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Evidence based risk analysis of Fire and Explosion accident scenarios in FPSOs

Article in Reliability Engineering & System Safety · July 2021

DOI: 10.1016/j.ress.2021.107904

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Evidence based risk analysis of Fire and Explosion
accident scenarios in FPSOs

U. Bhardwaj, A.P. Teixeira*, C. Guedes Soares

Centre for Marine Technology and Ocean Engineering (CENTEC), Instituto Superior Técnico,
A.K. Ariffin, S.S. Singh
Faculty of Engineering and Built Environment, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia
*Corresponding author E-mail: teixeira@centec.tecnico.ulisboa.pt

Abstract
The paper proposes a methodology for risk assessment and probabilistic modelling of fire and
explosion accidents in Floating production storage and offloading (FPSO) units. The overall
objective of the paper is to propose a Bayesian Network probabilistic framework towards
quantification of fire and explosion events in FPSOs derived from a systematic analysis of
incidental and accidental scenarios specific to FPSOs. A data set of around 800 incidents in FPSOs
from various open-source agencies is prepared and analysed. The key features of the incidents are
discussed and the relationships among the significant variables influencing the types of incidents
are assessed. The circumstances of potential incidents related to fire and explosions are discussed.
A detailed risk analysis is conducted using the risk matrix approach to screen and rank the major
accidents occurring in FPSOs. Then, a Bayesian Network model of high-risk fire and explosion
scenarios is developed based on evidences obtained from accident reports and expert opinions.
The model uses a framework based on immediate causes, basic causes and causal factors to
demonstrate various accidental scenarios specific to FPSOs. A sensitivity analysis is conducted to
identify the most important causal factors and the aspects that need more research work for
decision-making. The contribution of the present study is threefold: a methodology for
comprehensive risk assessment in FPSOs is proposed; FPSO specific incidents and accidents are
characterized; a probabilistic model for fire and explosion scenarios is developed from a causal
framework. The results of the paper provide FPSO developers and operators with information to
prevent and mitigate fire and explosion accidents.

Keywords: FPSO; Risk analysis; Bayesian Network; Chi-square test; Accident and incident; Causal factors

1
1. INTRODUCTION

As the oil and gas industry moves to deeper waters for hydrocarbon exploitation, the need of
mobile floating production systems further increases. The Floating Production Storage and
Offloading (FPSO) units have emerged as leading offshore mobile installations that not only
facilitate production of hydrocarbons but also process them at topside and storage in the hull area
[1,2]. The number of FPSOs around the world has been increasing in recent years, making them
preferable choice than other floating units [3,4].

An FPSOs is a typical ship-like vessel with processing equipment built in modules, which are
positioned on the vessel deck. The production fluid (hydrocarbon) is transferred from underwater
to the FPSO topside via risers. The fluid is then separated into oil, gas, water and gas at topside
facilities; the oil and gas are processed and then stored in the hull. Then, oil and gas are periodically
offloaded to shuttle tankers. Among all floating units, FPSOs are capable of performing various
functions more efficiently, conveniently and economically [5]. FPSOs offer additional benefits
such as they are faster to build and adaptable to different water depth [6]. Moreover, its ship-like
feature makes it preferable over other offshore installations such as tension leg platform, jackups
and spars [6].

However, high level of congestion due to pipelines network and topside crude processing
equipment inflict higher risk in FPSO [7]. As FPSOs often work in extreme weather conditions,
the risk can never be underestimated and thus become major area of research interest. [8,9].
Moreover, the complex system and equipment need expert human operators, robust technical
infrastructure and organizational support for its safe operation [8,10]. Safety in FPSOs is defined
as the protection of life, health, property and environment [7] and therefore reasonable measures
have to be taken to reduce the risk [10]. Risk assessment is an efficient tool for decision-making,
to prevent, mitigate and recover from potential accidents.

In general, the ‘risk’ concept itself may not fully reflect the risk description. Further, risk factors
such as human, organizational and environmental factors increase the occurrence of hazardous
scenarios and may escalate them [11]. With such factors, minor events in a FPSO may escalate
into a disaster in a matter of minutes [12]. From the history of accidents, it can be stated that
accidents tend to increase when a loss of knowledge occurs and conversely, updating the
knowledge will help in reducing the accident occurrence [13,14].

2
It has previously been observed that FPSO accidents are low probability – high consequence events
in nature [15]. According to WOAD, based on data from 1970 to 2012, FPSO is the fourth offshore
unit type regarding the number of incidents per unit and among all floating units they have the
highest incidence rate (3.29 per unit) [16]. The injury rates in FPSOs remain the highest among all
floating units and comparable to all facilities in Australia [17]. Over the analysis from 1996-2002,
FPSOs have twice the rate of incident occurrences compared with statistics for all offshore
installations [18].

In the context of FPSOs analysis, there is a general lack of accident and incident data and similar
vessel (large oil tankers) data is used instead [19]. Figure 1 presents statistical trends of occurrence
of accidents, incidents and injuries from analysis of National Offshore Petroleum Safety and
Environmental Management Authority (NOPSEMA) [17], Health and Safety Executive (HSE)
[20,21] and Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) databases [22]. It is evident
that accidents, incidents and injuries all show an increasing trend and appreciable high numbers.
The severity of accidents, incidents and injuries are discussed in the respective database and so not
replicated here. The definitions of basic terms from the databases are given in Appendix A. These
trends are sufficient to corroborate the statement of FPSO being the most hazard-prone offshore
mobile unit.

NOPSE HSE 18 210

16 160 NOPSE HSE BSEE NOPSE HSE BSEE
BSEE Cumulative accident 16 180
14 140
14
12 120 12 150
10 100 10 120
8 80 8 90
6 60 6
60
4 40 4
2 30
2 20
0 0
0 0
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
2015
2017

1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
2015
2017
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
2015
2017

Figure 1 Trends of accidents (a), incidents (b) and injuries (c) in FPSOs from
NOPSEMA, HSE and BSEE data

These databases only cover some specific region of the world for a given timeline and do not
record any disastrous incident involving casualty, major damage to property or environment.
However, such disasters are evident and some notable accidents in the last decade are presented in
Appendix B. It is therefore vital to model and analyse such incidences by an adequate risk

3
framework. The causal network, probabilities and sensitivities of basic causes can inform
designers and operators to take countermeasures.

The research community has dedicated efforts to understand how and why an accident occurs.
Consequently, studies are devoted to developing accident models and techniques to elaborate
accident causation to happening [23,24]. A literature review revealed that most of the work is
limited to a specific sector of industry, for instance, processing industry [25]. A few studies are
seen for the offshore oil and gas industry, however, the focus of the respective studies have been
the specific hazardous event and frameworks are rather generalized than an installation-specific
[26–29]. Operation in different industries varies with the type of equipment used, the environment
and expertise of personnel. Consequently, accident modelling becomes challenging with the
increase in complexity in the structure and operation of the socio-technical system [30–32].

Within the offshore oil and gas industry, the operational condition varies with water depth,
exploration field, sea state and distance from shore which are the basis for the selection of
appropriate installation [1]. Thus, a generalized analysis for all installations may not be suitable to
identify causes behind an accident specific to an installation. What is striking about FPSOs is that
they have a different structure [1,2], technical challenges [6] and risk picture [9,15]. Previous
investigation indicated that around 20 % of incidents in FPSOs are specific to the FPSO system
and not present on other fixed installations [18].

Another approach to address key features of accidents is via accident modelling. However, many
of these models are complex and sometimes too detailed, understanding and implementation of
which would require plenty of time. Reviews of existing models identify that there exist large
variations in the level of usefulness for decision-making. In particular, the quantitative models
have certain advantages over qualitative models [25]. Concerning FPSO, it is vital to know how
accurately the model can present the real system behaviour with risk factors and result of risk
[32,33]. To facilitate a more flexible and representative description of the real world risk for a
complex sociotechnical system like the FPSO, new methods like Bayesian Belief Networks are
required [7].

To cope with such issues, evidence-based risk analysis may lead to obtain more reliable and
realistic solutions. Contrary to a model that is purely hypothetical due to their construction entirely

4
by expert opinion and thus merely on the intuition of the developers, evidence-based models are
supported by data from real scenarios [34].

To achieve the above-stated goal, the present study is focused on presenting the most promising
framework for risk assessment for major FPSO accidents. First, data are collected from publicly
available investigation reports, papers and online articles. Following FPSO risk assessment
procedures [35], a holistic approach encompassing all incidents are considered. A common context
is developed listing incidents, their circumstances and consequences. The statistics of hazardous
events (incidents) is presented. Furthermore, the chi-square method for independence testing is
used to identify the statistically significant relationships among incident types and other variables,
which are considered to be related to them. The results of this test may help in identifying the
complexity of incident characteristics. Circumstances of potential incidents related to fire and
explosions are discussed. Next, the risk matrix approach is utilized to screen the accidents from
the study of around 100 accident descriptions and the accidents are ranked accordingly.

Then, a causal framework is developed to account for immediate, intermediate and basic causes of
the incidents. The collected evidential data are further used to develop probabilistic risk model for
assessing the probability and the contributing factors on fire and explosions, which is the main
accident type in FPSOs. Bayesian Network (BN) is utilized for modelling as it is a powerful tool
to incorporate interdependencies among the factors involved. It also allows the user to represent a
multivariate state of causal factors compared to the binary representations provided by Fault trees.
Besides many other advantages, BN allows the incorporation of expert elicitation in the model
when relevant data is scarce. Using canonical nodes, advance computation can be performed,
moreover, uncertainties can be included. This study also aims to identify the crucial causes
responsible for major accidents (Fire and explosions) in FPSOs through sensitivity analysis.
Finally, three common causal factors - human, organizational and environmental factors
influencing the basic causes are assessed to identify their relative influence on the accidents.

The present methodology aims at characterizing major accident scenarios from past accident data
using a BN model. The model can be further updated with more incident data when available. The
main potential causal factors can be identified and subsequently be controlled through
implementing safety measures.

5
The remainder of this paper is organized in different sections. Fire and explosion accident
scenarios in FPSOs are discussed in section 2. Section 3 describes the theory of the Bayesian
Network. Section 4 presents the proposed evidence-based risk assessment methodology. Data
collection from open-source agencies is explained in section 5. FPSO incident data is analysed and
characterised followed by few hypotheses’ tests by the chi-square method. Section 7 details the
Risk matrix approach to screen several accident cases. After categorizing the risk influencing
factors, the BN model framework for most probable accidents is developed in section 9.
Comprehensive probabilistic analyses with an illustration of the model and important findings are
detailed in this section. A discussion on various aspects of this analysis is presented in section 10,
followed by the conclusion drawn in section 11.

2. FIRE AND EXPLOSION ACCIDENT ON FPSO

As any other offshore facility processing oil and gas, FPSOs are susceptible to risk of hydrocarbon
release, which when ignited results in fire or explosion disaster [36–38]. The heat and explosion
pose serious threats to safety, assets and the surrounding environment [24,39]. Though rare still,
one recent explosion incident in a FPSO has costed 26 lives and environmental damages [40]. The
safety cases adopted in different regions worldwide strive to develop design and operational
strategies to minimize such hazards from occurring [17]. An accidental release of hydrocarbon and
a source of ignition are the two most important events (causes) that lead to such accident scenario
when they simultaneously exist. The conventional method of preliminary hazard analysis, fault
tree, event tree are often unable to identify frequency of hydrocarbon release and ignition
probability properly [41]. Therefore, it is deemed important to understand the probability of such
accident in a more realistic way. Statistical released data are required for efficient and adequate
causal analysis of fire and explosion scenarios in the offshore sector [42].

The Joint industry project (JIP) – Explosion and Fire Engineering of FPSO (EFEF) has developed
more refined approach to calculate frequency of fires and explosions [43]. In their quantitative
assessment, Paik et al. [43] have derived net frequency of release and fire from HSE database
while lesser attention paid on subsequent causes. Suardin et al. [36] have developed a fire and
explosion risk assessment tool which is rather a quantitative approach and highly particular to the
case chosen. Some simulation methods can also be implemented to create plausible fire and
explosion scenario using Computational Fluid Dynamics program and for structural response of

6
FPSO [41,44,45]. Among the leading industrial efforts, the Global Explosion Consultants
(Gexcon) is committed in the field of safety and risk management and advanced dispersion,
explosion and fire modelling. Their developed tools, such as FLACS-CFD [46] and Shell FRED
are specifically consequence modelling softwares that can also be utilised for explosion prediction
in the offshore sector [47]. A novel approach of fire risk analysis has been proposed by Jin and
Jang [38] that applied the concept of cumulative failure frequency to the safety evaluation of
FPSOs. However, the leak frequency that can significantly influence the results was calculated
approximately. Another relevant study [48] has simulated the consequences of FPSO fire and
explosions by the PHAST tool while the frequency is estimated using event tree model based on
historical data.

Such analyses are rather consequence analyses than causal ones and thus may provide a different
risk perspective. Some frequency analyses have proposed predictive models for fire and explosion
risk [26,43,48,49]. Though such models dig deep to predict risk, yet they often lack cause and
effect analyses. Conversely, effect analyses [29,50–52] have addressed the issue of offshore fire
risk with the objective of formulating relationships between causes (errors) and effects (risk).
However, much emphasis is given on human and organizational errors. This research has
performed a more comprehensive installation specific study by integrating some elements of both
frequency and effect analyses. Consequently, fire and explosion scenarios can be modelled (by
BNs) from real data with the objective to identify the most likely circumstances, i.e., states of the
cause variables that may occur [52].

3. BAYESIAN NETWORK

Bayesian Network has been used in many sectors as a tool for risk modelling and analysis with
uncertainty [53–56]. The use of BN in the maritime industry has been discussed by Zhang and
Thai [57]. The advantages of BN over other methods like Fault Trees and Event Trees are obvious
and discussed [57]. Although some probabilistic analyses can be performed by fault trees, BNs are
preferable due to their flexibility and advanced features [58]. Dynamic BNs have been used in
many time-varying probabilistic inference problems such as for probabilistic modelling of the
burst failure of corroded oil and gas pipelines [59].

The Bayesian Network (BN) is a direct acyclic graphical (DAG) network. BN is composed of
nodes and arcs that represent a probabilistic framework. The basic random variables are

7
represented by nodes, while arcs present relationships among them. The arcs connect the child
nodes with its parent nodes. These relationships in BNs describe the dependencies among the basic
and dependent variables. For example, if a variable Yi has an impact on Yj, Yi is called a parent
node of Yj.

The basic structure of a BN network displays the qualitative description. Quantitative relationships
among variables are described by the Conditional Probability Tables (CPT) of discrete variables.
A CPT provides a complete description of probabilistic interaction that can model any probabilistic
dependencies between a child and parent nodes. The foundation of BN is Bayes theory, which is
expressed as
𝑃(𝐵⁄𝐴)𝑃(𝐴)
𝑃(𝐴⁄𝐵 ) = (1)
𝑃(𝐵)

where 𝑃(𝐴⁄𝐵 ) is known as posterior probability that how likely is event A is, given evidence of
B, 𝑃(𝐵⁄𝐴) is the likelihood which represents how likely the evidence B is true, 𝑃(𝐴) is the prior
probability of event A, 𝑃(𝐵) is the prior probability of event B.

A BN represents the joint probability distribution for a set of discrete random variables Y, where
Y can be given as

Y = (Y1, Y2, Y3 ……Yn) (2)

where n is number of discrete random variables. The joint probability distribution of Y (Eq. 2) can
be calculated by taking the product of all priors and their conditional probability distribution.

P(y1, y2, y3 ……yn) =∏𝑛𝑖=1 P (𝑦i /pa(yi )) (3)

where, the term P(yi/pa(yi)) is the conditional probability of yi given its parent variables (pa(yi)).

3.1 Canonical probabilistic nodes

The BN model can be customized with canonical probabilistic nodes that can reduce computational
time by simplifying the model. In case of a general chance binary node with m binary parents, the
user has to specify 2m parameters, however canonical nodes reduce that requirement to m
parameters. Noisy-OR and leaky Noisy-OR are the example of canonical nodes.

A child variable Y may have numerous causes X1, X2…….Xm. Noisy-OR gates are applicable with
two assumptions: (i) If each of the cause X1, X2…. Xm have corresponding probability p1, p2…. pm

8
that are sufficient to cause Y independently, in the absence of other causes. (ii) Each of the causes
X1, X2…. Xm are mutually independent. This model requires probabilities pi = p1, p2…. pm that is
probability given one cause is true while all other causes are false. Therefore, the probability pi can
be given by:

𝑝𝑖 = 𝑃(𝑦|𝑥
̅̅̅1 , ̅̅̅ 𝑥𝑛 )
𝑥2 , … ̅̅̅ (4)

where, 𝑥 and 𝑥̅ are the two complimentary states of variable X. Using the Eq. 4 the required CPT
of variable Y can be completed.

Another great advantage of canonical models is that they can be adopted to account for the
uncertainties in the probabilities of evident variables. By means of leak probabilities (l), the model
can show occurrence probability of variable Y despite all its cause are false. In the present scheme,
leaky noise gate is applicable to account the occurrence of various causes that have insufficient
data.

Some uncertainties still exist in modelling with BN due to probabilities used and quantification of
expert opinion. Epistemic uncertainties are often addressed using probability density function
rather than using discrete probability values. To assess uncertainties in BNs, some well-known
methods like Taylor series and Monte Carlo simulations can also be used [60].

3.2 Sensitivity analysis

One significant element of a BN analysis is to identify the most important input parameters through
sensitivity analysis. The objective of a sensitivity analysis is to assess the influence of changes in
the input parameters on a model output of interest. This is a vital step for any risk assessment as it
provides insights on model robustness and is also used for model validation [61]. The simplest
measure of sensitivity is provided by the partial derivative of a relevant output with respect to a
particular model input parameter, which is a local measure of sensitivity as the derivative is
typically observed at a particular point of the space of the input parameters.

3.2.1 Parameter sensitivity analysis

In case of BN models, a parameter sensitivity analysis assesses the effect on the target variable of
introducing, systematically, an evidence on a state variable while keeping the other variables
unchanged. The result yields the variables that have the largest influence on the target variable of
interest. Some BN software tools, such as GENIE [62,63] provide this parameter sensitivity

9
measure by calculating one-way derivatives. In particular, every conditional and prior probability
in BN is varied in turn, keeping the others unchanged. Further details of this method can be referred
from the studies [64,65]. The results of parametric sensitivity analysis over a complex BN models
can be arduous as they involve a large number of sensitivity measures estimated for each entry of
the marginal and conditional probability tables of all variables of the models.

3.2.2 Sensitivity to evidence

Another significant way that provides insights into the properties of models and their robustness
is sensitivity to evidence. This approach accounts the variations of the BN’s posterior probability
distribution under various conditions using mainly two types of measures, entropy and mutual
information (also known as variance reduction for continuous variables) [66]. Following to this
method, a sensitivity measure is adopted in this study as described below.

The variation in the probability of basic events (variable Yi) from prior to posterior is observed
when the state of target node (final event) is changed to 100 %. The indicating term can be coined
as change ratio (𝐶𝑅𝑌𝑖 ) given by:

𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑦 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑡𝑜 100%−𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑌𝑖

𝐶𝑅𝑌𝑖 = ( ) (5)
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑌𝑖

A global measure of the importance of the variable Yi on the final event is then defined based on
Change ratio as:
𝐶𝑅𝑌𝑖
𝑆𝑌𝑖 = 2
(6)
√∑𝑚 (𝐶𝑅𝑌 )
𝑖=1 𝑖

The results of sensitivity analysis are presented in later section that identify the factors with the
greatest importance in major accident scenarios in FPSOs.

4. METHODOLOGY

There are a number of differences in safety philosophy for FPSOs and other manned units or fixed
offshore installations [35]. For instance, FPSO operations are complex and operated in harsh
environmental conditions, involving different factors responsible for causing accidents [12,18].
The major categories include state of the weather, training of on-board crew, use of specific
equipment and human factors [1]. For example, the fire scenarios in FPSOs involve failures of
processing equipment that is not present in ships. The FPSO’s motion influenced by severe weather

10
conditions can also be a cause for many incidents, which is not present in fixed offshore
installations. Thus, a FPSO specific accident scenario and corresponding modelling is necessary.

Figure 2 shows the framework of the proposed methodology, and the procedure is explained as
follows. First, raw data are collected from primary sources like databases [17,18,20,21,67], disaster
reports like [40,68] and websites [69–72]. Secondary source of data are composed of a deep review
of published statistical investigation reports [73–76], expert assessments on risk [77,78] and
analysis of primary (incidental) data [15,79,80]. To evaluate major risks in FPSOs, the obtained
and analysed data is screened, and the major accidents are ranked. The major accidents are
highlighted, and relevant data are again analysed to formulate a causal framework. Evidential data
and expert opinions are used to build a BN model, followed by the parametrization of all the nodes.
Finally, the probability of final accident can be computed, and the sensitivities of basic causes can
be obtained.

Primary Secondary Evidence based Decision

Risk screening Brainstorming
sources sources modeling making

Incident Accident Interrelations

reports, reports, Involved
Ranking of Structure and
statistical Statistical intermediate
accidents Parameters of Analysis of
data, analysis, and basic
Occurence Baysian result
causes
witness and Expert probability Network
Expert
evidence knowledge elicitation

Figure 2 Proposed methodology for evidence-based risk analysis using Bayesian Networks

5. DATA COLLECTION

This section describes the collection of historical accident and incidental data. There are several
sources of information on offshore accidents and incidents: research papers, government and
industrial reports, newspaper articles and accident database [14]. Some of the available offshore
oil and gas accident databases are WOAD (World Offshore Accident Database) by DNV (Det
Norske Veritas), ORION by UK HSE Offshore Safety Department, MAIB by UK DFT Dept.
Environment, Transport and the Regions and PTIL by PSA(Petroleum Safety Authority)
BLOWOUT by SINTEF of Norway DEA/EASY (Danish Energy Agency) by Denmark, WCID
(Well Control Incident Database) by OGP (International Association of Oil and Gas Producers),

11
Common reporting format project NSOAF (North Sea Offshore Authorities Forum), Performance
Measurement Project IRF (International Regulators' Forum).

In this study, the HSE, NOPSEMA and BSEE databases with extensive information are used as
primary data to understand and characterize accidents and incidents [14]. Besides, more reports
from HSE, WOAD, and papers are consulted to provide credible accident scenarios exclusively
for FPSOs [20,73,81]. It is important to note that different databases use different taxonomies in
terms of severity and accidents types (see Appendix A) and may create difficulties among the
terms when evaluating them [14,82]. Thus, the present study assumes accidents as an unintended
event (mostly terminal) that involve fatality or serious personal injury or significant damage to the
environment or to the structure, whereas an incident is a serious event or dangerous occurrence
that has the potential for causing an accident. The present study aims to categorize incidents and
accidents into different groups for analysis primarily using the HSE taxonomy (from Appendix
A). In this regard, the database created here may have some minor differences from their primary
sources.

5.1 HSE database

HSE is a pioneer organization based in UK that accounts for health and safety-related issues. The
reports focus to record all (serious and non-serious) incidents and study extensively for the causes
behind them. A large and descriptive set of UK Continental Shelf accident and incident data has
been obtained from [20]. It is believed that such a compilation of information on FPSO accidents
and incidents might be the most comprehensive publicly available. From 1999 to 2006, three R&D
projects were defined by the UK Health & Safety Executive-Offshore Safety Division where the
main objective was to obtain complete statistics for accidents having occurred on floating offshore
units engaged in the oil and gas activities on the UKCS over 25 years, from 1980-2005. An
extended version of the HSE report [20] has been published later [21] that covers the period from
1990 to 2007.

5.2 NOPSEMA data

National Offshore Petroleum Safety and Environmental Management Authority (NOPSEMA) of

Australia publish yearly reports of the offshore petroleum industry [17]. It shows statistics about
accident and incidents, moreover, presents the industry's efforts to protect individuals and
environment and manage hazards, however, the main focus is on human safety.
12
Viewing the hazards and risks to health and safety, the operator submits a document known as
safety case. In virtue of handling hazardous occurrences, NOPSEMA assesses each safety case
against its safety regulations. NOPSEMA also takes action to enforce compliance when it
identifies non-compliance with obligations imposed by regulators or for the sake of safety. Figure
3 shows the year-wise safety cases and enforcements per FPSO. At least one safety case and one
enforcement per year for each FPSO are acknowledged by NOPSEMA.

5.3 BSEE database

Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement BSEE [22] accounts for any hazardous incidents
occurred within the US outer Continental Shelf. Their website on offshore incident compiles
accident and incident data with date, type of facility, description, etc. The public released database
by BSEE was undertaken from 2013 to 2017. The main focus of these investigation reports is on
personal injuries, still useful information about causation can be obtained.

5.4 Other databases

WOAD is known to be one of the most abundant sources of worldwide accident and incident data.
However, their data are not available in the public domain and need to be purchased. Some other
useful databases are eMARS [83], FACTS [84], ARIA [85], PSID [86] etc. The reader may also
refer the studies [14,15,82] for details on the source of offshore databases and reporting systems.

Safety cases/FPSO Enforement/FPSO

3.0

2.5

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

0.0
2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017

Figure 3 Safety cases and enforcements issued by NOSEMA per FPSO in recent years

13
6. ANALYSIS OF FPSO INCIDENTS

As recommended by Bai and Jin [35] if a risk assessment is applied to a part or feature (Fire and
explosion) of the FPSO, all hazards and associated scenarios including the remote hazards (so
called near miss and insignificant incidents) across all bounds of the systems should be considered.

This section aims at understanding the basic information about the various hazards (incidents) and
their key circumstances evidenced in FPSOs. The publicly available databases, reports, papers and
web articles are explored for descriptions of the accident and incidents that have occurred on
FPSOs.

6.1 Statistics of FPSO incidents

The superficial scrutiny of databases and reports for FPSOs provided results as presented in Table
1. The important information regarding the number of accidents, incidents, injuries and their rate
of occurrence per unit-year is provided. The figures obtained from different sources are
comparable with each other; however, some of the significant differences are due to population
data and definition of incidents, accident and injury (see Appendix A). The accident and incident
rates are appreciably high, indicating that FPSOs are more susceptible to hazards among all mobile
offshore units. One important point is that the data is limited and only represent a small proportion
of worldwide accidents. Thus, the information in Table 1 reflects a lower bound of risk exposure
in FPSOs. The normalization of data from different sources (combined data from HSE,
NOPSEMA and BSEE) indicated that there are around 0.5 serious accidents; at least 3 incidents;
0.5 significant injuries per year per FPSO unit.

Table 1 Incident data for FPSOs from different sources

NOPSEMA (2005-2017) HSE (1990-2007) BSEE (2013-2017) WOAD (1970-2012)

Accident rate 0.36 0.23 0.94 0.49
Incident rate 10.25 3.04 2.00 2.00
Injury rate 0.53 0.19 1.09
Total accidents 60 44 44 25
Total incidents 1692 584 94 102
Total injuries 87 37 51

14
6.2 Incident types in FPSO

A structured hazard identification process is adopted to conduct a statistical analysis to identify

the main hazards and operations. Not all the stated incidents in Table1 are elaborate, however,
around 800 incidents from the gathered data are found with investigation reports and so, analysed.
The description in all reports varies up to some extent as per the difference in their reporting form
and definitions (Appendix A). Thus, a common data set is created for systematic evaluation of
data.

The basic circumstances during the incidents are shown in Fig. 4. The definitions of incidents and
operations in Fig. 4 have their usual meaning, still for more clarification reader can refer HSE
taxonomy [20].

The number of occurrences of incidents (initiating events) is counted for its type (Fig. 4 a). It can
be seen that more than half of the incidents are spill/releases of fluids. Following that, crane
accidents, fire and falling loads are the next prominent incidents. The mere occurrence frequency
is not enough to judge the risk associated with the occurrences and, therefore, the next chapter
deals with the risk assessment that accounts also for consequences of these hazards.

From Fig. 4 (b), it is evident that 88% of hazardous incidents developed during the normal
production operations of FPSOs. A few hazards are seen during other operations such as drilling,
well work-over and offloading.

Structural damage 1% Anchor failure 2% Other 2% Development drilling 1%

Contact 2% Well
Other Drilling 3%
workover
5% 2% Offloading
Crane 2%
accident
14%
Falling load
10%
Spill/release
Fire Production
55%
11% 88%

Figure 4 Distribution of major hazardous incidents involved in FPSOs (a) and type of operations (b)

15
6.3 Application of chi-square independence test

To better understand various circumstances involved with incident type, the present study uses
chi-square test to check the dependence among them. Chi-square test statistically signifies the
difference between observed and expected frequency. The commonly used chi-square tests in
literature are goodness of fit, homogeneity test and independence test. A goodness of fit test aims
at finding suitable distribution type for a given sample data set. The homogeneity test determines
if a random sample selected from each subgroup or population separately and collect data on a
single categorical variable is the same for each subgroup or population. The independence test
using chi-square is applied when to test whether two variables have a statistically significant
relationship.

This section first utilizes a comprehensive report from HSE [20] that contains a list of offshore
installations operational for the period of 1980 to 2005 with description of incidents. A total of
3820 incident data categorized by their frequency is presented against the offshore installation in
Appendix C. The objective here to justify the present study i.e., the FPSO exhibit different
hazardous circumstance than other offshore installations.

Next, chi-square tests are conducted on incidents occurred on FPSO alone. Out of the 800 incident
records collected, 508 incidents are selected that meet the requirements for this analysis. In
addition, the authors’ previous works [15,79,80] are utilized to develop various circumstances
against incident types as subsequently presented in Appendix D.

Various general hypotheses based on statistics of incidents in Appendices C & D are presented in
Table 2. The hypothesizes H0,2,4…. state that there is no significant relationship among the
compared variables whereas H1,3,5…. state that there is a significant relationship among the
compared variables.

The chi-square statistics (χ2) are calculated from the observed frequency by comparing them with
expected frequency. The critical values of χ2 are calculated with 95% significance level. The null
hypothesizes (H0,2,4….) are accepted if χ2 less than critical χ2 and vice versa.

Table 2 Chi-square hypotheses established in this study and test results.

Hypothesis Critical χ2 χ2 Result

There is no significant relationship between incident type and type of offshore
H0* 212.3 1892.5 Rejected
installation

16
 There is a significant relationship between incident type and type of offshore
H1* Accepted
installation
H2 There is no significant relationship between incident type and its severity 47.4 184.1 Rejected
H3 There is a significant relationship between incident type and its severity Accepted
There is no significant relationship between incident type and FPSO operational
H4 73.3 121.9 Rejected
mode
There is a significant relationship between incident type and FPSO operational
H5 Accepted
mode
There is no significant relationship between incident type and FPSO topside
H6 73.3 57.8 Accepted
activity
H7 There is a significant relationship between incident type and FPSO topside activity Rejected
H8 There is no significant relationship between incident type and on-board fatality 11.1 24.1 Rejected
H9 There is a significant relationship between incident type and on-board fatality Accepted
H10 There is no significant relationship between incident type and error type 60.5 55.6 Accepted
H11 There is a significant relationship between incident type and error type Rejected
There is no significant relationship between incident type and average age of
H12 19.7 31.5 Rejected
FPSO
H13 There is a significant relationship between incident type and average age of FPSO Accepted
(* Hypothesizes checked against data in Appendix C, rest from Appendix D)

The validity of above-mentioned hypotheses is constituted that are supposed to influence the type
of incident. The results in terms of critical and observed values of the chi-square statistics (χ2) are
also presented in Table 2. From the results of the first chi-square test, H0 hypothesis is rejected and
H1 is accepted. In this case it is statistically proven that FPSO is different from other offshore
installations with the distribution of incident type. The type of incident occurring is highly specific
to the installation e.g., FPSOs and production semi-submersibles are involved in higher number of
spill/release whereas drilling semi-submersibles are involved in crane accident. This fact also
justifies the objective of present study that accidents in FPSOs should be considered distinct and
explicitly.

All later hypotheses concern the type of incident occurring in FPSOs and the influencing variables.
As in the case of incident type and its severity, H2 is rejected and H3 is accepted suggesting a
significant relationship between them. In other words, some incidents on FPSOs tend to be more
serious (e.g. crane accident) while others (e.g. falling load) are less serious.

The operational mode of the FPSOs is a vital feature of FPSOs which is tested next. H4 is rejected
and H5 is accepted as there is a significant relationship between type of incident and FPSO
operational mode. Although, the highest incidents are reported during production mode, still other

17
modes may increase risk of other incidents such as offloading influences the occurring probability
of contact incidents.

Topside activities are conducted by people on-board such as commissioning, watch keeping and
maintenance on FPSOs [79]. However, there is no significant relation found between the type of
activity and the type of incident (as hypothesis H6 is accepted and H7 is rejected). The type of
incident shows random distribution on topside activities with no clear dependence.

Regarding the chi-square test results between incident type and fatality, the H8 hypothesis is
rejected and H9 is accepted. The number of fatalities depends on type of incident, in particular
crane accidents involve the highest number of fatalities. From the authors’ previous study
regarding the causes of spill or releases [80] and the analysis of the reports some statistics are
prepared (see Appendix C) for incident types and causal errors. From the chi-square test results it
is seen that incidents are randomly distributed over types of error. In this case it can be inferred
that an incident does not depend on any specific error.

The database analysed does not contain the age of the FPSOs in the incident description. However,
it was possible to calculate the average age of operational FPSOs per year. For the total service
time, the average age is categorized in two sets: 1) when the average service time is more than 5
years (after first oil and gas production); 2) when the average service time is less than 5 years, and
the frequency of incident type is recorded. The results from chi-square test reveal that H12 is
rejected whereas H13 is accepted. So, the type of incidents has significant relation with average age
of the FPSOs in service. For example, the frequency of crane accidents increases more than two
times for an average age > 5 years. The reason could be that old systems and equipment offer more
grounds for hazardous events (incidents).

6.4 Circumstances of incidents pertaining to fire/explosion

Release, fire and explosion incidents are the three types of incidents present in the database that
have either escalated or have potential to result into fire and explosion accidents. These three
incident types from the database are analysed for their circumstances. The results of this analysis
are shown in Figure 5 as percentage of severity (a) onboard activity (b) and basic causes (c) of
incidents pertaining to fire and explosion. Though only 2% of incidents are escalated to severe
accidents, yet the major concern is that 70 % of them are significant incidents. A total of 60 % of
incidents are reported during normal operations followed by 18% found in routine inspections.

18
This study attempts to identify the basic causes behind such incidents, however due to limited
description of incidents in the source data, 36% of the causes remain unknown. It has been
evidenced that operational errors have been the prominent reason for the occurrence of incidents
followed by component failures. Obviously, as similar to previous findings, the 92 % of incidents
occurred during normal operations, followed by 3 % incidents occurred during drilling and well
work-over each.
Accident 2% Design Error 2%
Maintenance Watch keeping 5%
8%
Commissioning
9% Component
failure
Insignificant Unknown 25%
27% Normal 36%
Near-Miss Routine Operation
1% Inspection
Incident 60% Operational
70% 18% errors
33%
Procedural errors 4%

Figure 5 Severity (a) Onboard activity (b) and basic causes (c) of incidents pertaining to Fire and explosion

Coalescer
Other Degasser
Flare Well
Umbilical
Water treatment Header
Turret Manifold
Boiler
Module/System

Equipment

Subsea Scrubber
Separation Turbine
Separator
Oil processing Metering skid
Offloading Heat Exchanger
Flowline/riser
Bulk Storage Engine
Power Generation
Pump
Tank
Gas Treatment Compressor
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Number of incidents Number of incidents

Figure 6 FPSOs’ module or system (a) and equipment (b) involved with the incidents pertaining to
fire and explosion

Further, the database is scrutinized for modules/system and equipment involved in the incidents
pertaining to fire and explosion. The results of this analysis are presented in Figure 6 (a) and (b)
for the involved module/system and equipment, respectively. For the formal definition of the
terms, the authors’ previous work [79] can be referred. The module and equipment handling gas
with high pressure are more prone to such incidents. Power generation and bulk storage systems
are the next sensitive areas. In terms of equipment, tank, pump, engine and flowlines are

19
susceptible to higher risk of fire/explosion. The detailed statistics about the causal factors of every
incident are not presented here, although the information is used in the later section to evaluate
risk and compute prior probabilities.

7. ACCIDENT ANALYSIS WITH RISK MATRIX

The incident statistics are described in the previous section, which represent mostly the initiating
events. The accidents have higher consequences or outcomes than such incidents. From the
gathered data, investigation reports of around 100 accidents have been utilized for basic risk
assessment.

This section adopts a risk matrix to screen and characterize accident scenarios observed in the
database and available in public domain (a sample is shown in Appendix B). This is a qualitative
approach adopted here to rank and highlight major accidents. The risk is calculated using Eq. 7,
given below:

Risk = Probability of failure (PoF) × Severity (7)

The risk matrix is adopted from DNVGL [87] and customized to suit FPSO accidents as shown in
Table 3, which also illustrates the criteria for severity and PoF. The degree of severity is assigned
with indices from A to E, where A signifies minimum level and E implies the highest level of
severity. Severity is perceived in three consequence categories namely safety, environment and
cost. The rationale behind using such a taxonomy is to bring all possible consequences in one line,
resulting from different accident scenarios. The PoF ranges from 1 to 5 in order of increasing
failure probability or occurrence of such a scenario.

Table 3 Risk matrix adopted from DNVGL-RP-0002, 2014 [87]

Consequence categories Increasing probability

Increasing consequences

1 2 3 4 5
Cost (million Euro)

An accident Has been Occurs

Environment

Never heard
Severity

Failure is has occurred experienced several

Safety

of in the
not expected in the by most times per
industry
industry operators year
< 105 105 - 104 104 – 103 103 – 102 102 – 101

20
 Massive effect,
Multiple Large damage
E > 10 M H VH VH VH
fatalities area >100
BBL
Single Major effect,
fatalities or Significant spill
D 1 - 10 L M H VH VH
permanent response
disability <100BBL
Major injury, Localized effect,
C long term Soil response 0.1 - 1 VL L M H VH
absence < 50 BBL
Slight injury, a Minor effect,
B few lost work Non-compliance 0.01 - 0.1 VL VL L M H
days < 5 BBL
No or Slightly effect on
A superficial the environment < 0.01 VL VL VL L M
injuries < 1 BBL

Table 4 Risk categories and acceptance criteria

Colour
Risk Interpretation
code
VH Very high Unacceptable risk - Immediate action to be taken
H High Unacceptable risk - Action to be taken
M Medium Acceptable risk - Action to reduce the risk may be evaluated
L Low Acceptable risk - Action to ensure the risk remains low

VL Very low Acceptable risk - Action to ensure the risk remains very low

The risk categories and acceptance criteria are provided in Table 4. The matrix here can be used
to calculate the risk of each scenario under consideration. The criteria shown in Table 4 are used
to rank accident scenarios.

The database is analysed thoroughly to obtain generic accident scenarios based on a balanced
consideration of hazard identification and historical accidents. The above-mentioned scheme is
employed to calculate risk as per section for the different accidental scenarios. Appendix B shows
some sample risk calculations for recent major accidents. The present study, however, calculates
risk for several accidents that are not included here due to space limitations. The risk assessment
resulted in the ranking of major accidents in FPSOs as follows: Fire and Explosion, occupational

21
accidents, crane accidents, loss of position or stability, collision, machine failure, helicopter
accident, grounding, blowout, other. Fire and Explosion accidents are typically registered in the
same category as they have almost the same causal framework.

8. RISK INFLUENCING FACTORS – CAUSAL FRAMEWORK

The analysis of the causes of accidents is an important element of the risk management process.
This step is synonymous to the hazard identification in the risk assessment framework. It aims to
generate the hieratical structure of various risk influencing factors causing an accidental scenario
in FPSO. From the data of accidents in the last section, a detailed analysis has been carried out to
relate the types of accidents (in particular Fire and Explosion), the intermediate and basic causes
and frequency of occurrence of basic events. The extensive study of accident data when compared
with technical reports and papers indicated that this analysis is not sufficient to develop a causal
framework and for basic probability characterisation. It is emphasized that incident or near-miss
data are also important to gain a better understanding of the underlying causes of accidents [49].
For this purpose, this analysis digs as far as possible into the available investigation reports (around
800 incident descriptions) to provide a statistical representation of causal factors.

A common framework for incorporating these data is established. A database structure has been
developed by type of incident, operation involved, outcome of the incident and the causal factors
in terms of immediate, intermediate and basic causes. This data structure is used in the next section
to model fire and explosion accident scenarios in FPSOs.

It should be noted that the basic causes may or may not be a root cause. The basic cause is the last
identified factor in the investigation reports, however this cause may have some contributory
factors known as the root cause. For simplicity, this study assumes the last identified cause as the
basic cause. The investigation reports are reviewed, and the contributory factors are categorized
and prioritized. It is important to note that the most important and the most likely factors found in
the literature are incorporated. This makes the study distinct from other studies on similar accidents
on other installations. For example, fires in convectional ships are far different from those in
FPSOs as there may be more agents as per the complex systems present in FPSOs.

22
9. EVIDENCE-BASED BN MODEL

9.1 Construction of BN model for Fire/Explosion

After understanding the accidents and incidents causation (Section 8), a directed acyclic graph
(DAG) is structured based on the evidential information provided. The BN model is developed
using the structure and relationship among the contributory parameters. The GeNIe [62,63]
software from the decision systems laboratory of the University of Pittsburgh is utilized here to
develop the BN model.

Fig 7 shows the BN model of the fire and explosion scenario in FPSOs. The basic causes can be
numerous, however, the present model only incorporates the ones that are observed in accident
reports and the ones that are the most likely to occur by expert opinion. For finer discretization of
intermediate and basic causes, more data and evidences are required. However, a greater number
of variables imply more complex and larger conditional probabilities that need to be obtained.

The taxonomy for immediate, intermediate and basic causes is kept simple, and is defined based
mainly on HSE reports and other references [73,88,89]. The use of typical taxonomy may provide
a different perspective to the modelling and analysis, such as the HFACS taxonomy to elaborate
more on the human factor aspects involved in the accident scenario [90]. However, the present
study focuses on the basic causes and their importance in an accident scenario based on the
observed data. In a later section, causal factor analysis is also conducted.

23
 Figure 7 BN model for fire and explosion scenarios in FPSOs

9.2 Prior probabilities for model input variables

After formulating the qualitative model, the next step is to quantify the model with states and
probabilities. Each node of the BN has two states: “T”- True, positive and “F” – False, negative
states to indicate a cause of a particular variable. For example, if the basic cause “corrosion” has a
probability of occurrence of 9×10-5, the node for corrosion depicts T = 9×10-5 and the non-
occurrence probability is F =1-9×10-5.

In this paper, the prior probabilities are calculated from the assessment of the combined database,
since the number of accidents is limited, and it is well-known that incidents also characterize the
potential threats. In total 792 accidents and incidents with a detailed description are studied. The
cases where an event is leading or may lead to a particular accident are segregated. For example,
438 cases that represent potential to lead to fire and explosion are selected, out of which, 303 cases
were identified with reasonable evidence for the causes. Some of the causes remain unidentified
due to lack of reporting quality and content. The basic causes are further classified, and their
occurrence frequency is calculated. The population data is characterized by total unit-years defined

24
as number of FPSO units active for one year. For example, the probability of failure due to
corrosion per unit-year is calculated as
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠 (6)
𝑃(𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛) = = 9×10-5 per unit-years
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠(303).𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 (220)

Table 7 tabulates the prior probabilities calculated as per the above method. Some basic causes do
not occur in the databases, however, deemed as potential causes. Such cases are identified as
“Cause*” and assigned a minimum probability value.

9.3 Uncertainty in predicting the probability of fire/explosion

The final probability of an accident depends mainly on the accident modelling technique and inputs
at various constituent nodes. First, the BN model is inferred as a simple fault tree using OR gates
at all the conditional probability tables for intermediate nodes. Thus, the probability of fire and
explosion is calculated using this conventional approach.

Next, the BN model is constructed using Noisy-OR gates at the intermediate nodes. The primary
implication in such models is the calculation of CPT. Based on expert opinions and the data
analysed (in above sections), the CPT of all child (intermediate) nodes are assigned with non-
causation probability. For the demonstration purpose a part of the BN model “Design /fabrication
failure” node is considered here. Table 5 presents the non-causation probability for the parent
nodes: Substandard material, Improper installation and Wrong dimension. Next, the CPT are
computed as shown in Table 6 for the intermediate node - design/fabrication failure. The sum of
all the values in column 6 of the table represents the net probability of design/fabrication failure.
If the dependence among failure causes is to be modelled, a study with advanced CPT computation
can be referred [23].

Table 5 Safe and failure probabilities of basic causes of design/fabrication failure

Causal group Probability of design/fabrication failure

Basic causes Causation Non-causation Probability of basic

cause

25
 Substandard material 0.75 0.25 p1

Improper installation 0.9 0.1 p2

Wrong dimension 0.8 0.2 p3

The probabilities p1, p2 and p3 are given against the basic causes in Table 7

Table 6 Conditional probability of design/fabrication for Noisy-OR gate

Basic causes Probability of design/fabrication

failure

Substandard Improper Wrong Causation Non causation Conditional probability at

material installation dimension different states

T T T 0.995 0.005 = 0.25×0.2×0.1 = 0.995 ×( p1) ×( p2) ×( p3)

T T F 0.975 0.025 = 0.25×0.1 = 0.975 ×( p1) ×( p2) ×(1-p3)

T F T 0.95 0.05 = 0.25×0.2 = 0.95 ×( p1) ×(1-p2) ×( p3)

T F F 0.75 0.25 = 0.75 ×( p1) ×(1- p2) ×(1- p3)

F T T 0.98 0.02 = 0.1×0.2 = 0.98 ×(1- p1) ×( p2) ×( p3)

F T F 0.9 0.2 = 0.9 ×(1- p1) ×( p2) ×(1- p3)

F F T 0.8 0.1 = 0.8 ×(1-p1) ×(1- p2) ×( p3)

F F F 0 1 = 0 ×(1- p1) ×(1- p2) ×(1- p3)

Further this BN model is advanced (BN-Un) with the application of Leaky Noisy-gates at the
intermediate nodes to account for the uncertainty in the incident data analysed. It is evident that
some of the cases had limited description that could be used to identify the causal group but not
the basic causes. These cases are not incorporated in earlier modelling; however, their occurrence
can be used as leak probability at the intermediate nodes (causal group). Moreover, the leak
probabilities are assigned to the case that only describes the occurrence of final incidents such as
the release and ignition. For example, the Design and Fabrication (D/F) failure is indicated as the
cause of release in 30 cases without further specifying the basic cause, thus its leak probability is
calculated as:
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 (30)
𝑃𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑦 (𝐷⁄𝐹 ) = 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡(438).𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 (220)
= 6.23 ×10-4 per unit-years

26
Similarly, leak probabilities are assigned to the nodes mechanical failure, operational failure,
releases and ignition.

The essence of this study is to model a scenario that is the most pragmatic, using realistic cases
even with limited data, however, the authors do not claim for absolute quantitative accuracy. The
model can be updated when more data are available and can be observed as a qualitative and
quantitative model.

The probabilities of the final event are calculated from the three models as; 2.76×10-6 by Fault
tree, 1.91×10-6 by BN and 4.52×10-6 per unit-years by BN-Un. Some obvious differences are
evident by the three models as the highest probability is computed with the model BN-Un while
lowest by BN. From the analysis of the failure probabilities from these models, it can be deduced
that the probability of failure calculated from the BN model and BN-Un model can be treated as
lower and upper bounds.

Figure 8 BN when evidence is set to Fire and explosion scenario

9.4 Sensitivity analysis

As discussed at the introduction and methodology sections, the sensitivity analysis is performed
here to identify the most critical basic events (causes) in the fire and explosion scenario. Figure 8
presents the model when the final event “Fire and Explosion” is set to True. The basic causes now

27
present the posterior probabilities given the occurrence of “Fire and Explosion”. These values are
used to calculate the sensitivity factors (SF) of the variables as per Eqs. 5 & 6. The results of
sensitivity analysis are presented in Table 7 and illustrated in Fig. 9. As already discussed in the
previous section, two BN models are used here and therefore two sets of SF are calculated.

Table 7 The prior probabilities and sensitivity factors for the basic causes

Prior
Basic causes 𝑺𝒀𝒊 – BN 𝑺𝒀𝒊 – BN-Un
Probability

Aging* 6.00E-05 0.097 0.069

Erosion 2.25E-04 0.064 0.055

Corrosion 9.00E-05 0.097 0.093

Wear 9.00E-05 0.064 0.046

Substandard material 9.00E-05 0.064 0.046

Improper installation* 6.00E-05 0.097 0.069

Wrong dimension* 6.00E-05 0.048 0.069

Welding defect 3.00E-04 0.087 0.083

Excess vibration 1.05E-04 0.110 0.079

HE- Incorrect fitting 5.40E-04 0.113 0.108

HE-left open 4.95E-04 0.094 0.084

Fatigue 5.25E-04 0.061 0.055

Excess mechanical loads 4.50E-05 0.064 0.093

High pressure 4.80E-04 0.078 0.069

High temperature 1.65E-04 0.070 0.050

Loss of station keeping 1.50E-05 0.077 0.055

Collision 4.50E-05 0.064 0.093

Dropped object 1.50E-05 0.058 0.041

Lack of procedures* 6.00E-05 0.097 0.069

HE - not follow procedure 1.95E-04 0.089 0.085

HE-introduced arc 1.35E-04 0.258 0.279

HE-welding spark 1.20E-04 0.339 0.348

Hot surface 9.00E-05 0.322 0.371

Exhaust gas 1.05E-04 0.304 0.318

Friction 6.00E-05 0.290 0.279

28
 Faulty electric equip 1.35E-04 0.366 0.402

Circuit failure 2.25E-04 0.348 0.371

Lightening 1.50E-05 0.387 0.279

HE- Human Error, * cases with assumed values

The causes with the highest importance in fire and explosion scenarios are all the ones responsible
for the ignition, i.e., lightening, HE- introduced spark, electric spark or hot surface. In the causes
for release, the human error, like incorrect fitting, is the most important one followed by welding
defect. Remaining most of the causes have a 𝑆𝑌𝑖 between 0.05 and 0.1. Commenting on human
errors as a whole, they represent 21.5 % share of total sensitivity. This implies that different types
of human errors at the front end increase the chance of accident. It is important to note that human
factors’ involvement may be even more relevant and so is analysed later.

The BN model with uncertain data results in slightly different (mostly lower) values of SF for the
basic causes, as seen in Figure 9. Some causes like wrong dimension, excess mechanical loads and
collision have the same SF as that calculated earlier. According to BN-Un model, faulty electric
equipment followed by circuit failure and hot surface are the most important causes.

Comparing the two immediate causes “release” and “ignition”, the importance of preventing
ignitions is 62% while that for releases is 38% (Fig. 10). This signifies that preventive barriers for
ignition are more important compared to the release ones.

The information provided in this section may be useful for decision-makers to prioritize their
resources. The proposed BN model framework for risk analysis can be customized to any particular
scenario. For example, for FPSOs working under specific conditions (extreme weather, region
with ice bergs) or with less operating equipment, a new set of relevant variables can be added to
the BN model.

29
 0.45
BN BN-Un
0.4

0.35

0.3

0.25
SY i

0.2

0.15

0.1

0.05

Lack of procedures
Wrong dimension
Wear

HE-left open

Exhaust gas
High pressure

Hot surface
HE - not follow procedure
HE-introduced arc
Fatigue

Loss of station keeping

High temperature

Circuit failure
Substandard material
Aging

Excess mechanical loads

Improper installation
Corrosion

Excess vibration
HE- Incorrect fitting
Welding defect

Dropped objecct

Faulty electric equip

Friction
HE-welding spark

Lightening
Erosion

Collision
Basic causes

Figure 9 Global sensitivity measure (𝑺𝒀𝒊 ) of basic causes for fire and explosion scenarios (HE- Human Error)

Preventive
barrier for
release
Preventive 38%
barrier for
ignition
62%

Figure 10 Share of the importance of ignition release preventive barriers

9.5 Causal factors analysis

During the operation of FPSOs in a different region or by a different operator/contractor, the causal
factors may change, influencing the probability of basic causes and, consequently, the probability
of Fire/Explosion. As a matter of fact, most of the reasons for the fire accidents are their
relationship with the human (HF), organizational (OF) and environmental (EF) factors [52]. This
section discusses the effect of these three categories of causal factors.

30
Human errors (HE incorrect fitting, left open, not follow procedures) are influenced by the human
factors. It is obvious that events such as collisions, loss of station keeping or lightening are
influenced by environmental factors. The optimum temperature and pressure of operation are
maintained with respect to organizational policy. It is to be noted that faulty electric equipment are
mostly transformers. From the investigation reports, it is hinted that predominantly the failures are
caused due to lack of preventive maintenance and hence they are influenced by OF. To incorporate
their effect in the BN model, evidences are introduced in the relevant nodes and the variation on
the fire and explosion probability is assessed. For the sake of simplicity, in the present scheme of
analysis, only the first BN model, without leaky probabilities, is used.

Through the comparison of sensitivity analysis for different scenarios, the relative importance of
each causal factor is evaluated and presented in Fig. 11. Unsurprisingly, HF accounts for almost
half (48%) of the importance followed by OF and EF.

Organizational
Factor
Human 28%
Factors
48% Environmental
Factors
24%

Figure 11 Relative importance of causal factors

10. DISCUSSION

Efficient measures to prevent and mitigate accidents in the offshore sector require comprehensive
knowledge on the accident-related phenomena, as well as the adequate risk analysis methodology.
Significant research work has been conducted on offshore fire risk analysis and accident
modelling. However, the mainstream of offshore fire risk analyses is neutral to installation types
and the scope is limited to consequence, frequency or effect analysis. The primary motivation of
the present study is to develop a FPSO specific risk assessment integrated approach.

The objective of the present study is to assess major accident scenarios in FPSOs with accident
and incident data. The accident scenario for fire and explosion is modelled and the basic causes
are prioritized using a Bayesian Network probabilistic framework. The model is generic,

31
simplified and the states of nodes are static. A rigorous study and relevant data are required to
model the complex operational scenarios of FPSOs and to assess the basic causes of fire and
explosion accidents. A preliminary attempt to address this issue is made in this study. However,
the present study stands on some key assumptions and various issues that need to be sorted out as
discussed below.

The BN model is developed to calculate the probability of fire and explosion in one year of
operation. The prior probabilities are calculated from the evaluation of accident and incident
databases. These probabilities may not be accurate due to the inherent uncertainties involved, still
the model is valuable for preliminary analyses. The uncertainties may also remain due to the
quality of information obtained from the databases. The BN model with canonical nodes has been
used to accommodate conditional probabilities and uncertainties to some extent.

Raw data available in the public domain have been analysed. Besides, the authors have analysed
other accident reports and data to provide the basis for the model. So, the results and observations
made are directly related and limited by the source materials used. The depth of this study is also
conditioned upon the findings of the investigation as not all incident reports were detailed enough
to describe all dimensions of the scenario.

Another issue with the reports is their casual approach of reporting an incident. In addition, the
content varies in the databases for similar incidents. It has been observed that they require a
coherent taxonomy to record each incident, in which the present reporting forms have limited
scope.

Some basic causes in this study can be further broken down into additional variables or factors,
such as corrosion can be influenced by the environment, pipe material, fluid properties. Similarly,
any human error may be composed of various factors like skill, knowledge. The present model can
be extended further to better detail these factors if the necessary data are available. Conversely,
unavailability of data would make the model more hypothetical.

The study also assumes that all child nodes have some dependence on parent nodes primarily from
expert opinion. This is because the quality of data was not sufficient to derive such dependencies
adequately. The expert opinion when assigning the dependence levels has a substantial impact on
the results.

32
Then, a sensitivity analysis is conducted to identify the most significant variables (basic causes)
on fire and explosion accidents. The sensitivity analysis is also important to identify measures for
preventing and mitigating the impact of an accident. Some basic causes show low sensitivity
factors, yet the minimum value to make them significant is a subjective case and thus depends on
decision-makers.

The direct causes are exposed by the current methodology based on the qualitative information
provided by the reporting data. Moreover, human, organizational and environmental factors are
evaluated. Another prominent causal factors, such as technical factors that influences mechanical
failures and design fabrication errors are not incorporated. The authors believe that technical
factors are relatively less important than other factors observed in the accident scenarios. However,
further studies incorporating technical factors are necessary to assess their influence on the
accident scenarios.

CONCLUSIONS

This study proposes an integrated approach for risk assessment and probabilistic modelling of fire
and explosion scenarios in FPSOs. First, FPSO incident data is taken from major open source
databases like HSE, BSEE and NOPSEMA. It is found that there are around 0.5 serious accidents,
at least 3 incidents and 0.5 significant injuries per year per FPSO unit. Moreover, accident
databases, reports and specialised literature are analysed to characterize accidents and incidents
specific to FPSOs. A total of 800 FPSO specific incident descriptions are evaluated, categorized
and coded. More than half of the incidents are spills or release of fluids, followed by crane
accidents, fire and falling loads. Around 88% of these incidents developed during the normal
production operational mode of the FPSOs.

The chi-square method is applied to test hypotheses regarding incident types and potential
influencing variables. Some significant relationships for incident type is found with incident
severity, number of on-board fatality, FPSO operational mode and average age. However, the type
of topside activity and error do not influence a particular incident.

About 100 cases of accidents are characterized and categorized to develop different risk scenarios.
The risk matrix is constructed for major accident scenario and accidents are consequently screened.
Fire and explosion is found to be a major threat for FPSO.

33
The literature is further assessed and incidental data combined with accidental data are utilized to
construct the causal network. Prior probabilities are estimated based on their occurrence in the
databases.

Later, this study creates a fire and explosion model using Bayesian Network in FPSO based on
evidence obtained from accident databases. Evidence-based modelling allows more realistic
scenario whereas, the use of BN allows flexibility to model interdependencies among causal
factors and provides space for expert elicitation. The methodology presents a way to calculate the
probabilities of major accidents.

Probability of fire and explosion is computed from the model, it is observed that Leaky Noise OR
gate estimates lower bound of the probability. Sensitivity analysis is performed to highlight the
most significant basic causes for fire and explosion. Ignition prevention is found as more important
than release prevention.

Finally, a causal factor analysis using human, organizational and environmental factors is
conducted. Human factors have higher importance (around half), followed by organizational and
environmental factors.

The accident (Bayes) network model developed in this study, from a sequence of causal events
play an important role in the accident formation. The model can be further customized to
incorporate many features such as relative influence of causes on failure through CPT, prioritizing
one error above any other errors etc. The results of this study may be useful for FPSO operators
and decision-makers to allocate resources for accident prevention. This study will be further
extended to assess various uncertainties and model other major accidents.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This work was performed within the project RESET (REliability and Safety Engineering and
Technology for large maritime engineering systems), which is partially financed by the European
Union Horizon 2020 research and innovation program, under the Marie Skodowska- Curie grant
agreement No. 73088 RESET. This work contributes to the Strategic Research Plan of the Centre
for Marine Technology and Ocean Engineering (CENTEC), which is financed by the Portuguese
Foundation for Science and Technology (Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia - FCT) under
contract UIDB/UIDP/00134/2020.

34
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40
APPENDIX AN OVERVIEW OF DEFINITION OF BASIC TERMS IN DATABASES
Database Definition of accident and incidents
Accidents - Casualty events, serious injury, LTA (1-3 days), LTA > 3 days (LTA-Lost Time Accident,)
Dangerous occurrences (potential accidents) - Fire/Explosion, collision, uncontrolled hydrocarbon leaks, well kicks, dropped objects, events with emergency action
NOPSEMA
required, failure of safety critical equipment, pipe failure etc.
Recordable environmental incidents - types of spills and releases, operational failures
Accidents - Casualty events, serious injury, LTA (1-3 days), LTA > 3 days, RW/JT (1-3 days), RW/JT>3 days, pollution, fire, explosion, loss of well control,
collision, structural damage, crane accidents, other lifting equipment, damaged/disabled system
BSEE
Incidents - >25K, H2S release, required muster, shutdown from gas release, other (RW/JT - Restricted Work/Job Transfer)
Anchor failure, blowout, capsize, collision, contact, crane accident, explosion,
Accident Hazardous situation causing fatalities and severe injuries
fire, falling load, foundering, grounding, helicopter accident, leakage, spill
HSE/WOAD
Hazardous situation not developed into an accidental situation. low release, list, machine failure, off position, structural damage, towing accident,
Incident
degree of damage, but repairs/replacements are required well problem, other

APPENDIX B (RISK ASSESSMENT OF SOME RECENT ACCIDENTS) [69][40][70][71][72]

FPSO Year Country Initiating event Final event Consequence Basic Causes Accident Severity PoF Risk
Petrobras- Helicopter Rough landing Helicopter
2017 Brazil 4 injured Human, Environment C 3 M
P-37 Incident and crashed accident
Newfoun Collision with Structural
SeaRose 2017 Structural Inadequate safety precautions Collision C 4 H
dland iceberg damage
Petrojarl North Sea Loss in position Loss of
2016 Anchor failure - Extreme weather and lost tension A 3 VL
Banff UK /stability position/stability
Electric induced fire in a heating,
Petrojarl
2015 Norway Fire Fire - ventilation and air conditioning Fire C 4 H
Knarr
unit.
Petrojarl Loss of
2015 Norway. list Loss in position Door ripped off Extreme weather A 3 VL
Knarr position/stability
Cidade
9 killed 26 Equip failure, wrong installation,
de São 2015 Brazil Gas leak Explosion Explosion E 4 VH
missing operational errors
Mateus
North Sea 1 Fatality (age
Anasuria 2015 Unknown Unknown Unknown Other D 2 M
UK 61)
Anchor
North Sea Loss in position Manufacturing defect on a chain Loss of
Gryphon A 2011 failure(Chain 2 injured B 4 H
UK /stability link, Very heavy weather position/stability
Break)
Poor safety culture (Deluge
Ngujima- Breakdown of
2009 Australia Fire Explosion valves foam system GRE piping B 5 H
Yin gas compressor Explosion
failed)

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APPENDIX C DISTRIBUTION OF INCIDENTS INVOLVED IN OFFSHORE INSTALLATIONS [20]
Offshore installation Incident type
AN BL CL CN CR EX FA FI GR HE LE LG LI MA OT PO ST TO WP
Accommodation jackup 2 4 6 1 2 2
Accommodation semi-submersible 24 6 24 1 9 10 3 1 1 2 8 5
Drillship 5 1 23 3 2 1 2 2 4
FPSO 14 0 0 15 63 2 20 44 0 1 0 321 0 1 20 0 6 0 1
Drilling jackup 8 6 72 379 4 97 50 1 1 2 92 9 1 24 8 164
Production jackup 9 7 1 9 4
Production semi-submersible 8 7 40 3 17 16 133 5 3 1
Drilling semi-submersible 182 2 10 106 860 11 241 84 6 11 140 3 3 23 3 30 19 136
Tension-leg platform 2 58 9 13 1 19 1 1 3
(AN- Anchor failure, BL – Blowout, CL – Collision, CN – Contact, CR - Crane accident, EX – Explosion, FA - Falling load, FI – Fire, GR Grounding, HE Helicopter accident, LE
Leakage, LG Spill/release, LI – List, MA - Machinery failure, OT –Other, PO - Off position, ST -Structural damage, TO -Towing accident, WP - Well problem)

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APPENDIX D DISTRIBUTION OF INCIDENTS INVOLVED IN FPSO WITH CIRCUMSTANCES [15,20,79,80]
Incident type
AN CN CR EX FA FI HE LG MA OT ST WP
Severity of Accident 1 7 1 1 6 3 0
incident
Incident 12 5 40 1 10 30 0 225 1 12 3 1
Near-Miss 2 7 7 4 2 1 2
Insignificant 2 9 6 11 90 6
Operational Development drilling 1 2
mode
Drilling 2 1 1 1 1 9
Off-loading 1 3 1 2 1
Production 10 12 57 1 18 40 1 297 1 17 5
Well workover 1 1 9 1 1
Other 1 2 1 2 2 1 1
Topside Normal Operation 6 5 20 1 7 15 1 202 1 6 3 1
activity
Routine 2 3 16 1 4 11 56 4 1
Inspection
Commissioning 1 2 12 5 7 26 3 1
Maintenance 3 3 9 2 6 24 4
Watch keeping 2 2 6 2 5 13 3 1
Number of 1 1 21 4 1 4
fatality
2 1 2
Error type Design Error 1 2 1 1 1 4 1 1
Component failure 2 2 7 4 6 87 5 1
Operational errors 7 6 26 1 9 18 1 103 1 8 3 1
Procedural errors 0 2 7 2 5 9 1
Unknown 4 3 22 1 4 14 118 5 1
FPSO < 5 years 5 6 17 0 9 19 0 170 1 4 0 0
average age
> 5 years 9 9 46 2 11 25 1 151 0 16 6 1

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