Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Neo-Ottoman
Imaginaries in
Contemporary
Turkey
Edited by
Catharina Raudvere
Petek Onur
Modernity, Memory and Identity
in South-East Europe
Series Editor
Catharina Raudvere
Department of Cross-Cultural and Regional Studies
University of Copenhagen
Copenhagen, Denmark
This series explores the relationship between the modern history and pres-
ent of South-East Europe and the long imperial past of the region. This
approach aspires to offer a more nuanced understanding of the concepts
of modernity and change in this region, from the nineteenth century to
the present day. Titles focus on changes in identity, self-representation and
cultural expressions in light of the huge pressures triggered by the interac-
tion between external influences and local and regional practices. The
books cover three significant chronological units: the decline of empires
and their immediate aftermath, authoritarian governance during the twen-
tieth century, and recent uses of history in changing societies in South-
East Europe today.
Catharina Raudvere • Petek Onur
Editors
Neo-Ottoman
Imaginaries in
Contemporary Turkey
Editors
Catharina Raudvere Petek Onur
Department of Cross-Cultural and Department of Cross-Cultural and
Regional Studies Regional Studies
University of Copenhagen University of Copenhagen
Copenhagen, Denmark Copenhagen, Denmark
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer
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Contents
1 “I
am the Granddaughter of the Ottomans”: Gender,
Aesthetics and Agency in Neo-Ottoman Imaginaries—An
Introduction 1
Catharina Raudvere and Petek Onur
2 Neo-Ottomanism
versus Ottomania: Contestation of
Gender in Historical Drama 33
Murat Ergin and Yağmur Karakaya
3 Lovers
of the Rose: Islamic Affect and the Politics of
Commemoration in Turkish Museal Display 57
Torsten Janson
4 Between
Memory and Forgetting and Purity and Danger:
The Case of the Ulucanlar Prison Museum 99
Courtney Dorroll
5 Architectures
of Domination? The Sacralisation of
Modernity and the Limits of Ottoman Islamism125
Kerem Öktem
6 Claiming
the Neo-Ottoman Mosque: Islamism, Gender,
Architecture155
Bülent Batuman
v
vi Contents
7 Commemorating
the First World War and Its Aftermath:
Neo-Ottomanism, Gender, and the Politics of History in
Turkey175
Nazan Maksudyan and Hilal Alkan
8 The
New Ottoman Henna Nights and Women in the
Palace of Nostalgia209
Petek Onur
9 Post-truth
and Anti-science in Turkey: Putting It into
Perspective237
Hande Eslen-Ziya
10 Mixed
Marriage Patterns in Istanbul: Gendering Ethno-
religious Boundaries257
Özgür Kaymak
11 Neo-Ottoman
Intersections: The Politics of Gender in a
Transforming Turkey—An Afterword285
Nora Fisher-Onar
Index313
Notes on Contributors
vii
viii NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
entitled Politics and Gender Identity in Turkey: Centralized Islam for Socio-
Economic Control, published by Routledge, that looks at how illiberal
regimes use discursive tools and governmentalities rather than actual pub-
lic policies to foster human capital. Currently she co-edited the book titled
The Aesthetics of Global Protest: Visual Culture and Communication pub-
lished by Amsterdam University Press. Eslen-Ziya is the Co-I of Covid-19
project funded by the Norwegian Research Council (2020–2022). The
project titled “Fighting pandemics with enhanced risk communication:
Messages, compliance and vulnerability during the COVID-19 outbreak”
aims to uncover the correlation between risk communication and social
vulnerability in the context of the Covid-19 outbreak.
Nora Fisher-Onar is an associate professor of international studies at the
University of San Francisco. Her research interests include the theory and
practice of international relations, foreign policy analysis, comparative area
studies (Turkey; Middle East; Europe), political ideologies, gender, and
history/memory. She received her doctorate from Oxford and holds mas-
ter’s and undergraduate degrees from Johns Hopkins (SAIS) and
Georgetown universities, respectively. Fisher-Onar is editor of the volume
Istanbul: Living With Difference in a Global City (2018 with Rutgers
University Press). Her forthcoming Pluralism in Turkey: Islam, Liberalism
and Nationalism will be published by Cambridge University Press.
Torsten Janson is senior lecturer at the Centre for Theology and
Religious Studies and affiliated with the Advanced Centre for Middle
Eastern Studies, Lund University. During the past decade, he has served as
co-coordinator and principal investigator of the Swedish national research
program The Middle East in the Contemporary World (MECW). He has
published widely on Islamic mission (da‘wa) and religious socialisation
through cultural production, with a particular focus on children’s culture.
Among his publications are Your Cradle Is Green: The Islamic Foundation
and the Call to Islam in Children’s literature (Almqvist & Wiksell 2003)
and contributions to the volumes Images of the Child and Childhood in
Modern Muslim Contexts (Duke University Press 2012), New Words about
Pictures: Current Research on Picturebooks and Visual/Verbal Texts for
Young People (Routledge 2017), and Handbook of Islamic Education
(Springer 2018). He is currently principal investigator for the three-year
project, Beyond Sacred/Secular Cities: Politics of Memory, Space, and
Religion in Middle Eastern Nationalisms.
x NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
xiii
xiv List of Figures
Fig. 3.7 Two award-winning panels. Cevan Huran and Emel Türkmen
(left) provide a lexicon of Muhammad nomination, in fairly
close compliance with Master Osman’s scheme. The
structurally more inventive design by Avni Nakkasṃ and
Emel Selamet (right) invokes the Prophet as the defender of
monotheism, through extensive Quran quotations and
symbolic/textual cosmic references 86
Fig. 4.1 Ulucanlar courtyard. (Photograph by author) 106
Fig. 4.2 Mugs for sale in the prison museum giftshop. Pictured on the
mug is Nazım Hikmet, modern Turkey’s most famous poet
who was a political prisoner in Turkey during his lifetime.
(Photograph by author) 116
Fig. 4.3 Wax figure display of prisoners in a communal cell inside the
museum. (Photograph by author) 119
Fig. 5.1 Top left: The Mausoleum of the state founder Atatürk
(Anıtkabir), Top right: Hacıbayram Mosque and plateau, Bottom
left: Streets in the Hacıbayram neighbourhood, Bottom right:
View from Hacıbayram to lower-middle-class neighbourhoods.
(The source of all figures is the author) 133
Fig. 5.2 Top left: Ulus Square, Top right: Melike Hatun Mosque, Bottom
left: Gençlik Park Entrance, Bottom right: Melike Hatun
Mosque seen from the north 134
Fig. 5.3 Top: Taksim Mosque, Bottom: Taksim Mosque and
commemoration of Atatürk’s death 139
Fig. 5.4 Top left: North Ankara Mosque Complex, general view, Top
right: North Ankara Mosque Complex park, Bottom: North
Ankara Mosque Complex Hacıbayram University 142
Fig. 5.5 Top: Çamlıca Mosque, general view, Bottom: View to central
Istanbul from the plateau 145
Fig. 5.6 Top left: General view of the Presidential Complex, Top right:
Mosque of the Nation (Millet Camii), Bottom left: Forecourt of
the Library of the Nation (Millet Kütüphanesi), Bottom right:
Main reading hall of the library 147
Fig. 6.1 Left: The original proposal for Kocatepe Mosque designed by
Vedat Dalokay and Nejat Tekelioğlu. (Source: Vedat Dalokay
Archive). Right: Kocatepe Mosque dominating the skyline of
Ankara. (Photograph by author. The reversion to classical
Ottoman mosque architecture represented by this project
involved not only the reproduction of the external image. The
interior organisation, as well as traditional decorations, also
strictly followed classical examples, and this approach
henceforth defined the mainstream in mosque architecture
endorsed by the Presidency of Religious Affairs) 158
List of Figures xv
Fig. 6.2 The Ahmet Hamdi Akseki Mosque inside the Diyanet
compound, designed by Salim Alp. (Photograph by author.
Located along the main road tying Ankara to Eskişehir, the
mosque rises as a landmark visible to everyone approaching the
city from the western suburbs) 161
Fig. 6.3 The Ahmet Hamdi Akseki Mosque inside the Diyanet
compound, designed by Salim Alp: early stage and the actual
building. Note the change in the main entrance to the mosque.
(Source: Salim Alp Mimarlık and author) 162
Fig. 6.4 The Mimar Sinan Mosque designed by Hilmi Şenalp.
(Photograph by Gülse Eraydın. Located in Ataşehir, a rapidly
growing district in the Anatolian part of Istanbul, the mosque is
situated at the north-western corner of a large park surrounded
by two highways and a busy street. To the west of the park lies
an upper-class mixed-use compound of high-rise blocks. Thus,
although it is huge in size, the mosque is unavoidably dwarfed
by the blocks towering over it) 166
Fig. 6.5 The Çamlıca Mosque, designed by Hayriye Gül Totu and Bahar
Mızrak: (left) under construction with Erdoğan’s posters
surrounding the site in August 2016; (right) view from across
the Bosphorus in January 2017. (Photographs by author. The
billboards, part of mobilisation efforts following the failed coup,
read, “Whatever they do, it is futile/There is [This is] a divine
judgement coming from heaven”) 169
Fig. 7.1 Soldier with the “historical uniform” of the First World War
Ottoman infantry. (Sibel Hürtasṃ, “Çankkale ve Öteki Şehitler”
(Çanakkale and other martyrs), Al-Monitor, 27 March 2015,
https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/tr/originals/2015/03/
turkey-gallipoli-war-other-m.html#)182
Fig. 7.2 Poster for the centennial Sarıkamısṃ commemorations prepared
by the Ministry of Youth and Sports. The poster slogans read,
“Asım’s generation at the March of the Century”; “Sky
Allahuekber, Earth Allahuekber” 186
Fig. 7.3 Top left: The memorial of Atatürk and Şerife Bacı in Kastamonu,
sculpted by Tankut Öktem between 1985 and 1990; the
memorial stands in the city centre (“Atatürk ve Şehit şerife Bacı
Anıtı” [Atatürk and Şerife Bacı Monument], Kastamonu
Belediyesi, https://www.kastamonu.bel.tr/v2/portfolio/
ataturk-ve-sehit-serife-baci-aniti/ (7 July 2020)). Top right and
bottom right: Nene Hatun Memorial, with the rifle
(1994–2018) (https://www.haberturk.com/yerel-haberler/
haber/53573170-tarihe-adini-kahramanligiyla-yazdiran-nene-
xvi List of Figures
1
Osmanlı Torunu (Ottoman Granddaughter) was produced by the media publisher
140journos in 2019 and is published on https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zx3F_
W2lr7M. Accessed on 28 April 2021.
headscarf, leather jacket and a badge with the Turkish crescent, she articu-
lates her complete identification with the Ottoman past:
—I ruled the world! I sometimes meet people who say, “I’m Yugoslavian,”
“I’m Kosovan” and the like, exactly like this. I say, “You are nuts. Those
places are ours; you are my sibling. I haven’t given away those places.”
Think of Palestine or anywhere up to Venice. I did not give my territories
away in my heart. This is what the procedure requires. We are standing by.
—Will we take them back one day? [the interviewer asks]
—I want to, if I don’t die.
We really come from the Kayı tribes [that founded the Ottoman Empire]. …
I proudly say, “I’m a granddaughter of the Ottomans; my grandfather was
born in the Ottoman period. I’m the granddaughter of a grandfather who
died in the first years of the Republic. Should I deny my ancestry now?
These territories, these seas, this ground, this sky. All of them are mine.”
2
Adam olsunlar literally translates to “Be a man!” which refers to being a decent person.
1 “I AM THE GRANDDAUGHTER OF THE OTTOMANS”: GENDER… 3
those who can afford it. Her business includes a café and a store selling
Ottoman-style souvenirs in a historic mansion in Istanbul.
Both women emphasise the glory of the Ottoman Empire and express
a strong sense of connectedness with Ottoman history and culture, as well
as sympathy for the imperial mode of governance, the latter reflected in
Nilhan Osmanoğlu Vatansever’s claim, “There is no such thing in life as
absolute freedom.” History is thus perceived in a deterministic mode and
the future as a matter of rediscovery of bonds rather than visions of change.
This kind of essentialism in the comprehension of the values of the past is
recognisable in many facets of neo-Ottoman discourse in the cultural
sphere. Being a descendant, an Osmanlı torunu, is fundamental to both
women’s way of presenting themselves and in both cases directly con-
nected to a moral stance.
Although the two women come from very different social backgrounds,
both are capable professionals and economically independent. Their
extensive use of Ottoman imaginary in their self-definitions and means of
communication raises the issue of the rhetorical effects gained from such
historical references. While the portraits in this film perhaps are on the
exceptional side, they nevertheless point to a recognisable form of argu-
ment wherein a personal narrative connects with a glorious long-term
past. As this volume shows, the various agents constructing neo-Ottoman
imaginaries instil a sense of ownership of history through an idiom inspired
by trust in what is conceived as authentic when selectively claiming back
segments of the past. The women’s mode of communication is in many
ways revealing: the metaphors, the ways of telling, the disciplining ambi-
tion, the commercial side and, not to forget, the vivid imaginaries. The
latter serve as a reminder not to reduce neo-Ottoman trends merely to
mass consumerism only. The popular indeed plays a crucial part, but the
cases discussed in the chapters of this volume demonstrate that there are
other modes of articulation. The boundaries between the popular and the
exclusive appear to be as blurred as ever.
References to the Ottoman period in contemporary Turkey are not
only frequently present in verbal communication, but also highly percep-
tible in visual manifestations and designs. Yet, as these are products of
4 C. RAUDVERE AND P. ONUR
3
AK Parti Programı, https://www.akparti.org.tr/parti/parti-programi/. Accessed on 30
April 2021
6 C. RAUDVERE AND P. ONUR
governance, and open discussions about creativity in which high and low
culture are not always distinguishable entities. The result is eleven chapters
that explore the ambitions of a variety of actors and investigate the condi-
tions for individual as well as collective agency. The chapters include analy-
ses of architecture, uses of public space and media, ritual events, post-truth
in science, minority politics, memorialisation of the near and more distant
past, museum cultures and heritage claims.
Several variations of the expression “neo-Ottomanism” have been
introduced in the academic literature over the past decade that shed light
on the phenomenon, all based on dissatisfaction with the term’s ungainly
character and having the objective of indicating the variation in the form
and content of a many-sided history culture. The problematic suffix “-ism”
evokes ideology and policy making, which are undoubtedly at the core of
the matter, but overshadows the many other ways in which the Ottoman
paradigm is promoted. The bulk of the literature on Turkish neo-
Ottomanism deals with actualised and failed foreign politics moves. There
are also a number of important studies of the cultural aspects of the neo-
Ottoman trends, ranging from analyses of the political to the aesthetic.
Some contributions have been pivotal for this introduction and for the
following chapters and should therefore receive special mention.
In Nostalgia for the Empire: The Politics of Neo-Ottomanism, Hakan
Yavuz provides a full section on literary and artistic expressions that carry
the counter-identity ideals significant for neo-Ottoman nostalgia (2020,
68–106). Taking his examples from writers as varied as Yahya Kemal,
Ahmed Hamdi Tanpınar and Orhan Pamuk,4 the author discusses how the
Ottoman world has been presented in Turkish literature, albeit transposed
to new eras. Yavuz notes in his chapters on the political application of neo-
Ottomanism that references to a glorious past have even been activated in
attempts to overcome the deep ethnic conflicts in the country. He further
examines how the Islamic element in President Erdoğan’s political pro-
gramme has evolved and Islamic heritage has been positioned as the foun-
dation of the nation (2020, 156–166), quoting one of Erdoğan’s
early addresses: “Presiding over the heritage of our ancestors, the Ottoman
State that ruled the world for 600 years, we will revive the Ottoman con-
sciousness again” (2020, 155). The president’s personal attachment to the
sultans plays a crucial role in Yavuz’ analysis. Abdülhamid II in particular
stands out in the interpretation by Necip Fazıl Kısakürek (1904–1983),
4
A theme developed at length by Johanna Chovanec (2021).
1 “I AM THE GRANDDAUGHTER OF THE OTTOMANS”: GENDER… 7
makes visible and expresses a certain order of time, in which the dimension
of the past is the most important. More precisely, it is a past that the present
cannot or does not want to relinquish entirely, whether the bond to it takes
the form of celebration, imitation, banishment, reflected glory, or, simply,
the possibility of visiting it. (2015, 152)
Thus, its “visible embodiment is important for the present,” Hartog con-
tinues. By underlining the cultural aspects of neo-Ottomanism, we sug-
gest that the politics of Ottoman heritage dominate by framing the
heritage as Turkish, Islamic, victorious and glamorous; such a worldview
12 C. RAUDVERE AND P. ONUR
5
For another discussion on football, nationalism and Islamic authoritarianism in contem-
porary Turkey, see Evren (2022).
1 “I AM THE GRANDDAUGHTER OF THE OTTOMANS”: GENDER… 13
the changed status of the building which Spyros Sofos has discussed in
terms of “the emotional topography of populism” (Sofos 2021, cf. Sofos
2022). Led by the president of Diyanet, Ali Erbaş, the prayer attracted
large crowds that filled the courtyard and adjoining streets; many of the
participants carried Turkish and Ottoman flags; nationalist symbols
appeared on t-shirts, badges and placards. The Ottoman references oper-
ating during the event were further emphasised when Ali Erbaş climbed
the stairs of the pulpit for his sermon with an Ottoman sword in his hand:
the core symbol at the inauguration ceremony of the sultans and an allu-
sion to the founder of the Ottoman dynasty, Osman. In order to accentu-
ate the Ottoman allusions, Erdoğan continued after the service to visit the
tomb (türbe) of Mehmet the Conqueror at the mosque that bears his
name, the Fatih Mosque. On site, Erdoğan proclaimed Mehmet “the real
owner” of Hagia Sophia.
The significance of the event was not only visible in the massive pres-
ence of Ottoman symbols and the invisibility of the Christian history of
the place, but in the exaggerated mode of communication, which was not
substantially different from Islamo-national discourse in general, but even
more aggressive in its rhetoric. Words, acts and visual representations
spoke of victory, conquest and reconnection to (parts of) earlier history.
The issue of rightful ownership was the central theme and embedded in a
tone of combat. The crowds outside represented more than attendance at
a Friday prayer; the gathering had a character that was equally celebration
and demonstration. The forceful emotional involvement linked to the
martial tone of the communication inside the now mosque. It was a highly
male business. Furthermore, by choosing to visit the türbe as a finale to
this public manifestation, Erdoğan connected very directly to Ottoman
ritual practices when Sufi saints, sultans and war heroes defending Islam
(gazi) were venerated at their tombs. President Erdoğan hereby stood out
as an heir to the sultans and the gazis and a man who had rightfully recap-
tured what had been lost: a demonstration of restorative nostalgia in
Boym’s vocabulary and an effective marker of diverging stands on histori-
cal matters in Turkish society.
Islamist understandings of the Ottoman era dominate popular concep-
tualisations of the past, but they are not without competitors (Akturk
2009; Barkey 2012). How to relate to a multi-cultural and multi-religious
past has, however, remained a complicated matter, difficult to integrate
into the Islamic vision and one confined to silence. The Ottoman Empire
was diverse not only in terms of ethnicities and denominations. The varied
1 “I AM THE GRANDDAUGHTER OF THE OTTOMANS”: GENDER… 15
Onur shows in her chapter. Consumption is a sphere where the ideas and
imaginaries of Ottoman history are put into practice through tangible
objects in everyday life, as well as ceremonial events and celebrations. The
phenomenon of Islamic fashion has been part of many pious urban wom-
en’s lives since the 1990s, during which time the Islamic fashion industry
has evolved from a small market with a few companies into a large sector
which offers modest fashion in a wide range of tastes, styles and prefer-
ences. The heyday of neo-Ottoman cultural trends inspired this sector to
adopt Ottoman clothes and symbols. The ferace (a long dress which
women used to wear when they went out) in casual outfits and the kaftan
in festive clothing (see Onur’s chapter) have become prominent pieces.
The signatures of sultans, views of Istanbul and the palaces, golden tones
and numerous other iconic symbols started to be widely printed or embroi-
dered on scarves, clothes and accessories.6
However, modest fashion is only a part of the world of consumption
where this trend may be observed. As Akçaoğlu (2020 [2018]) and Alimen
(2018) show, for the newly emerging Islamic upper-middle class, having
elegant and distinctive taste which is also religiously acceptable and dis-
playing it through their lifestyles, particularly their home and office decor,
have become increasingly important. Islamic fashion and lifestyle maga-
zines offer guidelines and have become highly influential among the newly
rich Islamic upper class and the lower classes which aspire to the same
upward mobility. As well as adherence to Turco-Islamic values, nostalgic
and glamorous references to the Ottoman era have become symbols
of status.
While domestic spaces and daily life were being redesigned with touches
of neo-Ottoman nostalgia and imageries of harem life, urban spaces have
also been under major transformation. The public space policy of the AKP
governments started to become a strategy to counter Republican architec-
tural symbols and create an urban habitus for the Islamist way of life
(Batuman 2018). As Batuman and Öktem discuss in this volume, numer-
ous mosques, state buildings and emblematic squares and other public
spaces in Ankara and Istanbul have been have been erected in a short
period and with substantial impact on the cityscapes. Or are suggested as
part of reconstruction plans. The Ottoman-Seljuk style is not only
6
Based on the data from Petek Onur’s ongoing research project “Gendered Nostalgia:
Neo-Ottomanism in Islamist Women’s Media in Turkey” funded by
H2020-MSCA-IF-2019.
1 “I AM THE GRANDDAUGHTER OF THE OTTOMANS”: GENDER… 19
prevalent in state projects but widely adopted in other sectors, such as new
residential areas and tourism enterprises. The Ottoman home, imagined
by AKP governance to have been lost with the Republican era, is to be
rebuilt. The grandiose constructions evoke emotional connections with
the imperial past and sultan ancestors and create a public memory
(Tokdoğan 2019, 167–220; Çınar 2020, 92–95). Walton also draws
attention to the recent attempts of the AKP governments and Erdoğan to
unify Istanbul. Hereby aiming to homogenise its identity by erasing its
multicultural, fragmented, heterogeneous heritage and memory (Walton
2021). However, with an intentional exclusionary attitude, the decisions
for these major transformations and constructions are made without the
involvement of civil society and most of the time against the will of a large
part of the country’s inhabitants as well as diaspora. Furthermore, they are
unsuccessful in building public spaces that are safe and easily accessible for
women, non-Muslims, ethnic minorities and other disadvantaged groups;
therefore, they are not meaningful and fail to generate a sense of belonging.
Back in 2002, lifting the headscarf ban in public spaces was among the
election promises of the newly founded AKP. The ban, which prevented
women state employees from wearing a headscarf when on duty and
women university students when on campus, was a long-term dividing line
in Turkish society. It reached its turning point when Erdoğan, then Prime
Minister, fulfilled his promise on 3 October 2013, eleven years after he
came to power. To Erdoğan, this was the end of a dark time, “a step
towards normalization,”7 and toward increased professional opportunities
for women, along with full access to higher education. In the meantime,
the plain tesettür clothing of the 1980s and early 1990s had given way to
a colourful and diversified world of modest fashion offering stylish solu-
tions to the participation of veiled women in public life. The discussions
about veiled women being victims of the strict secular regime were gradu-
ally replaced by discussions of boundaries of religiously appropriate and
acceptable veiling (Sandıkçı and Ger 2010; Alimen 2018; Sayan-
Cengiz 2018).
The transformation of state institutions responsible for women’s issues
and gender equality is yet another significant indicator of the AKP
approach to gender in Turkey. For twenty years (1991–2011), the Ministry
7
Aljazeera, “Turkey Lifts Decades Old Ban on Headscarves” https://www.aljazeera.
com/news/2013/10/8/turkey-lifts-decades-old-ban-on-headscarves, Accessed on 4
November 2020.
20 C. RAUDVERE AND P. ONUR
of State for Women and Family was expected to develop gender policies
and gender equality, but was replaced by the Ministry of Family and Social
Policy in the years 2011–2018. President Erdoğan explained the institu-
tional change by saying, “We are a conservative democratic party. It is the
family that is important to us.”8 In 2018 this administrative body was
transformed into the Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Services and
women’s issues are currently the responsibility of the ministry’s special
General Directorate of Woman’s Status.9 The shrinking administrative
structure signifies both the decreasing importance attributed to the prob-
lems of women’s empowerment and equal rights and the increasing
emphasis on prioritising family over women, family being defined on the
basis of Turkish and Islamic traditions and values. In addition to the min-
istry, Diyanet started to take a more active role in gender and family issues
by reaching out to women and youth via its Family and Religious Guidance
Bureaus and female preachers in the field. These endeavours certainly take
their references for women’s roles as mothers and wives from those defined
by Sunni Islam (Yilmaz 2015, 2017; Kocamaner 2017, 2018; Adak
2020, 5).
What concerns and priorities characterise the last decade of gender poli-
cies and government discourse in Turkey? Forming heterosexual, reli-
gious, nationalist, patriarchal families which also involve a pronatalist
ethics, and defining women’s status within this family, are the clearly
expressed missions of the party, particularly since 2011, a year which marks
the authoritarian turn in the political sphere (Cindoglu and Unal 2017).
In the following years statements by Erdoğan, high-ranking state officials,
AKP members and the coalition partner, the Nationalist Movement Party
(Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP), regarding the control of women’s sex-
uality, women’s rights and violence against women, which had drastically
increased, should be understood within this framework. Prominent figures
of radical Islamist and nationalist groups support and contribute to the
discourse and even, in some cases, criticise it because they find it too mod-
erate or Western. Turkey was the first country to sign The Council of
Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against
8
Bianet, “Kadın Bakanlığı Kaldırıldı, Kadın Örgütleri Öfkeli” https://bianet.org/bianet/
kadin/130585-kadin-bakanligi-kaldirildi-kadin-orgutleri-ofkeli. Accessed on 25 May 2021.
9
On 21 April 2021, with a presidency decree, the ministry was changed into The Ministry
of Family and Social Service. For the whole history, see Aile ve Sosyal Hizmetler Bakanlığı
“Tarihçe” https://www.aile.gov.tr/bakanlik/hakkinda/tarihce/. Accessed on 30
April 2021.
1 “I AM THE GRANDDAUGHTER OF THE OTTOMANS”: GENDER… 21
I believe that we have sufficient potential to create original and free texts
which exalt humans and human honour, put family in the centre and are
suitable for our social texture. Instead of translated texts now we need to
determine our own framework. Instead of saying Copenhagen Criteria, we
will say Ankara Criteria and pursue our way. I think that the last discussion
is deliberately fuelled. If the ones who fan the flame think that we will take
even one step back from the struggle against violence against women and
providing human rights for women, they should know that they will be
disappointed. I believe that we will put out this fire of instigation.10
This statement also openly opposes the EU accession criteria known as the
Copenhagen Criteria and reveals a change in direction away from the EU
membership process, which also delineates a roadmap for achieving equal-
ity on the basis of universal human rights for candidate states. Yet, despite
the promises and the official statements, no progress has been made
toward preventing male violence and establishing gender equality in the
country.11
The shift from the aim of establishing gender equality to providing
gender justice for women at the discursive and institutional level was made
possible by several factors. Firstly, KADEM, one of its found-
ers being Erdoğan’s daughter Sümeyye Erdoğan Bayraktar (discussed by
Eslen-Ziya, this volume), encourages civil societal and academic discourse
by disseminating the term, especially through its organisation of annual
10
Haber 7, “Erdoğan’ın Sözlerinin Perde Arkası Ortaya Çıktı! Bazı Maddeler Değişiyor”,
https://www.haber7.com/guncel/haber/3004137-erdoganin-sozlerinin-perde-arkasi-
ortaya-cikti-bazi-maddeler-degisiyor Accessed on 10 November 2020.
11
According to the 2020 Global Gender Gap Index of World Economic Forum Turkey’s
rank among 153 countries is 130. http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2020.
pdf Accessed on 10 November 2020.
22 C. RAUDVERE AND P. ONUR
12
KADEM, https://kadem.org.tr/zirve-ve-kongreler/uluslararasi-toplumsal-cinsiyet-
adaleti-kongresi/. Accessed on 11 November 2020.
13
The decision to open a women’s university is announced in the 2021 Annual Plans of the
Presidency: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı Strateji ve Bütçe Başkanlığı (2020)
2021 Yılı Cumhurbaşkanlığı Yıllık Programı, 272.
1 “I AM THE GRANDDAUGHTER OF THE OTTOMANS”: GENDER… 23
the voters of the AKP (Çelik 2020).14 Due to the conglomerations in the
AKP period, the mainstream television channels and print media are
owned by pro-AKP business groups and mostly constitute a univocal choir
of party propaganda, particularly the news and debate shows. Besides, the
state’s strict control and censorship have weakened, if not silenced, alter-
native voices and discourses in Turkey, thus facilitating the post-truth
communications of the party. The leading agents in the mainstream and
conservative media, namely the columnists, use conspiracy theories to
mobilise the masses with the aim of maintaining the status quo, especially
in times of crises. They adopt a strategy that actively creates certain links
with the past, expands the borders of the present and tells the masses what
to remember, how to remember and what to forget. The discourse of
conspiracy theories is mostly based on an emphasis on dualities, polarities
of us versus them and hostilities that create or define enemies and stress
the notion of victimhood (Tangün and Parlak 2020). Consequently, the
age-old dichotomies like Islamic/secular, conservative/modern, Eastern/
Western, Sunni/Alevi, Turkish/Kurdish, Turkish/Armenian, Muslim/
non-Muslim and Ottoman/Republican never lose their power in either
political discourse or mainstream media, becoming an essential part of
public memory.
Media support has a fundamental route of transmission and communi-
cation of the AKP governments’ gender perspective. Islamist and other
pro-AKP women columnists come to the fore as “a bridge between their
conservative community and secular feminists” (Arat 2016, 127). The
statements of these popular and influential female figures do not challenge
the ideology but celebrate the politics of the government and Erdoğan.
However, as Arat shows in her analysis covering the period 2011–2013,
on certain subjects such as abortion, women’s employment and domestic
violence, they make arguments for women’s empowerment and gender
equality by using references drawn from both Islam and secular feminism.
For these pioneering figures—insiders of the Islamic community and fore-
runners of the headscarf struggle—criticising the patriarchal policies of the
14
Despite the increasing prevalence of social media, television continues to be the most
consumed medium. The Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters (Radyo Televizyon
Yayıncıları Meslek Birliği, RATEM) reported in 2018 that Turkey ranks first in the world in
terms of daily consumption with 5.5 hours a day (Çelik 2020, 341). 81% of AKP voters do
not use Internet as their news source (KONDA 2018, 61) and 56% are not Internet users
(KONDA 2014, 25). The state channels and the mainstream pro-AKP channels are the most
watched and trusted choices of this group.
24 C. RAUDVERE AND P. ONUR
government is a matter of courage which may cost them their jobs, as Arat
contends (2016, 206, 128).
The place of neo-Ottomanism in popular culture, particularly in televi-
sion productions, can be understood within these dynamics. The pioneer-
ing example of the portrayal of the Ottoman Empire on television has
been Magnificent Century (Muhteşem Yüzyıl), aired on a private TV chan-
nel, which narrates the sixteenth-century reign of Süleyman the
Magnificent. As Carney argues, the series portrays Süleyman “as a great
hero of the time and yet also treats his character subjectively, exploring his
human side and allowing viewers to form a bond with him” (Carney 2014,
9). It was not only Süleyman’s character but also the depiction of Hürrem
Sultan, his legendary love and harem life that enabled the audience to
build a new bond with history and the Ottoman heritage that replaces the
previous unidimensional heroic narratives. Coloured with Oriental exotic
imageries and soap opera intrigues, the series succeeded in reaching mil-
lions in Turkey, the Balkans and the Middle East. Yet it was targeted by
then Prime Minister Erdoğan for its underrepresentation of the campaigns
and victories of the Sultan and the overemphasis on his love life.15
The following popular production, the movie, Conquest 1453 (Fetih
1453), narrated the conquest of Istanbul by Sultan Mehmet II. In contrast
to Magnificent Century the movie’s storyline is a “black and white repre-
sentation of history” and “Mehmed’s character is largely one-dimensional:
he is young, ambitious and clever, and will stop at nothing in his quest to
conquer the city” (Carney 2014, 9). The film ends with images and mes-
sages of tolerance which aim to provide the concept of conquest with new
meaning that can be interpreted as the AKP’s populist mission of “con-
quest of the hearts” (Karakaya 2018). Strong heroism, chauvinism, valori-
sation of violence and a lack of a humanised presentation of history were
the points that were brought into discussion by columnists in liberal and
oppositional newspapers (Carney 2014, 10). Furthermore, as Koçak and
Koçak argue, the film “solidifies a longing for a golden age” and “puts
forward a Muslim-Turkish identity in place of secular Turkish identity”
(Koçak and Koçak 2013, 73).
The involvement of the Turkish state television (TRT) in bringing
Ottoman nostalgia to the screen with big budget productions began with
the series Resurrection Ertuğrul (Diriliş Ertuğrul), which narrates the
15
Hürriyet, “Erdoğan Zafer Havalimanını Açtı”, https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/
erdogan-zafer-havalimanini-acti-22010262. Accessed on 10 November 2020.
1 “I AM THE GRANDDAUGHTER OF THE OTTOMANS”: GENDER… 25
story of the Kayı tribe’s founding of the Ottoman state. The series achieved
top rankings in ratings, being watched by millions of viewers in Turkey
and abroad and had its audience highly engaged with its characters and
messages.16 Due to the fact that it depicted a period in history less known
to the wider public, it had the opportunity to fill the gaps in public memory
by communicating ideological messages in line with the political stand-
point of the ruling government. Predictably, the series soon gained the
admiration of Erdoğan, who visited the set in person with his wife.17 As
Carney discusses, the use of the notion of resurrection is also very com-
mon in AKP discourse and election propaganda, where it references a
rebirth of Islamic politics and a return to Ottoman identity in contempo-
rary Turkey (Carney 2018). Furthermore, while Magnificent Century was
blamed for misrepresenting history, Resurrection has been praised for its
respect for the so-called authentic Turkish culture, particularly by the
nationalist-Islamist audience.
It was with another TRT production—Payitaht Abdülhamid, about the
late nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire and Sultan Abülhamid’s strug-
gle against the Western world as the empire declined—that echoes of the
contemporary ruling ideology became most visible; indeed, “as one
watches Payitaht, it becomes hard to distinguish whether it’s the state-
sponsored news bulletin, a conspiratorial debate show or an artefact of
̇
popular culture” (Bulut and Ileri 2019, 246).
Even though there are numerous other representations of Ottoman
history on both private and state television channels, these have been the
most debated and influential. The use of popular culture and media in
building a neo-Ottoman identity serving, or in line with, the hegemonic
power of the AKP had its golden years in the last decade but it still contin-
ues with new productions. Ultimately, except for Magnificent Century to
a large extent, this media discourse has been created on the basis of a con-
spiracy theory of polarities and enmities, along with the exaltation of mili-
tarism, masculine heroism, violence and feelings of victimhood and
16
The viewers shared their photographs of watching the series in costumes, toy swords,
̇
guns and knives in their hands: Onedio, “Diriliş: Ertuğrul Dizisini Izlerken Kendini Biraz
Fazla Kaptıran Vatandaşlarımızdan 15 Komik Fotoğraf’”, https://onedio.com/haber/
dirilis-i zlerken-ecdaninin-davasini-evinde-yasayan-cilgin-torunlardan-15-komik-
fotograf-806126. Accessed on 19 November 2018.
17
“Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan, ‘Diriliş Ertuğrul’ Dizisinin Setini Ziyaret Etti” https://
www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/32612/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-dirilis-ertugrul-dizisinin-
setini-ziyaret-etti.html. Accessed on 19 November 2018.
26 C. RAUDVERE AND P. ONUR
revenge. The effects that this has had on the masses have been to build
new links with the past and ancestors and a new notion of Ottoman iden-
tity based on Turkish and Islamic roots. On the other hand, with the wide
range of themed merchandise available on the market, these series offer
the playfulness of accessible glamour, heroism and historical symbols of
Ottoman identity, status and power to be consumed in the everyday life of
their fans. All these media productions also provide temporary escapism by
offering a safe space for the masses who have to deal with the impacts of
social, economic and political crises in their daily lives. They address feel-
ings, thus bringing the emotional side of neo-Ottoman imaginary into
being, for better or worse, during and after these moments of escape.
Interest in depictions of history on screen is not unique to Turkey
though. The popularity of these productions should also be considered in
relation to an on-going, globally popular, culture trend in historical dra-
mas such as Rome (2005–2007), The Tudors (2007–2010) and Vikings
(2013–). Game of Thrones (2011–2019) can also be included to this genre
despite being based on a mythical story. All of them have an aestheticised
way of narrating history and post-imperial nostalgia, enabling their audi-
ences to be further attracted to their stories no matter which country of
origin or where they are watching them. The neo-Ottoman imaginaries
are emotional and accessible, finding a place (in time and space) and pro-
viding glamour in everyday life, be it fashion, social status or an identity
confirmed by the past.
the President here refers to the weakening bonds of the younger genera-
tions with Turco-Islamic identity which he explains with the continued
influence of Western and global culture, and of other ways of thinking
about religion than following in the footsteps of Diyanet (Bilici 2018).
State-governed attempts to imitate the glory of the Ottoman era and enact
the imagined golden age of Turkish and Islamic history did not achieve a
long-term success, after a brief heyday in the 2010s. Popular culture, con-
sumerism and transnational media proved stronger and ready to take on
new themes, while authoritarian politics and nationalistic discourse
remained in the sphere of state governance.
Yet the political turbulence attending the transformation of Hagia
Sophia—as discussed in several of the chapters—offers a multi-layered
example of how the combination of nationalism and Sunni Islamic hege-
monic claims still functions as a forceful tool. The Friday prayer, which
marked the denominational shift, brought about the intended responses,
in both domestic and international politics. Inclusionary and exclusionary
family metaphors have appeared along with a self-understanding that pres-
ents the Republican period in parentheses. If Ottomania has lost some of
its medial attraction, Ottomentality lingers in the construction of collec-
tive memory and the politics of belonging.
The peak of the neo-Ottoman media trends seems to have passed.
Internal affairs and foreign policy have taken other directions and Turkish
popular culture presents new themes, like psychological dramas on TV
and Turkish rap in the music industry: a reminder of how the dynamics,
creativity and speed of popular culture provides an immediate adaptability
to shifting conditions that political top-down strategies lack. The neo-
Ottoman imaginaries of the past carry with them hegemonic pictures of
life-style models, gendered norms and aesthetic preferences promoted as
modes of relating to the present. The elusive character of these varying,
and sometimes conflicting, visions is at the core of the discussions in
this volume.
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Adak, Sevgi. 2020. Expansion of the Diyanet and the Politics of Family in Turkey
under AKP Rule. Turkish Studies 22: 1–22.
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www.aile.gov.tr/bakanlik/hakkinda/tarihce/.
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tympanal organs: the small tegmina cover them up completely. In the
female the tips of the tegmina seem to be adapted for forming
covering-flaps for the tympana. In both sexes there is a sac (Fig.
186, b) adjoining the structures we have mentioned, but which is not
directly phonetic, though it may be an adjunct of the apparatus.
The family Acridiidae includes a large part of the species that make
up our meagre list of British Orthoptera. Indeed, the only native
Orthoptera at the present time sufficiently common to attract general
attention are, in addition to the earwig, the species of the genera
Stenobothrus and Gomphocerus, whose musical instruments we
have described previously. We have eight species of these Insects.
They are the little grasshoppers, so common in our fields and
gardens, the hunting of which is a source of much amusement to
children. The Insect goes off with a sudden and long hop just as it is
going to be seized, and this is appreciated by the child as very
clever. The hunt, as a rule, does not result in much damage to the
grasshoppers, the ingenious escape being the greater part of the
pleasure. These Stenobothri are remarkable for their variation in
colour, and it is thought by some that they frequent spots where they
find themselves a match with their surroundings. There is, however,
little or no information of importance on this point extant.
Mecostethus grossus (Fig. 173), though larger, is very like the
common field grasshoppers, but appears to have become rare since
the fens were drained. The two curious little grasshoppers of the
genus Tettix (Fig. 179) are not uncommon. In addition to these
Acridiidae, three species of migratory locusts are occasionally met
with in Britain, viz. Pachytylus cinerascens (Fig. 177), P. migratorius,
and Schistocerca peregrina (Fig. 84); this latter we have already
alluded to as being probably the locust mentioned in the book of
Exodus.
CHAPTER XIII
The ocelli in Locustidae are much more imperfect than they are in
Acridiidae, and are frequently rudimentary or nearly totally absent, or
there may be but one instead of three. They are, however, present in
a fairly well-developed state in some species, and this is the case
with the one whose face we portray in Fig. 189, where the anterior of
the three ocelli is quite conspicuous, the other two being placed one
on each side of the curious frontal cone near its base. The peculiar
head ornament shown in this figure exists in both sexes, and
something similar occurs in a large number of Conocephalides. We
have not the slightest idea of its import. Individuals of one or more
species of this curious South American genus are occasionally met
with alive in gardens near London. They are, no doubt, imported as
eggs, for they are sometimes met with in the juvenile state, but in
what way they are introduced is not known.
Near to one another, on the middle of the ventral aspect of the true
ninth abdominal segment, are seen the two papillae (b′), which at
first are the only visible indications of the future ovipositor. If,
however, the integument be taken off and carefully examined, it will
be found that there exist on the eighth abdominal plate two spots,
where there is a slight thickening and prominence of the integument
(Fig. 191, B, c). From these two spots the two lower rods of the
ovipositor are produced; these two, together with the two growths
from the ninth segment, form the four external rods of the ovipositor.
Inside these there exist in the completed structure two other rods
(Fig. 192, B, b'′). These are produced by a growth from the inner
parts of the two papillae of the ninth segment. The relations of the six
rods in their early condition are shown in Fig. 191, C, where the two
primary papillae b′ of the ninth segment are seen with their
secondary offshoots b″; c′ being the papillae of the eighth segment.
The subsequent relations of the pieces are shown in Fig. 192; A
exhibiting the base of the organ with the lower rods turned on one
side to show the others, the shaded parts indicating muscular
attachments; B is a transverse section of the organ. In these figures
the different parts of the appendages bear the same lettering as they
do in Fig. 191. It will be seen that in the completed structures the
parts c′ have become very intimately connected with the parts b′ and
b″, which belong to another segment.
Although the tibial ears of Locustidae are very perfect organs, there
is great difficulty in deciding on the exact nature of their functions.
They would appear to be admirably adapted to determine the precise
locality from which a sound proceeds, especially in those cases—
and they are the highest forms—in which the tympanum is placed in
a cavity the external orifice of which is a slit (Fig. 193, B); for the legs
can be moved in the freest manner in every direction, so as to bring
the drum into the most direct line of the vibrations. But as to what
kinds of vibrations may be perceived, and the manner in which they
may be transmitted to the nerves, there is but little evidence. On
reference to the diagram it will be noticed that the tympanum, the
tympanal vesicles, and the nervous apparatus are not in close
connexion, so that even the mode by which the impulses are
transmitted is obscure.
The musical organs of the Locustidae are different from those of the
Acridiidae, and are invariably situate on the basal part of the
tegmina. They are found, in the great majority of cases, only in the
male; in the tribes Ephippigerides and Callimenides they exist in
each sex. One of the wings bears a file on its inner surface, while the
other—on the right side of the body—is provided with a sharp edge
placed on a prominent part of its inner margin. By slightly tilting the
tegmina and vibrating them rapidly, the edge passes under the file,
and a musical sound is produced. These structures are limited to the
small anal area of the wing, and when the tegmina are very greatly
reduced in size, it is this part that still remains. There is much variety
in the details of the structure. The nervures of this part of the
tegmina are different in the male from what they are in the female,
and, moreover, the two wing-covers of the male differ from one
another. It is apparently the vibrations of the right tegmen that
produce the sound, and this part usually bears a space of a glassy
nature, which probably improves the character of the sound
produced. Our chief British songster of this group, Locusta
viridissima, is only provided with phonetic organs (Fig. 195) of a
somewhat imperfect character, but in the genus Mecopoda there is
great perfection of the structures. The anal areas of the two tegmina
are in this case very different; that of the left one, which bears the
file, being similar in texture to the rest of the wing-cover, while the
corresponding part of the other tegmen is rigid and transparent, and
greatly distorted, so as to create a cavity which, no doubt, improves
the sound; the scraper too is very perfectly formed. The difference
between this form of musical organ and that of L. viridissima is
curious, inasmuch as in the better instrument the important
modifications are confined to one tegmen, while in the other form
both tegmina are largely changed. The difference appears to be that
in Locusta the left tegmen, as well as the right one, acts as a
sounding-board, while in Mecopoda it does not do so, but when the
wings are closed quite covers and conceals the musical instrument.
The Locustidae, notwithstanding the fact that their alar organs are
generally more ample than those of the Acridiidae, seem to be, as a
rule, of more sedentary habits, and more nocturnal in their activity.
The musical powers of the different species are very varied. Locusta
viridissima produces a shrill and monotonous but not disagreeable,
sound, and is capable of sustaining it for a quarter of an hour without
any intermission, except a break for the sake of starting again
immediately with greater force, like a performer on a flute. It
occasionally chirps in the day, but the act is then very brief. Bates
informs us that one of these singing grasshoppers, called Tananá by
the natives of the Amazon valley, is much admired for its singing,
and is kept in little cages. The Amazonian naturalist thought the
music of this species superior to that of any other Orthopterous
Insect he had heard. The name of this grasshopper is Thliboscelus
camellifolius. It is very similar in appearance to Cyrtophyllus
crepitans, the Insect we have represented in Fig. 187.