Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Foreword—Frank Putnam
Preface
Acknowledgments
FRANK PUTNAM
The year 2020 marks the 40th anniversary of the third edition of the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, commonly
referred to as “DSM-III” (1980). Unveiled to cries of acclaim and
alarm from the establishment, the DSM-III’s atheoretical, symptom-
driven, multi-axial, descriptive approach to psychiatric diagnosis was
a significant departure from earlier nosology based on outdated
theories of personality reaction formation. The DSM-III’s delineation
of specific symptom constellations, irrespective of theory or etiology,
helped to refocus clinicians on the clients in front of them.
While acute psychological effects of combat were recognized
under labels such as WWI “shell shock” and WWII “combat
fatigue/neurosis,” there was a need for psychiatric diagnoses that
encompassed delayed and/or chronic emotional, cognitive, somatic,
and behavioral responses to past trauma. In the United States this
was, in large measure, a response to a growing awareness of the
serious mental health problems in Vietnam War veterans that often
emerged years after their return from combat. To address this
deficit, the DSM-III introduced the diagnosis of posttraumatic stress
disorder (PTSD) as well as detailing a more accurate clinical profile
of multiple personality disorder, subsequently renamed dissociative
identity disorder (DID) in DSM-IV (1994). The DSM-III’s recognition
of delayed-onset posttraumatic disorders initiated a new field of
research and clinical practice—although it would struggle to gain
legitimacy and resources for years to come.
Forty years later, however, the existence of posttraumatic
disorders is rarely questioned, although a lively debate continues
about subtypes. As additional, noncombat forms of trauma were
studied (e.g., rape, child abuse, first responders, and natural
disasters), it became clear that there is a range of posttraumatic
responses that are complexly influenced by variables such as age,
gender, type(s) and duration of trauma, and relationship to
perpetrator(s), as well as factors such as degree of social support,
synergistic interactions among different types of trauma, and
individual differences. One of the posttraumatic psychological
processes that critically influences clinical presentation and
treatment response is the client’s degree of dissociation. The recent
addition of the diagnosis, PTSD—dissociative subtype in DSM-5, for
example, reflects a growing appreciation of the importance of
dissociation in influencing clinical features of trauma-related
disorders (TRDs).
Despite an initial lack of professional awareness and widespread
skepticism about the existence of dissociative disorders, much has
been learned over the past four decades that demystifies these
conditions. Dissociation is now measured with the same
psychometric precision as depression and anxiety. Epidemiological
studies in general population and clinical samples find that the
dissociative disorders are common psychiatric conditions (see
Chapter 1 of this book). High levels of dissociation are correlated
with refractoriness to standard treatments for a variety of psychiatric
conditions, including PTSD, eating disorders, and borderline
personality disorder.
Pathological dissociation is strongly linked to a history of severe
trauma. This etiological relationship of severe trauma and
subsequently increased levels of dissociation holds for a wide range
of types of trauma across culture and time. Severe, repetitive, often
early-life traumas such as childhood sexual abuse are recognized as
a necessary—but not sufficient—cause of dissociative disorders.
Longitudinal parent–child dyad studies outline a generational
dissociative trajectory in which certain parental deficits in caretaking,
together with early-life trauma, are associated with Type D
attachment in infants. Type D attachment in infancy, in turn, predicts
increased levels of dissociation later in adolescence and early
adulthood, which is associated with emotional dysregulation and
impaired executive functions. Impaired executive functions are linked
to difficulties learning from life experiences, problems controlling
strong emotions, and failure to consolidate a unified sense of self.
Adults with high levels of dissociation are more likely to use harsh
parenting tactics associated with having Type D offspring. Thus, far
more than for many psychiatric disorders, there is an empirically
supported etiology and developmental theory for how early trauma
and impaired caregiving produce pathological dissociation and
identity fragmentation. Few other psychiatric disorders can marshal
equivalent levels of evidence for their putative etiologies and
developmental trajectories.
Research on the underlying neurobiology of TRDs in general and
dissociative disorders in particular has been remarkably productive,
despite low levels of funding. Brain imaging studies find activation
patterns that differentiate classic PTSD hyperarousal from
dissociative responses to traumatic reminders (see Chapter 3 of this
book). Multiple studies using an array of imaging technologies detect
reliable brain state differences associated with the identity states of
individual DID subjects. Research with a variety of types of trauma
finds that experimental activation of dissociative responses to recall
of past trauma is associated with decreased autonomic arousal,
especially decreased heart rate. This is consistent with theories that
analogize human dissociative reactions to the “freezing” behaviors
seen in young animals such as fawns and baby rabbits in response
to predators.
Posttraumatic effects on memory, cognitive associations, and
logical reasoning are now well documented for different forms of
trauma. Emotional dysregulation manifest by rapid shifts in affect
and mental state produces disruptions in an individual’s continuous
sense of self. Longitudinal and cross-sectional studies find that
severe early trauma alters the long-term development of adrenal
and gonadal hormonal systems as well as acute responses to
stressors. Prepubertal sexual abuse, for example, accelerates the
onset of puberty in females. Even a victim’s genes may be altered by
trauma through epigenetic mechanisms such as stress-induced DNA
methylation. These trauma-induced genetic changes may be
transmitted to future generations, providing a genetic contribution to
the tragic cycles of family violence.
Progress in the treatment and prevention of TRDs, especially the
dissociative disorders, has lagged behind developmental, cognitive,
and neurobiological scientific advances. Treatments for classic PTSD
that have been proven by randomized clinical trials (RCTs) exist,
including psychotherapies, exposure and desensitization models, and
pharmacotherapies. Until recently, however, treatment models for
DID and other dissociative disorders were, at best, limited to the
descriptive case series level, usually reflecting the experience of a
single clinician’s practice.
By systematically following the progress of hundreds of
independent client–therapist dyads with longitudinal evaluations, the
Treatment of Patients with Dissociative Disorders (TOP DD) studies
have significantly advanced our therapeutic knowledge of the
dissociative disorders. While short of gold-standard RCTs, the TOP
DD Network study findings are based on repeated, independent
client and therapist assessments with standard self- and therapist-
report measures. After viewing a set of safety-oriented videos, TOP
DD Network clients scoring in the higher ranges on dissociation
measures (previously associated with clinical failure) showed
clinically relevant improvements on behaviors such as nonsuicidal
self-injury, number of hospitalizations, and degree of emotional and
impulse control. In contrast to prior studies, clients with higher levels
of dissociation showed faster rates of improvement than subjects
with lower (but still abnormal) levels of dissociation, indicting a
specificity of TOP DD therapeutic approaches for highly dissociative
clients.
Finding Solid Ground: Overcoming Obstacles in Trauma Treatment
and the accompanying workbook distill the lessons of the TOP DD
studies into a coherent therapeutic approach. Because dissociative
clients are likely to read this text, it is sprinkled with motivational
encouragement to practice the TOP DD-tested interventions. In
addition to the TOP DD insights, the authors add their own wealth of
therapeutic expertise from years of working with patients with
dissociative TRDs. As individuals, they have all achieved recognition
for their contributions to the field. Together, the authors present an
inclusive and comprehensive therapeutic approach to dissociative
TRDs. While more remains to be learned, this volume and workbook
translate 40 years of progress into a new, evidence-informed,
generalizable approach to the treatment of dissociative TRDs
surpassing many of the limitations inherent in earlier individual
clinician-based case series.
PREFACE
What is dissociation?
Dissociation is defined in a multitude of ways and is a complex
phenomenon. To be treatment focused, pragmatic, and accessible,
we do not review the multitude of definitions and theories about
dissociation and DDs here, nor the historical development of these
theories; excellent overviews are available (e.g., Dell & O’Neil, 2009;
Simeon & Loewenstein, 2009). Among the most prominent theories
of trauma-related dissociation are Frank Putnam’s (1997) discrete
behavioral model, the structural model of dissociation (Nijenhuis &
van der Hart, 2011), the “4-D Model” of dissociation (Frewen &
Lanius, 2015), and the corticolimbic model of dissociation (Fenster et
al., 2018; Lanius et al., 2010).
Our clinical conceptualization of traumatized patients’ dissociative
symptoms, our research, and the foundation of the treatment
approach described here are each rooted in these theoretical
models. An individual who is “dissociated” is in a discrete state of
consciousness, or as Putnam describes it, a “discrete behavioral
state.” Therefore, throughout this book and in the workbook, we
refer often to dissociative “states.”
Trauma creates states of overwhelm that are strikingly different
from normal states of being (Frewen & Lanius, 2015; Lanius et al.,
2010; Putnam, 1989, 1997, 2016). Trauma-based states differ in
terms of the intensity and types of physiological arousal, emotion,
neurobiological patterns, level of self-awareness and awareness of
others (sometimes called “metacognitive” or “reflective” abilities),
access to autobiographical memory, and patterns of thinking,
perceiving, and behaving (Frewen & Lanius, 2015; Lanius et al.,
2010; Putnam, 1997, 2016).
As they mature, children are supposed to gradually develop
awareness and control over what are initially uncontrolled shifts in
state. It is common for an infant or toddler to rapidly shift from
being alert and playful to whining, crying, or having a tantrum when
overwhelmed with the physiological and emotional distress of
intense hunger or exhaustion. The rapidity of this type of state
change and the intense dyscontrol of emotion and behavior are
normal in very young children but are not typical of older children or
adults. Older children and adults do not typically shift states that
rapidly or intensely or with that level of dyscontrol.
Maltreatment interferes with a child developing control over
behavioral states as well as the integration and organization of these
trauma-based states. Maltreatment can create unintegrated states of
extreme distress that can unpredictably intrude into the person’s
thinking, behavior, and emotions, even decades after the
maltreatment has ended. For example, an adult survivor may
suddenly become utterly terrified and urgently want to run and hide.
Sometimes, the adult has no idea what caused their utter terror,
which makes them feel weak, vulnerable, and/or “crazy.” People with
severe DDs may become so terrified that they shift to a traumatized
state and then behave like a terrified child. They may find
themselves under a table as if they were still a child attempting to
escape an abusive adult. They may or may not have control over
what they do in such a trauma-based state. Afterwards, they may
clearly remember hiding, they may remember it only vaguely, or
they may have complete lack of memory (i.e., dissociative amnesia)
for hiding.
Dissociative amnesia occurs from trauma creating trauma-
dependent states that can lead to the development of “profound
forms of state-dependent learning and memory retrieval” (Putnam,
1997, p 179). Said differently, the adult survivor may not recall what
they did or how they felt when in a traumatized state once they shift
back to a nontraumatized state due to memory being less accessible
between states. As a result, a maltreated child may develop a sense
of self (or selves) that is/are unintegrated. That is, as the child
matures, they may retain “discrete behavioral states” rather than
integrate these states. The child may compartmentalize and avoid
thinking about “that bad thing that happened to that bad child,”
thereby distancing themselves from the profound betrayal, shame,
hurt, anger, and terror that they experienced during the abuse and
even the memory of the maltreatment. Over time, particularly if
traumatization occurs repeatedly and the child is not comforted or
protected by caregivers, the disruption to the child’s development
can be amplified. The child may develop difficulty accessing
memories about themselves and have increasingly elaborated,
divergent rather than integrated, dissociative states of self. In cases
of severe and early abuse, these states may become elaborated and
complex and ultimately develop into DID (Putnam, 1997, 2016).
The various conceptualizations of trauma-related dissociative
symptoms “converge around the concept that dissociation involves a
failure to integrate or associate information and experience in a
normally expectable fashion” (Putnam, 1997, p. 7). Consistent with
this idea of a lack of integration, the fifth edition of the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) defines
dissociation as “a disruption and/or discontinuity in the normal
integration of consciousness, memory, identity, emotion, perception,
body representation, motor control, and behavior” (American
Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013, p. 291).
Dissociative states range from mild, nonpathological detachment,
such as those occurring during peak athletic, religious, and artistic
experiences (Butler, 2006; Butler et al., 1996); to derealization or
depersonalization that occur transiently with stress; to the more
chronic pathological forms of dissociation, including DPTSD and DDs.
The concept of a continuum of dissociation ranging in severity is
most fitting to individuals who do not fall into the most severe end
of the continuum, sometimes referred to as belonging in the
“dissociative taxon.” The dissociative taxon includes those with the
most severe DDs, which includes DID and some forms of “other
specified dissociative disorder” (OSDD; previously referred to as
“dissociative disorder not otherwise specified” [DDNOS] in the DSM-
IV-R [APA, 2000]; Waller & Ross, 1997). Most commonly,
OSDD/DDNOS patients experience identity fragmentation without
amnesia across self-states. Some writers refer to people in the
dissociative subtype of PTSD as belonging to a dissociative taxon
(Lanius et al., 2014), although we prefer to reserve the term
“dissociative taxon” for those with elevated scores on the
Dissociative Experiences Scale taxon subscale (DES; see Chapter 2),
who are frequently also diagnosed with a DD.
The DSM-5 describes dissociation as a “disruption and/or
discontinuity” among a variety of psychological processes. Examples
of what can be disrupted in each of these psychological processes
clarify how broad the range of dissociative experiences can be.
Dissociation can disrupt perception, such as when one’s
surroundings appear to be far away, blurry, surreal, two-dimensional,
or otherwise distorted; this is referred to as “derealization.”
Perceptual dissociation can also result in a type of detachment from
self (i.e., feeling numb or disconnected from one’s body or emotions,
such as feeling as if one’s body does not belong to oneself or seeing
oneself at a distance as if in a movie), which is called
“depersonalization.” A traumatized person may enter a trance-like
state during which they may be less responsive or even
nonresponsive to what is going on around them; this is an example
of a disruption of consciousness. Amnesia for part or all of a
traumatic event, or not being able to recall what one has done for
minutes, hours, or even days at a time, is an example of disrupted
memory. Dissociation can also result in a lack of integration between
identity and memory, which is referred to as “compartmentalization”
(Holmes et al., 2005). Abrupt shifting of emotions, such as when a
person shifts inexplicably from calm to terrified or from very angry to
silly, could be due to dissociative disruptions in emotion. Feeling as if
one has a fragmented identity (e.g., behaving, feeling, and/or
thinking so differently that one feels as if one is almost a different
person) rather than having a cohesive, unified sense of self
exemplifies a disruption of identity. Dissociative body representations
occur when a person perceives their body to be much younger or
older, or larger or smaller, or of a different sex than they are.
Dissociative disruptions of motor control and behavior often occur
simultaneously. (For example, an individual with a DD may
experience having no control over their movements, such as seeing
themselves engaging in self-harm and wanting to stop the behavior
but being unable to do so.) These dissociative experiences can be so
confusing and frightening that the individual may avoid thinking
about them, and may avoid telling others, including mental health
professionals, about them due to fear of sounding “crazy.”
Dissociative detachment can be conceptualized as a process or
mechanism (“I am dissociating”), whereas compartmentalization can
be conceptualized as an outcome of the process of detachment or
structural dissociation (“Another part of me said those angry words,
not me”). In this book, we use the term “dissociation” to mean the
act of dissociating, whether it is experienced as a trance state or as
depersonalization or derealization. When referring to the process of
shifting DSS that occurs in the more complex DD, we will explicitly
state this. When we are referring to the disorder that involves DSS
coupled with periods of amnesia, we will specifically refer to DID.