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The Palgrave Handbook
of Digital Russia Studies
Edited by Daria Gritsenko
Mariëlle Wijermars · Mikhail Kopotev
The Palgrave Handbook of Digital Russia Studies
Daria Gritsenko
Mariëlle Wijermars • Mikhail Kopotev
Editors
The Palgrave
Handbook of Digital
Russia Studies
Editors
Daria Gritsenko Mariëlle Wijermars
University of Helsinki Maastricht University
Helsinki, Finland Maastricht, The Netherlands
Mikhail Kopotev
Higher School of Economics
(HSE University)
Saint Petersburg, Russia
ISBN 978-3-030-42854-9 ISBN 978-3-030-42855-6 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42855-6
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2021. This book is an open access publication.
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Preface
This Handbook emerged out of the Digital Russia Studies (DRS) initiative,1
launched by Daria Gritsenko and Mariëlle Wijermars at the University of
Helsinki’s Aleksanteri Institute and Helsinki Center for Digital Humanities
(HELDIG) in January 2018. The aim of the DRS initiative was to unite schol-
ars of the humanities and the social and computer sciences working at the
intersection of “digital” and “social” in the Russian context. By providing a
regular meeting place and networking opportunities, we sought to establish
open discussion and knowledge sharing among those who study the various
aspects of digitalization processes in Russia and those studying Russia with the
use of (innovative) digital methods. The many positive responses to our inter-
disciplinary approach and the exciting research that is currently conducted in
this area of study inspired us to join forces with Mikhail Kopotev to compile
this Handbook.
The editors would like to thank Lucy Batrouney and Mala Sanghera-Warren,
our commissioning editors at Palgrave Macmillan, for their enthusiasm for the
project as well as the anonymous reviewers for their critical eye. We thank the
Faculty of Arts of the University of Helsinki for making it possible to publish
the Handbook in Open Access. We are particularly grateful to Aleksandr
Klimov, our research assistant, who was of great help in preparing the manu-
script for publication.
The interdisciplinarity of the Handbook has affected our choice concerning
the transliteration of Russian. While it is customary for scholars working in the
humanities and social sciences to apply the Library of Congress system of trans-
literation, for scholars in linguistics and computer science a different system,
ISO 9, is more appropriate. For consistency, we have chosen to follow the
v
vi PREFACE
Library of Congress system for references (authors’ names) and ISO 9 for all
other Russian terms and names throughout the book. Where appropriate, cus-
tomary English spellings are maintained for familiar terms, places, and per-
sonal names.
Helsinki, Finland Daria Gritsenko

Maastricht, The Netherlands Mariëlle Wijermars
Saint Petersburg, Russia Mikhail Kopotev
Note
1. https://blogs.helsinki.fi/digital-russia-studies/.
Contents
1 Digital Russia Studies: An Introduction 1

Daria Gritsenko, Mikhail Kopotev, and Mariëlle Wijermars
Part I Studying Digital Russia 13
2 The Digitalization of Russian Politics and

Political Participation 15
Mariëlle Wijermars
3 E-Government in Russia: Plans, Reality, and Future Outlook 33

Daria Gritsenko and Mikhail Zherebtsov
4 Russia’s Digital Economy Program: An Effective

Strategy for Digital Transformation? 53
Anna Lowry
5 Law and Digitization in Russia 77

Marianna Muravyeva and Alexander Gurkov
6 Personal Data Protection in Russia 95

Alexander Gurkov
7 Cybercrime and Punishment: Security, Information War,

and the Future of Runet115
Elizaveta Gaufman
vii
viii Contents
8 Digital Activism in Russia: The Evolution and Forms of

Online Participation in an Authoritarian State135
Markku Lonkila, Larisa Shpakovskaya, and Philip Torchinsky
9 Digital Journalism: Toward a Theory of Journalistic Practice

in the Twenty-First Century155
Vlad Strukov
10 Digitalization of Russian Education: Changing Actors and

Spaces of Governance171
Nelli Piattoeva and Galina Gurova
11 Digitalization of Religion in Russia: Adjusting Preaching to

New Formats, Channels and Platforms187
Victor Khroul
12 Doing Gender Online: Digital Spaces for Identity Politics205

Olga Andreevskikh and Marianna Muravyeva
13 Digitalization of Consumption in Russia: Online Platforms,

Regulations and Consumer Behavior221
Olga Gurova and Daria Morozova
14 Digital Art: A Sourcebook of Ideas for Conceptualizing New

Practices, Networks and Modes of Self-Expression241
Vlad Strukov
15 From Samizdat to New Sincerity. Digital Literature on the

Russian-Language Internet255
Henrike Schmidt
16 Run Runet Runaway: The Transformation of the Russian

Internet as a Cultural-Historical Object277
Gregory Asmolov and Polina Kolozaridi
Contents ix
Part II Digital Sources and Methods 297
17 Corpora in Text-Based Russian Studies299

Mikhail Kopotev, Arto Mustajoki, and
Anastasia Bonch-Osmolovskaya
18 RuThes Thesaurus for Natural Language Processing319

Natalia Loukachevitch and Boris Dobrov
19 Social Media-based Research of Interpersonal and Group

Communication in Russia335
Olessia Koltsova, Alexander Porshnev, and Yadviga Sinyavskaya
20 Digitizing Archives in Russia: Epistemic Sovereignty and Its

Challenges in the Digital Age353
Alexey Golubev
21 Affordances of Digital Archives: The Case of the Prozhito

Archive of Personal Diaries371
Ekaterina Kalinina
22 Open Government Data in Russia389

Olga Parkhimovich and Daria Gritsenko
23 Topic Modeling in Russia: Current Approaches and Issues in

Methodology409
Svetlana S. Bodrunova
24 Topic Modeling Russian History427

Mila Oiva
25 Studying Ideational Change in Russian Politics with Topic

Models and Word Embeddings443
Andrey Indukaev
x Contents
26 Deep Learning for the Russian Language465

Ekaterina Artemova
27 Shifting the Norm: The Case of Academic Plagiarism

Detection483
Mikhail Kopotev, Andrey Rostovtsev, and Mikhail Sokolov
28 Automatic Sentiment Analysis of Texts: The Case of Russian501

Natalia Loukachevitch
29 Social Network Analysis in Russian Literary Studies517

Frank Fischer and Daniil Skorinkin
30 Tweeting Russian Politics: Studying Online Political

Dynamics537
Mikhail Zherebtsov and Sergei Goussev
31 The State of the Art: Surveying Digital Russian Art History569

Reeta E. Kangas
32 Geospatial Data Analysis in Russia’s Geoweb585

Mykola Makhortykh
Index605
Notes on Contributors
Olga Andreevskikh is a PhD candidate at the University of Leeds, UK. Her

PhD thesis focuses on the verbal and visual communication of non-
heteronormative masculinities in contemporary Russian media. Her other
research projects focus on offline and online activism for women’s and LGBTQ
rights in contemporary Russia.
Ekaterina Artemova is a researcher at the National Researcher University
Higher School of Economics (HSE University), Saint Petersburg, Russia. Her
research interests include natural language processing in general as well as
applications of deep learning to information extraction and question answering.
Gregory Asmolov is Leverhulme Early Career Fellow at the Russia Institute,
King’s College London. His research focuses on how ICTs constitute the role
of crowds in crisis situations. He has published in Journalism Studies, Policy &
Internet, Russian Politics, MIT’s Journal of Design and Science, and others on
vertical crowdsourcing, digital propaganda, and Internet regulation.
Svetlana S. Bodrunova is a professor at the School of Journalism and Mass
Communications, St. Petersburg State University, Russia, where she also leads
the Center for International Media Research. She has published two books,
several chapters, and over 80 research papers in Russian and English, including
in Journalism, International Journal of Communication, Media and
Communication, and Digital Journalism. Her research interests include
Russian and European journalism, media and politics, social media, and
ethnicity in communication.
Anastasia Bonch-Osmolovskaya is an associate professor at the School of
Linguistics, National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE
University), Saint Petersburg, Russia. She is also an academic supervisor of the
master’s program in computational linguistics and the founder of the Digital
Humanities Center at HSE. She is a member of the Russian Association for Digital
Humanities (DH-Russia). Her main research interests concern digital archives,
xi
xii NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
linguistic and other textual corpora, and the implementation of quantitative meth-
ods in the studies of language, literature, and culture.
Boris Dobrov is the head of the Laboratory in Research Computing Center
of Lomonosov Moscow State University in Moscow, Russia. He leads the
development of software tools for processing and analyzing large text col-
lections, including RuThes-like large linguistic ontologies, ALOT
(Automated Linguistic Text Processing) tools, and NearIdx corporate
information-analytical system.
Frank Fischer is Associate Professor for Digital Humanities at the Higher
School of Economics (HSE University), Saint Petersburg, Russia, and director
of DARIAH-EU, the pan- European digital infrastructure for the arts and
humanities. He studied computer science, German literature, and Spanish phi-
lology in Leipzig and London and is an Ancien Pensionnaire de l’École
Normale Supérieure in Paris. He holds a PhD from the University of Jena for
a study of revenge in Enlightenment drama.
Elizaveta Gaufman is Assistant Professor of Russian Discourse and Politics at
the University of Groningen, the Netherlands. She is the author of Security
Threats and Public Perception: Digital Russia and the Ukraine Crisis (Palgrave
Macmillan, 2017). Her other publications include peer-reviewed articles on
nationalism, sexuality, and social networks, as well as regular blog posts at The
Duck of Minerva.
Alexey Golubev is Assistant Professor of Russian History and Digital
Humanities at the University of Houston. He holds a PhD degree in history
from the University of British Columbia (2016). Before starting his current
position, he was Banting Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Toronto.
Sergei Goussev is an independent scholar whose research focuses on compu-
tational propaganda, social media analytics, and political sociology of digital
social networks. He holds a master’s degree in financial economics from
Carleton University, Canada.
Daria Gritsenko is an assistant professor at the University of Helsinki,
Finland, affiliated with the Aleksanteri Institute and the Helsinki Center for
Digital Humanities (HELDIG). She is a co-founder of Digital Russia Studies,
an interdisciplinary network of scholars working at the intersection of “digital”
and “social” in Russia and beyond.
Alexander Gurkov is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Helsinki,
Faculty of Law. He researches international cooperative law, alternative dispute
resolution, and blockchain economy. Before working in academia, Gurkov
practiced law as an attorney in St. Petersburg.
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS xiii
Galina Gurova is a researcher at the SKOLKOVO Education Development

Centre with expertise in the field of school education. She currently pursues a
PhD degree at the Doctoral Programme of Education and Society at the
University of Tampere, Finland, and is a member of the EduKnow—
Knowledge, Power, and Politics in Education research group at the same
university.
Olga Gurova is Assistant Professor of Consumption Studies at Aalborg
University, Denmark. Her research interests include consumption studies,
social theory, and qualitative methods of social research. She is the author of
Fashion and the Consumer Revolution in Contemporary Russia (2015) and sev-
eral articles, published in the Journal of Consumer Culture, Consumption,
Markets and Culture, and Cultural Studies, among other journals.
Andrey Indukaev is a postdoctoral researcher at the Aleksanteri Institute of
the University of Helsinki. He is a member of the Digital Russia Studies
research group, working on the politics of digitalization in Russia and develop-
ing digital methods of textual analysis. His doctoral dissertation, defended in
2018 (ENS Paris-Saclay, France), focused on innovation policy and academic
entrepreneurship in Russia.
Ekaterina Kalinina is a senior lecturer at the Department of Media and
Communication Studies of Jönköping University, Sweden. She worked as a
research fellow at Swedish National Defense University, researching questions
of Russian patriotism and biopolitics. Her recent research project investigated
the role of affective mnemonic experiences in triggering social mobilization.
Kalinina also runs the Swedish NGO Nordkonst, where she manages cul-
tural projects.
Reeta E. Kangas is a postdoctoral researcher in the School of Art History at
the University of Turku. Her research focuses on Soviet and Russian visual art
and propaganda and the use of animal symbols for political purposes. In 2017,
she completed a PhD on animal symbolism in Soviet political cartoons.
Victor Khroul is an associate professor at the Department of Sociology of
Mass Communications, Faculty of Journalism, Lomonosov Moscow State
University. He is the author of Media and Religion in Russia (2012) and
over 90 publications in Russian and English. He is the founding editor of
the “Media and Religion” book series (published since 2011).
Polina Kolozaridi is a social researcher focusing on the Internet. Her key
research interests are around the issues of how we know, feel, anticipate, and imag-
ine technologies. In Moscow, Kolozaridi coordinates a grassroots community of
researchers (academic and independent) called the Club for Internet and Society
Enthusiasts (http://clubforinternet.net/). Together with other club members,
she organizes research projects and acts as a knowledge activist. She teaches
courses about Internet studies, amateur online media, and critical data studies at
the Higher School of Economics (HSE University), Saint Petersburg, Russia.
xiv NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
Olessia Koltsova is an associate professor at the Department of Sociology of

the St. Petersburg School of Social Sciences and Humanities, Higher School of
Economics (HSE University), Saint Petersburg, Russia. She is the director of
the Laboratory for Internet Studies (LINIS) at HSE. Her research interests
include sociology of the Internet and of mass communication, political com-
munication, online interpersonal communication, online social networks, text
mining, big data analysis, and modeling.
Mikhail Kopotev is the academic director of the MA program in Language
Technology at Higher School of Economics (HSE University), Saint Petersburg,
Russia, and an associate professor at the University of Helsinki, Finland. His
research interests include corpus linguistics, quantitative analysis of big textual
data, plagiarism detection, and computer-assisted language learning. He is the
author of Introduction to Corpus Linguistics (Praha, 2014) and a co-editor of
Quantitative Approaches to the Russian Language (Routledge, 2018).
Markku Lonkila works as Professor of Sociology at the University of
Jyväskylä. His research concerns the study of social movements, social media,
social networks, and Russian society. Since the early 1990s, Lonkila has carried
out several empirical research projects in Russia, investigating the role of social
networks in civil society and economy and politics in Russia, often in a com-
parative perspective. Of late, he has focused on new forms of Russian civic and
political activism enabled by social media.
Natalia Loukachevitch is a leading researcher at the Research Computing
Center of Lomonosov Moscow State University, Russia. She is the main author
of several large Russian resources for natural language processing including
RuThes thesaurus, Russian wordnet RuWordNet, the ontology on natural sci-
ence and technologies OENT, and Russian sentiment lexicon RuSentiLex. She
is the co-organizer of several Russian language evaluations such as senti-
ment analysis evaluations SentiRuEval and semantic similarity evalua-
tions RUSSE.
Anna Lowry is a postdoctoral researcher at the Aleksanteri Institute of the
University of Helsinki. She has published on a range of topics dealing with the
political economy of Russia and Eurasia. Recent publications have focused on
Russia’s development strategy and industrial policy.
Mykola Makhortykh is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Bern.
He holds a PhD from the University of Amsterdam, where he studied digital
remembrance of WWII in Eastern Europe. Recently, he published on (coun-
ter)memory, discursive construction of (in)security, and conflict framing in
articles published in journals such as Media, War and Conflict, Memory Studies,
and Visual Communication.
Daria Morozova is a PhD student at Aalborg University, Denmark. She holds
a master’s degree in social sciences from the University of Helsinki. Her
research focuses on sociology of consumption, cultural entrepreneurship, and
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS xv
sustainability. Her current project concerns wearable technology, particularly

how it changes daily practices of consumers.
Marianna Muravyeva is Professor of Russian Law and Administration at the
University of Helsinki. Her research is interdisciplinary, bringing together
history, social sciences, and law to examine long-term trends and patterns in
social development with a special focus on normativity, gender, and violence.
Arto Mustajoki is professor emeritus at the University of Helsinki. He is a
leading research fellow at the National Research University Higher School of
Economics (HSE University), Saint Petersburg, Russia.
Mila Oiva is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Turku, Finland.
She is an expert on Russian and Polish history with a particular interest in the
transnational transfer of information and computational research meth-
ods. Her work has been published by Media History, among others.
Olga Parkhimovich is affiliated with the Faculty of Software Engineering and
Computer Systems at ITMO University (ITMO: Information Technologies,
Mechanics and Optics). She is a project manager at the NGO Information
Culture, the team leader of spending.gov.ru, and a member of the Public
Council at the Federal Treasury of the Russian Federation.
Nelli Piattoeva is University Lecturer in Education Sciences at the University
of Tampere, Finland, and Adjunct Professor of International and Comparative
Education Policy Research at the University of Oulu, Finland. Her
research interest in the institutions of formal education is mainly focused
on the complexities of the relationship between education policy-making
and the wider society.
Alexander Porshnev is a senior research fellow at the Laboratory of Internet
Studies of the National Research University Higher School of Economics
(HSE University), Saint Petersburg, Russia. His research interests include
mathematical models and data mining in psychology, marketing and manage-
ment (including social network analysis, cluster, factor, regression analysis, and
machine learning methods), and natural language processing.
Andrey Rostovtsev is a professor at the Institute for Information Transmission
Problems of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Kharkevich Institute) in
Moscow, Russia. He is a co-founder of the Dissernet network project.
Henrike Schmidt is a private lecturer at the Szondi-Institute for Comparative
Literature, Freie Universität Berlin. Her research interests include digital cul-
ture in Eastern and Central Europe. Her publications include the monograph
Russian Literature on the Internet. Between Digital Folklore and Political
xvi NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
Propaganda (Transcript Verlag, 2011, in German). She is a co-editor of

the online journal Studies in Russian, Eurasian and Central European New
Media (digitalicons.org).
Larisa Shpakovskaya holds a PhD in sociology and works on several research
projects at the University of Helsinki, Finland. Her research interests include
Internet communities on the Russian Internet, hate speech in the Russian-
language segment of the Internet, state regulation of Runet, and processes of
accumulating social capital in virtual communities and its conversion into a
resource for mobilizing collective actions.
Yadviga Sinyavskaya is a junior research fellow at the Laboratory for Internet
Studies (LINIS) and a PhD student at the Department of Sociology, St.
Petersburg School of Social Sciences and Humanities, Higher School of
Economics (HSE University), Saint Petersburg, Russia. Her research interests
include Internet studies, social psychology, online communication and online
behavior, online privacy, social network analysis, and online experiments.
Daniil Skorinkin is the head of the MA in digital humanities program at the
Higher School of Economics (HSE University), Saint Petersburg, Russia. He
teaches digital humanities and digital literacy courses and conducts research at
the HSE Centre for Digital Humanities. His research interests include stylom-
etry, network analysis of literary texts, and the use of computational methods
for literary research.
Mikhail Sokolov is Professor of Sociology at the European University at St.
Petersburg, Russia. His principal research interests are in the fields of microso-
ciological theory, social stratification, cultural consumption, sociology, and his-
tory of the social sciences.
Vlad Strukov is an associate professor at the University of Leeds, specializing
in Russian and Russophone media and communication with special focus on
visual culture and digital culture. He is the founding and principal editor of a
research journal called Studies in Russian, Eurasian and Central European
New Media (www.digitalicons.org).
Philip Torchinsky is an independent scholar who has specialized in computer
networks from 1993 onward. His current interests in social media include
technology marketing and messenger bots. He has co-authored a booklet on
hate speech on Runet while working as the head of the Computer Science
Center at the European University at St. Petersburg.
Mariëlle Wijermars is Assistant Professor of Cyber-Security and Politics at
Maastricht University, The Netherlands. She is a co-founder of the Digital
Russia Studies network and an editor of the journal Studies in Russian, Eurasian
Notes on Contributors xvii
and Central European New Media (digitalicons.org). She is the author of

Memory Politics in Contemporary Russia: Television, Cinema and the State
(2019) and editor (with Katja Lehtisaari) of Freedom of Expression in Russia’s
New Mediasphere (2020).
Mikhail Zherebtsov is an adjunct research professor at the Institute of
European, Russian and Eurasian Studies at Carleton University. His research
interests are focused on contemporary issues of governance and public policy
in Russia and other post-Soviet countries as well as computational political
studies, particularly social media analytics.
List of Figures
Fig. 17.1 Frequency of adjective decade constructions for each decade 307
Fig. 17.2 Distribution of rannie (early) and pozdnie (late) in decade
constructions308
Fig. 17.3 Frequencies of lihie devânostye (wild nineties) compared to all
adjectives attested in the construction (2001–2013, the
Newspaper subcorpus) 309
Fig. 17.4 The relative frequency (%) of modernizaciâ (modernization)
occurring in texts from Russian national newspapers (Source:
Integrum, Dec. 31, 2000—Dec. 31, 2012) 311
Fig. 17.5 The usage of modernizaciâ Rossii (modernization of Russia) in
comparison to importozamesê nie (import substitution) (Source:
Integrum, Russian National Media, 2013–2015) 313
Fig. 18.1 Representation of the current international sanctions situation in
the thesaurus form 329
Fig. 21.1 Prozhito. User interface 376
Fig. 21.2 Prozhito. Author page 377
Fig. 21.3 Prozhito. The page Pomos ̂’ (Help), where volunteers can learn how
they can contribute to the project 378
Fig. 21.4 Prozhito. A suggested page of a diary 379
Fig. 24.1 The ten topics covered in newspaper articles that discussed Yves
Montand’s 1956 tour of the Soviet Union 435
Fig. 24.2 The top eight topics in the Polish Życie Gospodarcze newspaper,
1950–1980436
Fig. 25.1 “Modernization” topic prevalence dynamic 456
Fig. 25.2 Projection of keywords on a two-dimensional space 459
Fig. 26.1 Neural network layers. (a) feed forward layer, (b) convolutional
building layer, (c) recurrent layer, (d) transformer layer 469
Fig. 26.2 Word2vec configurations. (a) continuous bag of words, (b)
skip-gram471
Fig. 27.1 A network in the MGPU producing large-scale plagiarism
(A. Abalkina, Dissernet.org). The full interactive graph is available
at: https://www.dissernet.org/publications/mpgu_graf.htm 491
xix
xx List of Figures
Fig. 27.2 The overall distribution of small-scale plagiarism across disciplines 495
Fig. 29.1 The seven bridges of Königsberg. Wikimedia Commons, https://
commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:7_bridges.svg, licence: CC
BY-SA 3.0 518
Fig. 29.2 Extracted social networks of 20 Russian plays. Excerpt (left-upper
corner) from a larger poster displaying 144 plays in chronological
order (1747–1940s). Version in full resolution: https://doi.
org/10.6084/m9.figshare.12058179521
Fig. 29.3 Network graph for Ostrovsky’s Groza522
Fig. 29.4 Network sizes of 144 Russian plays in chronological order, x-axis:
(normalized) year of publication, y-axis: number of speaking
entities per play. Arrow indicates Pushkin’s “Boris Godunov.”
Russian Drama Corpus (https://dracor.org/rus) 526
Fig. 29.5 Network visualization of A. Pushkin’s Boris Godunov. Russian
Drama Corpus (https://dracor.org/rus) 527
Fig. 29.6 Network visualization of L. Tolstoy’s War and Peace530
Fig. 29.7 Network visualization of L. Tolstoy’s War and Peace, book 1 (first
part of the first volume) 531
Fig. 29.8 Network visualization of L. Tolstoy’s War and Peace, book 10
(second part of the third volume) 531
Fig. 29.9 Network visualization of L. Tolstoy’s War and Peace, epilogue 532
Fig. 29.10 Network densities of separate books (parts) of War and Peace532
Fig. 30.1 The structure of political communities on Twitter by event 543
Fig. 30.2 Clique size frequency distribution by community—Crimea sample 545
Fig. 30.3 Clique size frequency distribution by community—
Medvedev sample 545
Fig. 30.4 Influence of leaders’ content, distribution across quantiles 549
Fig. 30.5 Pro-government community reaction to Medvedev’s comment to
pensioners in Crimea 555
Fig. 30.6 Opposition community reaction of disbelief to Belykh’s guilt 556
Fig. 30.7 First and second quantile breakdown of account types by political
communities561
Fig. 30.8 Change in influence of leaders’ accounts when centrality
compliments the impact of their distributed content 561
Fig. 30.9 Tweet patterns for the two main communities, tweets per hour by
event562
List of Tables
Table 4.1 Main indicators of the national program “Digital Economy of

the Russian Federation” (2018) 58
Table 8.1 European Social Survey questions on various forms of activism
(European Social Survey Round 8 Data 2016) 141
Table 11.1 Religions and digital media normative expectations 192
Table 13.1 Classification of online retail platforms in Russia 226
Table 17.1 Russian National Corpus: texts by subcorpora 304
Table 17.2 Russian National Corpus: texts by creation date (the main
subcorpus only) 305
Table 17.3 Frequency of adjective decade constructions for each decade 307
Table 18.1 Types and examples of part-whole relations in RuThes 326
Table 18.2 Examples of conceptual dependence relations denoted as
nonsymmetrical associations in RuThes 328
Table 19.1 SNS use in Russia according to media research (October 2018,
in mil) 337
Table 22.1 Cumulative effect of using applications based on open data in
Moscow’s public transport system 404
Table 25.1 Top-30 semantic neighbors of the word modernizaciâ
(modernization) before and after January 1, 2012. Neighbors
appearing only in one list are highlighted 458
Table 26.1 Word embeddings for Russian 472
Table 26.2 Tools to train word embeddings 472
Table 26.3 Two examples of sequence labeling tasks 475
Table 26.4 Transfer learning models for Russian 477
Table 27.1 A source text (left) and the copy-pasted text after OCR (right) 486
Table 27.2 A source text (left) and the paraphrased text (right) 487
Table 27.3 A source text (left) and the translated text (right) 488
Table 27.4 Percentage of borrowing in dissertations defended at various
Russian institutions 496
Table 27.5 Differences in publication and citation performance among
authors demonstrating the highest and the lowest amount of
borrowing497
xxi
xxii List of Tables
Table 29.1 Number of co-occurrences of characters in A. Ostrovsky’s Groza

(abbreviated)521
Table 29.2 Graph-related values for five selected Russian plays 525
Table 29.3 Selected network metrics for five characters in A. Pushkin’s Boris
Godunov528
Table 29.4 Central characters in L. Tolstoy’s War and Peace ranked
according to three different centrality measures 530
Table 30.1 Six events and size of captured networks 541
Table 30.2 Density and transitivity of the network in its entirety and within
its main communities 545
Table 30.3 Leaders’ impact metrics using all data collected or focused on the
top 10k popular tweets 548
Table 30.4 Relative community sizes and standardized homophily indicators 554
Table 30.5 Duplication and similarity of content in two main communities
(% identical; % similar) 558
Table 30.6 Sample of “bot” communities detected (% identical; % similar) 558
Table 30.7 Botometer (Bot or Not) results (average universal probability of
automation; proportion of accounts no longer present two years
after samples were originally collected) 559
Table 30.8 Polarization of communities: retweets 560
Table 30.9 Polarization of communities: mentions 560
Table 30.10 Polarization of communities: replies 561
Table 32.1 Open datasets in Russian geoweb 589
CHAPTER 1
Digital Russia Studies: An Introduction
Daria Gritsenko, Mikhail Kopotev, and Mariëlle Wijermars
1.1 Area Studies Go Digital

The “digital” is profoundly changing Russia today. While in the mid-1990s less
than 1 per cent of the Russian population had Internet access, today Russia
ranks sixth globally with approximately 110 million Internet users, or three
quarters of the population (The World Factbook 2019). The proliferation of
affordable smartphones in the 2010s has made Internet access a common place
by 2020, with over 60 per cent of users connecting through mobile devices,
and Russia’s Internet market is the largest in Europe (GfK 2019). According
to the Russian Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and Mass
Media, the Russian Internet industry amounted to an estimated value of five
trillion rubles in 2019, or 5 per cent of the country’s gross domestic product
(GDP) (TASS 2019). Taking into account the additional 25 million Russians
who live outside of Russia, it is no surprise that Russian is the second most
popular language on the Net after English (Historical trends 2019). These
figures alone make Russia an attractive object for researchers interested in the
The names of the authors are given in alphabetical order.
D. Gritsenko
University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland
e-mail: daria.gritsenko@helsinki.fi
M. Kopotev
Higher School of Economics (HSE University), Saint Petersburg, Russia
e-mail: mkopotev@hse.ru
M. Wijermars (*)
Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands
e-mail: m.wijermars@maastrichtuniversity.nl
© The Author(s) 2021 1

D. Gritsenko et al. (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Digital Russia
Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42855-6_1
2 D. GRITSENKO ET AL.
development of today’s digital society. The Russian information technologies

(IT) industry, moreover, is an ample provider of highly sophisticated digital
tools and well-organized software solutions: Nginx’s popular web server that is
used by, for instance, Netflix; Kaspersky antivirus software; optical character
recognition application ABBYY FineReader, to mention just a few. In Russian-
speaking markets, tech conglomerate Yandex furthermore successfully rivals
with Google, while social networking sites VK (formerly known as VKontakte)
and Odnoklassniki outperform their international competitor Facebook.
The global digitalization trend and the major societal shifts that accompany
the process of converting ever more information and communications into
digital form, challenge and transform existing practices across all spheres of life.
In many ways, the digital transformation Russia is undergoing is far from
unique. For example, the Russian government, similar to governments else-
where, actively develops digital strategies, looking to reform education, finances
and telecommunications and to increase governmental efficiency. Russian busi-
nesses seek to reap the benefits afforded by information and communication
technologies (ICTs) and big data as they operate in and expand into domestic
and global markets. Russian citizens, meanwhile, actively engage in the pro-
duction and consumption of web-based content, while their dealings with state
authorities increasingly occur through online e-government portals. New
trends and practices emerge in the arts, where literary authors experiment with
virtual personae and hyperlinked narration, while visual artists explore collab-
orative and cooperative online work and digital forms of expression.
At the same time, the impact of and responses to these digitalization prac-
tices in Russia are evidently context driven. The conservative and authoritarian
turn in Russian politics (Smyth 2016) during Vladimir Putin’s third presiden-
tial term (2012–2018), for example, has influenced not only the political, but
also the technological landscape. State attempts to control the online sphere
have materialized in various forms, including the regulation of data flows and
the blocking of access to unfavorable online content and unruly platforms.
Russia also exerts pressure on major domestic and international Internet com-
panies, for example to transfer personal data of Russian citizens to servers
located in Russia, and seeks to shape global Internet governance to reflect its
favored terms. At the same time, digital communications have created new
opportunities for the facilitation of civic resistance, as is evidenced by the suc-
cess of oppositional leader Alexei Navalny in rallying support and mobilizing
political resistance through his online activities.
For researchers investigating Russia, digitalization has resulted in the emer-
gence of a wealth of new (big) data sources, including social media and other
kinds of digital-born content that allow us to investigate Russian society in
novel ways. The accelerating speed at which Russian archives are being digi-
tized means that collections of research materials have become more easily
available, while simultaneously new methodological possibilities open up for
examining Russian historical sources with the help of digital tools. The abun-
dance of computational methods, ranging from simple automated keyword
sorting to complex machine learning algorithms, allow us to tap into the
1 DIGITAL RUSSIA STUDIES: AN INTRODUCTION 3
opportunities offered by combining different types of data that have not previ-
ously been used together, or to explore patterns in large datasets that are dif-
ficult to grasp with a “manual” approach.
Given the intricate combination of the universal and the particular in how
Russia is influenced by the digital as well as gives shape to digitalization trends,
and the specificities involved in the availability and use of digital sources and
methods, we argue that an area studies approach is both timely and productive.
Area studies, as we know them today, developed in American and Western
European universities in the second half of the twentieth century, when depart-
ments studying non-Western cultures welcomed sociology, economics, and
political science specialists to, together with language and literature scholars,
explore the contemporary social life of the regions they studied (Colonomos
2016, 65). The value of area studies, essentially a Cold War project striving to
provide a general framework to describe and explain what was going on in dif-
ferent parts of the non-Western world, be it the Soviet Block, the Middle East,
Africa, Latin America, or China (Rafael 1994), was increasingly questioned
after “the end of history” (Fukuyama 1989). The forces of globalization, the
third wave of democratization, and the worldwide triumph of the market econ-
omy were expected to diminish the value and necessity of studying an area,
with its emphasis on contexts; disciplinary knowledge was thought to be cen-
tral and contextualized “place knowledge” secondary. This volume asserts that
area studies, as a geographically and geopolitically motivated interdisciplinary
research domain, is of particular value to and can provide a general framework
for describing the variety of responses to digitalization and explaining the
mechanisms that assist or obstruct the domestication of global trends. In this
respect, we can build upon earlier efforts in this direction, such as the volume
Digital Russia: The Language, Culture and Politics of New Media
Communication (2014) edited by Michael Gorham, Ingunn Lunde, and
Martin Paulsen and the journal Studies in Russian, Eurasian and Central
European New Media (digitalicons.org). Other area studies fields have similarly
turned their attention to digitalization. Consider, for example, the launch of
the Digital America journal in 2012 and publications such as The Other Digital
China by J. Wang (2019). All such emerging digital area studies initiatives, in
turn, draw upon and contribute to the by-now-established field of Internet
Studies, exemplified by, for example, The Oxford Handbook of Internet
Studies (2013).
The fact that digitalization started making major headline appearances
around the same time the post–Cold War end of history was declared is instruc-
tive for understanding how it came to be viewed (even though the process of
converting traditional forms of information storage and processing into the
binary code of computer storage can be traced back to the advent of comput-
ing after the Second World War). The ideals closely connected to the early
development of the Internet, such as freedom, decentralized control, the claim
of universality of technological development and so on, fitted well with the
overall narrative of global modernity (Dirlik 2003). Yet, during the past decade
we have witnessed backlashes on all “global fronts”—including democratic
backsliding, the rise of populism, the return of economic protectionism and

borders, first off- and then online—allowing area studies to make a comeback.
More than half a century of area studies scholarship has brought forward
important methodological accomplishments that turn out to be extremely use-
ful in approaching these global backlashes. First, the idea that context matters,
a staple in the disciplines of geography and anthropology, has been explicitly
brought into studies on economics, politics, and society through in-depth field
research. Area studies have routinely challenged the US- and Euro-centric
assumptions of many disciplines, while Szanton (2004) even argued that main-
stream disciplines are in fact special cases of area studies, American and
European Studies, respectively. Practices of place-based research that produce
contextually and culturally rooted explanations are useful if we seek to fully
understand questions of digital transformation.
Second, the multi- and interdisciplinary approaches that are inherent to
research projects in area studies have led to extensive conceptual borrowing,
cross-fertilization among disciplinary fields, and an emphasis on comparative
methodologies (Katzenstein 2001). Practical circumstances—colleagues work-
ing at centers for area studies are likely to have various disciplinary backgrounds
and area studies conferences bring together scholars working across the
humanities and social sciences—not only push individual scholars out of their
(disciplinary) comfort zone, but also provide ideas and nourish creative con-
ceptual development. This feature, we want to suggest, is invaluable for study-
ing digitalization across societies. Finally, language, which has been at the
center of area studies from its very inception, has been recognized “as produc-
tive and powerful in its own right” (Gibson-Graham 2004) and capable of
shaping social practices. Accentuating the performativity of language and the
power of discourse as a method for critical deconstruction, area studies have
been at the forefront of the so-called interpretative turn in the social sciences.
By the same token, language-based approaches—in particular computational
approaches—are among the backbones of digital studies.
Therefore, it makes sense to talk about Digital Russia Studies. Yet, a com-
prehensive volume that offers novice-friendly guidance for navigating the full
breadth of this new territory is currently lacking. To grasp the simultaneous
transformation of research object and research practices, this Handbook brings
together world-leading experts and emerging scholars to lead the way in the
emerging field of Digital Russia Studies. That being said, we are moving away
from the conventional label of Russian Studies to highlight that we aim to
contribute to and consolidate a methodological broadening in area studies:
Digital Russia studies focuses on the digital transformation of the (geographi-
cal) area of study, while digital Russia Studies indicates the use of digital sources
and methods in studying it and that is only partially captured by the term “digi-
tal humanities.” Together, Digital Russia Studies emphasizes how these two
research lines are intertwined, interdependent, and mutually reinforcing.
Drawing the borders of Digital Russia is no easy feat, even though it is clear
that it cannot be reduced to the digital projection of the state within its physical
borders. For one, many political and economic digital actors of significance are
located outside Russia, for example online media outlet Meduza that operates
from Latvia and Yandex N.V. that is registered in the Netherlands. Russian
services also operate in languages other than Russian and are not merely hosted
on the Russian .ru domain, but also on international domains (such as .com or
.edu) and the still functional Soviet .su domain. Russian Studies for the digital
era therefore deals with opaque, negotiable, and constantly moving borders—
material and virtual—that cannot be set once and for all, but rather require
careful consideration depending on the case-study, level of analysis, or specific
research application.
Aiming to present a multidisciplinary and multifaceted perspective on the
issues outlined above, the objective of this Handbook is twofold, as reflected in
its two-part structure. The first part of the book, Studying Digital Russia, pro-
vides a critical and conceptual update on how Russian society, politics, econ-
omy, and culture are reconfigured in the context of digitalization, datafication,
and the—by now—widespread use of algorithmic systems. Reviewing the state
of the art in scholarship on a broad range of policy sectors and issues, the chap-
ters investigate the transformative power of the digital and the particularities of
how these transformations manifest themselves in the context of Russia. The
chapters also reflect on societal responses to these ongoing transformation
processes.
The second part of the Handbook, Digital Sources and Methods, combines
two subsections that aim to answer practical and methodological questions in
dealing with Russian data. Digital Sources describes the main resources that are
available to investigate the multifaced Digital Russia sketched above: textual,
visual, and numeric. In addition, the vulnerabilities, uncertainties, legal and
ethical controversies involved in working with Russian digital materials are
addressed. The second subsection, Digital Methods, showcases examples of
cutting-edge digital methods applied in different fields of research. The chap-
ters provide a concise overview of the manifold opportunities for studying soci-
ety, politics, and culture in novel ways. The chapters also address the particular
methodological issues that researchers will encounter when working with
Russian data, such as working with Russian social media platforms and process-
ing sources written in Cyrillic rather than Latin script. The chapters in this
section demonstrate how the area studies tradition of invoking context as an
essential element of scientific explanation can leverage some of the criticism
that is being directed to the use of digital methodologies and big data in
humanities and social sciences research. In the remainder of this introduction,
we provide an overview of the topics, questions, and methods covered by the
contributions in this Handbook and briefly sketch the emergence of digital
technologies and networks in the region.
1.2 Studying Digital Russia

The first attempts to establish a national digital network in Russia can be traced
back to the late Soviet period and the never realized project called OGAS
(Obŝegosudarstvennaâ avtomatizirovannaâ sistema, All-State Automated
System). As is recounted by Benjamin Peters (2016), the story of OGAS is a
troubled one that ended in total failure due to the forces of Soviet bureaucracy,
effectively resisting innovations capable of jeopardizing state power, or the
positions of those in power. In the 1990s, local- and national-level networks
were overtaken by the expansion of the global Internet, emerging out of the
efforts of, for example, research institutions Conseil Européen pour la
Recherche Nucléaire (CERN) in Switzerland and the Institute for High Energy
Physics in Russia (Abbate 1999; Gerovitch 2002). Since then, global techno-
logical developments have followed similar trends, albeit at different paces; for
example, the transitions from low- to high-speed Internet, from wired to wire-
less access, and from expensive to affordable services offered by Internet service
providers. While the Internet was becoming more user-friendly, functional and
attractive all around, its social and political domestication in Russia had its
specificities: whereas many Western publicly available online services were
developed by IT geeks in garages, the Russian Internet, as legend has it, was
born in the kitchens of the intelligentsia. This local feature is sealed in the term
“Runet” coined from the words “Russian” and “Internet.”
The concept of Runet has evolved over the course of the past decades, along
with the object it describes, as Asmolov and Kolozaridi explain in their chapter.
Yet, in any circumstance it cannot be reduced to the .ru-domain or to online
content in the Russian language. In the late 1990s–early 2000s, when the con-
cept gained a foothold, Runet was defined as having two fundamental features:
it was logocentric and free. The first feature refers to the fact that many of
Runet’s forerunners had an interest in the arts and humanities:
The RuNet is specific with regard to the topic of literature: the myth of ‘literature-
centrism’ of Russian culture (almost dead, as it seems) has been resurrected on
the RuNet’s literary sites, which have no analogues in the other (national) seg-
ments of the Internet. (Konradova et al. 2006)
The first Runet websites, for example lib.ru, while technologically and
economically amateurish, were oriented toward the free distribution of infor-
mation and deeply rooted into the domestic cultural context. Many of these
features are still preserved in Runet today (see Chaps. 15 and 9), even though
it has become technologically advanced and market oriented, as the chapter
by O. Gurova and Morozova on digital consumption shows. Runet preserves
some of the spirit of freedom, although the legality of some of these activities
can be questioned (see Chaps. 7, 8 and Chap. 6). Digital technologies have
given a great impetus to innovation of the arts, as Strukov demonstrates in

his chapter. The Internet has also been instrumental in facilitating the expres-
sion and negotiation of gender identities, analyzed by Andreevskikh and
Muravyeva, and is leaving its mark on religious practices, as Khroul’s chapter
demonstrates.
In its early days, the Internet in Russia developed practically free from state
interference. As many sources testify (e.g. Babaeva 2015), soon-to-be president
Vladimir Putin hosted a meeting with representatives of the IT (information
technologies) industry on December 28, 1999, during which the sector was
promised a decade of free development. Limited state regulation and meddling
indeed was among the defining features of Runet for a considerable period of
time (e.g. the lack of effective online copyright protection), but the screws have
been steadily tightening, most rapidly from 2012 onwards, as is addressed in
multiple chapters in this volume (e.g. Chaps. 16, 8 and 2). The Russian Internet
has come under ever more direct and indirect control of the state, among others
in terms of extensive surveillance capabilities and prerogatives concerning digital
communications and the economic dependence of IT businesses. In 2019 alone,
there have been several milestone decisions that illustrate the extend of state
control over how the Internet develops in Russia. For example, the expansion of
5G network technology has been significantly delayed because of continued
resistance, among others by the Security Council of the Russian Federation,
against making the preferred frequency band available for civilian uses (the
3.4–3.8 GHz range earmarked for 5G use by, e.g. European Union [EU] coun-
tries, is currently used by the Russian military and security services), while Yandex
changed its corporate governance structure to accommodate governmental pres-
sure and avert the introduction of legislation limiting foreign ownership of major
Internet companies (Yandex N.V. is registered in the Netherlands).
While the Russian government has sought to counteract the freedoms previ-
ously afforded to the Internet through regulation and other control strategies,
the analyses in the first part of the Handbook make clear how it at the same
time recognizes the enormous potential of digital technologies. Indeed, the
Russian government frequently points toward digitalization as a cornerstone of
the country’s development. At the 2017 Saint Petersburg Economic Forum,
for example, Putin highlighted Russia’s place among the forefront of research
into artificial intelligence (AI):
Just like other leading nations, Russia has drafted a national strategy for develop-
ing AI technologies. It was designed by the Government along with domestic
hi-tech companies. (http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60707, offi-
cial translation)
The federal government runs various programs to support digitalization

across sectors, such as government (analyzed by Gritsenko and Zherebtsov),
politics (discussed by Wijermars), law and justice (addressed by Muravyeva and
Gurkov), economy (examined by Lowry), and education (analyzed by Piattoeva
and G. Gurova). Billions of rubles from the federal budget have been invested
into infrastructure, making available many e-services, as well as an abundance
of administrative, legislative, archival, textual, geospatial data (explored in Part
II of this volume). As the chapters in this Handbook discuss in more detail, the
success of these federal programs is ambivalent. It is however undeniable that
the massive amount of data that is produced by various agencies as a result is
now available to experts and citizen scientists alike, enabling them to conduct
in-depth big data analyses, among others to reveal breakdowns in governance
(as is argued by Parkhimovich and Gritsenko, and Kopotev, Rostovstev, and
Sokolov in their respective chapters).
The ostensibly clear-cut image of Russia’s Internet status changing from free
to not free over the course of the past two decades, as is evidenced by annual
rankings of Internet freedom, therefore fails to tell the full story and its inher-
ent paradoxes. Manifold examples demonstrate how the Internet continues to
be instrumental for facilitating civic resistance, as Lonkila et al. recount in their
analysis. From this perspective, today’s digital dissidents can be seen as acting
in the vein of the Soviet intelligentsia, even though the two groups represent
different generations and values.
1.3 Digital Sources and Methods

The second part of the Handbook is diverse and of a more applied nature. It
starts with chapters discussing the most widely used digital sources, mainly
those for text-based studies that depart from the assumption that language can
be studied as a reflection of society. Collections of texts, or textual corpora, are
a key resource for linguistic studies as well as for a wide variety of applications
within the humanities and social sciences. Kopotev, Mustajoki, and Bonch-
Osmolovskaya describe these sources with a focus on the Russian National
Corpus (RNC), a deeply annotated and well-designed resource on the Russian
language, and the Integrum database, which comprises most newspapers, jour-
nals, and online media published in Russia or in Russian, as well as TV and
radio transcripts. Thesauri, for example the Russian RuThes thesaurus that is
discussed by Loukachevitch and Dobrov, are more sophisticated linguistic and
terminological resources for automatic text processing that can be used to
explore concepts, changes in word meaning, text categorization, and so forth.
More recently, social media have established themselves as a new channel of
communication and novel resource for studying a wide set of societal ques-
tions. In a chapter that focuses on assessing the applicability of existing models
of social media research in the Russian context, Koltsova et al. present the limi-
tations of existing approaches and suggest best practices for social media
research that uses Russian sources.
Two chapters are devoted to digital archives and digitized archival materials.
While all standard text-analytical techniques, both qualitative and quantitative,
can be applied to these materials, the contributions draw attention to questions
regarding their provenance, objectivity, and affordances, and the complex

political economy of historical knowledge production. Providing an overview
of digitization practices in Russia, Golubev reveals an underlying political
agenda to restore epistemic sovereignty over Russian history. Kalinina, in turn,
raises a series of techno-methodological questions concerning the composition
and affordances of a digital archive platform created by a community of volun-
teers. The final digital source covered is open government data, which is pre-
sented by Parkhimovich and Gritsenko from an infrastructural, legal, and
technical viewpoint. Illustrating their argument with examples of projects and
applications utilizing open government data, especially open financial data, the
authors provide concrete use cases that show the perceived benefits for govern-
ment agencies and citizens.
The final collection of chapters is methodological in orientation, presenting
a variety of digital and computational techniques and providing concrete exam-
ples of their use in Russian Studies. First, topic modeling, a method of proba-
bilistic text clustering, is explored. Bodrunova looks at how topic modeling
techniques have been developed and employed by Russian scholars—applied
both to Russian and other languages—paying special attention to questions of
validity and assessment of model quality. Oiva shows how topic modeling can
be applied to Russian historical sources—such as Soviet newspapers—and offers
an accessible step-by-step walk through of the basics of topic modeling.
Indukaev then applies topic modeling to a contemporary media collection
obtained from the Integrum database and showcases how the analysis can be
enriched by incorporating the word embedding technique. He argues that the
latter is capable of providing more accurate observations of the data. Artemova
dives even deeper into Natural Language Processing (NLP). She focuses on
deep-learning applications for processing Russian, presenting state-of-the-art
methods in the field. The chapter written by Kopotev, Rostovtsev, and Sokolov
investigates the issue of academic plagiarism and how its detection posits a
challenge for computational linguistics. Another popular NLP application—
sentiment analysis—is discussed by Loukachevitch, who explains the main con-
temporary applications of the method focusing on Russian-specific components
of automatic sentiment analysis.
While computational text-analytical techniques constitute the backbone of
Digital Russia Studies, other methods provide equally exiting opportunities for
future research. The first of these is network analysis, a method for exploring
relationships and structures based on graph theory. To show the versatility of
its application, we have included two chapters. Fischer and Skorinkin apply
network analysis in the field of literary studies. They demonstrate how texts can
be formalized into a set of nodes and edges, where nodes represent characters
and edges describe interactions between these characters, based on a selection
of Russian plays and the classic novel War and Peace by Leo Tolstoy. The sec-
ond application concerns a study of Russian politics and society on microblog-
ging platform Twitter. Zherebtsov and Goussev analyze six resonant political
events to demonstrate how network analysis enables an alternative approach to

answer classic questions within political science, such as designating political
communities, tracing group reactions to informational events, and detecting
opinion leaders and influencers.
The Handbook concludes with two methods that operate with nontextual
data. The field of art history, Kangas argues, has lagged behind in joining the
digital humanities trend; yet, digital image analysis opens up various new ave-
nues for research. Drawing upon the example of Soviet political cartoons, she
advocates the use of mixed methods to best utilize computational and human
interpretative strengths. The final chapter is devoted to the analytical use of
geospatial data, their attributes in Russia’s online ecosystem, and the method-
ologies best suited for their analysis. Makhortykh discusses novel techniques
for extracting geolocations from various data formats and demonstrates differ-
ent ways of using these data, from mapping the spatial distribution of social and
political phenomena to the use of the geoweb for narrating individual and col-
lective identities online.
1.4 Concluding Remarks

With this Handbook we have aimed to lay down the foundations for the emerg-
ing research direction of Digital Russia Studies. Through its 32 chapters, the
book makes a timely intervention in our understanding of the changing field of
Russian Studies at the intersection of the societal and the digital in order to
become a first comprehensive review and guide for scholars as well as graduate
and advanced undergraduate students studying Russia today.
As is true for any work that seeks to carve out the contours of an emerging
field of study, the range of topics, approaches, and methods covered in this
Handbook is necessarily incomplete. However, by compiling analyses of the
impact of digitalization on various spheres of Russian politics, society, and cul-
ture in a single volume together with chapters exemplifying best practices in
using digital sources and methods in Russian Studies, we hope to have demon-
strated the value of an area studies approach in studying the digital domain. At
the same time, it has to be acknowledged that this Handbook is itself a product
and expression of the shifts we are currently witnessing: while most analyses
included here are still predicated to some extent on the opposition between,
coexistence, and interwovenness of digital and analogue, such distinctions may
rapidly become obsolete as digital becomes the new norm in ever more
domains. In this regard, the Handbook also functions as an important land-
mark, documenting these transitional pathways as they take shape across vari-
ous spheres of society and human activity.
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PART I
Studying Digital Russia

CHAPTER 2
The Digitalization of Russian Politics

and Political Participation
Mariëlle Wijermars
2.1 Introduction
Digitalization has affected politics in manifold ways, which result from the
broad variety of technologies the term comprises. The Internet and, more
recently, social media have, for instance, transformed political campaigning.
The publication of public policy documents on government websites has cre-
ated new expectations for political transparency. And, the introduction of vot-
ing computers and other e-voting solutions has made it possible to fundamentally
rethink the voting process (e.g. online voting) while raising novel security con-
cerns. In its strictest sense, digital politics can be defined as “how politicians
employ the Internet to reach, court, and mobilize citizens and about how citi-
zens rely on the web to inform themselves and engage with others politically”
(Vaccari 2013, 4). Yet, as is pointed out by Stephen Coleman and Deen
Freelon, “[t]o speak of digital politics is not simply to tell a story about how
political routines are replicated online,” rather it is about the (unforeseen)
transformations of political practices that result from digitalization:
One feature of all technologies is that they are constitutive: they do not simply
support predetermined courses of action, but open up new spaces of action, often
contrary to the original intentions of inventors and sponsors. (Coleman and
Freelon 2015, 1)
M. Wijermars (*)
Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands
e-mail: m.wijermars@maastrichtuniversity.nl
© The Author(s) 2021 15

D. Gritsenko et al. (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Digital Russia
Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42855-6_2
16 M. WIJERMARS
In this chapter, I discuss the impact of digitalization on politics in Russia and

the extent to which such unforeseen transformations in the political process
have taken place. My discussion highlights four areas: political communication;
political campaigning; voting; and, political participation and civic engagement.
While the digitalization of politics is a global trend, the characteristics and
constraints of the national political context, such as the uptake speed of par-
ticular technologies, condition the shape digital politics takes. In the case of
Russia, the proliferation of digital technologies unfolded in parallel with the
“authoritarian turn” under President Vladimir Putin (Smyth 2016). As the
examples discussed in this chapter will illustrate, digitalization has in fact been
a deliberate politics on the part of the Russian state. While it is therefore neces-
sary to consider to what extent the impact of digital technologies on politics
unfolds differently in democracies as compared to hybrid regimes or non-
democracies, the opposite poles of the scholarly debate are similar: they either
highlight the democratizing potential of digital tools or focus on their unin-
tended or negative consequences. Given the different starting points—for
example, the extent to which the object of study can be classified as a function-
ing democracy—this nonetheless results in different questions being asked.
Regarding Western liberal democracies, the democratizing potential is
thought to lie in the opportunities digitalization provides for remedying the
democratic deficit, for example through increased citizen participation, more
direct communication channels between politicians and citizens through social
media and the facilitation of forms of direct democracy. On the flipside, con-
cerns have emerged about how online communications, in particular social
media, may have polarizing effects that negatively affect societal stability and
may be used to manipulate public opinion and election outcomes, as well as
concerns about expanding state surveillance. In a similar vein, in the context of
hybrid or non-democratic states, scholarly debate placed high hopes on the
democratizing potential of the Internet. It was assumed that, among other fac-
tors, increased access to information online and the facilitation of political
mobilization through the use of social media would empower citizens to chal-
lenge state power and demand a greater say in political decision-making (e.g.
Castells 2012). Departing from the same assumption, many studies have exam-
ined states’ efforts to control online communications and protect the political
status quo in response (e.g. Deibert et al. 2010). The extent to which the
Internet indeed functions as a “liberation technology” is increasingly ques-
tioned (e.g. Diamond 2010). Rather, it appears that the proliferation of
Internet access has given rise to “networked authoritarianism” (MacKinnon
2011, 33), a condition in which:
the single ruling party remains in control while a wide range of conversations
about the country’s problems nonetheless occurs on websites and social-
networking services. The government follows this online chatter, and sometimes
people are able to use the Internet to call attention to social problems or injus-
tices and even manage to have an impact on government policies. As a result, the
2 THE DIGITALIZATION OF RUSSIAN POLITICS AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 17
average person with Internet or mobile access has a much greater sense of free-
dom—and may feel that he has the ability to speak and be heard—in ways that
were not possible under classic authoritarianism. At the same time, in the net-
worked authoritarian state, there is no guarantee of individual rights and free-
doms. (MacKinnon 2011, 33)
Notwithstanding the challenges that online communications raise for main-

taining political control by increasing citizens’ access to information and
opportunities for free speech, it appears many authoritarian states are disin-
clined to (fully) limit access to the Internet. The seeming paradox—often
referred to as the digital “dictator’s dilemma”—may be explained by the poten-
tial economic consequences of such a decision, fear of popular unrest or the
undermining a regime’s democratic image or other sources of regime legiti-
macy. Yet, scholars have also noted that digitalization may, in fact, strengthen
rather than weaken authoritarian regimes since the Internet can be used to
effectuate political control, and information and opinions shared by citizens
online can be a valuable resource to gauge public opinion on policy issues (e.g.
Gunitsky 2015).
In this chapter, I first examine how the activities of political actors in Russia
have changed as a result of digitalization, focusing on political communication
and election campaigning, before turning my attention towards changes in vot-
ing and other forms of political participation. Many of these changes result
from or developed against the backdrop of the introduction of open govern-
ment ideas. Therefore, I open with an overview of actions in this domain. I
argue that, while some of the changes described can be categorized as mere
digital reproductions of existing political practices, several spheres of Russian
politics have been transformed as a result of digitalization, in particular the
opportunities for political opposition and civic engagement.
2.2 Open Government

The concept of open government promotes the ideal of transparency and
accountability in governance: citizens should be able to access governmental
documents and proceedings in order to establish an effective climate of checks
and balances. In the past two decades, the concept has been inseparably inter-
twined with the notion of “e-government”: the spread of Internet access and
information technology (IT) infrastructures have made the Internet the perfect
solution for achieving the aims of “open” government. Combined, the overall
goals of open and e-government are to increase efficiency and transparency, as
well as to simplify and improve the provision of governmental services to civil-
ians and government-to-citizen communication. In Russia, the government
initiated the expansion of information technologies, digitization, provision of
online services, increased governmental transparency and so forth in earnest in
18 M. WIJERMARS
the early 2000s (see also Chaps. 3 and 5). The Federal Program “Èlektronnaâ
Rossiâ (2002–2010)” (Electronic Russia)
called for the ‘widespread integration’ of information technology in government

operations for such tasks as document management, registrations and declara-
tions, and procurement tenders. To accomplish this mission, E-Russia’s goals also
included building up the nation’s IT hardware and telecommunications infra-
structure and developing a supportive legal and regulatory environment. Of note,
the program’s mission statement also called for ‘significantly increasing the vol-
ume of information [that] government institutions provide to citizens, including
via the Internet,’ such as draft laws and decrees, government revenues, and bud-
gets; performance reports by public enterprises; and assessments by auditing
agencies. In the process, information technologies were seen as ‘cardinally chang-
ing the basis of the government’s relationship with citizens and businesses’.
(Peterson 2005, 51)
While some government bodies were early adopters, from 2003 onwards all
federal agencies were required to make a broad range of information accessible
online, such as regulations and legislation, and information on the activities of
their officials (Peterson 2005, 58).
With modernization and innovation as the buzzwords to define his “lib-
eral” presidency, Dmitry Medvedev (2008–2012) launched a federal program
aiming towards turning Russia into an “Information Society” (2011–2020)
(Toepfl 2012, for more, see also Chap. 25) and a Minister of Open Government
was appointed in 2012. In 2018, the ministerial position was discontinued,
signaling the topic had lost priority with the authorities. The push towards
open government has resulted in a significant increase in the availability of
open government data. For example, information concerning government
tenders can be accessed on the Goszakupki (Government procurement) por-
tal, zakupki.gov.ru, while various open data sources are collected on the open
data portal data.gov.ru. Through the creation of dedicated online platforms,
the transparency of the legislative process has been enhanced; for example, the
video recording of the Russian State Duma can be viewed on the platform
video.duma.gov.ru and draft laws are made available for public discussion on
the platform regulation.gov.ru (for more, see also Chap. 5). Yet, many issues
remain, including a tendency to reintroduce restrictions on publicly available
information. For example, in response to investigations by Alexei Navalny’s
FBK (Fond bor’by s korrupciej, Anti-Corruption Foundation), examples of
which will be discussed below, the FSB (Federal’naâ služba bezopasnosti,
Federal Security Service) proposed a law in 2015 that would severely restrict
access to information about property ownership contained in Rosreestr
(Federal Register). While the law was not passed, the Supreme Court deter-
mined in 2017 that Rosreestr is permitted to limit third-party access to owner-
ship data, invoking the protection of personal data, thus setting a precedent
(Kornia 2017).
2.3 Political Communication

Parallel to the emphasis on adopting digital technologies in the policy sphere,
significant changes were implemented in the authorities’ communication strat-
egies that, to an extent, resemble trends in political communication elsewhere.
As a public advocate for technological innovation, Medvedev can be credited
with pushing forward both the open government agenda and expanding
Russian political communication from traditional media to online platforms.
Through videos posted on the Kremlin website and, from 2009 onwards, his
blog on LiveJournal (at the time the most popular blogging platform, see
Podshibyakin 2010), Medvedev set an example for novel ways of communicat-
ing and engaging with citizens, and he pushed other government officials to
start blogging as well (Gorham 2014). In 2010, some 35 per cent of Russian
regional governors had a blog, a third of which emulated the videoblog format
exemplified by the president (Toepfl 2012).
Medvedev’s blogging activities were criticized for being “a blog without a
blogger” (Yagodin 2012, 1422): his page featured videos posted by the presi-
dential administration and functioned rather as a one-way channel for commu-
nication, lacking signs of Medvedev’s direct contribution or his interaction
with the online community, for example, with those commenting on his posts.
Notwithstanding Medvedev’s initial statements about aspiring towards a form
of direct democracy through digital means, in practice most Russian politicians
used their online communications “in ways that minimize the perils of truly
direct online interaction and opting, instead, for a more hierarchical model of
communication grounded in the discourse of ‘e-government’” (Gorham 2014,
235). Rather than entering into conversations with engaged citizens, the online
communication strategies they chose opted for “the carefully structured, moni-
tored, and filtered interfaces such as the online opinion polling, ‘online recep-
tion area,’ or the sound-bite sized Twitter scroll” (Gorham 2014, 246). In a
similar vein, Florian Toepfl (2012, 1454) argues that, when it concerns the
leaders of Russia’s federal subjects, “most Russian governors did not set up
their blog primarily with the intention of gaining electoral support.” Instead,
blogging was predominantly “a symbolic action that showcased their allegiance
and loyalty to the president, who was widely known for his Internet enthusi-
asm” (Toepfl 2012, 1454).
In his capacity as prime minister, following Vladimir Putin’s return to the
presidential office in 2012, Medvedev moved his most visible online presence
to Twitter and Instagram, following the shifts in the platforms’ popularity.
Compared to his earlier presence on LiveJournal, the Instagram account is
administered as a personal account, alternating between press photographs and
pictures taken by Medvedev himself, accompanied with brief captions. Contrary
to the LiveJournal blog, there is some interaction between the prime minister’s
account and other users on the platform, with Medvedev now and then com-
menting and responding. The increased personal dimension of Medvedev’s
social media presence may be explained by changing public relations (PR)
20 M. WIJERMARS
needs—aimed to remedy the previous lack of connection with citizens and fol-
lowing the more general trend of increased personalization of politics. The fact
that Instagram is predominantly image-based—Medvedev is known to have an
interest in photography—and allows one to post, edit and comment quickly
through the application on one’s smartphone may also have been factors.
Yet, the decision to switch to Instagram also created vulnerabilities. Indeed,
it was Medvedev’s Instagram that provided opposition leader Alexei Navalny’s
Anti-Corruption Foundation with crucial visual evidence to tie together vari-
ous publicly available sources of information indicating the prime minister’s
involvement in large-scale corruption (including hacked emails leaked by
Russian hacker collective Šaltaj Boltaj [Humpty Dumpty], Global Positioning
System [GPS] tracking of naval movements and various official registries). The
results of the investigation were published in a video entitled “On vam ne
Dimon” (“He is not Dimon to you”) shared through FBK’s YouTube channel
and website. While this was not the first video FBK published that exposes cor-
rupt practices by Russian state officials—indeed, there are many—the Dimon
video gained particular traction online (by December 2019: 32.8 million
views). More importantly, it served as the occasion for mass anti-corruption
protests on March 26, 2017, that mobilized thousands of protesters across
Russia1; the largest demonstrations to take place since the protest movement of
2011–2012. FBK’s investigations demonstrate how open source data—some
of which became available as part of the implementation of open government
ideas—can be effectively used to scrutinize and challenge government practices.
On the sub-federal level, Ramzan Kadyrov, the head of the Republic of
Chechnya, is one of the Russian political actors who has most successfully used
social media to increase his popularity, both in Chechnya and (far) beyond. His
Instagram account, with posts that blended “discussion of politics with photos
of himself hugging cats, posing in a knight’s outfit, working out in a gym, and
throwing snowballs with friends” (Rodina and Dligach 2019, 95) collected
some three million followers, before the platform decided to shut down his
account. Kadyrov’s posts merged public, political and private spheres to the
extent that “all of the personal topics contain elements of political framing, and
most of the public/political topics include terminology that refers to personal
topics such as friendship and family” (Rodina and Dligach 2019, 106).
Kadyrov’s success exemplifies how social media “can be used to normalize des-
potism, giving a modern-day dictator ‘a human face’” (Rodina and Dligach
2019, 96). The increasing use of social media in political communication is
visibly changing the communication strategies used by the Russian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs as well, whose official Twitter account incorporates vernacular
language and actively partakes in online debates (Zvereva 2020). The Ministry’s
spokesperson, Maria Zakharova, in particular, has adopted a style of communi-
cation that blends formal and informal statements, expressed through multiple
(and at times parallel) accounts on, for example, Facebook and Twitter.
Digitalization has also changed the rules of the game when it comes to
political contestation by citizens. The rise of the Russian “blogosphere” and,
subsequently, the popularity of bloggers, citizen journalists and vloggers on

social media and YouTube, brought about novel opportunities for sharing
political criticism with a wide audience, and for creating communities around a
political cause (of which Navalny is but one example). Over time, the Russian
government has responded to this perceived threat in multiple ways. Most
notably, with the so-called “Bloggers’ Law” (Federal Law No. 97-FZ) it intro-
duced a special register for bloggers with a daily audience of >3000 visitors in
2014. For bloggers, some of whom published under a pseudonym, the regis-
tration involved, among other requirements, the disclosure of their real identi-
ties to the Russian authorities. The impact of the measure on the expression of
political criticism online is difficult to ascertain, yet it is known that its intro-
duction did not lead to any blogs being blocked or fines imposed (Soldatov
2019). Nonetheless, as Oleg Soldatov points out, “the mere existence of the
public list of popular Internet personalities, administered by and conceived in
the interests of a governmental body, should have led to a certain number of
such personalities thinking twice before making public their criticism of the
government” (Soldatov 2019, 70–71).
The law was repealed in 2017, which can be explained by a combination of
factors: the ineffectiveness of the register and difficulties in enforcing the law
(e.g. poor definition of who counts as a blogger, estimation of daily audience);
a change of policy towards other control strategies (expanding restrictions on
the publication of particular types of content); as well as the recognition that
the practice of blogging was rapidly losing ground to other forms of online
expression, most notably the shift to social media and video sharing platforms.
Around the same time, the government attempted to co-opt some of these
online “influencers.” Popular vlogger Sasha Spilberg was invited to address the
State Duma in May 2017, and soon after a special “bloggers council”—in full,
Sovet po razvitiû informacionnogo obŝestva i sredstv massovoj informacii (Council
on the Development of Information Society and Mass Media)—was convened
on the initiative of Vladimir Vlasov, the youngest member of parliament. The
council got off to a bad start since only a third of the invited bloggers took
part, and the most popular Russian vloggers publicly distanced themselves
from the initiative, including oppositional vloggers such as Kamikadzedead
(Makutina 2017). The council has since convened incidentally, yet appears to
be of limited influence and predominantly speaks out in support of govern-
mental restrictions on online speech.
2.4 Political Campaigning

Political campaigns in Russia tend to be candidate-centered, rather than focus-
ing on policy issues or political parties, a feature resulting from the constitu-
tionally strong president and other characteristics of the electoral system
(Ishiyama 2019). As an “electoral authoritarian regime” (Gel’man 2015), elec-
tion outcomes in Russia are deemed important, even if the elections themselves
are unfair. By extension, political campaigns are a significant feature of Russian
22 M. WIJERMARS
politics.2 As is noted by Sergei Samoilenko and Elina Erzikova, “[t]he tradi-

tional boundaries between news and political advertising have eroded in
Russia” and unfair practices, such as “[h]idden advertising, black PR and biased
news reporting” have been a common feature since the 1990s (2017, 265).
Television and print media have played an important role in political campaign-
ing and media ownership is generally seen as an important factor in explaining
election outcomes, most notably Boris Yeltsin’s victory in the 1996 presidential
elections.3
The parliamentary elections of 2011 were the first in which the Internet
played a role of significance in how election campaigns were run, resulting
from both the increase of Internet access and the expansion of online party
presence in the years preceding it (Roberts 2015; Samoilenko and Erzikova
2017). While party websites appeared already at the time of the 1999 parlia-
mentary elections, by 2011 political campaigning via social networking sites
had become a common feature. Edinaâ Rossiâ (United Russia), as the “party
of power,” was particularly prolific and was active on multiple platforms in
large measure because it had access to the resources needed to finance investing
in the online dimension of its campaign. For example, the party’s Twitter
account (er_2011) “issued an average of over 360 tweets per day during the
intensive campaign period—more in a single day than the LDPR [Liberal
Democratic Party of Russia, led by conservative nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky,
M.W.] and Yabloko [party of social-liberal orientation, M.W.] managed in the
whole of the campaign, literally swamping the tweets from other parties,” while
amassing 600 videos on its YouTube channel by December 2011 (Roberts
2015, 1235).
On the candidate level, however, a different picture emerges. Analyzing the
online campaigns of 910 candidates representing the seven political parties that
were successfully registered for the elections, Sean Roberts found that only 111
of them (12%) maintained either a website, a Twitter account or a LiveJournal
blog, while this percentage was markedly higher among United Russia candi-
dates (43%) (Roberts 2015, 1236, 1238). However, a significant number of
these accounts were dormant during the campaign period, suggesting “that
United Russia candidates were being forced to use social networks by the party
leadership making them at best reluctant web users, at worst ‘dissenters’ by
deliberately failing to maintain their accounts” (Roberts 2015, 1245).
Notwithstanding United Russia’s more extensive online activities, Roberts
found “evidence of equalization [a relative leveling of the political playing field
in favor of opposition parties, M.W.], as the online message of the remaining
party candidates converged on an anti-United Russia theme” (Roberts
2015, 1229).
The availability of resources appears to be a key determinant in whether a
party decides to invest in developing online campaigning strategies. In this
respect, a clear difference has emerged between the campaigning style of
United Russia, whose “campaigns have become increasingly professionalized
and digitized, with expansive media campaigns funded by administrative
resources” while its main competitor, the communist party KPRF

(Kommunističeskaâ partiâ Rossijskoj Federacii, Communist Party of the
Russian Federation), still “relies heavily on traditional methods of local party
organization, voter mobilization (particularly older voters), newspaper adver-
tisements, short television spots, public appearances by Zyuganov and other
KPRF leaders, and campaign flyers and posters” (Ishiyama 2019). Of the
remaining parties represented in parliament, the LDPR operates more similar
to United Russia, but without the same access to large budgets, while the cam-
paigning of Spravedlivaâ Rossiâ (A Just Russia) is more alike to the KPRF
(Ishiyama 2019).
The significance of the availability of digital technologies appears to have
been the greatest for opposition groups who are not represented in the Russian
parliament (sometimes referred to as the “non-systemic” opposition) and who
lack access to traditional media. A closer look at two campaigns run by Alexei
Navalny—for the 2013 Moscow mayoral elections and 2018 presidential elec-
tions—demonstrates this well. As is argued by Renira Gambarato and Sergei
Medvedev (2015), Navalny’s mayoral campaign (which build upon the
2011–2012 protest movement; see Lonkila et al. 2020) introduced a new form
of political campaigning in Russia that was more grassroots (e.g. through
online fundraising) and characterized by the use of transmedia strategies.4
Online tools were essential for spreading information regarding his political
program—as the opposition candidate, Navalny was and continues to be barred
access to mainstream media, in particular federal television—and to recruit
campaign volunteers (Gambarato and Medvedev, 2015). These volunteers, in
turn, campaigned both on- and offline, while social media played an important
facilitating role in attracting people to these offline events. While Sergey
Sobyanin won the elections in the first round by garnering some 51 percent of
the votes, Navalny’s 27 per cent showed the success of the campaigning strate-
gies employed. Navalny’s 2018 presidential campaign, which built upon the
momentum generated following the anti-corruption protests discussed earlier,
optimized many of these strategies, incorporating sophisticated big data analy-
sis techniques. At the same time, it invested heavily in the creation of a network
of local headquarters and volunteer groups. Navalny’s campaign activities
therefore show the continued mutual interdependence of online and offline
campaigning, and the need to coordinate between and integrate both
approaches. Contrary to the mayoral elections, the success of Navalny’s presi-
dential campaign cannot be substantiated by election results: in December
2017, the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation decided
Navalny was not eligible to run for president because of his previous conviction
in a (much contested) fraud case.5
Notwithstanding the novel opportunities for political opposition, mobiliza-
tion and campaigning provided by digital technologies, it remains difficult for
those acting outside of the political establishment to be elected to a post of
political importance or to otherwise effectuate significant political change.
Gunitsky (2015) furthermore argues that the co-optation of social media by
24 M. WIJERMARS
authoritarian regimes in fact serves as a way out of the limitations contained in

the “dictator’s dilemma” that was introduced above. Social media co-optation,
he argues, can serve the resilience of authoritarian regimes by enabling, among
other things, the introduction of alternative frames—for example, counter to
those formulated by opposition groups—to shape public discourse online.
2.5 Voting
The digitalization of various aspects of the voting process was made possible by
the adoption of the law “O gosudarstvennoj avtomatizirovannoj sisteme
Rossijskoj Federacii ‘Vybory’” (On the State Automated System of the Russian
Federation [called] ‘Elections’, no. 20-FZ, 20 January 2003). “Electronic
urns,” that is, ballot boxes equipped with a special lid that scans the ballot
paper when it is entered, counts the votes that have been cast and prints out the
results, were first introduced in 2004 (kompleks obrabotki izbiratel’nyh bûl-
letenej, referred to in Russian by the abbreviation KOIB). The systems were
introduced with the stated aim to prevent miscalculations and speed up the
voting process, while also preventing ballot box stuffing since only one paper
can be passed through the scanner at a time. E-voting machines (kompleks dlâ
èlektronnogo golosovaniâ, or KEG) were introduced on a small scale during the
2007 elections, after having been successfully tested in 2006 in an election in
Veliky Novgorod. By 2018, most Russian federal districts used KOIB and/or
KEG systems, albeit on greatly diverging scales; in total 11.1% of votes were
counted automatically (RIA 2018).
Russia only recently trialed remote electronic voting, and on a modest scale:
during the 2019 Moscow City Duma elections the voters of three electoral
districts were given the option to vote online. The experiment did not run
flawlessly. Already during the preparatory phase, the security of the system was
questioned; moreover, the fact that it was run by the city of Moscow and vot-
ers’ identity and right to vote were verified by the Moscow Mayor’s portal,
rather than the Multifunctional Centers for Governmental and Municipal
Services normally endowed with this task, was criticized (Vasil’chuk 2019). In
May 2019, the Communist Party filed a case with the Supreme Court in an
attempt to prohibit the use of online voting in the Moscow elections, citing
concerns about the violation of voting secrecy and the risk of manipulation and
coercion of voters (Garmonenko 2019); the Supreme Court found the experi-
ment not to be in violation of the Constitution. On the day of voting, September
8, 2019, the online voting system experienced multiple interruptions, which
caused the service to be offline for periods of up to one hour (Kommersant 2019).
In the three districts where it was introduced, online voting appears to have
worked in favor of pro-regime candidates who received a higher percentage of
the online votes as compared to the paper votes, while the opposite was the
case for opposition candidates (Uspenskiy 2019). In one of the districts that
participated in the trial, the independent candidate would have won on the
basis of paper votes only, yet lost the election by a mere 84 votes with the
addition of votes cast online (Vasil’chuk 2019). The explanation for the fact
that pro-regime candidates fared comparatively well among those voters who
voted online has yet to be determined. One thinkable scenario is that the intro-
duction of online voting, and thereby the removal of the controlled conditions
of the polling station that aim to ensure voter secrecy and freedom of choice,
makes, for example, civil servants even more vulnerable to coercion. While it
commonly understood state employees are placed under pressure to vote (to
increase voter turnout) and support a given candidate, online voting creates
the opportunity for superiors to directly supervise how their employees vote
(e.g. by having them vote at the workplace). Whether and to what extent this
is indeed the case, and to what extent other factors may be able to explain this
difference, requires further investigation. Moreover, to be able to draw defini-
tive conclusions on how the introduction of online voting may affect political
outcomes, the empirical base needs to be extended as further trials with online
voting are conducted.
Apart from the automation of voting and the gradual introduction of voting
machines, the conditions under which Russians vote has changed through the
placement of webcams. In response to (proven) accusations of electoral fraud
committed during the December 2011 parliamentary elections, that gave cause
to a series of mass protests, the government installed webcams at nearly all poll-
ing stations for the 2012 presidential elections to allow for real-time monitor-
ing via a special website (webvybory2012.ru). In total, 91,000 of the 95,000
polling stations had a total of 180,000 cameras installed; of these, 80,000 were
streamed online and with sound (Asmolov 2014). Webcams had been in use
earlier, but only on a small scale. According to Gregory Asmolov, the actual
impact of this massive infrastructural investment on increasing the transparency
and, in particular, the accountability of the voting process was limited by the
lack of an integrated mechanism for reporting fraudulent behavior, the impos-
sibility of recording live-streamed footage (requiring one to file an official
request to gain access to centrally stored footage from the webcams) and the
ill-defined legal status of the recordings. As a result, no “criminal conviction of
electoral fraud or revision of election results” were made on the basis of the
videos (Asmolov 2014). Moreover, for volunteer monitors, the sheer number
of available live streams made it difficult to monitor effectively. Beyond polling
stations, webcams had earlier been used on smaller scale to monitor the prog-
ress on national projects in 2007, and in 2010 to monitor the reconstruction
process following the wildfires. According to Asmolov, however, these initia-
tives symbolized rather than truly increased government transparency and
accountability, as was their supposed aim (Asmolov 2014).
The 2012 presidential elections also saw the first use of a specially developed
app for election observers called Web-nablûdatel’ (web-observer) (Ermoshina
2016). The app, developed with the involvement of NGO (non-governmental
organization) Golos (Voice), provided observers with guidance on how to con-
duct their activities, as well as giving them the ability to report any violations.
The app was connected to a website hosting a collaborative map and statistics,
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indirizzate a Tacito, il rinomato storico, e compirò questo debito sotto
la maggior brevità.
Cajo Plinio Secondo, a dispetto di chi lo volle di Verona [84], nacque
in Como — Novocomum — l’anno 23 dell’Era Volgare, regnando in
Roma Tiberio. Suo padre fu Celere e sua madre Marcella. Datosi
alle lettere, non fu ramo di scienza cui non si fosse applicato, e dalla
assidua lettura degli autori latini e greci, solendo sempre prenderne
note, come è manifesto da quanto ne scrisse il di lui nipote e figlio
adottivo — Plinio il Giovine — potè trarne il profitto migliore. Fu un
vero miracolo di studj, considerando come perduto tutto quel tempo
che dava alle altre occupazioni. Così potè lasciare assai e assai
opere, delle quali la migliore e che si può considerare come
l’enciclopedia dello scibile antico, ci è rimasta ed è quella che si
intitola Naturæ Historiarum, divisa in XXXVI libri.
Essa fu da lui ordinata con certo metodo. Cominciò col contemplare
il mondo in generale; gli astri, le costellazioni, le comete, gli elementi
e le meteore, tutti i fenomeni celesti e terrestri passano rapidamente
sotto la sua penna. Descrive quindi la terra, cioè l’Europa, l’Africa e
l’Asia, e contiene codesta parte notizie e particolari importanti sia per
la geografia che per la storia. Segue la storia dell’uomo, poi quella
degli animali terrestri, degli acquatici, degli uccelli, degli insetti e vie
via discorrendo. Vi tien dietro il regno vegetale e vi si tratta degli
alberi stranieri, della gomma, della resina, de’ frutti, de’ grani che
servono alla alimentazione dell’uomo e per conseguenza
dell’agricoltura, del vino e della coltivazione della vigna e del lino;
degli arbusti e del loro uso nella medicina; de’ fiori, delle api, del
miele e della cera; degli usi differenti delle piante per l’industria e per
i farmaci, delle erbe che crescono senza mestieri di coltura, di loro
virtù e proprietà per certe malattie; de’ rimedj tratti dagli animali e da’
pesci. Nove libri consacra alla materia medica e riesce più completo
di Dioscoride e di Galeno. Passa di poi a’ minerali e metalli, di cui è
per avventura il primo a trattare, nè dimentica in tale proposito le
acque medicinali e i sali. Si occupa da ultimo delle materie impiegate
dalle arti, de’ colori, delle terre, de’ marmi, delle pietre da fabbrica, e
di quelle preziose; necessariamente toccando della storia della
pittura, della scultura, dell’architettura, annestandovi digressioni
curiose sul lusso de’ Romani, sulla navigazione, il commercio ed
altre interessantissime cose.
Quantità di notizie, profondità di studj e di filosofia e amenità di
forma sono pregi incontestabili di siffatta opera colossale, della quale
il celebre Buffon fa un elogio; abbenchè Geoffroy Saint Hilaire l’abbia
severamente giudicata una mera compilazione [85].
Svetonio ricorda di Plinio la Storia delle Guerre Germaniche,
compresa in venti volumi [86]; altri altre opere che lo attestano
indefesso e sapiente scrittore, e ne fanno ascendere il numero de’
volumi sino a cent’ottanta, scritti in minutissimo carattere.
Lo che non tolse che servisse dapprima nella cavalleria, che
sostenesse di poi continue e cospicue magistrature, stato essendo
procuratore altresì della Spagna, che fosse augure e da ultimo
comandante, o, come direbbesi in oggi, ammiraglio della flotta
romana a Miseno.
È precisamente nel disimpegno di questa onorevolissima ed
importante carica che noi lo troveremo fra poco.
Spuntava l’alba dei primo giorno di novembre. — Una nebbia
trasparente, che non era delle solite d’autunno, distendevasi su tutto
il golfo e vi toglieva quell’ineffabile sorriso onde fu dal cielo
privilegiato: l’aria era straordinariamente greve e soffocante, nè
spirava da veruna parte alcun soffio di vento. Pur tuttavia,
scendendo alla marina, sarebbonsi vedute le onde disordinatamente
mosse, come in ora di tempesta. Chi andava colle idrie alle fontane
per provveder l’acqua, maravigliava di vederle gocciolare appena
appena; la poche acque de’ pozzi avevano convertito in acre il loro
gusto. Il Sarno medesimo, la cui ricchezza in allora di onde non è
bene argomentata dalla picciola sua vena d’oggidì, parevasi per
prodigio disseccato repentinamente. Miasmi sulfurei e di mofete [87]
si facevano sentire leggieri dapprima, poi rendevansi più forti e
dominavano, e la calma e affannosa atmosfera era certo in contrasto
coll’ora mattutina per consueto fresca e pura; nè di tuttociò
sapevansi indovinare le cagioni. Perocchè a quanti fosse venuto in
mente di rammentarsi il disastro del tremuoto accaduto sedici anni
addietro, e temuto avesse per quegli indizj non fosse per rinnovarsi,
rispondeva assicurando la tranquilla sommità del vecchio Vesuvio,
che sorrideva tranquillo; nè appariva perfino quella bianca virgola di
fumo che d’ordinario vedevasi liberare dalle sue fauci.
Mano mano che il giorno avanzava l’aria facevasi più pesante, più
pallida e nebulosa la luce, maggiore ed affannosa la caldura; ma la
popolazione pompeiana era ben lunge ancora dal sospettare
l’imminenza d’un gravissimo male. V’hanno scrittori perfino che
affermarono non venissero per ciò que’ noncuranti cittadini rimossi
dall’accorrere in folla allo spettacolo dell’anfiteatro ch’era indetto per
quel giorno.
E fra i sanguinosi combattimenti di gladiatori e di fiere li colse
improvvisa la collera del Vesuvio. La clessidra non aveva forse
segnata per anco un’ora dopo il meriggio. Un cupo mugolio
rumoreggia sotterra e sembra esso proceda da lunge, poi
s’approssima mano mano, e ne traballa il suolo, e prima che gli
attoniti spettatori rivengano dalla sorpresa, repenti spaventosi scoppi
si odono dal lato della Porta Ercolano come di tuoni e di folgori; una
densissima e oscura nebbia invade il cielo e l’aria si fa più bassa, e
la notte più cupa sottentra al giorno. Tutti sorgono da’ loro stalli e si
precipitano in massa per gli ambulacri e pei vomitorj, la calca urla, si
preme e svia in quella oscurità, fra clamori di uomini, strida di
femmine, e nel trambusto v’ha chi cade, chi sviene e rimane
oppresso e schiacciato. Quel generale frastuono è fatto maggiore e
s’addoppia per l’eco che si ripete da una estremità all’altra
dell’arena [88]. Urlano agli inattesi fenomeni ne’ sotterranei, che
fiancheggiano le porte principali dell’anfiteatro, spaventate le fiere, e
ne frangono i ferrati cancelli dandosi invano alla fuga [89]; gemono i
cani per le vie, mugghiano i bovi, nitriscono i cavalli e tentano
strapparsi alle greppie onde fuggirsene all’aperto.
Incomincia un grandinare di pomici e di lapilli; una pioggia fittissima
di ceneri e d’acqua bollente si rovescia a furia, mentre in qualche
parte cadono grossi basalti che sfondano, stritolano, uccidono dove
cadono.
Spesse folgori guizzano con odiosa luce ad illuminare l’orrore di
quella scena e rivelano la nera colonna di fumo che si leva dal
cratere del Vesuvio, pari a pino gigante, e i torrenti di lava
incandescente che si precipitan dal monte, che si fanno strada pei
fianchi aperti d’ogni parte e rovinano e scorrono a portar desolazione
e lutto. Gli alberi, al loro passaggio, crepitano, inceneriscono e
scompajono in un baleno; ogni vegetazione è arsa e distrutta.
La Catastrofe di Pompei. Vol. I. Cap. V. Il Cataclisma.
I gemiti, le strida, gli ululati degli uomini rispondono alla generale

rovina e assordano miseramente la città; la disperazione regna per
le sue vie. Famiglie che fuggono verso il mare dove giunte gittansi a
furia sovra i fragili burchielli, già testimonj di letizie e di voluttà, e vi
trovano fra l’onde procellose la morte; mariti e padri che vorrebbero
trarre in salvo le mogli ed i figli; questi che in quel bujo d’inferno
vengono da altri accorrenti separati dai genitori: richiami inutili,
pianto disperato, orribili imprecazioni agli Dei. I magistrati più nulla
potevano e dividendo l’universale sentimento della propria
conservazione, provvedevano a sè medesimi: i sacerdoti, tolta a
stento qualche statua d’oro di nume, sottraevansi a’ templi: le vestali,
non curanti dei veli candidi e pudici, mescevansi atterrite alla folla
delirante e maledivan la Dea che le privava in quel punto degli umani
soccorsi. Vecchi che non reggono a’ passi della fuga e s’accasciano
rassegnati in attesa della morte; giovani che, pur volendo involare gli
antichi parenti, sono uccisi da’ proiettili del monte a mezzo dell’atto
pietoso; amanti che spirano nella reciproca assistenza e nel primiero
lor bacio [90]: confusione e caos terribile e peggiore assai della
morte, miscela orribile di urla, e d’omei, di atroci bestemmie di
uomini e di donne e di mugghj spaventosi di bestie, cozzo di animali
e d’uomini, sfascio di edificj e gragnuola incessante di lapilli e nembi
di ceneri sottili ed ardenti che invadono case, che penetrano
appartamenti e i più reconditi nascondigli, che soffocano il respiro,
che ricolmano e seppelliscono: puzzo acuto, insopportabile che ti
afferra e stringe le fauci, che istrozza: in una parola — rovina e
morte. —
Le torcie resinose che avvisavan taluni d’accendere a rompere
quell’atra notte, squassate qui e qua per le vie, pei crocicchi e nel
foro accrescevano l’orrore; nè valevano guari all’intento, chè la
pioggia bollente e gli inciampi d’ogni maniera le spegnevano, onde
più sgomentavansi e forviavansi i fuggenti.
Fra tanto lutto e terrore non mancarono scellerati uomini di penetrar
nelle case deserte e d’involarvi denaro e preziosità; ma vindice il
Vesuvio li puniva del sacrilegio, quando correvano di poi a salvarsi
colla infame preda.
Chi avrebbe in tanta confusione pensato allora a’ poveri prigioni?
Intento ognuno per sè, trepido e curante della propria esistenza o di
quella de’ più cari, chi avrebbe volto un pensiero al povero gladiatore
che stava ne’ ceppi del ludo ad espiare alcun fallo o a soddisfare il
capriccio dell’inflessibil lanista? Gli scavi pompejani discoprendo ed
il ludo e que’ ceppi, ci chiarì nelle ossa de’ piedi che ancor n’eran
costretti, come là quegli infelici avessero dovuto attendere l’estremo
fato, impotenti a difendersi dalla furia delle ceneri e della bollente
pioggia, impotenti a sottrarsene colla forza.
Ancor la sentinella che vegliava alla Porta Ercolano, all’ingresso del
Pago Augusto Felice, fedele alla avuta consegna, spirava
impugnando l’alabarda al suo posto, ed il suo scheletro rinvenuto
diciotto secoli dopo, attestò a’ posteri i rigori della militar disciplina
che imponeva Roma a’ soldati.
E tu pure, povera vedova di Marco Arrio Diomede, invano riparasti
nell’ampia cella vinaria della tua casa co’ tuoi più cari, confidando
che là non ti avrebbe raggiunta l’ira dei numi! Venti scheletri si sono
rinvenuti colà, e tanta dovette essere la disperazione di que’
disgraziati, che le pareti, forse allora recenti, serbano tuttavia le
impronte loro.
Ben avevano detto i miseri Pompejani di credere quella fosse l’ora
dello sterminio totale dell’universo. Seneca, colla divinazione che è
propria del poeta, aveva dipinto alcun tempo prima, od almeno
riassunto tutto l’orrore di tal giorno in que’ versi:
Trepidant, trepidant pectora magno

Percussa metu, ne fatali
Cuncta ruina quassata labent
Iterumque deos hominesque premat
Deforme chaos. [91]
Pochi furono i fortunati che giunsero a mettersi in salvo, fuggendo

per mare a Sorrento, a Neapoli o nelle isole adiacenti: così da’ pochi
fuggiaschi fu pur recata la dolorosa nuova a Miseno.
Tre giorni durò la spaventosa catastrofe ed a capo di essi voi avreste
cercato invano Pompei. La misera città era sepolta e scomparsa
sotto l’incredibile pioggia delle ceneri, e siffattamente scomparsa da
non sopravvivere pure la tradizione del luogo ove ella ebbe ad
esistere, se infino a mezzo il secolo scorso ebbe a invalere la
credenza che là fosse Pompei dove ora è Torre dell’Annunziata, che
è quanto dire a due miglia da dove venne poscia scoperta.
E con Pompei la vicina costiera era egualmente sparita. La più
lontana Stabia aveva patita la medesima sorte: Ercolano, Retina,
Oplonti, Tegiano e Taurania non esistevano egualmente più. I grossi
torrenti di candente lava, che al bagliore sinistro si vedevano
vomitarsi dal cratere e dagli aperti fianchi del Vesuvio, erano corsi
sui monumentali palagi delle ville di Cesare e dei Fabi e così le
avevano ricolme da stendere sovr’esse una pietra sepolcrale dello
spessore di più metri.
Perfino il mare s’era ritratto d’alquanto dal poggio ove s’assideva la
spensierata città che descrivo, sì che al presente vi si vegga
interposto buon tratto di terreno: il cataclisma dunque era stato così
formidabile che mai a memoria d’uomini non fu poi visto l’eguale.
Plinio, il comandante della flotta a Miseno, non ebbe appena l’avviso
delle incominciate furie vesuviane, che vi era accorso sollecito, e
come poi miseramente vi perisse, vittima di quella scientifica
curiosità ch’egli ebbe di studiare il formidabile fenomeno, lascerò che
il lettore l’apprenda dall’epistola che il suo nipote e figlio adottivo
Cajo Cecilio Secondo detto Plinio il giovane, secolui e colla madre
convivente in Miseno, diresse a Tacito, l’illustre storico amico suo. A
tal uopo io la volgo nella nostra lingua, che congiuntamente all’altra
del medesimo pure a Tacito scritta, completeranno meglio il povero
racconto che della tremenda catastrofe ho io procurato di fare:
«Cajo Plinio a Tacito suo salute:
«Tu mi domandi ch’io ti scriva della fine di mio zio, onde ne possa
con maggiore verità tramandare a’ posteri. Ringrazio. Imperciocchè
io vegga che dove essa venga da te celebrata, si appresti alla morte
sua una gloria immortale. Quantunque infatti nello sterminio di
bellissime terre, egli, come i popoli e le città, sia rimasto, in così
memorabile evento ravvolto, da sopravvivere quasi eterno, e
quantunque egli stesso abbia molte e durature opere lasciate; molto
tuttavia aggiungerà alla popolarità del di lui nome la immortalità de’
tuoi scritti. Io certo reputo avventurati coloro a’ quali è dato dal
favore degli dei o di compiere cose degne d’essere scritte o di
scrivere cose degne di essere lette; avventuratissimi poi quelli a’
quali e l’una cosa e l’altra è concessa. Mio zio, mercè i proprj scritti e
mercè i tuoi, sarà nel novero di costoro. Laonde più volontieri
m’accingo, anzi insisto a far quello che tu mi imponi.
«Trovavasi egli a Miseno ed attendeva al personale comando della
flotta [92]. Erano le calende di Novembre [93], quasi all’ora settima,
quando mia madre gli mostra apparsa una nube d’inusitata
grandezza e specie. Accostumato a star bene alquanto al sole e
quindi a bagnarsi d’acqua fredda, aveva asciutto in letto e messosi
poi a studiare, domanda le pianelle e ascende in luogo da dove si
potesse riguardar ampiamente il prodigio. Una nube levavasi (che a
chi da lontano l’osservava non avrebbe indovinato da qual monte,
che poi si conobbe essere il Vesuvio), la cui somiglianza e forma
nessuna altra arbore meglio che un pino avrebbe raffigurata.
Perocchè spingendosi in alto come su lunghissimo tronco, si
diffondeva per certi rami: credo che ciò procedesse perchè sollevata
da improvviso soffio s’allargava poscia alla base, fors’anco vinta dal
proprio peso, candida talvolta e talvolta sordida e macchiata, a
seconda che sorreggesse o terra o cenere. Parve all’eruditissimo
uomo che fosse il grande evento meritevole di più vicino studio.
Comanda allestirsi una liburnica [94] e m’accorda, dove il voglia,
seguirlo. Risposi amar piuttosto rimanermene a studiare, ed egli
stesso per avventura m’aveva commesso alcuna cosa scrivere.
Usciva di casa, quando gli si recarono alcune tavolette [95] scritte. I
classiarii di Retina [96], atterriti dall’imminente pericolo (poichè quella
borgata vi sottostasse, nè altra via di scampo vi fosse che per le
navi), supplicavano volesse sottrarli a tanto disastro. Ei modifica la
risoluzione e quel che aveva per amor di studio incominciato, compie
colla massima alacrità. Escono le quadriremi, vi monta su egli stesso
non per recar ajuto a Retina soltanto, ma a ben molti altri, poichè
popolata di gente fosse l’amenità della sponda. S’affretta colà da
dove fuggono gli altri ed in mezzo al pericolo egli regola il corso e
tien diritti i governali, così libero da timore, da distinguere e
disegnare tutte le fasi di quella sciagura e tutte le figure come gli si
paravano agli occhi. Già la cenere era cascata sulle navi, quanto più
s’accostavano, tanto più calda e più densa; già anche le pomici e le
pietre, nere, bruciate e spezzate dal fuoco, già apertosi un
improvviso guado e la ruina del monte levarsi ostacolo al lido.
Ristato alquanto, se dovesse dar addietro, al timoniere che a ciò fare
l’esortava, i forti, disse, ajuta la fortuna, raggiungi Pomponiano.
Questi era a Stabia, separato dal seno frapposto, essendo che il
mare, per l’aggirarsi e curvarsi delle sponde, non vi si introducesse
che a poco a poco. Quivi, quantunque non fosse ancora vicino il
pericolo, in vista nondimeno di esso che col crescere si farebbe più
presto, aveva portato sulle navi i fardelli, in attesa di dover fuggire
quando il vento contrario si fosse acquetato; dal quale il mio zio
invece assai favorito, colà sospinto, abbraccia il trepidante, lo
consola ed esorta e perchè colla propria tranquillità meglio
deponesse il timore, vuole essere trasportato nel bagno; lavatosi, si
pone a tavola e cena allegro od in sembianza di allegro, lo che è più
ancora. Intanto dal monte Vesuvio in più luoghi divampavano
larghissime fiamme ed alti incendj, il fulgore e chiarore de’ quali
veniva fatto maggiore dalle tenebre della notte. Egli per rimedio al
terrore andava dicendo quelle che ardevano essere le deserte e
solitarie ville abbandonate al fuoco dallo spavento de’ campagnuoli.
Allora si diede al riposo e riposò del più profondo sonno. Perocchè il
respiro, che per la corpulenza gli era più grave e sonoro, veniva
inteso da coloro che stavano sulla soglia. Ma lo spazio per il quale si
adiva all’appartamento, s’era per tal guisa di cenere mista a lapilli
cotanto colmo, che se più a lungo fosse rimasto nella camera, gliene
sarebbe stata negata la uscita. Riscosso, sorge e ritorna a
Pomponiano ed agli altri che avevano vegliato. Consultano in
comune se debbano restar in casa, o vagare all’aperto, perocchè la
casa traballasse per le frequenti scosse, e come scassinata dalle
fondamenta, di qua e di là ondeggiasse, e dell’uscir all’aperto si
paventasse nuovamente il ruinar de’ lapilli, comunque lievi ed esigui.
Nel confronto de’ quali pericoli si decise per codesto ultimo, in lui la
ragione vincendo il partito, negli altri la paura. Imposti de’ cuscini
sulla testa, ne li accomandano con fasce e ciò fu riparo contro
quanto cadeva. Già altrove il giorno, colà la notte più buja e densa
d’ogni notte, la qual tuttavia rompevano le molte faci ed i diversi lumi.
A lui piacque di portarsi al lido e da vicino riguardare se si potesse
commettere al mare, perchè mosso e procelloso perdurava. Quivi
adagiandosi sovra un disteso lenzuolo, una volta o due dimandò
dell’acqua fresca e la bevve. Poscia le fiamme e una puzza di zolfo,
foriero delle fiamme, volgono altri in fuga ed eccitano lui.
Appoggiatosi a due si levò, ma subitamente ricadde morto, impedito,
siccome io argomento, il respiro dalla più spessa caligine, onde gli si
chiuse lo stomaco, che già per natura aveva debole ed angusto e
soggetto a frequenti infiammazioni. Come fu ritornato il giorno (il
terzo da quello che a lui era stato l’ultimo), fu rinvenuto il di lui corpo
integro, illeso e ancor ricoperto de’ suoi indumenti, più simile la posa
del corpo ad uno che dorma, che non a defunto. Io colla madre
eravamo sempre a Miseno. Ma ciò nulla fa alla storia, nè tu bramasti
sapere altro che della morte di lui. Imporrò fine adunque; questo solo
aggiungendo che ho veracemente esposto tutto quello cui ho
assistito o che ho udito al momento, essendochè le cose vere tutte
vengano ripetute. Tu le più saglienti eleggi; perocchè altro sia una
lettera, altro la storia; altro è per l’amico, altro è scrivere per tutti.
Addio.»
Così il nipote e figlio adottivo Cajo Plinio Cecilio Secondo narrò la
morte del grande naturalista ed ammiraglio della romana flotta; ma
per quanto autorevole la di lui testimonianza, non tolse che
differentemente altri la narrassero di poi.
Tra costoro, Svetonio, o quegli cui si vogliono attribuire le Vite degli
Uomini illustri, ci fa sapere come v’abbiano bensì certuni che lo
dicano oppresso dalla violenza della rena e delle faville, ma ve
n’abbia di altri ancora che ritengano essere stato da un servo
ammazzato, quando sentendosi soffocare per l’ardore, avevalo
pregato d’anticipargli la morte [97].
Il Rezzonico, accostandosi a quest’ultima opinione, la vorrebbe
confortare colla consuetudine de’ Romani di liberarsi con morte
volontaria da’ dolori della vita, e col sistema di filosofia di Plinio il
Vecchio, il quale non pare che avesse le più precise idee intorno alla
immortalità dell’anima [98].
Nè di diversa sentenza era per avventura messer Francesco
Petrarca, se potè nel Trionfo della Fama introdurre il terzetto che
riferisco, mettendo per altro ancora in guardia il lettore contro quel,
che io reputo errore, come ho già precedentemente dimostrato,
d’aver, cioè, detto Plinio veronese:
Mentr’io mirava, subito ebbi scorto

Quel Plinio veronese suo vicino
A scriver molto, a morir poco accorto.
Tuttavia potrebbesi ritenere che il Cantore di Laura riputasse
egualmente essere stato poco l’accorgimento del vecchio Plinio di
esporsi sul lido del mare alle offese vesuviane, mentre ne fervevano
i furori, e che gli accagionarono la morte, anche senza ammettere la
morte datagli dal servo.
Ma all’illustre e severo storico non bastò lo intendere i casi del
vecchio Plinio; laonde pur quelli del giovine richiese, perocchè
avesse saputo costui essersi trovato ravvolto in quegli spaventosi
avvenimenti; epperò eccitava l’amico ad istruirnelo, ed io pensando
che pur un certo interesse provar dovrebbe il lettore a conoscerli, a
rendersi ben anco ragione dell’intero luttuoso quadro, dedurrò pur la
versione della seconda lettera che dall’argomento scrisse
quell’egregio all’amico.
«Cajo Plinio a Cornelio Tacito suo, salute:
«Tu dici essere tratto dalla lettera, che per tuo volere ti scrissi intorno
alla morte di mio zio, a desiderar di conoscere, quali timori non solo,
ma quali avventure altresì mi sieno toccate (ciò che del resto m’ero
posto per dirti e poi mi sono interrotto).
Benchè d’orror, nel rimembrarlo, frema

L’animo mio, principierò [99].
Partito lo zio, il restante tempo (poichè a ciò ero rimasto) io spesi

negli studj; poscia il bagno, la cena ed il sonno inquieto e breve. Per
molti giorni innanzi aveva preceduto il tremuoto; non ci parve
notevole gran che, perchè frequente nella Campania: ma quella
notte [100] si fe’ sentire talmente da credere che le cose tutte non si
movessero soltanto, ma crollassero. Irrompe nella mia camera mia
madre, mentre io stava per alzarmi e risvegliarla alla mia volta. Ci
sedemmo nel cortile della mia casa, che di poco spazio divideva la
casa dal mare. Non so se debba chiamare costanza od imprudenza:
io non contava che il diciasettesimo anno. Chieggo un volume di Tito
Livio, e quasi per ozio mi faccio a leggerlo e, come era il mio
costume, a farne estratti; quand’ecco un amico di mio zio, che non
ha guari era a lui venuto dalla Spagna [101], scorti me e mia madre
seduti ed io anzi intento a leggere, si pone a rimproverare la
noncuranza di lei e la mia tranquillità; contuttociò io non mi distolgo
dal libro. Già era l’ora prima ed ancor dubbia e quasi languida la
luce; già crollate le case circostanti e quantunque ci trovassimo in
luogo aperto, pure essendo esso angusto, grande e certo era il
timore di rovina. Parve allora finalmente di dover allontanarci dalla
città. Ci segue attonito il volgo, e ciò che nello spavento appare
prudenza, al proprio antepone l’altrui avviso, ed in gran numero
essendo, preme ed incalza i fuggenti. Usciti dall’abitato, ristemmo.
Quivi assai cose che ti farebbero maravigliare, e assai sbigottimento
patimmo. Imperocchè i veicoli che avevam comandato di condurci,
quantunque in pianissimo campo, volgevansi in opposta parte, e
neppure rimanevano nello stesso luogo, malgrado con grossi ciottoli
si assicurassero. Il mare inoltre sembrava riassorbirsi in sè
medesimo e dal tremuoto indietro cacciarsi. Certo erasi inoltrata la
sponda, e molti animali del mare giacevan sull’asciutta arena.
Dall’altro lato una nube nera e spaventevole ravvolta da violenti
vortici di un vento di fuoco, si squarciava in lunghe figure di fiamme,
or pari alle folgori ed ora maggiori. Allora poi quello stesso amico
ch’era giunto dalla Spagna con maggior severità ed insistenza ci
disse: Se tuo fratello, se tuo zio vive, egli vuole che voi vi salviate; se
è perito, voi vuole superstiti: a che dunque ritardate a fuggire?
Rispondemmo che incerti di sua salvezza non ci reggesse l’animo di
provvedere alla nostra. Nè oltre si trattiene, via si precipita e
rapidamente si invola al pericolo; nè a lungo andò che quella nube
discendesse sulla costa e ricoprisse il mare. Aveva cinta e ravvolta
Caprea, e tolto alla vista Miseno, che si spinge avanti. Allora mia
madre a pregare, esortare ed ingiungere ch’io dovessi in qualunque
modo fuggire, poichè giovane lo potessi, non calere a lei il morire e
comechè grave d’anni e di corpo, pur che ella a me non fosse
cagione di morte. Io oppongo non volere scampare se non con lei, e
quindi presale la mano, la costringo ad affrettare il passo: ella
obbedisce a malincuore e sè accusa perchè a me cagione di ritardo.
Già la cenere arriva, comunque ancor rara: mi rivolgo; una densa
caligine ci incalzava alle spalle, e ci seguiva rasentando la terra,
come torrente. Pieghiam da lato, io dissi, frattanto che vediamo,
onde sorpresi poi nella via, la turba di chi ci accompagna non ci
abbia nella oscurità a rovesciare per terra. Appena c’eravamo seduti,
che la notte piomba, non come quando è senza luna o nuvolosa, ma
come in luogo chiuso sia estinto ogni lume; avresti udito ululati di
femmine, stridere di fanciulli e gridar di uomini: altri i parenti, altri i
figli, altri il consorte ricercar colle voci: si riconoscevano a queste:
quelli il proprio caso, questi lamentan l’altrui: v’eran di coloro che per
paura della morte, la morte invocavano. Molti alzavan la mano verso
gli dei, e parecchi negavano aver mai gli dei esistito e quella
reputavano essere la eterna e novissima notte. Nè mancarono di
quelli che i veri pericoli accrescevano con finti e simulati terrori.
V’eran di coloro che annunziavano venir da Miseno e averlo veduto
ardere e comunque mendaci, venivan creduti. Si rischiarò alquanto,
ma a noi non parve il giorno, ma il chiarore del fuoco che si
avanzava; se non che questo si arrestò più lontano: di nuovo
tenebre, di nuovo cenere, molta e grave. Questa noi, levandoci,
scuotevamo di tratto in tratto, diversamente ne saremmo stati, non
che soverchiati, schiacciati dal peso. Mi potrei vantare che un tanto
frangente non mi abbia strappato un gemito e neppure alterata la
voce, se non avessi reputato a me misero di grande consolazione il
perire d’ogni cosa con me e con tutti. Finalmente quella caligine
diradata, si risolvette in fumo o nebbia, quindi si fe’ giorno davvero
ed anche il sole risplendette, comechè scolorito, quale suol essere
quando vien meno. Agli occhi ancor trepidanti si presentarono
mutate le cose, e, come per neve, oppresse da molta cenere.
Reduci a Miseno e ristorati alla meglio i corpi, passammo la notte
sospesi e dubbii fra la speranza e il timore, prevalendo il timore.
Imperocchè perfidiava il tremuoto e molti dementi [102] coi loro
spaventevoli vaticinj schernivano le proprie e le altrui sciagure. Noi
per altro allora, quantunque ammoniti dai passati, e nell’aspettazione
di venturi pericoli, non accogliemmo il partito di andarcene, finchè
non avessimo saputo dello zio. Queste particolarità, certamente non
degne d’essere registrate nella storia, leggi senza tenerne conto
nello scrivere, nè ad altri poi imputerai che a te stesso, se non ti
sembreranno pur in lettera convenienti. Addio.»
Tito Vespasiano Augusto, l’ottimo imperatore che deplorava perduto
quel giorno in cui non avesse accordata alcuna grazia [103], avuta
contezza del lagrimevole evento, non limitandosi, come scrive
Svetonio, a mostrare soltanto la sollecitudine d’un principe, ma
spiegando tutta la tenerezza d’un padre, prima con confortevoli
editti, poi con reali beneficj trasse agli infelici in ajuto e volle che,
tratti per sorte dal numero de’ consolari i procuratori, questi
avvisassero a’ modi di temperare tante sciagure e soccorrere a
quelle popolazioni littorane ch’erano rimaste senza tetto e fortuna,
disponendo allora che alla ricostruzione delle rovinate città, od a
sollievo de’ superstiti venissero impiegati i beni di coloro ch’erano
periti nella eruzione del Vesuvio, senza lasciare eredi, che altrimenti
sarebbero stati devoluti al fisco [104]; ma diligentemente esaminati
essi i luoghi, non parve loro sano consiglio il disotterrare le sepolte
città, che altra volta avrebbero potuto subire per conformi cataclismi
una medesima sorte, e ne fu però abbandonato ogni pensiero.
Intervenne per tal guisa a Pompei quel che veggiamo in mezzo agli
uomini tuttodì accadere. Lagrime e desolazione, rincrescimento della
vita, e giuri di lutto perpetuo onorano i primi giorni delle tombe più
predilette: poi il pianto si terge, si accolgono i conforti, si rassegna a
vivere, si dimentica, si ride e si danza forse nella camera stessa
dove il più caro de’ nostri ha dolorato poco prima ed è morto.
Sulle ceneri di Pompei i superstiti hanno arato, e seminato, crebbero
alberi, crebbero vigneti e sorsero cascinali, e le generazioni che si
vennero succedendo narrarono l’evento come di cosa assai assai
lontana e chi sa forse che non siasi da molti creduto ben anco che la
fama e gli scrittori avessero esagerato parlando di Pompei come di
celebre città della Terra di Lavoro.
CAPITOLO VI.
Gli Scavi e la Topografia.
I Guardiani — Un inconveniente a riparare — Ladri antichi

— Vi fu una seconda Pompei? — Scoperta della città —
Rinvenimento d’Ercolano — Preziosità ercolanesi —
Impossibilità d’una intera rivendicazione alla luce di
Ercolano — Scavi regolari in Pompei — Disordini e
provvedimenti — Scuola d’antichità in Pompei — C. A.
Vecchi — Topografia di Pompei — Le Saline e le Cave di
Pomici — Il Sarno.
Ora che il lettore mi ha cortesemente seguìto nel racconto della

sventurata città, entrando in essa dal lato della antica porta di
Ercolano, mi chiederà dapprima chi sia costui che nel consegnare la
tessera d’ingresso, che abbiam pagata due lire, ci si è posto come
un amico a’ fianchi, dopo averci graziosamente salutato? Vestito
come una giovane recluta in bassa tenuta, se il vedeste ne’ dì festivi
e nelle occasioni più solenni, di poco differenzia nell’uniforme dallo
spigliato bersagliere del nostro esercito, e se non ne divide il
carattere, ha però discipline proprie e severe, ed è, per così dire, alla
sua volta irreggimentato.
Egli è altro de’ guardiani della mesta città, il cicerone che ci sarà
guida nella nostra curiosa peregrinazione.
L’illustre commendatore Fiorelli, — col quale ho voluto che il lettore
facesse sin dalle prime pagine di questo libro, e conservasse poi
sempre la preziosa conoscenza, perchè egli sia il benemerito
sopraintendente degli scavi pompeiani, — ha, e per la custodia di
questi scavi e di quelli d’Ercolano, come per la cura del Museo
napoletano, delle antiche preziosità del Chiostro di S. Martino e di tal
altra interessante reliquia del passato, esistente nella provincia di
Napoli, creato un corpo di guardiani, gente tutta onesta e fidata,
ch’egli assegna a questa o a quella località, che vi appare
abbastanza compresa ed istrutta dell’importanza del proprio ufficio e
della storia di ciò che vigila ed addita a’ frequenti visitatori. V’han di
quelli cui famigliari son le lingue inglese, francese e tedesca, e il
forestiere però cui s’accompagna l’intelligente guardiano, trova in lui
un amico che gli apprende con franca disinvoltura ogni destinazione
antica di que’ luoghi e di quegli oggetti e gli fa intendere ben anco
nel disimpegno del proprio ufficio lo dolce suon della sua terra.
Il Guardiano del commendatore Fiorelli, dopo di essere stato tre o
quattro ore con voi, d’avervi colle sue indicazioni e racconti trasfuso
tutto l’interesse per la risorta città, si rifiuterà, con piglio di naturale
cortesia e senza un’ombra di sacrificio, oppur di affettazione, di
ricevere il beveraggio che tenterete di fargli accogliere e ve lo farà
con sì grande sincerità che sarete quasi mossi a fargliene le scuse,
quasi che la vostra offerta fosse stata una mancanza alle regole
della delicatezza e della urbanità.
Le discipline sull’argomento imposte dall’esimio soprintendente sono
severe e ferme: una mancanza del Guardiano varrebbe il suo
licenziamento. E noi plaudiamo ad ordini siffatti. Nulla di più
incomodo e imbarazzante pel forestiero, ignaro forse de’ costumi ed
abitudini del paese, che di por mano alla borsa per le mancie, le
quali teme o che sieno eccessive, ovver che sieno al di sotto della
convenienza o dell’uso. Imponete a lui pure una tassa per l’ingresso,
ma pagate voi il cicerone, e liberate noi da ogni fastidio. Dateci
adunque de’ guardiani da voi eletti, obbedienti a doveri, legati a
discipline e noi ci troveremo così a nostro bell’agio.
E così ha fatto appunto il Fiorelli.
Ma perchè non appaja ch’io, in grazia di facili entusiasmi, vegga qui
tutto bello e tutto buono, non lascerò d’additare un non dubbio
inconveniente. Presso a tanto ordine e vigilanza, vicino a tanta
severità e previdenza, non è possibile deplorare l’esistenza d’un
commercio o monopolio che trovate presso gli ingressi — non dirò
delle piccole Guide a stampa, che credo dettate da intelligenti
persone, che sono esatte e bastevoli a dichiarare quanto importa di
conoscere al momento e che formano anzi altro titolo di lode per il
detto signor Fiorelli, da cui furono per avventura rivedute — ma sì
delle copie d’oggetti pompejani e di fotografie di diversi monumenti
della città o di cose artistiche rinvenute, che a voi s’offrono a prezzi
troppo forti e che per la brama di portar con voi un ricordo della
interessante peregrinazione e delle care impressioni vi guardate dal
rifiutare. E fossero almeno le fotografie, che pagaste due lire l’una,
fatte bene; ma no; quando siete a casa vostra vi trovate d’aver nella
pressa acquistato indecenti sgorbj e gettato del denaro in buon dato,
perchè per poco che uomo senta l’amor dell’arte e dell’antico, per
poco che risenta d’interesse nel vedere questa città, rado addiviene
che s’incontri, come a me è accaduto d’udire da un francese che
Pompei non fosse che un tas des briques et des moëllons inutiles, e
che però non comperi una dozzina almeno di vedute fotografate.
Provvegga dunque il commendatore Fiorelli a cacciare codesti
profanatori, od almeno a far bandire codesta vera profanazione dal
suo tempio.
Toltomi dalla coscienza, cui faceva groppo, questo unico appunto,
perocchè a vero dire non si vorrebbe che la bella vostra si potesse
d’una minima nota censurare per chicchessia, seguiamo senz’altro i
passi dell’onesto guardiano, al quale tarda del pari di addentrarci nei
misteri di que’ ruderi solenni e silenziosi.
Nel presentarsi tuttavia subito alla nostra vista una lunga via,
fiancheggiata da case prive di tetto e smantellate, nel vedervi
crocicchi, nello scorgere la estesa massa dei fabbricati già scoperti,
vinta appena la sorpresa dolorosa che di voi si è impadronita avanti
a tanta rovina, voi correte collo sguardo a misurare tutta quanta la
vastità di Pompei, ed a chiedere e come e quando si fosse messo
sulla traccia di una sì grande scoperta e si avesse posto poscia la
mano all’opera così imponente degli scavi
Il Guardiano vi direbbe tutto questo in due parole: voi da me
pretendete di più; io mi cingo pertanto la giornea.
Quando il cataclisma che v’ho narrato fu accaduto, taluno de’
superstiti pompejani, come doveva essere naturale, fe’ ritorno alla
scena del disastro doloroso e per forza d’induzioni avrà cercato
d’indagare dove fosse stato il luogo dei calcidico de’ templi, ove
serravasene il tesoro, la Casa del Questore che, amministrando la
publica pecunia, avrà saputo, al par de’ suoi successori nella
bisogna, pensare un cotal poco anche al proprio gruzzolo; le magioni
dei ricchi ove là anche dovevano esistere di aurei e di sesterzj in
abbondanza e gli arredi preziosi e i muliebri gingilli, vasi murrini,
amuleti d’oro, idoletti e monili, anelli e contigie d’ogni maniera, e
praticandovi fori ed aperture ha procacciato penetrarvi a bottinare.
Così accadde che nelle odierne escavazioni molti luoghi apparissero
già frugati ed espilati, tra cui la summentovata Casa del Questore,
dove nell’atrio vennero bensì trovate, erette sopra uno zoccolo
laterizio incrostato di marmo, due casse di legno foderate di rame e
fasciate di ferramenta ed ornamenti di bronzo, ma non contenevano
che sole quarantacinque monete d’oro e cinque d’argento; mentre
presso i doviziosi pompejani e presso uomo di quell’officio assai e
assai più sarebbesi ripromesso di rinvenire. La fretta e la paura
d’impensati crolli avranno impedito l’intera sottrazione.
Avvenne parimenti in più luoghi di riconoscere infatti come più d’uno
di questi più o meno legittimi cercatori di ricchezze fosse rimasto
schiacciato sotto le rovine che forse profanava, stringendo ancora la
borsa, e i pregevoli effetti che s’era appropriato, vittima della propria
insana cupidigia.
Ma queste indagini per i gravi pericoli cui esponevano o furono
presto abbandonate, così che le sovvenute generazioni smarrirono,
come già dissi, persin le traccie dell’infelice città; o fu vero quel che
trovo scritto dall’architetto Gaspare Vinci, ma che non so da altri
confermato, che «i Pompejani rimasti senza patria ebbero ben
presto a fondarne una seconda non lungi dalla prima. Fabbricarono
delle case, sul principio pe’ soli agricoltori, quindi si formò un
villaggio. Questo continuò a denominarsi Pompei: fu abitato per
molto tempo: ma in fine altra catastrofe, simile a quella che aveva
estinta l’antica Pompei, fece cessare per sempre anche la
nuova» [105].
Toccai già come molti additassero essere stata Pompei là dove
sorse di poi Torre dell’Annunziata, che pare invece abbia occupato
l’area di Oplonte; or dirò com’altri la collocassero nel sito di Scafati
sulla moderna riva del Sarno, tratti appunto in inganno da ciò che si
sapesse avere un tal fiume lambito il piede alla sventurata città, e
quelli pure, come il Capaccio e il Pellegrino, che si mostravano edotti
dell’esistenza di rovine nel luogo appellato Civita, le scambiassero
per quelle di Taurania, mentre fossero precisamente di Pompei.
I posteri adunque l’avevano, come già dissi, interamente
dimenticata; la popolare tradizione, che sì sovente ripara l’obblio e
l’ignoranza delle età, non l’aveva tenuta meritevole pur d’un ricordo!
Ma fu vero che anche questa parte d’Italia venisse crudelmente
profanata, istupidita e tiranneggiata dalla barbarie straniera. Goti e
Visigoti, Longobardi e Franchi, Svevi ed Angioini, Aragonesi e
Francesi e vie via una colluvie d’invasori l’avevano corsa e ricorsa e
se l’erano disputata: chi ne avrebbe pensato, allorchè in forse erasi
sempre della vita e degli averi?
I primi indizj che s’ebbero della sepolta Pompei rimontano a’ tempi di
Alfonso I re di Napoli e forse intorno all’anno 1592. Un Nicola di
Alagni, conte di Sarno, volendo condurre un acquidotto, traendo
l’acqua dal fiumicello pompejano fino a Torre dell’Annunziata, faceva
scavare in certa località, quando l’architetto Domenico Fontana a un
tratto si vide tra le pareti di un tempio, che poi si riconobbe d’Iside e
trovò case, cripte, portici ed altri monumenti. Là si riscontrano
tuttavia spiragli del Sarno che vi trascorre sotto. Contuttociò non fu
ancora sufficiente ammonimento a designare le rovine della città di
Pompei, nè eccitamento a proseguire nell’opera della scoperta.
Perocchè monsignor Francesco Bianchini, nella sua Storia

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The Palgrave Handbook of Digital

Russia Studies 1st ed. Edition Daria

ISBN 978-3-030-42854-9 ISBN 978-3-030-42855-6 (eBook)

Cover illustration: FrankRamspott / gettyimages

Helsinki, Finland Daria Gritsenko

1 Digital Russia Studies: An Introduction 1

Part I Studying Digital Russia 13

2 The Digitalization of Russian Politics and

3 E-Government in Russia: Plans, Reality, and Future Outlook 33

4 Russia’s Digital Economy Program: An Effective

5 Law and Digitization in Russia 77

6 Personal Data Protection in Russia 95

7 Cybercrime and Punishment: Security, Information War,

8 Digital Activism in Russia: The Evolution and Forms of

9 Digital Journalism: Toward a Theory of Journalistic Practice

10 Digitalization of Russian Education: Changing Actors and

11 Digitalization of Religion in Russia: Adjusting Preaching to

12 Doing Gender Online: Digital Spaces for Identity Politics205

13 Digitalization of Consumption in Russia: Online Platforms,

14 Digital Art: A Sourcebook of Ideas for Conceptualizing New

15 From Samizdat to New Sincerity. Digital Literature on the

16 Run Runet Runaway: The Transformation of the Russian

Part II Digital Sources and Methods 297

17 Corpora in Text-Based Russian Studies299

18 RuThes Thesaurus for Natural Language Processing319

19 Social Media-based Research of Interpersonal and Group

20 Digitizing Archives in Russia: Epistemic Sovereignty and Its

21 Affordances of Digital Archives: The Case of the Prozhito

22 Open Government Data in Russia389

23 Topic Modeling in Russia: Current Approaches and Issues in

24 Topic Modeling Russian History427

25 Studying Ideational Change in Russian Politics with Topic

26 Deep Learning for the Russian Language465

27 Shifting the Norm: The Case of Academic Plagiarism

28 Automatic Sentiment Analysis of Texts: The Case of Russian501

29 Social Network Analysis in Russian Literary Studies517

30 Tweeting Russian Politics: Studying Online Political

31 The State of the Art: Surveying Digital Russian Art History569

32 Geospatial Data Analysis in Russia’s Geoweb585

Olga Andreevskikh is a PhD candidate at the University of Leeds, UK. Her

Galina Gurova is a researcher at the SKOLKOVO Education Development

Olessia Koltsova is an associate professor at the Department of Sociology of

sustainability. Her current project concerns wearable technology, particularly

Propaganda (Transcript Verlag, 2011, in German). She is a co-editor of

and Central European New Media (digitalicons.org). She is the author of

Table 4.1 Main indicators of the national program “Digital Economy of

Table 29.1 Number of co-occurrences of characters in A. Ostrovsky’s Groza

Digital Russia Studies: An Introduction

Daria Gritsenko, Mikhail Kopotev, and Mariëlle Wijermars

1.1 Area Studies Go Digital

The names of the authors are given in alphabetical order.

© The Author(s) 2021 1

development of today’s digital society. The Russian information technologies

backsliding, the rise of populism, the return of economic protectionism and

1.2 Studying Digital Russia

given a great impetus to innovation of the arts, as Strukov demonstrates in

The federal government runs various programs to support digitalization

1.3 Digital Sources and Methods

regarding their provenance, objectivity, and affordances, and the complex

events to demonstrate how network analysis enables an alternative approach to

1.4 Concluding Remarks

Studying Digital Russia

The Digitalization of Russian Politics

Helsinki, Finland Daria Gritsenko

1 Digital Russia Studies: An Introduction 1

Part I Studying Digital Russia 13

2 The Digitalization of Russian Politics and

3 E-Government in Russia: Plans, Reality, and Future Outlook 33

4 Russia’s Digital Economy Program: An Effective

5 Law and Digitization in Russia 77

6 Personal Data Protection in Russia 95

7 Cybercrime and Punishment: Security, Information War,

8 Digital Activism in Russia: The Evolution and Forms of

9 Digital Journalism: Toward a Theory of Journalistic Practice

10 Digitalization of Russian Education: Changing Actors and

11 Digitalization of Religion in Russia: Adjusting Preaching to

12 Doing Gender Online: Digital Spaces for Identity Politics205

13 Digitalization of Consumption in Russia: Online Platforms,

14 Digital Art: A Sourcebook of Ideas for Conceptualizing New

15 From Samizdat to New Sincerity. Digital Literature on the

16 Run Runet Runaway: The Transformation of the Russian

Part II Digital Sources and Methods 297

17 Corpora in Text-Based Russian Studies299

18 RuThes Thesaurus for Natural Language Processing319

19 Social Media-based Research of Interpersonal and Group

20 Digitizing Archives in Russia: Epistemic Sovereignty and Its

21 Affordances of Digital Archives: The Case of the Prozhito

22 Open Government Data in Russia389

23 Topic Modeling in Russia: Current Approaches and Issues in

24 Topic Modeling Russian History427

25 Studying Ideational Change in Russian Politics with Topic

26 Deep Learning for the Russian Language465

27 Shifting the Norm: The Case of Academic Plagiarism

28 Automatic Sentiment Analysis of Texts: The Case of Russian501

29 Social Network Analysis in Russian Literary Studies517

30 Tweeting Russian Politics: Studying Online Political

31 The State of the Art: Surveying Digital Russian Art History569

32 Geospatial Data Analysis in Russia’s Geoweb585