The Palgrave Handbook of Toleration

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Mitja Sardoč
Editor

The Palgrave
Handbook of
Toleration
The Palgrave Handbook of Toleration
Mitja Sardoč
Editor

The Palgrave Handbook of

Toleration
Editor
Mitja Sardoč
Educational Research Institute
Ljubljana, Slovenia

ISBN 978-3-030-42120-5 ISBN 978-3-030-42121-2 (eBook)

ISBN 978-3-030-42122-9 (print and electronic bundle)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42121-2
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Preface

“The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition,” as

Alfred North Whitehead accentuated in Process and Reality (based on his Gifford
Lectures Delivered in the University of Edinburgh During the Session 1927–28) “is
that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato” (1978, p. 39). If one would follow
Whitehead’s footsteps, contemporary discussions of toleration might best be
depicted as didaskalia to the writings of John Locke. Seminal intellectual figures
such as Plato and Locke alongside other luminaries from the philosophical tradition
provide us with a (giant’s) shoulder on which to stand on, while grappling with
whatever the task of scholarly research one is focusing on.
As a repository of knowledge on a particular topic, reference works including
encyclopedias, handbooks, and companions provide another such shoulder on which
to stand upon. Yet, the main goal of this publishing project is not only one of
customary purpose reference work has been usually associated with. Ultimately,
any author or editor has its own overall plan on how the volume one is either writing
or editing should turn out at the end. For example, Ian Fleming supposedly wrote
Casino Royale, the first of a series of novels on what turned out to be the global
franchise of James Bond, to end all spy stories. This reference work obviously does
not point in this direction.
The overall aim of this handbook has been to bring together a set of contributions
presenting some of the most distinctive, complex, and controversial aspects associ-
ated with the idea of toleration. Interestingly enough, there are plenty of these issues
around, making the navigation in this area of scholarly research particularly
distressing. Its ambivalent character and its enigmatic nature together with its
allegedly exotic origins and complex legacy are just some of the character traits
toleration has been associated with. The immediate impulse one encounters when
faced with the scholarly literature on toleration would most probably resemble
Winston Churchill’s puzzling observation summed up in the parable of “a riddle
wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.” This handbook therefore aims to provide a
conceptual cartography that would enable anyone making use of it a safe journey
through the many tumultuous issues this area of scholarly research is replete with.
In contrast to some of the other concepts from the pantheon of political ideas,
toleration has been graced with a number of monographs, articles, journal special
issues, and edited collections that have popped up around the globe. Nevertheless,

v
vi Preface

despite a steady supply of scholarly output, no reference work on toleration has been
available to this date. This publishing project aims to fill this gap in the academic
market by bringing together more than 50 chapters by leading academics in this area
of scholarly research on some of the most pressing and timely issues toleration has
been associated with.
Like any scholarly publication, this reference work has its fair share of lost
opportunities. They would have been much more numerous if it wouldn’t be for
the editorial team at Palgrave. In particular, I would like to thank Ambra Finotello,
senior commissioning editor in politics at Palgrave, and Michael Hermann, chief
editor of the MRW series at Springer, for supporting the idea of this handbook and
for helping out in the transition from “book proposal” to “book contract” for this
publishing project (usually a distressing period for any author or volume editor). My
most profound thanks go to Eleanor Gaffney, editor at Palgrave, for her superb
editorial skills, patience, care, and dedication to this handbook. Any author or
volume editor could not find better editorial cooperation than Eleanor has provided
both to me as volume editor and, I believe, to each of the contributors to this
handbook.
Last but not least, I would like to dedicate this handbook to my wife Mojca and
our two sons, Žiga and Jakob. It is in their company that the idea for this handbook
arose during a summer holiday back in 2018 on the island of Mljet in Croatia.
Perhaps more than anyone else, they exemplify a form of “liberal expectancy” the
idea of toleration has been associated with. Describing the many nuances of their
toleration (alongside their unfailing support and encouragement) would take another
volume to straight out.

September 2021 Mitja Sardoč

References

Whitehead N (1978 [1929]) Process and reality (Gifford lectures delivered in the
University of Edinburgh during the session 1927–28). Free Press, New York
Contents

Volume 1

1 The Trouble with Toleration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Mitja Sardoč
2 Toleration: Concept and Conceptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Rainer Forst
3 Defining Toleration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Andrew Jason Cohen
4 What Toleration Is Not . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
David Heyd
5 Toleration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Anna Elisabetta Galeotti
6 Paradoxes of Toleration ................................. 93
Peter Königs
7 The Epistemic Justification for Tolerance ................... 109
Joshua C. Thurow
8 Political Toleration Explained . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
Peter Balint
9 Toleration, Respect for Persons, and the Free Speech
Right to Do Moral Wrong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
Kristian Skagen Ekeli
10 Toleration and Political Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
Lucia M. Rafanelli
11 Toleration and the Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
Stijn Smet
12 Toleration and Domination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
Monica Mookherjee

vii
viii Contents

13 State Responses to Incongruence: Toleration and

Transformation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
Paul Billingham
14 Toleration and State Neutrality: The Case of Symbolic FGM . . . . 249
Federico Zuolo
15 Toleration of Moral Offense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263
Thomas E. Hill Jr
16 Moralism and Anti-Moralism in Theories of Toleration ........ 277
John Christian Laursen and Zachary Dorson
17 Toleration and Neutrality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299
Peter Jones
18 Political Toleration as Substantive Neutrality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325
Bryan T. McGraw
19 Conscientious Exemptions: Between Toleration, Neutrality, and
Respect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341
Yossi Nehushtan
20 Toleration and Its Possibilities: Relativism, Skepticism, and
Pluralism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363
John William Tate
21 Toleration, Reasonableness, and Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 397
Thomas M. Besch and Jung-Sook Lee
22 Toleration and Reasonableness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 419
Roberta Sala
23 International Toleration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 439
Pietro Maffettone
24 Toleration and Tolerance in a Global Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 455
Vicki A. Spencer
25 Two Models of Toleration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 477
Will Kymlicka
26 Modus Vivendi Toleration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 499
Manon Westphal
27 Multiculturalism and Toleration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 519
Sune Lægaard
28 Recognition and Toleration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 541
Cillian McBride
29 Toleration and Dignity .................................. 563
Colin Bird
Contents ix

30 Toleration and Respect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 583

John William Tate

Volume 2

31 Toleration and Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 615

Fabio Macioce
32 The Logic of Intolerance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 635
Richard Dees
33 Intolerance and Populism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 653
Nenad Miščević
34 Fear and Toleration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 673
Robert Paul Churchill
35 Toleration, “Mindsight” and the Epistemic Virtues . . . . . . . . . . . . 699
Colin Farrelly
36 Tough on Tolerance: The Vice of Virtue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 719
Thomas Nys and Bart Engelen
37 Toleration and Close Personal Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 737
Michael Kühler
38 Hospitality and Toleration ............................... 757
Andrew Fiala
39 Toleration and Compassion: A Conceptual Comparison . . . . . . . . 777
Yossi Nehushtan and Emily Prince
40 Toleration and Religion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 797
John William Tate
41 Toleration and Religious Discrimination .................... 827
Andrew Shorten
42 Religious Toleration and Social Contract Theories of Justice .... 853
Phillip J. Donnelly
43 Toleration and the Protestant Tradition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873
Manfred Svensson
44 Atheist Toleration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887
Charles Devellennes
45 Toleration and the Right to Freedom of Religion in Education . . . 905
Zdenko Kodelja
46 Education and Toleration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925
Johannes Drerup
x Contents

47 Toleration, Liberal Education, and the Accommodation

of Diversity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951
Ole Henrik Borchgrevink Hansen
48 Toleration Before Toleration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969
Cary J. Nederman
49 Early Modern Arguments for Toleration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993
Andrew R. Murphy
50 Thomas Hobbes and the Conditionality of Toleration . . . . . . . . . . 1009
J. Judd Owen
51 John Locke and Religious Toleration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023
John William Tate
52 “Stop Being So Judgmental!”: A Spinozist Model of Personal
Tolerance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077
Justin Steinberg
53 Toleration and Liberty of Conscience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095
Jon Mahoney
54 Tolerating Racism and Hate Speech: A Critique of
C.E. Baker’s “Almost” Absolutism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115
Raphael Cohen-Almagor
55 Toleration of Free Speech: Imposing Limits on Elected
Officials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1139
Amos N. Guiora
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
About the Editor

Mitja Sardoč (PhD) is senior research associate at the

Educational Research Institute in Ljubljana (Slovenia).
His research interests and expertise include philosophy
of education, political philosophy, and education policy.
Over the last two decades he has been member of
several (national and international) research projects on
multiculturalism, diversity, equality of opportunity,
patriotism, citizenship education, etc. During the last
few years, his research interest has moved to some of
the conceptual and policy-oriented issues associated
with radicalization, violent extremism, and conflicting
diversity. Between 2018 and 2021, he carried out a
research project “Radicalisation and Violent Extremism:
Philosophical, Sociological and Educational Perspective
(s)” funded by the Slovenian Research Agency as part of
its “basic research projects” program (the most selective
research funding scheme for basic research in Slovenia).
He is author of more than 40 scholarly articles and editor
of a number of journal special issues on radicalization
and violent extremism, citizenship education, multicul-
turalism, toleration, the American Dream, equality of
opportunity, and patriotism. He acted as an expert for
various research initiatives including the Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the
Council of Europe, and the Slovene Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. He also carried out consultancy work for other
international institutions (e.g., Cardiff University,
ODIHR). He is Managing Editor of Theory and
Research in Education (http://tre.sagepub.com/), Editor-
in-Chief of The Handbook of Patriotism, and editor of
The Impacts of Neoliberal Discourse and Language in
Education published by Routledge. Between September
and December 2019, he was a visiting fellow at the
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the
xi
xii About the Editor

European University Institute in Florence (Italy). Addi-

tional information (including the list of publications) is
available at the website: https://www.researchgate.net/
profile/Mitja_Sardoc
Contributors

Peter Balint School of Humanities and Social Sciences, UNSW Canberra, Can-
berra, ACT, Australia
Thomas M. Besch School of Philosophy, Wuhan University, Wuhan, Hubei, China
Department of Philosophy, The University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia
Paul Billingham Department of Politics and International Relations and Magdalen
College, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
Colin Bird Department of Politics, Program in Political Philosophy, Policy, and
Law, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA, USA
Robert Paul Churchill Department of Philosophy, George Washington University,
Westminster, MD, USA
Andrew Jason Cohen Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA, USA
Raphael Cohen-Almagor University of Hull, Hull, UK
Richard Dees University of Rochester, Rochester, NY, USA
Charles Devellennes University of Kent, Canterbury, UK
Phillip J. Donnelly Baylor University, Waco, TX, USA
Zachary Dorson University of California, Riverside, Riverside, CA, USA
Johannes Drerup Technische Universität Dortmund, Dortmund, Germany
Kristian Skagen Ekeli University of Stavanger, Stavanger, Norway
Bart Engelen Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Colin Farrelly Queen’s University, Kingston, Canada
Andrew Fiala Department of Philosophy, California State University, Fresno, CA,
USA
Rainer Forst Goethe University, Normative Orders Research Centre, Frankfurt/
Main, Germany

xiii
xiv Contributors

Anna Elisabetta Galeotti Università del Piemonte Orientale, Vercelli, Italy

Amos N. Guiora S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah, Salt Lake City,
UT, USA
Ole Henrik Borchgrevink Hansen Ostfold University College, School of Educa-
tion, Ostfold, Norway
David Heyd The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel
Thomas E. Hill Jr Department of Philosophy, University of North Carolina,
Chapel Hill, NC, USA
Peter Jones Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK
Zdenko Kodelja Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana, Slovenia
Peter Königs Human Technology Center, Applied Ethics, RWTH Aachen Univer-
sity, Aachen, Germany
Michael Kühler Department of Philosophy, University of Münster, Münster, Germany
Will Kymlicka Department of Philosophy, Queen’s University, Kingston, ON,
Canada
Sune Lægaard Department of Communication and Arts, Roskilde University,
Roskilde, Denmark
John Christian Laursen University of California, Riverside, Riverside, CA, USA
Jung-Sook Lee School of Social Sciences, UNSW Sydney, Sydney, NSW,
Australia
Fabio Macioce Law School, Lumsa University, Rome, Italy
Pietro Maffettone Political Science Department, University of Napoli, Federico II,
Naples, Italy
Jon Mahoney Department of Philosophy, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS,
USA
Cillian McBride Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast, UK
Bryan T. McGraw Wheaton College, Wheaton, IL, USA
Nenad Miščević University of Maribor, Maribor, Slovenia
Monica Mookherjee School of Social, Political and Global Studies, Keele Uni-
versity, Stoke-on-Trent, Staffordshire, UK
Andrew R. Murphy Department of Political Science, Virginia Commonwealth
University, Richmond, VA, USA
Cary J. Nederman Department of Political Science, Texas A&M University,
College Station, TX, USA
Contributors xv

Yossi Nehushtan Keele University, Newcastle-Under-Lyme, UK

Thomas Nys University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
J. Judd Owen Department of Political Science, Emory University, Atlanta, GA,
USA
Emily Prince University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK
Lucia M. Rafanelli The George Washington University, Washington, DC, USA
Roberta Sala Faculty of Philosophy, Vita-Salute San Raffaele University, Milan,
Italy
Mitja Sardoč Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana, Slovenia
Andrew Shorten Department of Politics and Public Administration, University of
Limerick, Limerick, Ireland
Stijn Smet Faculty of Law, Hasselt University, Hasselt, Belgium
Vicki A. Spencer Politics, School of Social Sciences, University of Otago, Dune-
din, New Zealand
Justin Steinberg Brooklyn College and CUNY Graduate Center, New York, NY,
USA
Manfred Svensson Department of Philosophy, Universidad de los Andes, Santi-
ago, Chile
John William Tate Discipline of Politics and International Relations, Newcastle
Business School, College of Human and Social Futures, University of Newcastle,
Newcastle, NSW, Australia
Joshua C. Thurow University of Texas at San Antonio, San Antonio, TX, USA
Manon Westphal Institute of Political Science, University of Münster, Münster,
Germany
Federico Zuolo Department of Classics, Philosophy and History, University of
Genova, Genova, Italy
The Trouble with Toleration
1
Mitja Sardoč

Contents
Introduction: The Language of Toleration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Summary and Future Directions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Abstract
Both historically and conceptually, toleration has been one of the foundational
characteristics that define the very essence of a plurally diverse polity and the
basic virtue associated with a liberal conception of citizenship. Despite its
central role in contemporary political thought, toleration remains subject to
various controversies and disagreements stemming from the many paradoxes,
dilemmas, and puzzles associated with it. This chapter identifies some of the
distinguishing features of contemporary discussions about toleration as well as
elucidates the most pressing and challenging controversies these discussions
have been focusing on.

Keywords
Toleration · Diversity · Liberalism · Pluralism · Limits of toleration · Justification
of toleration · Critique of toleration

M. Sardoč (*)
Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana, Slovenia
e-mail: mitja.sardoc@guest.arnes.si

© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 1

M. Sardoč (ed.), The Palgrave Handbook of Toleration,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42121-2_17
2 M. Sardoč

Introduction: The Language of Toleration

As a community of ideas, the pantheon of political concepts has been replete with a
variety of problems, challenges, and other conceptual “mishaps” that make the
analysis of almost any of its members far more devious than originally envisaged.
Alongside ambiguity and confusion, perhaps the most “stable” companions of any
conceptual analysis (and the associated disputes), some of the most well-known
political concepts are plagued by very peculiar problems and challenges. If being an
essentially contested concept is now a household challenge most of the concepts are
faced with (Gallie 1955), others are far less straightforward. For example, the
“traveling” of a particular concept has been identified as an interesting phenomenon
in political science (Sartori 1970). Equality of opportunity and responsibility are just
two of the most representative examples of this phenomenon.
Another frequent conceptual “mishap” associated with the “travelling problem”
(Sartori 1970) has taken up the form of conceptual stretching. Interestingly enough,
writing more than a century apart, the French political scientist Alexis de Tocqueville
and the British historian of ideas Isaiah Berlin pointed to this interesting phenom-
enon that seems to dominate our contemporary discussions. In Book II of Democ-
racy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville emphasized eloquently that “[a]n abstract
word is like a box with a false bottom: you can put in any ideas you please and take
them out again without anyone being the wiser” (de Tocqueville 2000, p. 553). In a
similar vein, Isaiah Berlin’s essay “Two Concepts of Liberty” points to a vexing
problem plaguing the idea of liberty, “[l]ike happiness and goodness, like nature and
reality, the meaning of this term is so porous that there is little interpretation that it
seems able to resist” (Berlin 2002, p. 181).
At the same time, several concepts face the challenge stemming from the absence
of a fixed definition. Interestingly enough, this has had important repercussions
outside the “ideal” world of conceptual analysis. A leading example of this challenge
has been the lack of a fixed definition of terrorism that has become a sort of
trademark of the “War on Terror.” As Stephen Nathanson emphasizes, “[c]larity is
not everyone’s goal, however, because confusion can be politically useful”
(Nathanson 2010, p. 20).
Several concepts face another challenging problem. Although the slogan “we
recognize violence when we see it” (Bufacchi 2009, p. 293) unequivocally illustrates
all the brutality of its consequences, the concept of violence is neither simple nor
unproblematic. Due to the sensitive nature of phenomena it may be associated with
there is a sort of urgency in having it addressed in a comprehensive manner. Given
the fact that it may refer to phenomena as diverse as physical violence, cyber
violence, mobbing, domestic violence, bullying, sexual violence, violent [political]
extremism, as well as structural violence, symbolic violence, cultural violence, etc.,
the concept of violence needs to be flexible enough to incorporate all its aberrations.
Nevertheless, having it open to as wide a definition as possible, we may ultimately
end up with a sort of conceptual inflation. Violence as well as racism are just two of
the examples where this problem is of particular salience (Bufacchi 2007; Miles and
Brown 1989).
1 The Trouble with Toleration 3

Among the most unlikely of the conceptual “mishaps” one may encounter has
been the one “identified” by Alasdair MacIntyre in his book After Virtue. As he
accentuates, “rights do not exist as such and to believe in them is similar to believing
in witches and unicorns” (MacIntyre 2007, p. 69). Surprisingly enough, this is not
the only such example of skeptical “denial” in scholarly research. Radicalization
leading to violent extremism has been another such case where “radicalization
deniers” (Neumann 2003) have expressed skepticism over the very existence of
this phenomenon.
At the same time, the complexity and controversiality of a particular concept
could intuitively also be evaluated by either its convergence with or distance from an
ordinary language definition of it. In fact, concepts and the ideas they are associated
with inhabit not only the pantheon of ideas but have their existence also outside the
scholarly discussions and its codified language. There are different ways of depicting
the relationship between a scholarly definition of a particular concept and its usage in
ordinary language. For some of these concepts, at least on the surface, moving from
one language register to another does not represent any major problem. For example,
in the case of patriotism [where in both cases patriotism means love of patria], there
is almost no difference between its use in ordinary language and its definition in the
scholarly community [what each of these elements may mean is a completely
different endeavor with a set of separate problems].
In contrast, there is a concept where the amplitude between its meaning in the
register of ordinary language and its scholarly definition is far from being negligible.
It is that of toleration. As Andrew Jason Cohen emphasizes, “[o]utside the academic
world of philosophy, the term ‘toleration’ is often used in different ways” (Cohen
2004, p. 70). Nevertheless, on the side of ordinary language, toleration is straight-
forwardly unequivocal. Being tolerant, as Wendy Brown somehow subsumes its
ordinary language usage, “conjures seemliness, propriety, forbearance, magnanim-
ity, cosmopolitanism, universality, and the large view, while those for whom toler-
ance is required take their shape as improper, indecorous, urgent, narrow, particular,
and often ungenerous or at least lacking in perspective” (Brown 2006, p. 178). On
this interpretation, toleration is primarily associated with open-mindedness. As Peter
Jones emphasizes, “‘[t]olerant’, ‘tolerance’, and ‘toleration’ are generally used as
terms of commendation, while ‘intolerant’ and ‘intolerance’ are typically pejorative
terms, but that should not mislead us” (Jones 2013, p. 629).
In contrast, a scholarly definition of toleration is crammed with paradoxes,
puzzles, and dilemmas, with different conditions and circumstances torn apart by
the different conceptions of toleration itself. At the same time, toleration also needs
to be discussed alongside concepts and ideas that are part of its gravitational orbit,
e.g., civility, dignity, coercion, harm, conflict, disagreement, secularism, orthodoxy,
dissent, knowledge, authority, power, domination, trust, restraint, non-interference,
neutrality, fairness, reasonableness, pluralism, autonomy, (mutual) respect, recogni-
tion, and ultimately diversity itself. In fact, one of the most important issues in
discussing a particular concept has been to contextualize it with its immediate
surrounding echoing Firth’s principle of co-occurrence [“You shall know a word
by the company it keeps”] (Firth 1957). This is an important signal for what lies
4 M. Sardoč

ahead for anyone undertaking either the analysis of a particular aspect of toleration
or a comprehensive coverage of this concept.
In fact, the understanding of toleration has never been either simple or straight-
forward. This comes as no surprise since the history of toleration, one might claim
with considerable confidence, has been a history of conflicts. Its long and venerable
history spans across some of the most tumultuous periods of human existence going
all the way back to the ages of discovery, empire, revolution, the extremes, etc.
[to partly paraphrase Eric Hobsbawm’s chronological timeline]. As Rainer Forst
accentuates, “the history and the present of toleration are always at the same time a
history and a present of social struggles” (Forst 2003, p. 2). Furthermore, its “exotic”
origins, its enigmatic nature, and complex character, as well as a contentious legacy
[at least for its critics] have been a major factor in a somehow puzzling response by
almost anyone trying to make sense of out of it.
At the same time, the turn of last decade of the twentieth century has witnessed a
theoretical seismic shift of considerable magnitude that had implications for discus-
sions about toleration. If John Locke’s Epistola de Tolerantia [A Letter on Tolera-
tion] first published in 1689 represents some sort of a “Year One” on the calendar of
“standard” discussions about toleration, several of the events in 1989 have had a
galvanizing effect on discussions about toleration in plurally diverse democracies. In
November of that year, following large-scale demonstrations in East Germany, the
Berlin Wall fell, leading to the collapse of communism throughout Eastern Europe.
This was accompanied by the rise of both xenophobic nationalism and religious
fundamentalism that have fueled several subsequent conflicts. Interestingly enough,
preceding the fall of the Berlin Wall by just a few weeks, three Muslim girls were
suspended in a French public school for wearing the hijab. This was a prelude to the
headscarf controversy [l’affaire du foulard] that remains to this day a landmark event
associated with contemporary discussions about toleration (Laborde 2008).
From then on, toleration remained at the forefront of public interest. Cases such as
the banning of minarets in some European countries, the display of religious
symbols in classrooms, the ban of face covering in public (targeting primarily
Muslim women wearing the burka or the niqab), the “gay cake” controversy, cases
of cultural appropriation, the disrespectful portrayal of religious figures, etc., are
some of the most recent examples where controversies over toleration are at the
center of social and political attention. However, these are just some of the most
visible cases making it either all the way up to the highest levels of judiciary
authority including the US Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights
or to frontline news (in some cases both).
Furthermore, phenomena as diverse as populism on both the “left” and “right” of
the political spectrum (Galston 2018; Müller 2016), the shrinking civic space
(Deželan et al. 2020), hate speech (Waldron 2012), fake news [including its various
“alternatives,” e.g., misinformation, distorted facts, etc.], extremist political move-
ments, “moral panic” and conflicting diversity including radicalization (Sardoč et al.
2021) and violent extremism (Cassam 2021) have also had an important influence on
theorizing about toleration. These illiberal forms of authoritarianism are part of the
“global authoritarian pushback against democracy and human rights” that has been
associated with a global phenomenon of “reverse transitions” (Buyse 2018).
1 The Trouble with Toleration 5

At the same time, the dominance of the standard liberal conception of civic
equality and its uniform treatment approach towards cultural diversity was chal-
lenged initially by a handful of scholars arguing that this conception of civic equality
failed to recognize the legitimate interest of ethno-cultural groups in a stable cultural
context and lacked the means to compensate adequately for individuals’ unequal
circumstances (e.g., Kymlicka 1989; Spinner-Halev 1994; Taylor 1997 [1992];
Young 1990). Moreover, they also argued that the standard liberal conception of
toleration as non-interference did not sufficiently protect the interests of culturally
disadvantaged groups, including national minorities, immigrants, and indigenous
peoples. On this interpretation, toleration is inconsistent with a commitment to civic
equality and a requirement of fairness.
From then on, discussions about toleration (and related issues) have been
all but anemic. It therefore comes as no surprise that there has been a steady
supply of research monographs (e.g., Balint 2017; Bejan 2017), edited collec-
tions (e.g., Drerup and Schweiger 2021; Först 2020), and scholarly articles
(e.g., Galeotti 2021; Konigs) addressing these and other phenomena previ-
ously thought to be either at the fringes of scholarly interest on toleration or
settled for good. In fact, time and again, toleration comes to the forefront as a
framework most adequate to makes sense out of the various conflicts, disputes,
and other pressing issues.
The events and theoretical developments explicated above have had a decisive
influence on subsequent discussions about toleration and have actually contributed
to some sort of a renaissance of theorizing over toleration. As “one of the defining
topics in political philosophy” (Williams and Waldron 2008, p. 1), toleration remains
to this day one of the concepts whose complexity and controversiality can hardly be
matched. In fact, both historically and conceptually toleration has been replete with
problems, challenges, and paradoxes, few, if any of the other concepts from the
pantheon of political ideas are entrusted with.
In particular, the complexity of the foundations, nature and value of toleration and
the controversiality of the status, the justification and the limits of what is to be
tolerated, raise a number of questions over the basis of toleration in a plurally diverse
polity. As the existing literature on this topic clearly exemplifies (e.g., Brown
2014; McKinnon and Castiglione 2003a; Dees 2004; Deveaux 2000; Galeotti
2002; Heyd 1996; Kukathas 2003; McKinnon 2006; Mendus 1989; Newey 1999;
Parekh 2000; Rawls 1993; Sardoč 2010; Sardoč 2013; Scanlon 2003; Spencer
2017; Taylor 1997 [1992]; Walzer 1997; Williams and Waldron 2008), the persis-
tence of moral and conceptual objections against toleration confirm that a number of
issues associated with the toleration-based approach to diversity remain contested.
For example, toleration is not a universal strategy for each and every conflict we
may encounter. Toleration has been a strategy for managing only peculiar conflicts,
as conceptual discussions about the conditions of toleration make clear. As Rainer
Forst emphasizes eloquently, “toleration is an attitude or practice which is only
called for within social conflicts of a certain kind” (2003, p. 1). It therefore remains a
contested issue what represents a genuine object of toleration. In particular, the
“inflatory use of toleration” (Ceva 2015, p. 633) may ultimately endanger its overall
coherence.
6 M. Sardoč

This, in turn, opens a set of challenges associated with the limits of toleration.
There is an important distinction that needs to be made between the logical and the
moral dimension of the limits of toleration. The logical dimension delineates the
conditions a particular act needs to fulfill in order to qualify as an act of toleration.
For example, liberal and multicultural conceptions of the logical dimension of the
limits of toleration differ primarily over what counts as a relevant object of tolera-
tion. As has already been emphasized, toleration traditionally dealt with religious
and moral conflicts. In contrast, a multicultural conception of toleration can also be
directed at identities and not only religious beliefs or other conscience-based com-
mitments of individuals. The logical dimension of the limits of toleration is therefore
linked to the status as well as the nature of the object of toleration.
In contrast, the moral dimension of the limits of toleration addresses the problem
of which differences should be tolerated and what are the principled bases delineat-
ing the limits of toleration. The moral dimension defines the situation where the
reasons for the rejection of certain beliefs, practices, or conceptions of the good are
stronger than the reasons for their adoption. The moral dimension determines how
far the limits of toleration are to be extended. As Rainer Först emphasizes,

The distinctive feature is that tolerance does not resolve, but merely contains and defuses, the
dispute in which it is invoked; the clash of convictions, interests or practices remains, though
certain considerations mean that it loses its destructiveness. (Först 2003, p. 1)

While both classical and contemporary proponents of toleration argued succinctly

for its necessity for the maintenance of a stable and a peaceful political community, its
status, its justification, and the limits of what is to be tolerated remain largely contested.
At the heart of these controversies lie a number of conceptual and moral problems
stemming from the many concepts and ideas that are part of its gravitational orbit,
e.g., civility, dignity, coercion, harm, power, conflict, disagreement, secularism,
orthodoxy, dissent, knowledge, authority, domination, trust, restraint,
non-interference, neutrality, fairness, pluralism, autonomy, (mutual) respect,
recognition, etc. Moreover, the use and application of toleration has also been
questioned as it might represent a form of “liberal expectancy” (Rosenblum 1998,
pp. 53–57). This strategy is based on the assumption that toleration will gradually
exert a gravitational influence by attracting towards the toleration that what is being
tolerated. As Sanford Levinson emphasized, toleration of diversity includes the
expectancy that “exposure to diverse beliefs and ways of life over time will shift
the tolerated’s view towards those of the tolerator” (Levinson 2003, pp. 91–92).
Liberals hope and expect, writes Will Kymlicka, “that ethnic, religious, and cultural
associations will, over time, voluntarily adjust their practices and beliefs to bring
them more in line with the public principles of liberalism, which will reduce the
‘incongruence’ between associational norms and liberal principles” (Kymlicka
2002, p. 103). Similarly, as Jürgen Habermas emphasizes eloquently,

[t]he liberal state expects that the religious consciousness of the faithful will become
modernized by way of a cognitive adaptation to the individualistic and egalitarian nature
of the laws of the secular community. (Habermas 2003, p. 6)
1 The Trouble with Toleration 7

On this interpretation, toleration would most likely appear as an extension of the

classical “formula” advanced by von Clausewitz where war functions as “the
continuation of politics by other means.” To extend the interpretation further, as an
instrument of liberal governance (Brown 2006), toleration would appear as the
continuation of war by other means or as some sort of a liberal “Trojan horse”
aimed to “colonize” either illiberal or non-liberal communities as some of its critics
might argue (Žižek 2008).
It therefore comes as no surprise that despite its political relevance and theoretical
import, toleration has found itself in crossfire between the different positions from
the political spectrum as its use and application found its way also on the “minefield”
of the “War on Terror.” For example, toleration has been defined one of the central
values aimed to tackle radicalization and violent extremism in a flagship anti-
radicalization program that is part of the Prevent strategy by the UK government.
As Awan et al. emphasize, “[t]he UK government has defined extremism as the
‘vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the
rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and
beliefs’” (Awan et al. 2019, p. 10). Here toleration functions primarily as a civiliza-
tional discourse (Brown 2006). On this interpretation, toleration appears also as an
ideological category as issues as diverse as inequality, exploitation, domination, and
discrimination have been recast as problems of toleration. “The language of tolera-
tion in liberal democracies,” writes Glen Newey, “is vulnerable to political manip-
ulation and that theories that ignore this fact risk becoming, in the pejorative sense,
ideological” (Newey 2013, p. 3).
Interestingly enough, the language of toleration has also found its way into the
moralizing rhetoric of zero tolerance by becoming a slogan used by public author-
ities to tackle problems as diverse as violence, drugs, sexual harassment, corruption,
etc. As Catriona McKinnon and Dario Castiglione accentuate, “zero tolerance”
stands as a slogan “for a less forgiving society” (2003, p. 1). For example, the
shift of emphasis here is that the foundational question of toleration, i.e., “what are
the limits of toleration” becomes redundant as zero toleration means that any
phenomenon identified as the one that is to be tackled, for example, violence or
corruption, is equally unacceptable as any other. This opens a range of separate
problems with important conceptual and empirical challenges. As Glen Newey
emphasizes, “[t]he political rhetoric of ‘zero tolerance’ provides an expression
of this way of thinking, which subverts toleration by appropriating its vocabulary
of commendation” (2013, p. 46).

Summary and Future Directions

The main challenge discussions about toleration face is therefore not one of direct
criticism addressed in the form of objections but primarily in a range of multitude of
shortcomings that might hamper our understanding of toleration in all its complexity.
On the one hand, discussions about toleration somehow fail to acknowledge that
there is a continuing import of paradoxes, dilemmas, and other conceptual
8 M. Sardoč

“mishaps.” On the other hand, most often when toleration is being discussed, its
civilizational import is oftentimes neglected. As Michael Walzer rightly emphasizes,

[t]oleration itself is often underestimated, as if it is the least we can do for our fellows, the
most minimal of their entitlements. In fact, [. . .] even the most grudging forms and
precarious arrangements [of toleration] are very good things, sufficiently rare in human
history that they require not only practical but also theoretical appreciation. (Walzer 1997,
p. xi)

Looking for alternatives for those interested in going beyond toleration would
remain at its most productive when its acknowledgment – whatever its faults may
be – will be rightly acknowledged. Its continuing relevance is ultimately an impor-
tant reminder not only of the basic civilizational commitment to “live and let live”
but one perhaps much more challenging. The trouble with toleration, as Glen Newey
accentuated in his Epilogue to Toleration in Political Conflict, “is not just about
living with a threatening other, but about living with ourselves” (2013, p. 209).

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Toleration: Concept and Conceptions
2
Rainer Forst

Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
The Concept of Toleration and Its Paradoxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Four Conceptions of Toleration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Summary and Future Directions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Cross-References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Abstract
In order to do justice to the multiple interpretations of the term toleration, it is
useful to distinguish a core concept of toleration from different conceptions of it.
Four such conceptions can be defined, each involving different ways to relate to
others with whom one disagrees. In addition, toleration should be understood as a
normatively dependent concept, i.e., one which must be combined with justifica-
tions that stem from other normative sources.

Keywords
Coexistence · Concept of toleration · Justification · Paradoxes of toleration ·
Permission · Respect

Introduction

The term “toleration” is used in many ways and with very different evaluations,
ranging from very positive to extremely negative ones (Forst 2013; Newey 2013).
For some, it marks an ideal of pluralist cooperation and mutual esteem, and for

R. Forst (*)
Goethe University, Normative Orders Research Centre, Frankfurt/Main, Germany
e-mail: forst@em.uni-frankfurt.de

© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 11

M. Sardoč (ed.), The Palgrave Handbook of Toleration,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42121-2_11
12 R. Forst

others, a hierarchical form of domination and stigmatization. Therefore, one might

be led to assume that there is not just one but many conflicting concepts of toleration,
in the sense that Isaiah Berlin (1969) spoke of “two concepts of liberty.” However,
this assumption is problematic. For, if these usages are to count as understandings of
toleration, they must share a core meaning, and this core is the concept of toleration.
Important differences reside in how this core gets elaborated, thus constituting
different conceptions of toleration, which, furthermore, are associated with different
justifications for toleration. Following John Rawls’s (1999, p. 5) proposal (apropos
the concept of justice), a “concept” includes the central semantic contents of the
term, whereas “conceptions” are specific interpretations of the elements contained
within the general concept.

The Concept of Toleration and Its Paradoxes

The core concept of toleration is defined by three components, each of which is

connected with a particular paradox.

1. Of primary importance for the concept of toleration is the fact that the tolerated
convictions or practices are regarded as false or condemned as bad; following
Preston King (1976, pp. 44–51), this can be described as the objection compo-
nent. Without this component, one would not speak of toleration but instead
either of indifference (the absence of a negative or positive valuation) or of
affirmation (the presence of a positive valuation). Although these two attitudes
are often confused with toleration, they are in fact incompatible with it.
Although to demand that the reasons for objection should be “objective” or
“capable of being generally shared” seems excessive, nevertheless certain criteria
for an acceptable objection are indispensable – at least if we understand tolerance
as a virtue (in the following, the term “tolerance” is used primarily to denote a
particular attitude and the term “toleration” mainly to refer to a practice, but the
conceptual argument holds for both). If the objection rested on mere prejudices,
such as belief in the inferiority of certain “races,” or even on blind hatred, then the
call for tolerance would accept such objections and prejudices as valid judge-
ments to a certain extent. This could lead to the paradox of the “tolerant racist”
according to which someone with extreme racist antipathies would be described
as tolerant provided only that he or she showed restraint in his or her actions
(without changing his or her way of thinking). And the more such prejudices the
racist had, the greater would be his or her scope for tolerance (Horton 1994,
p. 17f.; Newey 1999, p. 107f.). To call on a racist to be tolerant, therefore, seems
mistaken; what we should do instead is call upon him or her to repudiate
this prejudice and attempt to convince him or her of its groundlessness (Crick
1971). Otherwise, the demand for toleration would be in danger of exerting
repressive effects by perpetuating social discrimination and morally demeaning
condemnations.
2 Toleration: Concept and Conceptions 13

Resolving this paradox regarding the virtue of tolerance requires the formula-
tion of minimal conditions for objection judgements, which, to put it negatively,
exclude grossly irrational and immoral prejudices. Reasons for objection will, of
course, be drawn from particular ethical belief systems; but the key point is that
they must not fall below a certain moral threshold beneath which one cannot
speak of tolerance as a virtue.
2. In addition to the objection component, toleration also has an acceptance com-
ponent (King 1976, pp. 51–54), which specifies that the tolerated convictions and
practices are condemned as false or bad, yet not so false or bad that other, positive
reasons do not speak in favor of tolerating them. The important point here is that
the positive reasons do not cancel out the negative ones but are set against them in
such a way that, although they trump the negative reasons, the objection never-
theless retains its force. The practical reflection of those who exercise tolerance
consists in this balancing of reasons.
The nature of the reasons for objection or acceptance remains open at the
level of the general definition of the concept. Thus, a negative aesthetic
valuation can be offset by a positive ethical or moral evaluation or a religiously
grounded objection by other religiously grounded considerations. If the rea-
sons for objection as well as those for acceptance are identified as “moral,” the
paradox arises how it can be morally right or even obligatory to tolerate what is
morally wrong or bad. This paradox, which we can call the paradox of moral
toleration, has been exhaustively discussed in the literature on toleration and
has inspired very different proposals. According to John Horton (1994, p. 13),
the paradox can be resolved if either pragmatic reasons speak for toleration or it
becomes clear that lack of toleration would jeopardize a higher-level value
such as freedom or autonomy. According to Susan Mendus (1989, p. 161f.), we
must go beyond liberal justifications and appeal to the idea that tolerating
something to which one objects, but which nevertheless is part of people’s
identities, is imperative if we are to create an inclusive society. Glen Newey
(1999, p. 73f.) argues that tolerance must be regarded as a supererogatory
attitude on the grounds that the reasons for objections are morally sufficient to
repudiate a conviction or practice pro tanto, and hence that there cannot be an
obligation to tolerate (see also Bejan [2017] on toleration out of a stance of
“civility”).
This is not the place to examine these (and other) proposals since that would
mean examining the full spectrum of justifications for toleration. It becomes
apparent, however, that resolving the paradox of moral toleration depends on
clarifying how the reasons for objection must be constituted in order to admit a
morally (and not just strategically) grounded, higher-level acceptance component
without contradiction; and this calls, for example, for a distinction between
ethical and moral reasons and the corresponding judgements concerning
“wrong” or “bad” convictions and practices. Thus, a case for toleration arises
where one has ethical objections against certain practices as being detrimental to
the good life but finds no basic moral fault with them such that they violate
essential standards of moral respect. For example, one may find a certain religious
14 R. Forst

way of life wrongheaded but accept it because it does not deny other people’s
basic rights.
The paradox in question is reflected at the epistemological level. For, if the
objection to “wrong” convictions is understood as a function of being convinced
of the truth of one’s own system of values, then the paradox of the relativization
of truth follows. According to this, the person who exercises tolerance seems to
be compelled to regard her convictions as true in order to arrive at a negative
judgement and at the same time to assume that the convictions objected to could
also be true if she is to arrive at a judgement of acceptance. This paradox poses a
serious problem for the concept of toleration, for it amounts to the demand for a
kind of relativization and restriction of one’s own convictions which does not
fundamentally place one’s belief in their truth in question – a relativization
without relativism, as it were. One of the central issues in discussions of religious
toleration, for example, is how toleration is possible without relativism or skep-
ticism (Forst 2013; Rawls 2005).
3. The concept of toleration implies the need to specify the limits of toleration. This
is a conceptual matter, for toleration involves striking a precarious balance
between negative and positive reasons and presupposes the willingness to sus-
pend toleration when the tolerated convictions and practices are judged in such
negative terms that the positive reasons are no longer sufficient to counterbalance
them. The space of toleration is limited. To want to tolerate “everything” is an
incoherent stance, for in that case, one would have to tolerate a practice and at the
same time also tolerate it not being tolerated (see Forst 2020 vs. Kukathas 2020).
But unlimited toleration is also impossible for practical reasons, for, according to
Popper (1994), it would entail the paradox that toleration could disappear alto-
gether: if toleration extends to the enemies of toleration, it leads to its own
destruction (this could be called the paradox of self-destruction). This paradox
is overcome when we acknowledge that toleration is justifiably restricted and we
understand it as involving a certain form of reciprocity, so that extreme intoler-
ance does not have to be tolerated (and under certain conditions should not be
tolerated either).
How should the limits of toleration be drawn? Here it is important to recognize
that, in addition to the reasons for objection and reasons for acceptance, we need a
third category of reasons, namely, those for rejecting convictions and practices,
where the rejection can no longer be offset by reasons for acceptance. Hence here
we can speak of a rejection component. The nature of the reasons for rejection is
not predetermined: they can be of the same kind as the reasons for objection or the
reasons for acceptance, but they can also be of a different kind.
Against this background, we should make a distinction between two bound-
aries: the first boundary is that between (a) the normative domain of what one
agrees with completely, in which there is affirmation and no objection – the
domain of what is truly “one’s own,” as it were – and (b) the domain of what can
be tolerated in which there is normative objection and yet also an acceptance
which leads to toleration; the second boundary, the true limit of toleration, runs
between the latter domain and (c) the domain of what cannot be tolerated, of what
2 Toleration: Concept and Conceptions 15

is strictly rejected and repudiated. When it comes to toleration, therefore, we must

distinguish three normative domains, not just two.
In light of the foregoing, however, the resolution of the paradox of self-
destruction seems to give rise to a new paradox. If the concept of toleration
implies the necessity of drawing a boundary, then every concretization of the
concept leads to the drawing of a boundary which places the tolerant on the
“good” side in contrast to those who are labelled as “intolerable” or “intolerant”
as a consequence. But then there is no genuine toleration because this one-sided
act seems to be itself an act of intolerance and of arbitrary exclusion. What lays
claim to the name of toleration merely serves to protect and strengthen one’s own
evaluative convictions and practices and to claim a higher form of legitimacy for
them. Neither side can fall back on such a claim to legitimacy, however. There-
fore, the paradox of drawing the limits states that toleration must always flip over
into its opposite, intolerance, once it traces the inevitable boundary between what
can and cannot be tolerated (Fish 1997; Minow 1990).
This paradox points to central difficulties with the concept of toleration. For it
can indeed be shown historically that where the maxim “No toleration towards
the intolerant!” was filled with content, intolerance all too often crept in and made
its presence felt, for example, when the adherents of a particular religion (or
atheists) were – and are – distrusted and condemned as a group. There are good
reasons for mistrusting the way in which the boundaries separating the “tolerant”
from the “intolerant” were drawn historically and continue to be drawn today.
Here we should not forget that toleration is always a matter of social power
(Brown and Forst 2014).
However, the deconstructivist-skeptical argument that purports to demonstrate
the incoherence of toleration must be treated with some skepticism because it
conflates two meanings of “intolerance” which should be kept apart. For to
describe both the attitude and behavior of those who roundly reject the norm of
toleration and the attitude and conduct of those who do not tolerate this alike as
“intolerant” presupposes a relativism concerning values which fundamentally
doubts the possibility of drawing the limits of toleration in a nonarbitrary and
justifiable way. This answer does not resolve the paradox in question, however.
Rather, it presupposes the possibility of a nonarbitrary justification of the limits of
toleration, so that the identification and critique of intolerance cannot itself be
described as similarly “intolerant.” Not every rejection could then be criticized as
a bad form of intolerance, but only a rejection which lacks good reasons. The
normative meaning of the concept of toleration can be rescued only if one
succeeds in placing it on a higher-level, generally justifiable foundation which
cannot be deconstructed as one-sided and arbitrary.
4. The concept of toleration is further characterized by the fact that tolerance must be
exercised of one’s own free will and may not be coerced. For in that case, one
would speak instead of “putting up with” or “bearing” practices against which one
is powerless (Garcón Valdéz 1995, p. 471). However, to conclude from this that
the tolerating party must actually be in a position of power from which they could
effectively prevent the practices in question seems unfounded (Williams 1996).
16 R. Forst

For a minority who are not equipped with such power can also adopt an attitude of
tolerance and be of the (uncoerced) conviction that, if they had sufficient means of
power at their disposal, they would not use them to the disadvantage of others.
5. Finally, it is important to keep in mind that the concept itself leaves open the
question of which justification of toleration is the correct or most appropriate one.
Hence, in order to acquire a normative content and to lead to a justified concep-
tion, the concept must be filled out with other principles or values – and only in
this way does it become a virtue or a particular practice. The concept of toleration
itself remains a normatively dependent concept which is indeterminate without
other normative values or principles. The history of toleration (Forst 2013) can
then also be understood as the history of the justifications that have been used to
fill the three components of objection, acceptance, and rejection with content.

Four Conceptions of Toleration

In light of this characterization of the central elements of the concept of toleration,

we can distinguish four conceptions which provide specific interpretations of these
elements. All of them refer to the political context of a state in which the subjects
(who are also members of particular communities) exhibit important, profound
differences. These conceptions of toleration are not construed as different regimes
of toleration, whether in the sense of a historical series or in Michael Walzer’s (1997)
sense of distinct social arrangements. For, as current discussions of the problem of
toleration show, these conceptions exist simultaneously in present-day societies.
Moreover, many of the heated discussions about what toleration means in concrete
terms can be understood as conflicts between advocates of these conceptions.

1. On the first conception, which we can call the permission conception, toleration
designates the relation between an authority or majority and a minority which
does not subscribe to the dominant system of values. Toleration here means that
the authority (or majority) grants the minority the permission to live in accor-
dance with its convictions as long as it does not question the predominance of the
authority (or majority). The Edict of Nantes of 1598, which was supposed to put
an end to the conflicts between Catholics and Huguenots in France, can serve as a
historical example. In it Henry IV declared: “[N]ot to leave any occasion of
trouble and difference among our Subjects, we have permitted and do permit to
those of the Reformed Religion, to live and dwell in all the Cities and places of
this our Kingdom and Countreys under our obedience, without being inquired
after, vexed, molested, or compelled to do any thing in Religion, contrary to their
Conscience, nor by reason of the same be searched after in houses or places where
they live” (see Mousnier 1973, pp. 316–347). The more than four centuries that
separate us from this edict (which was revoked in 1685) should not mislead us
into thinking that this form of toleration has lost its relevance; on the contrary, it is
often raised as a minimal demand by oppressed minorities and plays an important
role in the interest calculations of states and majority populations within states.
2 Toleration: Concept and Conceptions 17

As long as the difference between the minority and the majority remains
within limits and a “private matter,” so that no demand is made for a public
political status based on equal rights, on this conception the minority can be
tolerated primarily on pragmatic grounds, although also for reasons of principle.
According to the permission conception, therefore, toleration means that the
authority or majority which has the power and opportunity to intervene and to
coerce the minority into (at least external) conformity, “puts up with” their
difference and refrains from intervening, while the minority is forced to accept
the authority’s position of power. Therefore, the toleration situation is not recip-
rocal: one side permits the other certain deviations from the dominant practices or
beliefs provided that the political dominance of the permission-granting side is
not infringed upon. Toleration is accordingly understood as permissio mali, as
putting up with a conviction or practice which is regarded as neither worthy nor
deserving of equal treatment, even though it does not exceed the “limits of the
bearable.” It is this conception which Goethe had in mind in his dictum
concerning toleration as an insult: “Tolerance should be a temporary attitude
only; it must lead to recognition. To tolerate means to insult” (Goethe 1998,
p. 116; translation amended).
2. The second conception of toleration, the coexistence conception, resembles the
first in asserting that tolerance counts as an appropriate means of avoiding conflict
and pursuing one’s own ends and does not itself represent a value or rest on strong
values. Toleration is justified primarily in pragmatic and instrumental terms. What
is different, however, is the constellation formed by the subjects and objects of
toleration. For now, it is not an authority or majority and a minority or minorities
which confront one another but groups of approximately equal strengths who
recognize that they must exercise tolerance for the sake of social peace. They
prefer peaceful coexistence to conflict and consent to the rules of a modus vivendi
in the guise of a mutual compromise. The toleration relation is thus no longer a
vertical one, as in the permission conception, but a horizontal one: those who
exercise tolerance are at the same time also tolerated. The insight into the
preferability of a condition of toleration does not have a strong normative char-
acter but is rather an insight into practical necessities.
3. By contrast, the respect conception of toleration proceeds from a morally
grounded form of mutual respect on the part of the individuals or groups who
exercise toleration. The tolerating parties respect one another as autonomous
persons or as equally entitled members of a political community constituted
under the rule of law (Scanlon 1996; Yovel 1998). Although their ethical convic-
tions about the good and worthwhile life and their cultural practices differ
profoundly and are in important respects incompatible, they recognize one another
– and here an alternative with far-reaching consequences presents itself – as
ethically autonomous authors of their own lives (Raz 1988; Weale 1985) or as
moral and legal equals in the sense that, as they see it, the basic structure of
political and social life common to all, which concerns the basic questions of the
ascription of rights and the allocation of social resources (Rawls 2005, lec. 7),
should be governed by norms which can be accepted by all citizens alike without
18 R. Forst

privileging any single “ethical community” (e.g., a religious community) (Forst

2013; Habermas 2004). This may be based on respect for the moral autonomy of
the individual and her “right to justification” of norms which claim to be recipro-
cally and generally valid (Forst 2012). Notwithstanding the alternative between
justifications based upon a theory that – following classical liberalism – treats the
right to be the autonomous author of one’s life as central and justifications based
upon an approach which emphasizes the principle of the impartial justification of
universal norms of justice, the respect conception does not require that the
tolerating parties must regard and value each others’ conceptions of the good as
equally (or in part) true and ethically good; rather, they should be able to view them
(and here the alternative again comes into play) as the results of autonomous
choices or as not immoral. The person of the other is respected; her convictions
and actions are tolerated.
Two models of the respect conception can be distinguished, that of formal
equality and that of qualitative equality. The former assumes a strict separation
between the private and public domains according to which ethical differences
between citizens should be confined to the private domain and must not lead to
conflicts within the public political sphere. All citizens are equal and, as equals,
they stand “outside” or “above” their private convictions. This model can be
found in liberal and republican versions depending on whether individual, private
liberty or the political equality of the citoyens is accorded central importance; an
example of the latter is the view of the French authorities that headscarves as a
religious symbol have no place in a public school (Galeotti 1993). The model of
formal equality, therefore, turns essentially on defending classical liberty rights of
citizens and avoiding discrimination on ethical grounds.
The model of qualitative equality, by contrast, is a reaction to the fact that
certain strict regulations of formal equality are in danger of giving preference to
ethical-cultural forms of life whose convictions and practices can be more easily
reconciled with such a separation between “private” and “public” or correspond
to the received understanding of this separation. Viewed in this light, the model of
formal equality is itself potentially intolerant and discriminatory towards forms of
life which lay claim to a kind of public presence that contradicts customary
practice and conventional institutions. According to the alternative model, per-
sons respect one another as legal and political equals who nevertheless have
different, politically relevant ethical and cultural identities with a special claim to
consideration and toleration, because the values and convictions constitutive of
these identities have a special existential meaning for persons. This demand for
respect in the sense of fairness calls, finally, for particular exceptions to or
changes in traditional rules and structures (Laden and Owen 2007; Waldron and
Williams 2008).
4. In discussions of the relation between multiculturalism and toleration, a fourth
conception is occasionally encountered which can be called the esteem conception.
It involves a more demanding form of recognition than the respect conception for,
according to it, toleration means not only respecting the members of other cultural or
religious communities as legal and political equals but also esteeming their
2 Toleration: Concept and Conceptions 19

convictions and practices as ethically valuable (Apel 1997; Bauman 1991; Kristeva
1991). However, if this is to remain a conception of toleration and the objection
component is not to be lost, the esteem in question must be limited or “with
reservations,” so that the other form of life does not count as equally as good as,
or even better than, one’s own. One values certain aspects of this form of life while
objecting to others; however, the domain of what can be tolerated is defined by the
values which one affirms in an ethical sense. Thus, this conception of toleration
corresponds, from a liberal perspective, to a version of value pluralism which holds
that a rivalry exists within a society between intrinsically worthwhile yet incompat-
ible forms of life (Raz 1988) and, from the communitarian perspective, to the view
that there are particular, socially shared notions of the good life whose partial
variations can be tolerated (Sandel 1989).

Summary and Future Directions

The conceptual analysis of toleration provides a framework for fleshing out different
conceptions of toleration, but given the normative dependency of the concept, the
sources of the principles and values used to determine the grounds of objection,
acceptance, or rejection are not predetermined by this analysis. Within Western history,
one major source for all of the three sets of reasons was religious faith, whether Jewish,
Christian, or Muslim. In the course of history, many other foundations were added, and
apart from strategic or instrumental considerations, values such as peace, truth, reason,
autonomy, community, identity, democracy, human dignity, and the like were used to
justify a stance or policies of toleration. Some of these foundations lend themselves
more to one rather than another conception, but the range of possible combinations is
broad. At this point, normative reflection that is connected but not based on the
foregoing analysis becomes necessary. It may be helpful to consider the question of
toleration to be a question of justice and of the mutual justifiability of a common legal
and political normative order, but that question cannot be further explored here (Forst
2013). It remains a matter for further research to discuss the advantages and problems
of various justifications for toleration.
Another important direction for further research is to transcend the boundaries of
Western traditions and discourses and inquire into the way in which other traditions
and reflections dealt with the question of toleration, especially whether there is a
particular, similar concept for it or not and how toleration was justified (Chan 2014;
Dhouib 2020; Flanagan 2013).
Translated by Ciaran Cronin

Cross-References

▶ Paradoxes of Toleration
▶ Toleration and Justice
▶ Toleration and Liberty of Conscience
20 R. Forst

▶ Toleration and Neutrality

▶ Toleration and Reasonableness

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Defining Toleration
3
Andrew Jason Cohen

Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Related Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
A. Indifference, Simple Noninterference, Resignation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
B. A Principle of Toleration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
C. Pluralism, Multiculturalism, Diversity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
D. Permissiveness, Relativism, Pessimism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
E. Neutrality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
F. Tolerance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
The Conditions of Toleration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1. Agent (“an agent tolerates when she . . .”). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2. Intentional (“an agent tolerates when she intentionally . . .”) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3. Value (“an agent tolerates when she intentionally and on principle . . .”). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4. Noninterference (“an agent tolerates when she intentionally and on principle refrains
from interfering . . .”) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
5. Opposition (“an agent tolerates when she intentionally and on principle refrains from
interfering with an opposed . . .”). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
6. Object (“an agent tolerates when she intentionally and on principle refrains from
interfering with an opposed other (or their behavior, etc.) . . .”). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
7. Believed Power (“an agent tolerates when she intentionally and on principle refrains
from interfering with an opposed other (or their behavior, etc.), though she believes she has
the power to interfere”). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Summary and Future Directions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Abstract
The task of this chapter is to provide what is necessary for a conceptual analysis
of toleration such that one would have a clear definition of this central liberal
tenet. First, notions related to but different from toleration are discussed; this

A. J. Cohen
Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA, USA
e-mail: cohenaj@gsu.edu

© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 23

M. Sardoĉ (ed.), The Palgrave Handbook of Toleration,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42121-2_20
24 A. J. Cohen

provides guidance by introducing the likely definitional conditions of toleration.

Next, those conditions are explicated and defended. Putting the conditions
together, we can say an agent tolerates when she intentionally and on principle
refrains from interfering with an opposed other (or their behavior, etc.), though
she believes she has the power to interfere. This definition is neither normatively
loaded nor sufficient for moral or political theory. Readers may also prefer a
definition made with some subset of the conditions rather than all.

Keywords
Toleration · Tolerance · Interference · Neutrality · Diversity · Pluralism · Power

Introduction

Toleration has been called “the substantive heart of liberalism” (Hampton 1989: 802).
This should be understood as precisely as possible. The task of this chapter is thus to
provide what is necessary for a conceptual analysis of toleration such that one would
have a clear definition of this central liberal tenet. First, notions related to, but different
from, toleration are discussed; this provides guidance by introducing the likely
definitional conditions of toleration. Next, those conditions are explicated and
defended. Putting the conditions together, we can say an agent tolerates when she
intentionally and on principle refrains from interfering with an opposed other (or their
behavior, etc.), though she believes she has the power to interfere1. This definition is
neither normatively loaded nor sufficient for moral or political theory. Readers may
also prefer a definition made with some subset of the conditions rather than all.

Related Concepts

While we all likely have some inchoate ideas about toleration, it is also likely that
these ideas are somewhat confused. Outside the world of academic philosophy, the
term “toleration” is often used in different ways. Since much of that variation finds
its way into scholarly thought, it is worth distinguishing toleration from other
concepts with which it is often confused before engaging directly in conceptual

1
This is a revision of work in Chaps. 1 and 2 of Cohen (2018), which was itself revised from Cohen
(2004a). The definition defended here is thus a modification of that in Cohen (2004a): that an act of
toleration is an agent’s intentional and principled refraining from interfering with an opposed other
(or their behavior, etc.) in situations of diversity, where the agent believes she has the power to
interfere. The current version is meant to be substantively equivalent to the 2004a though with the
removal of the requirement of “situations of diversity,” which now seems to me to add nothing to
the definition for reasons I make clear. I am grateful to Taylor and Francis (Routledge) for
permission to use the material from Cohen (2018) and Ethics for the earlier permission to use the
material from Cohen (2004a).
3 Defining Toleration 25

analysis. This will also provide guidance for determining what the core idea of
toleration is as we begin to see conditions necessary for toleration. These, indeed,
will appear quite quickly in this discussion; it will nonetheless be worth looking at a
number of other concepts that are often confused with toleration. The following list
owes much to Robert Paul Churchill 1997 (esp. 193–198). In particular, indifference,
resignation, permissiveness, and neutrality are all suggested in his discussion,
though they are discussed differently here. Of course, all of these concepts – and
the others discussed here – are related to toleration. If they were not, there would be
no confusion. Some may be on a continuum with toleration, but we need not be
concerned with that here.

A. Indifference, Simple Noninterference, Resignation

Toleration is not indifference or simple noninterference. If you see someone playing

baseball and have no interest in that American game, you would likely walk past
without interfering; when you do, it does not seem right to say you tolerate the
behavior. The reason for this seems straightforward: we think of ourselves as
tolerating only when we recognize something and disapprove or, at least, dislike it.
If someone is throwing a ball against your wall, you may tolerate it (or not) – in part
because the behavior annoys. Some negative response is necessary for our lack of
interference to count as toleration. Put another way, we must care (see Churchill
1997: 193; David Heyd 1996: 4; and Edward Langerak 1997: 111). Absent caring
about that with which we refrain from interfering, we are not tolerating it. It may be
that we are indifferent to it or that we simply do not notice it.
From this brief discussion, we already see that we are the sorts of beings that can
tolerate, that toleration requires noninterference, and that behavior is something that
can be tolerated. These three facts seem uncontroversial; they will be conditions one
(agent), four (noninterference), and six (object). Also interesting is that toleration
requires that the tolerator have some negative response; as Bernard Williams
explains, “If you do not care all that much what anyone believes, you do not need
. . . toleration . . . Indeed, if I and others in the neighborhood said we were tolerating
the homosexual relations of the couple next door, our attitude would be thought less
than liberal” (Williams 1996: 20). Interestingly, then, a world populated by individ-
uals indifferent to those they do not know and like might be better than a world
populated by individuals who know and tolerate those others. One way people can
tolerate more often, after all, is to have more negative reactions. Horton notes
something similar (1996: 34) which he points out may be thought paradoxical (see
Horton 1994). Newey’s discussion of the “censorious tolerator” (1999: 107ff and
elsewhere) is helpful in dispelling the paradox, but it can also be dispelled by noting
that though the agent who has more negative reactions is less tolerant, he may
tolerate more (see the discussion about tolerance below). Indeed, Williams’s point
(above) is simply that “being liberal” (in the colloquial sense) requires being tolerant,
not tolerating. The need for a negative reaction – for toleration, not tolerance – will
be condition five (opposition).
26 A. J. Cohen

Having a negative reaction to something is not enough to make noninterference

with it toleration. One may refrain from interfering with it, after all, because one
recognizes that one has no power to stop the disliked behavior, because the
opposed other is physically stronger or, differently, because others have rights
“even if they exercise those rights in unattractive ways” (Walzer 1997: 11; see also
59). Noninterference we resign ourselves to because we cannot do otherwise is not
toleration but a matter enduring what one does not like – a sort of resignation,
“mere restraint” (Heyd 1996: 14), or “a kind of moral stoicism” (Walzer 1997: 11).
The person engaging in this form of noninterference resigns herself to living with
others for the sake of peace, as if in a sort of modus vivendi (see John Rawls 1999a,
esp. 430–433) or “pragmatic compromise” (Heyd 1996: 4; see also Walzer
1997: 10).
If these descriptions are accurate, why don’t we consider these activities tolera-
tion? Why, that is, does one’s resignation to one’s inability to prevent some behavior
not count as toleration? Simply put, it is because we think toleration is something we
do for the right reasons. The presence of those reasons matters. We might say that
one endures what one (believes one) has to; one tolerates what one (believes one)
should.
To be clear, etymologically, the Latin root of toleration, “tolerantia,” is “broadly
intended to label . . . the general notion of enduring,” as Preston King points out
(King 1976: 12; see also Creppell 2002: 5). King also notes this, though, as a distinct
use. What is here called “resignation,” King calls “‘acquiescence’ or ‘sufferance’ or
‘endurance’”; “toleration” is different and likely requires what is below called the
believed power condition (King 1976: 21). George Fletcher similarly points out that
in German, Hebrew, and Russian, the “same root generates both tolerance and
patience” (Fletcher 1996: 237 note 12) but adds that “people [have to] care enough
to be tolerant rather than indifferent” (237; emphasis added). There are often times
when the concepts seem to overlap, at least in ordinary language. We say, for
example, that one endures a pain and that one tolerates it (or builds one’s tolerance
toward it). If something could be done about that pain – taking an analgesic, for
example – but one intentionally and on principle refrains from doing so, it may be
toleration as well.
Importantly at this point, noninterference must be valued or properly principled
for it to count as toleration. This will be condition three (value). It is obvious, but
worth pointing out, that for a case of noninterference to be principled, it must also be
intentional – one does not act on one’s principles by accident. This will be condition
two. (While an action could be intentional and unprincipled, it cannot be principled
and unintentional. Hence, we could consider the intentionality requirement a sub-
condition of the value condition.)
One must refrain from interfering for good reason for one’s noninterference to be
toleration. That one must act for good reason means that one’s belief states matter
when determining if one is tolerating or merely not interfering. Belief states matter in
a second way. Consider a new example. Say Albert tries to persuade his sister not to
have an abortion but then stands aside when she leaves to go to the family planning
clinic. Surely, Alex may be tolerating her action. His attempt at rational persuasion –
3 Defining Toleration 27

which, as will be made clearer in below, should not be considered interference –

failed and he does not interfere with her actions, which he nonetheless opposes. Now
it may be that Albert is merely enduring his sister’s actions – that because he has no
(legal) right to interfere, he could do nothing and so must have resigned himself to
her action. This may be the case, but it need not be. Perhaps Alex mistakenly thinks
he does have a (legal) right to interfere. If so, he may not be merely resigning himself
to her action. He may be standing aside because, though he believes he can interfere,
he also believes he should not – that is, he may well value his non-interfering or her
right to proceed so that his noninterference is based on a principled reason, as
indicated is needed in condition three. What we also should notice now is that this
case clearly suggests that believing one has the power to interfere is relevant to
toleration. It will be condition seven (believed power).
The previous paragraph assumed that what was at issue was the lack of a legal
right (of Albert’s) to interfere with his sister. Some may think it is a moral right that is
at issue; that is, they may claim that Albert has no moral right to interfere with his
sister’s action. For that to make it such that the case is not one of toleration but one of
mere resignation to what he cannot change, the moral prohibition indicated by the
absence of a right must be accompanied by an internal compulsion to abide by
morality. If there were none, he would be able to interfere by disregarding morality.
Delving further into this requires looking to the internalism-externalism debate.
If someone (a third party to the above debate) were to think that Albert had, in the
example, a moral right (perhaps accompanied by a legal right) to interfere, then it is
indeed possible that the case is one of toleration.
Two caveats should be recognized at this point. First, as motivations and belief
states generally are often mixed and/or confused, there may be cases where deter-
mining whether an act is one of mere resignation or one of toleration is near
impossible; indeed, it may be that there is no sharp line between the two. Second,
complicating the first, there is a common use of the word “tolerance” (itself
discussed below) which is equivalent to endurance – one “builds one’s level of
tolerance/endurance.” Given that and the oft conflation of tolerance and toleration,
confusions are not infrequent.
We have now (briefly) elucidated the seven likely conditions of toleration. They
are:

1. the presence of an agent

2. who intentionally
3. and on principle
4. refrains from interfering with
5. an opposed
6. other (or their behavior, etc.) though
7. she believes she has the power to interfere.

Each of these will be examined below. First, though, we continue our examina-
tion of concepts that are distinct though related to – and sometimes conflated with –
toleration.
28 A. J. Cohen

B. A Principle of Toleration

It will be noted that the seven conditions of toleration do nothing to tell us when we
should interfere or refrain from interfering. Their joint presence indicates that
toleration is present, not that it should be. When we say that toleration is at the
heart of liberalism, we mean something like toleration’s presence in society is
morally important. Indeed, its presence is of paramount moral importance. Its
absence suggests a society is not liberal – or rather suggests either that the society
is not liberal or that the society is so harmonious that liberalism is irrelevant because
none of its members oppose how any of their compatriots live (whether because they
are indifferent to many of those compatriots or have universal love toward them).
Assuming we will not attain utopia any time soon, liberalism thus must include a
view about when toleration should be present – no one thinks it should always be
present. We should not, for simple examples, tolerate murder and rape. Liberalism
thus requires a normative principle (or principles) of toleration to adjudicate
interference.
In order to have a principle of toleration, one must be clear about what toleration
is. With a clear understanding of toleration, we can move on to discuss possible
principles and defend one (or more) against others. Toleration itself, then, is not a
principle. It is a form of behavior (refraining from interfering). That behavior must
be principled, as we saw above and will discuss further below, but that is a different
matter. Again, being able to identify toleration is not the same as knowing when we
should or must tolerate or knowing when we should or must not. This is why
understanding what toleration is cannot be sufficient for moral or political philoso-
phy – in itself, it provides no normative guidance. We need a normative principle (or
principles) of toleration for that purpose. (That is not the topic of this chapter, but see
Cohen 2014, 55–85.)

C. Pluralism, Multiculturalism, Diversity

Toleration is not pluralism, the view that insists there are multiple genuine values.
Nor is it “enthusiastic endorsement of difference” (Walzer 1997: 11; see also
Langerak 1997: 111) that might be better associated with multiculturalism.
There may be multiple genuine values and if there are, we ought usually to
tolerate (or at least not interfere with) people acting in ways meant to promote
those values. This means, though, that pluralism and toleration are distinct. Believ-
ing that X is a value (or that X and Y are values), tolerating X (or X and Y),
promoting X (or X and Y), and tolerating the promotion of X (or X and Y) are all
different. One does not tolerate what one promotes. It may, of course, be that we
recognize values without promoting them in any significant way, but to recognize X
as a value is to recognize it as something not to oppose. (Should one, perversely,
oppose a value, one might be able to tolerate it. Still recognizing it as a value and
tolerating it are different. Recognizing that there are multiple values is distinct from
toleration.)
3 Defining Toleration 29

Importantly, the claim that there is cultural diversity is distinct from pluralism
understood as the view that there are plural values. The first is an empirical claim
only. Saying there is cultural diversity is not saying there should be cultural diversity
nor why there should be. Multiculturalists presumably believe not only that there is
cultural diversity, but also that there should be. Some may believe the latter claim
because they believe different cultures instantiate different values; some may believe
it because they believe different cultures instantiate the same values but in different
ways. We need not pursue those questions here.
Cultural diversity itself may or may not be a value. (Arguments in favor are
familiar; for an argument against it, see Susan Moller Okin 1999; for a broader
discussion, see Chap. 9 of Cohen 2018.) While toleration would make diversity
possible, the latter is not required for the former (see Newey 1999: 4 and 28–30). If
no one brings different cultural (or other) views to the table, as it were, there likely is
simply less to tolerate and the advocate of toleration need not be concerned. Of
course, the advocate of multiculturalism may seek to bring different cultures to the
table, perhaps wanting to promote them all. The advocate of multiculturalism, that is,
promotes multiple cultures. Of course, she is thereby precluded from tolerating them
– again, one does not tolerate what one promotes. She may, on the other hand, seek to
encourage the toleration of one or more of the cultures she promotes by others who
oppose those cultures. If she does, she will seek to provide good principled reasons
for those with opposition to particular cultures to refrain from interfering with them.
Toleration and enthusiastic endorsement of difference may form a spectrum of
related responses to diversity.
Those advocating for the value of multiple cultures may wish to make toler-
ation more intertwined with their view. Ingrid Creppell, for example, adds a
condition to toleration that she takes to be of fundamental import: “one stays in
a relationship with the person or group with whom one is in conflict [i.e.,
opposes]. . . . the parties remain in the presence of one another in a nontrivial
way” (Creppell 2002: 4). Depending on what is meant by “nontrivial” or “the
commonality of the ensuing relationship” (ibid), this may be what might be called
a diversity condition for toleration (see Cohen 2004a), as discussed below.
Creppell’s “nontrivial ensuing relationship” seems, though, to mean something
more and may be problematic. An act of toleration is, as Creppell notes, “a
unilateral act of one person toward another” (ibid) – when one person tolerates
another, the other may be tolerating the first or not (indeed, may be doing nothing
regarding the first). There thus does remain a relationship, but it remains trivially.
It is unclear, then, why the conception of toleration must thereby be “one that
acknowledges the fundamental feature of the maintenance of [nontrivial] rela-
tionship[s]” as Creppell would prefer. That is, it does not seem that “toleration is
about what connects persons to one another in a significant way despite differ-
ences and conflict” (Creppell 2002: 6). Toleration is simply one way to react
when there are differences – regardless of the presence or absence of a connec-
tion. If this is mistaken, it would appear that there is no role for toleration in
situations where the two involved groups have no significant connection. To take
one simple example, if the USA decided to, it could interfere with, rather than
30 A. J. Cohen

tolerate, Iceland. It could also tolerate Iceland. This is true whether there are any
significant connections between the two countries and their peoples.
Some will think the idea that tolerating and tolerated parties must remain in the
presence of one another is plausible and shows that there is cultural diversity when
one group tolerates another. That seems right. The point here is not that there is no
cultural diversity – there obviously is. The point is only that such diversity is not
necessary for toleration.
Though toleration does not require cultural diversity, it may seem to require some
form of diversity. Indeed, as already mentioned, some defend a “diversity” condition
for toleration, believing that this follows directly from the opposition condition – if
there were no diversity, there would be no differences and if there are no differences
there would be nothing to oppose and so nothing to tolerate. Churchill, for example,
claims “Toleration arises in ‘circumstances of diversity,’ i.e., when people are aware
of salient differences existing among them” (191). Similarly, Larmore claims it is
“because reasonable persons disagree about the value of various conceptions of the
good life, [that] we must learn to live with those who do not share our ideals”
(Larmore 1987: 23; see also Nicholson 1985: 160; Deveaux 1998: 409; Oberdiek
2001: 38 and 47–48; Rawls 1999b: 11–12 and 131 ff.; and Rawls 1993: 36 and
elsewhere).
Despite the above claims, however, the sort of diversity that must be present for
toleration may well be trivial. Consider the claim that Mary can tolerate Paul’s
snoring even if Mary is also a snorer – indeed, even if everyone snores. The lack
of diversity here would not make toleration impossible. Of course, someone might
claim that when Mary refrains from interfering with Paul’s snoring, there is diversity
simply because they are two different individuals, in two different spatial locations.
This is utterly trivial; as a condition of toleration, diversity is redundant – it adds
nothing to the opposition requirement. Mary can tolerate Paul’s snoring because
Mary opposes things that keep her awake, whether or not they are things she also
does.
Diversity as a condition of toleration is at best redundant. Worse though, includ-
ing it as a necessary condition of toleration might lead some to mistakenly declare an
absence of toleration where it is present. Some might think, to continue the example,
that Mary cannot tolerate Paul’s snoring because they have snoring in common and
so there is no diversity. Yet most would likely say that Mary does (or at least can)
tolerate Paul’s snoring. We should not let this lead us astray. Though diversity is not
required for toleration, there is a great deal of diversity and a great deal of opposition
to different elements of that diversity – and hence a great deal to be tolerated.

D. Permissiveness, Relativism, Pessimism

Toleration is not mere permissiveness, wherein one cares (having a negative reac-
tion) but is either (i) a relativist who believes that one’s view cannot be shown to be
better than that of the person potentially interfered with, or (ii) a pessimist about the
possibility of (perhaps cross-cultural) dialogue.
3 Defining Toleration 31

As has been frequently noted, the relativist cannot offer any defense of toleration;
all he can say is “I approve of it” – and he can only mean this in some emotive sense,
not in any way rationally defensible. If it were rationally defensible, it would not be
relativist – there would be an objective claim about the value of toleration. The concern
here, then, is not “an indiscriminate toleration at times indistinguishable from relativ-
ism” (Wolfson 1999, 39). Indeed, toleration is a well-defended value. (For arguments
in favor of toleration, see Rainer Forst 2013, especially 399–446 and Cohen 2014,
125–150 as well as Chaps. 4 and 5 of Cohen 2018. For arguments that toleration
accords better with objectivism than subjectivism, see Graham 1996, esp. 46–48 and
55–58; Williams 1996, esp. 204–8; and Oberdiek 2001: 14–16.) This is important;
“toleration does not mean we lack commitment to our own ideals, or are surrendering
them. We are enjoined not to suppress ideas of which we disapprove: we are not being
asked to like or support or encourage them” (Nicholson 1985: 170). In a nutshell, the
relativist seems to think he cannot interfere because he cannot show that his view is
better than his opponent’s and so merely resigns himself to suffering the disapproved
of activity. He is permissive because of that resignation brought on by his relativism.
The situation of the pessimist about dialogue is perhaps less clear than that of the
relativist. It may seem that the pessimist thinks her view is objectively valuable but
simply does not believe she can convince the other – the one with whom she chooses
not to interfere – of that value. Perhaps, then, her noninterference is actually
principled so that she is tolerating. If so, she would not be tolerating because of
her pessimism. Her pessimism might prevent her from engaging in dialogue with the
opposed other, but if she tolerates, she does so for some other (principled) reason.
Absent a principled reason, she does not tolerate. She likely merely endures, perhaps
accepting a modus vivendi as discussed above.

E. Neutrality

Toleration is not the same as neutrality. One can remain neutral between two parties by
failing to tolerate either – perhaps even by killing both. Moreover, one can tolerate X –
say a disliked religion – while clearly disapproving of it. So too, one may endorse one
religion (e.g., a state might give it favorable tax status) while tolerating other religions.
All of this should be fairly clear. Say Phillip wholeheartedly endorses and practices
Judaism, the religion of his parents. Perhaps Phillip loves Judaism and thinks it vastly
superior to all other religions. This would make it impossible for him to tolerate
Judaism, but not other religions. Indeed, if he thought Judaism vastly superior to other
religions, he would presumably oppose (factors of) those other religions, thus leaving
open the possibility of toleration. Still, Phillip might think some of those other
religions worse than others. He might think, for example, that Christianity should be
tolerated but that Satanism should be suppressed. If that were the case, Phillip would
not be neutral toward the three religions; he would endorse one, tolerate another, and
advocate suppressing the third.
It is worth noting that neutrality is here used as a form of comparison (perhaps
coupled with a resulting behavior). If one is neutral about X and Y, one compares
Another random document with
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 Aggie was dressing for dinner.
'Think about what, Polly?'
'Oh, miss, Mr Gustie gave me a kiss.'
'Well?'
'Yes, and a 'alf-crown.'
'Where, and when, and what for?'
'In your budd-oyre, miss, soon's you were gone, not to tell he stole your
letter from dear Master Antony.'
'But I found the letter on the table where I left it.'
'Yes, miss, cause master hisself put it there.'
'Did my cousin, Mr Robb, give it to father?'
'That he did. I see'd him with these beautiful eyes, as Mr Gustie called
'em. And I 'eard all 'e said, and master too.'
'Ah! Polly, never mind; but I'm afraid you have neither earned your kiss
nor your half-crown. There's a dress of mine, Polly, you can have for the
servants' ball next month. It only wants altering.'
'Oh, thanks; and I won't ever let Mr Gustie kiss me or 'alf-crown me
never no more. Yours until death do us part, Polly Smiggins.'
Then Aggie Blake went down to dinner.
'Oh, by the way, Aggie,' said Mr Blake, 'did you find your letter? You had
dropped it on the hall-floor, and then it was picked up, and I placed it on
your desk.'
'Thank you very much, papa. It was only from Antony. He is enjoying
himself very much, and is going to travel soon. Shall I give it to you?'
'Oh, you needn't, Aggie. Fact is, seeing it was in Frank's handwriting, I'm
afraid I was rude enough to read it.'
'Was it the butler who found it, daddy?'
'Ye—ye—es,' Gustus Robb interjected. 'The fellow picked it up just as I
was entering the library, and I handed it to you, Mr Blake.'
The only reply Aggie made was, 'Um—m—m!'
And that might have meant anything.
 CHAPTER XI.

BLOWN OUT TO SEA.

U P in the north the weather continued clear and calm and beautiful;
woods and forests, now bedded with fallen leaves, a carpet on which
those feeble folk the coneys played and gambolled all day long, but
ready, aye ready, to dart into their burrows should their 'cute, alert ears detect
the sound of a footfall or snapping of a twiglet in the distance.
The sun went down about three in the afternoon now, but the gloaming
was long, and the stars ever so large and near and brilliant. Indeed, the tallest
spruce-trees seemed high enough to move amongst them, one would have
thought. The aurora borealis danced and flitted on the northern sky above the
sea every night, their marching spears of light sometimes darting upwards as
far as the zenith.
There was but little doing in camp at present. The show was seldom
visited except when some new feature was advertised in the neighbouring
towns. The merman, it was stated in the Murlin and Creel, was hibernating,
but sometimes awoke and came to the surface, ravenous for want of food.
The dreaded dooroocoolie gave voice but seldom now, but was quite
prepared to swallow any boy under fifteen that came within reach of its
fearful jaws.
It must not be supposed, however, that there was any such thing as
idleness in the camp. No, for every one under Biffins Lee had to work hard
for his 'screw.' Moreover, there was to be great doings about the New Year,
and when these were over the Queerest Show would be preparing for the
spring campaign. But New Year's Day was some distance ahead yet, so Lotty
had plenty of time to row, to sail, and manœuvre her New Jenny Wren. She
took the skiff out first all alone by herself, but did not venture to sail. So
pleased with her seaworthiness was she that she next took Chops with her,
and this youth was even a better sailor than Lotty. They tried the Jenny Wren
with the mainsail, then with mainsail and jib, and in a second and third
cruise also with the gaff most tentatively. The ballast was well secured so as
not to shift, and Lotty clapped her hands with delight to see how close to the
wind the pretty craft could sail, and how like a 'puffick hangel,' as Chops
called her, she behaved.
Then after this Lotty ventured out alone with Wallace, bending what she
called her storm-jib, and having a reef in the mainsail, but no gaff. With so
well-ballasted and nicely built a boat this was a very safe rig. Last of all, she
took Antony himself for a sail, and tried the experiment of having Wallace at
the same time lying on a lot of tarpaulin for'ard towards the bows.
Everything went well, and young Blake expressed himself as delighted
beyond measure.
Lotty's experiments were not nearly all over yet. But the thoughtful child
always went alone when there was the slightest danger, and there was always
a spice of this when there was a bit of a breeze on. On such occasions the
marvel was that the Jenny Wren did not capsize; but her little skipper
evidently knew what she was about. She went round, too, with the greatest
caution; and sometimes, had she not been one of the strongest girls for her
age that ever swung an Indian club, her boat-sail would have defeated her.
She always kept her craft well trimmed, and had an eagle eye to the ballast
before she put to sea. And such confidence did Lotty gain at last, not only in
her own prowess and management, but in the seaworthiness and good
qualities of the Jenny Wren, that she feared nothing, and never seemed to be
so much at home as when out on the open sea.
Biffins Lee, to tell the whole truth, rather encouraged her in rashness than
the contrary. This man was inordinately fond of money, or rather perhaps the
making of it. To him this was a species of gambling that he could never tire
of; and now—at times when Lotty was out in her boat, 'evoluting,' as she
called it—he used to walk the beach, watching her through his spyglass, and
wondering whether he could not make this infant prodigy of his pay as a
daring child-sailor.
It is doubtful whether he had any real love for Lotty apart from the
money she brought to his purse, the grist to his mill. Her feats of strength
were certainly marvellous enough in all conscience for one so young.
Somehow, Frank Antony did not like to see his little friend on the stage
performing any of her 'tit-bits,' as she laughingly called them. He had seen
her once swinging the clubs to music with a gracefulness of strength and
attitudes such as he had never believed possible. But he had not gone a
second time. He used to hear the wild shouts of applause sometimes when he
knew her to be acting, and was satisfied with that.
 There is, of course, a deal of art and artfulness in feats of strength. Every
muscle of the body must be made the right use of at the proper time, and
every nerve and sinew has to perform its own duty in its own place. There
must be method, else, to put it in plain language, one muscle may get in the
way of the other.
It was very easy for Lotty, after getting gracefully into position, to have
Skeleton to leap nimbly on her shoulders and stand there, a trained cat
running up his back and sitting down on his head, and finally a white rat to
run up over all, and, standing on pussy's back, wave the Union-jack. It was
more difficult for Lotty to balance herself with one foot on Wallace's
shoulders and one on his rump, her arms extended, and thus permit Skeleton
to take his place on her shoulders. But the main feat of strength undoubtedly
lay in rising off the stage, on which she had crouched, with all the weight of
Mary the fat lady on her back. This was not only wonderful, but it was
positive cruelty to the child. Only, it brought down the house, and that was
all Biffins Lee cared about.
There were performing Shetland ponies at the Queerest Show on Earth,
and with these not only Lotty, but Chops, Skeleton, and Mary performed in a
marvellous way. One pony was but little bigger than Wallace, and the two
together never failed to create quite a sensation, so numerous were the tricks
they tried. The strange thing is this: in their play not even Biffins Lee
himself knew beforehand exactly what was going to take place. There
appeared to be the most complete understanding betwixt dog and pony.
Sometimes it was Wallace who suggested a new antic, and sometimes it was
evidently the pony. But it was certain that both of them were delighted with
the roars of laughter they succeeded in eliciting from the audience. At the
conclusion of a performance like this Lee would come to the front of the
stage, leading Wallace with his left hand and Tony the pony with his right.
Both animals bent low their heads and forelegs by way of making a bow,
then Lee would put to his audience the question: 'Which is the nobler
animal?' and asked for a show of hands, first for Wallace, and then for Tony.
It was not always apparent who had it. Only, Wallace was not yet eighteen
months old, while Tony scored ten years.
No, it was not Lotty the show-girl whom Antony loved—well, liked, then
—but Lotty, his dear, delightful little companion of the woods and wilds.
. . . . . . .
 Terrible are the squalls that sometimes rise suddenly during the winter
over this far northern sea, and frequently they break the weather for days.
Probably Lotty had become too confident in the sailing qualities and
prowess of her tiny yacht and in her undoubted abilities as skipper; and she
thus grew almost foolhardy. But then she was only a child, albeit an infant
prodigy.
There is a long twilight even in winter up in these latitudes; but one
afternoon the sea was so inviting, the sky so serene, that Lotty had been
manœuvring the Jenny Wren farther from shore than probably she believed
herself to be. Suddenly she noticed a huge black cloud rising rapidly up in
the south-west. So dense and dark was it that, though fringed along its top-
edge at first by the yellow-gold light of sunset, it speedily assumed the
appearance of a huge pall obscuring the sky and obliterating every vestige of
twilight from the surface of the sea. Lotty could see a line of foam
approaching, and for the first time in her boating career she felt nervous. She
never lost her presence of mind for one moment, however.
The wind had changed a bit, and well she knew it would soon blow
almost a hurricane off the shore. But she was ready. Down went the helm;
she lowered sail quickly. The danger was in broaching-to, and she had to act
as skipper and crew as well—ay, and the man at the wheel—for she must try
to keep the skiffs head to the wind and seas. Only her extraordinary strength
enabled her now to unstep the mast, and this with the oars and sail she
quickly tied together with some spare rope and the sheet. She worked
cautiously, yet with a speed that was wondrous, tying everything securely
and with the best of sailor's knots, and finally crawling aft and fastening the
boat's painter firmly to the whole as near to the centre of the jib as possible.
Then overboard with a flash went the lashed oars and spar, but not a
second too soon. The squall drove down on her with tremendous force, and
had the painter snapped nothing could have saved the gipsy lass from a
watery grave. But that painter held, and next moment she was crouching in
comparative safety between the bows of the Jenny Wren.
There was driving scud and spray, almost whole water at times, and a
constant lifting of the after-part of the boat, which seemed to flog the seas
with a noise that made Lotty think the timbers were snapping. But as the tiny
yacht filled up with water till she was nearly swamped both this movement
and the noise became less apparent. Lotty had no intention, however, of
letting the Jenny Wren get wholly swamped, so as soon as the first force of
the squall had abated a little she set herself to bail the boat. The bailer was
semi-shallow and a very useful one. It was lashed so that there could be no
danger of losing it.
Both water and wind now were bitterly cold, and the work of bailing put
some life in the girl. She did not mind that she was drenched as far as feet
and legs went, for she was well used to that, and her body was well protected
by a smart oilskin, her head by a natty little sou'-wester tied with a ribbon
firmly under her chin. It was the girl's pride to have everything on board the
Jenny Wren ship-shape and Bristol fashion. Attached to a girdle round her
waist she had even a small compass, and in a waterproof bag lashed under a
thwart was a strong electric flashlight. In this bag also were stored
provisions and a bottle of milk, to say nothing of a bagful of hazel-nuts and a
box of chocolate which Chops had bought her when last at the neighbouring
town.
She was thankful that she had not brought Wallace, for he might have got
excited and swamped the boat.
It was now very dark, and every now and then the squall came down with
merciless force upon her, so that, with the chance of the painter snapping
when extra strain was on it, or the lashed spars being driven down upon the
bows and staving them in, Lotty's position was that of exceeding great peril.
In the midst of it all, however, she felt hungry, and presently crept farther aft;
and, in spite of the intense darkness that now reigned, managed to open the
bag and secure her supper. At the same time she took out her flashlight and
hung this by its ring on to her girdle. She had a long draught of milk and
returned the bottle, then—with a portion of food, a few nuts, and all the
chocolates—she got forward again and resumed her place under the bows.
Her supper revived her spirits and courage, although as yet she had not
taken into consideration the chances of her being able to ride out the storm to
leeward of her bundle of oars and spars. It was well for her she did not think
much, for she was entirely at the mercy of the wind and the waves, and
drifting nor'ard and east into one of the wildest seas anywhere around our
coasts. More than a sea was this; it was part of the great Atlantic Ocean, that
extended in one unbroken line or expanse till it reached the Arctic and
thundered upon the wintry bergs of the sea of ice itself. But, more betoken,
the farther away the boat drifted from the shore, the higher became the
waves, the less the poor wee gipsy lass's chance of keeping above the stormy
waves.
 CHAPTER XII.

'OUT YONDER, ON THE LEE BOW, SIR.'

T HERE was not a pulse in the gipsy camp that did not beat more quickly
with anxiety on this sad winter's evening when the sudden black squall
came roaring over the hills, bringing with it the darkness of night and
obliterating both sea and land. Hardly did any one dare to ask another what
would become of the helpless child in her little boat. Dread fear and
uncertainty seemed at once to kill all hope.
'Were the Jenny Wren a strong man-o'-war pinnace,' said one old sailor,
'or the sturdiest herring-boat that ever turned head to wind, there could be
but small chance for her in the teeth of the gale that is now beginning to
rage.'
To young Blake the whole affair was too frightful to contemplate. To
have tried not to think of it would have been an act of cowardice, and to
hope against hope seemed folly. Never till now had he known how his little
companion had, with her innocence and winsome ways, wound herself round
his heart, entwined herself into his affections. Strong he was, it is true, but in
character most gentle and loving. He almost cursed the day now on which he
had ordered the new boat. The old one that he had been so awkward as to
sink was less safe in reality. Yet Lotty knew it, and would not have dared so
much in it.
In about half an hour after the first fierce squall the darkness lifted just a
little; then with his best telescope anxiously did Antony sweep the sea, while
Biffins with his did the same. Not a speck of anything was to be seen.
'She has gone down,' raved the gipsy Lee; 'boat and all has sunk. And
Lotty was the best property of the show. I am ruined! I am ruined!'
Antony was looking at the man hard and angrily.
'It is only the show you think of, Mr Lee. Have you neither love nor pity
for the lost child—your daughter?' It was with difficulty Antony could utter
the last two words.
'True, true,' Biffins replied; 'it is a pity about the lass; it is a pity all ways
of it, and—I'll never get another like Lotty.'
 Blake walked away. He felt that had he waited another minute he would
have been tempted to fell the man on the beach where he stood.
He met Mary. Poor fat soul! she was wringing her hands in the anguish of
really womanly grief.
'Oh, my bonny bairn!' she was crying. 'Oh, Mr Blake, you loved her, but
will never see the lassie mair.'
'Cheer up, Mrs Pendlebury; cheer up, we may still hope.'
'Hope, sir; hope? Na, na; there are few ships on that dark sea at this time
of the year. Oh, the cruel winds and the cruel, cruel waves!'
Chops was huddled up beside the great caravan, silent, dumb with the
great sorrow that had overtaken him. Having no word of comfort to utter,
Antony entered the 'Gipsy Queen' and lit his lamps. Wallace was on the sofa.
He whined and cried when Antony came in. Well did he know his mistress
was gone. The young man sat down beside him and took his great head in
his lap; but the dog refused consolation, and at every outside sound lifted his
head, holding it a little to one side as he listened and watched the door.
All this was more than Antony could endure, and he formed a sudden
resolve. He would go right away out into the night, and, if he could but find
his way through the upland woods, pay a visit to Crona in her lonely cottage.
Battling with the wind would help to assuage his grief.
'Yes, Wallace, you may come. We are going to the house of Crona, dear
boy.'
The dog sprang down off the couch at once and shook himself in
readiness. No doubt he thought he was going to find Lotty.
Antony took a strong flashlight with him, and after telling Mary of his
intentions, started off at once. Until well into the very depths of the forest the
road was by no means difficult to follow; but it was dangerous from the
falling branches, while the roar of the wind among the lofty pines was
bewildering. But for Wallace he would certainly have failed to keep upon the
little winding footpath. But the trees that Chops had blazed assisted him
considerably, and after a tiresome march he came out into the open and
could now see the blinking light in the witch's window. He was soon near
enough to hear the yapping of the startled fox, and when he reached the door
and knocked he speedily heard Crona behind it asking in Scotch, 'Fa [who]
be ye that knocks sae bauldly at an auld body's door at this untimeous oor o'
nicht?'
 'It is me, Crona. Me—Antony Blake.'
Then the door was opened, and the light of the blazing fire fell upon his
face.
When he told his story she was not nearly so much astonished as he
expected she would be.
'Something told me what would happen,' she replied smiling; 'and I tell
you now, Frank Antony Blake, to keep up your heart, for Lotty will return.'
'Oh, Crona, if I could but believe it! But tell me, now that we are alone,
have you really the gift of second-sight?'
Said Crona in reply, 'There is no gift about it, dear boy, though to ignorant
people who consult me on their future I might put on airs of mystery, and
say:

'Tis the sunset of life gives me mystical lore,

And coming events cast their shadows before.'

Antony held his peace.

'To you,' she added, 'I tell the truth, that palmistry, even prophecy, if you
like to call it so, is only the outcome of long study and science. I know you
are fond of your playmate, boy, for you are little else; well, pray if you like,
for there is One who heareth prayer.'
'Oh, I have prayed, Crona, ever so much, all the way through the forest.
But you give me a little hope, and I am so glad I have come.'
'Lotty will return,' Crona said again.
And Antony was now smiling.
'Think you she has been picked up by some vessel already?'
She did not answer immediately. The blazing peat and wood sent darting
tongues of flame up through the blue-white smoke, and it was at these the
witch was gazing.
'I can see the dear bairn at this moment,' she said. 'Lotty is crouching
under the bows of her boat, and this is riding to the lee of something, I
cannot tell you what. That is all you or I will know to-night.' Then she
placed her hand on the back of his, and smoothed, patted, and stroked it.
It may have been some magnetic influence, or it may not; but true it is
that from that moment Antony mourned no more for Lotty, only hoped.
 But now she began to speak of himself, and told him much as she looked
at his palm about his past and not a little about his future.
'Have you an enemy,' she said abruptly; 'a tall, dark man?'
'Oh, there is nearly always a tall, dark man in fortune-telling, Crona.'
'I am not fortune-telling, dear, foolish boy.'
Then Antony suddenly remembered his cousin Gustus.
'That man,' said Crona, 'will work you and yours evil. Beware of him.'
The fire was making Blake drowsy perhaps. He could see Tod Lowrie
curled up in a corner into which Wallace had quietly rolled him, as he always
did; pussy nodding in the binkie; and, not far off, Joe himself with his head
buried underneath his ragged wing. Then he knew nothing more until
daylight. But he went back home to camp with a new hope in his heart that
nothing could entirely extinguish, and told poor Mary all his adventure.
. . . . . . .
Perhaps at the very time that Antony awoke in Crona's cottage, Lotty also
awoke, but under sadly different circumstances. The wind was still roaring
across the sea, but the boat was almost empty of water, and, crouched up as
she had been, she was fairly dry and warm. But she noted now that one of
the lashings of the sail she had fixed around the oars and mast was coming
undone. She got hold of the painter and commenced, against the scud of the
sea, to round in the slack of it, thus working the little boat at great risk up to
her floating moorings.
It took her a whole hour to make things taut and trim and safe. But they
were so at last, and now the child discovered that she was very hungry. So
she opened the bag and looked over the stores, as she termed the food. Quite
as wise and provident was Lotty as any skipper who had been to sea all his
life. She found that the food would last for a whole day, and the milk longer.
Then there would be the nuts—Chops's nuts.
'Poor Chops!' she sighed. 'Why, the stupid boy loves me so much that he
will be half-dead with grief.'
She had a meagre breakfast and a little sup of milk, but felt very cold
after eating, and her legs were cramped. But Lotty did not dare to stand up,
the wind was so high. She simply stretched her numbed limbs, and this
relieved her a little.
 The whole of that day, whenever the boat was on the crest of a high wave,
she kept looking out. But nothing saw she until the red sun was nearly
setting and turning the spray into frothy blood; then, oh joy! a steamer
bearing right down towards her. Oh joy! and oh hope! but oh grief and
collapse when it passed on its way and never saw the Jenny Wren!
Then down went the angry sun, and, slowly to-night, came darkness on.
But although the spray dashed inboard so much that she scarce could look to
windward, the sky was clear and a thousand bright stars were shining.
Later on there was the aurora borealis. Later still, and after eating a few
nuts, the gipsy lass, still crouching in the old place, fell into a deep, sound
sleep while saying her prayers.
. . . . . . .
'But I tell you it is, sir. Just out yonder on the lee bow, sir; my night-glass
never told me a fib yet.'
'Well, mate, if you like to keep away a bit and maybe save a life, as you
suggest, you may do so; only, don't let her get stove on top of some floating
wreckage.'
'The wind is nearly down, skipper, though the seas are a bit high.'
'Hard a-port!'
'Hard it is, sir!'
'Easy, steady as you go!'
A short, sturdy sailor was this mate, a bearded man with a kindly eye,
who had roughed it far away in the Greenland Ocean even from his
boyhood, and the bark he was now on board of was the Nor'lan' Star of Hull,
on a voyage now to Archangel for timber. Few vessels dared so dangerous a
voyage at this season; but those brave fellows who did managed to make a
very good thing of it. There was a big lump of a boy standing by his side in
the starlight.
'Take a look through that glass, Ben, my lad.
Presently the black hull of the bark was looming within fifty yards over her.
LASS. Page 129.

Focus her to your own tune, and squint ahead. See anything?'
'Ay, that do I, mate. Summat dark but dippin', dippin' ahind the seas like.'
'I thought your young sight was better than mine. See anything else?'
'It is a small boat, sir, and she is moored to leeward of something floating.
And oh, sir, I can see a figure for'ard. Now, now I see a hand raised!'
Lotty's hand might have been raised in a dream, yet was she fast enough
asleep.
'Ben, hustle aft with all your might and fetch me a Roman candle.'
There was a bright dazzling light all around the little boat, and Lotty
awoke with a start, very much bewildered to see stars, bright crimson, blue,
and green, falling all about her in the sea.
But she had sense enough to know it was a rocket of some kind, and
quickly pulled herself together. A noise of voices shouting came down the
wind, and she flashed her light over and over again to show the sailors of
that huge, dark ship that someone was alive in the boat. Presently the black
hull of the bark was looming within fifty yards over her, and she could see
her masts waving back and fore among the glittering stars. She did not forget
to thank God for the deliverance that was close at hand. She, too, had been
praying until, childlike, she had fallen asleep in the middle of 'Our Father,
who art.'
The rough sailors carried her tenderly on deck and aft, and even the Jenny
Wren was hoisted. Then sails were filled, and northwards once more sailed
the Nor'lan' Star.
The skipper had his wife on board, and she hardly knew how kind to be
to poor Lotty, who was soon sound asleep on the saloon sofa, all her cares
forgotten for the time being.
. . . . . . .
The time in camp went wearily by—oh, so wearily!—day after day, a
whole week, and there was no word or sign of Lotty.
Antony got all the newspapers he could think of, and read them, inch by
inch, handing them quietly to Biffins Lee to glance at after he had finished.
As long as he found nothing about Lotty in the paper hope lived in his heart,
but again and again, to keep it burning, he had to recall the words of Crona.
He feared, somehow, to go back there again notwithstanding, lest she might
have received some second revelation that would dash all that hope aside.
Wallace followed him everywhere and slept in his caravan at night. But
the dog seemed very nervous at times, and would start as if with fear when
he heard the slightest unusual sound. Antony avoided Biffins as much as he
possibly could, because the man appeared to have but one string on which he
cared to harp—namely, the utter ruin to the Queerest Show that the loss of
Lotty Lee was bound to entail.
But one day a strange thing happened. Antony Blake was walking sadly
enough by the seashore at some distance from the camp, and Wallace
himself quietly followed. Suddenly the great dog gave a yap of impatience,
and, looking about, the young man saw him rush seawards, and, with a howl
of mingled joy and despair apparently, take the water with a splash. And to
his horror Antony noticed that the dog was making for some sort of cloth or
garment that was rising and falling on the waves a long distance out. His
heart almost stood still, and there were beads of cold perspiration on his
brow as the dog seized the fearful something and was seen making his way
inshore with it. It must be, young Antony thought, poor Lotty's dead body.
He placed his hand over his eyes and kept it there for quite a long time, until
he heard the dog bark again close beside him on the beach. What he had
brought in was the mast and sail of the Jenny Wren. And Antony could
breathe more freely now. But that night he made his way again to Crona's
cottage, and, strangely enough, the old lady was waiting to receive him.
 CHAPTER XIII.

ON BOARD THE 'NOR'LAN' STAR.'

T HE little gipsy lass was in a very pleasant dream—at least she firmly
believed it was a dream. Her dreams were nearly always nice, so much
so indeed that she never cared to waken too soon out of one. She did not
mean to, out of this one, for she was very warm and comfortable, and she
would be aroused far too speedily presently, and find herself in the little
caravan with hardly time for breakfast before Biffins Lee would be shouting
for all hands to come to rehearsal.
Yet she could not help wondering what o'clock it might be, so she just
opened her eyes wide enough to look lazily through the lashes at the wee
clock that ticked up in the skylight. Lo! the clock was not there. That was a
skylight sure enough, but not Lotty's, and—why, surely it was moving, and
everything else seemed moving, even her bed and her body. What a droll
dream to be sure! Then the sound of voices close beside her, and the music
of knives and forks and plates fell upon her ears, and the whole appeared to
be very real. What could have happened? Where could she be? She
remembered nothing.
'Wasn't it a blessing, mate, that you discovered that bit of a boat?'
'It was a 'tarposition of Providence, and that's what I calls it. God is ever
kind, and those that has got to live He will bring again up out of the depths
of the yawning deep itself.'
'That's so, mate; that's so.—How sweet and pretty the child looks asleep
there. I declare, wife, I would like to go and kiss her.'
'Then why don't you, dear?'
'Well, Maggie, at present my mouth's about half-full of kippered herring,
and it seems to me that kippered herring and kisses are not on the same
quarterdeck like.'
Lotty was beginning to think this surely could not be a dream, so she
opened her eyes a very little way again and looked round her. She appeared
to be inside a large German concertina, for this saloon was perfectly
octagonal, but very cosily curtained and pretty, with plenty of pictures and
photographs on the bulkheads. At the round table in the centre were seated
four red people all looking her way—a rosy, motherly-like lady; a red-faced,
good-natured-looking sumph of a lad, somewhat like Chops, but not so fat; a
redder-faced, brown-bearded figure, jolly-looking, and dressed in blue pilot;
and another man dressed similarly, the jolliest-looking and reddest of all—
painted red by the sea every one of them, and by the spray of salt waves and
the wild winds that had brushed their cheeks for many a long year.
Perhaps the skipper's wife had seen the flickering of the child's eyes, for
she got up now and knelt down beside the sofa, taking Lotty's hand.
'Are you better, darling? You've had such a nice sleep.'
The bonny blue eyes were wide enough open now.
'It isn't a dream then?'
'No dream, little un,' said the skipper across the table. 'You are saved.'
'Oh, I don't like Salvation Army people,' cried Lotty; 'the band is vile. But
this can't be heaven surely?'
'A long way off that port, my pretty. But you are saved, all the same, from
a watery grave.'
'It were a 'tarposition of Providence, it were,' said the first mate. 'Hadn't
been for the boy Ben, here, who is doin' dooty as second-mate, I wouldn't
have seen Miss Mite. It's 'im ye've got to thank, little missie—nobut Ben.'
'And God,' said the skipper reverently.
'And God,' assented the mate.
'I remember all now,' said the gipsy lass, 'and I am very thankful; but they
will all be so sad on shore, Chops and Mary and all. You couldn't land me,
could you?'
'Ay, little dear,' laughed the skipper, 'we'll land ye; but it will be in
Trondhjem. But we've made up our minds to make ye as happy as Arctic
summer days are long.'
Having once comforted herself with the thought that, although Antony
and Chops and all the rest would mourn for her for a time as dead, there
would be such a joyful meeting to make up for all when she got back again,
she settled herself to be happy and to enjoy her strange, new life. When the
captain and the mate and the boy Ben went on deck, the motherly lady
dressed her and tidied her hair as much as it ever would tidy—for it was, like
Lotty herself, very irrepressible—she sat down to breakfast. Lotty was not
shy, no well-brought-up child of the world ever is. She could not even be
timid beside so kindly a soul as the skipper's wife.
No, she did not care for fish. 'It was nearly all fish in the camp,' she told
Mrs Skipper Paterson; but the English bacon was a treat, and the English
toast, and, 'Oh those eggs, how beautiful! What are they?'
'Sea-gulls', dear, from the rocks of Tromsö.'
'How large and pointed they are, and so sweetly green; and what are those
curious streaks of black and brown, like a baby's writing, all over them?'
'Well,' said Mrs Skipper, who was just a little romantic, as all true sailors
are, 'well, Lotty, I think that every egg is a love-letter written by a gull to her
charming mate.'
'It seems such a pity to break them though.'
'So I have often thought, but one doesn't mind so much when one is
hungry.'
'I love the sea-gulls,' said Lotty, 'and they all love me, and don't mind
coming close up; and then they are so neat and so clean, never a feather
awry, and with eyes ever so clear and bright. I think they are just little bits of
the waves with souls put into them.'
When Lotty got on deck she could hardly keep upright, for it was
blowing half a gale from the west, and now the bonny bark, with her close-
reefed topsails and storm staysails, was standing nor'-east, and away where
black clouds had painted the sky from zenith to horizon. The girl looked a
queer figure—a wee sou'-wester on her head, which could not hide her hair
nor her beauty, and a huge pilot jacket belonging to Ben, the sleeves a bit too
long and the garment itself coming right down to her heels. She swayed and
swayed till the red-faced mate came to her assistance, tucked her under his
arm, and trotted her off for a stroll under the weather bulwarks. Then she felt
as if she had been at sea all her life.
Kaye—kaye—kaye! screamed the birds, for there were sea-gulls even
here, playing at tack and half-tack around and over the quarterdeck, darting
through the fountainheads of wind-vexed seas, circling, swirling, swishing in
every beautiful attitude conceivable—kaye—kaye—kaye! Oh, how happy,
how glorious, those feathered children of the ocean!
Lotty just longed to catch one, tie a message to its leg, kiss it, and tell it to
fly home with this to the little gipsy camp by the lone seashore.
 Up and down, fore and aft, the two walked together, and the girl thought
she could never tire listening to the mate's strange stories of the sea, while he
was quite as pleased to have so innocent and sweet a listener.
So a whole hour passed quickly by, and then something happened. A full-
rigged ship was seen bearing towards them from afar, very close-hauled and
with snow-white sails.
'A Yankee from Bergen, I'll lay my last sixpence on that. I'll try to speak
her if she crosses our hawse, and tell her you are safe.—Ben!' he shouted.
'Ben, my boy, look lifty.'
'Ay, ay, sir.'
'Bring my megaphone.[D] Sharp's the word, lad; quick's the action.'
Next minute Ben had hurried aft, and presented his superior officer with a
large tea-tray and a lump of chalk.
'A very old-fashioned arrangement,' he said, 'but does well enough for us.'
In huge letters on the back of his 'megaphone,' as he grandly termed it, he
hastily wrote:

'Timber-ship Nor'lan' Star—Capt. Paterson.

'Child girl picked up at sea,

Which her name is Lotty Lee.
'Report to Lloyds.'

Then he took his stand on the grating right abaft the wheel, and held the tea-
tray aloft.
With her cloud of snowy canvas on came the Yankee. Then, as she was
passing, a real megaphone roared out the words: 'The Louisiana of
Baltimore, U.S.A., bearing up for London, England, en route for the States.
What is that?' continued the awful voice. 'Hold your bally old tea-tray
higher. Captain Peters, eh? Little girl born at sea. All right, I'll report it.
Hope mother and daughter are doing well. Love to the missus. Good-bye,
old grampus; bon voyage.'
Next minute the Louisiana was past and away, and the mate dashed the
tea-tray on the deck with a rattle and a word that made Lotty jump.
'Hang the fellow!' he cried; 'he couldn't read plain English, and now he's
off, and may all the bad weather go with him, for he'll report that Mrs
Paterson—— Ha, ha, ha!'
He laughed louder than the west wind as he jumped down.
'Never mind. Come along, Lotty, and we'll have another stroll. Merrily
does at sea, little lass.

With a he! and a ho!

How the wild winds blow,
As we go rolling home, brave boys,
As we goes a-rolling home!'

The gale moderated considerably in the first dog-watch, and the sea
became smoother. Reefs were shaken out, and as the sun set red in the nor'-
west a heavenly starlit night succeeded the stormy day.
Ben went on watch at eight o'clock, and the rest settled around the stove
in the cosy octagonal cabin.
They were plain-living people in the Nor'lan' Star, as all true sea-folks
are. The skipper smoked in his easy-chair, Mrs Paterson sat knitting in hers,
with Lotty on a footstool by her knee, and the red-faced mate between. The
steward brought tumblers to these two men-people, so they sipped their grog
and then settled to yarning and singing.
So soft, so sweet, yet so ringing withal was the good mate's voice as he
gave his rendering of the 'Bay of Biscay' and 'Tom Bowling' that Lotty had
tears in her eyes; but she clapped her little hands as he finished.
'Oh, how much I love that!' she cried with real enthusiasm; 'and oh, Mr
Mate, how delighted my daddy Biffins Lee would be to have you in our
camp! People would come from all directions to hear you sing real sea-songs
like that.'
The mate laughed. 'I fear,' he said, 'I should make but a poor gipsy. But
why do you like my songs, little lass?'
'Because I hear things in them.'
'Hear things in them?'
'Yes, oh yes, for as you sing I can hear the woesome wail of white-winged
gulls as they beat to windward in the dark-cloud sky, dipping now and then
down, down till they touch the darker water and dive through the spray, then
up and up, screaming, till the haze hides the silver of their flight. And I can
hear the storm wind too, sir, rising and falling, falling and rising, so
mournful-like because of the quiet sleeping dead that lie so far beneath the
waves upon the yellow sands.'
Lotty was blushing now at her own youthful enthusiasm, and was fain to
hide her face on Mrs Skipper's lap. And Mrs Skipper patted the shapely
yellow poll.
'So we've really picked up a little poet, have we, from off the stormy
main? said Mr Mate.
'Lotty,' cried the captain suddenly, 'you can sing I'm sure!'
The blue, sparkling eyes glanced upwards through the tousled hair. 'Yes,'
she replied, 'I sing always in the show. I have a mandoline. Have you a
mandoline?'
'No, just the fiddle.'
'Oh, that will do. It is tuned the same. Thanks, not the bow, only my
fingers.'
The child's voice was very beautiful, and almost sad were the songs she
sang.
The skipper beckoned to the steward and pointed to the empty tumblers.
Then he threw back his head in his easy-chair and shut his eyes.
'Sing again, my sweet,' he said.
Lotty did, and once more too.
And the ship swayed and swung in rhythm, while Mrs Skipper, though
her eyes were on her work, forgot to knit.
'Maggie, lass,' said the captain as a song was ended, 'Maggie, dear wife, I
feel sure, quite sure, I saw a tear drop down upon your wool. There! I was
sure of it. Your eyelashes are wet.'
Well, maybe—who knows?—this kindly, homely skipper's wife had a bit
of romance buried away back in her past.
But that evening was a happy one to all, and so were many more that
followed.