Yasmin Amir Osman Abdelrazig

NIM.21030120199206
TABLE OF
CONTENTS
Background

Problem Identification

Literature Review

Analysis

Effects on the city of Flixborough

Suggestions

References
Introduction
 BACKGROUND
Context
The Flixborough disaster was an explosion at a chemical plant that killed 28 and
seriously injured 36 of the 72 people on site at the time. A contemporary
campaigner on process safety wrote "the shock waves rattled the confidence of
every chemical engineer in the country".

Where? When? How?

Flixborough, North Explosion at a

Saturday, 1 June 1974
Lincolnshire, England chemical plant
 PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION

Only limited Those concerned layout

calculations were of the plant did not
undertaken on the consider the potential for
integrity of the a major disaster
bypass line. happening
instantaneously.

The incident
No pressure No calculations
happened during
testing was carried were undertaken
start up when
out on the installed for the dog-legged
critical decisions
pipework shaped line or for
were made under
modification. the bellows.
operational stress.
Literature
Review
HISTORY OF THE
CHEMICAL PLANT
The chemical works, owned by Nypro UK (a joint
venture between Dutch State Mines (DSM) and
the British National Coal Board (NCB)) had
originally produced fertiliser from by-products of
the coke ovens of a nearby steelworks. Since
1967, it had instead produced caprolactam, a
chemical used in the manufacture of nylon. The
caprolactam was produced from cyclohexanone.
 Each reactor was
In the DSM process,
slightly lower than the
cyclohexane was
previous one, so that
heated to about 155 °C
the reaction mixture
before passing into a
flowed from one to the
series of six reactors.
FLIXBOROUGH next by gravity.
After 1967
CHEMICAL
The reactors were
PLANT In each of the reactors,
compressed air was passed
constructed from mild steel through the cyclohexane,
with a stainless steel lining; causing a small percentage of
when operating they held the cyclohexane to oxidise and
in total about 145 tonnes of produce cyclohexanone, some
flammable liquid.. cyclohexanol also being
produced..
Analysis
PRIOR TO THE ACCIDENT
The most important idea is that the number 5 reactor was discovered to be
leaking cyclohexane two months prior to the explosion, Thereafter, the facility
was shut down for an investigation. As further examination revealed a
significant issue with the reactor, it was decided to dismantle it and create a
bypass assembly to link reactors No. 4 and No. 6 so that the facility could
resume operations.
 It is hypothesized that the bypass pipe section ruptured because of inadequate
support and overflexing of the pipe section as a result of internal reactor pressures.
Upon rupture of the bypass, an estimated 30 tons of cyclohexane volatilized and
formed a large vapor cloud. The cloud was ignited by an unknown source an
estimated 45 seconds after the release. The resulting explosion leveled the entire
plant facility, including the administrative offices.
AFTERMATH
Since the accident took place at a weekend
there were relatively few people on site: of
the 72 people on-site at the time, 28 were
killed and 36 injured. Fires continued on-
site for more than ten days. Off-site there
were no fatalities, but 50 injuries were
reported and about 2,000 properties
damaged.
LESSONS TO BE LEARNED AND SUGGESTIONS

Special care should be Plant should be

taken when decisions
designed and run to
have to be taken which
minimise the rate at
would normally be
which critical
taken by or on the
management
advice of the holder of
the vacant post decisions arise

Modifications should Plant – where possible –

be designed, should be designed so
constructed, tested that failure does not lead
and maintained to the to disaster on a timescale
same standards as the too short to permit
corrective action
original plant
 LESSONS TO BE LEARNED AND SUGGESTIONS

Inerting Plant Layout

reliability/back- positioning of
up/proof testing occupied buildings

Operating Maintanance
Design Code
Procedures Procedures
use of flexible
number of critical recommisioning
pipes
decisions to be
made
CONCLUSION
The disaster was caused wholly by the
coincidence of a number of unlikely
errors in the design and installation of a
modification. Such a combination of
errors is very unlikely ever to be
repeated. The recommendations should
ensure that no similar combination
occurs again and that even if it should
do so, the errors would be detected
before any serious consequences
ensued.
 REFERENCE
Chemical Process Safety Fundamentals with Applications
Second Edition Book
Daniel A. Crowl/Joseph F. Louvar
THANK
YOU
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