Conquest, Natives, and Forest: How Did the Mapuches Succeed in Halting the Spanish

Invasion of Their Land (1540–1553, Chile)?

Author(s): Vincent Clément
Source: War in History , November 2015, Vol. 22, No. 4 (November 2015), pp. 428-447
Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/26098447

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 WAR IN
Article HISTORY
War in History
2015, Vol. 22(4) 428-447
Conquest, Native©The Author(s) 2014
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DOI: 10.1177/0968344514523000

Mapuches Succeed in Halting wih.sagepub.com

USAGE
the Spanish Invasion of Their
Land (1540-1553, Chile)?

Vincent Clement
University of New Caledonia, New Caledonia

Abstract
The paper offers new explanations on the causes of the Mapuches' success in resisting the in
of their land in the time of Pedro de Valdivia. It is has been accepted the Spaniards were
to subdue the Mapuches on account of their low level of social organization. Because of
a widespread view, other factors have been neglected. The Spaniards undertook the con
while knowing almost nothing about the natives and their country. Far from being inexper
in warfare, the Mapuches were well organized in wartime. Their success was heavily ba
their prowess in using the forest environment to fight against the Spaniards.

Keywords
Mapuches, Spanish conquest, indigenous warfare, defensive forest, colonial Chile

In 1540 Spanish armies seemed to be invincible. In Europe, as a demonstration of

power, Emperor Charles the Fifth entered Paris on 1 January 1540, at the head
imperial army on the way to Flanders. A few days later, at the far end of South Am
on 20 January 1540, conquistador Pedro de Valdivia left Cuzco to conquer Chile. De
the limited strength of his troops, about 150 Spanish soldiers and a thousand Per
Indians, Pedro de Valdivia had no misgivings about the success of his enterprise. In
than fifty years the Spaniards had overthrown powerful native Empires such as

Corresponding author:
Vincent Clement, University of New Caledonia, James Cook Avenue, BP R4, 98851 Noumea, New
Caledonia.

Email: vincent.clement@univ-nc.nc

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Clement 429

Aztecs' and the Incas'. In addition Pedro de Valdivia was an experienced officer.1 He was
a veteran of Flanders and Italy. He participated in the battle of Pavia (1525) where the
king of France was taken prisoner. Later he won fame in Peru by fighting on Francisco
Pizarro's side. Owing both to the past successes of the Spanish armies in Europe and the
Americas and to his military background, Pedro de Valdivia and his men could not
imagine failing to conquer Chile.
It was, however, on this fringe of the Americas that the Spaniards were defeated by
the natives. Their tough campaigns against the Mapuches were unsuccessful. Because of
the continuous uprisings of the Mapuches, the inspired missionary Diego de Rosales
termed Chile as the Indian Flanders. At the beginning of the seventeenth century the
Spaniards had no option but to change the war of conquest into a defensive war and,
above all, to recognize the autonomy of the Mapuches' territory (Treaty of Quillin, 1641).
Of course the Mapuches were not the only native people who resisted the conquest of
their lands. On the margins of their empire the Spaniards had to face strong resistance.2
They progressed in territories inhabited by mobile Amerindian groups who were living
in inhospitable ecological environments (deserts, deep forests, swamps). For instance,
the Chiriguanos in the dry Gran Chaco, the Chichimecs in the Mexican deserts, or the
Amazonian Guarani groups were the cause of long-lasting struggles against the invaders.
In the Chichimec case, nearly half a century (1550-90) was needed for the Spaniards to
defeat the natives. Nevertheless, despite the natives' resoluteness, the Spaniards often
could contain such resistances thanks to military expeditions and the creation of Roman
Catholic missions, which played an important part in the control of the conquered
peoples. But in Chile the Spaniards were unable to subjugate the Mapuches during the
entire colonial period (1540 to 1810). Classical studies on Spanish conquests in South
America give few clues to explain the Mapuche case, in which the usual positions between
Spaniards and natives are inverted. Most of the works on military conflicts between the
southern Amerindians and the Spaniards are centred on Spanish successes. In broad out
line, the analysis often rests on binary oppositions: on the one side, power and force; on
the other side, helplessness and submission. That is why the natives' knowledge of war
fare has occupied a marginal position in colonial studies of the Americas. Apart from a
few pioneer works, such as those of Georges Raudzens and Ross Hassig, it is probably
because the Amerindians often lost their confrontations against the Spaniards that analys
ing indigenous war-making has not been regarded as being of much interest.3

1 M.J. Cordero, The Transformations ofAraucaniafrom Valdivia s Letters to Vivar s Chronicle

(New York, Peter Lang, 2001), pp. 22-4.
2 D.J. Weber, Barbaros: The Spaniards and their Savages in the Age of Enlightenment (Yale,
YUP, 2005); J. Lockhart and S.B. Schwartz, Early Latin America: A History of Spanish
America and Brazil (Cambridge, CUP, 2005), pp. 253-304; C. Lazaro Avila, Las fronteras
de America y los Flandes indianos (Madrid, CSIC, 1997).
3 G. Raudzens,' So Why Were the Aztecs Conquered, and What Were the Wider Implications?
Testing Military Superiority as a Cause of Europe's Pre-industrial Colonial Conquests',
War in History II (1995), pp. 87-104; G. Raudzens, 'Why Did Amerindian Defenses Fail?
Parallels in the European Invasion of Hispaniola, Virginia and Beyond', War in History III
(1996), pp. 331-52; R. Hassig, War and Society in Ancient Mesoamerica (Berkeley, UCP,

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430 War in History 22(4)

However, recent works on the North American frontiers have thrown new light on
conflicts between natives and conquerors, and involve thorough studies which are useful
for re-examining the Mapuche case. Concerning the North American south-west,
Charlotte Gradie, Susan Deeds, and Maria Wade explore the early uprisings of the
hunter-gatherer tribes of Nueva Vizcaya and the Texas Edwards Plateau.4 On the North
American south-east, two books which complement each other, by Steven Oatis and
William Ramsey respectively, concern the Yamasee frontier and the conflicts with the
Mississippian groups.5 For their part, Clay Mathers, Jeffrey Mitchem, and Charles
Haecker edited in 2013 a comparative synthesis on the sixteenth-century Spanish
expeditions towards the American south-west and south-east frontiers, including military
aspects.6 While challenging Frederick Turner's view on the frontier,7 these new Indian
historians or ethnohistorians provide a global understanding of conflicts which are
regarded as part of a complex process of exchange, trade, violence, mutual changes, and
living together in disputed territories. It is not possible to sum up in a few lines these rich
contributions. Nonetheless, several points as regards the natives' war-making can be
highlighted briefly. As shown by the uprisings of the Guales (1597) and Tepehuanes
(1616-17), the natives of the North American south-east and south-west were able to mobi
lize large contingents of warriors. Although inter-tribal wars were common among the
natives, they could form alliances to repel the Spaniards, as occurred with the Guales and
Yamasee tribes in the early seventeenth century. To attack the Spaniards they developed
different tactics which were not limited to sporadic raids, like the Pueblo communities in
New Mexico.8 Moreover, the Mississippian tribes used to build defences which consisted

1992); R. Hassig, Aztec Warfare: Imperial Expansion and Political Control (Oklahoma,
UOP, 1995); W. Stavig, The World of Tupac Amaru: Conflict, Community, and Identity in
Colonial Peru (Lincoln, UNP, 1999); R.J. Chacon and R.G. Mendoza, eds, Latin American
Indigenous Warfare and Ritual Violence (Tucson, UAP, 2007).
4 The main native communities were the Xixime, Tepehuan, Tarahumara, and Concho groups
in Nueva Vizcaya, and the Coahuiltecan and Apache groups in the Texas Edwards Plateau.
C.M. Gradie, The Tepehuan Revolt of 1616: Militarism, Evangelism and Colonialism in
Seventeenth Century Nueva Vizcaya (Salt Lake City, UUP, 2000); S.M. Deeds, Defiance
and Deference in Mexico's Colonial North: Indians under Spanish Rule in Nueva Vizcaya
(Austin, UTP, 2003); M.F. Wade, The Native Americans of the Texas Edwards Plateau,
1582-1799 (Austin, UTP, 2003); R.J. Chacon and R.G. Mendoza, eds, North American
Indigenous Warfare and Ritual Violence (Tucson, UAP, 2007).
5 The Mississippian groups extended from the Mississippi Valley to South Carolina, including
large parts of present-day Alabama, Georgia, and Florida. S.J. Oatis, A Colonial Complex:
South Carolina's Frontiers in the Era of the Yamasee War (1680-1730) (Lincoln, UNP,
2004); W.L. Ramsey, The Yamasee War: A Study of Culture, Economy, and Conflict in the
Colonial South (Lincoln, UNP, 2008).
6 C. Mathers, J. Mitchem, and C. Haecker, eds, Native and Spanish New Worlds: Sixteenth
Century Entradas in the American Southwest and Southeast (Tucson, UAP, 2013).
7 F.J. Turner, The Frontier in American History (New York, Holt, 1920).
8 The natives employed tactics to combat Spanish cavalry, or minimize waterborne assaults
and sieges. They also ambushed the Spaniards and trapped the horses: Mathers et al., Native
and Spanish New Worlds, p. 220.

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 Clement 431

THE NATIVES' LAND IN 1540

| | Mapuchcs' forested country

«— • •— Inca border of the Kollasuyu
Former limit of the Incas'
southwards expansion in Chile

THE SPANISH WAR OF CONQUEST

Arrival of Pedro de Valdivia
from the Atacama Desert

A City founded by the Spaniards,

with corresponding year
I • Spanish progress towards
tne south (1549-1550)
a Forts built by the Spaniards
from 1552 to 1553

People of Concepcion shipped

back to Santiago after Valaivia's
death and Villagra's defeat

THE MAPUCHES' RESISTANCE

United fronts to the enemy

i Forts of Michimalonko and

Tanjalonko
■ ^ Mapuches1 strategic withdrawal
Convergence of the forces
■^ led by Toqui Caupolican
and Lautaro

Batde won by the Mapuches,

3 with corresponding place and
date

50 100km ^ V(
j V. Clement

Figure I. Valdivia's conquest and the Mapuches' resistance in early colonial Chile.

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432 War in History 22(4)

of log palisades, sometimes surrounded by buffer zones.9 Thus, like other native peoples
of the world, the Maoris of New Zealand, the Australian Aborigines, or the Tuaregs in
Africa, for instance, the American hunter-gatherers or pre-agriculturists could design a
type of warfare more sophisticated than generally thought.10 To what extent was it also
the case with the Mapuches?
The aim of the paper is to find out the real reasons for the Mapuches' success in resisting
the Spaniards at the very beginning of the struggle. In order to analyse the original
Mapuches' war-making before later changes due to the prolonged contact with the
Spaniards, the paper focuses on the first decade or so of the confrontation, corresponding
to Pedro de Valdivia's era, 1540-53. (see Figure 1). The thesis usually accepted among
scholars to explain the Spaniards' defeat comes from Alvaro Jara's work, which greatly
influenced subsequent studies. According to Jara, the Spaniards could not win against the
Mapuches because of the low level of social organization of the natives.11 Actually, the
Mapuches had no pyramidal social structure which could be regarded as similar to that of
the Incas. They had neither king nor emperor who could be easily deposed. Nevertheless,
this is not enough to fully understand why the Mapuches could face the invaders. In order
to get a more convincing explanation, it is necessary to have a global view on the beginning
of the conflict between the Spaniards and the natives. How did Pedro de Valdivia and his
men undertake the conquest of the Mapuches' territory? What did they know about the
natives and their country? Were the Mapuches inexperienced in warfare, as Jara claimed?
Moreover, Jara and most other scholars paid no attention to the ecological environment
where the war was taking place. Southern Chile was covered with thick forests over end
less miles.12 It is not difficult to guess this had consequences for the course of the war. How
did the Mapuches make the forest their best ally in this asymmetric conflict?13

The way wars begin often has great bearing on their outcome. What was the military situ
ation in Chile when the Spaniards arrived? Was it a corner of the earth with neither

9 Oatis, Colonial Complex, p. 13; M.D. Fontana, 'Of Walls and War: Fortification and Warfare
in the Mississippian Southeast', PhD thesis, Chicago, University of Illinois, 2007, pp. 54-5.
10 A.R. Vayda, Maori Warfare (Wellington, Reed, 1960); J. Connor, The Australian Frontier
Wars, 1788-1838 (Sydney, UNSWP, 2005); R.J. Richard, Warfare in African History: New
Approaches to African History (Cambridge, CUP, 2012); L.H. Keeley, War before Civilization:
The Myth of the Peaceful Savage (Oxford, OUP, 1996), p. 8; A. Gat, War in Human Civilization
(Oxford, OUP, 2008), pp. 25-35; W.E. Lee, ed., Empires and Indigenes: Intercultural Alliance,
Imperial Expansion and Warfare in the Early Modern World (New York, NYUP, 2011).
11 A. Jara, Guerre et societe au Chili: Essai de sociologie coloniale (Paris, IHEAL, 1961), pp.
53^1.
12 P. Camus Gayan, Ambientes, bosques y gestion forestal en Chile (1541-2005) (Santiago
de Chile, LOM, 2006), pp. 59-60; S. Villalobos, La vida fronteriza en Chile (Madrid,
MAPFRE, 1992), pp. 241-2.
13 A.J.R. Mack, 'Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict',
World Politics II (1975), pp. 175-200; I. Arreguin-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory
of Asymmetric Conflict (New York, CUP, 2005).

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Clement 433

conflict nor war between native peoples? In fact, before the Spaniards, the Incas had tried
to conquer Chile. Their expansion towards the south started in the early fifteenth century.
The main stages of it, however, occurred during the reigns of Tupac Yupanqui (1471-93)
and Huayna Capac (1493-1527).14 The Incas' conquest of Chile had been more difficult
that is generally thought. In order to maintain the precarious Pax Incaica, no fewer than
50,000 warriors occupied northern Chile at the end of the fifteenth century.15 When
Pedro de Valdivia came from Peru, the Incas had annexed most of the Atacama Desert
and part of the Central Valley. Further south the Incas attempted to take control of the
Mapuches' territory. But the forested country of the Mapuches remained mostly unreach
able for them. Because of the resistance of the natives, the Children of the Sun could not
go beyond the Maule River.16 They stopped the conquest there and converted northern
Chile into an agricultural colony, according to Inca Garcilaso de la Vega:

The Inca ordered them not to go further in conquering new lands but take care in cultivating and
benefiting from what they won ... Because of that order the Incas of Chile stopped their
conquest, strengthened their frontier, and put limits and landmarks on their territory, which on
the southern part of their empire was bounded by the Maule River.17

In 1540 the Incas' border of the Kollasuyu was far from being stable. According to
Vivar's chronicle, Quilicanta was the main military Inca chieftain (curaca) of the area.18
He was in conflict with Michimalonko and Tanjalonko, the two Mapuche chieftains of
the Aconcagua Valley.19 It was not a simple dispute between touchy neighbours on the
limits of their lands, as we can deduce from Vivar's chronicle: 'Those chieftains [the Inca
ones] were at war with the cacique Michimalongo before we came into the area ... and
the war between them was quite tough when the general [Pedro de Valdivia] arrived in
this land with the Christians.'20 A short time before the Spaniards' arrival, north of the

14 L. Leon Soils, 'Expansion Inca y resistencia indigena en Chile, 1470-1536', Chungara X

(1983), pp. 95-115; J. Bengoa, La memoria olvidada: Historia de lospueblos indigenas de
Chile (Santiago de Chile, Biblioteca del Bicentenario, 2004), p. 53.
15 Inca Garcilaso de la Vega, Comentarios reales que tratan de el origen de los Incas (Madrid,
Nicolas Rodriguez, 1623), I, p. 247.
16 J.L. Rector, The History of Chile (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 30; T.D.
Dillehay, Monuments, Empires, and Resistance: The Araucanian Polity and Ritual
Narratives (Cambridge, CUP, 2007), pp. 100-1.
17 'El Inca les embio a mandar que no conquistasen mas nuevas tierras, sino que atendiesen
con mucho cuidado cultivar y beneficiar las que avian ganado ... Con este mandato cesa
ron los Incas de Chile sus conquistas, fortalecieron sus fronteras, pusieron sus terminos y
mojones que a la parte del Sur fue el ultimo termino de su Imperio el Rio Maulli': Garcilaso
de la Vega, Comentarios reales, I, p. 248.
18 J. Vivar, Cronica de los reinos de Chile (Madrid, Dastin, 2001), pp. 95, 111; Marino de
Lobera, Cronica del reino de Chile, Coleccion de historiadores de Chile y documentos
relativos a la historia nacional (Santiago de Chile, Ferrocarril, 1865), IV, p. 58.
19 Vivar, Cronica de los reinos, pp. 93-4.
20 'Estos caciques hacian la guerra al cacique Michimalongo antes que nosotros entrasemos
en la tierra ... la cual tenian muy trabada cuando el general allego con los cristianos a estas
tierras': ibid., p. 95.

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434 War in History 22(4)

River Mapocho in the Coquimbo Valley the Incas exterminated 5,000 native Indians
because they did not want to collaborate in digging ditches for irrigation. As Vivar said,
it was probably an excuse to depopulate the area and get new lands for Inca settlers.21
Thus, the Spaniards did not arrive in a pacified place where the Indians were living
peacefully.22 They did not invent the frontier but came into a disputed one between Incas
and Mapuches.
Nevertheless, the arrival of the Spaniards changed the situation. The Incas of the area
thought the Spaniards would be helpful in reducing the continuous threat the Mapuches
represented in the Central Valley of Chile. Because of the early alliance between Incas
and Spaniards, the Mapuches thought of both as foreign enemies. Or rather, the natives
thought that Incas and Spaniards were the same enemy, as written by Pedro de Valdivia:
'They called us Incas and our horses hueque incas, which means sheep of the Incas.'23
The assimilation between Spaniards and Incas in Mapuches' minds was also fed by a
noticeable continuity in the occupation of the territory by both invaders. Once he arrived
in the Mapocho Valley, Pedro de Valdivia founded, on 24 February 1541, Santiago de
Nuevo Extremo, on the southern bank of the river. The site was not free of any occupa
tion, being the location of an Inca garrison led by cacique Huelen-Huala.24 At the end of
January 1541 Quilicanta allowed Pedro de Valdivia and his men to settle there.
Pedro Valdivia did not choose at random this particular place to build Santiago. As
Captain Marmolejo explained, it was the best site he could find in the Mapocho Valley.25
The main advantage of the spot was its geographical situation. It was located in a
strategic knot, just at the limit between Michimalonko's and Tanjalonko's territories, the
two enemies of the Incas and the Spaniards in the area. It was also on the Inca Road,
which was a vital umbilical cord with Peru to get reinforcements and supplies. The future
Santiago was an excellent military site. It was behind two arms of the Mapocho River
and protected by marshy lands to the west and the south. On the east the hill of Huelen
(Santa Lucia) gave a sweeping view of the whole surrounding country. It was an asset to
observe the Indians' movements and give the alarm in case of Mapuche onslaughts. In
addition, the Spaniards had at hand much wood and timber in the nearby forests, which
was essential to build the new city.26
The Mapuches knew that Incas and Spaniards were not the same men. Michimalonko's
troops had already fought against those bearded people when Adelantado Diego de

21 Ibid., p. 85.
22 L. Leon Solis, Lonkos, Curakas and Zupais: The Collapse and Re-making of Tribal Society
in Central Chile (1536-1560) (London, ILAS, 1992).
23 'Llamannos a nosotros ingas, y a nuestros caballos hueque ingas, que quiere decir ovejas de
ingas': J. Toribio Medina, ed., Cartas de Pedro de Valdivia (Seville, M. Carmona, 1929), p.
205.

24 B. Vicuna Mackenna, Historia critica y social de la cuidad de Santiago desde su fundacion

hasta nuestros dias (1541-1868) (Valparaiso, Mercurio, 1869), pp. 22-3.
25 A. Gongora Marmolejo, Historia de Chile, desde su descubrimiento hasta el ano 1575,
Coleccion de historiadores de Chile y documentos relativos a la historia nacional (Santiago
de Chile, Ferrocarril, 1862), II, p. 6.
26 Lobera, Cronica del reino, p. 49.

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Clement 435

Almagro came into the Central Valley through the Aconcagua to discover Chile and
returned to Peru (1535-8). Contrary to the widespread view that the natives regarded the
Spaniards as gods or supernatural creatures, the Mapuches were soon certain they were
'men of flesh and blood', as Lobera stated.27 They understood the Spaniards represented
the same threat as the Incas. But what the Mapuches could not know was the significance
of the name given by Pedro de Valdivia to the new place, Santiago de Nuevo Extremo,
whereas it contained a clear message for all Spaniards of the time. During the Reconquista
against the Moors in Medieval Spain, the apostle Santiago (St James) was the protector
of the Christian fighters. When the soldiers were in trouble, the apostle was said to appear
and help the Christians. In their beliefs, partly inherited from the Middle Ages, the con
quistadores thought Santiago followed them in the Americas. For instance, as Juan Gines
de Sepulveda asserted, thanks to the apostle, Cortes and his men succeeded in defeating
the Indians of the region of Tabasco in Mexico.28
According to Marmolejo, this was the reason why Pedro de Valdivia named the first
city of Chile Santiago de Nuevo Extremo: 'As I said, he gave it the name of Santiago as
defender and patron saint of Spain in case of war against the Indians he was supposed
to be confronted with every day.'29 The apostle appeared to act as he was supposed to
do. While Michimalonko's troops threatened Santiago a few times after its foundation,
a mysterious knight riding a white horse appeared and terrified the Indians. He could
not be anyone else than the 'glorious Santiago', as Lobera said.30 The added words
'Nuevo Extremo' are also an evident reference to the Reconquista, as is the designation
of Chile as the 'Nueva Extremadura'. The terms 'Extremo' and 'Extremadura' were not
merely an evocation of Pedro de Valdivia's birthplace, as is often asserted. They come
from the Latin expression extrema dorii (the borders of the Duero): in medieval times
this designated the territories to be conquered from the Moors beyond the Duero River.31
Thus, by using those terms, the goal of the Spaniards in Chile was unambiguous. They
wanted to convert the defensive border of the Incas into a new front of conquest towards
the south. Santiago de Nuevo Extremo was thought to be the starting point of the mili
tary enterprise.

Once they had defeated the powerful Aztec and Inca empires, the Spaniards could not
guess the Mapuches would be able to stop them in the conquest of South America. The
idea seemed to be unbelievable to most sixteenth-century Spaniards, as Marmolejo said
in the introduction to his chronicle of Chile:

27 Ibid., p. 39.
28 J. Gines de Sepulveda, Historia del Nuevo Mundo (Madrid, Alianza, 1996), p. 107.
29 Marmolejo, Historia de Chile, p. 7.
30 Lobera, Cronica del reino, p. 59; Vivar, Cronica de los reinos, p. 237.
31 V. Clement, De la marche-frontiere au pays-des-pays: Forets, societes paysannes et
territoires en Vieille-Castille (XIe-XXe siecle) (Madrid, Casa de Velazquez, 2002),
p. 136.

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436 War in History 22(4)

Many people will remain speechless when they know that at the far end of the world, naked and
barbarian people, without any weapon, are so warlike, shrewd and bold in the defence of their
homeland as the ones of this province.32

As on the margins of many empires all over the world and down through the centuries
(Roman, Chinese, or Russian, for instance), in the conquerors' minds the territory of the
Mapuches belonged to the category of 'barbarian' frontiers and conquest appeared to be
easy.33 Obviously, the Spaniards underestimated the difficulty of the task, despite the
Incas' previous defeat. In the following words of his introduction, Marmolejo lamented
the impossibility for the Spaniards to subjugate the natives. The disappointment was all
the greater as in those times Spain had one of the best armies in the world. Pedro de
Valdivia and his men had weapons of steel and firearms unknown to the Mapuches, and
they had horses which gave them a serious advantage. As Juan Gines de Sepulveda
asserted, the Spaniards' efficiency was based mostly on the cavalry: 'the major hope and
greatest possibilities to conquer the New World lie in horses'.34 Thus, the striking para
dox between a theoretical military superiority and the powerlessness of the conquistado
res in defeating the Mapuches needs to be clarified.
The Spaniards knew very little about the land and the people they wanted to subdue.
Marmolejo qualified the Mapuche area as 'such an unknown land'.35 As for Lobera, he
stressed the lack of information they had about the people: 'on the natives, we don't
know the origin, neither where they came from nor the way they took to come to those
kingdoms, and we are speculating about that without getting at the truth'.36 It was a major
weakness to launch the conquest of southern Chile while knowing almost nothing about
the land and the natives. The Spaniards did not perceive it clearly at the beginning of the
war, and the Mapuches' territory appeared full of promise. When they arrived in the
Mapocho Valley, they were enthusiastic about leaving the Atacama Desert, where they
had experienced too much thirst and starvation, to the point of eating dogs they caught
on the way: 'And when the sun rose, they were happy to find another dog and two pump
kins which they cooked in water without salt in order not to be thirsty.'37 Vivar celebrated

32 'Muchos se holgaran de saber que en el cabo del mundo, jente desnuda y barbara, sin armas
sea tan belicosa, ardidosa y arriscada por la defension de su tierra, como es la de esta pro
vincia': Marmolejo, Historia de Chile, p. xii.
33 J.C. Romer, ed., Face aux barbares: Marches et confins d'empires de la Grande muraille
de Chine au Rideau de fer (Paris, Tallandier, 2004); P. Senac, La frontiere et les hommes,
VIIIe-XIIe siecle: le peuplement musulman au nord de 1 'Ebre et les debuts de la reconquete
aragonaise (Paris, Maisonneuve et Larose, 2000), p. 354.
34 Sepulveda, Historia del Nuevo Mundo, p. 131.
35 Marmolejo, Historia de Chile, p. xii.
36 'De cuyos naturales ni sabemos el orijen, ni de que parte, o por que via hayan aportado a
estos reinos; y andamos conjeturando acerca desto, sin atinar con el rastro de la verdad":
Lobera, Cronica del reino, p. 14.
37 ' Y venido el dia hallaron otro perro y dos zapallos, que no se contentaron poco, y cociendolo
en agua y no le echaron sal, porque sed no les diese pena': Vivar, Cronica de los reinos, pp.
83-4.

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Clement 437

as a deliverance the fact that they came at last to the land where 'it often rains'.38 Pedro
de Valdivia did not have enough words to describe the many qualities of the country.
After explaining the delightful aspects of the climate and enumerating all the resources
of the region (food, water, firewood, timber, gold mines, and so on), he concluded 'the
land was nothing but a divine creation in order to have everything at hand'.39
Nevertheless, the forest environment of southern Chile soon became less favourable
than expected by the Spaniards. As Najera claimed, the whole territory of the Mapuches
was a real fortress. Indeed its wildness converted the progress of the conquerors into a
risky and tough adventure, as shown in the following extract taken from Lobera's
chronicle:

After crossing the river with a lot of difficulties, they continued ahead, opening tracks in the
mountainous woodland with axes and machetes they had, doing that at the cost of their blood,
hurting themselves at every step with the prickly bushes and thorns, and going through large
swamps and rivers with not a piece of ground that was not a quagmire full of heavy mud. And
the roots of the trees were so entangled that the horses remained crippled; and some of them
caught their hoofs in the network of roots, and in that way we lost many of them.40

Far from being unusual, the situation described appeared repeatedly in Spanish
chronicles. Because of the abundant rainfall of the area, the Mapuches' territory was
covered with rainforests over endless miles. The thick undergrowth vegetation of the
forests often made them impenetrable, particularly when invaded by Chilean bamboos.41
There were also a lot of thorn bushes and urticating plants which injured the soldiers. It
was difficult to make their way through the forests not only for men but also for horses.
They often broke their legs when their hoofs became trapped in the tree roots.42
Nonetheless, the Spaniards had to cross many rivers coming down from the Andes in
rapid streams such as the Maule and Biobio rivers.43 Many men and horses disappeared
when crossing rivers.44 The horses were often unable to escape from the sticky mud of
the marshes, while others fell down from precipices.45 If the cavalry in Chile was

38 Ibid., p. 85.
39 'Parece la crio Dios a posta para poderlo tener todo a la mano': Medina, Cartas de Valdivia,
pp. 42-3; Cordero, Transformations of Araucania, p. 86.
40 'Habiendo pasado el rio con hartas dificultades dieron traza en ir abriendo sendas en la mon
tana con hachas, y machetes, que llevaban, haciendo esto a costa de su sangre lastimandose
a cada paso en los espinos y matorrales: y pasando grandes pantanos y arroyos de agua sin
haber pedazo de tierra, que no fuese lodazal de mucha pesadumbre. Y estaban tan enredadas
las raices de los arboles unas con otra, que se mancaban los caballos; y aun algunos dellos
dejaban los vasos encajados en los lazos de las raices perdiendo de esta manera muchos':
Lobera, Cronica del reino, p. 229.
41 Marmolejo, Historia de Chile, p. 175.
42 Ibid., p. 82.
43 Lobera, Cronica del reino, p. 137.
44 A. Gonzalez de Najera, Desengano y reparo de la guerra del reino de Chile (Santiago de
Chile, Ercilla, 1889), p. 204
45 Marmolejo, Historia de Chile, pp. 48, 153.

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438 War in History 22(4)

effective on open land, the situation was, however, different in the wild forests. Every
chronicler refers to the laborious task of driving horses through forests. In addition, the
wet climate of the country often eliminated the Spaniards' firearms advantage, because
it made gunpowder useless.46 The natives knew that and took advantage of it by attacking
after downpours.47 Consequently, the barbarian frontier of the Spaniards was first of all
that of a wild and impenetrable environment. The southern Chilean forests were like a
green hell in which they were quite vulnerable.
The wildness of the area could only be inhabited by savage people, in the Spaniards'
minds.48 As the Incas had done before, at the beginning of the conquest they called the
Mapuches pormocaes or pomaucaes. Those designations came from the expression
purum aucca, what meant in Quechua 'unconquered enemies', according to Holguin's
Quechua dictionary.49 The term purum is mostly associated with the idea of uncivilized
or barbarian people.50 The translation given by Vivar expresses this representation of
otherness: 'Seeing their way of life, the Incas called them pomaucaes, which meant sav
age wolves.'51 The Spaniards shared the same view of the natives. Pedro de Valdivia
compared the Mapuches not to wolves but brave bulls.52 By using images which evoke
animals of the forest, the Spaniards clearly made a link between the woodland environ
ment and the natives they supposed to be uncivilized people. That is why, at the very
beginning of the conquest, Vivar asserted: 'as they are people without order and reason,
they had no experience in war'.53

The Mapuches were not as ignorant of warfare as the Spaniards supposed them to be.
After many decades fighting against the Incas, the Mapuches had gained a solid experi
ence.54 Pedro de Valdivia was implicitly to recognize it after several unsuccessful cam
paigns: 'I promise on my faith that for thirteen years I served Your Majesty and I fought

46 H.L. Peterson, Arms and Armor in Colonial America, 1526-1783 (New York, Dover, 2000),
p. 69.
47 Najera, Desengano y reparo, p. 93.
48 J. Pinto, 'Integration y desintegracion de un espacio fronterizo: La Araucania y las Pampas
1500-1990', in J. Pinto, ed., Araucaniay Pampas: Un mundo fronterizo en America del Sur
(Temuco, Ediciones de la Frontera, 1996), pp. 15-16.
49 D. Gonzalez Holguin, Vocabulario de la lengua general de todo el Peru llamada lengua
Qquichua o del Inga (Lima, Francisco del Canto, 1608), p. 296.
50 For example, the expression purum runa poques is translated into Spanish by Holguin as
'barbarian, savage people, with neither law nor King': ibid., p. 295.
51 ' Visto los ingas su manera de vivir los llamaron pomaucaes, que quiere decir lobos monte
ses': Vivar, Cronica de los reinos, p. 229.
52 Medina, Cartas de Valdivia, p. 137. Cordero, Transformations of Araucania, p. 92.
53 'Como es gente sin orden y sin razon, carecian de experiencia en la guerra': Vivar, Cronica
de los reinos, pp. 109-10.
54 M. Restall and K. Lane, Latin America in Colonial Times (Cambridge, CUP, 2011), I, p.
121.

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Clement 439

against a lot of nations, I have never seen such a stubborn people in fighting as those
Indians were against us.'55 Nevertheless, the Spaniards were not the Incas. How did the
acquired experience make the Mapuches able to face the new invaders?
From the arrival of the Spaniards the Mapuches were immediately able to mobilize
their warriors and prepare coordinated actions. On 11 September 1541 Michimalonko's
troops set out to burn Santiago. For, contrary to the thesis of Jara, who considers that
Pedro de Valdivia could not win against the natives because of their low level of social
hierarchy, the Mapuches were well organized when they were at war.56 In fact the social
organization of the natives had a dualistic form, depending on peace or war. In times of
peace, they used to live in scattered clans (rehues). They did not have any principal
leader who might be regarded as king. Their social hierarchy was reduced to its simplest
expression, for each clan had its own chieftain (ulmen). Everyday life was regulated by
customary rules (admapu), which could be somewhat different from one clan to another.57
But in times of war against external enemies (weichan), a centralized power emerged
promptly, as occurred when the Spaniards tried to settle their territory.58 As soon as the
conquistadores laid the first stone of Santiago, all the Mapuche clans united to repel the
invaders. As Vivar said:

They made a general call for unity, put their people under orders and held large banquets and
[ritual] drunken parties as they are used to doing. And it is then when they make their agreements
and decide for war, which is what they agreed to do in one of their gatherings ... they ordered
to be put to death all the Christians that were on earth saying they were few.59

The kind of native meeting referred to by Vivar was headed by a gentoqui. He was a
central figure in the preparations for war against external enemies.60 Under his authority
a main military leader was elected and recognized by all the clans for the duration of the
war. He was chosen among the proudest warriors. The gentoqui sent to the elected leader
an axe with a black stone (toquicura). It symbolized the fact that he was the repository of
the general military command. That is why such a military leader was simply called
toqui, which comes from the verb toquilin, to command. The Mapuches had other spe
cialized toquis who headed a single kind of fighters. For instance, Najera mentions the

55 'Prometo mi fe, que ha treinta afios que sirvo a V.M. y he peleado contra muchas naciones,
y nunca tal teson de gente he visto jamas en el pelear, como estos indios tuvieron contra
nosotros': Medina, Cartas de Valdivia, p. 202.
56 Jara, Guerre et societe, p. 54.
57 R. Latcham, La organization social y las creencias religiosas de los antiguos araucanos
(Santiago de Chile, Cervantes, 1924), p. 153.
58 For conflicts between different Mapuche clans, they did not use the term weichan but
tautulun.

59 'Hicieron llamamiento general y ordenaron a sus gentes e hicieron grandes banquetes y

borracheras, porque lo tienen por uso. Y en ella hacen sus acuerdos y dan orden a la guerra
que juntos alii en aquella junta acordaron ... dieron orden en como matarian a todos los
cristianos que habia en la tierra, diciendo que eran pocos': Vivar, Cronica de los reinos, p.
110. On the quick mobilization of the natives: Lobera, Cronica del reino, p. 46.
60 Dillehay, Monuments, Empires and Resistance, p. 117.

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440 War in History 22(4)

existence ofpilquitoqui.6i The term is composed ofpilqui, meaning 'arrow', and toqui,
'leader'. The pilquitoqui was thus the chieftain of the Mapuche archers, but he was him
self under the orders of the main toqui.
The military hierarchy of the natives did not end there. In the different Mapuche dis
tricts, they had military chieftains called lonko, such as Michimalonko or Tanjalonko in
the Aconcagua Valley. The lonko commanded local battalions (linco) which could be
composed of thousands of soldiers. Furthermore, among the soldiers two categories of
warriors were to be distinguished. The privates were called cona, whereas the non
commissioned officers were designated by the term cupilonko. As shown by Marmolejo,
the cona had the hair cut under their ears and just above their eyes.62 For their part, the
cupilonko had their heads entirely shaved.63 This was certainly easily spotted by other
native soldiers when engaged in combat and enabled them to transmit their orders.
Thus, war led the clans to transcend their differences and to stick together against the
invaders. During the war they all accepted they depended on a pyramidal military hier
archy, whereas in times of peace each group used to respect only the chieftain of its own
clan. Some rituals and practices show that in Mapuche culture the art of warfare was
ancient and always associated with the forest environment. For instance, the ritual of war
meetings has often been described by scholars. But the different authors paid little atten
tion to the meaning of the places where the election of the main toqui was held. Najera
gives one of the rare descriptions of these sites:

they are forests which seem to be made or designed for such purposes, small in area and with
very big and twisted trees, places which we commonly call drinking spots for they are
specifically set aside for the Indians to drink in them, and as in a council or in a town hall, the
chieftains and people gathered in such [ritual] drunken parties have their council to decide
about matters concerning war governance, and about questions such as uprisings, peace,
campaigns or other enterprises.64

As we can deduce from the quotation, they were exclusively reserved for military
issues. They were located in secret parts of the forest.65 Only chieftains and

61 Najera, Desengafio y reparo, p. 98.

62 Marmolejo, Historia de Chile, p. 2.
63 L. Valdivia, Arte y gramatica general de la lengua que corre en todo el Reino de Chile, con
un vocabularioy confesionario (Seville, Lopez de Haro, 1684), p. 95; Najera, Desengafioy
reparo, p. 39.
64 'Son unos bosques que parecen hechos o criados para tal efecto, de poco circuito y de
altisimos y diformes arboles, lugares a que comunmente llaman los nuestros bebederos, por
ser dedicados particularmente para beber los indios en ello, donde como en consistorio o
palacios de ayuntamientos, los caciques y taneapis en tales borracheras tienen sus consejos
y determinaciones en las cosas del gobierno de la guerra, como es para tratar rebeliones,
paces, jornadas o otras empresas': Najera, Desengafioy reparo, pp. 43^1. The word tane
apis used by the author is wrongly spelt. The correct form is tantani ('people gathered' or
'to gather'). Holguin, Vocabulario de la lengua, p. 338.
65 D. Rosales, Historia general del reyno de Chile: Flandes Indiano (Valparaiso, Mercurio,
1877), I, p. 113.

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Clement 441

valiant soldiers (conahuentu) were admitted to participate in war councils. To refer to

such meeting sites the Mapuche used two terms of different significance: lepun and ali
huen. By lepun they designated the materiality of the space. It was a circular area planted
with old trees and without undergrowth vegetation as in wood pasture.66 Beyond the
material space of the lepun, the big and twisted trees mentioned by Najera had a deep
meaning for the Mapuches. The term alihuen is generally translated as 'big tree'.
However, this is not the tree as it is regarded by Western eyes67 To understand the mean
ing of alihuen it is necessary to bear in mind that for the Mapuches every human being
was personified by a tree of the forest. Alihuen was not merely a tree but a spiritual
incarnation of a person or a major event he or she represented.68 Glorious toquis, notice
able victories, and great decisions concerning war were symbolized by planted trees.
Such plantations were ritualized. When they celebrated a war council, another native
man, apart from the gentoqui, emerged from the others. He was called genboye (or gen
voye), which means 'lord of the canelo tree'.69 He represented the highest spiritual man,
for the canelo tree was the most important of Mapuche sacred trees.70 On the lepun, the
genboye came to war councils with a canelo tree and planted it into the ground to mark
the event and the elected toqui.71 Thus, as a living chronicle of war, each canelo tree
planted by the genboye recalled each council celebrated and the decisions which were
taken by the Mapuches. When the native council opted for war against invaders, they
sent them an unequivocal message, as shown by Marmolejo: 'when they know that stran
gers have entered their country and want to fight against them, they issue an order to put
on the track branches of a tree the Spaniards call canelo with bloodstained arrows across
them'.72 The canelo tree was usually a symbol of peace between the Mapuches, as the
olive tree was in the Mediterranean world, but of course not when thrown down on the
tracks leading to their territory with bloodstained arrows on it. Once war was declared,
for eight days the Mapuche warriors remained in the forest in order to train and be well
drilled to fight against their enemies.73 This step in the preparation for war was called

66 Dillehay, Monuments, Empires and Resistance, p. 291.

67 To designate the tree as a forest resource, the Mapuches used the word mamll.
68 For instance, the Mapuches used to plant trees close to their homes for a birth or a wedding.
The natives called them 'tree of life' or 'tree of health' (mongalihuen). Latcham, La organi
zation social, p. 324.
69 Valdivia, Arte y gramatica, p. 100. The Latin name of the canelo tree is Drimys winteri, after
John Winter described it in 1578. He commanded the Elizabeth on Sir Francis Drake's first
voyage (1577-8). E.W. Mosbach, Botanica indigena de Chile (Santiago de Chile, Andres
Bello, 1999), pp. 78-9; A.E. Hoffmann, Flora silvestre de Chile: Zona Araucana (Santiago
de Chile, Fundacion Claudio Gay, 1982), pp. 56-7.
70 G. Boccara, Guerre et ethnogenese mapuche dans le Chili colonial: L'invention du soi
(Paris, L'Harmattan, 1998), pp. 79-80.
71 Valdivia, Arte y gramatica, p. 100.
72 'Tiene por orden cuando quieren pelear y saben que extranos entran en su tierra, ponelles en
el camino ramos de un arbol que los espanoles llaman canela, y en ellos atravesadas flechas
untadas con sangre': Marmolejo, Historia de Chile, p. 2.
73 J. Toribio Medina, Los aborijenes de Chile (Santiago de Chile, Gutenberg, 1882), pp. 124-5.

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442 War in History 22(4)

kolullallin. According to Luis de Valdivia, the term kolu designates both the colour
brown and the clay of that colour they put on their faces. Llallin refers to the fact of
becoming a lot thinner. It was one of the expected results of the Mapuches' training for
war.74

The Mapuches regarded the forest environment not only as the place to prepare for war.
As Vivar said, the natives avoided face-to-face confrontations on open land where, in the
first encounters, they suffered great damage caused by the Spanish cavalry.75 When they
were in trouble, they would take refuge in the closest forests.76 But it would be simplistic
to reduce the part of the forest in Mapuche warfare to a protective environment. What did
the Mapuches find in the forest they could not get in other theatres of war? How did they
use the forested environment to organize the defence of their homeland?
Because of the duration of the campaigns, supplies were the lifeblood of war. When
fighting, every Mapuche warrior brought as his only supply a small bag filled with flour
(ulldpu). The Spaniards were amazed by the capacity of the Mapuches to engage for sev
eral weeks or months with so little provision. Of course they could not do so without any
other sources of food. The forest environment provided them with countless nourishing
resources unknown to Pedro de Valdivia and his men. The collection of wild berries, plants,
roots, and tubers was an important part of their usual diet, and Mapuche troops could easily
be fed. Many trees and bushes of the Chilean forests produce a lot of nuts or fruits. The
most noticeable is the coniferous Araucaria araucana, called pehuen by the natives.77 It is
a typical tree of the Araucania zone which gives large quantities of energy-giving nuts.
Mapuche warriors could pick them up from the ground. They could also gather the berries
of the boldo tree (Peumus boldus), peumo tree (Cryptocarya alba), maqui tree (Aristotelia
chilensis), or palo amarillo bush (Berberis montana), to give a few examples.78 Apart from
trees and bushes, other plants provided them with edible resources such as different wild
potatoes, creepers such as the copihue (Lapageria rosea) which bear tasty fruit, and rhi
zomes of ferns such as those of the big anpe (Lophosoria quadripinnata).
The Mapuches' knowledge of the food resources of the forest was a real advantage
over the Spaniards. The Mapuches knew that the question of supplies was the invaders'
Achilles heel. They wanted to push their advantage. As often as possible they launched
raids and destroyed Spanish crops.79 The natives also burned their own crops in the zone

74 On the terms kolu and llallin, see Valdivia, Arte y gramatica, pp. 93, 110. Rosales used the
expression collullanllin, but it is badly translated by the author as 'to get a lot thinner as
ants'. Rosales mistook kolu for kollella ('ant'). Rosales, Historia general, I, p. 115.
75 Vivar, Cronica de los reinos, p. 71.
76 Ibid., p. 134.
77 Lobera, Cronica del reino, p. 266; V. Clement, 'Peuple de la foret, peuple de la frontiere:
Identite des indiens Pehuenches dans l'ancienne marche araucane (Chili, xvic-xxie)',
Melanges de la Casa de Velazquez XXXV (2005), pp. 127-31.
78 Medina, Los aborijenes de Chile, p. 198.
79 Vivar, Cronica de los reinos, p. 139.

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Clement 443

between the Mapocho and Maule rivers, and ordered their people not involved in war to
take refuge south of the River Maule.80 Thus, the Spaniards could not count on the
Mapuche harvesting. Pedro de Valdivia tried to stop the Mapuches' strategic withdrawal.
He ordered General Francisco de Villagra to keep the natives from crossing the Maule,
but certainly with no success.81 A short time after the foundation of Conception del
Nuevo Extremo, in 1552 the natives used another strategy to ruin the Spaniards' supplies.
As lamented by Vivar, they succeeded in introducing large numbers of rats into the
fortress thanks to holes they carved under the fortifications. In the traps the Spaniards
laid in order to limit the plague they found some days 400 or 500 rats.82 More commonly
the Mapuches hid food in the forest such as maize or araucaria nuts. The conquistadores
desperately looked for it, and to find some hidden food was celebrated as a great event.83
No doubt the Mapuches wanted to wage a war of attrition in order to deprive the Spaniards
of supplies, according to Vivar.84
In addition, the natives had at hand many kinds of wood to make their weapons. It was
another clear advantage, as stressed by Najera.85 Although Spanish weapons were of a
more advanced technology, Pedro de Valdivia and his men were not capable of making
them. Their weapons came from specialized centres located in Spain, mainly in
Guipuzcoa and Toledo. Mapuche weapons were simpler but also easier to reproduce ad
infinitum. They had at their disposal a large range of woods with different properties
suitable for each kind of weapon. For instance, the hardwoods of the boldo tree (Peumus
boldus), espino tree (Acacia caven), and guayacan bush (Porlieria chilensis) were used
to make spears and clubs.86 Bows were made with the maqui tree (Aristotelia chilensis),
whereas slim bamboos were used for arrows.87 Sometimes the Mapuches coated the
arrows with poison prepared from colliguaya (Colliguaja odorifera), a common euphor
biaceous shrub in the Araucania zone. The poison comes from the latex contained in the
roots. It was used by the natives for war but never for hunting on account of its high
toxicity.88 It could kill a man in only 24 hours, according to Lobera, who found in a
native fortress large earthen vats filled with poisonous herbs.89
Furthermore, the Mapuche had defence systems based on forest planning. As John M.
Cooper noted, they used 'trenches protected with torn branches, pitfalls and ditches with
sharp stakes at the bottom' and Tog forts and palisades'.90 For his part, Louis de Armond

80 Ibid., pp. 162-3; Medina, Cartas de Valdivia, p. 35.

81 Medina, Cartas de Valdivia, p. 37.
82 Vivar, Cronica de los reinos, pp. 258-9.
83 Najera, Desenganoy reparo, pp. 87-8.
84 Vivar, Cronica de los reinos, p. 122; Najera, Desenganoy reparo, p. 87.
85 Najera, Desenganoy reparo, p. 169
86 Medina, Los aborijenes de Chile, p. 133; R. Latcham, La capacidad guerrera de los
Araucanos, sus armasy metodos militares (Santiago, Universitaria, 1915), p. 40.
87 Rosales, Historia general, I, p. 224.
88 J. Vellard, 'Les curares: leur preparation par les indiens sud-americains', Journal de la
Societe des Americanistes XLIV (1955), p. 69.
89 Lobera, Cronica del reino, pp. 364, 373.
90 J. Montgomery Cooper, 'The Araucarians', in J. H. Steward, ed., Handbook of South
American Indians (Washington, US Government Printing Office, 1946), II, p. 730.

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444 War in History 22(4)

added further observations based on Najera's chronicle concerning Mapuche tactics in

felling trees over trails to make the Spaniards' retreats more difficult.91 The following
research neglected the subject in the main.
Vivar's chronicle gives valuable information on the Mapuches' defences made of
trees, particularly when describing Michimalonko's refuge. It stood on the Aconcagua
Valley north-east of Santiago. On arriving at the place, Pedro de Valdivia and his men
were surprised to see in front of them a huge wall of vegetation made this way:

Carob trees are tall trees in the country, with large and thick thorns which are as large as half a
nail of carpentry and strong and bulky. From those branches and trees, this chieftain
[Michimalonko] had made such a stronghold which was ideally prepared both for attack and
defence, mostly from people on horseback. It was so woven and thick that it seemed to be a
fortress wall.92

The native defence described by Vivar was a more complex structure than a common
palisade made with logs. Actually, the description given corresponds to a hedge of very
large dimensions like those of the defensive forests in medieval Europe (Wehrwald,
Grenzwdlder, haies forestieres, plessis).93 The thorny carob tree was well adapted to
make a strong barrier. Such a natural defence was composed of several rows of old trees.
Between them, flexible branches and young trees were bent and linked together or to
older trees. The action of bending or twisting trees was called tomplin by the Mapuches.94
Bent branches and trees continued to grow in those twisted positions. They soon became
densely entangled, hence the aspect of being woven, as Vivar stressed. Eventually what
remained was an impressive wall of vegetation, as seen by Pedro de Valdivia and his
men. Michimalonko's carob tree wall was several kilometres long, for, as Vivar speci
fied, it began from a tall hill, spanned a valley, and ran on to very high pinnacle rocks on
the other side. It completely closed the access from the lower part of the valley to
Michimalonko's refuge. Moreover, turrets were built all along the wall for the native
archers.95 In Tanjalonko's territory Vivar described a defence of the same kind. It was

91 L. Armond, 'Frontier Warfare in Chile', Pacific Historical Review XXIII (1954), pp. 127,
131.

92 'Los algarrobos son arboles grandes en esta tierra y de grandes y gruesas puas, son tan largas
como clavos de medio tillado y recias y muy espesas. De estas ramas y arboles tenia este
cacique hecho un fuerte tan fuerte que era tan aparejado para ofender como para defender,
principalmente a gente de a caballo. Estaba tan tejido y tan gruesa que parecia muralla':
Vivar, Cronica de los reinos, p. 99.
93 W. Kuhn, 'Der Lowenberger Hag und die Besiedlung der Schlesien Grenzwalder', in
Beitrage zur schlesischen Siedlungsgeschichte (Munich, Delp, 1971), pp. 32-62; C.
Higounet, 'Les grandes haies forestieres de l'Europe medievale', Actes du Congres de la
Societe des historiens medievistes (Lille, 1979), pp. 213-17; J.J. Dubois and J.P. Renard,
'Forets et frontieres: Quelques reflexions pour une etude causale et evolutive', Espace,
Populations, Societes I (1984), pp. 25^-2.
94 Valdivia, Arte y gramatica, p. 134.
95 Vivar, Cronica de los reinos, p. 100.

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Clement 445

located north-west of Santiago in a thick forest of old trees and made with 'heavy and
very well woven branches'.96 It was designed as an arc from a river to a lake. It was
impossible to build such defences made of trees so soon after the Spaniards' arrival,
contrary to Villalobos's point of view.97 In fact, they were a survival from the previous
war against the Incas.
Confronted with such walls, the Spaniards had only two possibilities. The first was to
skirt around the obstacle, which is what they did to attack Michimalonko's fort. That
involved trudging wearily for a long distance across the forested slopes of the nearby
hills and arriving from a more elevated point than the wall itself. The second alternative
was to cut a hole in it with machetes and make the soldiers go through one by one, as
explained by Lobera.98 This hard and perilous work had to be achieved under continuous
volleys of native arrows. But after the barrier was crossed, the situation became even
more critical. The Spaniards had no option but to win the combat. For, in the contrary
case, the wall prevented them from any possibility of falling back quickly and allowed
them little chance to escape alive, as shown in the following example:

they saw a squad of Spaniards get out from the [native] fort, running down the slope in a very
disorderly way, and behind them a huge battalion of Indians coming after them and inflicting as
many injuries as the defence of bushes and wild bamboo where the horses were entangled."

Unable to escape from the trap of the wall of vegetation, 44 Spaniards perished in the
clash, mostly cavalrymen. Apart from the static defence of the walls, the Mapuches
could quickly prepare barriers with bent or felled trees.100 It was an essential part of
their preparation for ambushes. The purpose of these trees over tracks was, above all,
to lead the Spaniards towards the thickest parts of the forests by closing many trails
and allowing them one path as the only option.101 Later, when the Spaniards were far
enough along it was easy to block the path with other bent or felled trees, and thus
prevent their enemies' retreat.
According to Lobera and Vivar, it is in an ambush of this kind that Pedro de Valdivia
waged his last battle, in Tucapel. After several hours fighting against Lautaro's troops,
and having lost almost all his men, he tried to escape from the forested area where the

96 Ibid., p. 104.
97 S. Villalobos, Historia del pueblo chileno (Santiago de Chile, Universitaria, 2000), IV, pp.
69-70.

98 Lobera, Cronica del reino, p. 271.

99 'Vieron salir del fuerte una cuadrilla de espanoles corriendo con gran tropel por la cue
abajo, y un opulento ejercito de Indios que venian tras ellos haciendoles no menos dan
que la maleza de las matas y caneral donde se embarbascaban los caballos': Lobera
Cronica del reino, p. 316. In medieval Spain the expression 'maleza de las matas', us
by Lobera, designated a defensive wall of vegetation. V. Clement, 'La frontera y el bosque
en el Medievo: nuevos planteamientos para una problematica antigua', Actas del Congre
La Frontera Oriental Nazari como sujeto historico (S. XIII-XVI) (Almeria, Institute
Estudios Almerienses, Diputacion de Almeria, 1997), p. 335.
100 Lobera, Cronica del reino, p. 315.
101 Ibid., p. 230.

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446 War in History 22(4)

combat was taking place.102 But as every way out was closed by bent and felled trees, the
Mapuches could easily take him prisoner.103 They put him to death on 27 December
1553. A few months later, on 23 February 1554, General Francisco de Villagra narrowly
missed being killed in similar circumstances in the battle of Mariguenu (Marihuenu).
The Mapuches lured him into a trap. When retreating from a forested hill south of
Concepcion, all the return tracks were obstructed by barriers made of bent and felled
trees.104 Lautaro's troops took advantage of the situation to attack the Spaniards at each
of these barriers. As detailed by Vivar, there were heavy losses among the Spanish troops:
90 Spaniards were killed, as well as 3,000 Indian auxiliaries. In one of the attacks the
natives managed to unseat and injure General Villagra. Unhorsed, he was in great danger.
He was spared thanks to another cavalryman, who gave him his own horse to enable him
to escape alive.105 Thus, the bent and felled trees were a deciding factor in the success of
the Mapuches' ambushes. As a consequence of Valdivia's death and Villagra's defeat, all
the forts of the area were abandoned for several years by the Spanish soldiers. The people
of Concepcion were shipped back to the starting point of the conquest, Santiago de
Nuevo Extremo.

To conclude, Jara's thesis is not enough to fully understand why the Spaniards failed to
conquer the Mapuches' territory. The analysis made above on the first decade or so of the
war makes it possible to point out a new series of factors explaining the Mapuches' suc
cess in preventing the Spaniards from conquering their land. What the Spaniards regarde
as a new front of conquest was an old frontier for the natives. In 1540 the Mapuches had
been fighting against the Incas for at least a century. Obviously, they were not at all ine
perienced warriors but already had long military experience. The ceremonial of the war
councils, the process of the main toquVs election, and their prowess in landscaping
defences from vegetation could not have been invented straight after the arrival of th
Spaniards in Chile. They were rooted in ancient knowledge the Mapuches had acquired
from their previous enduring war against the Incas, or perhaps even before. Pedro de
Valdivia and his men could not count on the effect of surprise. On the contrary, the native
defences were operational and the Mapuches were soon in battle array. They had been
able to mobilize large numbers of warriors in order to lead coordinated attacks on th
Spaniards since the foundation of Santiago.
The Mapuches' onslaughts were not those of distressed people having bravery as their
only asset but fighting in a disordered way. They were well organized when they were a
war with external enemies. As seen above, their warfare was based on a substantial mili
tary hierarchy going from the private (cona) to the main military leader (toqui), whose
authority was recognized by all native fighters in wartime. The native military hierarch

102 Lobera, Cranica del reino, p. 154.

103 Vivar, Cronica de los reinos, p. 276.
104 Ibid., pp. 283—4; D. Barros Arana, Historia general de Chile (Santiago de Chile
Universitaria, 1884; reprint, 2000), II, p. 21.
105 Ibid., p. 285.

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Clement 447

also included non-commissioned officers (cupilonko), district officers (lonko), and spe
cialized officers such as the chieftain of the native archers (pilquitoqui). The military
organization of the Mapuches did not spring from the war against the Spaniards, for it
was already well established when the first combat took place. Thanks to their experi
ence, the Mapuches were able to use a large range of tactics to repel the conquistadores.
The war of attrition they conducted by reducing as much as they could the Spaniards'
ability to obtain supplies shows that the Mapuches were soon aware of their enemies'
weaknesses. It also demonstrates that the Mapuches could devise an elaborate strategy of
war, like some native groups of the North American south-west and south-east (Tepehuan,
Guale, or Pueblo tribes, for instance).
But the most determining factor lies in the forested nature of southern Chile and the
ability of the natives to fight in this kind of environment. In fact the forest played a
prominent part in the Mapuches' war-making. It was not only where they found countless
supplies or suitable wood for fashioning their weapons. The forest was the place where
they used to train for war. Their forts were located in remote spots of the forest and pro
tected from the invaders by defences made of vegetation similar to fortress walls. From
the forest they launched large-scale raids on the Spanish forts, but in the main they
avoided face-to-face confrontation on open land where they were much too vulnerable
because of the cavalrymen. They were not, however, in as strong a position as when they
ambushed the Spaniards in the forest by preventing their enemies' retreat with bent and
felled trees and attacking them on the blocked trails. Such a tactic was dreadfully
effective. In a striking contrast, Pedro de Valdivia and his men were quite vulnerable in
the forest. The asset they had with horses on open land was almost reduced to nothing.
For them, the forest environment was an unknown world and they had to face a type of
warfare they were not prepared for. Valdivia's death in the thick forests surrounding the
fort of Tucapel symbolized all the difficulties of the Spaniards in fighting in this wild
environment. It also marked a major turning point in a war which remained impossible
for the Spaniards to win.

Funding
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or
not-for-profit sectors.

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