question want to avoid appearing to look to their own interests, not to
avoid plainly looking to them); the only solution seems to be to bracket
it. —τοῦ/τὸ: omicron plus grave accent replace ligature for ου plus
circumflex in P.
a2 Contra Susemihl (lacunam ante ἔτι pos. Susemihl) the nominative

inside the following noun-clause τὸ κουϕότεροι εἶναι . . . shows that
the subject is still the same as that of the previous sentence; ἔτι δὲ intro-
duces something else that suffering friends want to avoid appearing to
choose. —μόνοι P2/3, μόνον P1: P2 writes οι over the signs for -νον,
while P3 adds μὴ μόνοι in the margin.
a5 B’s ἐπει δὴ probably = ἐπειδὴ; the absence of an accent on ἐπει,

despite the fact that B is marginally less strict about including accents
than PBL, is more significant than the gap between ἐπει and δὴ, because
B is also less strict in observing the divisions between words. Casaubon’s
ἐπεὶ δὴ must anyway be right, because Aristotle is now drawing an
inference from the preceding sentences—it is indeed already clear, from
what has been said, that people disagree about the weight attaching to
τὸ ἅμα. —At least one hand adds an acute accent over the first omicron
of ποσον in P—without deleting the original grave over the second
omicron.
a7 συνδεικνεῖν in B has a neat pi above the kappa.
a8 Pace P2 (writing γρ.: οὕτω δ’ ἂν μὲν in the margin), the only way
of saving the ἂν would be to read the following negative as οὗ: see the
next part of the present note. —Jackson reads οἱ δ’ ἅμα μὲν τοῦ εὖ
Aristotelica 177
βούλονται, sc. τοὺς ϕίλους μετέχειν, which gives a more than pass-
able sense, but requires a further and much less plausible change in
what follows (see below). To read οὗ βούλονται for οὐ βούλονται
would be even more conservative, even preserving the preceding ἂν,
giving us ‘but o thers [think/say friends should share only] if [ἂν] it is
[sc. ᾖ] what they [the friends] actually want them [i.e. their friends, to
share in]’, the ‘only’/‘actually’ representing the μέντοι, which would
have to be either ‘asseverative’ μέντοι, i.e. intensifying βούλονται, or
the adversative use (or a mixture of both: see the examples of μέντοι
cited in Bonitz’s Index)—or, if that is too much to ask, we could try οἱ
δ’ ἂν μὲν τοίνυν οὗ βούλονται, with μὲν looking forward to a sup-
pressed δέ-clause, and τοίνυν in a ‘transitional’ use (Denniston
575–6). At this point, however, it all begins to feel like a defence of the
indefensible: Casaubon’s αὖ is the only change required, and the
μέντοι can be taken just as emphasizing the degree of opposition
from this new group (οἱ δ’ ) whose argument for their complete rejec-
tion of the other view is now given. —ἐπειδὴ εἴ γε Jackson, ἐπειδή γε
P1, ἐπεὶ B, ἐπεὶ δέ γε CL, ἐπεὶ δ’ εἰ γε P2. The δέ in CL is surely super-
fluous, unless with Susemihl we suppose a lacuna following; its origin is
surely hinted at in the ἐπειδή that was once in P, altered by P2 to ἐπεὶ δ’
(εἰ), which is then faithfully reproduced in Pal. 165; at some earlier
point, on the plausible story suggested by Jackson’s proposal, the o
riginal
εἰ had been swallowed up by ἐπειδὴ. —B may have τις, but still writes
ἐπεὶ before it.
a9 P2 has ‘γρ.: ἥδιον εἶναι δηλονότι’ in the margin (more than likely
written on top of an earlier intervention), marked as to be supplied after
ὁμολογῶσιν, and in principle this is right—we do have to supply ἥδιον,
as most translators do; the only real question is whether actually to
print ἥδιον, which on balance, I think, in EE, is unnecessary. Jackson’s
ὁμολόγους εἶναι (‘are on a par’) has to meet the objection that the par-
ity of those doing supremely badly together and those doing supremely
well apart does not follow from the position being rejected, the conse-
quence of which—if togetherness is all (the relevant ὑπερβολή)—would
be that doing supremely well separately from others would, absurdly, be
less desirable than togetherness in supreme suffering. The subjects of
(1246a9) ὁμολογοῦσιν are the holders of the view being rejected; that
the verb is not in the infinitive (cf. Richards’s proposal) is perhaps
explained by the fact that Aristotle will himself be one of the resisters: ‘if
one is going to take their position to the extreme, those who say that
togetherness is all are actually conceding. . .’.
a10 Susemihl presumably suspects a lacuna because we have actually

been talking—inter alia—περὶ τὰς ἀτυχίας (how then can he say that
this subject is like the previous one?). But what Aristotle has just been
advocating (cf. preceding note), from the beginning of this little section
(a3 ἐπεὶ δ’ αἱρετὸν τό τ’ εὖ καὶ τὸ ἅμα . . .), is a compromise p osition,
and he now continues to press this specifically in relation to the sharing
or otherwise of misfortune.
a12 It is just possible that P2 intends προσεῖναι rather than παρεῖναι

(Susemihl, Walzer/Mingay), and that may be how the copyist of Pal. 165
read him (Walzer/Mingay says so: I have not checked), but I think if he
did he was mistaken—it is an alpha, I think, above/between the pi and
rho added by P2.
a13 ὁτὲ P2, correcting the supralinear, half-moon sign for -αν—the α´
copyist was remembering the preceding ὅταν—to epsilon by adding a
bar in the middle, adding a grave accent and crossing out the original
accent on the omicron. —τοὺς τοιούτους: i.e. friends, even when their
presence is not going to make any practical difference. If we find τοὺς
on its own (PCL) intolerable, Sylburg’s anodyne αὐτοὺς will work well
enough, but B’s reading gives us something that is not only more inter-
esting but actually true, and it is quite possible that τοιούτους dropped
out twice (in L and in α) independently, by homoioteleuton. —ἡδίστους
P1: P2 overwrites the sign for -ους with that for -ον.
a14 P2 writes in the margin ἴσως· τρόπον κατὰ μἀλα εὔλογον· ϕησὶν
δηλονότι: I take it that what comes after the second colon is saying ‘that
is clearly what Aristotle means’), so that τρόπον κατὰ μάλα εὔλογον is
intended as a conjecture, not definitively to be installed in the text.
a15 τὸ μὲν (Richards) would be more regular, but this is not a clinching
argument in EE.
Aristotelica 179
a17 ἡδὺς B2: B2 seems, unhelpfully, to write in an -υς above the upsi-
lon of ἡδύ.
a20 τοῦτ’ P2, τότ’ P1CB, τό τε L: the original omicron in P is changed to ου.
a23 Against Rackham’s ἀπεῖναι, I agree with Dirlmeier that Aristotle is

already thinking of cases like the one mentioned immediately after, of
enough to make emending the MSS’ εἶναι unsafe.) —〈ἂν〉 ἀνάγκη 〈ᾖ〉
inferior lovers killing their beloveds. (Or, at any rate, that is possible
αὐτοῖς (Kyrgiopoulos: his version of the rest of the sentence is, however,
quite different from the one I print) is Fritzsche’s conjecture minus his
further supplement of εἶναι (regularizing/filling out, as he not infre-
quently does); we could perhaps do without the ᾖ too, but there is noise
in the MSS beyond a bare ἀνάγκη.
a24 There is what appears to be a second augment over ἐρωμένους in B.
a25 αἰσθάνεται Richards: but αἰσθάνεσθαι reports what the lover

thinks, not what is true of him.
a26 After . . . ἢ εἰ ᾤετο ἀεὶ κακῶς πράττειν, PC add the first four words
of (what they call) Book VIII (‘: ἀπορήσειε δ’ ἄν τις : —’), before—on
the next line—giving the new book’s title.
Eudemian Ethics VIII/V
1246a26 bis (the book heading): the new book, like the last one, is given
two different numbers by PCB, i.e. VIII (PC), P2 again applying a differ-
ent Greek numerical system, and V (B). L, for its part, does not number
it as a separate book at all, simply leaving a gap of one line, but this is
certainly an accident: see next note. Bekker follows Marc. (itself follow-
ing the apparent example of L) and treats the next three chapters as a
continuation of VII (hence my fictional ‘1246a26 bis’ above, introducing
the book title, a27 being—in my numbering—the first line of what
Bekker calls VII.13—a26 in his), while noting in his apparatus that P
and Pal. 165 begin Book θ here, Marc. 200 Book ε. It is true that these
three last chapters are hardly, quite, a complete book (see below), but in
no way do they continue the treatment of ϕιλία that occupies Book VII/
IV. (Marc.[213] actually makes the gap of a single line after VII in L—the
same gap as L leaves between earlier books—even smaller: πράττειν,
the last word of the last line of VII, is followed in the same line by
ἀπορήσειε, the first word of our VIII/V, after a space of a mere six or
seven characters.)
a27 πορήσειε L: someone other than the copyist, presumably, was meant
to put in the first, ornamented, letter, but failed to do so; it would also
have been his task to put in the title of the book (ἀριστοτέλους ἠθικῶν
εὐδημίων η´ ), in the same red ink. In other words, so far as the copyist
himself was concerned, this was the beginning of a new book, and the
lack of a book title/heading is merely accidental. But that is not the end
of the matter. The new ‘book’ begins with a singular abruptness—witness
the attempt of a glossator (for which see the next note) to make VIII/V
into a continuation of the discussion of friendship in VII/IV; noting the
abruptness, Spengel proposes to mark a lacuna at the beginning of the
‘book’, and Susemihl follows him. VIII/V also ends in a way that
Aristotelica 181
suggests that something more either was to follow or actually did once
follow. My own proposal (for which see Rowe 2022 and Rowe forth-
coming 3 [see the bibliography to the Preface of the accompanying text
volume]), partly following Dirlmeier (366–7) and others, is that the
fragment was originally designed as part of a larger whole (a full ‘book’)
intended not to f ollow but to precede Book VII/IV, but was then replaced
by a new book at least closely resembling what we know as the second of
the ‘common’ books, i.e. NE VI ‘=’ EE V. Finding this now isolated frag-
ment, an editor (I surmise) placed it in its present position, after the
discussion of friendship, by false analogy with the closing chapters of
NE (X.6–8); VIII.3, at least, can be seen as rounding off EE in a way not
dissimilar to the way that X.6–8 completes NE—or rather could be so
seen, if it were not for the sentence or part-sentence with which it
ends: in effect, ‘So much for that subject [sc. and now for the next one]’.
—ϕίλῳ (LC2, B) here in a27 is plainly intrusive, the subject being now not
friendship but ἐπιστήμη, and neither P nor C have it. But since both B
and L do have it, then it was presumably in ω, and one can only suppose
that it originated in a gloss like the one in P, εἰ ἔστιν ἑκάστῳ ϕίλῳ
χρήσασθαι (apparently as a subject heading, in the margin where there is
room for it, which happens to be beside the last lines of Book VII), written
by someone (P2) trying to make sense of the abrupt transition by treating
this first line as a continuation of the treatment of ϕιλία. C2, adding ϕίλῳ
above the line in the text itself, is either doing the same as P2 or is correct-
ing against another MS. B’s ἐϕ’ ἑκάστῳ ϕίλῳ, meanwhile, suggests a way
of keeping the hopelessly intrusive ϕίλῳ that is by no means unintelligent.
a27–8 ἐϕ’ ἃ vs ἐϕ’ ᾧ: Allan preferred ἐϕ’ ἃ, but in support of ἐϕ’ ᾧ see
1227a24 αἴτιον δ’ ὅτι τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπ’ ἄλλῳ
χρήσασθαι κτλ.
a28–9 ἢ 〈ᾗ〉 αὐτὸ ἢ αὖ κατὰ συμβεβηκός: another possibility might
be to read ἢ αὐτῷ ἢ αὖ κατὰ συμβεβηκός (which is perhaps what
Inwood/Woolf ’s proposal to do without the supplement would amount
to [in the Cambridge translation]: it has to be a dative after χρήσασθαι,
and omicron for omega would be a standard error), but even if some-
thing is used κατὰ συμβεβηκός it will still surely be used αὐτό. It is
tempting to go with Jackson and do without the first ἢ, but since the
182 Eudemian Ethics VIII/V
(1246a28–9) whole point of καὶ τοῦτο is to introduce alternatives,

the ἢ seems necessary—and either it or the ᾗ would always be at risk of
omission by haplography.
a29 εἰ Spengel vs ᾗ Jackson (ἢ PCBL). Jackson’s ᾗ for ἢ is neater, but if

Aristotle is saying what this would have him saying here, he would be
saying the same thing at greater length in the next line (ὅτι μὲν ὀϕθαλμός,
κτλ). I construe ‘for example, if [it’s] an eye’ (as opposed to Sylburg’s/
Allan’s ‘if [it’s a matter of using the] eye/eyes’). —ὀϕθαλμὸς: B squeezes
in what looks like ὀϕθαλμη—and was perhaps read by B2 as ὀϕθαλμη:
see on a31 below—at the end of the line. B does sometimes use short-
hand, often with a flourish, especially at the ends of lines, in a way not
found in P or C (L, for its part, tends to write everything out), but it is
still hard to make what we have into ὀϕθαλμὸς; on the other hand it
would be a surprising error, since B is evidently a Greek speaker, and one
moreover who happily recognizes ὀϕθαλμός and ὀϕθαλμῷ in the next
sentence. —Ross’s ἢ is unnecessary before ἰδεῖν, as is Robinson’s ἢ πρὸς
τὸ or ἢ ὥστε: substantive infinitives without the definite article are not
uncommon in EE.
a30 Jackson’s αὐτὰ reflects the same worry as does Spengel’s supplement
of χρεῖαι, namely that χρεῖαι/χρήσεις is just too much to be left under-
stood, i.e. from χρήσασθαι in a27; I think not.
a31 ὀϕθαλμη B2: what looks like a slimline η is added over line after the
ος, apparently incorporating the original accent on ὀϕθαλμός, perhaps
for the sake of consistency with (what B2 took to be?) B’s ὀϕθαλμη
two lines before; alternatively, it is just an unusually formed accent.
—ἦν δ’ ὀϕθαλμῷ: once again there is extreme ellipse (understand
χρήσασθαι/χρῆσθαι). —Given the general absence of iota subscripts,
Jackson’s ἄλλῃ would be unobjectionable; but he reads ἄλλῃ only
because he has got rid of the preceding αὗται.
a33 ἐπιστήμῃ or ἐπιστήμη: as with the preceding ἄλλη/ἄλλῃ, either

choice is open to any and every editor; the dative (‘similarly, then, with
the use of ἐπιστήμη’), evidently first proposed by Spengel, is preferable
because χρῆσθαι clearly has to be understood in what immediately fol-
lows, i.e. with ἀληθῶς (why, then, not here?).
Aristotelica 183
a34 Spengel’s χρήται or χρήσεται for χρῆσθαι improves the syntax,

but it is not clear that it needs improving. χρῆσθαι simply continues the
same construction as the two preceding infinitives—‘there is x-ing and
y-ing, just as when someone ἑκὼν μὴ ὀρθῶς γράψῃ [there is] z-ing’;
with μεταστρέψας τὴν χεῖρα, the sentence resumes the clause ὅταν
ἑκὼν μὴ ὀρθῶς γράψῃ (which Walzer’s supplement of καὶ before ὡς,
itself intended to help out with the syntax, surely makes more difficult).
Here we are dealing not just with ellipse but with an extreme looseness
of syntax that some—like Spengel and perhaps Walzer—may find intoler
able, but syntactical looseness is surely of a pair with an elliptical style;
since we have ample evidence of both, especially in this last book of EE,
and if by and large we can extract a decent sense from the text as it stands,
as I think we can, then I see no good reason for embarking on the
hopeless task of deciding which particular rewriting of the MSS to prefer
over any other.
a35 I understand the καὶ . . . ποτε, i.e. in καὶ τῷ ποδί ποτε, as ‘and actu-
ally [sc. there is a real-life case of μεταστρέϕειν τὴν χεῖρα]’; for a simi-
lar way of introducing an illustration, with a plain καί, see, e.g.
1247a18–19. No emendation is needed, and Moraux’s in particular
should be resisted, because it introduces a banality: we hardly need to be
told that ὡς ἀγνοίᾳ χρῆσθαι τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ is a change of use.
a36 So laconic is Aristotle in this context that it seems unwise to insist

on a definite article with ὀρχηστρίδες. (LSJ s.v. ὀρχηστρίς refers to a
falsa lectio here of ὀρχηστριάδες, which probably comes via Bekker.
Harlfinger reports that Matr. 4627 [Laskaris] and Ambr. [Chalcondyles]
similarly correct to ὀρχηστριάδες: PCBL all accent ὀρχηστρίαδες, where
the accent perhaps already suggests the original and proper reading.)
1246b1 Another omission in B brought on by inherited nonsense (εἰ

δίκης εἰ)?
b3 ἃ ante καὶ2 suppl. Fritzsche, ἅπερ Spengel: τὰ αὐτὰ καί is enough for
the sense ‘the same things as’; ἃ might well have fallen out after the final
alpha of αὐτὰ, or ἅπερ before ἀπὸ, but—once again—the temptation to
supply what we might feel more comfortable with should be resisted in
the context of EE (and particularly in this book, the style of which
(1246b3) inclines even more towards brevity than usual; no doubt this
is a contributory factor in its ubiquitous corruption).
b6 ἀλλ’ ἔτι εἰ Kenny: Kenny’s emendation (or Spengel’s second proposal,

but ἔτι εἰ for ἐπεὶ is the more economical change) is surely indispens
able, given that the chapter will end with an emphatic declaration that
ϕρόνησις is not ἐπιστήμη. That Aristotle should here start his new
argument, however dialectical, by saying ‘since it is’ is surely impossible,
pace von Fragstein’s—implicit—claim that ἐπεί can be read as including
the qualification ‘nach der Annahme einiger’.
b7 κἀκείνῃ: Walzer/Mingay prints κἀκείνη, which—by now a familiar

point—is just as legitimate a reading of MSS that tend not to mark iota
subscripts, especially in endings; I choose to read κἀκείνῃ, with Susemihl
(‘the same as it’, i.e. as ἐπιστήμη: cf. 1247a1).
b8–9 εἰ δὲ ἁπλῆ ἡ ἑκάστου χρεία: Rackham is right to reject

Bussemaker’s suppression of the article, wrong to suppose we need the
ἦν to be spelled out.
b11 στροϕήν P2: the sigma in P is plainly a later addition (Victorius has
‘γρ. τροπὴν’ in the margin of his Ald., then later writes στροϕὴν beside
it). —κυρία post τίς suppl. Robinson: κυρία is to be understood in any
case, with no need for it to be spelled out.
b12 ἐπιστήμη γε ἢ νοῦς L: given that there are other gaps in PCB in the
immediate context, it is in principle possible that they omit ἢ νοῦς too
in error, and that the words were in the original common source of
PCBL (ω). However I agree with Spengel and Bussemaker that they are
intrusive, on the simple grounds that there is and has been no argument
for ruling out νοῦς as well as ἐπιστήμη: ἢ νοῦς, I suppose, was origin
ally someone’s gloss, perhaps prompted by the γε (ἐπιστήμη γε), or
possibly by the argument of the next chapter (q.v.)—although there only
the most general role is given to νοῦς and νοεῖν as such (cf. b15 below),
and in such a role, at least in the present context, it would actually add
little or nothing to ἐπιστήμη. (Did the glossator perhaps have in mind
the specialized νοῦς of NE VI ‘=’ EE V, functioning as a kind of percep-
tion? Pace Dirlmeier [who thinks ἢ νοῦς is Aristotle, translating νοῦς as
Aristotelica 185
‘Intuition’: ‘Sollte das ein Zusatz sein, so müsste der Glossator seinen Ar.
sehr gut gekannt haben’], it would be odd indeed for Aristotle himself to
introduce that here, i.e. in a context where νοῦς is used consistently in a
non-specialized role, as it is in EE VIII/V as a whole.) There is one prob-
lem: according to Harlfinger’s stemma there is a direct and uninter-
rupted line between ω and L, in which case the original gloss would
have to have been in ω itself: either, then, it was taken up into the text in
L but not in the other recensio, or, alternatively, the gloss was introduced
into ω after α´, the hyparchetype of PCB, had been copied from it. But I
also would not rule out the possibility that there was at least one other
copyist at work between ω and L. (It is hard, incidentally, to see why an
editor proposing to omit ἢ νοῦς should put it in square brackets, as
Susemihl does; that would normally suggest that the omitted words
were in all the primary MSS, which they are not in this case.)
b12–13 The loss from PCB of χρῆται γὰρ αὐτῇ· ἡ γὰρ τοῦ ἄρχοντος
ἀρετὴ is evidently caused by simple haplography (in α´ ), and not by
puzzlement about the argument, though that would be understandable:
cf. Kenny’s note (Oxford World’s Classics translation ad loc.). Could
Aristotle be supposing that ϕρόνησις/ἐπιστήμη would ‘rule over’
ἀρετή insofar as, in the imagined scenario, it would be the sole factor in
determining whether the agent’s actions are good or bad (irrespective of
the ἀκρατής)? Spengel’s 〈αὐτὴ〉 αὑτῇ is bizarre, not least in light of the
any division in the soul such as the one just about to be introduced with
sentence that follows.
b13–14 τίς οὖν ἐστιν; The τίς is perhaps surprising, and a number of
translators, Woods, Kenny, and Inwood/Woolf among them, appear
implicitly to emend to τί (‘What, then, is it?’ ‘So what is it?’). In light of what
follows, Jackson’s construal of the question as τίς οὖν ἔστιν, sc. ὁ τὰ
τοιαῦτα παθών, i.e. who there could be that can / under what circum-
stances can anyone be said to act ἀϕρόνως ἀπὸ ϕρονήσεως (answer:
perhaps the ἀκρατής), is perhaps right, but is hardly the most intuitive
reading; I myself incline towards taking it (despite b11–12 οὐ γὰρ ἔτι
ἐπιστήμη γε) as τίς, sc. ἐπιστήμη—‘so what ἐπιστήμη is it?’ As
Aristotle will affirm at the end of the chapter (b36–8), and as has
been confirmed in the preceding sentence by the exclusion of the one
(1246b13–14) plausible candidate, ἀρετή, there just is nothing more

powerful than ἐπιστήμη.
b15 The choice between πὼς and πῶς is, again, in such a case as this, a
matter of choice; I prefer, and have consistently preferred, the first, to
avoid confusion.
b16–17 τἀναντία. ἢ ἔστι Jackson: the apparatus for once lists the vari-
ous supplements (offered to explain the MSS’ τἀναντία η σϕι/τἀναντία
***σϕι) not chronologically but in ascending order of redundancy and/
or desperation (Susemihl has an even more elaborate proposal). All are
based on the erroneous belief, of which Jackson alone is innocent, that
the MSS together contain evidence of a lacuna—when (a) there is a gap
only in L among the three that offer the mysterious σϕι, and (b) it is not
unusual for the copyist of L to resort to leaving a gap when faced with a
problematic bit of text. In other words he is merely giving a signal that
something is amiss, which P2 and C2 do by inserting dots over σϕ (P2)
and σϕι (C2). It seems reasonable to suppose that η σϕι was in ω (and
more than likely, given B’s behaviour, in α´ too: this, Ι suspect, another
case of omission—here of a whole sentence—signalling perplexity), and
ἢ ἔστι δῆλον ὅτι, κτλ—with a full stop after τἀναντία—not only repre-
sents a minimal departure from the puzzling sequence of characters the
MSS bequeath to us but actually makes sense.
b18 Jackson suggests we should retain ἄνοια here (rather than accepting
Spengel’s ἄγνοια), and read it in place of the MSS’ ἄγνοια in b26 and 27
too, on the grounds that ‘ἄνοια and not ἄγνοια is the intellectual vice
which answers to the intellectual virtue of ϕρόνησις’ (1913: 205–6), but
that looks like a mere assertion, and in any case ἄγνοια is what is gener-
ally being paired with ϕρόνησις in the present dialectical context, and
with ἐπιστήμη, with which ϕρόνησις is alternating; it would also be the
natural pair of ἐπιστήμη. See further on b22. —ἑτέρᾳ μεταποιοῦνται
Jackson: ἑτέρᾳ, with no iota subscript marked, as usual, might easily
become ἑτέραι (PCL) before the plural verb. (Or could the iota in the
MSS’ ἑτέραι be an adscript? Since there is no other evidence of such sur-
viving adscripts in any of PCBL, I exclude this possibility.) I construe this
ἕτερᾳ (sc. ὁδῷ: LSJ s.v. ἕτερος) as if it were ἑτέρως: ‘they lay claim to
Aristotelica 187
roles in one or the other way’, i.e. either the ἄλογον dominates, or λόγος,
and this happens even if / also if (κἂν, a16) it is the non-reasoning part
that is as it should be, the reasoning part not. —B resumes with ὥστ’.
b18–19 τὸ PCBL, τ’ οὐ Jackson: PCBL’s τὸ would be possible but some-

what oddly placed, not least when it is evidently redundant in the context
of Eudemian style. Βut it is in any case a negative we need—unless we
read τε, which, with Allan’s τε for ὥστε after ἀϕρόνως in the next line,
would give us a double τε . . . καί; this solution, however, soon runs into
trouble (see on 19 ὥστε below). —On the reconstruction proposed, the
reasoning part is here envisaged as negating the δικαιοσύνη of the non-
reasoning, which would be a misuse of reasoning. Of course reasoning is
not the same as ϕρόνησις; but we have not yet escaped completely from
what can be called the single-use argument (εἰ δὲ ἁπλῆ ἡ ἑκάστου χρεία
ᾗ ἕκαστον κἂν ϕρονίμως ἔπραττον οὕτω πράττοντες, b8–9).
b19 Spengel’s supplement of ἀρετῇ after καὶ1 (χρῆσθαι καὶ) is an uneco
nomical way to save the καὶ, which can in any case plausibly be taken as
epexegetic. —Allan’s τε for ὥστε is palaeographically impeccable (dittog-
raphy after the ως of ἀϕρόνως), but would link ἀϕρόνως to the following
τἀναντία (ἀϕρόνως τε καὶ τἀναντία), which would surely take the argu-
ment nowhere: the natural pair for χρῆσθαι ϕρονήσει ἀϕρόνως would be
χρῆσθαι ϕρονήσει ϕρονίμως, whereas what Aristotle is leading up to is
the possibility of ἀγνοίᾳ χρῆσθαι ϕρονίμως: cf. on b28–9 below. (Walzer/
Mingay adopts Allan’s emendation, but accidentally makes nonsense of it
by printing a comma after ἀϕρόνως.)
〈ἐνούσης〉, although less economical than his preferred τὴν μὲν ἐν τῷ

b20–1 Spengel’s conjecture, τὴς μὲν ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ ἀρετὴς
λογιστικῷ ἀρετὴν, does a better job of explaining the MSS readings

here, and sets up a nice pair with ἀγνοίας ἐνούσης in b23 (q.v.). With
τὴν μὲν ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ ἀρετὴν, the placing of what would be the
grammatical object so far ahead of the verbs governing it (b22 στρέψει,
ποιήσει) is also awkward.
b22 στρέψη P1: P2 appears to overwrite an original eta with the liga-
ture for ει.
gratia) 〈καὶ τὴν ἐν τῷ ἀλόγῳ ἀρετὴν στρέψει ἡ ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ

1246b22 To fill his first lacuna in this line, Susemihl supplies (exempli
ἄγνοια〉, perhaps to balance b24–6 καὶ πάλιν . . . ἡ ἐγκράτεια; but that

seems unnecessary, the point of 24–6 being to give weight to the sugges-
tion that ἀρετή in the ἄλογον might correct κακία in the λογιστικόν
(why not, if it works the other way round, with the familiar phenom
enon of ἐγκράτεια?). Susemihl’s filling for his second lacuna, ἐν τῷ
λογιστικῷ, is more plausible than his proposed filling for the first, but
surely ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ is readily understood here; where else would
we expect to find ignorance?
b23 The difference, orthographically, between ἄγνοια and ἄνοια is so

small, and the MSS so consistently muddle them, that there seems little
point in trying, as some do, to defend ἄνοια here or anywhere else in the
present context (cf. on b18 above); ἄγνοια is what is required, and what
we finally get in all of PCBL in b25 and 26. —The obvious and necessary
correction to ϕρονίμως is made by Ambr. (D. Chalkondyles) as well as
by Matr. 4627 (K. Laskaris).
b26 πράττη B—apparently mistaking the typical double oblique strokes

that signal -ειν for a (straight-sided, uncial-like) eta.
b26–7 ἔσται καὶ [ἡ] ἀπὸ ἀγνοίας ϕρονίμως, sc. ϕρονήσει χρῆσθαι:
cf. χρῆσθαι . . . ϕρονήσει ἀϕρόνως in b19, and ἀγνοίᾳ χρῆσθαι
ϕρονίμως (Moraux) in the next sentence (i.e. b28). I take it that
ϕρόνησις in this case is ἀπὸ ἀγνοίας in that it has been brought
about by ἡ . . . ἀρετὴ ἐν τῷ ἀλόγῳ, which has turned round the
ἄγνοια in the reasoning part and made it judge correctly, as specified
in b21–3.
ἀπὸ ἀγνοίας χρῆσθαι 〈ϕρονήσει〉 ϕρονίμως spells out what would surely
b28–9 Moraux’s τὸ ἀγνοίᾳ χρῆσθαι ϕρονίμως must surely be right. Spengel’s
have to be understood with the MSS’ text, not least given b19, but it is rather
acting ϕρονίμως as a result of ἀρετή (ἐν τῷ ἀλόγῳ) ‘turning ἄγνοια round’
(στρέϕειν, b23), not ‘using wisdom wisely as a result of folly’ (Rackham), that
was the focus of the preceding discussion. I imagine a copyist writing ἀπὸ
ἀγνοίας instead of τὸ ἀγνοίᾳ under the influence of the previous sentence
(the immediate repetition of ἀπὸ ἀγνοίας ϕρονίμως, even with the addition
Aristotelica 189
of χρῆσθαι, in any case immediately suggests the possibility of

contamination).
b29 There is a case against οὐδαμῶς, but it is not proven (least of all by
what the Latin translation (‘Lat.’) gives us, i.e. [in ceterarum] nulla).
b30 The καὶ is written in above the ἢ in B—if καὶ is what is intended.
b30–1 ἀλλ’ οὖν PCBL: this ἀλλ’ οὖν I take, tentatively, to be a version of
the apodotic variety recognized by Denniston 444; ‘[ἀκολασία may dis-
rupt an(other) ἐπιστήμη like medicine,] but for sure. . .’. —ὁ for οὐ, as
we have seen, is not unusual in these MSS.
b31 Robinson’s supplement of ἡ ἀρετή after ἄγνοιαν at first sight seems

essential, given that the ‘turning’ of ignorance by ἀρετή in the non-
reasoning part is what Aristotle has just been talking about. Some recent
translators have done without it, but nevertheless construed the context
in the same way: thus Kenny in the Oxford World’s Classics translation
has ‘but the contrary of intemperance does not convert ignorance into
knowledge’, while in the Cambridge translation Inwood and Woolf pro-
pose ‘but if it is the opposite it does not pervert ignorance’. The latter trans-
lation raises the question: what is the ‘it’? Surely not ἀκολασία, which
seems the only candidate; it can hardly be the opposite of itself. English,
like many modern languages, can manage without raising that question, as
in ‘Who was that?’ ‘It was Aristotle’, but Greek, with the gendered ἐναντία,
cannot. Kenny’s slightly freer version is similarly problematical. In short, if
Aristotle is to be saying what Kenny, Inwood and Woolf, and Robinson
want him to say, we need Robinson’s supplement; without it the transla-
tions offered are literally impossible. But the interpretation in question
does not fit with what follows. Aristotle says ‘but it [whatever ‘it’ is] does
not convert/pervert/turn ignorance if it [again, whatever this ‘it’ is] is
ἐναντία, because of there not being ὑπεροχή in it but rather ἀρετή’s being
generally in this relation [i.e. of ὑπεροχή] to κακία’ (the whole of ‘because
of . . . κακία’ forming a single noun-clause with τό + infinitive). Now the
translations cited break this explanation into two distinct parts, with a full
stop between them (‘Virtue in total, however. . .’. ‘Rather, it is virtue in gen-
eral that . . .’), which obscures the fact that ‘ἀρετή’s being generally in this
relation to κακία’ is part of the explanation as to why ‘it’ does not convert,
etc., ignorance if it is ἐναντία. If ‘ἀρετή’s being generally in this relation to
(1246b31) κακία’ is part of that explanation, then plainly ‘it’ cannot be

ἀρετή, but must rather be κακία, or rather the species of κακία that just
figured earlier in the sentence, i.e. ἀκολασία. So Robinson’s supplement
must be definitively rejected: Aristotle is saying that ἀκολασία στρέϕει
medical or grammatical knowledge, but not any sort of scientific
ignorance if it is ἐναντία to it, where either the first ‘it’ refers to the
ἀκολασία and the second to the ignorance or vice versa, the point being
just that they have to be in opposition, as ἀκολασία and knowledge were
in the preceding example, and as ἀρετή/κακία in the non-reasoning and
reasoning parts were in the discussion that led up to those ἄτοπα out-
comes now being dismissed. One of the main features of that discussion
was that it introduced a further cause of the disruption of knowledge
(other causes having been ruled out), itself expressed in a somewhat bizarre
form—πὼς ἀκόλαστος ὁ ἀκρατὴς ἔχων νοῦν, b15—that directly leads to
those ἄτοπα results, but nevertheless itself has a parallel in the case of
other kinds of knowledge: ἀκολασία can disrupt medical, or grammatical,
or . . . knowledge. But there is no parallel, in such cases, for the overturning
of ignorance, dreamed up in the preceding dialectical discussion, by the
non-reasoning part—here represented by ἀκολασία/κακία, as being the
only source of disruption there can be from that quarter, in the real world,
for ἐπιστῆμαι. —διὰ: Susemihl writes διὸ, evidently a simple error.
—ἐνεῖναι, if that is what it is, in P is a mess; what was underneath the cor-
rection (and successive hands may have been at work) is hard to make out.
b33 Susemihl supplies ἃ after πάντα (which is actually where B has it),
claiming to follow the Latin translation and Victorius, but the sense surely
demands that it should be before ὁ ἄδικος; and that is where a later mar-
ginal note by Victorius places it, preceded by ‘fort.’ (anticipating Jackson).
b34 B2’s ἕν ἐστιν is a mistake illuminated by the hyphen, or what looks

remarkably like a hyphen, in the margin in L, after the ἔν- of ἔνεστιν,
which happens to be split between two lines; that is, a reader of L was
marking that ἔν εστιν was not (as the correcting hand in B took ἔνεστιν,
whether split in his source as in L or not) ἕν ἐστιν.
b35 ἐκεῖναι PCBL: ἐκείνων Moraux. But there is a special edge to

ἐκεῖναι: Socrates, Aristotle’s opponent in the whole of this chapter, did
Aristotelica 191
not recognize such ἕξεις, since he did not divide off a non-reasoning
part of the soul for them to belong to. —αἱ ἀλόγου scripsi, αἱ ἄλλου
PCBL: it seems important that the nature of the other part should be
mentioned here, i.e. that it is ἄλογον, not just other than the part that
reasons (cf. preceding note, on ἐκεῖναι). I also doubt whether ἄλλου by
itself can stand for τοῦ ἄλλου μέρους (τῆς ψυχῆς), as ἀλόγου can, in its
own way, in the present context. Jackson’s ϕρόνιμοι καὶ ἀγαθοὶ, ἐκεῖναι
δ’ ἄλλου ἕξεις is neat enough (apart from the problem just raised about
ἄλλου), but gives an inappropriate sense: that the ἕξεις belong to a differ-
ent part of the soul is of course true, for Aristotle, but it could hardly be
said to be one of the consequences of the preceding argument. Rather,
the conclusion is what the MSS say it is, i.e. that people’s being ϕρόνιμοι
goes along with the goodness of the ἕξεις of their ἄλλο (ἀλόγον) part.
b38 It looks as if the ultimate common source of PCBL (i.e. ω) had

γνώσ followed by a small gap (the precise size of which will be affected
by the presence or absence of ligatures, etc.). Bekker, not knowing of B,
duly prints γνώσ (with no punctuation following, just a new paragraph)
after the L tradition as represented by Marc. and Oxon., leaving Spengel
to complete it in the way the B copyist had already done, evidently on
his own initiative. Pace Spengel, to judge by parallels elsewhere in these
MSS the gaps in PCL are more likely to have originated in problems
some previous copyist prior to ω had in deciphering the ending of
γνώσεως than in a larger lacuna.
b39–40 καὶ ἀρετὴ C: καὶ ἀρετὴν PBL; et virtutem BF; κατ’ ἀρετήν
Jackson. C here is the clear outlier, given the agreement of PBL and BF,
but I think its καὶ ἀρετὴ is nevertheless right: Jackson’s argument
against it, that ‘with καὶ ἀρετή, the sentence suggests that εὐτυχία may
take the place at once of ϕρόνησις and of ἀρετή, whereas the context
shows that εὐτυχία is regarded as a possible substitute for ϕρόνησις
only’ (208), is, I think, unconvincing. The language of 1247b24–5 and
1248a6 (ἐπιθυμοῦσιν . . . ὡς δεῖ καὶ οὗ δεῖ καὶ ὅτε / ἐπιθύμησεν ὧν
ἔδει καὶ ὅτε ἔδει, the subject/s in both cases being those/the person
relevantly εὐτυχεῖς/ής) in my view rather suggests that the ‘εὐτυχία’
under discussion is being thought of precisely as a possible substitute for
both ϕρόνησις and ἀρετή, which of course have just been said, firmly,
(1246b39–40) to go together. (Hence what I think is Aristotle’s careful

use of εὐπραγία: the question presently under discussion is what makes
for / brings about good acting, not what makes for / brings about a good
life, closely connected though the two things may be.) The reason why
the second of the two subjects in the sentence (i.e. ἀρετή) is delayed, I
propose, is because the first has been the subject of the immediately pre-
ceding sentence, καὶ ἀρετή being added as an afterthought, for the sake
of clarity. I disagree too with Jackson’s claim that ‘the accusative ἀρετήν,
because of its difficulty, . . . represent[s] a genuine tradition’, because, I
argue, it would be a typical error, for ἀρετή, in these MSS, after the
accusative εὐπραγίαν (although, Jackson might respond, καὶ for his
own κατ’ would be another typical error, which would then have cleared
the way for C’s nominative, ἀρετή). —These εὐτυχεῖς are evidently
people of whose lives Aristotle would approve; why else would he even
momentarily entertain the possibility, as he will go on to do, that god or
the divine is somehow involved in their success (1248a24ff.)? On the
other hand they lack the right ἕξεις as well as ϕρόνησις. One hypothesis
might be as follows. The aim of VIII.2 in general is to get some more
things straight with Socrates (following VIII.1), and with Plato. They
claim that good acting, when properly understood, is all down to
ἐπιστήμη (see 1247b15–16), and this has the effect—since the relevant
knowledge, they suppose, will be in very short supply—of saying that
actually nobody acts well, or only a few do so. No, Aristotle retorts, we
recognize (ϕαμέν, 1246b40; οὓς λέγομεν εὐτυχεῖς, 1247a37) that
people do get things right even if they lack ἐπιστήμη. It is striking how
many times the term ἐπιστήμη comes up in the chapter—at least as
many times as ϕρόνησις, and this despite the clear ruling at the end of
VIII/V.1 that ϕρόνησις is not (an) ἐπιστήμη; in fact it is introduced,
apparently now as interchangeable with ϕρόνησις, as early as the third
line of the chapter. Is that perhaps just because Socrates is so much still
in Aristotle’s mind? So how to account for the phenomenon in question
(Aristotle asks), i.e. that people can get things right even without know
ledge? What the εὐτυχεῖς have, it will turn out, is a special variety of
ἐνθουσιασμός (1248a35), which allows them to get to the right answer
almost as quickly as those with ἐπιστήμη / ϕρόνησις / σοϕία do
(1248a35–8). If this is along the right lines, ch. 1 will then run straight in
Aristotelica 193
to ch. 2: ‘nothing is stronger than ϕρόνησις. But wait a minute—we do

seem to say that good acting isn’t restricted to the ϕρόνιμοι; people do
seem to act well without reasoning well (indeed, even without reason-
ing, which makes Socrates wrong twice over—or even three times, since
he claimed that εὐτυχία was actually itself ἐπιστήμη: 1247b15–16).
How so?’ VIII/V.1 is not, then, a ‘fragment’ on its own, as Moraux and
others have claimed; if there is a fragment, it is Book VIII/V itself.
1247a1 ποιούσης B, εὐποιούσης PC, εὖ ποιούσης L: the εὐ/εὖ is by

dittography after εὐτυχίας, as the combination of B and BF confirms.
Fritzsche’s ἐμποιούσης saves the εὐ, as it were, but why ἐμποιεῖν?
εὐπραγία is not an internal state. —κατὰ Spengel: the corruption of
κατὰ to καὶ would be easy enough, but ‘. . . and the same effects as . . .’
(epexegetic καί) works well enough.
a4 πολλοὶ Jackson, accepting Bekker’s οἱ for ἔτι in the next line; he

thinks this should have a correlative.
a5 Jackson’s πολλῷ μᾶλλον πολὺ μέντοι καὶ τύχης implausibly com-

bines L’s reading with BF ’s, presumably in an attempt to explain the lat-
ter; but μᾶλλον for μέντοι, I suppose, was a consequence of someone’s
reading πολλῷ for the (already) corrupt πολλοὶ we find in PC.
means impossible, it should stay (οὗτοι 〈τοιοῦτοι〉 might be worth con-

a7 οὗτοι: one might have preferred τοιοῦτοι, but since οὗτοι is by no
sidering?). —Ambr.’s οὐ τῷ is presumably an independent conjecture

(by Demetrios Chalkondyles), confirmed by BF, and supported by the
lack of the expected sigma in οὕτω(ς) before a vowel in all of PCBL.
a11 τῷ τοδὶ τοιονδὶ ἔχειν (Kyrgiopoulos) is not only the simplest

resolution of the MSS’ readings but makes good sense, the point being to
distinguish the characteristics we are born with that we just have from
those that belong to us more loosely ‘by nature’ from the start: ‘[people
B’s τῷ τοιόνδε δεῖν ἔχειν could possibly point to an original τῷ 〈τοιονδὶ

differ immediately they are born] by having a this that is such-and-such’.
κατὰ τὸ εἶναι〉 τοιονδὶ δεῖν 〈καὶ〉 ἔχειν, i.e. exactly what BF seems to
represent; we would only have to suppose haplography, followed by the
omission of what would now be a redundant καὶ. But BF’s version is in
(1247a11) itself hard to accept: ‘by [the rule that] something such-and-
such κατὰ τὸ εἶναι must also have such-and-such’? This might be
improved with a οὕτως in place of the second τοιονδὶ, but the outcome
would surely be no more than a banality. Was the author of BF here per-
haps trying his own hand at improving the transmitted text?
a13 C2 writes in the missing ἡ over the line between ἄλογος and
ϕρόνησις, with an insertion mark below.
a14 πράττει vs πράττοι: cf. the indicative in the next line—and anyway,
what the ϕρόνιμος agent is able to explain is what he is doing. The οι
(visible also in BF’s operetur) was perhaps originally by assimilation to
the following οἱ.
a15 Editors until Walzer generally interpreted the MSS’ τέχνη, without
comment, as a nominative, as did the translator of BF (ars); it seems to me
that though a nominative makes sense Walzer is right to take it as a dative
(‘if they were able to say, it would be by means of τέχνη’)—an option that
was always available given the typical lack of iota subscripts in endings in
these MSS. (Ald., which does have them, does not have one here, nor does
Victorius insert one.) —Jackson’s ὅτι (ὅτι δὲ [sc. κατορθοῦσι], ϕανερόν,
ὄντες ἄϕρονες) will surely find few supporters, and goes against his nor-
mal policy of respecting BF (whose amplius surely represents ἔτι). —BF’s
enim after ἔτι is implausible: ‘for in addition’? Dirlmeier accepts γὰρ, but
that would only be defensible if we thought BF always and necessarily
right, which it is not: see e.g. on a11, and on a26 below. —If we keep
ϕανερὸν, we need Spengel’s supplement of ὅτι; it is more economical to
adopt Spengel’s originally conjectured ϕανεροὶ (BF’s manifestum = PCBL,
followed as it is by insipientes existentes).
a16 It would be easy to do without μὲν—which seems good enough rea-

son to keep it; the corresponding δέ clause is perhaps forgotten as the
following example expands. (BF ’s quidem = μὲν.)
a17 δοκεῖ PCBL, ἐδόκει Sylburg: the translator of BF was himself per-
haps faced with δοκεῖ . . . εἶναι, and quietly emended this to ἦν, in the
knowledge that the reference must be to the past. Sylburg’s proposal
looks attractive until we come to a20 ὡς λέγουσιν: Aristotle is, it seems,
Aristotelica 195
talking about people in the present looking back to the past, in which
case I propose taking the εἶναι after δοκεῖ as an imperfect infinitive
after δοκεῖ, if only hesitantly, (a) given that I do not have a parallel to
offer (beyond those in Goodwin, Moods and Tenses §119), and (b) when
the corruption from ἐδόκει to δοκεῖ would be easy. —χρυσίον B: B is
evidently making his own sense of the πλέον he found following.
a18 Victorius: ‘γρ. πλέων’ in the margin of his copy of Ald.
a19 For ὑπὸ τῶν BF offers ab hiis qui, with no verb following the rela-
tive: I cite this as an illustration of the fact that the relationship of BF to
any Greek text is complex (could the MS from which it was copied really
have read ὑπὸ τῶν (or τούτων) οἳ, with no following verb?), i.e. that
even BF is not simply a word-for-word transcription.
a19–20 δι’ εὐήθειαν ὡς λέγουσιν secl. Allan: the words do have some-
thing of the feel of a gloss—nothing substantial would be lost without
them, and ejecting them would then clear the way for Sylburg’s ἐδόκει
in a17; but this is too thin a basis for bracketing the words. BF’s dixerunt is
perhaps the translator’s own invention, following his erat in a18.
a20 ὅτι (quod BF) here has been introduced—so I propose—by false ana
logy with a16 ὅτι, where οὐχ ὅτι = ‘not only’, or ‘not just’, is answered by
ἀλλὰ καὶ here. Barnes points to a similar error at Poetics 1448b35. That
people are silly about things other than those in which they are successful,
like Hippocrates about geometry, is of no interest (‘not just . . .’); the question
is whether they are ἄϕρονες about the very things in which they do suc-
ceed as well (καὶ). —ἐν οἷς: Bessarion (in Par. 2042) got there first, before
Victorius (‘γρ. ἐν οἷς’); Ambr. got halfway there with ἐν ἐνίοις.
a20–1 περὶ γὰρ ναυκληρίαν: BF circa naucliriam enim = περὶ
ναυκληρίαν γὰρ?
a21 δυνατώτατοι B: the B copyist was perhaps faced with the same υ for
ει (δεινότατοι L) as PC, and made the wrong correction—or did he get it
right? δυνατώτατοι is far from being impossible, and BF’s maxime indus-
tri (or industrii) is not the most obvious translation of L’s δείνοτατοι.
a22 Jackson derives his βάλλει ἕξ from BF ’s iacit ex (eo quod naturam
habet benefortunatam), supposing a corruption in the Latin from sex to
(1247a22) ex, and continuing καθὰ ἦν ϕύσει, τῷ τὴν ϕύσιν ἔχειν

εὐτυχῆ ἐστὶν εὐτυχής: ‘. . . the Greek and Latin traditions are [again]
irreconcilable, and again I think they must be combined’ (210). Quite
apart from our needing to ask (again) about how ‘Greek and Latin tradi-
tions’ could have come apart in the first place, the result of combining
them here results in a pleonasm sufficient on its own to bring Jackson’s
method into disrepute. I myself think that here the translator is
paraphrasing: ex eo quod naturam habet benefortunatam is his—

reasonable—take on καθ’ ἣν ϕύσει ἐστὶν εὐτυχής. In sum, what PCBL
have is perfectly acceptable: what the lucky dice-player throws is what
he wants to throw, and does not need specifying (καθ’ ἣν, sc. βολήν:
Collingwood).
a24 κακῶς νεναυπηγημένον: male regibilis BF, at best an over-translation.
a25 Jackson defends the δὲ by saying ‘πολλάκις δὲ may stand for καὶ
τοῦτο πολλάκις’, a claim that few, I think, would be inclined to accept;
and the lack of anything corresponding to δὲ in BF ought to count
against it, at any rate by Jackson’s own rule (i.e. always to take notice of
what BF says). —BF ’s propter se ipsam confirms Bekker’s δι’ αὑτό (if it
needed confirmation).
a26 P2 writes his supplement ἀλλ’ οὗτος εὐτυχ´ (= εὐτυχὴς: εὐτυχῶν

Matr. 4627) τὸν δαίμον’ ἔχει κυβερνήτην ἀγαθόν in the margin with an
insertion mark (plus κείμ[ενον]) above it, corresponding to a similar mark
in the text after ἀλλ’ ὅτι ἔχει κυβερνήτην ἀγαθόν. This supplement must
derive from L or a descendant of L, but its ultimate origin, i.e. the ultimate
origin of what we find in L, must surely have been in a gloss, for the follow-
ing reasons. (1) The repetition of ἔχει(ν) κυβερνήτην ἀγαθόν is odd, and
fits particularly badly with the usually spare style of EE. (2) The sentence
anticipates what will be said, more economically, in the next sentence. (3)
The sense of redundancy is increased by the repetition of ἀλλά (one sen-
tence, i.e. the preceding one, and one ἀλλά, will suffice: note Fritzsche’s
bracketing of the new ἀλλά, though he accepts the more problematic repe
tition of ἔχει[ν] κυβερνήτην ἀγαθόν). (4) The elision of δαίμονα (in L, as
well as P2, pace Walzer/Mingay) is odd; and (5) the sentence will in any case
need emendation to make it look like something Aristotle could have
Aristotelica 197
written. The sense is plainly ‘But could this sort of εὐτυχής really have a
gloss?); moreover (6b) we would need either οὗτος 〈ὁ〉 εὐτυχὴς (conjec-
god as steersman?’, and (6a) the ἀγαθόν is then out of place (less so in a
tured by Susemihl) or 〈ὁ〉 οὕτως (sic BF; οὕτως Fritzsche) εὐτυχὴς, i.e. in
addition to losing ἀγαθόν at the end. The ἀγαθόν (i.e. bonum) is actually
missing in BF, but BF is in any case otherwise less than helpful, appar-
ently giving us what is, if anything, another version of the preceding sed
quia habet gubernatorem bonum (which itself adds weight to the idea that
we are dealing here with a gloss). —The fact that what we find in the mar-
gin of P coincides almost exactly with the form of the sentence in L, includ-
ing the truncation of εὐτυχής by two letters (and the elision of δαίμονα),
is striking. In P, εὐτυχ´ is evidently deliberate truncation, i.e. shorthand;
does the truncation in L betray the origin of the sentence there, i.e. in a
glossator who used the same shorthand, foreign to the L copyist? The gloss
would be of a recognizable type, singling out a point that particularly inter-
ested the reader; this is perhaps the category to which the frequent head-
ings in P, especially, belong. Either the gloss was added to ω after the
hyparchetype of the recensio Messanensis (α´ ) had been copied from ω, or
else it was in the margin of a putative descendant of ω in the other recensio
predating L. (There is no more reason to print this sentence, bracketed, in
the text, if it is indeed a gloss attached to a single MS, than there is for so
treating the many other such inorganic elements we find attached to one or
more MSS.)
a28 ϕυσειόω B1: B2 introduces an accent above the upsilon, ἢ + ν above

the ειό. (Thus PCBL all end up with the uncontracted form νόῳ, which
is at least worth remarking: I resist the temptation to correct to νῷ.)
a28–9 κατορθοῦν, τὰ δὲ δύο μὴ ἔστι: BF gives us, nonsensically,

dirigencia autem non sunt.
a31 Spengel’s εὖ for εἰ is the first instalment of a major recasting of what

follows—he later changed his mind, and surely rightly; with one excep-
tion, for which see the next note but one, the sentence seems to work
well enough.
a32 ἀλλ’ εἴπερ: qui autem BF. Did the translator have ἀλλ’ ὃς before
him, or was he just doing his best with the difficult ἀλλ’ εἴπερ? —utique
(1247a32) videbitur BF: was ἂν δόξειε (utique = ἂν) in BF ’s Greek text,

or did the translator supply it to explain the infinitive following
(τοιοῦτον εἶναι PCBL)? I suppose the latter, as does Fritzsche: εἴη for
εἶναι is (a) palaeographically more plausible and (b) more economical
than supplying δόξειε.
a33 οἷον: no equivalent in BF, even following a talis (indeed, what BF

offers here overall is quite unworkable: qui autem [ἀλλ’ εἴπερ, a32]
propter fortunam benefortunatus non utique talis videbitur esse causa
semper eiusdem aut ut in pluribus).
a34 Langerbeck’s ᾗ might be preferred on palaeographical grounds to

Fritzsche’s ὅτι, but the latter makes a better pair with the following
ὥσπερ ὅτι; BF ’s quia clinches it. I note that the sentence that B gives us,
without τοιοσδὶ, makes a certain kind of sense—if not the right one.
a35 Harlfinger reports the absence of ὁ from Neap.; with Neap. predat-
ing Marc., it and not Marc. (Bekker, Susemihl . . .) should get the credit
for a necessary emendation. (The wrong accent on the following
γλαυκὸς suggests that somebody thought there was a reference to a
Γλαῦκος; cf. Plato, Phaedo 108d4–5.) —οὐκ ὀξὺ ὁρᾷ: non acute BF (i.e.
apparently omitting ὁρᾷ).
1247b1 Jackson could have kept BF ’s quorumcunque/ὅσων as well as

adopting its fortunati/εὐτυχεῖς by construing, with Kenny (in the
Oxford World’s Classics translation), ‘the fortunate are those whose goods
are caused by good luck’, i.e. by making ὅσων a possessive genitive, with
the second genitive, ἀγαθῶν, governed by αἰτία. There are signs here,
with ὅσων αἰτία τύχη ἀγαθὴ ἀγαθῶν, of a rare stylistic, even epigram-
matic, flourish (rare, that is, for EE)—one that, one could argue, might
actually be completed by having τύχης rather than εὐτυχεῖς before the
ὅσων: ‘to τύχη belong those ἀγαθά that are caused by ἀγαθὴ τύχη’;
and a corruption from τύχης to εὐτυχεῖς (as would be evidenced by
BF’s fortunati), after another εὐτυχεῖς, might be easier than vice versa.
In that case εὐτυχεῖς/fortunati would have originated in a simple dit-
tography, whether of εὐτυχεῖς or of fortunati (BF has . . . benefortunati.
fortunati . . .)—helped along by the following plural ὅσων/quorumcunque.
Aristotelica 199
But after all this is said, there is a worrying sense of un-Aristotelian

banality about a declaration that ‘to τύχη belong what goods good τύχη
causes’: what else would they belong to? εὐτυχεῖς, by contrast, would
round out the argument nicely—with what is still a certain flourish in
the following relative clause.
b3 οὐκ ἔτι is split between two lines in B; B2 adds (what looks like) a
hyphen after οὐκ at the end of the line.
b4 Langerbeck’s ἐξαιρετέα is an entirely unnecessary proposal, not least

in light of segregandum BF.
b7 Shorey’s ἄδηλον is perhaps tempting, but ἄλογον makes good sense;

there is no reason why Aristotle should have used the same adjective
here as at Physics 196b6 (Walzer/Mingay), especially since he uses a dif-
ferent noun to follow, λογισμός instead of the Physics’ διάνοια, and
actually ἄλογον fits well with λογισμός. (The repetition of the root λογ-
adds to the point: ἄλογος, to human λογισμός at least.)
b8 Β2 inserts ου over the final letter of (the abbreviation for) ἀνθρώπῳ.

That the same abbreviation cannot serve for both ἄνθρωπος and
ἀνθρώπινος is confirmed by the correction in P (from ἀνῴ with bar to
ἀνίν plus bar and following superscript omega).
b9 πρόβλημ’ ἂν L: the L copyist perhaps found πρόβλημα in the abbre-
viated form we have in PC, with a kind of elongated mu over the eta
(and no elision mark); πρόβλημα is written out in full, and unelided, in
B, as it is unelided (i.e. with no elision mark) in PC. —In C ‘δὲ sup.,
eadem manu’, Walzer/Mingay reports, but what they are describing is
the standard way in which Nikolaos, the scribe of P and C, writes ἐπειδή;
what P has here is identical to what is found in C.
b10–11 κατορθώσαιεν: P2 adds the sign for εν after the superscript αι

(which shows that the εν is later: if it had been original, the preceding αι
would not be superscript). Quite how he would have construed διὰ τὸ
ἀποκατορθώσαιεν is unclear: that he would have thought that a change
from ἀπο to αὐτὸ would automatically follow seems unlikely; he is per-
haps just noticing the preceding ἄν and correctly inferring that it should
be followed by an optative—in which case he is halfway towards Jackson’s
(1247b10–11) solution (διὰ τὸ αὐτὸ κατορθώσαιεν), which is well

supported by BF ’s propter idem. —One καὶ πάλιν after κατορθώσαιεν is
enough—‘why would they not also succeed again διὰ τὸ αὐτὸ, and
again?’; we do not need L’s two (cf. Dirlmeier). On Susemihl’s . . . καὶ πάλιν
ἄν; ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ ἀποκατορθῶσαι ἓν, καὶ πάλιν: (a) if ἀλλὰ is to be
derived from BF ’s sed (‘ἀλλὰ . . . add. [BF]’, Susemihl; cf. Jackson, reporting
sed after iterum), we should notice that at least in some MSS BF more
plausibly has iterum si . . . rather than iterum sed (my thanks to Terry Irwin
for pointing this out); (b) according to LSJ, this is the sole occurrence of
ἀποκατορθόω (interpreted as ‘recover one’s prosperity’, which is what the
(Susemihl’s ἕν, in his 〈ἀλλὰ〉 διὰ τὸ ἀποκατορθῶσαι ἓν) is surely a cor-

verb ought to mean, if it existed, but cannot be meant here). BF ’s unum
ruption, like the ἀπο- in ἀποκατορθῶσαι; the hopelessness of the infini-

tive in BF itself propels us in the direction of Jackson’s κατορθώσαιεν.
b11 τοῦ γὰρ αὐτοῦ τὸ αὐτὸ αἴτιον: BF here certainly hits the nail on
the head; our MSS’ reading gives entirely the wrong sense, but once τοῦ
was misread as τὸ, the rest would easily follow.
b12 Editors infer τοῦτο from BF ’s hoc, but it is already in B, which
resumed with οὐκ ἄρα (how it came to leave out διὰ τί οὐ . . . τὸ αὐτὸ
αἴτιον is anybody’s guess). —ἄλλο ταν P1: P2 adds the necessary elision
mark, rough breathing, and accent to give ἀλλ’ ὅταν; there is also a
separation mark beneath the lambda and omicron, inserted perhaps by
a third hand. The positioning of the omicron in C, next to the second
lambda and away from the ταν, may suggest that Nikolaos, the PC copy-
ist, started making the same mistake when writing C; if so, he self-cor-
rects. The origin of the error may well have been in ω, since BF has sed
cum: B, I suppose, makes the correction on his own initiative, as does C
(perhaps), after that false start.
b13 〈ἀπ’〉 ἀπείρων καὶ ἀορίστων: something is needed to rescue the
two genitives from orphanhood, the loss of an απ before another (and
after ἀποβαίνῃ) would hardly be surprising, and BF ’s ab rounds off the
case for the supplement. —Jackson’s τῳ is in one way exactly what is
needed before ἀγαθὸν: εὐτυχία/ἀτυχία is a matter of things ‘coming
together’, for good or for ill, for a particular individual (and omicron for
omega, and vice versa, is a regular phenomenon in these MSS—to repeat
Aristotelica 201
a by now more than familiar point). But the possibility that something
good might repeatedly happen like this for someone (τινί ) will be intro-
duced in the next sentence (b16–18 τί οὖν κωλύει, κτλ). So to this
extent Dirlmeier is right in saying (485) that a reference to what is good
for someone is out of place here, and his ὃ, from BF ’s quod, is to be
preferred.
b15 εὐτυχεῖν vs εὐτυχεῖς: Allan’s supplement of γίνεσθαι is unneces-

sary, since εὐτυχεῖν would have to be understood in any case, i.e. after
ἐμάνθανον. Spengel’s εὐτυχεῖν, however, is a conjecture of a different
order. The point behind τινες εὐτυχεῖς would presumably be that if
knowledge were involved, only some εὐτυχεῖς would acquire it, just as
only some practitioners of any other ἐπιστήμη actually master it. But it
would be unusual for Aristotle to refer to inferior practitioners of an
ἐπιστήμη in such a (general) context; the point here in any case is just
that if εὐτυχία were a matter of ἐπιστήμη, some people would be able
to learn it, in the same way that (only) some people learn mathematics
or medicine. But then all of the εὐτυχεῖς, not just some of them,
ἐμάνθανον (or rather ἔμαθον) ἂν εὐτυχεῖς εἶναι/γίνεσθαι, since learn-
ing would be—on the present hypothesis—the only route to εὐτυχία. So
εὐτυχεῖν, I think, it must be.
b16 Susemihl thinks the definite article may be needed before

Σωκράτης on the grounds that the reference appears to be to the
Platonic Socrates (Euthydemus 279d), though he adds ‘at fort. retinen-
dum est Σωκράτης propter praeteritum ἔϕη’. But Aristotle surely can
refer to Plato’s Socrates in the past tense (1246b37 would be a case in
point, if as I think the reference there is to Plato’s Protagoras); if he does,
then that will blur the distinction between Plato’s and the historical
Socrates, so that despite LSJ (s.v. ὁ, ἡ, τό B.I.c), a reference to the latter
will not always require the article. (There is already just such blurring,
perhaps, in I.5, 1216b2–8.)
b16 B’s συμβαίνειν seems preferable to L’s συμβῆναι, with πολλάκις,

and is probably supported by PC’s corrupt συμβαίνῃ as well as by
accidere in BF (pace Walzer/Mingay, L has συμβῆναι τινὶ, not
συμβῆναί τινι).
1247b17–18 Might οἷον ἂν εἶεν (PCL; B is out of play) derive from an

original οἷον ἂν εἰ εἴη? Perhaps not, but one would ideally like some
κύβους ?〈βάλλειν〉? ἀεὶ μακαρίαν βάλλοι.

explanation of how the plural arose: Fritzsche conjectures οἷον εἰ ἐν τῷ
b18 κοίβους P1: P2 overwrites an original οι with an upsilon.
b19 ἔνεισιν is written outside the right-hand margin, at the bottom of

the page, in C; evidently the copyist left it out, started the next folio with
ὁρμαὶ, then went back and put in the missing word.
b20 There is a curious gap in the text in C after αὗται, filled with two dots,
and not caused by any fault in the parchment. —B2 overwrites B’s original
ἡ for εἰ with the ligature for ει plus smooth breathing.
b21 ἡδέος Β2, inserting ος above the supralinear ligature for ως—which B
does not normally use, its general practice being to write things out in full.
—καὶ ἡ secl. Spengel before ὄρεξις, following the Latin version, i.e. not BF
but the other, later one; but what this offers us (siquidem naturalis est per
cupiditatem iucundae rei appetitus) is surely nothing more than a simpli-
fication; and how reliable in general is this Latin translation, as opposed to
BF? (Answer: not very.) BF itself makes a mess of the beginning of the
sentence (et primi [for our καὶ πρότεραι] ipsi sunt natura quidem si
propter concupiscenciam delectabilis et appetitus natura quidem ad
bonum tendet semper), and I think of the end of it too—see next note. I
propose with some confidence that there is nothing wrong with the text
transmitted by our MSS: ἡ δι’ ἐπιθυμίαν ἡδέος is ἡ δι’ ἐπιθυμίαν ἡδέος
ὁρμή, ὁρμαί having been the subject of the preceding sentence, and the
following καί is then epexegetic: ἡ δι’ ἐπιθυμίαν ἡδέος, i.e. ἡ ὄρεξις (n.b.
the singular ἐστι covering both subjects, although this is not decisive by
itself). Jackson inserts a comma after ἡδέος, making ἡ ὄρεξις the subject
of the following verb (see next note), but I suggest that for this to work
ϕύσει γε would have had to precede καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις; and if Jackson is right,
why the καὶ?
b22 πᾶσα Allan: πᾶσα what? Neither πᾶσα ὁρμή nor πᾶσα ὄρεξις
looks an attractive alternative to πᾶν; why should Aristotle not use a
vague ‘everything’, just in order to avoid having to specify what, exactly,
Aristotelica 203
would βαδίζειν towards the good? On Jackson’s πάντοτε (semper BF)

see preceding note: BF is less reliable than he proposes.
b23 BF ’s indocti is surely wrong; if singers sing without knowing how to,
i.e. without expertise, it seems to follow anyway that they will be indocti
(so that if οὐκ ἐπιστάμενοι ᾄδειν is right, which we have no reason to
doubt, we wouldn’t need indocti—or Jackson’s ἀδίδακτοι). We also
need some sort of explanation for the wild ἄδικοι in PCBL, which
Sylburg’s ᾠδικοὶ provides while also paving the way appropriately
for/fitting well with οὐκ ἐπιστάμενοι ᾄδειν—as BF ’s reading does not,
though in any case this translator did not have ᾄδειν in front of him, to
judge by his quae oportet. —Laur. 81,42’s ἀδικεῖν at least fits with the
preceding ἄδικοι.
b24 Jackson’s supplement of ᾗ looks as certain as any intervention in

this highly corrupted context; the article could in principle itself have
been a misread ᾗ, but looks indispensable.
b25 There is nothing corresponding to καὶ οὗ δεῖ in BF.
b26 κατορθώσουσι: cf. following future tense in PCBL as well as BF.
b28 ἐπι το πολύ L: the L copyist seems uncertain about whether he is

writing three words (the spacing suggests three) or one (two are missing
accents); B commits himself to one.
b29 P2 adds an acute accent under the circumflex of ἆρα, after the
breathing.
b31 ἐν οἷς: Spengel’s εἰ could be preferred to ἐν οἷς on grounds of econ-

omy and the parallel with the following καὶ πάλιν ἐν τούτοις εἰ
ἐβούλοντο, but such arguments do not trump BF here. (Jackson here as
elsewhere unsuccessfully tries to combine both the MSS’ and BF ’s
readings.)
b32 κατορθοῦντες: the middle/passive κατορθοῦνται, as found in

PCB, is probably impossible (κατορθοῦται at NE 1106b26 is surely
impersonal). An alternative might be to read δοκοῦντες κατορθοῦσι,
but even supposing that the endings of the two words could have
become switched in this way, the emphasis in the clause, in the context,
(1247b32) is on the agents’ κακῶς λογίσασθαι δοκεῖν rather than their

success, so that it is appropriate that the latter, their success, rather than
their failure in reasoning should find itself relegated to a participle.
—καὶ secl. Bussemaker: there seems to me no point to the καὶ (et BF);
did it originate with the corruption of κατορθοῦντες to κατορθοῦν τε
(L), PCB’s κατορθοῦνται being a further corruption of that (cf. BF
dirigunt)? Bussemaker’s alternative conjecture of κατευτυχῆσαι,
approved by Fritzsche and adopted by Walzer/Mingay, is neat, but the
compound form would be uncalled for in a context in which the subject
of inquiry is εὐτυχία itself. κατευτυχεῖν at 1229a20 has a different
sense, irrelevant to the present case.
b33 Fritzsche’s 〈ἐν οἷς〉, εἰ ἐβουλεύοντο, 〈ἐβουλεύοντο〉, like other

interventions recorded in Susemihl’s apparatus, is quite unnecessary in
light of Jackson’s solution to the genuine problems in what immediately
follows (q.v.). —Jackson’s ἄλλο solves the problem of the impossible ἂν
at a much lesser cost than Fritzsche’s rewriting (see previous note). There
is what looks like a dot over the ἂν in C, which if intentional might indi-
cate uneasiness about it on the part of one reader. For the immediately
following ἢ BF unhelpfully offers secundum quod (= ᾗ).
b34 τἀγαθόν: the definite article is surprising, but I construe ‘if the
good they wished for was other or lesser than. . .’. —Opposite the end of
the three lines in P beginning with τοίνυν εὐτυχεῖν is what was appar-
ently a gloss, now indecipherable and partly cut off in the process of
binding.
b35 κατόρθωσεν in B is corrected by the insertion of an omega above

the omicron.
b37 We should probably resist the temptation to emend δοκῶν to δοκῇ

(Mingay): see LSJ s.v. μέν A.4 (‘one of the correlative clauses is sts. inde-
pendent, while the other takes the part. or some other dependent form’).
BF ’s visa probably = δοκῶν. —The obvious correction from ὀρθῶς to
ὀρθὸς also appears in Matr. 4627 and Marc. (Harlfinger); Victorius sup-
plies it without comment. —The MSS’ τύχη can be read as either τύχη
or τύχῃ; the context shows, pace BF, that τύχη cannot be the
Aristotelica 205
subject here. —Dirlmeier is surely right to take the reference of αὐτοῦ to

be the λογισμὸς: cf. ἀλλ’ ἐνίοτε δι’ ἐπιθυμίαν ἐλογίσατο πάλιν οὕτω
immediately following. The desire sparked off the reasoning even if the
reasoning was wrong. Inwood and Woolf ’s ‘the cause of the success’
(in the Cambridge translation) is not impossible, but it is hard to
pass over the masculine singular λογισμὸς immediately preceding
αὐτοῦ and make αὐτοῦ refer to something else (it / the thing done /
the success).
b38 Dirlmeier’s supplement of ἐπιθυμία originates in BF, which how-

ever misconstrues the whole sentence, making τύχη the cause, and
subject of the following main verb ἔσωσεν, with our MSS’ αὐτὴ (δ’ )
ὀρθὴ οὖσα appearing as (concupiscencia) ipsa recta existente = αὐτῆς
ὀρθῆς οὔσης. (The paraphrase of BF contained in two MSS described
in Lacombe et al., Aristoteles Latinus I [1939], no. 35 [fourteenth cen-
tury] and no. 326 [early fifteenth century], confirms this construal: in
quibus enim quis male ratiocinasse videtur, et ea relictus impetus et
appetitus direxit, recta concupiscencia existente, recte bona fortuna
causa esse videtur, et non recta existente, mala.) For an equally egre-
gious misreading, see Jackson, who creates a text that he translates
‘And in this case, when reasoning seems to be incorrect and neverthe-
less of itself brings about the result, whilst the desire on its part is
rightly directed, it is the desire which, being rightly directed, brings
about the right result’. It is hard to see how BF ’s own extraordinary
misconstrual could have arisen if ἐπιθυμία in some form had not
been there in its original Greek text, and I therefore agree with
Dirlmeier that it should be included in ours, even though the text
would work without it: i.e. if we place the comma after rather than
before αὐτὴ/αὕτη. ὁρμὴ/ὄρεξις was the main subject of the preced-
ing sentence, and there would be nothing to prevent it from continu-
ing in the role. This is, incidentally, another part of the text that makes
it clear that BF ’s version is no mere word-for-word transposition from
Greek into Latin that a critic might have hoped for. —ἔξωσεν PCBL: B
writes what looks like a zeta over the xi of ἔξωσεν; it could, just, be
intended as a sigma, but that is hopeful, and it is more likely to be
meant to bring B into line with P or C (or . . .), whose xi, if that is what
(1247b38) it is, looks remarkably like a zeta. —‘[36–8] καὶ . . . ἔσωσεν

susp. Allan’, reports Walzer/Mingay, which proceeds to obelize the
whole of it. Such a counsel of despair seems to me overdone; the pas-
sage is difficult, but ultimately intelligible, and it is perhaps its difficulty
that has helped lead to its corruption in the MSS.
b39 ἐλογίσαντο Spengel: but why should Aristotle not switch from
plural to singular (‘a person’)? —καὶ οὕτως ἠτύχησαν Spengel: on the
plural see previous note; as for the proposed change of order, Spengel
misses Aristotle’s point, which is that the person reasoned in the same
way and yet ἠτύχησεν, this being meant to (help?) confirm that the out-
come had nothing to do with the λογισμός. The pairing of ὄρεξις and
ἐπιθυμία in the next sentence shows that we are still talking about
πράξεις ἀπὸ τῆς ὁρμῆς, as introduced at b29–30, not some new cat
egory, i.e. one involving specifically irrational appetite as against rational
desire; in this context no such distinction appears to be in play.
1248a1 〈ἢ〉 ἡ: if, as seems inevitable (see next note), καὶ τύχη διττή is
to be transposed to the end of the sentence, then the following ἢ
πλείους . . . surely requires a corresponding ἢ preceding it (Aristotle is set-
ting up a genuine dilemma, which he will begin resolving in the next sen-
tence: see ad loc.); but equally ἐνταῦθα εὐτυχία seems to require a definite
article (ἐνταῦθα εὐτυχία κἀκείνη would read strangely, εὐτυχία ἐνταῦθα
κἀκείνη hardly less so); thus rather than supposing the corruption of ἢ to
haplography. —καὶ τύχη διττή makes no sense here after ἀλλὰ μὴν 〈ἢ〉 ἡ
ἡ, I prefer to supply ἢ before ἡ, such an omission easily occurring through
ἐνταῦθα εὐτυχία, but perfect sense at the end of the sentence.

a2 κἀκείνη is better than κἀκεῖ (a) because it gives us the necessary ref-
erence to the type introduced in b31 rather more clearly, and (b) because
κἀκεῖ would have to be taken as shorthand for ἡ ἐκεῖ εὐτυχία, which is
not impossible but also not attractive given that our MSS give us a better
alternative. The persuasive force of BF ’s et ibi is hardly enhanced by its
handling of the rest of the sentence: at vero si hic bona fortuna et fortuna
duplex et ibi eadem aut plures bone fortune.
a3 ἐπεὶ δ’ ὁρῶμεν κτλ: I think it important not have a new paragraph

beginning here, as some modern editors do (but not Susemihl). The
dilemma centres on the first of the two sorts of (alleged) εὐτυχία we
Aristotelica 207
have just been discussing, namely the sort in which agents somehow suc-
ceed in repeatedly getting things right because their ὁρμὴ/ὄρεξις is
rightly directed even though their reasoning is faulty: is that sort of case
(ἐκείνη, a5) one of genuine εὐτυχία or not? Aristotle now starts his
attempt to resolve the dilemma with the general point that the cause of
εὐτυχία cannot be ἐπιστήμη (sc. as he has described Socrates as hold-
ing), or λογισμός—as we have said it is not in the problematical sort of
case we are dealing with. So that (ἐκείνη) looks as if it could be a sort of
εὐτυχία. But is it really?
a6 ‘ἔστιν C: om. PL’, Walzer/Mingay: actually it is in P and L (also in B,
est BF). —εἰ Spengel: that εὐτυχία could desire anything (ἣ PCB, que =
quae BF, with εὐτυχία as antecedent) is inconceivable, ἢ is unhelpful
towards any sort of sense, η and ει are quite often confused in these MSS,
and the omission of a connective after a question is itself not uncommon
in EE. So Spengel’s εἰ, which begins to introduce some sense, and a good
one, seems the obvious choice. (‘It is doubtful’, says Woods of 1248a6–9,
‘if the text can be reconstructed with even moderate plausibility’, and
anyone looking at what he says ‘[t]he MSS have’ might be inclined to
agree. But the story told by ‘the MSS’ is actually more various, and more
informative, than he suggests, especially if one includes the evidence
from the Liber de bona fortuna.) —ὅτ’ ἔδει, λογισμός B: B’s reading,
given Spengel’s εἰ (which Jackson also accepts) at the beginning of the
sentence, offers a more economical, and actually more elegant, version of
what Jackson proposes, the use of a verb (in this case ἐπεθύμησεν) with
a subject otherwise unspecified being quite regular in the EE).
a7 γ’ suppl. Jackson, from quidem BF: for quidem = γε see e.g. 1248a18.
I construe ‘λογισμὸς of a human sort certainly won’t be [the] αἴτιον of
this, for x (for the value of which, see following notes) surely is not
πάμπαν ἀλόγιστον, but the agent/his λογισμὸς/λόγος [in this case]
διαϕθείρεται ὑπὸ τινός’ (= ‘for while x surely isn’t . . . , the agent/his
λογισμὸς . . .’). Alternatively, if quidem = μὲν, it promises an answering
δέ-clause which we then have to supply for ourselves: ‘λογισμὸς of a
human sort certainly won’t be the αἴτιον [sc. but there is rationality
involved somehow], for x is not πάμπαν ἀλόγιστον’ (see LSJ s.v. μέν
A.2); but this looks more difficult. Spengel’s proposal of a lacuna in a6 is
unnecessarily despairing.
1248a7 The genitive τούτου, I think, without αἴτιον would be odd. If we

did not already know that the desire’s being right in the case in question is
not attributable to human calculation, we cannot have been paying atten-
tion; but Aristotle is hinting at the explanation he is about to give of the
strange situation in which people regularly desire rightly but without
thinking rightly, i.e. an explanation involving something more than
I take it, explains why we need to be told λογισμός 〈γ’〉 ἀνθρώπινος οὐκ
human. See preceding note. (οὐ γὰρ δὴ πάμπαν ἀλόγιστον τοῦτο . . . ,
ἂν τούτου εἴη 〈αἴτιον〉: the phenomenon in question can surely not be

wholly and completely ἀλόγιστον, if the outcome is as it would have been
if there had been λογισμός: see below.) —B’s δὴ, which we also find in
Ambr. (BF ’s utique?), is what anyone would write in place of PCL’s δεῖ.
a8 οὗ γε Jackson for οὔτε PCBL (neque BF, οὐδὲ Susemihl): it would

surely be extraordinary were Aristotle suddenly to be saying that the
desire in question is not ϕυσική, when the supposed sort of εὐτυχία in
question has been set up as κατ’ εὐϕυΐαν ὀρέξεως (1247b40); extraor-
dinary, at least, were he to be saying that without giving any reason for
doing so. Susemihl’s οὐδὲ, then, is no more than a grammatical improve-
ment on the MSS reading. Jackson’s οὗ γε, by contrast, has Aristotle say-
ing something that is not only consistent with but adds something
important to what he has said before: why should he not propose that
when desire gets it right, apparently naturally, i.e. by being directed
somehow—repeatedly—towards the right object without the aid of rea-
son, this is nevertheless not πάμπαν ἀλόγιστον? It could at any rate be
said that desire in this case homes in on what we should have expected
to have been established by λογισμός.
a9 διαϕθείρεται ὑπὸ τινός: the question now is what it is that

διαϕθείρεται. I propose that it is the agent—who is after all the subject
both of the next sentence and of the conditional clause in the previous
one. ‘By nature’ the agent would not just desire well, but reason well too:
here, something unspecified has caused his reasoning to go awry (I firmly
resist supplying ὁ λόγος after διαϕθείρεται).
a10 Walzer/Mingay reports ‘τοῦτο fort. V’; in fact Victorius writes ‘γρ.
τοῦτο’ in the margin of his copy of the Aldine (but B has it anyway).
Aristotelica 209
—P2 adds an alpha over the ligature for αρα of παρὰ2, to confirm that it
is παρὰ and not περὶ, as B here has it; as I have often noted before, the
ligatures for (π)αρα and (π)ερι are confusingly similar.
a13 Susemihl, Jackson, and others are persuaded by the MSS’ bare
εὐτυχεῖν, and it would not be the first time in EE that an infinitive has
been used as a noun without the article: see e.g. 1246a29 (perhaps), and
note on 1244a33. However, it feels too stark here, as a way of referring to
εὐτυχεῖν in general, as it must (which probably also rules out another
candidate, εὐτυχεῖ, understood with an indefinite personal subject).
Dirlmeier’s proposal, εὐτυχεῖται, is respectable, and may even have
some authority insofar as it apparently follows BF (if it does); on the
other hand (a) the loss of a preceding τὸ is perhaps more likely than the
corruption of εὐτυχεῖται to εὐτυχεῖν, (b) BF has its own failings, and
(c) might ὅτι ϕύσει τὸ εὐτυχεῖν not itself be rendered as quod natura
benefortunate agatur?
a14 οὐ post ἀλλά suppl. Jackson: contra BF, which has sed propter
naturam.
a15 L’s οὐδ’ (‘nor does it demonstrate that τύχη is not even cause of
anything’) is surely superior to the others’ οὐδὲν, which would only
work without the following αἰτία οὐθενὸς, or else at the cost of our
adopting Jackson’s supplement οὐδ’ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τύχη before αἰτία,
which is excessive. Or should we just follow BF (and Ambr.) and read
οὐκ? My view is that BF is here simplifying, as it sometimes does.
a17 μέντ’ ἂν: BF has quidem utique, which apparently is μὲν ἂν. —P2
adds a circumflex across the acute accent of ἀρα.
a18 οὗ in P seems originally to have been οὐ.
a20 If we are to go with BF, Susemihl’s καὶ πρὸ τοῦ βουλεύσασθαι for
PCBL καὶ τοῦτ’ ἐβουλεύσατο is clearly superior to Bussemaker’s
πρότερον ἢ βουλεύσασθαι, but BF ’s version is surely inferior to that of
our Greek MSS.
a21 Both Susemihl and Walzer/Mingay accept Spengel’s πρότερον 〈ἢ〉;

Barnes (CR 1992: 29) thinks supplying ἢ ‘debilitates the sense. Aristotle
(1248a21) means: “nor did he think first to think, and then think . . .” ’. But
this use of νοεῖν, as ‘think to’ (cf. LSJ s.v. νοέω II), looks out of place
here; the last thinking in the putative series presumably will not be a matter
of thinking to. Bessarion’s beautiful πρὸ τοῦ (in Par. 2042) here carries the
day, being both a better explanation of BF ’s priusquam (intelligeret) than
Spengel’s and better palaeographically; πρὸ τοῦ might easily be mistaken
for (the shorthand for) πρότερον, with priority in the air.
a22 Bessarion, in Par. 2042, first writes νοῦς ἀρχὴ for the συνοῦσα ἀρχὴ
he would presumably have found—given that that is what is in all of
PCBL, and as far as I have checked, in all their known descendants—in
whatever MS he was copying from (probably Pal. 165). But he then
crosses out νοῦς ἀρχὴ and writes νόησις ἀρχὴ after it. νόησις is not
unattractive, but νοῦς is surely at least part of what was corrupted into
συνοῦσα. Τhen the question is whether or not to put in the definite art
icle, with Casaubon, and the following βουλή, without article, rather
suggests we should do without it. Casaubon’s ὁ, like Jackson’s εὖ, is there
to account for the συ(νοῦσα). I prefer however, to start at the other end:
νοῦς—I propose—is corrupted into νοῦσα by attraction to the feminine
before ἀρχὴ following, and the συ- is added to make νοῦσα into Greek.
If a masculine definite article had been present, that would have made
the change to νοῦσα less likely.
a25 διὰ τὸ τοιαύτη [τὸ] εἶναι τοιοῦτο δύναται ποιεῖν scripsi: the text I
print is Walzer’s except in relation to his two bracketed items. (The result is
not a banality: the contrast is with τύχη, the chief feature of which is that
it is supposed to produce results that are anything other than τοιοῦτο, i.e.
specifiable.) What is before εἶναι in the MSS is τὸ, not τῷ, and the mean-
ingless τὸ τοῦτο is itself surely a corruption of τοιοῦτο; after this new τὸ,
δύναται might readily become δύνασθαι. But the main issue here, as
Walzer saw, is whether or not we accept what I shall for convenience call
BF ’s version, which includes the idea that the sort of ἀρχή being intro-
duced will be one whose being/nature it is to be the ἀρχή of things with-
out requiring another ἀρχή outside / prior to / separate from itself. If we
do follow BF, we need only keep the first τὸ, i.e. the one before εἶναι, and
make τὸ εἶναι an accusative of respect; we can then dispense with
Dirlmeier’s supplement of κατὰ, and Susemihl’s τῷ (which he and others
Aristotelica 211
claim to get from BF; Walzer/Mingay compounds the error by implying,

in both text and apparatus, that it is in the Greek MSS). But it is hard to
see how the idea in question would be relevant to the argument, even if it
happened to be true, i.e. that the sort of ἀρχή being introduced will be one
whose being/nature it is, etc. The sole piece of evidence for its presence is
that first τὸ (that itself being the origin of BF ’s secundum [esse]), which
then becomes as dispensable as the idea it would introduce.
a27 δὴ has no counterpart in BF. —Dirlmeier’s καὶ πᾶν ἐκεῖνο = BF ’s et
omne illud, which Dirlmeier fills out, implausibly, in his translation, with
‘in der Seele’, going on to describe Jackson’s emendation as ‘überflüssig’.
In any case BF ’s Greek text need not have differed importantly from
PCBL’s καὶ πᾶν ἐκείνῳ, since it might well have included the recurrent
error of omicron for omega. However PCBL’s ἐκείνῳ is also problematic:
we really would need Spengel’s ἐκείνῃ, along with his [καὶ] κἂν, as we
would, equally, if we accepted Ross’s proposal. (A sudden ἐκεῖνος here
referring either to the agent, or perhaps to the sort of [ἐυτυχής] agent we
have been talking about, looks unlikely, when the question just asked was
about the soul.) Jackson’s proposal looks impeccable: an essential part in
the process of corruption will, I think, have been the introduction of
ἐκεῖνο, induced by the neuter πᾶν and the omission of κινεῖ by haplog-
raphy (the next sentence certainly begins with κινεῖ), with ἐκεῖνο then
itself being corrupted into ἐκείνω = ἐκείνῳ. (Kenny, in his World’s
πᾶν ἐκεῖ νῷ 〈κινεῖ〉 [‘adapting a conjecture of Jackson’s’], which is

Classics translation, but not in Barnes/Kenny Aristotle’s Ethics, reads καὶ
palaeographically unexceptionable, but gives νοῦς a role that appears

hard to marry with other things said about it in the context.)
a29 There are good reasons for following BF here and supplying καὶ νοῦ
after καὶ ἐπιστήμης, or better in a30 before πλήν: (a) a mention of νοῦς
here prepares for τοῦ νοῦ in the next sentence; (b) if in NE VI ‘=’ EE V
νοῦς is itself τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν θεῖον, and first cause, as it were, of thought, in
the present, Eudemian, context—see esp. a19–22 above—νοῦς is plainly
not this, but just the faculty of reasoning, or reasoning itself, apparently
indistinguishable from λόγος in the preceding sentence, so that any
apparent conflict with NE VI ‘=’ EE V, however we should regard that
(i.e. whether as Nicomachean, Eudemian, or both), is merely verbal; and
(1248a29) (c) a33 will say anyway that the ἀρχή in question is κρείττων τοῦ
νοῦ (though only in L: see below). But contra (a), given the way Aristotle
shifts between λόγος, νοῦς, ϕρόνησις, and ἐπιστήμη in the chapter gener-
ally, the transition to νοῦς in the next sentence would be smooth enough in
any case; contra (b), if νοῦς in this context is indeed being used in the generic
way suggested, it is hard to see what supplying it here would add; and contra
(c) given that the idea of the ἀρχή as κρείττων τοῦ νοῦ will be introduced in
a33, there is no necessity for it to be introduced here. The case is very similar
here to that at 1246b12, with the only difference that there it was L that intro-
duced νοῦς, while here it is apparently BF. Once again I suspect (BF ’s
reading originated in) a gloss, by someone who had read ahead, and/or
remembered NE VI ‘=’ EE V, and/or had a special interest in the topic of
νοῦς; perhaps, if we bear in mind the theological context within which BF
circulated, it might even have been the author of BF himself. In any case one
can have little confidence that Aristotle wrote καὶ νοῦ here, and I therefore
do not print it; and my replies to arguments (a)–(c) above together serve to
confirm that its presence or absence makes not a jot of difference to our
understanding of Aristotle’s own argument.
a30 In deleting εἴποι Jackson is following BF, which has nothing to cor-
respond to / in place of εἴποι, having already placed erit = εἴη after
utique = ἂν (see apparatus). The question, as so often in this chapter, is
how closely we should follow BF. I continue to follow a middle course,
attempting both to respect BF and to account for the tradition repre-
sented in our MSS. Hence my conjecture of εἴη ποτε for εἴποι PCBL, in
order to acknowledge the ποι in the MSS’ εἴποι, if their εἴ- is the
remains of an original εἴη: the delaying of εἴη and the addition of ποτε,
I suggest, signal that the question being asked is a momentous one (what
could be κρεῖττον even [καὶ] than ἐπιστήμη . . .’, sc. especially after what
we said at the end of the last chapter?).
a30–1 διατοῦτο P1: P2 adds a grave accent to the δια.
a31 Walzer/Mingay suggests that both ὃ and οἱ are in the MSS, but
dicebatur). —οἳ 〈ἃ〉 ἂν Jackson, 〈οἳ〉 οἷ ἂν Smith: what either supple-

PCBL all have οἱ, not ὃ, while with BF it is the other way round (quod . . .
ment gives us can be understood in any case.

Aristotelica 213
a33 That τοιαύτην ἣ κρείττων τοῦ νοῦ καὶ is missing from PCB
means, interestingly, that these MSS, lacking τοῦ νοῦ in a29–30 (BF,
Jackson) too, do not describe the ἀρχή in question as κρείττων τοῦ νοῦ
at all. Does this mean that τοιαύτην ἣ κρείττων τοῦ νοῦ καὶ was not in
the text of ω, and that it too originated as a gloss? (τοιαύτην ἣ κρεί in L
appears to be post ras., but it is doubtful whether this affects anything.)
On the other hand, in this case a reference to νοῦς, in the generic sense
(= reasoning capacity), forms an organic part of, or at least adds to, the
explanation (a33 γὰρ) as to why βουλεύεσθαι οὐ συμϕέρει αὐτοῖς.
Why, then, did it fall out of the line of descent leading to PCB? Was it
because βουλεύσεως had already been corrupted to βουλήσεως (if so,
that did not worry the L copyist, or any predecessor of his), or was it
perhaps removed/omitted by someone who knew his NE VI ‘=’ EE V?
On balance, it seems right to print τοιαύτην ἣ κρείττων τοῦ νοῦ καὶ as
part of the text.
a34 βουλεύσεως ‘[printed in S(usemihl) without comment] should per-

haps be ascribed to the Basel editors’, Barnes: Susemihl took it over from
Bekker, who similarly prints it without comment; but Susemihl does
restore the article τῆς, omitted by Bekker. If we commit to keeping
τοιαύτην ἣ κρείττων τοῦ νοῦ καὶ (see preceding note), it must cer-
tainly be βουλεύσεως, not βουλήσεως; further against βουλήσεως,
and in favour of keeping τοιαύτην ἣ κρείττων τοῦ νοῦ καὶ, we should
note that the ὁρμή that governs the εὐτυχεῖς has so far been character-
ized as ἐπιθυμία rather than βούλησις.
a34–5 καὶ ἐνθουσιάζουσι (scripsi), καὶ ἐνθουσιασμόν Spengel, οὐδ’

ἐνθουσιασμόν Langerbeck: in order to decide between these alterna-
tives to the impossible καὶ ἐνθουσιασμοί in PCL, and BF ’s equally
impossible neque divinos instinctus, we need to review the whole sen-
tence. Those who possess reason (οἱ δὲ τὸν λόγον) must themselves be
subject to the same ἀρχή—which is, after all, supposed to be ἀρχή
κινήσεως in the soul generally, a26–7—as the εὐτυχεῖς, even if it
operates in different ways in the two cases. If so, it is the εὐτυχεῖς that
are the subject of the following οὐχ ἔχουσι, not those who have rea-
son; what they, the εὐτυχεῖς, οὐχ ἔχουσι is λόγος; and with the next
(1248a34–5) sentence beginning ἄλογοι γὰρ ὄντες, they must also be

the subject of the following τοῦτο δ’ οὐ δύνανται. So τοῦτο in both
τοῦτο δ’ οὐκ ἔχουσι (or should we read τοῦτον with B?) and τοῦτο δ’
οὐ δύνανται must be reasoning. Indeed the second τοῦτο δ’ can func-
tion as it does just by virtue of its picking up the first, and commenta-
tors and translators generally seem to agree that the second must refer
to reason/deliberation. I construe ‘. . . for they [the εὐτυχεῖς] have a sort
of ἀρχή that is stronger than νοῦς and deliberation, while others [have
(that is, understood from the preceding ἔχουσι, not the following
one)] reasoning, but they [the εὐτυχεῖς] do not have this [i.e.
reasoning], and they are inspired [καὶ ἐνθουσιάζουσι, as I propose]
but are incapable of this [reasoning]’. Langerbeck’s οὐδ’ ἐνθουσιασμόν
(deriving from BF ’s neque divinos instinctus) for the MSS’ καὶ
ἐνθουσιασμόι entails—impossibly, as I have argued—that the posses-
sors of λόγος do not have the ἀρχή either; but then the whole sentence
in BF (qui autem racionem [sc. habent] hoc autem non habent neque
divinos instinctus, hoc autem non possunt) is another mess. If we put
brackets around οἱ δὲ τὸν λόγον, τοῦτο δ’ οὐκ ἔχουσι, with Susemihl,
then Spengel’s καὶ ἐνθουσιασμόν would work, at least syntactically,
but it would not do much for the overall sense (and, I add, since brack-
ets as such are not part of Aristotle’s armoury, it is surely dangerous
to build them, or indeed dashes, into any reconstruction in such a
way as actually to make the parenthesis break up the syntax: here,
ἐνθουσιασμόν would turn out to be governed by the first ἔχουσι, back
at the beginning of the line before). Hence my conjecture, καὶ
ἐνθουσιάζουσι—or perhaps ἐνθουσιῶσι, but ἐνθουσιάζουσι is closer
to the hopeless ἐνθουσιασμοί in the MSS and to BF ’s instinctus =
?ἐνθουσιασμούς; cf. I.1, 1214a24 ὥσπερ ἐνθουσιάζοντες (on the
absence of ὥσπερ here, cf. the second note on a36 below). (This is
another place where a truly conservative editor might have introduced
obeli; I am encouraged not to do so by the fact that the text I propose
makes only a single change, and that by no means an extravagant one,
to the reading of the MSS.)
a36 τοῦ τῶν/τούτων: without Sylburg’s tiny emendation—tiny espe-

cially when the divisions between words in these MSS are not always
Aristotelica 215
observed, and accents can be wayward—there seems no explanation for

the following infinitive. τούτων ϕρονίμων καὶ σοϕῶν would anyway
be peculiar Greek; and why ‘these’? —ϕρονίμων καὶ σοϕῶν: ‘ironice’,
says Mingay, as it would have to be if we retained the impossible τούτων
(as Walzer/Mingay does); but the following τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου, sc.
μαντικήν, indicates that Aristotle is using μαντική to cover what
people see through reason as well as what the εὐτυχεῖς in question see,
with the help of the θεός/θεῖον in them, despite their lack of the cap
acity to reason efficiently.
a38 ὑπολαβεῖν Ross: but why not ‘and one should practically take/
receive (= ἀπολαβεῖν) it as that arising from λόγος’? (Rackham, adopt-
ing a quite different interpretation, and one that seems impossible to
square either with the way the argument has gone so far or with the way
it will continue, keeps ἀπολαβεῖν but translates in a way that suggests
ὑπολαβεῖν: ‘only the divination that is based on reason one must not
specify’ (?).)
a38–9 οἱ μὲν δι’ ἐμπειρίαν οἱ δὲ διὰ συνήθειαν [τε] ἀν〈τὶ τοῦ〉 τῷ

σκοπεῖν χρῆσθαι: editors generally have bracketed τε, which has no
counterpart in BF and is evidently dispensable; beyond that there is little
or no agreement about what to make of this line (BF is of no help). But
two things, I think, are fairly certain: first, that οἱ μὲν . . . and οἱ δὲ are
subsets of the εὐτυχεῖς under discussion (these being the focus both of
what has preceded, and of what follows: a description here of some other
sort of people would be entirely pointless); second, that the verb
σκοπεῖν would typically be used of rational inquiry, which we have
been told is not something that such εὐτυχεῖς do, or at any rate do suc-
cessfully. So there should be a contrast between ἐμπειρία and συνήθεια,
on the one hand, and σκοπεῖν, or rather τῷ σκοπεῖν χρῆσθαι, on the
other. (Both Kenny in the Oxford World’s Classics translation and
Inwood and Woolf in the Cambridge translation evidently take χρῆσθαι
as ‘consult the oracle’: that is perhaps the only way of even beginning to
make sense of the transmitted text, as printed in Walzer/Mingay [albeit
with the τε obelized], but that text is syntactically unworkable.) Both
ἐμπειρία and συνήθεια are, I propose, examples of non-rational pro-
cesses, i.e. ones leading to success, which are part of the current story
(1248a38–9) about εὐτυχία (this notwithstanding 1247b14: ἐμπειρία

does not itself constitute ἐπιστήμη, only a possible basis for it); hence
the ensuing τῷ θεῷ δὲ αὗται, attested by all of PCBL, where αὗται,
unless we emend it away, must refer to ἐμπειρία and συνήθεια, and
where ὁ θεός must still be, as it was, part of the explanation of our spe-
cial sort of εὐτυχία. That the sentence is contrasting ἐμπειρία and
συνήθεια with the use of reason is consistent with the ἀλλά (BF has
quidem) introducing it: we have just been told, with the reconstruction I
have suggested, that the μαντική practised by our εὐτυχεῖς is almost as
quick as that of the ϕρόνιμοι καὶ σοϕοί, but (ἀλλά) there is a difference,
because the εὐτυχεῖς achieve what they do by different processes that—
so I propose Aristotle to be saying—do not involve inquiry, but rather
κατορθοῦσι] οἱ δὲ διὰ συνήθειαν [τε] ἀν〈τὶ τοῦ〉 τῷ σκοπεῖν χρῆσθαι:

substitute for it. Hence my conjecture οἱ μὲν δι’ ἐμπειρίαν [sc.
τοῦ, I speculate, was lost before τῷ; then ἀντὶ became ἄν τε, then ἔν τε,
then by standard inversion τε ἐν. This is of course highly speculative, but
whatever it was that Aristotle originally wrote, what he intended must, I
think, have been something of the sort, and I am further encouraged to
print the conjecture by the unattractiveness of the alternatives on offer,
Spengel’s having no clear regard to the sense, Dirlmeier’s being part of
larger and even more speculative rewriting of a36–41 as a whole. (As
usual, readers are at liberty to introduce their own obeli: perhaps around
τε ἐν rather than just τε as in Walzer/Mingay.)
a39 Spengel’s θείῳ is presumably because of the following τοῦτο; but

we had θεός followed by τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν θεῖον in a27–8; why should we not
(implicitly) have the same here? —Jackson’s δύνανται for δὲ αὗται is
part of another wholesale, and unconvincing, rewriting of a38–41; BF ’s
per se = αὐταί ?
a39–40 Should we read καὶ or γὰρ after τοῦτο? καὶ is at first sight sur-
prising. There are so many surprises in the context as a whole that one
should not change it just for that reason (or because we miss a connect
ive, there being many such missing connectives in EE). But further,
I propose that there is real point to the καὶ. τοῦτο is presumably the
faculty or capacity responsible for the ‘divining’: ‘this also sees the future
Aristotelica 217
and the past’, says Aristotle, in what I speculate is a reminiscence of

Homer’s Calchas, who knew τά τ’ ἐόντα τά τ’ ἐσσόμενα πρό τ’ ἐόντα,
thanks to the μαντοσύνη given him by Phoebus Apollo (Iliad I.70–2).
Aristotle’s εὐτυχεῖς are familiar with the past, through ἐμπειρία or
συνήθεια, and the mantic element, the divine, in them can see future
and present too. This amounts to a rationalization of, or, better, com-
mentary on, the Homeric lines: after all, not only did Aristotle know his
Homer, he had an interest in divination. For more on this whole context,
see Rowe forthcoming 3 [see bibliography to Preface in text volume].
1248b1 καὶ secl. von Arnim: not without reason, but the case against
καὶ is not quite proven (‘and [it is] just as . . .’?); et in BF.
b2–3 ὁρωμένοις in b3 is surely right (see next note for a particular
argument for it); it would not be surprising, I think, if this was what is
translated by BF as visibilia. So, . . . ἀπολυθέντες τοῦ πρὸς τοῖς
ὁρωμένοις εἶναι τὸ μνημονεῦον. BF ’s version of the whole sentence (as
reported by Jackson: I rely on his version in most cases) is actually gib-
berish, running . . . et quemadmodum ceci [= caeci] memorantur magis
amissisque hiis que [= quae?] ad visibilia virtuosius esse quod memora-
tur, i.e. something like καὶ ὥσπερ οἱ τυϕλοὶ μνημονεύονται μᾶλλον
ἀπολυθέντων τε τούτων [= τοῦ τῶν?] ἃ[?] πρὸς τοῖς ὁρατοῖς/
ὁρωμένοις ἐρρωμενέστερον [σπουδαιότερον Jackson] εἶναι τὸ
μνημονεῦον; by comparison the version in PCBL is a model of clarity
and simplicity, requiring only a single emendation of our Greek text, i.e.
ὁρωμένοις for εἰρημένοις. (Jackson tries to save the day, not for the
first time, by combining the MSS’ with BF ’s reading: . . . ἀπολυθέντες
τοῦ πρὸς τοῖς ὁρατοῖς εἶναι, τῷ πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις σπουδαιότερον
εἶναι τὸ μνημονεῦον [. . . ‘more earnestly addressed to what has been
said’], which apart from anything else looks bloated.) Here is one place
where privileging BF over our Greek MSS does not look helpful; if we
had only BF here, we could scarcely even begin to reconstruct the text.
The origin of virtuosius, I speculate, lies in someone’s failed attempt to
emend the corrupt εἰρημένοις, i.e. ἐρρωμένως, which finds its way
into the text, and then—adapting itself to the context—becomes
ἐρρωμενέστερον. At any rate the similarities between ὁρωμένοις,
εἰρημένοις, and ἐρρωμένως provide food for thought.
1248b6 Although it is hard to see how κατορθωτικός could become

διορθωτικός by mistake, after both κατορθοῦν and κατὰ (τὴν ὁρμὴν),
BF ’s directivus = κατορθωτικός (κατορθοῦν = dirigere) is hard to
resist. ‘Tends / has the capacity to make things right’, διορθωτικός (‘rec-
tificatory’, NE V ‘=’ EE IV.2, 1131a1), would fit in the case of θεία
εὐτυχία, given that things would certainly be going awry for this sort of
εὐτυχής, in the absence of reason, without the intervention of τὸ ἐν
αὐτῷ θεῖον; it would scarcely fit in the other case (ὁ δ’ ἕτερος ὁ παρὰ
τὴν ὁρμήν, sc. κατορθωτικός/διορθωτικός), where the εὐτυχής has
nothing to do with his own good fortune. Maybe there we are just
expected to supply ‘succeeds’, the essential point being the contrast
κατὰ/παρὰ τὴν ὁρμήν? But that would already be halfway to conced-
ing that we need κατορθωτικός in the first place.
b11 BF ’s/FL ’s vocamus (BF unaccountably includes the first two sen-
tences of the new chapter, which are not on good fortune at all, and say
as much; ‘FL’ = fragmentum Latinum, a Latin translation of VIII.3 found
in combination with BF as well as without it [see Dirlmeier 119–20], and
therefore possessing a similar level of usefulness and authority) might
tempt us into going with Jackson and Ross and reading καλοῦμεν, pre-
sent, on its own (‘Damit ist das Präsens gesichert’, Dirlmeier), especially
since it hard to see where ‘we’ called it καλοκἀγαθία before. But BF, as
we have seen, is not always right, and can also cut corners; so too FL, and
it seems unsafe to follow them here.
b12 None of PCBL writes καλοκἀγαθία with the crasis mark; they do
tend to recognize its presence in the corresponding adjective(s).
b18 καὶ post ἀλλὰ suppl. Bussemaker: before καθ’, καὶ might easily
have fallen out, but ἀλλὰ after οὐ μόνον is not always followed by καί;
as for the sed et in FL, the translator perhaps had the same instinct as
Bussemaker—although he / his source does better than our MSS on
more than one occasion (see below).
b19 B’s τὴν seems to me desirable: there is a difference, and not just a
difference of names; so what is the difference?
b21 Solomon’s construal, in the original Oxford translation, seems
enough to justify πάντα (and the preceding ὄντα): ‘which, existing
Aristotelica 219
(better ‘being’?) all of them for their own sake’. But we should note that
there is nothing to correspond to πάντα in FL.
b22–3 καὶ γὰρ: this γὰρ is in all of our MSS, and is supported by an
enim in FL (albeit with another, and somewhat bizarre, enim preced-
ing); there seems no good reason to omit it, as does Bekker, then
Susemihl (without remarking on the omission; Walzer/Mingay refers to
it in the apparatus).
b25 After ὑγίεια without a definite article, I see no reason not to follow
BL and leave ἰσχύς similarly without article. —Bekker writes ἀγαθὰ
without comment, while Susemihl notices that his main MSS have
τἀγαθὰ, as does Walzer/Mingay; none indicates the authority for
ἀγαθὰ—which, as it now turns out, belongs to B.
b32 οὐδὲν ὀνήσεται: Langerbeck’s emendation of the impossible οὐδ’
ὀνήσειε (the absence of ἄν is one thing, but the active ὀνήσειε is
another) is simple and quite elegant, except for the retention of οὐδέ—
‘not even’ is not needed, rather ‘not at all’. Richards’s ὀνηθείη, relying on
a parallel in Xenophon, might be a rival for οὐδὲν ὀνήσεται, but is less
economical insofar as it also has to call in aid Spengel’s ἂν.
b34 τοῖς τοῦ ὑγιοῦς καὶ [τοῖς τοῦ] ὁλοκλήρου κόσμοις: B2 writes an
eta over the original eta of τῆς in B’s τῆς τοῦ ὑγιαίνοντος καὶ τοῦ
ὁλοκλήρου (so changing τῆς to τῇ), which gives a perfectly good sense,
but one that has Aristotle more or less repeating the same parallel as in
b32–3 οὐδ’ ὁ κάμνων τῇ τοῦ ὑγιαίνοντος τροϕῇ χρώμενος rather
than introducing a new one, as in PCL (i.e. mutton dressing as lamb).
I bracket the second τοῖς τοῦ because it separates the ὁλόκληρος
from the ὑγιής, when they are surely one and the same, as FL appears to
agree; the καί is epexegetic, ὑγιὴς καὶ ὁλόκληρος corresponding to
ἀσθενὴς καὶ ἀνάπηρος. Copyists seem to have assumed an identity
between the κάμνων and the ἀσθενής—the B copyist certainly does,
when he writes ὑγιαίνοντος for ὑγιοῦς in b34; this is why they like the
feminine (τῆς), even if the case is wrong (τῆς, sc. τροϕῆς). But then
τοῖς τοῦ will be needed to go with ὁλοκλήρου κόσμοις, or just τοῦ
in the case of B, to go with ὁλοκλήρου. N.b. even if there were two
cases involved here (i.e. if the ὁλόκληρος were intended to be distinct
from the ὑγιής), the repetition of τοῖς τοῦ would be unlike the usual
(1248b34) Eudemian style, especially after ὁ ἀσθενὴς καὶ ἀνάπηρος,

supposing that that in the present context could ever refer to two
separate cases.
b36 I prefer δι’ αὐτὰ (Ald.) to Bekker’s δι’ αὑτὰ on the grounds that the
person is the logical subject of the sentence (cf. πρακτικὸς following); L
(the only main MS in play here) in any case has the smooth breathing.
The corruption of δι’ to δ’ (and vice versa), as here in L, is not uncom-
mon in these MSS. —Ald., followed by Susemihl and Walzer/Mingay
(but not Bekker), reads αὑτῶν, but the main MSS’ αὐτῶν is surely pref-
erable, τὰ καλά not being the subject.
1249a1 These, or some of them, being Spartans, we—even a copyist, at
some time, in some place?—might think—and indeed do think: see note
at the end of the present entry—ἄγριοι appropriate, but it hardly fits the
context: why would the following τὰ . . . ϕύσει μὲν ἀγαθὰ αὐτοῖς ἐστίν,
introduced with a γάρ, constitute a reason for their being ἄγριοι? It
should be noted that the orthographic distance between ἀγαθοί, surely
the only possible emendation, and ἄγριοι is small. (From his control
MS(S), Victorius notes the alternative ἄγριοι to Ald.’s ἀγαθοὶ, but rightly
does not prefer it.) This is one of those very many places where the argu-
ment ‘preferable because in all the manuscripts’ surely carries little
weight; we should not forget that all the extant manuscripts descend
from a single archetype, and their many shared corruptions, which as
will be more than evident by now are on a considerable scale, are
inherited from that single document (and its predecessors) [Note: the
preceding was written before the publication of T. Irwin, ‘The wild and
the good: conditions for virtue in the Eudemian Ethics’. In Giulio di
Basilio (ed.), Investigating the Relationship Between Aristotle’s Eudemian
and Nicomachean Ethics (Routledge, London, 2022: 188–206). The
paper argues strongly for the retention of ἄγριοι: as indicated by my
retention of ἀγαθοὶ, I remain unconvinced by Irwin’s argument (the ori
ginal version was delivered to a workshop in Dublin in 2018), but I
acknowledge that the entry above represents a quite inadequate response
to it. It should be added that quite a lot hangs on the main point at issue;
I look forward to returning to the question on a future occasion.]
Aristotelica 221
a2 Solomon’s supplied second ἀγαθὰ is implicit in any case and need not be
spelled out, after 1248b26–7. Richards’s reordering—‘The argument seems
to need ἀγαθὰ μὲν ϕύσει, or even ϕύσει ἀγαθὰ μέν’—probably misses this
point. —δὲ Victorius: any authority that FL’s autem might have is some-
what undermined by its autem in 1248b41, where γὰρ is hardly avoid
able, but here δέ is plainly needed in any case. (It is probably wrong to
talk about ‘authority’ in the context either of FL or of BF; both surely do
go back to a Greek manuscript or manuscripts that predate our PCBL,
but both contain peculiarities. Still, FL does much better than one might
have supposed from Dirlmeier’s reports, based as they are on a single
MS. [I am grateful to Victor Gonçalves de Sousa, of São Paulo University,
for providing me with access to Dieter Wagner’s c ritical edition of FL;
one may wonder how much less wayward BF itself would look with a
full collation of all its many MSS.])
avoidable. —The supplement 〈ὅσοις δ’ ὑπάρχει δι’ αὐτὰ〉 (proposed by

a3 ὑπάρχει Matr. 4627 (also Ald.): again, the emendation is scarcely
Dirlmeier [not Zeller, pace Walzer/Mingay], except that he prefers αὑτά,

following Bekker’s preceding δι’ αὑτά [= B]: for the smooth breathing,
see on 1248b36) is a transcription of FL’s quibuscumque autem existunt
propter ipsa, and it seems that we must adopt it, since otherwise it is hard
to explain how this extra, and wholly necessary, addition to our text
could have got into FL’s source; its author is not in the habit of restoring
infatti di per sé il possesso delle cose belle, 〈quelli invece che lo hanno
the text so extensively—and successfully—by himself. ‘[N]on hanno
infatti di per sé〉 dirigono anche le decisioni a oggetti belli e buoni’,

Donini, printing Walzer/Mingay’s text opposite, but commenting in a
supplement. Kenny’s 〈ἃ〉 (Barnes/Kenny, Aristotle’s Ethics [2016]), which

note ad loc. on their odd placing of a comma after rather than before the
is a simplified version of his original 〈τὰ δὲ καλὰ δι’ αὑτά〉 καὶ (Aristotle
and the Perfect Life [1992]: 13 n. 15), would do much the same job as
ὅσοις δ’ ὑπάρχει δι’ αὕτα more economically, but here it seems Aristotle
went for a fuller version. —After either supplement, Ross’s καλὰ κἀγαθά
in a4 is pointless, and indeed one can wonder if such a neuter plural is
even possible (see Kenny, in the same footnote).
1249a7 Susemihl retains the MSS’ καλὰ, placing commas around the
preceding relative clause, but construing the plural is still too difficult to
make the defence worthwhile. —διὸ Solomon: an obviously necessary
emendation: that τὰ ϕύσει ἀγαθά are καλά for the καλοσκἀγαθός is a
consequence, not an explanation, of the preceding claim about καλὰ
(see Woods). —τὰ τῇ ϕύσει: it seems marginally more likely, in a con-
text where ϕύσει without the article is the norm, that the article would
have dropped out than that PCB’s source would have added it. (I admit
that the argument could go either way; there are many cases like this
where any decision will in the end be somewhat arbitrary.)
a10 τούτῳ Ambr.: πλούτῳ PCBL; videtur defuisse FL—or did the
translator just decide to omit a meaningless πλούτῳ?
a11 It is hard to see what is wrong with καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ (PB), of which
what is in L is evidently a truncated version; Dirlmeier’s proposal is
driven simply by the Latin translations (hec FL, ea Lat.), and they, here,
and he merely impoverish the MSS’ text. Ross’s, by contrast, adds some-
thing to it, elegantly but unnecessarily.
a13 There is nothing corresponding to τῷ δὲ ἀγαθῷ καὶ καλά in FL.
a14 καὶ is inserted above the line in L, probably by the original copyist,
between γὰρ and καλὰς, with an insertion mark.
a18 The ει in διείρηται in P is—I think—written over an original eta; in

other words, διήρηται was what was in the source MSS of PB and of C
(so: in α´ ); P2, correcting against L or a relative of L, mistakes δ’ εἴρηται
for διείρηται (or does he intend δ’ εἴρηται?). For the possibility of con-
fusion between δ’ and δι, see 1249b21 (in P and C), etc.
a19–20 ὅτι τά τε ἁπλῶς ἡδέα ἀγαθὰ PCB: i.e. both καὶ καλὰ καὶ τὰ
τε ἁπλῶς after the first ἡδέα and the final ἡδέα itself are missing.
a19 καὶ2 τά or τά τε2? Either καὶ or τε would pair happily with τά τε1,
but it is probably easier to see how an unwanted καί crept in than an
unwanted τε after καὶ καλ(ὰ), and especially when it might look as if
that καὶ had already paired off with τε1.
Aristotelica 223
a23 ὃν BP2C2, ὃ P1C1L: P2 and C2 squeeze the nu in between the ὃ and

the following alpha. ὃ, being in PCL, was apparently in ω, with B making
the obviously necessary correction independently?
a25 Collingwood’s more palaeographically respectable alternative sadly

has to trump the elegance of Allan’s first proposal: the loss of εἰ before εὖ
is easier to envisage than the corruption of ἔσται to εὖ. —All of PCBL
have ὑγιαῖνον in this line (pace Walzer/Mingay).
1249b1 οὐκ is split between two pages in C, with οὐ at the end of one
and the κ beginning the next; evidently this copyist cares as little for the
integrity of a page as he, and the other copyists, do for that of a line.
—ἐπαινετὸν C, and possibly P too; the following δὲ in P is unusually
written out in full, probably over something else and in what looks like a
different hand, perhaps to fill the gap that would be left by the change to
ἐπαινετῶν, which would paradoxically reduce the space required.
b2 Bekker omits τῆς before ἕξεως; Susemihl puts it back on the author-
ity of ‘In. [= Lat.] Fr[itzsche]’, but actually it is in all of PCBL. —περὶ
secl. Zeller, with good reason: αἱρέσεως and ϕυγῆς are a natural pair,
with ϕυγῆς amplifying b1 αἱρέσεις, and αἱρέσεως needs the following
genitives as much as ϕυγῆς; περὶ, already looking awkward after ὅρον,
makes it look as if ϕυγῆς (χρημάτων πλήθους, etc.) is something new
and separate rather than the correlative of αἱρέσεως—and it (περὶ)
would probably also be happier with an accusative. That there is no
rewriting of what follows, i.e. ϕυγῆς 〈καὶ περὶ〉 χρημάτων πλῆθος καὶ
counterpart to περὶ in FL provides support for the deletion. But Zeller’s
ὀλιγότητα, is surely superfluous.

b3 In P, there is a probably accidental mark beneath the accent following
the shorthand for the ματων of εὐτυχημάτων; above the accent there
are also what may be traces of something, now indecipherable, by a
later hand.
b5 τροϕὴν PCB, τὴν τροϕὴν L: I side here with PCB on the grounds
that the article is not needed, and that it would fit the generally spare
style of EE not to have it.
1249b8 Like Richards, I can make little or no sense of κατὰ here before
τὴν ἐνέργειαν. Richards’s argument that we would expect a τὴν before
the κατὰ is not so persuasive, in the context of EE; more to the point is
his observation that it is the ἐνέργεια that is usually κατά the ἕξις: see
e.g. 1219a39–40.
b9 τὴν deest in L: the article is surely required here (in contrast with
b5 above).
b11 There is a gap here in P, before ἀρχομένου, corresponding in length

to about 9–10 characters, which is caused by a hole in the page.
b15 B’s ἐπιτακτικὸς ἄρχων, where ἐπιτακτικὸς is supported by FL

ordinativus, anticipates one of Richards’s conjectures; his other conjec-
ture, ἐπιτακτικῶς ἄρχει, would be smoother—but suspect because of
it? —Puzzlingly, Walzer/Mingay rejects Robinson’s second conjecture
〈ἐν ἡμῖν〉 θεῖον for τὸν θεὸν in b22. As Barnes crisply comments (CR 42
(ἄρχει τὸ θεῖον) here but reads τοῦ θεῖου for τοῦ θεοῦ in b19 and τὸ
[1992]: 30), ‘Robinson should be swallowed either whole or not at all—

and plainly not at all’.
b16 διττὸν δὲ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, διώρισται δ’ ἐν ἄλλοις transposui post

b17 οὐθενὸς δεῖται: my reasoning is that if we try taking ἐπεὶ in the
following ἐπεὶ-clause as ‘since’, that seems to require our knowing
immediately what the two uses of οὗ ἕνεκα are, when the function of
διώρισται δ’ ἐν ἄλλοις seems to be to avoid spelling it out. Rather, I
propose, ἐπεὶ is to be taken in what I have sometimes earlier called
its ‘(quasi-)concessive’ use (though Bonitz calls it straightforwardly
‘concessive’: Index Aristotelicus 266a55), the effect being that Aristotle
rows back from what ἀλλ’ οὗ ἕνεκα ἡ ϕρόνησις ἐπιτάττει might
suggest, i.e. that god might be in need of something. On this con-
strual, the ἐπεὶ-clause connects directly with what comes before
διττὸν δὲ τὸ . . . , which, placed where it is in the MSS, would then be
explaining something before we had been told exactly what needed
explaining.
b19 I prefer L’s ordering (τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ μάλιστα) as the less expected
and because of FL’s dei maxime contemplationem.
Aristotelica 225
b23 That there is no counterpart to the δὲ after αὕτη in FL is surely

another piece of evidence confirming that FL, like BF, is not consist-
ently a word-for-word rendering of the Greek. —ἔχει δὲ τοῦτο τῇ
ψυχῇ PCBL is strikingly devoid of substance as well as syntactically
odd; and similarly with the emendations offered by Rackham, Richards,
and Dirlmeier: it would be surprising if ‘this’ wasn’t how it is with the
soul. Why would it not be, if ‘this’ is how it has just been said to be? We
would hardly miss it if we were not told, as we would be with Richards’s
solution, that that is how it should be, not least since we are about to be
told the same in different terms. Leaving out a single letter (tau), on the
other hand, and transforming ῇ into ἡ, dative into a nominative (so: ἡ
ψυχή), gives us something that is not only syntactical but informative,
and has stylistic parallels—if, I suppose, the ‘this’ is that part of the soul
Aristotle is currently labelling τὸ θεωρητικόν, which he has just
assimilated, once more, to ὁ θεός (parallels for such a use of ἔχειν: e.g.
at 1224b29–30, 1248a33–4). This proposal is of a piece with the retention
of the MSS’ ἄλλου in the next line (see below). The ἔχει is in emphatic
position: ‘And the soul does have this . . . (sc. despite what the discussion
of εὐτυχία in VIII.2 may have suggested? See further on b25 ἄλλου
below.).
b23–4 The idea that ‘this’ is the ὅρος ‘of ’ the soul is odd, but the very
repetition of ψυχή + definite article, with τῆς ψυχῆς still to follow in
the next line, looks even odder. I suspect a version of dittography (τοῦτο
τῇ ψυχῇ / οὗτος τῆς ψυχῆς). An alternative that this might suggest is to
bracket ἔχει δὲ τοῦτο τῇ ψυχῇ altogether; but see note on b25 ἄλλου
below. (Another possibility: οὗτος τῇ ψυχῇ ὁ ὅρος ἄριστος? But the
dative would be strangely placed, and a sequence of three occurrences of
ψυχή + definite article in the same short sentence would still seem at
least one too many.)
b24 Susemihl’s ἂν ἥκιστα αἰσθάνηται on balance seems to take on
board more of the evidence available, such as it is, than do the others,
that evidence including FL’s cum minime senserit; that by itself might
well have served equally as a translation of Zeller’s τὸ ἥκιστα
αἰσθάνεσθαι, but none of PCBL has the infinitive either. The τὰ in all of
PCBL is by false analogy with ἥκιστα. Allan’s τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἥκιστα
(1249b24) αἰσθάνεσθαι presupposes the usual shorthand for ἄνθρωπος,

but still seems to add unnecessary bulk to Zeller’s proposal; similarly
Robinson’s ὅταν to Susemihl’s ἂν = ἐὰν.
b25 ἄλλου MSS, ἀλόγου Fritzsche: the in fer

ior Latin translator,
with alteram irrationalemque, mostly got there—either following the
incorporation of a gloss in the text, or on his own initiative—before
Fritzsche. But both, I propose, are wrong: Aristotle wrote ἄλλου = the
part of the soul other than the part (now) referred to at the beginning of
the sentence. What it will be ‘to perceive / be aware of the remaining part
of the soul ἥκιστα, ᾗ τοιοῦτον’ will be to perceive it ἥκιστα insofar as it
is other, i.e. other than rational, that other part itself still being rational to
the extent that it is capable of listening to reason. What exactly either of
the two parts includes is not clear, but my own view is that b14 οὕτω δ’
ἔχει κατὰ τὸ θεωρητικόν is saying that the counterparts of both medi-
cine and health (ἄλλως γὰρ ἡ ἰατρικὴ ἀρχὴ καὶ ἄλλως ἡ ὑγίεια,
b12–13) are intended to be included in (what is being referred to here as)
τὸ θεωρητικόν: i.e. τὸ θεωρητικόν includes both ‘god’ and ϕρόνησις—
the latter, of course, being the counterpart of ἰατρικὴ, ‘god’ of ὑγίεια.
That, it seems to me, is the inescapable logic of b12–16 (note the surpris-
ing sentence ἔστι γὰρ βουλευτικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ θεωρητικὸν αἰτίας
τινος, 1226b26–7—surprising, that is, against the background of a clear
distinction between theoretical and practical reason, of the sort we find
in NE VI ‘=’ EE V: see e.g. NE (EE) 1139a27–8). If this is indeed what
Aristotle intends, it will give added point to ἔχει δὲ τοῦτο ἡ ψυχή. It may
be—so I think Aristotle argued in VIII/V.2 —that many people live quite
successfully without reasoning (thanks to the operation of god / a divine
element in them too); but reasoning is a part of us, and that is what
should guide us in our choices. But another, and perhaps more immedi-
ate, contrast will be with the case of the Spartans, earlier in the present
chapter, for whom external goods are the goal in themselves.
b25 Bekker prints ᾗ without comment, and it is indeed an obvious

correction.
b27 B2 writes in an omega above the αι of ἔσται. —By marking a lacuna

after the last sentence of VIII/V, as he had before its first (and by ending
Aristotelica 227
the last sentence with a Greek colon, which I reproduce—after all, the
sentence starts with a μέν), Susemihl advertises the book as a fragment.
Allan, by contrast, does his best to make it into a whole by bracketing the
last sentence; in which we have no reason to follow him, especially when
the ‘book’ starts with a similar abruptness. Further, I believe that a book
may end with a μέν-clause, to be answered by a δέ in the following book
(EE III is a likely example: see note ad loc.). In the present case this
would be consistent with the proposal, made by Dirlmeier and others,
that EE VIII/V originally preceded VII/IV, although its beginning would
be likely still to mark it as a fragment. —After EE, P goes straight into
the Economicus without even a line’s break; οἰκονομικός — — — α′ is
written in the half of the line left after ἔστω εἰρημένον : —. But at least
the title is in red, and there is the same minimal decoration as at the
beginning of EE, which started with a similar lack of fanfare. C, for its
part, gives the title of the Economicus a separate line. B has a band of
decoration before the title of the new treatise; meanwhile EE in L ends
little more than two lines into a page, without flourish. The rest of that
page in L is left blank, and there are then several empty folios before the
beginning of the only other work in the codex, the Hieroglyphica of
‘Horapollo’, which is prefaced with Ὡραπόλλωνος Νειλώου
Ἱερογλυϕικὰ, ἃ έξήνεγκε μὲν αὐτὸς αἰγυπτίᾳ ϕωνῇ μετέϕρασε δὲ
Φίλιππος εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα διάλεκτον : —. (This inscription is barely
readable in L itself; I have copied it from Laur. 81,20, which follows L
faithfully from 1232a3 ἡ πώλησις, the first part being directly
descended from C.)
appendix
Data for the Relationships between

the Primary Manuscripts
(1) (Presumed) errors shared by all of PCBL
1214a5 〈δ’ 〉 // ἐρᾷ τὸ] ἐρᾶται PCBL // 26 τῇ παρουσίᾳ] ἡ παρουσία PCBL //

EUDEMIAN ETHICS I
[διὰ] // 28 〈τὰς〉 // 1214b33 μεταβαλοῦσιν] μετάβαλλουσιν PCBL // 1215a1

εἰκῇ γὰρ] εἰ μὴ γὰρ P1CBL // 19 [ἃ] // 27 〈οὐδ’〉 // 28 〈ἀλλ’〉 // 1215b5 〈ἕτερος〉
// 19 〈δι’ ἃ〉 // 1215b29–30 ἀπέραντον, τί] ἀπέραντόν τι PCBL // 1216a1
Ἆπιν] ἄπιν PCBL // 12 τοιαῦτ’ ἄττα] τοιαῦθ’ ἇττα PCLB2, ταῦθ’ ἇττα B1 //
16 Σαρδανάπαλλον] σαρδανάπαλον PCBL // 1216b2 λόγου] λόγοι PCBL //
1216b19 ἤ τι] ἢ τί PCL, ἤ τὶ B // 28 χρωμένους] χρώμενον P1CBL // 31
πάντας] πάντως PCBL // 1217b5 τὸ αἰτίῳ] τῷ αἰτίῳ PCBL // ἀγαθοῖς]
ἀγαθοῦ PCBL // 6 ὑπάρχειν] ὑπάρχει PCBL // 41 ἑτέρα] ἑτέραι PCBL //
1218a8 ἢ] εἰ PCBL // 15 ἢ ὡς] πῶς PCBL // 17 ἀνομολογουμένων]
ἀγαθόν P1B1CL // 1218b8 〈οὖν〉 // οὔτε] οὐδὲ PCL, οὐδ’ B // 19 τὸ2] τοῦ P1CBL
ὁμολογουμένων PCBL // 27 τοῦτο] τότε P1CBL // 38 αὐτοαγαθόν] αὐτὸ
// 21 καὶ τόδε] καὶ τότε PCB, καὶ τό τε (vel τότε) L // 22 τοῦ] τὸ PCBL
1218b32 〈ἐν〉 // 36 πᾶσιν] πᾶσι PCBL // 1219a29 τέλεον] πλέον PCBL // 31

EUDEMIAN ETHICS II
ταῦτα] αὕτη PCBL // 35 ἔσται] εἶναι PCBL // 1219b17 τέλους] τέλος PCBL //
25 πῃ] μὴ PCBL // 38 τῇ αὑτοῦ] τοῦ αὐτοῦ PCBL // 39 ϕυτικόν] ϕυσικόν PCBL
// 41 καὶ αὐξητικοῦ] καὶ ὀρεκτικοῦ PCBL // 1220a16 διὰ τίνων] διά τινων
PCBL // 17 ἀεὶ] δεῖ PCBL // 28 ϕθείρεσθαι πὼς] ϕθείρεσθαί πως PCBL // 33
πὼς bis] πῶς bis PCBL // 1220b2 κινεῖσθαι πώς] κινεῖσθαί πως PCBL // 6
[δ’ ] // [τῷ λόγῳ] // 10–12 [μετὰ ταῦτα ἡ διαίρεσις ἐν τοῖς ἀπηλλαγμένοις
τῶν παθημάτων καὶ τῶν δυνάμεων καὶ τῶν ἕξεων] // 15 ποιός τις] ποιότης
PCBL // 1220b38–1221a12: tertium quidque in his lineis omnibus secludendum
πῶς] ἄν πως PCBL // 22 ἤδη] δὴ PCBL // 39 〈ἕξις〉 PCBL // 1222a1 [ἡ ἡδονή]

// 1221a19 [ὁ1] // [καὶ] // 20 [ὁ1] // 23 ἢ] ἀλλ’ PCBL // 1221b1 [ἐπὶ] // 19 ἂν
πράξεις] ἕξεις PCBL // 28 〈ὃς〉 // 38 ϕιλόπονοί ἐσμεν] ϕιλόπονοι ἐσμέν PCBL

// 1222a11 τὴν καθ’ αὑτὸ ἑκάστην] τὴν καθ’ αὑτὸν ἕκαστον PCBL // 21
// 40 ἐναντίαν] ἐναντία PCBL // 42 πραότητι] πραότητα PCBL // 1222b18

ζῷον ὁμοίως] ζῷον ὂν ὅλως PCBL // 35 μεταβάλλει] μεταβάλλοι PCBL //
A ppe n d i x 229
// 25 〈ἂν〉 // 1223b11 τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς] τῆς ἀκρασίας PCBL // 25 τὸν αὐτὸν] τὸ

1223a3 [ὃ] // 11 [διὰ] // 13 αἴτιοί ἐσμεν] αἴτιοι ἐσμέν PCBL // 20 δῆλον[ότι]
αὐτὸ PC1BL // 26 〈αὐτὸ〉 // 33 γένηται] γίνηται PCBL // 1224a19 ταῦτα]

τοῦτο PCBL // 22 ἀψύχων] ἐμψύχων PCBL1 // 24 τι] τις PCBL // 29 τινὶ] τινι
PCBL // 30 γάρ ϕαμεν] γὰρ ϕαμὲν PCBL // 31 ἀλλὰ τὸν] ἀλλ’ ὅταν PCBL //
ἑκόντας] ἄκοντας PCBL // ἀκούσιον] ἑκούσιον P1CBL // 1225a1 〈αὗται〉 //

1224b4 ἑκόντες] ἄκοντες PCBL // 26 τι] τί PCL, τὶ B // 29 τι] τί PCBL // 40
11 [δεῖ] // 17 [μὴ] // 36 〈λόγοι οὗτοι εἰσιν〉 // 37 〈οὐχ〉 // 1225b1 δὴ] δεῖ PCBL
// 5 ἤτοι ᾧ] ἤτοι ὡς PCBL // 7 ὃ] ὅτῳ PCBL // 14 〈ἂν〉 // 24 [δ’ ] // 35 [ταὐτὸν]
// 37 ἃ δυνατὸν] ἀδύνατον PCBL // 1226a2 τι] τί PCL, τὶ B // ἦν] εἶναι PCBL //
5 δόξα] δόξαν P1CBL // 12 τινὸς] τίνος PCBL // [προαιρεῖται] // 13 τινὸς]
τίνος PCBL // 15 δοξάζει] δοξάζειν PCBL // 33 δῆλον ὅτι] δηλονότι PCBL //
1226b17 δῆλον ὅτι] δηλονότι PCBL // 19 βουλόμεθα1] βουλευόμεθα PCBL //
23 πάντως] πάντος PCBL // 24 διὰ τί] διατί PCBL // 29 αἴτιόν ϕαμεν] αἴτιον
ϕαμὲν PCBL // 1227a2 πῃ] πῆ PCBL // 15 τοῦτ’ ἔστι] τουτέστι PCBL // 18
αὑτὸν] αὐτὸν PCBL // 23 διαστροϕῇ] διαστροϕὴν PCBL // 32 διαστροϕῇ]
διαστροϕὴν PCBL // 34 γὰρ ἔστιν] γάρ ἐστιν PCBL // 42 [καὶ] // 1227b 6
αὐτή] αὕτη PCBL // 11 ϕιλόγλυκυς] ϕιλόγλυκος PCBL // 39 τῷ] τὸ PCBL //
1228a2 [οὗ] // 7 σπουδαῖός ἐστιν] σπουδαῖος ἐστὶν PCBL // 15–16 καίτοι
αἱρετώτερον ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς ἀρετῆς post 13 εἰς τὰ ἔργα habent PCBL
1228a23 〈ταῖς〉 // 29 πρότερον] πότερον PCBL // 1228b13 〈τὰ δὲ ϕοβερὰ〉 //

EUDEMIAN ETHICS III
37 οἱ δὲ] καὶ ἔτι P1CBL // 1229a11 μόνον] μόνος PCB1L // 13 〈τὰ〉 // 23 καὶ]
ἢ PCBL // 40 λυπήσεται] λύπη ἔσται PCBL // 1229b2 ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσι] ἀνδρεῖοι
εἰσί PCL, ἀνδρεῖοι εἰσίν B // 13 ϕαίνηται] ϕαίνεται PCBL // 15 λύπης
ὑπομένουσι PCL (deest in B) // 35 〈ἂν〉 // 40 〈ἂν〉 // 40–1 ἑτοίμος

ϕθαρτικῆς] λύπης τῆς ϕθαρτῆς P1CL (desunt in B) // 32 ὑπομένουσιν]
PCL (deest in B) // 19 〈ἂν〉 // 26 ϕοβούμενον] ϕοβουμένους PCL (deest in B)

ἀποθνήσκειν] ἑτοίμως ἀποθνήσκειν P1CL (deest in B) // 1230a12 δι’ ὃ] διὸ
// 28 οὐδὲ] οὔτε PCL (deest in B) // 37 διὰ τί] διατὶ PCBL // 〈ἔχει〉 // 40 πως]
πῶς PCBL // 1230b1 ἰατρευμένος] ἰατρευόμενος PBLC2, ἰατευόμενος C1 //
1230b13 δὲ] γὰρ PCBL // 19 κωμῳδοδιδάσκαλοι] κωμοδιδάσκαλοι P1CL,
κωμοδοδιδάσκαλοι B // 22 περὶ τίνας] περί τινας PCBL // 1231a8 μὴ deest in
PCBL // ἢ] μὴ PCBL // 17 Ἐρύξιδος] ἐξ ὔριδος PCL, ἐξύριδος B1 // 23
ἡδονὰς] ὀσμὰς PCBL // 36 δῆλον ὅτι] δηλονότι PCL (deest in B) // 38 ὥστ’
εἰ] ὥστε PCL (deest in B) // 1232a13 προσίεσθαι] προΐεσθαι PCBL // 21
λανθάνει] λανθάνειν PCBL // 24 ἐλευθερίῳ] ἀνελευθερίῳ PCBL // 31 ἔτι]
ὅτε PCBL // 34–5 [εἶναι ἡδέα] // 1232b2 μέγα γὰρ οἴεσθαί εἶναι] μέγα γὰρ
οἴεται εἶναι PCBL // 13 λυπεῖσθαι τ’ ἂν] λυπηθήσεται ἂν P, λυπηθήσετ’ ἂν
230 A ppe n d i x
CB, λυπηθήσαι τ’ ἂν L // 20 ἐπὶ τίνι] ἐπί τινι PCBL // 22 τιμία] τιμίαν PCBL
// 26 παρὰ] περὶ PCBL // 31 ζητητέος] ζητητέον PCBL // 1233b1 καλοῦσί
τοῦ πρέποντος PCBL // 9 〈τὸ κατ’ ἀξίαν〉 // 12 ᾤοντο] ᾤετο PCBL // 14

τινες] καλοῦσι τινὲς PCBL // 5 ἐκείνως] ἐκεῖνος PCBL // 8–9 τὸ πρέπον]
ἔχει] ἔχων PCBL // 15–16 οὔτ’ ἐλευθέριος οὔτ’ ἀνελεύθερος] ὡς ἐλευθέριος
PCBL // 37 〈ἀλλὰ〉 // καταϕρονητικὸς] ἀκαταϕρονητικὸς P1CBL // 1234a1

ὅταν ἐλεύθερος PCBL // 22 ἐστὶν αὐτὸ] ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ PCBL // 33 μὴ] μήτε
〈μὴ〉 // 30–1 ϕύσει καὶ] ϕυσικαὶ PCBL // 33 δ’ deest in PCBL // 1234b5 ὦσιν]
καθ’ αὑτοῦ] κατ’ αὐτοῦ PCBL // 19 ὁ δυνάμενος] τὸν δυνάμενον PCBL // 22
εἰσὶν PCBL // 10 τε] δὲ PCBL
EUDEMIAN ETHICS VII/IV

1234b20 εἴδη deest in PCBL // 29 ἅλις ϕίλους ποιῆσαι] ἀλλ’ εἰς ϕίλους
ποιῆσαι PCBL // 1235a2 ἑταίρων] ἑτέρων PCBL // [ἢ τέκνων ἢ γονέων ἢ
γυναικός] // 3 ἐστὶν] ἔστιν PCBL // 15 ἐρώμενον] ἐρωμένον PCBL // 16
PCBL // 26 ἔκ τ’ ] καὶ PCBL // 30 〈καὶ〉 // 37 καὶ αὐτοὶ τὰ αὑτῶν] καὶ αἱ

ἐπιθυμεῖν] ἐπιθυμεῖ PCBL // 22 αἰεὶ] ἀεὶ PCBL // 23 τοὔλασσον] τὸ ἔλασσον
〈ὅμοιον〉 // 14 λόγος] λοιπὸς PCBL // 21 ϕιλοῦμεν οὗ] ϕιλούμενον PCBL //

τοιαῦται τῶν, deinde spatium vacuum quinque fere litterarum PCBL // 1235b4
34 ὑγιαίνοντί ϕαμεν] ὑγιαίνοντι ϕαμὲν PCBL // 39 οὗτοί γε] οὔτε PCB; οὔτε
ἡμῖν PCBL // 28 〈τὰς〉 // 29 οἱ] αἱ PCBL // 34 [διὰ] // 37 τόσσον ϕίλος] τὸν

γε L // 1236a13 οὕτω] ὥσπερ PCBL // 16 πως] πῶς PCBL // 22 ἐν πᾶσιν] ἐν
σοϕὸν ϕίλον PCBL // 38 γιγνώσκουσιν] γινώσκουσιν PCBL // Ἀθηναῖοι]

ἀληθῆναι PCB, ἀθῆναι L // 1236b4 ὁ ϕιλούμενος] τῷ ϕιλουμένῳ PCBL //
6 μόνος] μόνον PCBL // 8 ἄνθρωπον] ἀνθρώπων P1CBL // ἄλληλα] ἄλλα
ἕως ἂν] ὡς ἂν PCBL // 23 ἀδύνατον] δυνατόν PCBL // 24 〈ἡ〉 // 28 τι] τις

PCBL // 15 οὐθὲν] οὐθεὶς PCBL // 16 ὑπομένουσιν] ὑπονοοῦσιν PCBL //
PCBL // 33–4 ἔχει γὰρ ἐπίστασιν πότερον] ἔχει ἐπίστασιν πότερον γὰρ
PCBL // 37 ἄν πως τύχῃ] ἁπλῶς τύχῃ P1CBL // 1237a2 τοῦτο ἡ] τοῦτον
PCBL // 3 εὔθετος] εὐθέτως PCBL // 7 ταῦτα] τοῦτο PCBL // σπουδαῖος]
σπουδαῖον PCBL // 14 τῳδί, οἷον τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι] τὸ καλὸν τοιοῦτον
γυμνάζεσθαι PCBL // 17 ἡ2] εἰ PCBL // 25 ἡδεῖ] εἴδει PCBL // 29–30 δῆλον
32 δῆλον ὅτι] δηλονότι PCBL // 34 αὐτὴ] αὕτη PCBL // 37 〈ᾗ〉 // 1237b1 τῷ

ὅτι] δηλονότι PCBL // 30 τελεωθέντι] τελεωθέντα P1CB; τελειωθέντα L //
ϕιλουμένῳ] τὸ ϕιλούμενον PCBL // [ὅ] // 2 τῷ] καὶ PCBL // 4 ἄλλο]
PCBL // 11 μηδὲ] μὴ δὲ PCBL // 12 [οὐ] // 16 〈εἶναι〉 // 19 [ϕίλοι] // 35 ἔδει]

ἄλλῳ PCBL // 5 δεῖ] δὴ P1CBL // 6 εἰ γὰρ] τί γὰρ PCL, τὶ γὰρ B // 8 ἣν] ᾗ
δεῖ PCBL // 36 ϕίλου] ϕίλοι P1CBL // 1238a3 δεῖ] εἰ PCBL // 4 εἰ ὁ] εἶεν PCBL
// 7 [τῷ] // 9 ϕίλον] ϕίλος PCBL // κωλύει] κωλύειν P1CBL // 14 ὅ τε] ὅτι
PCBL // 16 δῆλον ὅτι] δηλονότι PCBL // 22 ταχύ] ταχύς PCBL // 23 οἴνοις]
A ppe n d i x 231
ὄνοις P1CBL // 24 γλυκὺ deest in PCBL // 29 〈οὐ〉 // 31 ἡ2] αἱ P1CBL // 35
37 ϕιλῳδὸς] ϕειδωλὸς PCBL // 1238b1 ᾗ] ἢ PCBL // 6 ᾗ] ἢ PCBL // 7 〈καὶ〉 //

συντέτηκεν] συντέκεν PCBL // ἡδονῇ] ἡδονή P1CBL // 36 οὐχ] καὶ PCBL //
PCBL // 26 [τῷ] // 27 ἀντιϕιλεῖ] ἀντιϕιλεῖσθαι P1CBL // 32 〈οἱ〉 // εἰσιν]

12 εἶεν] εἰσιν PCBL // ἢ ᾗ] ἢ εἰ P1CBL // 22 διαϕοραὶ εἰσίν] διαϕοραί εἰσιν
ἐστιν PCBL // 36 αὐτοῖς] τῆς PCBL // 1239a11 ἄξιον] ἀξιοῦν PCBL // 14
〈τὸ〉 // 21 διὰ τί] διατί PCL, διατὶ B // 23 ὁ] οὐ P1CBL // 31 ἐνεργοῦντι]

οὐδὲν ἰσχύει] οὐδ’ ἐν ἰσχύι PCB, οὐδ’ ἐνἰσχύι L // ξύλου] ξύλῳ PCBL // 16
ἐνεργοῦντα P1CL, deest in B // τὸ μὲν γὰρ ϕιλεῖσθαι συμβεβηκός] τὸ μὲν

γὰρ ϕιλ συμβεβηκός P1, τὸ μὲν γὰρ ϕιλεῖν συμβεβηκός CL, συμβεβηκός
γὰρ τὸ ϕιλεῖν B // 34 δέ] δ’ PCBL // 35–6 ἐν ταῖς ὑποβολαῖς] ἐν ταῖς
ὑπερβολαῖς PCL, desunt in B // 38 τι] τί PCL, τὶ B // 1239b18 ταὔθ’ ] ταῦτ’ P1,
οὕτω] διὸ οὐ τὸ PCB, διὸ οὐ τῷ L // 36 〈ὄτι〉 // 1240a10 κρίνουσι] κινοῦσι

ταῦθ’ CBLP2 // [δὲ] // 22 [Κακὸς κακῷ δὲ συντέτηκεν ἡδονῇ] // 31 διὰ τὸ
PCBL // 15 δι’ ὃ] δι’ ἃ PCBL // 〈ὡς〉 // 20 διῃρημένοις] διῃρημένως PCBL //

πως bis] πῶς bis PCBL // 22 αὑτὸν] αὐτὸν PCBL // [ὡς] // 31 οἱ1] ὁ P1CBL //
// 〈ὅτι〉 // 〈39 τὸ γὰρ〉 // 1240b3 [μὴ] // ψυχὴν] ϕιλίαν PCBL // 10 μηδὲ] μὴ

33 τὸ] τῷ PCBL // [ἀγαπᾶν θήσομεν] // 36 γε] τε PCBL // 38 εἴτε] ὅτι PCBL
δὲ PCBL // 18 ὅτι γάρ πῃ] ὅτι γὰρ πῇ PCBL // ὅμοιος] ὅμοιοι PCBL // 20 ὁ
αὐτοῖς PCBL // 31 〈οὔ〉 // 1241a18 οὐδὲ] οὔτε PCBL // 20 οὐδ’ εἰ] οὐ δεῖ P1CBL
δ’ ] οὐδ’ PCBL // 22 μεταμελητικὸς] μεταληπτικὸς P1CBL // 26 αὑτοῖς]
// ὁμονοεῖ] ὁμονοεῖν P1CBL // 22 ταὐτὰ] ταῦτα PCBL // 32 τοῦ τὸν] τοῦτον

PCBL // 35 διὰ τί] διατί PCBL // ϕιλοῦσιν] ϕιλοῦντες P1CBL // 36 εὖ τοὺς]
αὐτοὺς PL, αὑτοὺς CB // 38–9 τῷ μὲν γὰρ ὀϕείλεται] τὸ μὲν γὰρ
ὠϕελεῖται P1CBL // 1241b1 δὲ] δὴ PCBL // 4–5 [καὶ αἱ μητέρες τῶν
πατέρων] // 6 αὑτῶν] αὐτῶν PCBL // 8 αὑτῶν] αὐτῶν PCBL // 10 αὑτὸν]
25 ὀργέων] ὀργίων PCBL // [ἔτι πολιτεῖαι] // 28 [τῶν] // 34 〈πολιτικὴ〉

αὐτὸν PCBL // 12 τι] τί PCBL // 13 τι] τί PCL; τὶ B // 19 [οὐδέν] // 24 [ἢ] //
// 36 〈ἡ〉 // 1242a15 αὐτὸ τὸ] τοῦτο PCBL // 22 ὁ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος οὐ μόνον

πολιτικὸν] ὁ γὰρ ἀνθρώπου μόνον οὐ πολιτικὸς PCBL // 24 συνδυάζεται]
συνδοιάζεται PCBL // 25 ἄλλως δὲ διὰ βίου μοναυλικόν] ἀλλ’ αἱ διὰ δύμον
αὐλικόν P1CBL // 26 συγγένεια ἐστίν] συγγένειά ἐστι(ν) PCBL // 28 ἥπερ]
ἤπερ PCBL // 37 ἀπεδείχθην] ἀπεδείχθη PCBL // πατὴρ] πατρὸς PCBL //
αὑτὸς] αὐτὸς PCBL // 1242b6 ἀμϕισβητήσεων] ἀμϕισβητησάντων PCBL //
7 τῇ] τῷ PCBL // 10 αὑτοῦ] αὐτοῦ PCBL // διακείμενος] διακείμενον PCBL
// 14 εἰσήνεγκαν] εἰσήνεγκεν PCBL // 24 γιγνώσκουσιν] γινώσκουσιν PCBL
// 25 Μεγαρῆας] μεγαρεῖς PCBL // 35 αὑτοῖς] αὐτοῖς PCBL // 1243a4 ἡδεῖς]
ἡμεῖς P1CBL // 9 δίκας] δὴ καὶ P1CBL // 15 τὸ1] τὸν PCBL // 16 ἦν] ἢ PCBL //
17 θεά σμικρὸν] θεὸς μικρὸν PCBL // 18 δὲ2] γὰρ PCBL // 19 παιδιὰν]
παιδείαν PCBL // 22 τι] τί PCL, τὶ B // 23 αὑτῷ] αὐτῷ PCBL // 24 αὑτῷ]
232 A ppe n d i x
αὐτῷ PCBL // μεταλαμβαν〈όντ〉ων [καὶ] // 32 ἐστι] ἐστὶ L (deest in PCB) //

33 διότι] διατί L (deest in PCB) // 34 ἄρχονται] ἔρχονται PCBL // 1243b1 τὴν
καλλίω ϕιλίαν] τῇ καλλίω ϕιλίᾳ P1CBL // 10 ἀποδῴη] ἀποδῶ ἢ PCBL // 15
χαλεπὸν γὰρ] γὰρ χαλεπὸν PCBL // 20 τί ἀντὶ τίνος] παντί τινος P1L, παντὶ
// 29 ἐνταῦθα] ἐνταῦθ’ PCBL // τῷ] τὸ PCBL // 34 τί 〈ἡ〉 σοϕία] τῇ σοϕίᾳ

τινός CB // 25 ὡμίλει] ὁμιλεῖ PCBL // ὁ δ’ ] ὅδ’ P1CBL // 27 ὅμως] ὅπως PCBL
PCBL // τὸν πλοῦτον] τὸ πλούσιον PCBL // 35 〈τὸ〉 // ἥμισυ] ἡμῖν PCBL //

38 ϕῇ ὁ μὲν] ϕήσωμεν PCBL // 38 ἀλλ’ ὡς] ἄλλως PCBL // 1244a3 ἀντιποιεῖν
deest in B // λόγους] λόγου PCBL // 12 ἐκεῖνος] ἐκείνοις PCBL // ἔργον 〈ὃς〉]

τι] ἀντιποιοῦντι PCBL // [καὶ] // 9 ὁ δὲ] διὸ PCBL // 11 λόγων] λόγον PCL,
ἔργα PCBL // 16 οὐκ εἰ] οὐχὶ P1CBL // 17 συζῆν2] εὖ ζῆν P1CBL // 18 ἀλλ’ ὁ]
ἀλλὰ PCBL // οἳ] οἱ PCBL // 19 [τούτῳ] (τούτο B1) // οὐδενός] οὐδ’ PCBL //
εἰσιν] εἰσὶν PCBL // 23 τῷ ὁποιῷ δή] τῷ ὁποῖος δεῖ PCBL // 33 τὸν ἔχοντα]
τὰ ἔχοντα PCBL // ϕιλεῖν] ϕιλεῖ PCBL // 35 δὴ ἀγανακτεῖ] δεῖ ἀγανακτεῖν
εἰ2] ἢ PCBL // 〈ὁ〉 // 5 καὶ] εἰ PCBL // 7 εὐϕρανούντων] εὖ ϕρονούντων PCBL

P1CBL // 36 οἱ δ’ ] ὅδ’ vel ὅ δ’ P1CB1L // 1244b4 ἢ οὔ] ἢ ὁ PCL (desunt in B) //
// 10 οὗ γε μηθὲν ἐνδεής ποτε] οὔτε μηθὲν δεσπότου PCBL // 13 ἀεὶ] δεῖ

PCBL // 16 ὁ] οὐ PCBL // 20 ποιήσοντας] ποιήσαντας PCBL // ἀμείνω]
διατιθέναι PCBL // 30 〈αὐτὸν〉 // 30–2 [ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ... μὴ λανθάνειν] //

ἀμείνων P1CBL // 21 μάλιστά τε] τὲ μάλιστα P1CBL // 29 δεῖ τιθέναι]
1245a3 αἰσθητόν] αἱρετὸν P1CBL // 3 τῷ] τὸ PCBL // 4 αὑτοῦ] αὐτοῦ PCBL

// 5 αὑτὸν] αὐτὸν PCBL // 12 πως] πῶς PCBL // 13 κοινῶν] κοινωνῶν PCBL
// 15 μὴν] μὴ PCBL // 17 οἷόν τε] οἴονται PCBL // 18 μανθάνων] μανθάνειν
P1CBL // ὁ] οὐ PCBL // 21 ἑκάστῳ] ἔκαστον PCBL // 23 τὸ ἅμα δεῖν] τολμᾶ
δὴ PCBL // 24 δέον] δεῖ PCBL // 26 συζῆν] εῦ ζῆν PCBL // 35 γε] τε PCBL //
κοινωνίαν P1CBL // 4 γε] τε PCBL // 6 〈γὰρ οὐχ〉 // 15 ἠξίου] ἀξίου PCBL //

37 αὑτοῦ] αὐτοῦ PCBL // 1245b3 δ’ αὐτὸν] δυνατὸν P1CBL // 4 ἡ κοινωνία] ἢ
23 πλείστοις] πλείστους P1CBL // 25 δεῖ] ἀεὶ PCBL // 28 τὸ] τῷ PCBL // 30

ἄλλο] ἀλλ’ PCBL // 39 αὑτοῦ] αὐτοῦ PCBL // 40 αὑτῶν] αὐτῶν PCBL //
1246a1 [καὶ] // 2 μόνοι] μόνον P1CBL // 4 αἱρετώτερόν] αἱρετόν PCBL // 5
πόσον] ποσὸν P1CBL // 6 καὶ οἴονται] καὶ οἷον καὶ PCBL // 7 ταὐτὰ] ταῦτα
PL, ταῦτ’ CB // 8 αὖ] ἂν PCBL // 9 ὁμολογοῦσιν] ὁμολογῶσιν PCBL // 12
ἀπεῖναι] εἶναι P1CBL // 13 τὸ δὲ] τὸν δὲ PCBL
1246a28 〈ᾗ〉 // ἢ αὖ] ἡδὺ PCBL // 29 εἰ] ἢ PCBL // 31 ἐστιν] ὅτι PCBL // 36
EUDEMIAN ETHICS VIII/V
ὀρχηστρίδες] ὀρχηστρίαδες PCBL // εἰ δὴ] εἴδη PCB, ἤδη L // 36 ἀρεταὶ]

ἄρισται PCBL // 38 ἀδικήσει] εἰ δίκης εἰ PCL (deest in B) // 1246b6 ἀλλ’ ἔτι
εἰ] ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ PCBL // 8 ταὐτὰ] ταῦτα PCBL // 11 στροϕήν] τροϕήν PCBL //
A ppe n d i x 233
15 εἰ δή] ἤδη PCB1L // 16–17 τἀναντία. ἢ ἔστι] τἀναντία η σϕι PC, inter
τἀναντία et σϕι habet spatium vacuum trium fere litterarum L (desunt in B) //
// 18–19 τ’ οὐ] τὸ PCBL // 21 〈ἐνούσης〉 // ἐν] μὲν PCBL // ἀλόγῳ] λόγῳ

17 δῆλον ὅτι] δηλονότι PCL (deest in B) // 18 ἄγνοια] ἄνοια PCL (deest in B)
PCBL // 23 ἀγνοίας] ἀνοίας PCBL // ϕρονίμως] ϕρονίμῳ PCBL // 25
// 33 〈ἃ〉 // 35 αἱ ἀλόγου] αἱ ἄλλου PCBL // 36 Σωκρατικόν] σῶμα

ἀκολασίαν] κὁλασιν ἂν PCBL // 26 [ἡ] // 30–1 ἀλλ’ οὖν οὐ] ἀλλ’ οὖν ὁ PCBL
κρατητικόν PCBL // 1247a1 τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ] τῆς ἐπιστήμης PCBL // 5 ἔτι] εἰ

PCBL // 7 οὐ τῷ] οὕτω PCBL // 14 διὰ τί] διατί PCL, διατὶ B // πράττει]
πράττοι PCBL // οἱ] οἵ PCBL // διὰ τί] διατί PCL, διατὶ B // 15 ϕανεροὶ]
25 [δὲ] // δι’ αὑτό] δι’ αὐτό PCBL // 33 εἴη] εἶναι PCBL // 34 〈ὅτι〉 // 35 [ὁ] //
ϕανερὸν PCBL // 18 πλέων] πλέον PCBL // 20 [ὅτι] // ἐν οἷς] ἐνίοις PCBL //
γλαυκὸς] γλαῦκος PCBL // 1247b1 εὐτυχεῖς] τύχης PCBL // 1247b2 οὐκ] ἢ

PCBL // 3 οὐκ αἰτία] οὐκέτι PCLB2, οὐκ ἔτι B1 // 8 ἀνθρωπίνῳ] ἀνθρώπῳ
P1CB1L // 9 ἐπεὶ δὲ] ἐπειδὴ PCBL // 10 διὰ τί] διατί PC, διατὶ L (deest in B)
// 10–11 αὐτὸ κατορθώσαιεν] ἀποκατορθώσαι P1CL (deest in B) // 11 τοῦ
αἴτιον C (desunt in B) // 13 〈ἀπ’〉 // ὃ] τὸ PCBL // 14 ἐμπειρίαν] ἀπειρίαν

γὰρ αὐτοῦ τὸ αὐτὸ αἴτιον] τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ τοῦτ’ αἴτιον PL, τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ τοῦτο
PCBL // 15 εὐτυχεῖν] εὐτυχεῖς PCBL // 17 τοιοσδὶ] τοῖς δεῖ PCL (deest in B)
ᾠδικοὶ] ἄδικοι PCBL // εὖ] οὐ PCBL // 24 〈ᾗ〉 // 25 καὶ τότε] καὶ πότε PCB,
// 18 εἴη] εἶεν PCL (deest in B) // μακαρίαν] μακρὰν PCL (deest in B) // 23
ἔσονται PCBL // οὐ] οἱ PCBL // 31 〈ἐν οἷς〉 // 32 κατορθοῦντες] κατορθοῦνται

ποτὲ L // 26 κατορθώσουσι] κατορθοῦσι PCL, κατορθοῦσιν B // 27 ᾄσονται]
PCB, κατορθοῦν τὲ L // [καὶ] // 33 ἄλλο] ἂν PCBL // 34 〈ἢ〉 // 37 ὀρθὸς]

ὀρθῶς PCBL // 38 〈ἐπιθυμία〉 // ἔσωσεν] ἔξωσεν PCBL // 1248a1 〈ἢ〉 // καὶ
τύχη διττὴ post 2 αἱ εὐτυχίαι transferenda // 7 〈γ’〉 // 〈αἴτιον〉 // 8 οὗ γε]
οὔτε PCBL // 10 παρὰ λόγον] παράλογον PCBL // 13 〈τὸ〉 // 21 πρὸ τοῦ]
πρότερον PCBL // 22 νοῦς] συνοῦσα PCBL // 24 ἢ] εἰ PCBL // 25 [τὸ] // 27
καὶ πᾶν ἐκεῖ κινεῖ] καὶ πᾶν ἐκείνῳ PCBL // 30 εἴη ποτε] εἴποι PCBL // 31
ὃ] οἱ PCBL // 32 κατορθοῦσιν] κατορθοῦν PCBL // 34 βουλεύσεως]
βουλήσεως PCBL // 34–5 καὶ ἐνθουσιάζουσι] καὶ ἐνθουσιασμόι PCL (deest
in B) // 36 ἐπιτυγχάνουσι] ἀποτυγχάνουσι PCL, ἀποτυγχάνουσιν B // τοῦ
τῶν] τούτων PCBL // 39 [τε] // (ἀν)τὶ τοῦ desunt in PCBL // 41 οὕτως]
οὗτος PCBL // 1248b1 τοῦ λόγου] τοὺς λόγους PCBL // 3 ὁρωμένοις]
εἰρημένοις PCBL // 6 κατορθωτικός] διορθωτικός PCBL // 14 οὐδὲ] οὐδὲν
PCBL // 20 αὑτὰ] αὐτὰ PCBL // 21 ἀϕ’ ὧν] ἐϕ’ ὧν PCBL // 23 αἱ2] οἱ PCBL //
32 οὐδὲν ὀνήσεται] οὐδ’ ὀνήσειε PCBL // 36 δι’ αὐτὰ] δ’ αὐτὰ L (desunt in
PCBL // 〈ὅσοις δ’ ὑπάρχει δι’αὕτα〉 // 7 καλὸν] καλὰ PCBL // ᾖ] ἢ PCBL // 10

PCB) // 1249a1 ἀγαθοὶ] ἄγριοι PCBL // 2 δὲ] γὰρ PCBL // 3 ὑπάρχει] ὑπάρχειν
234 A ppe n d i x
τούτῳ] πλούτῳ PCBL // 13 καλῷ κἀγαθῷ] ἀγαθῷ PCBL // 19 [καὶ] // 20 〈ὁ〉

// 25 〈εἰ〉 // 1249b2 [περὶ] // 5 εἴπειεν] εἴποιεν PCBL // 8 καὶ] κατὰ PCBL // 11
[καὶ2] // 12 ἑαυτοῦ] ἑαυτῶν PCBL // 16 διττὸν δὲ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, διώρισται δ’ ἐν
ἄλλοις post 17 οὐθενὸς δεῖται transferenda // 23 ἡ ψυχή] τῇ ψυχῇ PCBL // 24
[τῆς ψυχῆς] // ἂν] τὰ PCBL // 25 ᾗ] ἢ PCBL
(2) Readings shared by PCB and not in L

or in L and not in PCB
EUDEMIAN ETHICS I
1214a5 τις] τίς L // 20 ϕαύλως] ϕαύλοις L // 21 χρηστῶς] χρηστοῖς L // 24
τὴν deest in L // 1214b21 ὑπάρξειεν] ὑπάρξαιεν L // 22 ἑκάστην] ἑκάστων L //
24 περιπάτων] περὶ πάντων P1CB // 28 νομίζουσιν] νομίζουσι L //1215a4
ἀλλὰ πάθους] ἀλλὰπαθους L // 13 ἐστιν] ἐστι L // 1215b8 ὧν] ὃν L // ἄτοπος]
ἄτοπον L // 15 περὶ] παρὰ L // 31 τῆς deest in L // 1216a2 οὐδὲ] οὐ L // 4
ἀνέγερτον] ἀνέργετον L // 5 ὁποσωνοῦν] ὁποσονοῦν L // 17 τὸν] τὸ L // 31
ποία] ποίά L // 1216b40 ϕιλόσοϕον] ϕίλοσοϕον L // 1217a19 δὲ] καὶ L // 41
ἀνθρώπῳ πρακτῶν] ἀνθρωποπρακτῶν L // 1217b13 ἔχειν] ἔχει L // 14
ὥστ’ ] ὥστε L // 17 τῆς deest in L // 21 ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν bis L // 34 παρὰ] περὶ
L // 1218a1 σχολῇ] σχολῆς L // 1218a16 δεικνύουσι] δείκνυσι L // 24 ταῦτα]
αὐτὰ L // 26 λέγεται] λέγονται L // 29 ἀλόγως] ἀλόγοις L // 30 τό τε] τότε
PCB // 32 ὄψεως] ὄντως L // 1218b1 ὑπάρξαι] ὑπάρξας L // 12 τοῦτ’ ] τούτων L
// 13 ἀνθρώπῳ πρακτῶν] ἀνθρωποπρακτῶν L // 15 γὰρ] δὲ L // τοιαῦτ’
(τοιαῦτα B)] τοιαύτας L // 21 ὑγιεινὸν] ὑγιαίνειν L // 23 δείκνυσιν οὐθεὶς]
δεικνύουσιν οὔθ’ L // ὑγίεια] ἡ ὑγίεια L
EUDEMIAN ETHICS II
1218b32 τὰ ἀγαθὰ] τἀγαθὰ L // 35 ὧν ἢ ἔνια] ὧν ἔνια L // 1219a1 ἐστί ] ἔστι
L // 3 γὰρ deest in L // 5 καὶ πλοίου] καὶ τοῦ πλοίου L // 11 ὑπέκειτο]
ὑπέκειται L // 24–5 ἔτι ἔστω] ὅτι ἔστω L // 31 ἢ] ἡ L // 32 ἢ] ἡ L // 34 ἡ] ἢ L
// 1219b19 ἥμισυν] ἥμισυ L // 31 μετέχειν] μετέχει PCB // 32–3 εἰ δέ τι
ἐστὶν] εἰ δ’ ἔστιν PCB // 1220a11 δὲ deest in PCB // 15 μόρια] μοῖρα L // 21
τῶν deest in L // 36 καὶ2 deest in PCB // 40 δ’ ἐστὶ] δέ ἐστι L // 1220b3 ὃ] καὶ
PCB // ἐν τοῖς ἀψύχοις] ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς L // 7 ἔσται] ἔστι PCB // 9 ταῦτα
λέγονται] λέγονται ταῦτα L // 1221a18 ὁ] ὃ PCB1 // 18 ὅτ’ οὐ] ὅτου L //
1221b14 πλήκτης δὲ . . . 15 ἀπὸ τῆς ὀργῆς desunt in PCB // 16 τῷ] τὸ L //
16–17 πρὸς ὁποτέρας] πρόσω ποτέρας P1CB // 19 πῶς λαμβάνειν]
προσλαμβάνειν PCB // 29 λόγον] λόγου L // 32 τῆς deest in L // 39 πᾶσα γὰρ
ψυχὴ PCB, πάσα γὰρ ψυχῆς L1 // 40 πέϕυκε . . . βελτίων desunt in PCB //
1222a2 εἶναι ϕαμὲν] ϕαμὲν εἶναι L // 3–4 ἀπαθείας καὶ ἠρεμίας] ἀπάθειαν
A ppe n d i x 235
καὶ ἠρεμίαν L // 34 ἐναντίος] ἐναντίως L // 38 μὲν deest in PCB // 1222b2 μὴ

deest in L // 11 εἰσί] εἰσίν PCB // 32 ἔχοντος] ἔχων τὸ PCB2; ἔχει τὸ B1 // 34
ὀρθὰς] ὀρθὰ PCB // 39–40 οὔτε λέγειν desunt in PCB // 1223a4 τῶν τοιούτων
desunt in L // αὐτοί] αὐταί PCB // 7 κύριός ἐστι] κύριος ἐστὶ L // 22 τί τὸ2
desunt in L // 24 καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον desunt in PCB // 25 δὴ] δὲ PCB // 27 παρὰ]
περὶ PCB // 34–5 τὸ δὲ παρὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν πᾶν λυπηρόν desunt in PCB //
1223b5–6 βουλόμενος πράττει desunt in P1CB // 11 ἐγκρατὴς] ἀκρατὴς
P1CB // 20 βίαιος] βίαιον L // 30 τοῦτ’ ] τοῦτο L // 35 γένηται] γίνηται PCB
// 1224a4–5 προαιρεῖται δ’ οὐδεὶς οὐδὲν ἐξαίϕνης desunt in PC1B // 8
διανοούμενόν πως] διανοούμενον πῶς L // 12–13 ἀκούσιον καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον
πᾶν βίαιον desunt in PC1B // 32 πράττοντα] πράττοντι P1C, πράττοντ B //
33 χαίρων δέ desunt in PC1B // 35 τ’ deest in PCB // 37 τὴν deest in L // 40 οὐ2
deest in P1C1B // 1224a40–1224b2 ἡ δὲ πειθὼ . . . ἀλλ’ ἑκών desunt in PCB //
1224b6 τις] τι L // 7 τῷ] αὐτῷ L // προσκείμενον] προκείμενον L // 9–10
ἀκρατεῖ καὶ ἐγκρατεῖ] ἐγκρατεῖ καὶ ἀκρατεῖ L // 18 ἀπ’ deest in PCB // 24
ἄκοντά ποτε] ἄκοντα ποτὲ L // 28 ἀκρατοῦς] ἀκρατῶς L1 // ἐγκρατοῦς]
ἐγκρατῶς L1 // 1225a3 δὲ deest in PCB // 11 ἃ μὴ βούλεται ἑκὼν πράττει
desunt in PC1B // 14 ὁ] οὐ L // 18–19 ἕνεκ’ ἂν κακοῦ PC1B, ἕνεκ’ ἂν μείζονος
κακοῦ L // 20 τιθέασι] τιθέασιν PCB // 22 ἔχομεν deest in PC1B // 25
ἀνάγεται] ἀναγάγεται L // 1225b2 ἐναντία] ἐναντίον PCB // 5 Πελιάδες]
πολιάδες PCB // 6 δ’ deest in PCB // 10–11 τοῦτ’ ἔστιν] τουτέστιν PCB // 20
λέγωμεν] λέγομεν L // 27 γὰρ deest in L // 39 ἀνάγκη] ἀνάγκη μὲν PCB //
1226a2 τι1 deest in PCB // 6 τι deest in PCB // ἢ ἀπρακτεῖν desunt in PCB // 10
ἕνεκεν] ἕνεκα L // 12 τε] τὲ L // 19 οὖν deest in PCB // 20 ἡ] ἢ L // 29 καὶ τὸ
βουλεύσασθαι] συμβουλεύσασθαι PCB // 32 τὸ] τὰ L // ἀλλ’ deest in PCB //
33 ᾗ deest in L // 34 προαιρετὰ] προαιρετικὰ PCB // 1226b2 προαίρεσις deest
in PCB; προαίρεσίς ἐστιν L // 8 πρὸς ἑτέρου τοῦτο PCB, πρὸς ἑτέρον L // 13
τοῦτο πάντες] πάντως τοῦτο L //14 μὴ deest in P1CB // 16 βουλεύεται]
βούλεται L // 21 βουλεύσασθαι] βουλεύεσθαι L // 29 τοῦ] του L // 33 αὑτὸν]
αὐτὸν L // 1227a13–14 ἢ μὴ πολεμῶσιν desunt in PCB // 15 δι’ ὅ] διὸ PB, διό
C, δι’ οὗ L // 27 ἐπιστήμης] ἐστήμης L1 // 41–2 οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει . . . καὶ τὸ
λυπηρὸν desunt in PCB // 42 ἄμεινον] καὶ ἄμεινον L // 1227b7 τίς deest in L
// 8 καὶ2 deest in PCB // 27–8 ἀλλ’ εἰ περιπατεῖν ἢ μή desunt in PCB // 29
παλαῖσαι] παλαίσαι L // 37 δ’ ἐστὶ] δέ ἐστι L // 1228a2 αἰτία deest in PCB //
2–3 διὰ τοῦτο] διατοῦτο L // 11 ἀκούσια] ἑκούσια L1 // ψέγεται] ψεκτά L //
τὰ ἀγαθὰ] τἀγαθὰ L // 12 ἐπαινεῖται] ἐπαινετά L // 16 μὴ deest in L // 18
ποῖός τις] ὁ ποῖός τις L
EUDEMIAN ETHICS III

1228a24 αἱ deest in PCB // 32 οὗτος] ὁ τοιοῦτος PCB // 1228b1 πλὴν] πλὴν ὡς
PCB // 1228b6 καὶ2 deest in L // 10 πρῶτον deest in PCB //12 αὑτῷ] αὐτῷ L //
236 A ppe n d i x
αὐτῷ] αὑτῷ PC1B // 13 πολλὰ deest in L // 14 ἰσχυρὸς] εἴη ἂν ἰσχυρὸς L // 19

τὸ ἀγαθόν] τἀγαθόν L // 20 καὶ1 deest in L // 26 ϕοβερὰ deest in L // 28 ἃ ἔστι]
ἅ ἐστι PCB // 1229a3 αἱρεῖσθαι] ἀναιρεῖσθαι L // 16 τὰς] τοὺς L // 18
ϕερόμενα] ϕοβερά L // 21 εὐέλπιδας] ἐλπίδας PCB // 40 οἱ deest in L // 1229b1
οἱ deest in L // 3 καὶ δὴ καὶ] καὶ δὴ L // 15 δὴ ὅτι] διότι L // 25 σϕόδρα]
σϕοδρὰ L (deest in B) // 26 σϕόδρα] σϕοδρὰ L (deest in B) // δ’ ] δὲ L (deest in
B) // 1230a9 εἶναι τὴν ἀνδρεῖαν PC, τὴν ἀνδρείαν εἶναι L (desunt in B) // 29 δὲ
πῶς] δέ πως PC (desunt in B) // 32 ἀνδρεία] ἀνδρεῖα PCB // 1230b4 δέ deest in L
// 8 διὰ κολάσεως] δι’ ἀκολασίας PCB // 12 πρότερον] πότερον PCB // 23
πάντα] ἅπαντα L // 33 ἀϕροδισιάζειν] ἀϕροδιάζειν L // 35 κηλούμενοι]
καλούμενοι P1CB // 36 Σειρῆσιν] σηρίσιν L // 37 θηρία deest in CB, videtur
defuisse in P1 // μόνον] μόνα L // 39 αἰσθητῶν] αἰσθήσεων L // 1231a20–1
ὀψοϕαγία καὶ λαγνεία] λαγνεία καὶ ὀψοϕαγία PCB // 29 ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ] ἐπι το
πολὺ L // 31 τε] τὲ L // 32 οὐ] καὶ L // 33–4 καὶ λυπεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ μὴ
τυγχάνοντες desunt in PC (et in B) // 1231b3 τοῦ γένους] τὸ γένος L // 5–6 καὶ
χαλεπότητος desunt in PCB // 6 τὸν] τὸ L // 11 μηδ’ ] μὴ δ’ L // 20 δῆλον ὅτι]
δηλονότι L // 23 οἷς2] οἷς οὐ PCB // 25 ἂν deest in L // 26 τοῦ2 deest in L // 31
ἄσωτος] ἄσωματος L // 37 ἀσωτίας] ἀσωτείας PCB // 1232a6 ἂν εἴη] εἴη ἂν L
// 12 κίμβιξ] κίβιξ PCB // 13 μὴ deest in PCB // 14 κίμβιξ] κίβιξ PCB // 16
λαϕύκτης] ϕυλάκτης L // 35 ἡ περὶ ἕκαστον] ἡ περὶ τὰ ἕκαστον L // 1232b4–5
δοκεῖ τοῦτο] τοῦτο δοκεῖ L // 14 χαίρειν] χαίρει PCB // 24 ἐστίν] ἐστιν L // 28
δ’ ἐστὶν] δέ ἐστιν L // 29 δ’ 2 deest in PCB // 30 κατ’ ] κατὰ L // 31 αὑτούς] αὐτοὺς
L // 32 δ’ deest in PCB // 37 ἀξιοίη] ἀξιῴη L // 1233a1 ἐνταῦθα] ἐνταῦθ’ L // 2 ὢν
ἄξιος] ἄξιος ὢν L // 3 τοιοῦτός ἐστιν] τοιοῦτος ἐστὶν PCB // 9 τὸ] τῷ L // 19
μεγάλων2] μεγάλῳ L1 // 23 γένοιτ’ ] γένοιτο L // 26 ἢ1] εἰ PCB // 27 ἐλαττόνων
ἔτι] ἔτι ἐλαττόνων L // 33 ἔστιν] ἔστι L // 37 τῇ deest in PCB // 1233b18 μὲν] μὲν
γὰρ L // 19 παθητικαί ] παθηματικαί PCB // 36 ἀρεσκείας] ἀρεσκίας PCB // 39
δ’ ] δὲ PCB // 1234a6 περὶ] παρὰ L // 10 προσίεται] προσίεσθαι L (deest in B) //
11 τὸν deest in L // 32 πρὸς ἄλλον γὰρ] πρὸς γὰρ ἄλλον L // 1234b8 καθ’ ] κατὰ
L // 9 κατ’ ] κατὰ L // 11 ἐναντιώτερον] ἐναντιώτατον L // 12 ἐναντίον]
ἐναντιώτερον L // 13 τὸ θράσος πρὸς τὸ θάρσος] τὸ θάρσος πρὸς τὸ θράσος L
// 16 περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης ἤδη λέξεται post σχεδόν habet L

1234b33 τὸν ϕίλον] καὶ τὸν ϕίλον B; τὸν ϕίλον εἶναι L // 1235a13 οὖν deest
in PCB // τὸ2] τὸν L // 17 μὲν] μὲν οὖν PCB // 17 πάντων] πάντων γὰρ PCB //
18 εἰς τοὐναντίον] ἐκ τοὐναντίον P1CB1 // ὅμοιον ἐχθρὸν] ὅμοιον ἔχει
ἐχθρὸν L // 23 ἐχθρᾶς] ἔχθρας L // θ’ ] τε PCB; τὲ L // ἡμέρας] ἡμέρα L // 25
ϕίλα] ϕἰλοι L // 31 ἐγγυτέρω] ἐγγυτέραι L // 1235b11 ἀτυχίαις] ἀποχίαις
P1CB // 14 δὴ] δὲ L // 33 αὐτὰ] αὐτῷ PCB // μὲν deest in L // 35 οὔ deest in PCB
A ppe n d i x 237
// ϕαρμακείας] ϕαρμακίας PCB // 37 καὶ deest in PCB // 1236a13 τὸν] τὸ

PCB // 17 εἴδη deest in P1CB // 26 ψεῦδος] ψευδές PCB // 32 ἤδη] εἴδη PCB //
35 χρήσιμοι] χρήσιμον PCB // 36 Γλαῦκ’ ] γαῦκ’ PCB // 38 Ἀθηναῖοι]
ἀληθῆναι PCB, ἀθῆναι L// 1236b22 ἐστι] ἔστι PCB // 23 πάσας] πᾶσαι PCB
// 38 αὐτῷ] αὑτῷ PCB // 39 ἔστιν] ἐστὶν L // 1237a5–6 ἀϕυὴς εὐϕυῶς PCB,
ἀϕυὴς εὐϕυοῦς L // 6 καὶ ἀνάγκη] ἀνάγκη καὶ PCB, ἀνάγκη L // 12 τῳδὶ] τῷ
δι’ PCB // 13 ἕξεων] ὀξέων P1CB // 21 πότερον] καὶ πότερον L // 25 οὕτω]
οὕτως PCB // 26 ἀναγνωρίσεις] γνωρίσεις PCB // 30 τελεωθέντα P1CB,
τελειωθέντα L // 31 ἀντιπροαίρεσις] ἀντὶ προαιρέσεως L // 32 ἡ2 deest in L
// 1237b2 ἢ] ᾗ L // 16 οὐδ’ ] οὐκ PCB // 19 οὐ deest in PCB // 21 εἰ deest in
P1CB // 26 οὐδ’ ἐν] οὐδὲν P1CB // 29 εὐεξαπατητότεροί εἰσιν] εὐεξαπατη
τότεροι εἰσὶν L // 30 τὰ] τοῦ P1CB1 // 31 ὥστ’ ] ὥστε L // 34 γίγνεται]
γίνεται L // 37 δοκεῖ] δοκεῖν P1CB // 37 τοῦ νοῦν ἔχοντος] τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα
PC, τόν . . . νοῦν ἔχοντα B // 1238a3 ἁλῶν] ἄλλων P1CB // 9 οἷόν τε] οἴονται
PCB // 18 αἱ add. L // 20 ὄντως] οὕτως PCB // τυχόν] τυχών P1CB, ἀτυχ L //
27 ὁμολογήσαιεν] ὁμολογήσειε P1CB // 28 πόματος] πώματος PCB1 // 36 ᾗ]
οἱ PCB, ἢ L // μὴ δι’ ἕτεροι PCB, μηδ’ ἕτεροι L // 38 ἀλλήλοις] ἀλλήλους L //
1238b2 ϕαύλῳ] ϕαύλων PCB, ϕαῦλον L // 8 πιεῖν] ποιεῖν P1CB1 // 12
σπουδαίῳ] σπουδαῖοι L // 16 εἰσὶν ἀρετῆς] ἀρετῆς εἰσιν L // 24 ἡ δὲ] ἢ PCB
// 37 ἐρώμενος] ἐρρωμένος PCB2, ἐρωμένος B1 // 1239a3 ἴσον] ἶσον PCB //
17–18 οὐδ’ αὐτοὶ ἐπιζητοῦσιν ὡς] οὐδ’ αὐτὸ ὡς ἐπιζητοῦσι PCB // 19 δὴ] δὲ
L // 1239b8 ὑπὸ] ἀπό L (deest in B) // 15 οὐ] οἱ P1CB // 16 βέβαιος] βεβαία L
// οὕτω] οὕτως PCB // 19 ἕξεις] αἱ ἕξεις PCB // 21 τοὺς ϕαύλους] τοῖς
ϕαύλοις PCB // 31 τὸ PCB, τῷ L // γίνεσθαι] γένεσθαι L // 38 πᾶσι] πᾶσαν
P1CB1 // 1240a3 οὖν] γὰρ PCB // 11 τὰ] τὸ PCB // 15 οὕτως] οὗτος L // 16
εἴρηται πῶς PCB, εἴρηταί πως L // 18 αὑτῷ] αὐτῷ L // 20 εἰ P1CB, ἡ L // 21
ᾗ] ἡ P1CB // 24 τἀγαθὰ] τὰ ἀγαθὰ L // 27–8 μὴ τῷ τὸ εἶναι τούτῳ ἂν δόξαιεν
PCB, μὴ τὸ [spatium quadraginta fere litterarum] δόξειε L // 31 ἂν deest in PCB
// οἱ2] ὁ L // 1240b2 τῆς deest in L // 7 δοκεῖν] δοκεῖ L // 14 αὑτῷ1] αὐτῷ L //
ᾗ] ἡ L // αὑτῷ] αὐτῷ L // 19 αὑτῷ1] αὐτῷ L // 21 οὔτε] οὔθ’ L // τῷ] τὸ P1CB
// 24 τὸ] τῷ L // 27 ζητεῖ] ζητεῖται PCB // 29 εἶναι] εἶνα L // 34 οὐθέτερον]
οὐθ’ ἕτερον PCB // ἐϕ’ αὑτοῖς] ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς PCB // 35 ἀλλὰ κἂν διαϕέρωνται]
ἀλλὰ διαϕέροντα PCB // συγγενεῖς ἔτι] ἔτι συγγενεῖς PCB // 1241a6
τἀγαθὰ] τὰ ἀγαθά L // 7–8 οὐκ αὐτοῦ εὔνοια desunt in P1CB // 9 εἰ δὴ PCB,
εἰ δ’ ἡ L // 17 πρακτὰ] πρακτικὰ P1CB // ὁμονοοῦσι] εὖ νοοῦσι PC, εὖ
νοοῦσιν B // 21 ὁμόνοια] ἡ μόνοια L // 29 ὀρέγωνται] ὀρέγονται PCB // 32
ἑκάτερον] ἑκατέρου L // 38 συμβαίνειν] συμβαίνει P1CL // 1241b12 ἴσον]
ἶσον PCB // 14–15 ὅστις ἀεὶ δὴ PCB, ὅστις ἀεὶ διὰ L // 22 ἀϕαιρετόν]
ἀϕαιρετέον L // 24 ἡ τῶν] ἡ τῆς P1CB // 27 παρεκβάσεις] παρεκβάσεως
P1CB, παρεισβάσεις L // γὰρ] δὲ PCB // καὶ2 deest in L // 29 ἀριστοκρατικὴ]
238 A ppe n d i x
ἀριστοκρατιστικὴ PCB // 31 τὰ δίκαια] τὸ δίκαιον PCB // 32 τὸ ἴσον] τὸ

ἶσον PCB // 1242a1 λέγονται] λέγων P1C, λέγω B // 6 πρεσβείων] πρέσβειον
PCB // 7 αὑτάρκει PC, αὐτάρκει B1, αὐτάρκη LΒ2 // 11 τὸ1] τῷ P1CB // 16
τὸ2] τῷ L // 18 δοῦλος] εἶδος PCB // 21 τισὶ] τίσι PCB // 30 τὸ deest in PCB
// 32 ὡς] οὐ PCB // 38 ἴσον] ἶσον PCB // 1242b7 ἀλλ’ deest in L // 8 αὐτὸς]
αὐτὸ L // 11 ἴσον] ἶσον PCB // 14 ἴσον1] ἶσον PCB // ἴσον2] ἶσον PCB // 15
ἴσον] ἶσον PCB // 21 δὲ] καὶ L // 27 καὶ ἄρχον] καὶ ἄρχων L (deest in B) // 29
ἴσον] ἶσον PCB // 35 ἡ deest in L // 1243a8 ἴσον] ἶσον PCB // 11 πιστοὶ] τῆς
τοῖς PCB, τοῖς L // 23 οὐ τί] οὔ τι PCB, οὔτι L // 31–2 εἰς τὴν προαίρεσιν . . . 34
ἡ ἠθικὴ desunt in PCB // 35 ἠθικοὶ ϕίλοι] οἱ ἠθικοὶ ϕίλοι PCB // 36 ἕτεροι]
ἕταιροι L // 1243b7 ἐπεὶ] ἐπειδὴ L // 8 ὑποκρινάμενος μηδ’ ἕτερος PCB,
ὑποκρινόμενος μηδέτερος L // 14 τοῖς] ταῖς PCB // 16 ἑνὶ δὲ τῷδε τῷ PCB,
ἑνὶ τῷδε τῷ L // 20 Παμμένης] μαμμενὴς PCB // 21 ὅλως] ὅλος PCB // 26
ἐποίησε] ἐποίησεν PCB // εὐϕρᾶναι] εὐϕράναι PCB // 28 μὲν deest in L //
32–3 ἰσασθήσεται τὰ ἔργα . . . τὸ ἀνάλογον desunt in PCB // 36 δῆλον ὅτι]
δηλονότι L // 1244a8 ὁ δὲ ἔσται οὔπω δέ desunt in PCB // 11 εἰσϕέροις PCB,
εἰσϕέρης L // 18 οὗτος] οὕτως P1CB // 22 γὰρ deest in PCB // 24 ἄλλῳ]
ἄλλως PCB // 25 ἄλλῳ] ἄλλως PCB // συναλγεῖν] συναγαγεῖν P1CB // 29 ὁ]
οἱ PCB // 29–30 καὶ ποιήσας εὖ . . . ὑπάρχειν desunt in PCB // 32 ἀλλήλους
ἔνιοι] ἔνιοι ἀλλήλους L // 34–5 καὶ ὅτι χρήσιμος τὸν πλοῦτον εἵλετο desunt
in PCB // 37 ζητήσαντες] ζήσαντες L // 1244b3 εἴ τις] εἴ τε P1CB, εἴ τι L // 6
αὐτάρκους] αὐταρκῶς PC, αὐταρκῆ B, αὐτάρκως L // 7 αὑτῷ ἱκανὸς]
ἱκανῶς αὐτῷ L // 9 δεήσεται] δεήσεως L // 23 λανθάνει] λανθάνειν P1CB //
24 λαβοῦσι] λαβοῦσιν L // 25 ὥστε καὶ τὸ συζῆν . . . 27 γνωρίζειν desunt in
PCB // 28 διὰ τοῦτο] διατούτο L // 33 ἀνθ’ αὑτοῦ] ἀντ’αὐτοῦ L // 1245a1
ἐστιν] ἔστιν L // 2 αἱρετοῦ] ἑτέρου L // 7 μὲν deest in L // 15 ἀναϕέρεις P1CB,
ἀναϕἐρει L // 21 οὗ] οὐ PCB // 23 διό ϕησι] διὸ ϕησὶ L // 26 οὐχὶ P1CB, οὐχ
ᾗ L post corr. // 28 ὁ μὲν τοίνυν] ὁ μέντοι οὖν PCB // 29 δῆλον ὅτι] δηλονότι
L // 33 τὴν deest in L // 34 τὸ deest in L // 37 πως] πῶς PCB // 38 τὸ2] τὰ L //
1245b7 οὗ] οὐ P1CB // 8 τέλους] τέλος P1CB // 17 ἄλλο τι] ἀλλότριον PCB //
18 αὐτὸς αὑτόν] αὐτὸς αὐτόν L // 25 πολλοὺς] πολλοῖς P1CB // 33 ἐκέλευσεν]
ἐκάλεσεν L // 34 Διοσκόρους] Διὸς κούρους L // 40 τὸ] τῶν P1CB // 1246a1
τὸ] τοῦ P1CB // 3 δῆλον ὅτι] δηλονότι L, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὸ ἅμα desunt in PCB
// 13 ὁτὲ] ὅταν P1CB // 14 καὶ μάλ’ εὔλογον] καὶ μᾶλλον εὔλογον P1CB // 15
τοῦτο] ταῦτα L // 19 εἰ αὐτός] εἰ ὁ αὐτός PCB // ᾖ] ἢ PCB // 20 τοῦτ’ ] τότ’
P1CB // 21 καὶ deest in L // 24 οἰκείου deest in PCB // 25 ὅτι] ὅ τί L

1246a27 ἀπορήσειε] πορήσειε L // 27–8 ἐϕ’ ᾧ] ἐϕ’ ἃ L // 32 ϕαγεῖν] ϕυγεῖν
PCB // 34 δὴ νῦν] δὴ L // 36 εἰ δὴ] εἴδη PCB, ἤδη L // 37 εἶπαν PCB, εἶπε L //
A ppe n d i x 239
1246b 9 ᾗ] ᾖ PCB // 11 ἔτι deest in PCB // 12 ἐπιστήμη γε] ἐπιστήμη γε ἢ νοῦς

L // 12–13 χρῆται γὰρ αὐτῇ· ἡ γὰρ τοῦ ἄρχοντος ἀρετὴ desunt in PCB // 16 ἡ
deest in PCB // 17 ἐν μὲν] μὲν ἐν L // 20 τὴς] ταῖς PCB // 21 ποτὲ] πότερον PCB
// 30 στρέϕει] τρέϕει L // 35 δῆλον ὅτι] δηλονότι L // ϕρόνιμοι] ϕρόνιμαι
PCB // 1247a1 ποιούσης] εὐποιούσης PC, εὖ ποιούσης L // 2 ἆρ’ ] ἄρ’ L // 5
πολὺ] πολλοὶ PCB // 15 ἔτι] ἔστι L // 16 μὲν deest in L // οὐθὲν deest in PCB //
18 πολὺ χρυσίον] πολυχρυσίον PC, χρυσίον B // 19 πεντηκοστολόγων]
πεντηκοστῷ λόγων PCB // 22 οὐθέν] οὐδέν L // 26 post κυβερνήτην ἀγαθόν
L habet ἀλλ’ οὗτος εὐτυχ [spatium duarum litterarum] τὸν δαίμον’ ἔχει
κυβερνήτην ἀγαθόν // 28 ἐπιτροπείᾳ] ἐπιτροπίᾳ L // 33 ἢ ὡς] εἰ ὡς PCB; ὡς
L // 34 ὥσπερ ὅτι] ὅτι ὥσπερ PCB // 1247b2 οὕτως] οὕτω L // 7 ἄλογον]
ἀνάλογον L // 9 πρόβλημα ἂν] πρόβλημ’ ἂν L // 10 διατί PC, διατὶ L (deest in
B) // καὶ πάλιν] καὶ πάλιν καὶ πάλιν L // 16 συμβαίνῃ PC, συμβῆναι L // 18
κύβους] κοίβους P1C (deest in B) // 21 ἡδέος] ἡδέως PCB1 // 25 καὶ πότε PCB,
ποτὲ L // 31 ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον] ἀλλ’ οὐ τοὐναντίων P, ἀλλ’ οὐ τοὐναντίον CB
// 32 κατορθοῦνται PCB, κατορθοῦν τὲ L // 39 οὕτω] οὕτως PCB // 1248a4
δῆλον ὅτι] δηλονότι L // 6 ἣ PCB, ἢ L // 9 οὖν] ἂν PCB // 15 οὐδ’ ] οὐδὲν PCB //
19 δὴ deest in L // 26 τοῦτ’ ἔστι] τουτέστι PCB // 28 οὐ deest in PCB // 29 ἀλλά
τι] ἀλλὰ τί PC, ἀλλὰ τὶ B // 32 βουλεύεσθαι] βουλέσθαι L // 33 τοιαύτην ἣ
κρείττων τοῦ νοῦ καὶ desunt in PCB // 37 μόνον] μόνων PCB // 41 εὐθυόνειροι]
εὐθυώνειροι L // 1248b5 οὗτος] οὕτω PCB // 11 διαρθρωτέον] διορθωτέον
PCB // 15 οὐθεὶς γὰρ ὅλον μὲν] οὐθεὶς μὲν ὅλον PCB // 35–6 τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ
καλὰ ὑπάρχειν . . . εἶναι desunt in PCB // δι’ αὐτὰ] δ’ αὐτὰ L (desunt in PCB) //
37 αἵ τ’ ] αἵ τε PCB // 39 οἵαν] οἷον PCB // Λάκωνες] λάκονες L // 1249a7 τῇ
deest in L // 18 δ’ εἴρηται] διήρηται P1CB // ποῖόν τι] ποῖον τι L // 19 καὶ καλὰ
(καὶ) τὰ τε ἁπλῶς desunt PCB // 20 ἡδέα deest PCB // διὰ τοῦτο] διατοῦτο L
// 21 τοῦτο] τούτου PCB // 24 ὑγιαῖνον] ὑγιεινὸν L // 1249b3 πλήθους] πλῆθος
PCB // ὀλιγότητος] ὀλιγότης PCB // 5 τροϕὴν] τὴν τροϕὴν L // 9 τὴν deest in
L // 11–12 ἂν δέοι] δὴ δέοι PCB // 18 ἥτις] εἴ τις L // 19 τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ μάλιστα]
μάλιστα τήν τοῦ θεοῦ PCB // 21 ἥτις] εἴ τις L // 24 ὁ deest in PCB //
αἰσθάνηται] αἰσθάνεται L
(3) Readings shared by BL and not in PC or by

PC and not in BL (readings in BL presumed
correct are in bold)
EUDEMIAN ETHICS I
1214a25 εὐτυχίαν] εὐτυχείαν PC // 29 συναγάγοι] συναγάγει PC, συναγάγη L
// 1214b12 σημεῖόν ἐστι] σημεῖον ἐστίν B, σημεῖον ἐστί L // 17 ὥστε] ὥστ’ PC
240 A ppe n d i x
// 23 οὔτε1] οὔτ’ PC // 1215a26 ποιὰς τινάς] ποιάς τινας BL // 7 ἐρωτηθεὶς]

ἐρωτιθεὶς PC // 1215b24 μηδεμίαν] μὴ δὲ μίαν PC // 26 ἐστιν] ἐστὶν BL // 30–1
ἀλλὰ μὴν] ἀλλαμὴν PC // 1216a20 οὐδεμίαν] οὐδὲ μίαν PC // 23 ἀληθῶς]
ἀληθoῦς PC1 // 1216b33 πως] πῶς BL // 1217a24 βελτίονος τινὸς] βελτίονός
τινος PC // 1217b19 οὐδεμίαν] οὐδὲ μίαν PC // 1218a14 ὥστε] ὥστ’ PC // 36
οὐδεμιᾷ] οὐδὲ μιᾷ PC // 1218b9 ἀγαθόν ἐστιν] ἀγαθὸν ἐστίν PC; ἀγαθόν ἐστι
L // 25 οὐδεμίαν] οὐδὲ μίαν PC
EUDEMIAN ETHICS II
1219a26 ἀργία] ἀργεία PC // ἡσυχία] ἡσυχεία P1C // 28 ἄρ’ ] ἄρα PC // 40
κατὰ ἀρετὴν] κατ’ ἀρετὴν PC // 1219b20 καθεύδοντες] καθεύδονται BLC2 //
ἀργία] ἀργεία PC // 1220a2 ἄρα] ἆρα PC // 33 καὶ2 deest in BL // 34–5 πρὸς
ταῦτα ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῆς ὑϕ᾽ ὧν καὶ αὔξεται καὶ ϕθείρεται] πρὸς ταῦτα ἡ
χρῆσις αὐτῆς ὑϕ’ ὧν καὶ αὔξεται καὶ ϕθείρεται καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα ἡ χρῆσις
αὐτῆς ὑϕ’ ὧν καὶ αὔξεται καὶ ϕθείρεται PC // 35 καὶ πρὸς ἃ] πως ἃ PC, καὶ
ἃ B1, πρὸς ἃ L // διατίθησι] διατίθησιν PC // 1220b13 ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ] επιτοπολὺ
B; ἐπι το πολὺ –––– L // 16 ποιότης] ποιός τις PC // 18 αἴτιαί εἰσι] αἴτιαι εἰσὶ
PC // 22 ἐστὶν] ἔστιν BL // 1221a28 μηδεμίαν] μὴ δὲ μίαν PC // 1221b5
οὐδεμία] οὐδὲ μία PC // 1222a17–18 ἔστι τις] ἔστι τίς PC // 19 οὗ μὲν . . . οὗ
δὲ] οὗ μὲν οὖν . . . οὗ δὲ PC // 1222b8 πρὸς τίνα] πρός τινα PC // 12 ἀλλὰ μὴν]
ἀλλαμὴν PC // 20 μόνον] μόνων PC // 42 τῶν ὕστερον] τῶν ὑστέρων BL //
1223a5 ὁ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν] ἐστὶν ὁ ἄνθρωπος B, ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐστὶν L // 17–
19 καὶ κατὰ προαίρεσιν . . . ἀκούσια desunt in PC // 27 ἀλλὰ μὴν] ἀλλαμὴν
PC // 1223b1 ἀκρατὴς] ἀκροατὴς BL // 5 ὃ] ὁ PC // 7 ἀλλὰ μὴν] ἀλλαμὴν PC
// 9 ἀκρατεύεσθαί ἐστιν] ἀκρατεύεσθαι ἐστιν B, ἀκρατεύεσθαι ἐστίν L //
32 τις] τίς PC // 1224a12 τό τε] τότε PC // 1224b38 περὶ] παρὰ P1C //
ἐγκρατῆ καὶ ἀκρατῆ] ἀκρατῆ καὶ ἐγκρατῆ PC // 1225a10 ἐϕ᾽ ἑαυτῷ] ἐϕ’
αὑτῷ PC // 30 ἀλλὰ μὴν] ἀλλαμὴν PC // 1225b2 κατὰ διάνοιαν] κατὰ τὴν
διάνοιαν PC // 8 ἄρα] ἆρ’ P, ἆρα C // 13 ὁ deest in PC1 // 23 ταὐτόν ἐστιν]
ταυτόν ἐστι PC, ταῦτά ἐστι L // 34 ἀλλὰ μὴν] ἀλλαμὴν PC // 1226a26
γένεσίς ἐστιν] γένεσις ἐστὶν BL // 1226b13 ἕως ἂν εἰς] ἕως ἂν ἢ εἰς PC // 26
διὰ λογισμοῦ] διαλογισμοῦ PC // 1227a13 πολεμῶσιν] πελεμῶσι PC,
πολεμῶσι B // 17 ὅ τι] ὅτι BL // 25–6 μὴ ἔστιν] μή ἐστιν PC // 26 μὴ ἔστιν]
μή ἐστιν PC, μὴ ἐστιν L // 27 μὴ ἔστιν] μή ἐστιν PC // 33 ἀλλὰ μὴν] ἀλλαμὴν
PC // 1227b29 οὐδεμία] οὐδὲ μία PC // 1228a17 τις] τίς PC
EUDEMIAN ETHICS III

1228a23 μεσότητες εἰσί τε] μεσότητές εἰσί τε PC; μεσότητες εἰσὶ τὲ L // 29
θράσος] καὶ θράσος PC // 1228b10 αὑτῷ] αὐτῷ BL // 22 ὠϕέλιμα] ὠϕέλημα
PC // 27 ταῦτα] ταῦτ’ PC // 33 μηδεμιᾶς] μὴ δὲ μίας PC // 1229a31 οὐδεμία]
A ppe n d i x 241
οὐδὲ μία PC // 1229b4 τούτου] παρὰ τούτου PC // 1230b16 ἐπιπόλαιον] ἐπι

πόλεως PCB2 // 37 τἆλλα] τἄλλα BL // 1231a14 ὅσων] ὅσον L, ὄσοις B1 // 24
ὑπερβάλλῃ] ὑπερβάλῃ PC // 1231b10 ἀνδραποδώδη] ἀνδραπωδώδη PC // 19
ἀνδραποδώδης] ἀνδραπωδώδης PC // 20 τις] τίς PC // 29–30 χαίρων
μᾶλλον] μᾶλλον χαίρων PC // 1232a26 ὑπομενετικὸς] ὑπομενητικὸς B,
ὑπομονητικὸς L // 1232b2 ἀνδρεία] ἀνδρεῖα PC // 1232b8 Ἀγάθωνα]
ἀγάθονα PC // 22 τἆλλα] τἄλλα BL // 24 οὐδεμία] οὐδὲ μία PC // 34 τινα]
τινὰ PC // 1233b2 τις] τίς PC // 5 μηδὲ] μὴ δὲ BL // 23 τῷ] τὸ PC // 1234a16
αὑτόν] αὐτόν BL // 18 ἀμϕότεραι] ἀμϕότεροι PC // 20 αὑτὸν] αὐτον BL

1234b30 ἀλλὰ μὴν] ἀλλαμὴν PC // 33 τὸν ϕίλον] καὶ τὸν ϕίλον B, τὸν ϕίλον
εἶναι L // 1235a25 οἱ] οἵ PC // 29 τε] τὲ BL // 1235b2 ἄχρηστος] ἄχρηστον PC
// 9 ἀτυχίας] εὐτυχίας BL, εὐτυχείας PC // 37 σκότει] σκότῳ PC // 1236b8
ἡμέροις] ἰμέροις P1CB2 // 11 οἱ] οἵ B, οὐ L // 17 οὐδ’ οἱ δι’ ] oὐ δι’ B1L // 23
λείπεται] λίπεται P1, λύπεται C // 1237a8 τὸ] τῷ PC // οὐδὲ μίας ἡμέρας]
οὐδεμίαν ἡμέραν BL // 15 ἀτυχίαι] ἀτυχεῖαι PC // 16 εὐτυχιῶν] εὐτυχειῶν PC
// 18 εὐτυχίαι] εὐτυχεῖαι PC // 19 ἀτυχία] ἀτυχεία PC // 1238b6 τὰ ἁπλᾶ] τὰ
ἁπλά PC // 20 ἴσον1] ἶσον PCB2 // ἴσον2 ἶσον PCB2 // 22 ἄλλη] ἄλλην PC, ἄλλων
B // 29 ἧττον] ἥ τε PC, ἡ τέ B, εἰ τε L // 1239b1 τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦ ϕίλου ἕνεκα]
τοῦ ϕιλεῖν καὶ τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦ ϕίλου ἕνεκα B1, τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦ ϕιλεῖν
ἕνεκα L // 1239b22 Κακὸς κακῷ δὲ] κακὸς δὲ // 1238a1 κακῷ BL // 1240a1
ἀνομοίοις] ἀνομίοις PC // 8 αὐτὸν] αὑτὸν PC // 13 κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν] κατὰ
ἀναλογίαν PC // 17 πρὸς ἄλληλα] προσάλληλα PC // 19 τις] τίς PC // 1240b5
αὑτῷ] αὐτῷ PC1 // 6 διά τι] διατί PC, διότι B // 21 λοιδορεῖται] λοιδωρεῖται
PC // 23 τε] τὲ BL // 34 αὑτὸν] αὐτὸν BL // 1241a5 οὔτ᾽bis] οὔτε bis PC // 17 εἰς
τὸ] εἰστὸ PC // 22 ἀλλήλους] ἀλλήλοις PC // 27 ὥστ᾽ ] ὥστε PC // 1241b26
συνυπάρχουσι] συνυπάρχουσιν PC // 1242a23 τἆλλα] τἄλλα BL // 1242b22
ἴσα] ἶσα PC // 27 καὶ ἄρχον] deest in B, καὶ ἄρχων L // 32 εἰς τὸ2] εἰστὸ PC //
1243a31 εἰς τὸ] εἰστὸ PC // 1243b3 ἀξιωτέον] ἀξιοτέον PC // 5 ἐλυσιτέλει]
ἐλυσιτέλη PC // ἐκείνως] ἐκεῖνος B, ἐκείνους L // 11 ἠδύνατο] εἰδύνατο B,
ἐδύνατο LC2 // 19 ἄλλου] ἀλλ’ οὐ PC // 34 τί2] τὶ BL // 1244a9 ἐστὶν] ἐστιν PC,
ἔστιν L // 13 ἄλλα] ἀλλὰ P1C // 16 τἀναγκαῖα] τὰ ἀναγκαῖα PC // 19 ἐρωμένῳ]
ἐρρωμένῳ PCB2 // 23 τἀκείνῳ] τὰ ἐκείνῳ PC // 1244b4 εἰ1] εἰ δὲ B, ἢ L // 15
ἀλλὰ μὴν] ἀλλαμὴν PC // 20 αὐτάρκεις] αὑτάρκεις PC // 29 τις] τίς PC //
ποιήσειε] ποιήσειεν BL // 32 ἔστι] ἐστὶ BL // 1245a2 εὐτυχείας P1C, εὐτυχίας
B, εὐστοχίας L // 5 τοιονδὶ] τοιόνδη P, τοιὸν δὴ C // βούλεσθαί ἐστιν]
βούλεσθαι ἐστιν B, βούλεσθαι ἐστίν L // 9–10 διὰ τοῦτο PC, διὰ τουτων B1,
διατοῦτο L // 19 ἀλλὰ μὴν] ἀλλαμὴν PC // 20 ἥδιον] ἡδεῖον P1C1, ὡς B // 21
καθ’ ὅσον] καθόσον PC, καθ’ ὅσόν B // 38 τὸ1] τῷ PC // 1245b14 οὐ] ὁ P1C,
242 A ppe n d i x
deest in B // 32 θητεύειν] θηπεύειν PC, θηστεύειν B // 33 εἴποιεν] εἴποιε P1C //

1246a7 ἥδιον] ἡδεῖον PC // 11 ἀτυχίας] ἀτυχείας PC // 24 συναποκτιννύασι]
συναποκτειννύασι P1C

1246a27 ἑκάστῳ] ἑκάστῳ ϕίλῳ LC2, ἐϕ’ ἑκαστῳ ϕίλῳ B // 32 ἀποδόσθαι]
ἀπόδοσθαι PC // 1246b12 ἀλλὰ μὴν] ἀλλαμὴν PC // 16–17 τἀναντία. ἢ
ἔστι] τἀναντία η σϕι PC; inter τἀναντία et σϕι habet spatium vacuum trium
fere litterarum L (desunt in B) // 20 τῆς] ταῖς PC //1247a1 εὐτυχίας]
εὐτυχείας PC // ποιούσης] εὐποιούσης PC, εὖ ποιούσης L // 11 τῷ τὸ δεῖν
τοιὸν δεῖ ἔχειν PC, τῷ τοιόνδε δεῖν ἔχειν B, τῷ τὸ δεῖν τοιονδὶ ἔχειν L //
13 ἡ deest in PC1 // 23–4 ἔξωθέν τι] ἔξωθεν τί PC // 29 μὴ ἔστι] μή ἐστι PC,
μὴ ἔστιν B // ἀλλὰ μὴν] ἀλλαμὴν PC // 33 ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ] ἐπιτοπολὺ B,
ἐπιτοπολύ L // 1247b10 διὰ τί] διατί PC, διατὶ L (deest in B) // 16 εὐτυχίαι]
εὐτυχείαι PC // 28 ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ] ἐπιτοπολύ B, ἐπι το πολύ L // 29 ἄρα] ἆρα
P1C // εὐτυχία] εὐτυχεία PC // 38 αὐτὴ PC, αὐτὴ δ’ BL // 40 εὐτυχία]
εὐτυχεία PC // 1248a1 ἀλλὰ μὴν] ἀλλαμὴν PC // εὐτυχία] εὐτυχεία PC // 2
εὐτυχίαι] εὐτυχείαι PC // 5 εὐτυχίας] εὐτυχείας PC // εὐτυχία] εὐτυχεία
PC; ἡ εὐτυχία L // 10 παρὰ λόγον] παράλογον PC // 31 οἳ ἂν] οἷαν PC //
1248b4 εὐτυχίας] εὐτυχείας PC // 7 εὐτυχία] εὐτυχεία PC // 25 ἰσχύς] ἡ
ἰσχύς PC // 28 περιμάχητα] περι μάχητα P; περὶ μάχητα C // 29 εὐτυχίαι]
εὐτυχείαι PC // 30 δ᾽ deest in PC // 33–4 τῆς τοῦ ὑγιοῦς καὶ τῆς τοῦ
ὁλοκλήρου κόσμοις PC, τῆς τοῦ ὑγιαίνοντος καὶ τοῦ ὁλοκλήρου B1, τῆς
τοῦ ὑγιοῦς καὶ τοῖς τοῦ ὁλοκλήρου κόσμοις L // 1249a6 πράττουσι]
πράττουσιν PC; πράττωσι L // 26 περὶ] παρὰ PC // 1249b1 τινα] τινὰ PC
// 18 κτῆσις] κτίσις PC // 21 δι᾽] δ’ PC
(4) Readings in C not found in PBL (readings

in C presumed correct are in bold)
EUDEMIAN ETHICS I
1214a24 ταὐτό] ταυτὸ PBL // 1214b1 συμβάλλεσθαι] συμβάλεσθαι C // 26
οἷόν τε] οἷον τὲ C // 1215b20 χειμῶνας] καὶ χειμῶνας C1 // 33 τις] τίς C //
35 δῆλον deest in C1 // 36 διενέγκειε] διηνέγκειε C, διενέγκειεν B,
διενέγκοιεν L // 1216a6 τινὸς] τοινὸς C // 1216b14 θεωρῆσαι] θεωρίσαι C //
22 ἀνδρεία] ἀνδρεῖα C, ἀνδρία B // 1217a13 ὁπόταν] ὁπότ’ ἂν C // 1217b10
τἆλλα] τἄλλα PBL // 1217b14 ὕστερον] ὕστεστερον C // 27 τῷ ὄντι ἀγαθόν]
τῷ ὄντι τὸ ἀγαθόν P, τὸ τῷ ὄντι ἀγαθόν B; τωόντι ἀγαθόν L // 1218a10
ἀνδρεία] ἀνδρεῖα C, ἀνδρία B // 1218b19 αἴτιον] αἵτιον C
A ppe n d i x 243
EUDEMIAN ETHICS II
1219a20 λέγομεν] λέγωμεν C // 1220b10 ἀπαθεῖς] ἀπαχθεῖς C // 1221a24
ἀλαζὼν] ἀλλαζὼν C // 1222b1 καίτοι] καί τι C // 1224b35 γίνεται] γίγνεται
C // 36 τἆλλα] τἄλλα P1L, τ’ἄλλα B // 1225a25 τοῦτο ἔστιν] τοῦτο ἐστὶν P,
τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν C, τοῦτό ἐστιν L // 1225b8 ἆρα] ἄρ’ P, ἆρα C // 1226b8 οἷόν τε]
οἷον τὲ C, οἷον τε L
EUDEMIAN ETHICS III

1228a30 ϕόβον] ϕόβος PBL // 37 ἀνδρεῖᾳ C // 1228b4 ἀνδρεία] ἀνδρεῖα C //
12 μεγάλα] μεγέλα C // 1229a2 ἀνδρεῖα C // 13 τὰ αὐτά] τὰ αὑτὰ C // 31
ἀνδρεῖα C // 1229b1 σϕόδρα τινὲς] σϕόδρά τινες C // 31 ἀνδρεῖα C // 36 οὐκ
ὄντος ἡδέος post ἀποθνήσκειν add. C1 // 1230a3 Χείρωνα] χείρονα C // 10
ἱστοὺς] ἰστοὺς PL (deest in B) // 20 τὸν Ἕκτορά ϕησιν] τὸν Ἕκτορα ϕησὶν
PL (deest in B) // 1230b25 τε] τι C // 1231a36 ἔστιν] ἐστὶν C (deest in B) //
1231b17 τοιοῦτός ἐστιν] τοιοῦτος ἐστίν PBL // 1232a5 τῆς] τῶν C // 21 του]
τοῦ PBL // 1232b11–12 πλούτου, περὶ ὧν σπουδάζειν] πλούτου πὲρι
σπουδάζειν C, πλούτου σπουδάζειν B // 34 τηλικούτων] τοιλικούτων C //
1233b19 καὶ deest in C // 31 κολακείας] κολακίας C // 40 αὐθέκαστον]
αὑθέκαστον C // 1234a20 ᾖ] ᾗ C // 1234b9 αἴτια] αἵτια C

1234b24 τοῦτό ϕασιν] τοῦτο ϕασὶν PBL // 1235b37 τὸ] τῷ C // 1236a12 ἕκαστον]
ἕστατον C // 1236b31 αὐτὸν] αὑτὸν C // 1238a23 ἐδέσμασιν] ὀδέσμασιν C1 //
1238b11 τινος] τινὸς PL; τις B // 25 τὸ videtur defuisse C // 1239a20 ἔστιν] ἐστὶν
PBL // 1240a8 δὲ deest in C // 9 αὐτὸς] αὑτὸς C // 15 αὐτὸς] αὑτὸς C // 18 αὐτὸς]
αὑτὸς C // 19 αὐτὸς] αὑτὸς C // 25 αὑτὸν] αὐτὸν PBL // 29 αὐτὴν] αὑτην C // 35
αὐτοὺς] αὑτοὺς C // 39 ἐγγύτατα] ἐγύτατα C // 1240b5 αὐτὸς] αὑτὸς C // 10
ζῆν] ζεῖν C // 13 αὐτὸν] αὑτὸν C // 14 αὐτὸς] αὑτὸς C // 17 αὐτοῦ] αὑτοῦ C // 18
αὐτὸς] αὑτὸς C // 19 αὐτὸς] αὑτὸς C // 25 αὐτὸν PBL, αὑτοῦ C // 28 αὐτὸς]
αὑτὸς C // 30 αὐτὸς] αὑτὸς C // 1241a7 αὑτὸν] αὐτὸν PL, αὑτὰ B // 1241b10
τῆς2] τοῖς C // 11 τό τε] τότε C // 1242b13 ἴσου] ἶσου C // 18 ἄρα] ἆρα C // 38
ἀμϕότερα] ἀϕότερα C // 1244b10 αὐτῷ] αὑτῷ C // 20 κρίσιν] κρίσις C // 1245a5
τὸ] τὸν C // 38 αὑτόν] αὐτον PBL // 1246a17 αὐτούς] αὑτοὺς C

1246a35 ποδί ποτε] ποδὶ ποτὲ C // 1246b 39–40 καὶ ἀρετή] καὶ ἀρετήν PBL
// 1247a2 ἐστι] ἐστὶ C // 7 οὗτοί εἰσιν] οὗτοι εἰσὶν PBL // 13 ἄλογος] ἄλλογος
C // 21 δεινότατοι] δυνότατοι P, δυνώτατοι C, δυνατώτατοι B // 1248a24 τις]
τίς C // 1248b17 κατὰ ταυτὰ τὰ P, κατὰ ταὐτὰ τὰ C, κατὰ ταῦτα B, κατ’
αὐτὰ τὰ L // 1249a23 ἔστι τις] ἔστι τίς C, ἐστί τις B // 1249b1 ἐπαινετῶν]
ἐπαινετὸν C
244 A ppe n d i x
(5) Readings shared by CB and not in PL or shared by PL and

not in CB (readings in CB presumed correct are in bold)
EUDEMIAN ETHICS I
1214b1 διαμϕισβητοῦσι] διαμϕισβητοῦσιν CB // 1215b16 κρῖναι] κρίναι PL
// 1216b10 οὐ πῶς] οὐ πώς P, οὔ πως L // 40 διὰ τί] διατί PL // 1218a33 αὐτό
τι] αὐτὸ τί PL // 1218b4 τι] τί C, τὶ B
EUDEMIAN ETHICS II
1218b36 εἰσὶ] εἰσὶν CB // 1219a3 τι] τί PL // 1219b18–19 ποτ’ οὐθὲν] πόθεν
οὐθὲν CB // 1220a1 ἐνεῖναι] ἐκεῖναι CB // 6 γὰρ deest in CB // 1220b1–2 ὑπ’
ἀγωγῆς] ὑπαγωγῆς CB // 1221a18 ὅτ᾽ οὐ] ὅτου PL // 1221b8 διωρίσθω]
διορίσθω CB // 21 οὐκ ἔστι γὰρ] οὐ γάρ ἐστιν PL // 1222b35 μεταβάλλει]
μεταβάλλοι PL // 1223a6–8 γίνεσθαι καὶ μή, ὧν γε . . . ὅσα δ’ ἐϕ’ αὑτῷ ἐστι
desunt in CB // 1224a16 τῷ] τῇ CB // 1225a2 κατὰ ἄλλον] κατὰ τὸν ἄλλον CB
// 34 ὥστ’ ] ὥστε CB // 1225b11 δ’ ἀγνοῶν] διαγνοῶν CB // 19 τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον]
τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον CB // 22 οὐ ταὐτὸ] desunt in CB // 1226a1 δῆλον ὅτι]
δηλονότι PL // 1226b6 δέ πως] δὲ πῶς CB // 1227a20 βουλεύσαιτο ἂν]
βουλεύσαιτ’ ἂν CB //1227b13 λέγωμεν] λέγομεν PL // 20 λέγωμεν] λέγομεν PL
EUDEMIAN ETHICS III

1228a30 ἐστί] ἐστι CB, ἔστι L // 1229a2 τὸ] τῷ CB // 3 τούτων] τοῦτον PL //
1229a24 ἀποκτείνας] ἀποκτείνειν CB // 26 σύες] σῦες CBP2, θῆρες L // 28
καὶ deest in PL // 41 οἱ αἰσχυνόμενοι] αἰσχυνόμενοι CB // 1232a6 χρήσεώς
ἐστιν] χρήσεως ἐστίν CB // 1232b13 λυπηθήσεται ἂν P, λυπηθήσετ’ ἂν CB,
λυπηθήσαι τ’ ἂν L // 1233b40 ἁπλοῦς] ἁπλῶς CB // 1234a11 τὰ δὲ μή] τὰ δὲ
μή καὶ PL // 26 οὐδε] οὐδ᾽ CB

1235a8 αἰεὶ] ἀεὶ P, deest in CB // 1236a27 πάντ’ ] πάντα CB // 1236b10
λέγουσιν] λέγουσι PL // 15 ἐπεὶ] ἐπὶ CB // 19 βέβαιος] βίαιος CB // 34 αὐτῷ]
αὑτῷ CB (C post corr.?) // 1237a1 αὐτῷ] αὑτῷ CB (C post corr.?) // αὑτῷ]
αὐτῷ PL // 40 καὶ2] δὲ PL // 1237b23 εὐδιάβλητοι] εὐδιάλυτοι CB // 32 τὰ]
τὰ τῶν CB // 1238a18 καὶ δυστυχίαι] καὶ δυστυχεῖαι P, desunt in CB, καὶ αἱ
δυστυχίαι L // 1238b20 δ’ deest in CB // 31 ὡς δ᾽ αὔτως] ὡς δ’ αὕτως PL //
1239b10 εἰσι] εἰσὶ PL // 23 αὑτῷ] αὐτῷ PL // 1240b5 αὑτὸν] αὐτὸν PL // 6
χάριτος P1L, οὐ χάριτος CB // 11 αὐτὸς] αὑτὸς CB // 12 αὑτόν] αὐτόν PL //
17 αὑτὸν] αὐτὸν PL // 19 αὑτῷ] αὐτῷ PL // 27 αὑτῷ] αὐτῷ PL // 28 αὑτῷ]
αὐτῷ PL // 30 αὑτῷ] αὐτῷ PL / 1241a2 ταυτὰ PL, ταῦτα CB // 6 αὐτῷ] αὑτῷ
CB // 29–30 οἱ ὁμονοοῦντες δ’ ] οἱ ὁμονοοῦντες C, οἱ ὁομονοοῦντες B // 36
A ppe n d i x 245
αὐτοὺς P1L, αὑτοὺς CB // 38 αὑτῷ] αὐτῷ PL // 1241b11 διωρίσθω] διορίσθω

CB // 36 ἀριστοκρατικὴ] ἀριστοκρατιστικὴ CBP2 // 1242a3 καὶ υἱῶν] πρὸς
υἱόν CB // 27 ἔστι τίς PL, ἐστὶ τίς C, ἔστι τις B // 1243b20 παντί τινος P1L,
παντὶ τινός CB // 37 δὲ] γὰρ CB // 1244a30 δόντι] ὄντι CB, δίδοντι L //
1244b16 χρήσεως] χρήσεται CB // 1245a38 πως] πῶς CB // 19 αὑτοῦ] αὐτοῦ
PL // 24 ὥστ’ ] ὥστε CB // 1245b33 ἐπεί τις] ἐπεὶ τίς PL // 1246a4 πως] πῶς
CB // 7 ταὐτὰ] ταῦτα PL, ταῦτ’ CB

1246b2 μὴ ἔστιν] μὴ ἐστὶν P, μή ἐστιν CB // 6 ἀληθές τι] ἀληθὲς τί PL // 16
ἂν] ἐὰν CB // 18 ὥστε] ὥστ’ CB // 22 στρέψει] στρέψη P1, τρέψει L // 1247b12
ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν] ἄλλο ταν P1, ἄλλο τ’ ἂν L // 31 ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον], ἀλλ’ οὐ
τοὐναντίων P, ἀλλ’ οὐ τοὐναντίον CB // 35 δεῖ] δὴ CB // 1248b20 αὑτῶν]
αὐτῶν PL // 28 γὰρ] δὲ CB // 31 τὰς deest in CB // 37 καλὰ] καλά PL //
1249a23 ἔστι τις], ἔστι τίς C, ἐστί τις B
(6) Readings in B not found in PCL (readings

in B presumed correct are in bold)
EUDEMIAN ETHICS I
1214a1 αὑτοῦ] αὐτοῦ PCL // 8 ἥδιστόν ἐστιν] ἥδιστον ἐστίν Β // 12 περὶ
deest in B // τοῦ πράγματος desunt in B // 18 τὴν χροιὰν] τῇ χροιᾷ B // 30
συναγάγοι] συναγάγει PC, συναγάγη L // 1214b8 αὐτοῦ] αὑτοῦ B // 12 δὴ
δεῖ] δεῖ δὴ B // 17 οὐ deest in P1CL // 28 εἶναι deest in B // 31 παραϕρονοῦσι]
παραϕρονοῦσιν B // 32 διαπορήσειε] διαπορήσειεν B // 1215a2 περὶ deest in
B // 3 μηθὲν] μηδὲν B // 5 βίου] βίον P1CL // 10 τῳ] τῷ P1CL // 18 κεῖσθαι]
κεῖσθαι καὶ B // 19 ποιούς τινας desunt in B // 22 τί ] τὶ B // εἶναι deest in B //
30 τὰς1] τοὺς B // 1215b1 post ἀπολαυστικόν spatium vacuum quattuor fere
litterarum B // 10 ἐρόμενον] ἐρώμενον P1CL // 17 τί ] τὶ B // 20 περὶ ὠδυνίας
P1CL, περιοδυνίας B // 21 γε] τε B // 23 ὑπομείνειεν] ὑπομείνοιεν B // 24–5
ἐχόντων ἡδονὴν] ἐχόντων μὲν ἡδονὴν PCL // 35 ὢν ἀνδράποδον]
ἀνδράποδον ὢν B // 36 διενέγκειε] διηνέγκειε C, διενέγκειεν B, διενέγκοιεν
L // 1216a3 τί] τὶ B // 8 καθεύδοντα δὲ] καθεύδοντα μὲν PCL // 10 τί 1] τὶ B //
τί 2] τὶ B // 12 τοιαῦθ’ PCLB2, ταῦθ’ B1 // 18 δὴ] δὲ PCL // 18–19 ϕαίνονται
τάττειν] τάττονται B // 19 οὔτ’ ] οὔτε B // 31 τίς] τὶς B // 32 ὥστ’ ] ὥστε B //
34 καλῶς] καλὰς PCL // 35 ἡδονὰς τινὰς] ἡδονάς τινας PCL // δεῖ] δεῖ γε B //
36 ἡδοναὶ] αἱ ἡδοναὶ B // 38 περὶ1] παρὰ B // 40 ἐστι] ἐστιν B // 41 ἐστιν]
ἐστίν PC, ἐστι L // 1216b4 τί] τὶ B // 11 δὲ] δ’ B // 12 ἕτερόν ἐστι] ἕτερον ἐστὶ
B // 13 ἐπιστήμης bis B // 19 ἤ τί PCL ἤ τὶ B // 22 ἀνδρία B // 32 οἰκεῖόν τι]
246 A ppe n d i x
οἰκεῖον τί CL, οἰκεῖον τὶ B // 35 γνωριμώτερα] γνωριμώτατα B // 1217a3

ἀλλοτρίους λόγους τῆς πραγματείας] ἀλλοτρίους τῆς πραγματείας λόγους B
// 4 ὁτὲ2] ὀτὲ B // 6 τῶν μήτ᾽ ἐχόντων] ὑπὸ τούτων τῶν μήτ’ ἐχόντων PCL //
16 ϕησιν] ϕησὶν B // 17 γὰρ] δὲ B // 21 ἐπὶ τῷ] ἐπὶ τὸ PCL // 23 τοῦτο deest in B
// 26 ἐστὶν] ἐστιν B // 30 ζῇ] ἐστι B // 32 μέν ἐστιν] μὲν ἐστὶν B // 34 ὥστ’ ] ὥστε
B // 37 λέγεται] λέγομεν B // 38 ὑγίειαν] ὑγείαν B // 1217b1 τί ] τὶ B // 2 ϕασὶ]
ϕασὶ μὲν B // 6 τἀγαθοῦ] τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ // 8 ἀγαθοῖς2] ἀγαθοῦ B // 10 ἐκείνης]
ἐκείνοις B1 // 13 πρῶτον τοῦτον] τοῦτον πρῶτον B // 18 τε] τὲ B // 21 ἰδέας]
ἰδέαι PCL // 24 ἔπειτ’ εἰ] ἔπειτα εἰ B // 27 τῷ ὄντι ἀγαθόν] τῷ ὄντι τὸ ἀγαθόν
P, τὸ τῷ ὄντι ἀγαθόν B, τωόντι ἀγαθόν L // 28 ἐστι] ἐστιν B // 34 ἐστι] ἐστιν B
// οὐδὲ2] οὐδ’ B // 1218a1 αὐτό γε] γε αὐτὸ B // 10 ἀνδρεία] ἀνδρεῖα C, ἀνδρία B
// 12 τί ] τὶ B // 20–1 τὸ εἶναι τὸ ἓν αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν] τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸ τὸ ἓν ἀγαθόν B
// 23 τάξις] τάξεις PCL // 30–1 ἐϕίεσθαι ἑνός τινος ἀγαθοῦ] ἑνὸς τινὸς ἐϕίεσθαι
ἀγαθοῦ B // 32 ὑγιείας] ὑγείας B // 1218b8 οὐδὲ PCL, οὐδ’ B // 9 ἀγαθόν ἐστιν]
ἀγαθὸν ἐστίν PC; ἀγαθόν ἐστι L // 15 τοιαῦτ’ ] τοιαῦτα B, τοιαύτας L // 17
αὑτὸ] ἑαυτὸ B // 20 τοδί, ἀνάγκη] τὸ δι’ἀνάγκην B // τόδε] τόδ’ B
EUDEMIAN ETHICS II
1219a4 χρῆσίς ἐστι] χρῆσις ἐστι PC, χρῆσις ἐστίν B // ἀρετή ἐστιν] ἀρετὴ
ἐστίν PCL // 5 καὶ πλοίου] καὶ τοῦ πλοίου L, καὶ πλοίου bis B // 12 τἆλλα
πάντα] τ’ ἆλλα πάντα C, πάντα τ’ ἄλλα B, τἄλλα πάντα L // 16 ὑγίεια]
ὑγεία B // οὐδ’ ἰάτρευσις] οὐδ’ ἡ ἰατρεία B // 17 ὅρασις] ὄρασις B // 18
ὥστ’ ] ὥστε B // 23 σπουδαῖον] σπουδαίου B // 29 δὲ] δ’ B // 1219b10 οὐχ
οἱ] οὐχὶ B // 12 διὰ τί] διατί PCL, διατὶ B // 22 ἐστι] ἐστιν B // 26 μετέχουσι]
μετέχουσιν B // 28 μετὰ ταῦτα] μετὰ τοῦτο B // 34 οὔτ’ 2] οὔτε B // 39 ἐστὶ
μέρος ψυχῆς] μέρος ἐστὶ ψυχῆς B // 40 οὐδ’ αἱ] οὐδὲ B // 1220a3 ταῦτ’ ]
ταῦτα B // 10 ἐπιτακτικόν ἐστι] ἐπιτακτικὸν ἐστι B // ᾗ] ἣ B // 12 ποῖός
τις] ποῖος τίς B // 15 ἀνῆκται] ἀνῆκον B // 21 τί] τὶ B // 24 γίγνεσθαι]
γίνεσθαι B // 28 γίγνεσθαι] γίνεσθαι B // 30–1 διάθεσίς ἐστιν] διάθεσις
ἐστιν B // 39–40 λυπηρά ἐστι] λυπηρὰ ἐστὶ P, λυπηρά ἐστιν B // 1220b5 ἦθος
τοῦτο] τοῦτο ἦθος B // κατὰ] καὶ B // 6 λόγον] λόγων B // 7 ἄττα] ἅττα PCL //
10 τῷ] τὸ B // 25 ὁποιᾳοῦν] ὁποιανοῦν B // 26 καὶ1] καὶ ἀν B // 32 ἑκάτερόν
ἐστιν] ἑκάτερα ἐστιν B // 34 ἄττα] ἅττα PCL // 35 μεσότητα τινά] μεσότητι
κοινά B // 39 ἀνδρία B // 1221a5 ἀσωτία] ἀσωτεία PCL // 9 καρτερία] κακ ρία
(sic) B1 // 19 δὲ καὶ] δὲ B1 // 23 ζημιώδης] ζημιότης B // 25–6 πλείω συνεπαινῶν]
πλείοσιν ἐπαινῶν B // 34 σαλάκων] μεγαλοπρεπὴς B // 1221b3 ἐστίν] ἐστιν B
// 6 ἔστι] ἐστὶ CL, ἐστὶν B // 11 τῷ] ὁ B1 // 21 τις] τίς PCL, τὶς B // 22 ἐστι] ἐστιν
B // τε] γε B // 30 ἔχει] ἔχειν B // 1222a1 ταῦτά ἐστιν] ταῦτα ἐστὶν C; ταῦτα
ἐστιν B // 12 ἄττα] ἅττα PCL // 35 ἔνθα δὲ desunt in B // 1222b1 ἐστὶν] ἐστιν B
// 6 καὶ αἱ PCL, καὶ B // 7 τίς] τὶς B // 8 ἀποβλέποντας] ἀποβλέποντα
A ppe n d i x 247
B // 13 ἐστί] ἐστίν B // 18 ϕυτὸν] ϕυτῶν B // 19 πράξεων τινῶν ἐστὶν P,

πράξεων τινῶν ἐστιν CL, πράξεών τινων ἐστὶν B // 29 κινήσεώς τινος]
κινήσεως ἐστίν B // 37 ἐστί] ἐστίν B // 39 δ’ ] δὲ B // 40 μηθὲν] μηδὲν B // 42 εἴ
πέρ ἐστιν PCL, εἴ περ ἐστιν B // 1223a2 συμβαῖνον ἐστί PCL, συμβαῖνον ἐστι
B // γε] γ’ B // 3 τἀναντία] τὰ ἐναντία B // ἐστι deest in B // 4 καὶ] καὶ αἱ B // 5
ὁ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν] ἐστὶν ὁ ἄνθρωπος B, ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐστὶν L // 9 ἐστι] ἐστιν B
// 14 ἡ2 deest in B // 15 ταῦτ᾽ ] ταῦτα B // 17–18 ἑκούσια καὶ κατὰ
προαίρεσιν . . . ὅσα δ’ desunt in B // 19–20 πάντα δ’ ὅσα προελόμενος, καὶ
ἑκὼν δηλονότι τοίνυν ὅτι PCL; ὅσα δὲ προελόμενος καὶ ἑκὼν πάντα
δηλονότι τοίνυν ὅτι B // 33 ὥστ’ ] ὥστε B // 34 εἴ βίαιον] εἴ τι βίαιον BP2, εἰ
μὴ βίαιον PC // 37 ταῦτ’ ] ταῦτα B // 39 ὁ] ὃ B // 1223b4 δόξειεν ἂν] δόξειε δ’
ἂν PC1L // 5 ἑκών τις] ἑκὼν τίς P, ἑκὼν τις B // 9 ἀκρατεύεσθαί ἐστιν]
ἀκρατεύεσθαι ἐστιν B, ἀκρατεύεσθαι ἐστίν L // 14 τὸ μὲν] μὲν τὸ B // 16
παρὰ] περὶ B1 // 17 ἀκούσιον] ἑκούσιον PC1LB2 // 20 παρὰ] περὶ B // ὥστ’ ]
ὥστε B // 21 ἑκούσιον] ἀκούσιον B1 // 22 ἔοικε] ἕοικε B // 33 πράττει] πράττη
B // 34 μὲν] μὴ B // 39 δ’ ] δὲ B // πάλιν deest in B // 1224a6 ἕν τι] ἕν τε τι B // 11
τί PCL, τὶ B // 14 πρῶτον] πρότερον B // 20 ὁρμὴν] ὀρμὴν B // 23 ἐπὶ deest in B
// 29 ἔν τινι PCLB2, ἕν τινι B1 // 32 πράττοντα] πράττοντι P1C, πράττοντ B //
34 ἀμϕισβήτησις ἐστίν] ἀμϕισβήτησις ἐστιν B // 35 ὁρμὰς] ὀρμὰς B // 1224b5
τινα deest in B // 11 ὥστ’ ] ὥστε B // 16 ἔνεστι] ἔνεστιν B // 26 ἐν] ἐν τῇ B // τί
PCL, τὶ B // 32 ἔνεστιν] ἕν ἐστιν B // 34 γιγνομένοις] γενομένοις B // πᾶσι]
πᾶσιν B // 36 τἆλλα] τἄλλα P1L, τ’ ἄλλα B // 1225a1 δὲ deest in B // 6 ὦσιν] ὦσι
PCL // 8 αὐτὸ] οὗτοι PC, ἔτι B // 12 αὑτῷ] αὐτῷ B1 // 14 ἐστί τις] ἔστι τίς P,
ἐστὶ τίς CL // 15 ἀποκτείνας] ἀποκτείνῃ PC1L // 19 αὑτῷ] ἑαυτῷ B // 20
ταῦτα] ταῦτά γε B // 25 τοῦτο ἔστιν] τοῦτ’ ἐστιν PC, τοῦτό ἐστιν L // 29 οὔτ’ ]
οὔτε B // 35 μάλιστ’ ] μάλιστα B // 1225b8 ὅσα] ὅσῳ C1, ὅσον B // 9 ἑαυτῷ]
αὑτῷ B // τὸ2] τῷ B // τὸ3] τῷ B // 13 μὲν1 deest in PCL // ἔστι] ἔστιν B // 15 τίς
PCL, τὶς B // 16 εἰ] ἦ P1C1, ἢ B // ἔχει] ἔχῃ B // 17 ἢ1 deest in P1CL // ταῦτ’ ]
ταῦτα B // 21 πέϕυκε] πέϕυκεν B // 23 ἐστιν] ἐστι PCL // 24 ζητοῦντι]
ζητοῦνται B // δόξειε δ’ ἂν PCL, δόξειεν δ’ ἂν B // 30 δὲ deest in B // 1226a1
τί PCL, τὶ B // 2 γὰρ deest in B // τι2] τί PCL, τὶ B // 7 οὐθὲν] οὐδὲν PCL // 13
τὶ] τι PCL // 23 ἐνδέχεσθαι] ἐνδέξασθαι B // 24 δ’ ] δὲ B // 25 μέν] μή CL, μὴ
B1 // ἐστι] ἔστιν B // 27 ἐγχειρήσειε] ἐγχειρήση B1 // 34 προαίρεσίς ἐστιν]
προαίρεσις ἐστὶν B // 35 ἐστίν] ἐστὶν B // 39 δρῶντες] δρῶμεν B1 // 1226b2
βούλησίς ἐστι] βούλησις ἐστὶν B // 16 δὲ] δ’ B // ἐστι] ἐστὶ B // δυνατῶν καὶ]
δυνατῶν CL, δυναμένων B // 17–18 μέν ἐστιν] μὲν ἔστιν B // 21 βούλευσίς
ἐστι] βούλευσις ἐστιν B // 24 οὔθ’ ὑπόληψις] οὔθ’ ἡ ὑπόληψις B // 26 οὐκέτι]
οὐκ ἔστι B1 // 27 αἰτιῶν] αἰτίων PCL // 28 ἐστι] ἐστιν B // διατί PCL, διατὶ B
// ἕνεκά ἐστιν] ἕνεκα ἐστὶν B // 39 οἳ] οἱ PCL // τὰ δ’ ἀκούσια desunt in B //
1227a4 ἐστί] ἐστὶν B // 6 βουλεύεται ἀεὶ ὁ βουλευόμενος ἕνεκά τινος PCL,
248 A ppe n d i x
ἀεὶ ὁ βουλευόμενος ἕνεκά του βουλεύεται B // 9 τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν] τουτέστιν PC,

τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν L // 16 τί PCL, τὶ B // 17 ἢ P1CL, καὶ ἢ B // 21 στρατοπεδεύσηται]
στρατοπεδεύσεται B // 22 τὸ1 deest in B // ἐστι] ἐστιν B // παρὰ] περὶ B // 25
τ’ ] τε BP2 // 26 μὴ ἔστιν] μή ἐστιν PC, μὴ ἐστιν L // 27 ἡ deest in B // 30 ἐστι]
ἐστιν B // 1227b7 ἐστι] ἐστιν B, ἐστὶ L // 15 τισὶ] τισι B // 25 δὴ] δεῖ B // 32
τόδε] τό γε B // 39 ἐστίν] ἐστιν B // 1228a4 οὐ τί] οὐ τὶ B, οὔ τι L // 8 ὥστ’ ]
ὥστε B // 9 οὐδεμία] οὐδὲ μία PC, οὐμία B // 10 ψεκτὸν] ψεκτον C, ψεκτὴ B
// 15 μὲν ϕαῦλα] ϕαῦλα μὲν B // 17 ὁποία τις] ὁ ποία τίς C, ὁ ποῖα τίς C, ὁ
ποῖα τις L // 18 μὲν deest in B
EUDEMIAN ETHICS III

1228a23 μεσότητες εἰσί τε] μεσότητές εἰσί τε PC; μεσότητες εἰσὶ τὲ L // 29
ἐν τῇ διαγραϕῇ] ἐκ τῇ διαγραϕῇ P1, ἐκ τῆς διαγραϕῆς CP2, ἐκ τῆς γραϕῆς
B // 1228b1 ποιοῦσι] ποιοῦσιν B // 2 τῷ μὲν γὰρ θαρρεῖν] τῷ μὲν θαρρεῖν
γὰρ B // 3 ὑπερβάλλουσι] ὑπερβάλλουσιν B // 7 τὸ ἐναντίον] τοὐναντίον B
// 8 μεγάλα] ὀλίγα B // 17 ἀνδρία B // ἄϕοβον] ἀϕόβους B, ϕόβον L // 17 ἐν
τῷ desunt in B // 23 ἐστι] ἐστιν B // 29 ἠρέμα] ἡρέμα B // 33 ὁ] ὅ PCL // 40
οὐθέν] οὐδέν B // 1229a10 κελεύει] κελεύοι B // 19 οἵ] εἰ B1 // 37
προσδεχομένοις] προσδεχομένης B1 // 42 ὅσων] ὅσοις B1 // 1229b2 εἰσι] εἰσί
PC, εἰσίν B // 6 ὑπομενετικὸς] ὑπομενητικὸς B // 11 λέγεται μόνοις] μόνοις
λέγεται B // 13 ὅταν] ὁτ’ ἂν B // 1229b14–1230a35 τὰ μὲν οὖν ϕοβερά . . . αἰσχρὸν
γάρ desunt in B // 1230b10 εἰσὶ] εἰσὶν B // 19 κωμῳδοδιδάσκαλοι]
κωμοδιδάσκαλοι P1CL, κωμοδοδιδάσκαλοι B // 25 τὸ γευστὸν καὶ τὸ
ἁπτόν] τὸ ἁπτόν καὶ τὸ γευστὸν B // 31 γοῦν] οὖν B // 32 ᾄδοντος] ᾅδοντος
B // 33 μήτε ἐσθίειν] μήτ’ ἐσθίειν B // 1231a14 ὅσων] ὅσον L, ὄσοις B1 // 15
ἔοικεν] ἕοικεν B (bis) // 16–17 ἀλλὰ τὸν ϕάρυγγα] ἀλλὰ τὴν χεῖρα καὶ τὸν
ϕάρυγγα B // 25 λέγονται] λέγωνται B // 1231a28–1231b2 ἀναίσθητος μὲν
οὖν . . . προσαγορευομένη desunt in B // 1231b9 ἐστι] ἐστὶ B // 14 τῷ1] τὸ B1
// τῷ2 ] τὸ B1// τὸ2] τῷ B1 16 ἐνταῦθ’ ] ἐνταῦθα B // 19 ὁποίοις] οἷς B // 22
ἕξις] ἕξεις B1 // 23 οὐκ deest in B // 26 ἀνδραποδώδους] ἀνδραπωδώδους
PCL // 33 ἐπὶ deest in B // ὁ2 deest in B // 34 ἔσχατα εἰσὶ] ἔσχατά εἰσι PCL //
39 χρηματιστικήν] χρημαστικήν B1 // 1232a4 ὑποδήματι] ὑποδήματα PCL
// 4 νόμισμά ἐστιν] νόμισμα ἐστὶν B // 11 περὶ μόρια] ἀνελεύθερα B // 17
ἀπὸ] τοῦ B // 20 ἴδιον] αἴτιον PCLB2, εὔδιον B1 // 23 συμβέβηκεν] συμβέβηκε
PCL // 26 ὑπομενετικὸς] ὑπομενητικὸς B, ὑπομονητικὸς L // 28 δὲ] δὲ καὶ B
// 33 ἐπαινετόν] ἔπαινετόν B // 37 κελεύσειε] κελεύσειεν B // 1232b7 τί] τὶ B
// 10 μάλιστ’ ] μάλιστα B // 11 ὧν deest in B // 23 ἀγαθὰ τίμια] τίμια ἀγαθὰ B
// 25 μεγαλοψύχους] μεγαλοψύχως B // 26 ἔστι] ἐστί B // τις] τίς PCL // 29 τὰ
δ᾽ οὔ] τὰ δ’ ὡς διωρίσθη πρότερον PCL // 33 ἑαυτὸν τούτων] αὑτον αὐτῶν B
// 36–7 μεγάλων ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτὸν . . . μεγάλων desunt in B // 1233a1 ἑαυτόν]
A ppe n d i x 249
αὑτὸν B // 11 οὐκ ὄντες] μικροὶ ὄντες B // 13 δι’ ἃ δικαίως ἂν ἠξιοῦτο

(ἠξιοῦντο PC)] αὐτῷ μεγάλων B // 14 ὥστ’ ] ὥστε B // 16 διορισθέντων]
ὡρισθέντων PC, ὁρισθέντων B // 19 μικρῶν] μικρὸν B1 // 21 ἔχει, καὶ desunt
in B // 22 ἐστι] ἔστι B // 27 καὶ deest in B // 28 ἄρχειν μὴ] μὴ ἄρχειν B // 38
παρὰ μέλος] παραμέλος B // 1233b11 αὐτῷ] αὑτῷ B // 15 ὡσαύτως] ὡς
αὕτως B // 21 πράττουσίν ἐστι] πράττουσιν ἐστὶν P, πράττουσιν ἐστιν B // 23
κακοπραγίαις] κακοπραξίαις B1 // 24 νεμεσητικός] μεσητικός B1 // 28
μηδεμιᾶς] μὴ δὲ μιᾶς P, μηδὲ μιᾶς C, μιᾶς L // 31 ϕιλία] ϕιλίας B // 35
βέλτιστον] βέλτιστος B1 // 36 αὐθαδείας] αὐθαδίας B // 38 πάντων] πάντα B
// ἄρεσκος] ἄρεστος B // 1234a5 ἀγροίκου] ἀδίκου B // 9–10 ἀλλὰ χαλεπῶς
προσίεται desunt B // 18 μέν] μέν οὖν B // 22 λεχθὲν] τεχθὲν B1 // 27 πάντ’ ]
πάντα B // 30 πως] πῶς PCL // 1234b6 γίγνονται] γίνονται B // 7 δὲ] δ’ B // 8
ὁτὲ] ὀτὲ B // 9 ὁτὲ δὲ] ὁ δὲ B

1234b17 ἠθικῶν εὐδημίων ζ-ον P1C, ἀριστοτέλους σταγειρίτου ἠθικῶν
εὐδημίων δ-ον B, ἀριστοτέλους ἠθικῶν εὐδημίων ζ´ L // 18 περὶ] περὶ δὲ B //
ποῖόν τι] ποῖον τί C, ποῖον τί ἐστὶν B // τίς] πῶς B1 // 20 ἐστίν] ἔστίν B // 21
τί] τὶ B // 33 τὸν ϕίλον] καὶ τὸν ϕίλον B // 1235a14 τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ ἐναντίῳ]
τῷ ἐναντίῳ τὸ ἐναντίον B // 17 τὸ deest in B // 22 πλέονι] πλέιονι B // 26
ἐπιτιμᾷ τῷ ποιήσαντι desunt in B // 27 ἀπόλοιτο] ἀπόλλοιτο B // 29 εἰσί]
εἰσίν B // 32 τοὺς deest in B // 35 γοῦν] οὖν PCL // 1235b8 τοῖς δὲ σπανιώτατον
γνῶναι] τοῖς δ’ οὐ B // 15 μάλιστα] μάλιστ’ B // 16 τὰ ἐναντία] τἀναντία B
// 20 καὶ deest in B // 35 σώματι] σώματα B // 36 σώματι] σώματα B //
1236a1 ἀδιαϕθόρῳ] ἀδιαϕόρῳ B // 8 τοιόνδ’ ] τοιόνδε B // 12 τι] τε B // 17
καθ’ ἓν] καθ’ ἑνὸς B // 23–4 ἐν δὲ τῷ τοῦ ἰατροῦ λόγῳ οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ τοῦ
ὀργάνου desunt in B // 29 μὴ] μὲν B // 38 Μεγαρῆας] μεγαρέας B // 1236b5
ἀντιϕιλῶν] ὁ ἀντιϕιλῶν B // 10 συνεδρείας] συνεδρίας B // διεδρείας]
διεδρίας B // 11 οἱ] οἵ B, οὐ L // 14 οἱ δ’ οὖν] οὐδ’ οὐ PCL, οἵ δ’οὐ B // οὐ deest
in B // 30 τἀγαθά] τ’ ἀγαθὰ B // 39 τὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὰ οὕτως εἶναι ἀγαθά] τὰ
ἁπλῶς εἶναι ἀγαθὰ ἀγαθὰ B // 1237a1 αὐτόν] αὑτόν B (C post corr.) // 3
ὅπως] ὅ πως B // 9 τἀγαθὸν] τὸ ἀγαθὸν B // 20 τί] τὶ B // ποτ’ ] πότε B //
ἐστὶ] ἔσται B // 21 κἂν εἰ μὴ] κἂν ᾖ μὴ P, κἂν μὴ B // 1237b2 ᾗ2] ᾖ B // 4 ᾗ] ἦ
B // 7 μή] δή B1 // 11 κεκριμένον] κεκριμμένον B // 15 γυναικός] γαναικός B
// 21 ὥστ’ ] ὥστε B // 21–2 οὐδ’ εἰ] οὐχ οἳ B // 23–4 τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον] τὸν
τοῦτον τρόπον B // 27 ἄπιστος γὰρ] αὕτη γὰρ ἄπιστος B1 // 31 ϕίλου]
ϕαύλου B // οὐθεὶς] οὐδεὶς B // 37 τοῦ νοῦν ἔχοντος] τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα PC, τόν
γε νοῦν ἔχοντα B // βέλτιον] βέλτιστον B // 1238a5 τῷ1] τὸ B // δὲ2 deest in
PCL // 20 δὲ] γὰρ B // 24 χρόνον] χρόνῳ P1CL // 1238b5 τὰ ἀγαθά] τἀγαθά B
// 11 τινος] τινὸς PL, τις B // οἷον deest in B1 // ᾗ] ἢ PCL // ἔνι] ἐνὶ P, ἑνὶ CL,
250 A ppe n d i x
ἕνι B // 12 ἂν] ἐν B1 // 20 κατ’ ] κατὰ B // 24 post ἀρχομένου e b19 καθάπερ

καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἕτερον iterum ins. B // 28 τοῦ ἄρχοντος] τὸν ἄρχοντα B //
ϕιλεῖν2 deest in B // 29 ἧττον] ἥ τε PC, ἡ τέ B, εἰ τε L // τοῦ] τῷ B // 30 αὑτοῦ]
αὐτοῦ PCL // 37 τοιαῦτ’ ] τοιαῦτα B // 1239a4 ὑπεροχήν εἰσι] ὑπεροχήν
ἐστιν B // 5 ἂν εἴη εἰ desunt in B1 // 12 κατ’ ] κατὰ B // 22 κατ’ ἰσότητα] καθ’
ἵσότητα B // 23 κόλαξ] κόραξ B // 26 ἐν ὑπεροχῇ] ἐν ὑπεροχῇ ἐστίν B // 28
ϕιλότιμος μᾶλλον] μᾶλλον ϕιλότιμος B // 30–1 ἔνεστι γὰρ ἀνάγκη
ἐνεργοῦντα P1CL, desunt in B // 31 τὸ μὲν γὰρ ϕιλεῖσθαι συμβεβηκός] τὸ
μὲν γὰρ ϕιλ συμβεβηκός P1, τὸ μὲν γὰρ ϕιλεῖν συμβεβηκός CL, συμβεβηκός
γὰρ τὸ ϕιλεῖν B // 33 τὸ2] τῷ B // ϕιλεῖσθαι] ϕιλεῖσθαι ἔστι B // 35–6 ἐν ταῖς
ὑποβολαῖς] ἐν ταῖς ὑπερβολαῖς PCL, desunt in B // 36 ποιοῦσι] ποιοῦσιν B //
37 ἐθέλειν] θέλειν B // 38 αὑτοῦ] αὐτοῦ CL, deest in B // καὶ deest in B // τι]
τί PCL, τὶ B // ἀλλὰ μὴ ποιεῖν desunt in B // 1239b1 τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦ ϕίλου
ἕνεκα] τοῦ ϕιλεῖν καὶ τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦ ϕίλου ἕνεκα B1, τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦ
ϕιλεῖν ἕνεκα L // 3 γινώσκουσι γάρ ἀλλ’ οὐ γινώσκονται desunt in B // 5
ἀντιϕιλεῖσθαι] ἀντιϕιλεῖν B // 6 κατ’ ἰσότητα] καθ’ ἵσότητα B // οἱ καθ’
desunt in B // 7–8 καὶ κατ’ ἀρχὰς desunt in B // 8 ὑπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν
συμπεριλαμβανόντων desunt in B // 9 τὸ ἐναντίον] τοὐναντίον B // 10 καὶ
περὶ τούτων desunt in B // 23 αὐτὸ] αὑτὸ B // 32 συμβεβηκός ἐστι]
συμβεβηκὸς ἐστὶ B // 39 ἐστί] ἐστίν B // 1240a4 καὶ deest in B // 8 ἢ μή desunt
in B // 11 ϕίλους deest in B // 15 ϕιλεῖν] τὸ ϕιλεῖν B // 17 πὼς] πῶς PCL, πως
B // 25 ἀγαθὰ] τἀγαθὰ B // 1240b3 ἀληθῶς] ἀληθεῖς B // 6 διά τι] διατί PC,
διότι B // 23 εἰ δεῖ ὥσπερ] εἰ δεῖ ὥσπερ εἰ δεῖ B // 26 αὐτοις PC1L, αὐτούς B
// 28 δύ’ ] δύο B // 32 προαίρεσιν] προαίρεσις B // 1241a11 ἐστί] ἐστὶν B // 14
ἔοικεν] ὡς ἔοικεν B // 16 πάντα] ταῦτα πάντα B // 25 τοὺς] τὸ B // 36
παθόντας] παθόντες B1 // 37 ὑπολάβοι μὲν] ὑπολάβοιμεν P1CL, ὑπολάβοιεν
BP2 // 38 συμβαίνειν] συμβαίνει P1CL // 1241b3 σπουδὴ ἐστὶ] σπουδή ἐστι
PCL, σπουδή ἐστιν B // 9 διορίζουσι] διορίζουσιν B // 13 πολιτεῖαι]
πολιτείαι B // τι] τί PCL, τὶ B // 20 διαιρετὸν τὸ ἀγαθὸν] τὸ ἀγαθὸν διαιρετὸν
B // 21 ἕνεκά ἐστιν] ἕνεκά ἐστι B // 24 πόλεως] μόλεως B1 // 25 πολιτεῖαι]
πολιτείαι B // 26 πολιτεῖαι] πολιτείαι B // 27 ἐπὶ deest in B // 30 τυραννὶς]
τοραννὶς B // 33 εἴδη] ἤδη B1 // 36 ἀρίστη] ἀρετὴ B1 // 38 δὲ] δ’ B // 1242a1
λέγονται] λέγων P1C, λέγω B // 3 κατ’ ] κατὰ B // 4 κατ᾽ ] κατὰ B // ἀριθμὸν]
ἀριθμῶν B1 // 7 δοκοῦσι] δοκοῦσιν B // 19–20 δίκαιόν τι ἐστίν] δίκαιον τί
ἐστι PCL, δίκαιον τί ἐστιν B // 21 κοινωνοῖς] κοιρωνεις B1 // 37 τι] τοι B //
1242b3 κατ’ ] κατὰ B // 11 κατ’ ] κατὰ B // 17 συζεύγνυσι] συζεύγνυσιν B //
19 ἀνισάσαι] ἀνισῶσαι B // 27 καὶ ἄρχον] deest in B, καὶ ἄρχων L // 34 ὅταν]
ὅτι B1 // 36 καὶ deest in B // 1243a8 ἐστὶ] ἐστιν B // 11 οἱ] οἵ B // 13 αὑτοῖς]
αὐτοῖς PCL // 14 πιστεύσωσι] πιστεύσωσιν B // 23 ἠδύνατο] ἐδύνατο BP2C2
// 34 δὲ] δ’ B // 35 τι] τί PCL // 1243b3 οὐθὲν] οὐδὲν B // 10 προαίρεσιν] τὴν
A ppe n d i x 251
προαίρεσιν B // 14 πολλὰ ἐγκλήματα γίνεται] γίνεται πολλὰ ἐγκλήματα B

// 29 λόγῳ] λόγου B1 // 31 μὴ τῷ] μὴ τὸ PCL, τὸ B1 // 1244a3–4 πρόβλημά
ἐστι] πρόβλημά ἐστιν B // 9 ἐστὶν] ἐστιν PC, ἔστιν L // 10 λέγει Εὐριπίδης]
Εὐριπίδης λέγει B // 11 λόγων] λόγον PCL, deest in B // ἂν deest in B // 11
ἔργον] ἔργων PCL // 13 ἔστιν] ἐστὶν B // 14 πάσας] πόσας P1CL // 16 ἄλλα]
ἀλλὰ PC, ἄλλαι L // 19 τούτῳ PCL, τούτο B1 // 27 εἰσι] εἰσί PCL, εἰσιν B //
1244b4 εἰ1] εἰ δὲ B, ἢ L // ἢ οὔ] ἢ ὁ PCL, desunt in B // 5 τί] τὶ B // 6 αὐτάρκους]
αὐταρκῶς P1C, αὐταρκῆ B, αὐτάρκῶς L // 17 ὅταν γὰρ] ὅταν μὲν γὰρ B // 18
μηθενὸς] μηδενὸς B // 24 τί] τὶ B // 36 ἐκ τούτων desunt in B // 1244b36–
1245a1 τὸ αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχειν τὴν τοιαύτην ϕύσιν] τὸ αὐτὸ τοῖς ὑπάρχειν τὴν
τοιαύτην ϕύσιν P1CL, τὸ αὐτὸ τοῖς ἔχουσι τοιαύτην ϕύσιν B // 1245a2
συστοιχίας] εὐτυχείας P1C, εὐτυχίας B, εὐστοχίας L // 5 βούλεσθαί ἐστιν]
βούλεσθαι ἐστιν B, βούλεσθαι ἐστίν L // 9–10 διὰ τοῦτο] διὰ τουτων B1,
διατοῦτο L // 11 ὅτι deest in B // 15 ἢ] εἰ B // 19 καὶ deest in B // 20 ἥδιον]
ἡδεῖον P1C1, ὡς B // 25 τοῦτο γινόμενον] τούτου γινόμενον PCL, τοῦτο
γενόμενον B // 29 γινόμενον] γιγνόμενον B // 30 δ᾽ deest in PCL // 1245b3
καὶ2 deest in B // 11 ϕανερόν] ϕανερός P1CL // 15 οἷος] οἷον PCL // 19 ἐστιν]
ἐστίν PC, ἐστι L // 27 ὁτὲ] ὀτὲ B // 28 ὁτὲ] ὀτὲ B // 32 θητεύειν] θηπεύειν PC,
θηστεύειν B // 1246a5 ἐπεὶ δὴ] ἐπειδὴ PCL, ἐπει δὴ B // 7 συνδειπνεῖν]
συνδεικνεῖν B1 // 8 τις] τίς PCL // 13 τοὺς τοιούτους] τοὺς PCL // 16 τὸν
ϕίλον θεωρεῖν] τὸν θεωρεῖν τὸν ϕίλον B // 18 ἄλλο τι] ἄλλό τι B

1246a27 ἑκάστῳ] ἑκάστῳ ϕίλῳ LC2, ἐϕ’ ἑκάστῳ ϕίλῳ B // 28–9 ἢ αὐτὸ ἡδὺ
κατὰ συμβεβηκός PCL, ἢ αὐτὸ ἡδὺ ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός B // 31 ὅτι μὲν] ὅτι
μὲν δὴ B // 38 ἀδικήσει ἄρα ἀπὸ δικαιοσύνης . . . 1246b1 ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης
desunt in B // 1246b3 ἀλλὰ] ἀλλ’ B // 16–18 ἢ ἔστι . . . ἕτερᾳ μεταποιοῦνται
desunt in B // 33 πάντα] πάντα ἃ B // 38 γνώσεως] γνώσ PCL // 1247a1 ποιούσης]
εὐποιούσης PC, εὖ ποιούσης L // 5 ἐστὶ] ἐστιν B // 11 τῷ τοδὶ τοιονδὶ ἔχειν]
τῷ τὸ δεῖν τοιὸν δεῖ ἔχειν PC, τῷ τοιόνδε δεῖν ἔχειν B, τῷ τὸ δεῖν τοιονδὶ
ἔχειν L // 14 διατί1 PCL, διατὶ B // διατί2 PCL, διατὶ B // 21 δεινότατοι]
δυνότατοι P, δυνώτατοι C, δυνατώτατοι B // 28 ϕύσει ἢ νόῳ] ϕυσειόω B1 //
29 μὴ ἔστι] μή ἐστι PC, μὴ ἔστιν B // 34 τοιοσδὶ] τοῖος δεῖ P, τοῖος δὴ CL,
deest in B // 36 ἐστὶν] ἐστιν B // 37 εἰσὶν] εἰσιν B // 1247b3 οὐκ αἰτία] οὐκέτι
PCLB2, οὐκ ἔτι B1 // 7 ὁριζόμενοι] ὀριζόμενοι B // 10 διὰ τί . . . 11 τὸ αὐτὸ
αἴτιον desunt in B // 12 τοῦτο] οὐ τὸ PC, οὐτὸ L // 15 αἱ deest in B // 16
συμβαίνειν] συμβαίνῃ PC, συμβῆναι L // 17 οὐχ . . . 18 βάλλειν desunt in B //
19 τί] τὶ B // ἆρ᾽] ἄρ’ PCL // 20 εἰ] ἡ B1 // 21 ἐστι] ἐστιν B // 23 ᾄδειν] ἅδειν
B // 24 πέϕυκε] πέϕυκεν B // 26 κατορθώσουσι] κατορθοῦσι PCL,
κατορθοῦσιν B // 30 ὁρμῆς] ὀρμῆς B // 34–5 εὐτυχεῖν διὰ ϕύσιν ἐνδέχεται]
252 A ppe n d i x
εὐτυχεῖν ϕασὶ διὰ τύχην ἐνδέχεται B // 35 ὁρμὴ] ὀρμὴ B // κατώρθωσεν]

κατόρθωσεν B1 // 1248a3 παρὰ] περὶ B // 5 εὐτυχία] εὐτυχεία PC; ἡ εὐτυχία
L // 6 ὅτ᾽ ἔδει] ὅτε ἔδει τὸ PC; ὅτε ἔδειτο L // 7 δὴ] δεῖ PCL // 9 ὑπὸ τινός]
ὑπό τινος B // μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ] μὲν ἂν δοκεῖ PC, μὲν ἂν δοκοῖ B // 10 τοῦτο]
τούτου PCL // παρὰ1] περὶ B // 17 ἆρ᾽ ] ἄρ’ P1CL // 22–3 οὐδὲ τοῦ βουλεύσασθαι
bis B // 23 ὥστ’ ] ὥστε B // 25 διὰ τὸ τοιαύτη [τὸ] εἶναι τοιοῦτο δύναται
ποιεῖν] διατί τοιαύτη τὸ εἶναι τὸ τοῦτο δύνασθαι ποιεῖν PCL, διατὶ τοιαύτη
τὸ τοῦτο δύνασθαι ποιεῖν B // 26 τίς] τις B // 29 τί] τὶ B // ἂν κρεῖττον]
κρεῖττον ἂν B // 30 πλὴν] ἢ B // 34 τοῦτο δ’ ] τοῦτον B // 34–5 καὶ ἐνθουσιάζουσι
desunt in B // 36 ἐπιτυγχάνουσι] ἀποτυγχάνουσι PCL, ἀποτυγχάνουσιν B //
1248b1 ἀπολυομένου τοῦ λόγου] ἀπολυομένους τοὺς λόγους PCL,
ἀπολυομένου τοὺς λόγους B // 2 μνημονεύουσι] μνημονεύουσιν B // 16–17
τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν τρόπον] τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἔχειν B // 17 τὸ1] τῷ B // 18 καθ’
αὑτὰ] κατὰ ταυτὰ τὰ P, κατὰ ταὐτὰ τὰ C, κατὰ ταῦτα B, κατ’ αὐτὰ τὰ L //
19 τὴν deest in PCL // 21 ἐπαινετά ἐστιν] ἐπαινετὰ ἐστίν B // 25 οὐδὲ τὸ]
οὐδέ τοι B // ἀλλ᾽ ἀγαθὰ] ἀλλὰ τἀγαθὰ PCL // 26 ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων] ἐπ’ ἄλλων
B // 30–1 βλαβερὰ τισὶ] βλαβερά τισι B // 34 ὑγιοῦς] ὑγιαίνοντος B //
κόσμοις deest in B // 1249a3 δι’ αὐτά] δι’ αὑτά B // 6 πράττουσι] πράττουσιν
PC, πράττωσι L // 7 διὸ] διότι PCL, δι’ ὅ τι B // 11 ἐστι] ἐστιν B // 13 ἐστι]
ἐστιν B // δ’ ] δὲ B // 16 κατὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς τὰ καλὰ πράττει] καὶ τῷ
συμβεβηκὸς τὰ καλὰ πράττειν B // 23 δ’ ] δὲ B // ἔστι τις] ἔστι τίς C, ἐστί τις
B // ὃν] ὃ P1C1L // 1249b15 ἐπιτακτικὸς] ἐπιτακτικῶς PCL // 16 ἐπιτάττει]
ἐπιτάττοι B // 17 κεῖνός] τινος B // γε] τε PCL, τὸ B // 21 ὅρος] ὄρος B
(7) Readings shared by PB and not in CL or in

CL and not in PB (readings in PB presumed
correct are in bold)
EUDEMIAN ETHICS I
1214b35 ἐλάττων] ἐλάττω CL // 1215a6 εἰσίν] εἰσί CL // 32 μισθαρνικάς]
μισθανικάς CL1 // 33 τῶν δ᾽ εἰς] τῶν εἰς CL1 // 1215b27 συναγάγοι]
συναγάγει CL // 1217a1 οἳ] οἱ PB // 32 λέγωμεν] λέγομεν PB // 36 κρείττοσιν]
κρείττουσιν CL // 1217b33 διδάσκον] διδάσκων CL
EUDEMIAN ETHICS II
1219a6 γάρ τι] γὰρ τί CL // 1225a7 γάρ ϕασιν] γὰρ ϕασὶν PB // 1225b10
ταῦτ’ ] ταῦτα PB // 1226a4 ἡ] ἢ CL // 24 αὐτῶν] αὐτῆς CLB2 // 1226b9 ἐστιν]
ἐστὶν PB // 1227a28 τῆς] τοῖς CL // 1227b41 τῶν] τῆς CL
A ppe n d i x 253
EUDEMIAN ETHICS III

1228a30 πως] πῶς CL // 1230a36 ἐστιν] ἐστὶν PB // 1231a11 εἰσίν] εἰσιν C,
εἰσι L // 1233a23 αὑτοὺς] αὐτοὺς CL // 24 ἐστιν] ἐστὶν PB // 1234b1 τοῖς
ἄκροις] ἐν τοῖς ἄκροις PBC2

1235a37 ἄχρηστα ] χρηστὰ P1B; χρησταὶ C // 1236b30 αὑτὸν ] αὐτὸν PB
// 1237a19 πότερον ἔστιν ] πότερόν ἐστιν CL // 1238b11 ἔνι ] ἐνὶ P, ἑνὶ
CL, ἕνι B // 34 ποιῶσιν ] ποιῶσι PB // 1239a31 τὸ μὲν γὰρ ϕιλεῖσθαι
συμβεβηκός] τὸ μὲν γὰρ ϕιλ συμβεβηκός P1, τὸ μὲν γὰρ ϕιλεῖν
συμβεβηκός CL, συμβεβηκός γὰρ τὸ ϕιλεῖν B // 1242a13 τινος] τινός
CL // 1246a8 ἐπειδὴ εἴ γέ ] ἐπειδή γε P1, ἐπεὶ δέ γε CL, ἐπεὶ B

1247a34 τοιοσδὶ] τοῖος δεῖ P, τοῖος δὴ CL, deest in B // 1247b19 ὁρμαὶ] ὀρμαὶ
PB // 1249a11 καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ] καὶ αὑτὰ τὰ C, καὶ αὐτὰ L
(8) Readings found in P and not in CBL (readings

in P presumed correct are in bold)
EUDEMIAN ETHICS I
1214a23 δαιμονίου] δαιμονίᾳ CBL // 1214b5 δ’ 2] δὲ P // 7 ἐπιστήσαντας]
〈ἀλλ’〉 ἄλλως] ἄλλως P1, ἀλλ’ ὡς CBLP2 // 1215b34 post προτιμήσειε iterum
ἐπιστήσαντα P1 // 1215a15 οὐδὲ2] οὐδὲ διὰ P // 19 αὑτοὺς] αὐτοὺς CBL // 28
scripsit πορίζοι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις P1 // 36 διενέγκειε] διηνέγκειε C, διενέγκειεν

B, διενέγκοιεν L // 1216b7 ὥσθ’ ἅμα] ὥστ’ ἅμα P1 // 8 ἅμα] ἄμα P // 22 ἐστίν]
ἐστι P // 23 ἀνδρεῖοι] ἀνδεῖοι P1 // 27 πειρατέον] πειράτον P // 32 οἰκεῖόν τι]
οἰκεῖον τί CL, οἰκεῖον τὶ B // 39 τὸ τί] τὸ τὶ P // 1217a16–17 ὁ λόγος. ἔστι] ὁ λόγος
ἐστί. ἔστι P // 19 λέγωμεν] λέγομεν P // 1217b21 λέγωμεν] λέγομεν P // 27
τῷ ὄντι ἀγαθόν] τῷ ὄντι τὸ ἀγαθόν P, τὸ τῷ ὄντι ἀγαθόν B, τωόντι ἀγαθόν
L // τό τε] τότε P // 37 θεωρῆσαι] τὸ θεωρῆσαι P // 1218a34 ἴδιόν τι] ἴδιον τί
P // 1218b2 ὑπάρξει] ὑπάρξη CBL // ἰατρικὴ] ἡ ἰατρικὴ P // 4 πολλαχῶς]
ποσαχῶς CBL // 18 τἆλλα] τἄλλα CB1L
EUDEMIAN ETHICS II
1219a16 ὑγίανσις] ὑγίασις CBLP2 // 1219b1 τό τε] τότε P // 8 εὔδαιμον]
εὐδαῖμον CBL // 38 οὐκουσία vel οὐκουσιᾳ P, οὐσία vel οὐσίᾳ CBL // 1220a9
διανοητικαὶ] διανοτικαὶ P // 22 αὐτῶν] αὐτῆς CBL // 39–40 λυπηρά ἐστι]
254 A ppe n d i x
λυπηρὰ ἐστὶ P, λυπηρά ἐστιν B // 1220b11 ἀπηλλαγμένοις] ἀπηλαγμένοις

P1, ἀπηλεγμένοις L // 18 δέ εἰσιν] δὲ εἰσὶν P // 23 πρὸς ἄλληλα] προσάλληλα
P // 1221a13 τὰ τοιαῦτα] τοιαῦτα P1 // 17 καὶ3 deest in CBL // 1221b6 ἔστι]
ἐστὶ CL, ἐστὶν B // 22 συνειλημμένον] συνηλημμένον P1 // 1222a37
ἀϕέστηκε] ἀϕέστηκεν P // 1222b9 ἐπισκεπτέον] σκεπτέον P // 19 πράξεών
τινών ἐστιν] πράξεων τινῶν ἐστὶν P, πράξεων τινῶν ἐστιν CL, πράξεών
τινων ἐστὶν B // 1223a22 ἄρα] ἆρα P // 23 ἐπεἰ δὲ] ἐπεί δε P // 1223b8 παρ’ ὃ]
παρὸ P // 36 γε] γενέσθαι P // 1224a31 διὰ λογισμὸν] διαλογισμὸν CBL // 40
ὥσθ’ ] ὥστε P // 1224b40 δὲ deest in P // 1225a12 πώς] πως P, πῶς CBL // 14
ἐστί τις] ἔστι τίς P, ἐστὶ τίς CL, ἐστί τις B // 25 τοῦτο ἔστιν] τοῦτο ἐστὶν P,
τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν C, τοῦτό ἐστιν L // 26 ἐστὶ] ἐστι P, ἔστι CBL // 1225b8 ἄρα] ἆρ’
P, ἆρα C // 1226a1 οὐδ’ ] οὐδὲ P // 23 βουλεύσασθαι] βουλεύασθαι P1 // 25
μέν] μή CL, μὴ B1 // 30 ἐστι] ἐστὶ P // 33 τῶν ἡμῖν] τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν C1BL //
1226b16 δυνατῶν καὶ] δυνατῶν CL, δυναμένων B // 1227b10 ποιός τις]
ποῖός τις CBL // 12 ποιός τις] ποῖός τις CBL // 1228a17 ὁποία τις] ὁ ποία τίς
P, ὁ ποῖα τίς C, ὁ ποῖα τις L
EUDEMIAN ETHICS III

1228a25 λέγωμεν] λέγομεν P // 29 ἐν τῇ διαγραϕῇ] ἐκ τῇ διαγραϕῇ P1, ἐκ
τῆς διαγραϕῆς CP2, ἐκ τῆς γραϕῆς B // 30 ἐστί] ἐστι CB, ἔστι L // 1228b20
ἀγαθά ἐστιν] ἀγαθα ἔστιν P // 33 τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν] τοιοῦτοι εἰσὶν CBL // 37
θᾶττόν τε] θᾶττον τὲ CBL // 1229b27 ὑπομένει] ὑπομένοι P (deest in B) //
1230b2 τό τε] τότε P // 8 ἀνίατοι] οἱ ἀνίατοι P // 29 ὀσϕρήσεως] ὀσϕρίσεως
P // 31 τις] τίς P // 1231b25 τις] τίς P // 1232a1 ἐστιν] ἐστὶν CBL // 1233a20
ἄξιον] ἀξίῳ P // 1233b7 ἐστίν] ἐστιν P // 8 παρὰ] περὶ P1 // 1234a15
εὐτραπελίας] εὐτραπελείας P

1235a8 αἰεὶ] ἀεὶ P, deest in CB // 27 ἂν deest in P // 28 θήλεος] θηριεος P1 //
1235b14 τὰ] τά τε P // 25 περὶ] περὶ δὲ P // 32 ἐστιν] ἐστὶν P // 1236a5
καθεστῶτα] καὶ καθεστῶτα P // 10 ἐπεὶ δὲ] ἐπείδε P // 1236a16 λανθάνῃ]
λανθάνει P // 25 τὸ deest in P // 1236b3 ἐστιν] ἐστὶν P // 1237a4 καὶ deest in P
// 21 κἂν εἰ μὴ] κἂν ᾖ μὴ P, κἂν μὴ B // 1237b28 αὑτῷ] αὐτῷ P // 32
προσνέμεται] προνέμεται CB1L // 1238a18 καὶ δυστυχίαι] καὶ δυστυχεῖαι P,
desunt in CB, καὶ αἱ δυστυχίαι L // 1238b2 χρήσιμος] χρήσιμον CBL // 11
ἔτι] ἐπὶ P1 // 37 εἴρηκεν Εὔνικος] εὕρηκέν νεῖκος P; εὕρηκεναι νεῖκος CBL
// 1239a6 δὲ2 deest in CBL // 27 ϕιλητικὸς] ϕιλοτικὸς P // 38 αὑτοῦ] αὐτοῦ
CL, deest in B // 1239b19 αὑτῷ] αὐτῷ P // 34 εἰς τὸ] εἰστὸ P // 1240a2 εἰς τὸ]
εἰστὸ P // 9 ϕίλος] ϕίλω P // 15 αὑτῷ] αὐτῷ P // 31 πρὸς ἄλληλα] προσάλληλα
P // 1240b22 πρότερον] πότερον P1 // 1241a5 οὔτ’1] οὔτε P // 31 ᾖ] ᾗ P //
A ppe n d i x 255
1241b16 σύνορα] συνορᾷ CBL // 25 χρηματιστικαὶ] χρηματικαὶ CBL // 34 ἡ

ἑταιρικὴ] ἡ ἑτερικὴ P1 // 1242a5 ἐπιλαμβάνουσι] ἐπιλαμβάνουσιν P // 33–4
εὖ ποιήσαντος] εὐποιήσαντος P // 1243b4 πολιτικοί ] πολιτοὶ P1 // 7
διείποντο] διποντο P1 // 9 ἐστὶν] ἔστιν P // 13 ϕήσῃ] ϕήσει P // 1244a15
ἔστιν] ἐστὶν P, ἐστιν CBL // 21 πώς] πῶς P, πως CBL // εἰσι] εἰσὶ CBL // 26–7
λέγονται τινά] λέγονταί τινα CBL // 30 δόντι] ὄντι CB, δίδοντι L // 1244b15
εἰς τὸ] εἰστὸ P // 22 μέν τι] μέν P1 // 1245a16–17 τε οὔτε διδάσκειν οὔτε] τοῦ
τε διδάσκειν οὐτε C, τοῦτε διδάσκειν τοῦτε B1, τοῦτε δοκεῖν οὔτε L //
1245b40 ϕαίνωνται] ϕαίνονται P // 1246a13 ἥδιστον] ἡδίστους P1 // 18 διὰ
τὴν] διατὶ P

1246a34 χρῆσθαι] χρῆσται P // 1246b8 ἁπλῆ] ἁπλὴ P // 34 ἐν τῇ] ἐντῇ P //
1247a21 δεινότατοι] δυνότατοι P, δυνώτατοι C, δυνατώτατοι B // 34
τοιοσδὶ] τοῖος δεῖ P, τοῖος δὴ CL, deest in B // 1247b12 ἀλλ’ ὅταν] ἄλλο ταν
P1; ἄλλο τ’ ἂν L // 31 ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον] ἀλλ’ οὐ τοὐναντίων P, ἀλλ’ οὐ
τοὐναντίον CB // 1248a30–1 διὰ τοῦτο] διατοῦτο P1 // 1248b5 ἐστιν] ἐστὶν P
// 18 καθ’ αὑτὰ] κατὰ ταυτὰ τὰ P, κατὰ ταὐτὰ τὰ C, κατὰ ταῦτα B, κατ’
αὐτὰ τὰ L
Index
accentuation, double 2 Kassel, R. 128–9

ἄν, optative without in main clauses 44, Kosman, L. 167–8
60, 78, 79, 219
L as direct descendant of ω 137
B copyist vii n.1 Laur. 81,4 4, 19, 47, 64, 79, 93, 96, 102,
Bessarion 1–2, 3, 9, 16, 17, 22, 44, 60, 107, 111, 119, 132, 147, 203
64, 66, 96, 97, 109, 110, 111, 145, 152, Laur. 81,12 2, 105
175, 210 Laur. 81,20 12, 227
book endings 20–1, 100–1, 179, 180, 226–7 L copyist vii n.1
book titles, style of 1
Breier, F. 108 Nikolaos of Messina vii n.1, 38, 46, 60,
78, 80, 96, 100–1, 104, 108, 112, 149,
Castellani, V. 84–5 153, 174, 199
Chalkondyles, D. 5, 7, 68, 188, 193 nu ephelkustikon 60, 78, 120, 150
conjectures in derivative MSS 83
connectives, absence of 15, 19, 33, 48, Pal. 165 3
61, 73, 78, 98, 106, 108, 109, 110, 121, parentheses 15, 24, 32–3, 43, 57,
163, 164–5, 172, 207, 216 69–70, 214
Cook Wilson, J. 18, 34, 168 poetry, quotation of 1, 105, 107, 111
crasis marks 3, 17, 39, 51, 72, 87, 105, Primavesi, O. 102
142, 148, 218 pronunciation, Byzantine 4, 103,
111, 147
divergence between EE and NE
143, 154 quotation marks 44, 131
ellipsis 16, 17, 24–5, 26–7, 29, 49, 75, shorthand 25–6, 47, 59, 75, 102, 150,
108, 108–9, 120, 126, 130, 138, 139, 152, 183, 197
141, 173, 182, 183 Slings, S. 57, 69
ἐπεί, concessive 50, 83, 118, 224
uncial script 116, 120
Ferreira, P. 29
Frede, D. 84 Victorius 5–6, 8, 12, 14, 16, 18, 27, 30,
34, 36, 62, 65, 74, 75–6, 80, 105, 109,
imperfect tense, ‘philosophical’ use of 2–3 113, 132, 133, 148, 164, 165, 166, 184,
incorporation of marginalia 113, 114–15 190, 194, 195, 204, 208, 220–1
iota subscript 26, 27, 35, 67, 72, 105,
118, 136, 149, 159, 182, 184, 186, 194 Wagner, D. 221
Irwin, T. 220 Widmann, G. 166

Aristotelica Studies On The Tex of Aristotle Eudemian Ethics

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OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 04/08/23, SPi

Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,

The following Studies are designed primarily to explain the reasoning

1214a2 συνέγραψεν (PCBL) on the face of it looks unlikely, given (a)

a5 Αmbr.’s placing of the δέ before ἥδιστον corresponds with its pos­ition

a6 συγχωροῦμεν Laur. 81,12: an easy mistake (the ου is corrected by

a10–11 καὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις τοῦ πράγματος: if there is a problem

a13 Dirlmeier interprets the MSS’ ἦν as a ‘philosophical’ imperfect, tak-

Grundsatz, always a Grundsatz’, to paraphrase Dirlmeier). That, however,

­emendation (ὅτιπερ 〈ἂν〉 οἰκεῖον ᾖ) unnecessary.

a26 τῇ παρουσίᾳ [διὰ] τούτων, κτλ: as subject of the sentence, which

(1214a26) subject is surely εὐδαιμονία, and translators sometimes (see

rather less well with Spengel’s alternative proposal, 〈ἡ εὐδαιμονία〉 τῇ

παρουσίᾳ [διὰ] τούτων. . . .)

becomes so extended, especially with the—­unexpectedly ­expansive?—

set themselves an end: the list of possible ends is restricted to popular-­

b24 περὶ πάντων: P2 writes ἴσως: περιπάτων in the margin; L’s

b35 Spengel’s τῶν πολλῶν 〈ἐπισκεπτέον〉 is part of a solution to larger

a1–2 περὶ ἁπάντων καὶ μάλιστα περὶ ἐπισκεπτέον μόνας P1CL,

(1215a1–2) Ambr. leaves a gap after περὶ—­something must be missing

μάλιστα περὶ 〈τούτων περὶ ὧν τὰς τῶν σοϕῶν〉 ἐπισκεπτέον μόνας,

καὶ μάλιστα περὶ 〈τούτων περὶ ὧν τὰς τῶν ἐπιεικῶν〉 ἐπισκεπτέον

μόνας—­except that by borrowing an element of Dodds’s solution (see

a4 Jackson’s πειθοῦς for πάθους is surely implausible: does persuasion

a5 There are some traces of a correction above βίον in P, and it is nat­ural

1215a10 τῳ B (also P2, crossing out the circumflex accent) provides a

renders Fritzsche’s compromise, τῳ 〈τὸ〉, unnecessary.

2 A Greek–English Lexicon compiled by H. Liddell and R. Scott, revised . . . by H. Jones . . .

a28 In P a first correcting hand puts in an elision mark and rough

1215b1 The gap in B after ἀπολαυστικόν is not caused—­as some gaps

b10 ἐρόμενον BP2, ἐρώμενον P1CL: P2 corrects omega to omicron above

b14 ὡς ἄνθρωπον εἰπεῖν: both Russell’s and Richards’s emendations are

b23 B2 adds a breathing over the second alpha of ἀνακάμψαι: B is often

b29–30 ἀπέραντον, τί scripsi, ἀπέραντόν τι PCBL: changing the

solution than Rav.’s ἀπέραντόν τι 〈οὐ〉, adopted by editors.

b34 πορίζοι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις is repeated after προτιμήσειε in P but

b36 διενέγκοιεν L: the -εν is added as a compendium, unusually for

1216a2 μοναρχιῶν: Fritzsche and Susemihl both write μοναρχῶν, fol-

(1216a2) used μόναρχος (so Rackham); but μοναρχιῶν, on which

b3 The τοῦ for τὸ, before γινώσκειν, preferred by B2 (introducing a

b8 The μὲν is omitted/deleted in Marc., then by Bekker; Susemihl

b12 τέλος post ἕτερον suppl. Casaubon: we certainly cannot under-

b27 Spengel’s conjecture τούτων πάντα (with πάντα as masculine sin-

b28 P2 writes ἴσως: χρωμένους in the margin.

b35 γνωριμώτατα ends in B in what is apparently a version of the

1217a34–5 οὐδὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν: I understand ‘so not participating in the

1218a2 Bessarion’s πρῶτον for πρότερον is perhaps just an error of tran-

a14 Susemihl, and then Walzer/Mingay, accept Rassow’s supplement

1218a15 ‘γρ. ἢ ὡς’, then (a17) ‘γρ. ἀνομολογουμένων’, Victorius.

b21 Woods adopts Ross’s καίτοι, translating ‘but an efficient cause of

1218b30 In B, the ordinal number of the book, β-ον, is curiously filled

1219a16 ὑγεία B: perhaps part of the ligature for ει has accidentally

a25 τοῦ: I retain the MSS’ τοῦ—­as referring to ζῆν—­because (a) it is

it is possible, it is lectio difficilior, or at least less expected. Woods objects

a26 ἡσυχεία P2: an original iota is overwritten with ει.

a31–2 ταῦτα δὲ ἢ ἕξεις ἢ ἐνέργειαι scripsi. Susemihl prints ** αὐτὴ, κτλ

to avoid committing himself and the reader to a particular conjecture.

(1219a35) in the text). Bonitz’s, Fritzsche’s, and Ross’s proposals similarly

1219b12 ὁποῖός τις ἐστίν: τίς in P is inserted above the line by a

b18 Walzer/Mingay’s reference to Denniston 186 in defence of the δέ

(1219b20) interesting shared error. Both B and L are interpreting hands,

b25 Rackham’s supplement of the definite article before ὀρεκτικὸν

b37–8 ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς: ‘but [it is white] κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς’

a5 Αmbr.’s placing of the δέ before ἥδιστον corresponds with its position

emendation (ὅτιπερ 〈ἂν〉 οἰκεῖον ᾖ) unnecessary.

becomes so extended, especially with the—unexpectedly expansive?—

set themselves an end: the list of possible ends is restricted to popular-

(1215a1–2) Ambr. leaves a gap after περὶ—something must be missing

μόνας—except that by borrowing an element of Dodds’s solution (see

a5 There are some traces of a correction above βίον in P, and it is natural

1215b1 The gap in B after ἀπολαυστικόν is not caused—as some gaps

a25 τοῦ: I retain the MSS’ τοῦ—as referring to ζῆν—because (a) it is

intolerable without a verb, then prima facie Dirlmeier’s 〈ἔχοιμεν〉

(1221b19) followed by a mysterious oblique stroke, of a sort that in PC-

emendation/filling-out. Meineke’s οὐ 〈μὰ〉 Δία is something of a

b36 γε was apparently in both recensiones; γενέσθαι is unnecessary—

a9 δὲ μικρὸν: B’s free-flowing hand sometimes merges words, here δὲ

a20 τὴν ϕύσει καὶ καθ’ αὑτὰ ὁρμὴν: the—unacknowledged—