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The Rise and Return of the Indo-Pacific

The Rise and Return

of the Indo-Pacific
T I M O T H Y D OY L E A N D D E N N I S RUM L EY
1
1
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Preface
The genesis of the present volume goes back almost 20 years to the creation of
the Indian Ocean Research Group and its launch in Chandigarh in 2002. Some
of the research collaboration since then between Sanjay Chaturvedi, Timothy Doyle,
and Dennis Rumley has been concerned with the nature of maritime regions—
their construction and definition, their usage and institutionalization, and the
conflicts and contestations that have emerged during these processes. Our work
initially focused upon the ‘Indian Ocean region’ but inevitably became involved
in critically evaluating differing views of state adherence to particular regional
structures, including that of the ‘Indo-Pacific region’. Some of the early results of
this work were discussed in our joint paper published in 2012: ‘ “Securing” the
Indian Ocean? Competing Regional Security Constructions”, Journal of the Indian
Ocean Region, Vol. 8 (1), pp. 1–20. We owe a very considerable debt of gratitude
to our dear brother Sanjay who has been our close companion on an amazing
(sometimes ‘floral’) journey around the region both physically and mentally
for so long.
Several other smaller pieces of work have served to hone our overall arguments
for this larger volume, and feedback given by various conference goers, readers, and
policy-makers have made this ongoing work richer for their input and inspiration.
For Tim, an initial paper presented at the International Studies Association con-
ference in Toronto in 2014 initiated such concepts of ‘super-region as non-region’;
the ‘liquid continuum’, and ‘mare nullius’, with a version of this earlier paper pub-
lished, in part, in Priya Chacko’s edited volume, New Regional Geopolitics in the
Indo-Pacific: Drivers, Dynamics and Consequences. Another paper on the changes
in the construction of the Indo-Pacific policy during different regimes within the
United States was first presented at the European Studies Association Conference
in Prague in 2018. Thanks to Dr Barry Ryan of Keele University for putting this
panel on maritime security together. Some of these ideas appear in final form in
Chapter 6 of this book.
Acknowledgements must also be provided for Professor Mark Beeson of the
University of Western Australia and Dr Jeffrey Wilson of Murdoch University,
who ran an invited symposium on the Indo-Pacific in Perth in 2017. These ideas
were partly captured in a piece published in East Asia Journal, Vol. 35 (2), and
they also form the thrust of the argument developed in Chapter 2 of this book.
For Dennis, earlier versions of Chapter 4 were delivered at the 6th International
Conference of the Research Institute of Indian Ocean Economies, Yunnan
University of Finance and Economics, Kunming, China; and at the International
vi Preface
Seminar on Indian Ocean Regional Security, Fudan University, Shanghai, China

in November 2016. In addition, an earlier draft of sections in Chapter 7 on
‘Strategic Narratives of Great Powers’ was written for presentation at the Security
and Growth for all in the Region International Conference in Goa, India, in
October 2017; and some arguments presented in Chapter 7 on Australia were
delivered at the 7th Research Institute of Indian Ocean Economies International
Conference in Kunming in November 2017.
Both Tim and Dennis, apart from being academics, have worked closely with
the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) over the years: Tim as chair of IORA’s
Academic Group based in Mauritius; and Dennis as Australia’s IORA academic
focal point. Both our scholarly and practical interactions with governments, cor-
porations, and civil society across this vast and rapidly expanding region have
provided rich food for thought when researching and writing this volume. In
particular, thanks must be accorded to the Indonesian Government for the publi-
cation of a brief paper written by Tim, alongside Australian colleague David
Brewster, in a book to celebrate IORA’s first twenty years, presented at Jogjakarta
in 2016: IORA at 20—Learning from the Past and Charting the Future, Policy
Development and Analysis Agency, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of
Indonesia 2017. Some of these arguments have been reworked into the concluding
chapter of this book.
We must acknowledge the generous support of the Australian Research
Council (ARC) in its Discovery Projects scheme. Both Tim, as lead chief investi-
gator, and Dennis, also as a chief investigator, were supported by the ARC in both
the field work and writing stages of this book, which is just one part of an even
larger research agenda: ‘Building an Indian Ocean Region’ (DP120101166).
Our deepest appreciation must also be recorded to our two research assistants
on this project: Dr Adela Alfonsi and Dr Georgia Lawrence-Doyle. Thank you for
your diligent research, thorough scholarship, and constant support.
Over the past five years, Timothy Doyle and Dennis Rumley have enjoyed joint
professorial research positions at Curtin University in Western Australia during
which time the bulk of the writing of the present volume took place. We are grateful
to Curtin for this unique opportunity. Curtin University Library was especially
helpful during this period, as was the ongoing support of Curtin colleague,
Graham Seal of the Australia-Asia-Pacific Institute.
Thanks also to staff and students at the Indo-Pacific Governance Research
Centre, and the Department of Politics and International Relations at the
University of Adelaide; as well as to Tim’s colleagues in the School of Politics,
Philosophy, International Relations and the Environment at Keele University in
the United Kingdom.
Special thanks must be accorded to the staff of Oxford University Press—
particularly our commissioning editor, Dominic Byatt, who saw sufficient merit
in the initial book proposal to support this lengthy process.
Preface vii
Naturally, in the very complex and demanding endeavour involved in writing

this book, we required and happily received the extreme patience of our dear
families—Fiona, Georgia, Matilda, and Thomas for Tim; and Hilary, Alison,
Christopher, Tomoko, David, Nina, Ewan and Naomi for Dennis. Without their
love, support, humour, and ongoing commentary on our devotion to this volume,
it would have been the poorer. We owe them all a great deal and we dedicate the
book to them.
Contents
List of Figures xi
List of Tables xiii
1. Introduction: Constructions of the Indo-Pacific Region 1

2. Maritime Regional Theories: Oceans and Seas 12
3. The Return of Traditional Geopolitical Thought:
The Rise of the Indo-Pacific Concept 28
4. The New ‘Multiplex’ Cold War in the Indo-Pacific 45
5. The US ‘Pivot’ in the Indo-Pacific 68
6. The Role of India in the Indo-Pacific 85
7. Regional Middle Powers and the Indo-Pacific Strategic Narrative 110
8. The Rise of China and the Indo-Pacific 143
9. Conclusion: Continuities, Change, and Challenges 162
Bibliography 181
Index 211
List of Figures
4.1. Perceived potential US adversaries 56

4.2. China–India border disputes 57
4.3. East Asian territorial disputes 62
4.4. The Indo-Pacific new Cold War matrix 65
5.1. Map of Indo-Pacific under Obama and before 78
5.2. Map of Indo-Pacific under Trump 79
7.1. Core states of the Indo-Pacific region 113
7.2. The five Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement Philippines bases 131
7.3. Content analysis of Australian defence white papers 1987–2016 142
8.1. Global share of total exports 1948–2014 144
8.2. Share of global economic power 1970–2030 145
8.3. Indo-Pacific BRI economic corridors 155
List of Tables
4.1. India’s strategic partnerships 60

4.2. China’s Asian strategic partnerships 61
4.3. The Indo-Pacific bilateral principled security network 64
7.1. Some middle power characteristics 112
7.2. Socio-economic characteristics of Indo-Pacific core middle powers 114
7.3. China and the US: Indo-Pacific middle power strategic
partnerships and alliances 115
7.4. Indo-Pacific great power–middle power cooperative partnerships 116
7.5. The ideology of the Indo-Pacific 119
7.6. Twenty-first-century Indonesian regional security narratives 123
7.7. South Korean presidential ideological orientations 1987–2018 134
7.8. Indo-Pacific middle power strategic policies 141
8.1. Indo-Pacific state military expenditure 2017 146
8.2. China trade concentration 1991–2006: Indo-Pacific middle powers 151
8.3. Indo-Pacific middle power merchandise trade with China and the US 2017 153
8.4. Indo-Pacific trade liberalization agenda membership 2018 154
8.5. BRI positives and negatives—a view from the Economist156
1
Introduction
Constructions of the Indo-Pacific Region
Structure of the Book
We begin this book with a discussion and analysis of the contested Indo-Pacific
concept in order to highlight the variation in the nature of the construction and
acceptance of its varying meanings. Despite the prevailing narratives of the Indo-
Pacific, Chapter 2 explores how discourses of the region should not solely revolve
around the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Rather, we argue that the Indo-Pacific is
the convergence of these two, vast, geo-oceanic systems and the countries, com-
munities, and cultures which are touched by these waters in both a physical and
metaphysical sense. We contend that this collision of water spaces epitomizes the
essence of the Indo-Pacific region, as well as the littoral zone between the Indian
Ocean and the western Pacific. In Chapter 2, the ‘imaginations’ of seas and oceans
are discussed as discrete entities to understand the varying epistemological
traditions which strive to form, or critique, the emergence of grand ‘oceanic’
regionalisms.
For example, the Indo-Pacific region will be discussed in light of three domin
ant theoretical frameworks: the non-realist interpretation of the Indo-Pacific,
which posits a shared ‘oceanic neighbourhood’, surpassing the hegemony of trad
itional nation-states; second, the realist construction of the region, which aims to
establish ‘natural’ and essentialist relationships between individual states in the
region; third, we outline the universalist, ‘non-differentiated’ interpretation of
oceanic space, which views the Indo-Pacific as a globalized ‘non-space’ or ‘liquid
continuum’, resisting territorialization. This chapter will also expose some of the
previously overlooked cultural narratives of the Indo-Pacific prior to coloniza-
tion. We will examine the ways in which these stories are now being exploited
or reshaped in contemporary geopolitical discourse for both exogenous and
endogenous political gains. Finally, we argue that the concept of ‘region’ is
increasingly being co-opted in order to challenge the role and existence of any
uniform model of macro geopolitics.
Chapter 3 offers an outline and synthesis of the dissemination, perpetuation,
and evolution of traditional geopolitical thought concerning the Indo-Pacific
region. There will first be a discussion as to what is considered to be conventional
geopolitical discourse, followed by a broad regional synopsis of the transmission
The Rise and Return of the Indo-Pacific. Timothy Doyle and Dennis Rumley, Oxford University Press (2019).
© Timothy Doyle and Dennis Rumley.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198739524.001.0001
2 The Rise and Return of the Indo-Pacific
of traditional geopolitical concepts throughout the key nation-states of the

Indo-Pacific region, including: Japan, the United States (US), China, India,
Indonesia, Australia, and the African continent. Chapter 3 aims to grasp the
extent to which these concepts and ideas continue to contribute to contemporary
regional geopolitical policy-making.
In particular, we will outline the revival of particular classical paradigms and con-
cepts such as ‘pivots’, lebensraum, sea and land powers—all of which have been
drawn from the works of prevalent scholars in the field of international relations and
geopolitics, such as Mackinder, Spykman, Caroe, Pannikar, Semple, Ratzel, and
especially Haushofer. We argue how the return of these concepts and their reshaping
through various national lenses reveals the construction of these distinct Indo-
Pacific regionalisms. We posit that the limited national frameworks of the
Indo-Pacific tend to take precedence over more genuine, pan-regional aspirations.
Essentially, this chapter will argue that, in the twenty-first century, the Indo-Pacific is
being increasingly utilized as an ‘enabling tool’ for regional state territorial expan-
sionism, as well as for the geographical extension of m ilitary dominance, with the
potential for significant regional, national—even global—conflict.
Chapter 4 claims that the primary obstruction to sustainable security and
stability in the Indo-Pacific region is due to the economic and political legacy of
the Cold War. It will be asserted that the attitudes, perceptions, and misconcep-
tions of the Cold War remain an integral—or at least implicit—part of the
decision-making process undertaken by senior Indo-Pacific policy-makers. This
chapter will first outline some of the primary aspects and causes of the New Cold
War, and will then situate these within the broader context of South Asia and the
Indo-Pacific region. For example, we highlight how several international bound-
ary conflicts remain unresolved, including the Koreas, Japan, and Russia, and
how these states are yet to consolidate peace agreements regarding contested ter
ritories and seascapes. It will also be pointed out how Chinese expansion into the
South China Sea remains a key point of contention.
The chapter will also describe how post-Cold War strategic diplomacy shaped
the New Cold War structures present in the Indo-Pacific region. Strategic frame-
works such as containment, ‘constrainment’, sphere of influence, expansionism,
and territorial conflict all continue to permeate the rhetoric of the region—and
not only that of the regional security environment. It will be contended that
regional strategies can thus be viewed through the lens of Cold War ‘logic’, which
in turn obstructs regional security cooperation as Cold War realist logic by defin
ition infers conflict, and idealist globalist post-Cold War logic infers cooperation.
Finally, Chapter 4 will claim that there is a ‘New Cold War matrix’ which encap-
sulates contemporary geopolitical and geo-economic intersections among the
dominant powers of the Indo-Pacific.
Chapter 5 examines the US’s emerging strategic, military, and security interests
in the Indian Ocean region. As explored in Chapter 4, over the past decade or so,
Introduction 3
there has been a revival of classical geopolitical language in twenty-first-century

regional security discourses. Specifically, the concepts of ‘pivot’ and the regional
‘Indo-Pacific’ have been revived by US analysts and policy-makers. We claim that
this is, in part, due to the rise of and imperial power of Asian states, especially
China and India. Both of these and their economic and military status in the
region pose serious threats to the US. Chapter 5 will also argue that there is a
burgeoning American global identity as an ‘Indo-Pacific’ power-player, as the US
continues to ‘pivot’ further from the Greater Middle East. We will claim that the
re-emergence of the Indo-Pacific concept highlights the danger of merely utiliz-
ing state-centric geopolitical perspectives over complex, nuanced analyses and
understandings of global politics. This chapter posits that the primacy of nation-
states should not be trivialized: in addition, we should not dismiss other avenues
of understanding concepts of ‘place’ and ‘space’ within a more globalized context.
Finally, it will be claimed that the recent Trumpian turn towards the Indo-Pacific
has built upon—but has also co-opted—the neo-liberal discourse of Obama’s
‘liquid continuum’. The US administration’s ‘free’ and ‘open’ Indo-Pacific strategy
has now shifted towards a neo-mercantilist position, with the Indian Ocean
becoming a heavily demarcated and militarized space, split along statist and
territorial lines.
In Chapter 6, the role of India in constructions of the Indo-Pacific as a new
‘regional’ identity will be discussed. This concept is gaining traction in both the
foreign and defence policy institutions in India. Chapter 6 draws out the various
theoretical frameworks utilized in the formation of the Indo-Pacific, namely
how in Indian strategic discourse, the term is grounded more strictly in ‘realist’
thought—in a very different and more defined manner that the US experience
attests to. This may have much to do with India transitioning as a middle power,
fixed firmly in the terra and watery firmaments of its immediate regional proxim-
ity; whereas the US ranges more freely, wrapped more flexibly in its coat as
superpower.
We claim that the nascent Indian narrative of the Indo-Pacific requires a geo-
historical approach, because although the Indo-Pacific concept is currently ‘in
vogue’, the essential motivation behind India’s alleged centrality in the Asian stra-
tegic space is, historically, nothing new. In fact, we argue that it is quite the oppos
ite: the region has enduring historical connections to British imperialism and
Indian nationalism. The works of post-independence Indian strategic thinkers
such as Caroe and Pannikar will be drawn upon to illustrate how their geopolit
ical reasonings and arguments remain integral to contemporary Indian framings
of the Indo-Pacific.
We contend that India has the opportunity of destabilizing pervasive bilateral
and multilateral geopolitical relations within the Indian Ocean region; a region of
‘sub-regions’. Finally, this chapter posits the concept of the Indo-Pacific from the
perspective of both smaller sub-regions of the Indian Ocean, such as South Asia
(Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal), as well as the previously inadequately

unexamined triangular alliances of the Indo-Pacific (US–India–Japan and
US–India–Australia).
Chapter 7 investigates how, since the Cold War, there has been a political and
economic race between the great regional powers for control over the middle
powers of the Indo-Pacific. These powers have been competing to form a regional
middle power coalition in opposition to either China or the US. We argue that
political orientation to China has been facilitated through a programme of devel-
oping strategic partnerships, and in the case of the US, it has been enabled
through a policy of alliance reaffirmation or the modifying of Cold War treaties.
As a consequence, we discuss how the foreign policies of US co-opted states
marks a shift towards support for the US pivot, as well as a greater foreign policy
interest than previously displayed in the Indo-Pacific region. We claim that this
has resulted in an Indo-Pacific self-identification and an ‘Indo-Pacific narrative’
in the foreign policy rhetoric and debates of US co-opted states.
The chapter will further contend that the relevance of the Indo-Pacific strategic
narrative has taken many forms among the eight ‘core’ Indo-Pacific middle
powers—Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea,
Thailand, and Vietnam. Australia has quite vigorously implemented and perpetu-
ated the Indo-Pacific strategic narrative. We further note that in Australia, firmly
part of the ‘Anglosphere’, a very separate narrative has emerged compared to
other ‘fulcrum states’ in the region—Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand. In
the examples of the latter, qualities of pragmatism, equidistance, and uncertainty
have defined the strategies of these three countries in their relationships with
both China and the US. Finally, we outline how the remaining four middle
powers have responded to the Indo-Pacific narrative: Indonesia has embraced
the regional importance of the Indo-Pacific; Malaysia, similarly to South Korea,
has adopted an ‘equidistant’ approach; and Vietnam has followed a unique
multipolar balance.
Chapter 8 provides a broad overview and critical analysis of the nature of the
rise of China and its geopolitical and geo-economic implications for the Indo-
Pacific region. The chapter is in six parts: we first discuss the persistent, yet dis-
tinctive, rise of China, and how it has been framed as a ‘non-Western’ hybrid
model. Indeed, China is not one of the wealthiest states, nor is it democratic, and
through its open yet mercantilist approach, it boasts a unique blend of its own
past and culture (Jacques 2012: 546; Subramanian 2011: 138). Second, we outline
how China’s reform agenda by President Xi Jinping in 2013 called for a ‘new type
of international relations’ which relies on three critical elements: no opposition
or conflict, enhanced mutual respect, and the promotion of a cooperative win-
win situation, and how this has had a significant impact on China–US relations,
as it was seen as undermining the ‘core interests’ of the US and the ‘traditional
world order’.
Introduction 5
China’s regional trade relationships will then be discussed, and how the c urrent
geopolitics and geo-economics of the Indo-Pacific are primarily a result of a set of
competitive interactions among the great powers—notably China and the US—
and the regional middle powers—especially the core states already discussed.
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), for example, will be argued as potentially
one of the most visionary and significant geo-economic and geopolitical projects
in the modern history of Indo-Pacific policy-making. Finally, we contend that
with China’s inevitable rise, it will continue to shape the nature of the relationship
between the US and China, and in turn, this will significantly alter the nature of
relations with and among other Indo-Pacific states, and will have enduring global
and institutional impacts. We argue that policy elites in both states need to accept
that neither China nor the US can be the sole dominant power and that regional
peace and security can only be established if attempting to keep a balance of said
power (Zhao 2013: 9).
In the final episode of this work—Chapter 9—we reiterate core themes. First,
we further reiterate the central primacy of the relationship between the US and
China—it is this relationship over the next fifty years which will determine
whether the Indo-Pacific remains largely a region of peace or war. The other major
task of this final chapter is to move away from grand concepts and positionings in
global geopolitics, and look at the nascent attempts at building maritime regional
governance structures across the region which genuinely celebrate the more lib-
eral understandings of the Indo-Pacific—as a maritime neighbourhood, as a site
of cooperation, shared resources management, and securing peace. The imperfect
example of the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) is reviewed, with possible
suggestions for reform and potential implications for the creation of a new Indo-
Pacific Regional Forum.
Constructing the Indo-Pacific
The Indo-Pacific, constructed either as an oceanic region, super-region, or non-

region is currently a hotly contested map-making phenomenon. The Indo-Pacific
has been recently been classified as an ‘amalgam of the Asia-Pacific and the Indian
Ocean Region’ and identified as ‘the new, expanded theatre of power competition’
(Bateman et al. 2017: 7).
It is critical to establish, however, that the Indo-Pacific is not just about the
Indian and Pacific Oceans. Of course, these oceans, in biogeographical terms,
remain central to most constructions of what the Indo-Pacific is—a confluence of
two great, geo-oceanic systems. It can also be understood as the meeting place
of these two oceans, the clashing and smashing of these two watery systems
that describes the true heart of the Indo-Pacific, a littoral zone between the
Indian Ocean and the western Pacific (if that is conceptually possible). But the
Indo-Pacific is also about land—those countries which both directly abut the
Indian and Pacific Oceans, but also those which sometimes operate within it—in
terms of trade, culture, and security—but whose heartlands exist beyond these
oceanic catchments. Finally, and in more recent times, the Indo-Pacific is also
about the ‘space above’ (see Chapter 5).
Place largely determines the meaning of ‘Indo-Pacific’. Different geographical
points of view drastically alter the comprehension of the term. Various countries
and cultures, washed by the waters of these amorphous oceanic boundaries and
sea spaces, are currently seeking to establish exclusive territorial claims over these
water spaces by invoking stories and narratives taken from pre-colonial, colonial,
and post-colonial eras. These stories are often used in an attempt to legitimate
‘natural’ and more essentialist relationships between certain cultures and/or
nation-states with their surrounding seas. In addition, whether a country is a
‘super’, ‘great’, ‘middle’, or ‘lesser’ power will have a huge impact of how the con-
struction is built. These narratives both challenge the broader international sys-
tem and its rule of law and create internal narratives, strengthening domestic and
national support for state-building programmes in the region/s. But the Indo-
Pacific is more than a contestation between nation-statist imaginations and aspir
ations. Contrarily, it also invokes stories which seek to develop liberal narratives
which celebrate a shared ‘maritime regionalism’ beyond the exclusive and usually
dominant politics of nation-states. Finally, a third interpretive category is some-
times used by powerful strategic actors to do quite the opposite—to build an
Indo-Pacific as a neo-liberal, globalized ‘non-space’, with few borders and bound-
aries to annoy the free flow of capital and force.
In addition, time is a critical factor. Notions of the Indo-Pacific may be in
vogue in the early decades of the twenty-first century, but they have also enjoyed
similarly fashionable positions in geostrategic circles, in alternate ways, over the
past 100 years or more. During these times, Indo-Pacific discourse was not exactly
as it is today, but rumours emerging from those original manifestations still rum-
ble through foreign policy tropes today. In fact, the rise of the Indo-Pacific, used
to divide the world into geopolitical blocs during the Nazi regime of World War II,
is still reflected in cartographic imaginations today, and the classical geopolitical
writings which informed them continue to have unusual traction in government
and corporate think-tanks.
In very general terms, by way of introduction, let us touch upon just some of
these different constructions—both in place and time—to provide some of the
variances which shape this exercise in map making and region building, to be
thrashed out in subsequent discussions. First, the Indo-Pacific, as a construct, is
most often used in the US and Australia, and not so much in Asia (Sukma 2013).
In the twenty-first century, the original German conception, as discussed in
Chapter 3, has now ironically become an Anglo-Saxon co-option. Any sense of
‘construct attachment’ by regional states is therefore likely to be highly variable,
Introduction 7
thus affecting its potential success. Next, there are a considerable number of
versions of Indo-Pacific ‘strategic space’ that exclude China. Raja Mohan’s (2012)
map of the Indo-Pacific, however, includes all of the Indian Ocean plus the west
Pacific Ocean (and thus includes China). If we include the dimension of time, and
go back to consult some of the early German geopoliticians, China is very much
part of the Indo-Pacific. Karl Haushofer’s (1930s) military map of the region—the
‘Great Indo-Pacific Ocean’—for example includes all of the Indian and Pacific
Oceans (including, therefore, China).
In general, two overall conclusions dominate (but often with very different
premises)—on the one hand, there are the ‘inclusionists’ (who would include
China and/or Africa) versus the ‘exclusionists’ (those who would exclude China
and/or Africa from the definition).
Another area of substantive debate occurs over the pre-eminence of the term
‘Indo-Pacific’ versus ‘Indian Ocean’. A ‘nested’ approach is often taken; that is, the
Indian Ocean is seen as being linked to a larger Indo-Pacific strategic system
(Rumley 2015b). Indeed, as will be discussed in the conclusion to this book, insti-
tutional attempts to ‘govern’ the Indian Ocean region—the formation and oper
ation of IORA—are the closest thing to an Indo-Pacific ‘administrative region’ to
have emerged.
Nonetheless, one of the unresolved issues here is whether either the Indian
Ocean region or the Indo-Pacific region represents a ‘regional security complex’.
Among other things, this touches on a tendency on the part of some commenta-
tors to assume that ‘economic space’ (a functional space defined largely by non-
state economic interactions) is necessarily congruent with ‘strategic space’
(a functional space constructed by strategic commonalities which in turn are
largely driven by state geopolitical interests). As has been noted, as an economic
space, the Indian Ocean possesses ‘little economic coherence’ (Brewster 2012:
159), has traditionally been viewed as ‘the heart of the Third World’, and yet is the
most important economic routeway in the world. Furthermore, as a strategic
space the Indian Ocean has been most often organized on a sub-regional scale.
The Indo-Pacific, or ‘Greater Indian Ocean’, on the other hand, while being
regarded by some as ‘a single integrated geopolitical theater’ (Raja Mohan 2012:
212–15), is actually an even more highly differentiated strategic space. For
example, in its western Pacific or Asia-Pacific sub-regions, we argue in Chapter 4
that the Cold War has yet to end, and this sub-region is also beset by numerous
significant territorial disputes. For example, as historian Gregory Clark has
recently reminded us, Japan is in ‘severe dispute’ with every one of its neighbours
(Clark 2013). In terms of economic space, however, the Asia-Pacific has a degree
of ‘economic coherence’ (Brewster 2012: 159). While the Pacific and Indian Oceans
should be regarded as ‘strategically linked’, the Indo-Pacific region should be
viewed as a strategic space that is not ‘integrated’; but rather one that is evolving
‘gradually and partially’ (Brewster 2012: 158).
The ‘geopolitical revision’ and appeal of the Indo-Pacific concept has been
triggered, in part, by the process of global geopolitical transition, and/or the
‘domination’ post-Cold War narrative. In addition, in the twenty-first century, the
Indo-Pacific concept has emerged as an especially useful device for justifying any
form of territorial expansionism (land, sea, and space).
The concept of both ‘ocean’ and ‘region’ are relatively modern concepts. In
Chapter 2, we spend some time discussing the separate properties of sea spaces
and ocean spaces; the latter being more of a Westphalian construct, more
synonymous with European expansionism during both the colonial and post-
colonial eras.
Of course, regions, regionalisms, and regionalizations have long been part of
the international system (and non-systems), but it must be acknowledged that in
this sometimes translateralist world, the concept and symbol of ‘region’ has been
increasingly used to challenge the power and existence of any uniform model of
macro geopolitics. Katzenstein writes:
The end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union have lessened the
impact of global factors in world politics and have increased the weight of
regional forces that had operated all along under the surface of superpower con-
frontation. International politics thus is increasingly shaped by regional, as well
as national and local, dynamics . . . Distinctive world regions are shaping national
politics and policies. But these regions are indelibly linked to both the larger inter
national system of which they are a part, and to the different national systems
which constitute them. (Katzenstein 1996: 123–4; emphasis added)
Whilst acknowledging the primacy of nation-states, another way in which place

and space are now celebrated within a more globalized world order is the re-
emergence of geo-economic regionalisms. Regions, regionalisms, and regionali-
zations are, at once, a result of globalization and a challenge to it. Regions have
long been part of the international system (and non-systems), but it must be
acknowledged that in this progressively more translateralist world, the concept
and symbol of ‘region’ has been increasingly used to challenge the power and
existence of any uniform model of macro geopolitics. Nation-states remain the
most vociferous players, each one jostling from different and often ambiguous
positions, as to which countries should be included within and without these
new regional cartographies (Nieuwenhuis 2013). Due to the nascent nature of
these regional constructions, it must be stressed at the outset that these positions
are not universally adopted by particular nation-states. In some countries, it may
be a particular think-tank, a specific political party, or one branch of the govern-
mental bureaucracy which advocates a version of ‘Indo-Pacific’ regionalism. This
fits in nicely with Jayasuriya’s concept of a regulatory regionalism (Jayasuriya 2008):
that certain constructions are championed by actors, networks, and specific
Introduction 9
bureaucratic and epistemic communities within and outside of governments,

rather than being examples of a whole-of-government understanding. Despite
this lack of coherence, however, there is no doubt that amongst think-tanks,
national policy-making, and epistemic communities, these concepts are in their
ascendancy, and on occasions, certain positions become dominant.
Abetted by the institutions of statecraft, the dominant powers under threat are
searching for alternate alignments and directions to form a template of ‘national
interests’ that can no longer be utilized unilaterally or even bilaterally in this neo-
liberal, globalized world. In the geographical sense, seeking another ‘new’ region-
alism of the ‘like-minded’ is rife with paradoxes: numerous national positions on
the ‘Indo-Pacific’ are defined by common as well as nation-specific factors—such
as the deficit of trust vis-à-vis China. In addition to this, the nature and scope of
the burgeoning narrative of the Indo-Pacific is the fact that instead of geo-economics
and geopolitics mutually undercutting one another, both spheres appear open to
a mutually convenient ‘functional’ alliance founded on an amalgamation of theories
and rhetoric (e.g. realist-liberal combination). These are focused on consolidating
the security and military establishments, including the ‘strategic’ arenas of capi-
talism’s ‘increasingly self-produced geographies’ (Harvey 2010: 144).
In addressing the question of what is and who delimits the Indo-Pacific region
it is necessary to take account of at least eight basic regionalization principles and
processes (Rumley and Chaturvedi 2015):
1. All regions are human constructions.

2. There is no such thing as a ‘natural’ region.
3. Academics, policy-makers, business people, international entities, and others
delimit regions for a variety of classificatory and organizational functions.
4. Some regions are delimited simply for statistical purposes.
5. Other regions are delimited on ideological grounds.
6. Yet other regions have to do with security.
7. Inevitably, some states are excluded from the constructed region while
others become founder members. Why this is so is important for effective
regional cooperation.
8. In short, the constructed region is a product of the purpose, the spatial
vision, and the strategic goals of that which/who delimits it.
Indo-Pacific regionalism, then, is at once a challenge to non-differentiated

globalization (a recognition of the actual existence of pan- and sub-regional
‘neighbourhoods’ in the ‘real’ terms of space and place) and, at the same time, a
challenge to the primacy of the nation-state. Regionalism sometimes occupies the
‘middle ground’ between the geopolitics of the nation-state and an international
or transnational world. Oceanic regionalism, then, can be used to confront the
often overly homogenizing forces of globalization (sometimes also in the interests
of national geostrategy) and at the same time to promote an agenda sometimes

outside the direct remit of national governments. But it can also be used to
promote and prioritize certain nation-states, and argue for their ‘essential’
connections to the region; paradoxically promoting ‘non-regions’ and globalized
water spaces, where the market is represented as civilization or as a god.
This move to regionalizations and regionalisms is, of course, part of a more
general response which has emerged in this neoteric global geopolitical environ-
ment. States around the world, including ‘great powers’ like India and ‘middle
powers’ like Australia, are still undergoing post-Cold War transitions to a new
geopolitical order.
State post-Cold War transitions to a new global geopolitical order are operat-
ing in the context of at least five global geopolitical/geo-economic shifts:
1. A shift to a post-Cold War world—perpetuation of Cold War mentality and

shift to a New multiplex Cold War as a result of globalization.
2. A shift to a post-unipolar world—the relative decline of the US.
3. A shift to a post-colonial world—the emergence of post-colonial nationalism.
4. A shift in the global distribution of economic power—a shift in global
economic power away from Europe and the US to Asia.
5. A shift in the nature of ‘threat’ to ‘non-traditional’ concerns.
A new pentapolar world and the change in threat perception have fundamental
implications for stability and for cooperation.
At the time of writing, the Indo-Pacific is emerging as ‘the dominant inter
national waterway of the 21st century’, as was the Atlantic in the twentieth century
and the Mediterranean in the ancient world (United States National Intelligence
Council 2012: 80). In this new global geopolitical environment, competition
among great powers in the pentapolar world generates considerably more uncer-
tainty and instability. Conflict is to be expected, especially along great power
boundary zones or in spaces of perceived sphere of influence (land and sea).
However, there is considerable compulsion towards cooperation, especially in
terms of non-traditional threats. In addition, great power relationships are, for
the most part, increasingly regulated by post-Cold War partnerships, rather than
any revision or rebadging of old Cold War alliances.
The Epistemological Continuum: Essentialist

and Constructivist Methodologies Combined
Within the study of geopolitics and international relations, there is an

epistemological continuum, a battleground between essentialists and constructiv-
ists, and at the heart of these extremes are closely held assumptions about the
Introduction 11
nature of science, other forms of knowledge, and human relations. The work of
constructivists and ‘relativists’ is often looked down on by essentialists, par-
ticularly the work of those constructivists who advocate reality only through
its incarnation as narrative and language. Essentialists advocate the ‘realist’
perspective on international relations, focusing on state-centric histories, rela-
tions, and regimes. For their part, constructivists from a number of critical sub-
disciplines (be they Foucauldian, feminist, or neo-Marxist, to name a few) argue
that realist scholars are in fact only telling ‘statecraft stories’ themselves—only
this time, they are simply articulating the dominant world views of powerful
elites within the state, and within transnational organizations and corporations.
The world view espoused in this book comprises elements of the essential and
the socially constructed.
As mentioned, many countries in the Indo-Pacific are adopting this realist/
essentialist view regarding their own histories. Namely, that their state’s past is
more essential than the past stories of other nation-states. This is in no way an
innate criticism of the recent re-emergence of state-centred depictions of region,
just that this period of creating regional histories from the perspective of particu-
lar nation-states has escalated in recent times. As we will establish in this book,
these stories are often used in an attempt to legitimate ‘natural’, and more essen-
tialist relationships between certain cultures and/or nation-states with their
surrounding seas. The purpose is two-fold. Firstly, these stories are reworked to
create internal narratives which strengthen domestic and national support for
state-building programmes in the region, and secondly, these stories challenge
the broader international system and its rule of law. Later in this book we will
examine some of these stories currently being rewritten and reinvigorated by a
number of Indo-Pacific states in a bid to bolster civilizational claims and ‘natural’
domain linkages to these water spaces.
Our own geopolitical stance, however, is that it is conceivable to not only util
ize the best epistemological traditions of the essentialist and relativist schools of
thought, but to achieve this is critical both empirically and discursively. Despite
nation-states wielding less power than their immediate post-World War II status,
they are still extremely influential in shaping and curbing the tide of politics and
international relations. Granted, issues of identity, religion, race, and class tra
verse national borders. Nevertheless, countries continue to be the most prevailing
indicator of difference and identity in terms of earthly experience. We must
recognize, however, that a geopolitics founded solely on these more essentialist
structures of nation-states and cartographies of interstate relationships is a shal-
low and inadequate scholarly and practical world view. A more complex, nuanced,
and diverse investigation must be undertaken to embrace these more traditional
approaches, whilst recognizing that more constructivist frameworks, theories,
narratives, and tropes are also fundamentally important to the understanding,
imagining, and casting of twenty-first-century geopolitics.
2
Maritime Regional Theories
Oceans and Seas
Introduction: Regions, Oceans, and Sea Spaces
Seas and ocean ‘imaginations’ are often viewed differently. This, then, is the first
object of this chapter: to understand the different epistemic traditions which seek
to develop or, conversely, to critique the emergence of grand ‘oceanic’ regional-
isms. Secondly, we attempt to map out some of the subservient stories of cultures
existing in parts of the Indo-Pacific before European colonization, and how some
of these stories are being invoked and/or reshaped in current geopolitical contexts
for both exogenous and endogenous political purposes.
It can also be argued that the Indo-Pacific is, in fact, more about an acknow
ledgement of the rise of the Indian Ocean as a global power-base, rather than
providing a true focus on the entire Pacific. But the Indo-Pacific is also caught up
with past understandings of all the Earth’s oceans and seas, the Atlantic and
Mediterranean included. In pre-modern times, oceans did not exist. But seas did.
Considerable scholarship now points towards how sea space has been socially
constructed and reconstructed over the centuries (Steinberg 2001; Lewis and
Wigen 1997; Matsuda 2006; Van Schendel 2002; Frost 2010; Moorthy and Jamal
2010). Therefore, using a more multifarious framework informed by the seas may
provide a less homogenizing and totalizing conceptual vehicle: seascapes and
spheres of the sea may provide us with more understandings at the micro level,
allowing us to comprehend identity, community, and heritage projects at the sea-
neighbourhood level, within sub-regional frameworks which are more human
and less expansionist in scale.
The Social Construction of Maritime Space
The historical geographer, Wigen, argues that maritime regions are modern
cultural constructs, and she has problematized what she refers to as ‘basin thinking’—
the kind of thinking employed by Cold War military strategists, academics,
and policy-makers, who employed oceanic cartographic frames and lenses for
their own geostrategic interests (Wigen 2006). In her introduction to a collection
of essays on the ‘new thalassology’, she notes that, despite the continued hegemony
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198739524.001.0001
Maritime Regional Theories 13
of the Braudelian paradigm of historical research, ‘for historians of premodern

eras, oceanic labels are fundamentally anachronistic’. Even the concept of the
Mediterranean as a region (rather than a sea) owes its existence to the Enlightenment,
and basin thinking, she concludes, ‘is a product of high imperialism’ (Wigen 2006:
719–20).
Vink, also invoking a new thalassology, discusses the surge in regional ocean
studies research, and specifically concentrates on analyses of Indian Ocean his
toriographical developments and debates (Vink 2007: 33). Indian Ocean histori-
ography has emerged much later than historiography of the Pacific and the
Atlantic, but since its emergence in the 1950s and 1960s (dominated by the work
of three great architects of Indian Ocean Rim cultural commonalities research,
Pearson, Chaudhuri, and McPherson), it has developed a rich historiography. As
touched upon, it is a scholarship influenced by the Braudelian Annales school in
terms of its methodology, and from Wallersteinian World Systems theory and, as
a consequence, it has developed its connections with the literature and ideas on
development and dependency theory. The work of Sugata Bose is a more nuanced
version of this, as will be argued later (Bose 2006: 4).
Vink notes that this thalassology paradigm has some withering critics, and
Wallerstein’s theory has attracted plenty of commentary about its underlying
eurocentrism, its economic determinism, and its inconsistent interpretations
about the commodities that are the subject of the analysis (Vink 2007: 33). He
also argues that the boundaries of the Indian Ocean world have been far more
blurred and porous than land boundaries, and are far more constantly in flux. He
argues that mental remapping demands move away from essentializing ‘trait
geographies’ towards more deterritorialized concepts, ‘in which regions can be
conceptualized as both dynamic and interconnected’ (Vink 2007: 33). Many simi-
lar deterritorialized concepts emphasizing interaction, movement, and migration
have been suggested in recent years. These spatial constructs emphasize and
confirm the dual theme of integration and fragmentation underlying the Indian
Ocean ‘Mediterranean’ and ‘sub-Mediterranean’ world(s) (Vink 2007).
This new geopolitics, therefore, is often deterritorialized, and with regard to
temporalization, chronologies are also different (Vink 2007). Great areas of his-
torical debate emerge about whether—and when—the ‘organic’ unity of, in this
case, the Indian Ocean as some kind of region was finally sundered by the polit
ical and economic changes wrought by the changes in the world economy. Bose’s
work precisely purports to maintain the Indian Ocean as an area of economic and
cultural interaction without clinging too deeply to a thesis of a sustained continu-
ity (Bose 2006: 4). The European ‘scramble for Asia’ created maps, boundaries,
and sovereignties where these had not existed, or not existed in this form.
European cartographies reflected European visions, interests, and fantasies. Asia,
however, did not apply the same regional perspectives, or did not use the labels in
the same way. For example, in her fascinating ‘remapping’ of Asia, Ellen Frost
argues that ‘water is a marked feature of Asia’s profile’ which has influenced every
aspect of Asia, and refers to historian Takeshi Hamashita’s description of Asia as ‘a
series of seas connected by straits’ (Frost 2008: 23). Asian labels were also arbi-
trary and changeable, and rarely adopted a regional perspective. The Japanese
term sangoku referred only to Japan, China, and India, whereas ‘Indian concep-
tions of the region were mingled with religion and did not coalesce into a work
able scheme’ (Frost 2008: 25). The Chinese perspective, on the other hand, was
one of concentric circles, with the closest including the tributary states, the sec-
ond circle including inner Asia to the north and west, and the third comprising
‘the outer barbarians’, by which the Chinese meant most of Southeast Asia, South
Asia, and Europe (Frost 2008). Malay traders, by contrast, defined space and
peoples according to the movements of the monsoon winds, upon which their own
movements depended. Indians, Arabs, and Europeans were people from ‘above the
winds’, while the Malay region was the ‘land below the winds’ (Frost 2008).
Modern, predominantly European geo-imaginings, as well as other items of
trade and war, were bundled up into wooden ships of sail and traversed the
known universe in the second half of the second millennium CE. And because of
these centuries of imperialism and oppression, other constructions of seascapes
and oceanness have been, at worst, made silent or destroyed and, at best, made
subservient. As a consequence, we agree with Wigen that, ‘investigations into
emic conceptions of the sea . . . form an important counterweight’, so that insider
discourses are brought in (Wigen 2006).
Philip Steinberg, in his seminal work on the constructions of ocean, argues
that the social construction of oceanic space is different across time, according to
the pre-modern, mercantilist, industrial, and post-industrial phases of history,
and he explores this with reference to the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, and
the Melanesian constructions of oceanic space (Steinberg 2001). His work pro-
vides a very useful frame for our discussion. He argues that in pre-modern times
from about 500 BCE to about 1500 CE, the Indian Ocean was a non-territory, a
presence in social life, but one that was ‘constructed as a special space of trade,
external to society and social processes’ (Steinberg 2001: 45–6). Whilst the sea
brought goods, ‘the sea itself was perceived as a space apart from society, an
untameable mystery’, invoking fear and danger, and thus there was an aversion to
seeking dominance or control over the sea. The sea was merely a surface or void
to be crossed. The ocean was unregulated distance, not controlled space.
In sharp contrast, during this period, the societies of Micronesia constructed
the ocean like territory. They made ocean journeys like Americans do road trips
in cars, identified the places that held resources, and followed them. Accordingly,
ocean space could be claimed and appropriated, and be subjected to a form of
ownership in customary and flexible ways, insofar as it serves a social purpose.
Sea was the space of society. The Micronesians did not, however, attempt to pro-
ject sea power, possibly due to their small populations (Steinberg 2001).
Somewhere in the middle of these different paradigms, the Mediterranean Sea

acted as an arena of competition between societies that sought stewardship of
areas of it, although not actual ownership. The Romans claimed imperium, or
stewardship, which meant the right to command in the Mediterranean, but not
the power to own, or actual sovereignty (Steinberg 2001). Although the sea was
outside society, it served the crucial social purposes of transporting goods and
troops, and state power could therefore legitimately be exercised by societies over
it. Applying this framework historically, Steinberg argues that from about 1500
to 1800, the primary social construction of the ocean was as a nuanced
Mediterranean-style ‘force-field’. Through a mercantilist lens, states constructed
rights to sea routes, upon which their trade depended, but did not attempt out-
right possession. Sea space was not an asocial void during this period, but there
were no pretensions to possess it. Grotian Mare Liberum ocean space, argues
Steinberg, resembles the non-modern Mediterranean as much as it does the
Indian Pacific void—Grotius is defining imperium, but for a community of states,
not just one (Steinberg 2001).
During the period of industrial capitalism a different spatial logic applies, and
Steinberg argues that all three case studies—the Indian Ocean as an ‘asocial void’,
the Melanesian, and the Mediterranean ‘force-field’—become combined (Steinberg
2001). Post-modern capitalism, Steinberg argues, is now bringing an intensifica-
tion of the three components of industrial-era ocean construction. This is working
in awkward contradiction and tension with the ostensible commitment to the sea
as ‘great void’ (Steinberg 2001).
In the remaining part of this chapter, it is proposed that the Indo-Pacific can be
understood through the lens of three dominant categories: the first being the
non-realist interpretation of the Indo-Pacific, which fosters a shared ‘oceanic
neighbourhood’, which transcends the traditional hegemony of nation-states.
Next, the realist construction of the Indo-Pacific will be outlined, which seeks to
legitimate ‘natural’ and essentialist relationships between nation-states in the region.
Finally, there is the push for a universalist view of oceanic space, whereby the
Indo-Pacific region is a globalized ‘non-space’ or ‘liquid continuum’ which can-
not be territorialized. Let us now investigate these three different Indo-Pacific
frameworks, and how they manifest themselves in realgeopolitik.
Indo-Pacific as Region, Oceanic Neighbourhood,

Non-Realist, Differentiated Regional Oceanness
Oceanic frame making has been utilized by different scholars for a vast amount of
research. The works of Pearson, Bose, and Lewis and Wigen are largely pro-region,
but anti-nation-statist and ‘differentiated globalist’ in intent. While promoting
a form of regionalism, they are against both forms of imperialism, whether
nationalist or globalist. The debates amongst these historians, in this case, are
around making meaningful units of analysis out of oceanic frames. Pearson, for
example, provides commentary on different civilizations, rather than nation-states,
and their focus on the sea/ocean. He notes that most human cultures have
water-based beginning-of-life mythologies, such as those in Sumerian, Hindu,
and Buddhist literature. Curiously, he suggests that Hindu mythology did not
much reference the sea, although some references emerge in later Hindu thought
(Pearson 2003). The Laws of Manu and the Dharmasastra denoted the ocean as
the ‘kala pani’ or ‘Black Water’, which is forbidden to cross since traversing it
made the person spiritually impure; hence sea voyages tended to be avoided by
the higher castes, although Indian-grown Islam showed more positive attitudes
towards the sea (Pearson 2003).
Pearson places India firmly as the fulcrum in the trade system of the pre-
Islamic stage of the Indian Ocean region. He emphasizes the role of many differ-
ent routes being sailed by very many different peoples, at all stages of history,
including Europeans at the time of the Greeks and Romans. He is keen to correct
the overexaggerated narrative about the significance of European presence in the
Indian Ocean, at least until the eighteenth century. The picture he paints of the
complexity of the trade is enormous—and he argues that focusing attention only
on trading relations around long-distance, luxury goods (which happens because
that is where we have the records) occludes the real economic and social relations
of the region, privileging some actors, and making others invisible. Most of the
trade that took place was neither long distance, nor high-value goods. Pearson, as
mentioned above, makes a distinction between history of the ocean and history in
the ocean, and he argues that you can make a history of the ocean until about the
eighteenth century, when you have to make history in the ocean—the point where
outside forces such as industrialized Britain and globalization start to have a pro-
found influence.
Sugata Bose’s work, A Hundred Horizons, whilst universalist in intention, seeks
to embed local, colonial, and/or national histories within a broader regional
framework (Bose 2006). Bose takes the title of his book from Braudel’s work on
the Mediterranean Sea, where Braudel states that ‘We should imagine a hundred
frontiers, not one, some political, some economic, and some cultural’. Bose sees
the Indian Ocean as an inter-regional space, between the local and the global.
Bose highlights the shared political and cultural histories to reveal links that were
previously obfuscated by an excessive focus on shared trade. He explores the sto-
ries of movements of people—Indian labourers, merchants, soldiers, financiers,
poets, pilgrims, and ‘expatriate patriots’ such as Gandhi, Rabindranath Tagore,
and Chandra Bose, as well as the movements of commodities, and ideas, to find
that long-standing pre-existing networks were merely reordered under the colo-
nial empires. Bose argues that the Europeans achieved a ‘dominance without
hegemony’ and prior indigenous connections remained (Bose 2006).
Bose deterritorializes Indian nationalism, arguing that regional/civilizational

identity making cannot be understood within the confines of the nation-state,
and that diasporic identities remain. Curiously, while Bose believes Africa needs
to be considered as part of this narrative, the Indian sub-continent is still the
focus of his analysis, and indeed, Bose’s key actors are overwhelmingly Indian and
male. Despite this, his book is meant as a tale of subaltern human agency. He cri-
tiques the narrative of global integration that ‘hastily robs such interregional
arenas as the Indian Ocean rim of any real meaning’ (Bose 2006: 272). Bose
nevertheless also has universalist pretensions, such as highlighting the emergence
of Indian Muslim liberatory universalism as a counter to oppression by the
colonizers.
Finally, in the last type of Indo-Pacific regionalism, Martin Lewis and Karen
Wigen’s The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography also ‘received meta-
geographical constructs’, arguing that since the end of the Cold War, geographical
cartographies have been shaken and reconceptualized many times. The authors
note that ‘It is no coincidence that sea changes in ideology are generally accom
panied by a questioning of metageographical categories—or that those attempt-
ing consciously to formulate new visions of the globe often do so as part of a
campaign to promote new patterns of belief ’ (Lewis and Wigen 1997: xi–xiii). The
authors also argue that ‘some of the most basic and taken-for-granted “regions” of
the world were first framed by military thinkers’.
Commenting on the ‘Asia-Pacific’ and ‘Pacific Rim’ constructs, Lewis and
Wigen are also quite critical—referring to them as ‘plastic constructions’ (Lewis
and Wigen 1997). Pearson, Bose, and Lewis and Wigen all contribute to the debate
that critiques or problematizes the nature of oceanic regional dreaming. They are
all extremely wary of how such oceanic framing delivers power to specific pro
ponents. In the case of the Pacific, Lewis and Wigen argue that the debate over
how to conceptualize the Pacific community ‘conveys a sense of the immense dif-
ficulties entailed in rightly grasping—and naming—the elusive spatial structures
of contemporary life’. They go on to argue:
All geographical divisions share with these neo-categories the quality of being
artificial simplifications, more-or-less convenient devices for advancing analysis
rather than reflections of natural, wholly knowable spatial structures. At the
same time, this debate exposes the extent to which spatial categories are embed-
ded in a discourse of power. Like ‘Asia Pacific’ and ‘Pacific Rim’, all regional des-
ignations need to be subjected to political critique. (Lewis and Wigen 1997: 205)
Thus, whereas many states embedded within the region are revisiting and
strengthening pre-colonial narratives of meaningful and prioritized cultural inter-
sections, these attempts at regional framing are usually sparse with real intent
to develop regional and neighbourhood cooperative identities, securities, or
economies (though these exist as subservient traditions). Rather, these regional

conceptual maps are usually understood by regionally situated nation-states as
depicting new bilateral and multilateral relationships and allegiances designed to
draw lines in the sea denoting ‘natural’ borders and ‘no-go zones’ (such as evi-
denced in the South China Sea), through which other specific nation-states are
either admitted or excluded ‘entry’. What now needs to be done is to examine the
opposite, more non-critical position—how current appeals to ancient/cultural
tropes about diverse Indo-Pacific regionalisms are being used to push certain
national agendas.
The Bengali poet Rabindranath Tagore represents another such narrative of
oceanic region: broadly based civilizational neighbourhood. He formed part of
a broader Asian intellectual circle centred around Calcutta which, whilst not
presenting a coherent ideology, can be said to have, in the words of Mark Frost,
a ‘shared intellectual sensibility’ (Frost 2010). The Tagore circle comprised a
network of scholars, poets, thinkers, artists, and art collectors, and was part of a
movement in Asian intellectual history which moved from Swadeshi—a nation-
alist, anti-colonial frame—to advocating an idealist and idealized discourse of
Pan-Asian civilization. The key components of their thinking were firstly that
India and Asia were essentially one. Secondly, they believed that Asia was
engaged in a spiritual struggle against Western materialism and that this strug-
gle served as a lightning rod for a Pan-Asian solidarity. Nevertheless, this Pan-
Asian culture offered Europe its superior spirituality and virtue and could save
Western civilization from itself. It celebrated the local, the Pan-Asian, and the
international.
The cosmopolitan language used by this intellectual movement employed
abundant watery metaphors, employing ‘ripples’, ‘shores’, ‘tides’, and ‘beaches’,
which frequently evoked the Indian Ocean, as well as the language of pilgrimage,
maritime communication, and travel culture. Tagore defended not merely ‘the
expression of local and communal difference but a celebration of the civilisation
that India had given to the rest of Asia—and to be understood in these broader
international terms’ (Frost 2010: 265). Tagore later personally moved from Pan-
Asianism to universal humanism in response to the violence of the emergent
Indian anti-colonization movement. He wanted to create a different kind of Asian
modernity, one rooted in Pan-Asian spiritual values and virtues.
Although criticized by some as being reductionist, essentialist, and orientalist,
this thinking represented an ocean of idealism, visionary aspiration, and cosmo-
politan hope (though usually depicted as rooted in Asia). As Shamsad Mortuza
notes, Tagore underscored the supremacy of Indic, Chinese, and Japanese civil
izations to engage with the West on equal terms (Mortuza 2017). The historical
pride of Indianness for him was evident in adventures of the expansionist travel-
lers who crossed the Ocean between the third and the fifteenth centuries and cre-
ated colonies in the Indian Ocean Rim. With the strict imposition of kalapani
(the Hindu prohibition on crossing the Indian Ocean), however, India lost its
maritime edge. The glory of India remained as a concept in Indonesia and other
parts of the Indian Ocean world where these Indic colonies had existed, and this
encouraged Tagore to remember the past and to rebuild an imagined community
based on shared memory. Tagore’s vision, we can surmise, was one of recovering a
cultural and spiritual vision from its alienation from the sea.
But if people are indeed being alienated from the sea (and the destruction of
native cosmologies and stories of cultural intersections would certainly facilitate
this process), the question is, Who is creating a sense of Indo-Pacific oceanness,
and for what purpose? Is it only for the statecraft purposes of nation-states? Is
there a place for diversity over homogenization? The other problem is that this
idea of ‘non-space’ which challenges the state and populations ‘owning it’ also on
occasions deterritorializes it—and in a deterritorialized space, the most powerful
usually prevail.
Realist Constructions of Indo-Pacific
Many countries in the Indo-Pacific are arguing that their histories are, in some
way, more essential than the past stories of other nation-states. The focus of this
section is in no way an innate criticism of the recent re-emergence of state-
centred depictions of the region—just to note that this period of creating regional
histories from the perspective of particular nation-states has escalated in recent
times. As mentioned at the outset, these stories are often used in an attempt to
legitimate ‘natural’, and more essentialist relationships between certain cultures
and/or nation-states with their surrounding seas. The purpose is two-fold. Firstly,
these stories are reworked to create internal narratives which strengthen domestic
and national support for state-building programmes in the region, and secondly,
these stories challenge the broader international system and its rule of law. This
section will examine some of the stories currently being rewritten and reinvigor-
ated by a number of the Indo-Pacific states in a bid to bolster civilizational claims
and ‘natural’ domain linkages to these water spaces.
The instrumentalization of history—the reworking of (in Tagore’s memorable
phrase) a ‘tapestry of half-forgotten histories’—is well described by Vink (2007),
who describes how Indian Ocean historiography has been used by some histor
ians to emphasize local agency in order to serve particular nationalist, political, or
religious agendas and certain constituencies, promoting respective metanarra-
tives of ‘Greater India’, ‘Negara Indonesia’, the ‘Dutch East Indies’, or ‘Greater
China’. In the specific case of Indian historiography, Vink points to the Muslim-
Nationalist ‘Aligarh school’, who displace the idea of where the ‘core’ and the
‘periphery’ are (thus challenging Eurocentric analytical mapping), but instead
place India at the centre of their analysis in an autonomous ‘Indian-Ocean world
system’ or ‘Islamic world economy’, centred particularly in Gujarat. This replacement

of one centre of gravity for another neatly serves particular agendas.
We observe the nationalistic discursive role of oceanic imaginings in Indonesia
in the work of Jennifer Gaynor, who notes how the Malay concept of tanah air
(land and water, or land of water) and nusantara (currently invoked by Indonesian
nationalists) have formed part of nationalist ideology, serving to define nation
and invoking the idea of homeland—even while having perverse effects on some
of the citizens (in the case study she is presenting, of the Sama, or sea gypsies),
who are sea peoples displaced and marginalized by the modernization and
nation-building project. She notes:
Although associated with the waters, with lives that often revolve around the
tides, since sea people have been scattered throughout the region and have had
no history of political unity, there has been no context in which they might ideo-
logically objectify the space of the seas. While they may, then, consider them-
selves as ‘belonging’ somehow to maritime and littoral worlds, they apparently
have not produced explicit discourses that represent the sea and coasts as a col-
lectively salient political space. (Gaynor 2007: 63)
Sea space, she notes, is also an important part of the nationalist political imagin
ary of the Philippines and Malaysia. Such notions of sea space have come into
conflict in recent times with China, which has appealed to notions of historical
fishing rights to assert its authority over islands in the South China Sea—an inter-
pretation of sea space which has in turn been challenged, as we shall see, by a
globalized ‘mare nullius’ by the US (Gao and Jia 2013; Depuy and Depuy 2013).
Significantly, India’s Project Mausam: Maritime Routes and Cultural Landscapes
is a fascinating and ambitious attempt to (re)construct Indian Oceanness (but
with India at its core) (Project Mausam 2014), and will be discussed at greater
length in Chapter 6. Project Mausam/Mawsim is an initiative of the Indian
Ministry of Culture and is a conscious attempt to construct Indian soft power
over ‘its’ ocean by appealing to Indian civilizational linkages around the Indian
Ocean Rim. There are both internal and external objectives here. According to its
website, ‘at the macro level it aims to re-connect and re-establish communications
between countries of the Indian Ocean world, which would lead to an enhanced
understanding of cultural values and concerns; while at the micro level the focus
is on understanding national cultures in their regional maritime milieu’ (Project
Mausam 2014). It is creating a map of an historical Indian Ocean region’s com-
mercial, religious, and cultural interactions across communities connected by ties
of Indian ocean commerce, and cultural and religious ties in order to create a
sense of ‘Indian Oceanness’. It takes its name from the monsoon winds, which
determine at what times of the year sailors and traders could travel safely.
Although its express aim is to rekindle ‘long lost ties across nations of the Indian
Ocean “world” and to forge “new avenues of cooperation and exchange” ’, Project
Mausam creates a historical and symbolic space that is embedded at the root in
India. What is its narrative purpose and what imaginary/what discourse does it
project? Is it about placing India at the front and centre of a cultural project for
‘soft-power’ purposes? Is it about creating a way of seeing and imagining the
Indian Ocean? Is it a new way of engaging with other regional states? Akhilesh
Pillalamarri believes that it is all these things. He sees the project as a way of
organizing the Indian Ocean littoral states under India’s strategic influence: ‘It is
clear that India’s government intends to expand its maritime presence, culturally,
strategically and psychologically (in order to remind the region why the ocean is
called the Indian Ocean)’ (Pillalamarri 2014). It is early days yet, but certainly
some are interpreting this as part of a broader geostrategic agenda. For example,
the strategic role of this civilizational narrative is unabashedly taken up by
Padmaja, of the Indian navy-linked think-tank, the National Maritime Foundation.
In a 2017 essay, Padmaja argues that the civilizational narrative underlying Project
Mausam is part of a new maritime strategy and foreign policy that situates India
as a net security provider in the region (2017). India seeks to exercise maritime
influence, but will do as always, without domination or force. Whilst appealing to
cooperation or collective action, the discourse plays on a sense of Indian excep-
tionalism. David Brewster (2012) notes that an idea of Indian moral and spiritual
leadership and civilizing power existed even before independence; this underpins
the Indian perception of having a special duty and an international leadership
role to play in the Indian Ocean. India, he argues, does not want to be a hegemon;
but it does want its ‘special’ relationship with the Indian Ocean to be internation-
ally recognized.
The Indian cultural project would certainly buttress certain arguments that
link certain interpretations of past statecraft to current practice, for nationalistic
purposes and with significant geopolitical implications. For example, Vijay Sakhuja
argues that ‘Indian statecraft finds its theoretical expressions in the ancient Indian
classic The Arthasastra’:
In statecraft, the Arthasastra conceptualizes a geostrategic and a geopolitical

framework of interests, alliances and strategic conduct termed as the Mandala.
Mandala is a construct in international relations that signifies the contiguity of
region and defines the interests and relations of the state and in spatial terms
Mandala denotes a zone. Schematically, Mandala is figurative of concentric cir-
cles, which define the relations of a state that lies at the core, with its immediate,
intermediate and outer ring of countries. (Sakhuja 2011: 265)
This is very similar to the Chinese understanding of neighbourhood mentioned

earlier in this chapter. In the Indian sense, however, Sakhuja goes on to point out
that the ‘Indo-Pacific Oceans provide the seamless contiguity of strategic space
wherein the maritime Mandala is enacted by India’ (2011: 278). Thus, from an
Indian perspective, there is a perceived emerging functional convergence between
the Pacific and Indian Oceans and the two oceans should now be considered as
‘linked security systems’. Consequently, national security postures need to be
reframed to facilitate more extensive and expansive maritime security engage-
ment. However, while the use of the Indo-Pacific concept by some analysts legit
imizes an Indian maritime expansionist strategy into the Pacific, by implication it
also implicitly acknowledges that this is ‘mirrored by the expansion of China’s
interests into the Indian Ocean’ (Brewster 2012: 157).
As said earlier, these narratives are not necessarily a zero-sum game, but can be
invoked simultaneously, although elements of these stories sometimes conflict
directly in their interpretation of sea and ocean histories. Sri Lanka is an excellent
example here of two powerful, countervailing oceanic, regional imaginations
being invoked simultaneously for nation-building purposes. In this case, one Sri
Lankan commentator contends that Sri Lanka should leverage both the Chinese
Maritime Silk Road and the Indian initiatives. Acknowledging that past classifica-
tions of Sri Lanka have been the product of Eurocentric and imperialist thinking,
in recent times, Sri Lanka is refashioning its own identity, to reflect its emergence
as a hub of Indo-Pacific commerce and tourism, and its situation at the cross-
roads of trade, transport and energy routes:
Sri Lanka’s predicament is likely to be true of many states on the Indian Ocean
rim that share similar geopolitical positions astride both initiatives, such as
Mauritius, the Maldives and Madagascar. This historical point of flux is a rare
opportunity for such states to exercise agency in the scramble for a new strategic
architecture of power. As these two architectures compete with (or complement)
each other, small states will not only be able to leverage rivalry (or cooperation)
for economic benefits, they can also shape the priorities and policies of these
initiatives. (Alphonsus 2015)
Oman is another interesting example of a state which has recently been very
active in positioning itself in a geopolitical sense as an Indian Ocean entity (and
by loose association, an Indo-Pacific one). In this case, it has adopted a cultural
‘soft-power’ approach, with both internal and external objectives. Steffen Wippel
argues that Oman, although seen as ‘belonging’ to the Arab and Middle Eastern
world, is very much a part of the Indian Ocean Rim by virtue of its institutional
presence on regional organizations, its strong and increasing trade ties, and its
own ‘branding’ and sense of self-identity and belonging (Wippel 2013). This
reflects the domestic need to engage in state-building projects that integrate the
different tribal and linguistic groups, but also to prepare Oman for the post-oil
period with a shift towards tourism, and to becoming a trade hub. Wippel provides
interesting examples of highly symbolic and heavily mediatized events demon-
strating this narrative, the most striking of which are a number of re-enactments
of famous Indian Ocean maritime routes and trips, including one involving the
Sultan’s own yacht, run under the auspices of UNESCO in 1990. Traditional boats
and seafaring are feted everywhere, as is Oman’s historic and strategic location on
the Indian Ocean. Its tourist branding is explicitly connected to its maritime his-
tory and to seafaring, exploration, and to trade in general. For example, tourism
marketing appeals directly to the Sinbad legend (Wippel 2013).
Another recent Indo-Pacific case relates to the direct conflict with the Chinese
state in the case of the South China Sea, where paradoxical notions of sea space
coexist in a state of heightened tension. The Chinese claim to the Spratly Islands,
according to the notion of the ‘Nine-Dash Line’, is notably based on appeals to
customary law, which China argues continues to have a foundation in inter
national law and, in this case specifically, appeal is made to the grounds of historic
presence in the area, including appeals to the notion of having discovered the
island, and to ideas of terra nullius—that is, that there was no abandonment or
dereliction, and no prescription to Chinese claims over the islands.
China’s claim is therefore territorially based in this interpretation, including in
its resulting exclusive economic zone claims over adjacent waters. Chinese argu-
mentation has also appealed to legal concepts of acquiescence and recognition of
sovereignty by neighbours (until quite recently). Gao and Jia, for example, argue
that no treaty can subsume the customary law, and China, they claim, is success-
fully reconciling both with no contradiction (Gao and Jia 2013). The US and its
allies have countered Chinese claims with ‘freedom of navigation’ exercises, which
have drawn middle powers awkwardly into the discourse about oceanic space.
Universalist, Non-Differentiated Constructions

of Oceanic Space: The Indo-Pacific as Liquid Continuum
Phillip Steinberg’s work on the social construction of sea space is particularly

prescient here. Post-industrial capitalism, he notes, has intensified the spatial
logic of industrial capitalism, with its blend of pre-modern oceanic spatialities
(Indian Ocean-as-asocial-void; Micronesian Ocean-as-territorialized-social space;
Mediterranean ‘force-field’) (Steinberg 2001). Advanced and/or post-modern
capitalism have created an awkward tension between the re-emergence of rigid
territorialization demanded by specific nation-states in a bid to solidify their
claims to oceans/sea space; the need to exert governance as a kind of ‘force-field’;
and, also to preserve the ocean as a great asocial space. The colonial Dutch, for
example, portrayed the seas in the Grotian sense of Mare Liberum, and as such
justified free movement of trade and commerce through the oceanscape without
being inhibited by territorial boundaries.
Major economic powers such as the US, often with their national bases largely
outside the region, are readopting this view of oceanness. Under the Obama
administration, and now further into the Trump era, there has been a burgeoning
unholy alliance of neo-mercantilism and neo-liberalism. This views the

Indo-Pacific as a ‘continuum’, a super-region or even, paradoxically, as a non-
region. It constructs the Indo-Pacific as just one part of a global whole, as a
non-regional narrative—a quashing of local traditions and particularities—not a
mare liberum but a mare nullius, again enabling powerful neo-colonial forces to
move anywhere they wish, to protect sea lanes of transport, trade, communica-
tion and security; not needing to justify ‘ownership’ in a territorial sense, but
simply control of sea lanes.
In this manner, a super-region like the Indo-Pacific is also simultaneously a
non-region, or liquid continuum which (at least in narrative terms) denies the
existence of the formal politics and histories drawn on maps by nation-states. As
will be discussed further in Chapter 5, a super-region demands free and smooth
movement through time and place—national and regional borders are bypassed
or passed through, as the continuum is a globally referent object of security. As
has been noted elsewhere:
the Liquid Continuum constructs global spaces—in this case the Indo-Pacific—
using specific notions of time and globalisation, as connected threads of gold
through lawless darknesses; as networks, pathways and trading song-lines through
black waters and evil airs held together by strings of liberal values. The depiction
of nature is still a realist one—the essential nature of nature is a maelstrom, is
still anarchical—and nation-states (at least the good and the true ones) must
order it, and calls its marauding tribes to account. (Doyle 2016)
Conflicting notions coincide even within the US bureaucratic establishment

(although arguably all of them ultimately serve to buttress the needs of a neo-
imperialist project). For example, Steinberg argues that navies, especially the US
navy, are reluctant to give up their command-of-the-sea notions. Naval planners
continue to apply unreconstructed mercantilist-era visions of their role in the
world, and even as other actors have moved to concepts of ocean-as-void, naval
planners continue to adhere to visions of ocean space as a place where social
power is exercised by nation-states (Steinberg 2001).
Another, most relevant imagining of ocean space is also apparent in the work
of American analyst Ellen Frost, whose excellent work on emerging Asian region-
alism demonstrates much of what we are arguing here. Ellen Frost admirably
notes the significance of mapping and nomenclature in the context of the Asian
water world, and she remaps Asia into more porous entities that she calls
‘Maritime Asia’ and ‘Asia Major’. Remapping Asia is vital in her analysis, because
mapping so deeply influences foreign policy and security strategies. Her remap-
ping attempts to override the artificial borders that occlude real centres of units:
‘By highlighting spontaneous cross-border flows of goods, services, capital,
technology, knowledge, ideas, cultures, and people, remapping can correct this
misleading emphasis. These flows account for much of Asia’s success. Remapping
helps identify the obstacles clogging natural flow fields’ (Frost 2008: 22). Thus,
Frost alludes to the remapping that is necessary to reflect the realities of the
post-modern capitalist space.
The analysis of Asian regionalism and regionalization, however, betrays an
analysis that is really viewing the phenomenon from the point of view of its
implications for the US. Frost’s conception of ‘Maritime Asia’ (which she argues
is ‘where 60 to 70 per cent of Asians live’) unites the western Indian Ocean and
the east Pacific Rim (Frost 2008: 31). She includes in her definition south and
coastal India, and coastal Australia and maritime Russia. She ignores Eastern
Africa and the Middle East, but does not split the Bay of Bengal in half.
Revealingly, she argues:
The concept of Maritime Asia is quite similar to what the US Department of

Defense calls the ‘East Asian littoral’. A quadrennial report published in 2001
defined this term as ‘the region stretching from south of Japan through Australia
and into the Bay of Bengal’. Operational concepts adopted by the US Navy divide
the East Asian littoral into ‘seaward’ and ‘landward’ portions. (Frost 2008: 33)
This is a remapping, then, which aligns quite neatly with the geostrategic and geo-
economic interests of the US in the Indo-Pacific region. Such reimaginings of
mappings and reconceptualizations of space have significant ideational effects on
sovereignty, and ultimately, on legal regimes. Mountz, for example, has com-
mented on the reconceptualization by political geographers of sites of sovereignty,
noting that islands, sea spaces, and archipelagos are amongst those sites where
legal status is grey, and ‘sovereignty is contested, undermined, evaded, called into
question, or—conversely—asserted more strenuously’ (2013: 832). Various legal
regimes affect sovereignty in these sites, and there are particular kinds of asym-
metrical expressions of power applied there. In the case of islands, she points to the
case of Diego Garcia, whose population was forcibly moved by the British govern-
ment to the island of Mauritius, in order to place a military base on the islands to
continue to exert regional influence after independence. The base, she argues,
forms part of a chain ‘predicated on the strategic island concept as the “new inven-
tion of a new form of empire” ’ that would effectively replace colonies (Mountz 2013;
2014; Vine 2009). The Chagossians were denied the right to return, despite win-
ning a high court case. Return was deemed impossible, not just because of the
military use of the island (unpleasantly relevant as a black site in the ‘War on
Terror’ after 9/11), but also because the island was declared a protected marine area
by former United Kingdom (UK) prime minister Gordon Brown.
This example of legal sovereignty sits at odds with notions of sovereign rights
of indigenous sea peoples and indigenous peoples with seascape storylines and
cosmologies. One such example is the Saltwater People of the Torres Strait Islands
(McNiven 2004; Ash et al. 2010). The Saltwater People are spiritually and ritually
attached to their seascapes, with which they identify, and which have cosmo
logical meaning and importance. Their spiritual attachment to Dreaming beings
goes beyond merely procuring marine resources and has resulted in a relation-
ship of customary maritime tenure, legitimated through clan ownership over land
and sea, which anthropologists have become more involved in researching fol-
lowing native title claims arising after the Mabo (1992) Australian High Court
decision, which overturned the legal fiction in Australia of terra nullius.
Conclusion
What has been reiterated in this chapter is that which was first expressed in the
initial discussion of methodology found in Chapter 1—that is, both realist and
constructivist models of geopolitical enquiry, in all their heterogeneity, must be
embraced as conceptual tools in order to fully comprehend and celebrate the
differing cartographic imaginations of the Indo-Pacific. The Indo-Pacific is, on
the one hand, a narrative space which resonates with and confirms the power
of nation-states, used in all manner of realist ways to further shore up particular
nation-states’ maritime and terrestrial claims, as well as further essentializing
national characteristics as ‘true’, ‘sacred’—providing national citizens with ‘values
worth living and dying by’. These are regional games; but also, simultaneously,
intensely internal, domestic, and nationalistic political games.
At the same time, Indo-Pacificness can be used in a classical liberal vein: as a
genuine attempt at building long-lasting, and mutually beneficial maritime neigh-
bourhoods, sharing and sustaining communities, and resources which exist near
or next to each other in some geographical manner. In Chapter 9 we investigate,
in a positive sense, what some of these better models of Indo-Pacific maritime
regionalism look like, with particular reference to IORA, with all of its strengths
and foibles.
Finally, existing on another ideational plane is a very different version of the
Indo-Pacific concept: one enjoyed by the powerful—one which allows and pro-
motes free movement across and beyond local, national, and ‘regional’ borders by
superpowers and large transnational corporations. These constructions of Indo-
Pacific posit it as simultaneously a non-region and as a super-region—as a uni-
versal and non-differentiated space. These narratives are more post-structural in
their modality, are often justified on neo-liberal geo-economic principles; but are
also fiercely nation-state oriented in their actual design and practice. In short, the
language and pitch of justification may be multi and translateral, but the practice
is centred on narrow benefits accruing to major powers, providing unprecedented
access for elites to global domains, whether markets or military.
Not only do we utilize different matrices derived from alternative world views
of how international systems work, we also consistently argue throughout this
book that concepts and positions articulated by nation-states are not usually
coherent or whole; instead, they are more likely to be fragmented and contested
within—although, obviously, certain positions achieve more dominance than
others at particular times.
Furthermore, as mentioned at the outset of this book, the dimension of time is
extremely important. The point of view of Indo-Pacificness is not just placed-
based. What we have discovered and tried to articulate within this chapter is that
geopolitical seascapes and oceanic regionalisms change through time. Maritime
regionalism has metamorphosed from its earlier forms in the pre-modern
Mediterranean world into shapes which are peculiar to twenty-first-century
imaginations, bound by larger notions of what ‘global’ means; rewritten in
languages not always European, and served by cultures and religions largely
uninformed by Christian dreamings and doctrines.
For although the Indo-Pacific is in vogue, it is not just a recent set of construc-
tions. Rather, it first emerged over a century ago. It is to the dimension of time
which our gaze must now be shifted—a point of view determined by earlier
manifestations—a time of the initial rise of an ‘Indo-Pacific’.
3
The Return of Traditional
Geopolitical Thought
The Rise of the Indo-Pacific Concept
The principal aim of this chapter is to provide an overview and synthesis of the
diffusion, perpetuation, and contextual transformation of traditional geopolitical
thinking throughout the Indo-Pacific region and assess how these concepts and
ideas might still form some input into regional geopolitical thinking, particularly
among some key individual states within the Indo-Pacific. There has been a re-
emergence of classical frameworks and concepts such as pivot points, lebensraum,
sea power, and land power taken from traditional international relations and geo-
politics writers and thinkers, notably Mackinder, Spykman, Caroe, Pannikar,
Semple, Ratzel, and especially Haushofer. The re-emergence of these classical
ideas and their deployment through different national lenses reveal the construc-
tion of vastly disparate Indo-Pacific regionalisms in which, we argue, narrow
national constructions of the region take precedence over more genuine, pan-
regional aspirations.
Traditional Geopolitical Ideas
In the twenty-first century, it is highly likely that traditional geopolitical thinking

and concepts still function as a potential underlying influence for expansionist
states and/or those with hegemonic ambitions. However, it must be remembered
that traditional geopolitical concepts were developed and applied in Europe and
were diffused and transplanted to North America, Northeast Asia, South Asia,
Southeast Asia, South America, and Oceania wherein they became transformed
to meet local environmental imperatives.
Central to these transplants was thus a quasi-environmental deterministic
view of state behaviour associated in part with Friedrich Ratzel’s Darwinian-
influenced biological analogy of competition bound up with a perceived sense of
racial and/or religious superiority. Ratzel was the author of the essay ‘Lebensraum’.
In his view, the combination of environment, biology, and superiority propelled
territorial expansionism and competition and thus inevitable conflict with con-
tiguous states and sometimes relatively distant territories. While it has been
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198739524.001.0001
The Return of Traditional Geopolitical Thought 29
argued that in international relations theory the realist tradition can be traced
back to Sun Tzu and Thucydides (Tang and Feng 2016), it is suggested here that
the offensive realist position in classical geopolitics can be traced back to Friedrich
Ratzel. Racial dominance would be determined by how any particular race fared
in the constant ‘struggle for survival’ (Herwig 2016: 33). The ultimate aim of con-
flict was the imposition of social and cultural mores, of legal rules and proced
ures, and of religious and other practices upon the vanquished in a civilizing
mission in the guise of creating equality, ‘development’, justice, and peace—even
an ‘empire of peace’. The superior Aryan race had to undertake a civilizing mis-
sion based on nationalism and race (Herwig 2016: 104).
Ratzel’s ideas were picked up in Germany by Karl Haushofer, and together
they are credited with influencing Nazi imperialist ideology. Like Ratzel,
Haushofer was influenced by Mackinder’s ‘Heartland/Rimland’ theory of geo-
politics (which is diametrically opposed to the Mahanian sea-power theory of
geopolitics, which is centred on the power of navies). One interesting concept
introduced by Haushofer that is worthy of further discussion and analysis is
that of a ‘geopolitical manometer’: ‘These are certain political, economic, geo-
graphic, etc., symptoms which are supposed to gauge existing pressures and
thus indicate probable forthcoming events. Of such manometers, capitals,
urbanization, power fields, marginal growths, and cultural trends receive spe-
cial attention’ (Dorpalen 1942: 75). Haushofer argued that the Indo-Pacific
region contained four geopolitical manometers—Australia, Japan, Singapore,
and the Philippines, while the latter ‘carries the heaviest pressure of the entire
Pacific space’ due to its internal character coupled with pressures from the
‘island empire’—Japan—and the ‘continental power’—the US (Dorpalen 1942:
135–6). Singapore is an unusual manometer since it is one of the few examples
of Ratzel’s ‘marginal growths’—in this case, a small colonial base located on
foreign soil exposed to and able to register pressures and trends as outposts
otherwise unnoticeable (Dorpalen 1942: 79). Of course, Australia and Japan
became the southern and northern ‘anchors’ respectively in the US west Pacific
alliance system.
One of the essential elements of Haushofer’s Indo-Pacific discussion concerns
the overall conflict between Anglo-Saxon and non-Anglo-Saxon powers. There
was, Haushofer argued, an ‘Anglo-Saxon tutelage’ (Herwig 2016: 124), and from a
global perspective, this comprised Mackinder’s ‘outer crescent’ consisting of the sea
power of the US plus Britain, South Africa, and Australia—the ‘pirates of the sea’—
which collectively needed to be opposed by a Russo-German bloc (Herwig 2016:
115–17). In the twenty-first century, this ‘Anglo-Saxon tutelage’ could be referred to
as the ‘democratic Anglosphere’ consisting of the ‘mother country’ (UK) plus sev-
eral powerful (now great and middle power) former colonies—Australia, Canada,
India, South Africa, and the US. Other ‘subsidiaries’ of the ‘democratic Anglosphere’
could include Malaysia, New Zealand, and Singapore.
Central to Haushofer’s Indo-Pacific strategy was the need to check the

‘overbearing dominance’ of the Anglo-Saxon outer crescent—the ‘pirates from
the sea’—by the world’s ‘geographical pivot’—Germany, China, Japan, and
Russia—the ‘robbers of the steppe’ (Herwig 2016: 154). He conceded that the
‘Anglo-Saxon condominium’ over the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans could not be
broken by any Eurasian bloc or single power (Herwig 2016: 189). Haushofer pre-
dicted that there would be a constant great power conflict between the ‘pirates
from the sea’ and the ‘robbers of the steppe’ from 1945 between the Soviet Union
and US reflected more recently between the US and China (Herwig 2016: 214).
Geopolitically, he dreamed of a future in which India, together with China and an
independent Indonesia, would collectively function as a counterweight at the
crossroads of the German-Russian-Japanese ‘geographical pivot of history’ and
the Anglo-Saxon ‘outer crescent’ (Herwig 2016: 157).
Traditional Geopolitical Ideas: Adoption,

Adaptation, and Diffusion
It is clear that German geopolitical ideas and concepts played a significant role in
the development of geopolitics throughout the modern world. They were diffused
around the globe, were modified in terms of local temporal, geographical, and
political circumstances and, in the twenty-first century, we are still feeling the
long-term ‘legacy’ of Nazi geopolitical conceptual networks (Levenda 2014; Dodds
and Atkinson 2000). For example, Haushofer’s ideas reached France, Italy, Japan,
Spain, and the US (Atkinson and Dodds 2000: 5–9), among others. The social,
political, and conceptual linkages among states and regions subject to the political-
cultural diffusion of Haushofer ideas are also of interest. In short, the diffusion of
geopolitical ideas created a long-lasting network of conceptual and policy support.
Thus, states implicated in the diffusion process in the early twentieth century still
remain implicated to a greater or lesser degree although not necessarily subscrib-
ing to the precise meaning and intent of traditional concepts.
The Diffusion of Traditional Geopolitical

Thinking to Indo-Pacific States
The United States
The US has had a number of very influential geopolitical scholars, one of the most
prominent of whom was ‘Ratzel’s faithful disciple, Ellen Churchill Semple’
(Neumann 1943: 278). Indeed, Semple dedicated her second classic text—Influences
of Geographic Environment, on the Basis of Ratzel’s System of Anthropo-Geography
(1911)—to the memory of Friedrich Ratzel.
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would not stay here and moan myself to death if I were you. What do you say
to that, my friend?” said Warren, tapping his friend on the shoulder, one
summer evening as he saw how sad and lonely Paul was. Warren’s sympathetic
heart went out to his friend. It grieved him sadly to see his lonely friend, as
Paul was never seen to smile since his mother’s death.
It was nearly a year since the opening of our story. All nature was dressed in its
mantle of green when Paul decided to travel. The evening before he was to
start he sat in the library with his head in his hands thinking of the past. A
light rap sounded on the door, which brought him back to the present, and
bidding the knocker come in Pompey put his wooly head in the room and said,
“Massa berry busy? I’s like to talk wid you a little while before you goes away,
as you go so early in de morning, so I’s just come now to see you.”
“All right, Pompey, take a chair and tell me all the news.”
“I fear I has sad news for you, as you will get sad from what I’s got to tell you.
I’s lived here ever since you was a child. Well, I first lived with Missus’ fodder,
and when Missus got married I just came and lived wid her, so you see, Massa
Paul, I just knows nearly all de history of your fodder and modder. Well, I
suppose you would like to have me tell something about them?”
“Yes, Pompey, tell me all you know about them,” answered Paul, all animation
to hear something about his parents.
“Well, just before Missus died she told me there was a little tin box for you in
de garret, and I was to tell you all I knows about her.
“Your modder was a lady—a perfect lady—and your father a gentleman, and a
baronet’s son in England. Your fadder had a fust lub, and your mudder caught
him looking at a picture of a sweet face and head all curls—a pretty face it was,
too. It made Missus very angry and she wanted him to burn it up, but he
wouldn’t and they quarreled often about it. He told Missus it would not be any
harm to her if he did keep it—the original was dead. But he could not give up
the picture. Well, Missus was bound to have her way, so she stoled de picture
and burned it up, and when Massa found it out he just came to me and told
me what I told you under de tree. I told him to just stay, but he said, ‘No, no, I
never can be trampled on by a woman. We cannot lib peacefully together and I
will go and lebe her for a while.’
“I do not think he intended to stay away always. Massa Paul, you are just like
your fodder in every respect. You just look and act like him. Your fodder was a
British soldier and when he went to Boston with the regiment your mother
saw him and just fell in lub wid him ober head and ears. Well, he was a
baronet’s son and she a beautiful lady wid lots of money—as your fodder
supposed. Well, he was deceived, and Missus just let him think what he might.
I does not think your fodder lubber your mudder very much; and your mother
—beautiful and rich—he thought so—he just married her for she loved him
fondly; but she had such a temper and did not care what she said when mad.
Well, in their last quarrel she just up and told him she wished he would go
away, as she wished nebber to see his face any more, and he just up and went
away. But I always thought he would come back. Wid de money out de army
he bought dis big farm and bringed Missus to lib wid him here, and all Missus’
fodder had to gib her was me and my ole woman. Just before he left he went
and deeded de farm to Missus, free from all incumbrance, and told me to take
care of you. Dat is all I knows about your fodder.
“Your mudder neber was de same woman as before; she would not quarrel wid
anyone, and was just as docile as a lamb. If she had been so when Massa was
here he never would hab went away. I’s sure ob dat, as he cried like a great
baby when he bid me goodbye. Now, Massa Paul, let me get de ole tin box an
see what is in it. May be dar is something in it you would like to see. Come,
Massa, is you dreaming?” exclaimed Pompey, seeing Paul sitting like a statue,
gazing absent-mindedly before him into the deep shadows of the room.
“My dear man,” answered Paul, extending his hand to his servant, “I see
clearly why mother always avoided telling me anything about my father, as she
knew she had done wrong and was afraid to lose my respect, as she knew I
dearly loved her.
“Pompey,” said Paul solemnly, “she was a kind and loving mother to me.”
“Yes, Paul, I’s seed her sit and cry ober your little curly head many a time and
say, ‘I love my baby and I will never let him see my temper;’ and I guess she
never did. Shall we get de box tonight, or leave it until morning? Den you can
see to read better,” said Pompey, getting up and yawning.
“We had better get it tonight, as I do not wish to let everybody know what
there is in the box,” answered Paul, getting up and taking the candle and
opening the library door.
They went up stairs and out into a little hall leading to the garret, Pompey
leading the way.
“Gosh, Massa, I just guess there has been nobody up here in a long time, as de
cobwebs are so thick I can just cut them down. Golly, Massa, what a hole to
put treasures away in,” said Pompey, pulling the cobwebs out of his woolly
hair.
He set the light down and opened a closet on his right, and after searching a
long time he exclaimed, “Dar is noffin here in dis hole but cobwebs and dust
and mice nests”—jerking out a handful and throwing it on the floor. “I just
like to know where dat box is,” said he, taking up the light and viewing the
place critically.
Pompey exclaimed, “Paul, if your mudder has hidden anything she didn’t want
everybody to find we will find it in a little closet made purposely for it and well
covered up from prying eyes.”
He was looking carefully around and hitting a cleet which hung loose from the
wall he espied a little door in the side, which the cleet covered up entirely
unless it was struck or run against.
“I think I have found the place where it is hidden,” said Paul, opening the
door and viewing the interior.
The wall was covered with dust, and at first he did not discover anything that
looked like a box. Just as he was giving up the search he espied a little hole in
the wall, and thrusting in his hand he drew out a little box the size of a cigar
box.
“I have found it at last,” said Paul, handing it to his servant.
He knew there was something in it which would deeply affect him. He closed
up the place and they went down stairs without speaking. They went directly to
the library and Pompey set the box on the table as he said, “Golly, Massa, what
do you suppose dar is in this box that your mother took such pains to hide it?”
“I do not know,” answered Paul, “I dread to open it. Something seems to tell
me it will make me more deeply in trouble than I am now. But, Pompey, that
box must be opened,” said the young man, getting up and taking the box in his
trembling hands.
He viewed it over and saw it opened with a peculiar spring. He touched it and
the cover flew up and disclosed the contents. He drew the papers out one after
another until all lay on the table. He discovered a picture case, and opening it
the fair face of a young girl about eighteen met his view. He gazed at it a
moment and in a trembling voice said, “It is like her; the same dreamy eyes
and head. Who can it be?”
He took out the picture and in the case were the initials, M. H., and a small
tress of auburn hair. He put it back in its place of concealment as he said, “My
God, here is a mystery I cannot solve. It must be the picture Pompey
supposed burned.”
As he viewed the picture he exclaimed, “Just the same form and features. I will
keep this as my own, and if I can find her or any one it resembles I will show it
to her. I am bound to find out this mystery sooner or later, as ‘where there’s a
will there’s a way.’”
CHAPTER VII.
After placing the picture carefully in his pocket he picked up the papers one by
one and read each of them carefully. The first proved to be the marriage
certificate of his parents; the second and several others the receipts of the
interest paid on the mortgage before spoken of; the last was a letter in the
familiar handwriting of his mother. With the trembling hands he opened it. It
read thus:
“My dear son and only child: My career on earth is nearly run; I feel it
my duty to make an explanation. I sincerely hope I may find courage
to tell you all about your father and the secret mortgage, but if
anything should happen this note will be found and explain my
strange conduct. This mortgage was given when you were small. I
have tried to pay it but could not get enough money ahead, as it took
so much money to pay doctor bills and hired help. I gave the
mortgage to save my father from prison. He promised to pay it, but
never did, and I have only managed to pay the interest on it. The face
of the mortgage is three thousand dollars. I did not care to let
everyone know there was a shadow over your birthplace, so I have
kept it a profound secret. The mortgagee and our old servants are the
only beings who know of it. My dear son, I have taught you to be a
good farmer, and I pray to God you may be able to raise the
mortgage when it becomes due. It was given for twenty years at ten
per cent. interest. I would have told you before now, and perhaps we
could have paid it. But I could not; I have always told you it was free
from debt and I deeded it to you as the same. God forgive my
weakness! I was born a deceptive child and I have lived a deceitful life
the last twenty-five years. I loved your father, as noble and kind a
husband as ever lived. I deceived him cruelly, and after our marriage I
quarreled with him about a picture he had, and finally to torment him
I told him I had burned it. It made him very angry. One day he went
to the village and I never saw him any more. My child, I feel as if he is
alive and if you ever meet him give him the picture and ask him to
forgive me. Tell him I died loving him and our child, he who has
never seen me out of temper. My son you will never see these lines
until I am clasped in death’s repose. I have erred, but I must die. As
God forgives his erring creatures I pray of you to forgive me.”
Your affectionate mother.
As Paul folded up the letter tears were falling on the table, and he exclaimed
aloud. “My mother, Oh, my mother! if I had only known your trouble I could
have made it lighter for you to bear. I freely forgive you in all. Who would not
forgive a mother’s errors?—she who has borne many trials for us while
young.”
“Massa,” exclaimed Pompey, breaking in on Paul’s murmurings, “you is just
like your fadder; he would have forgiven her if she would have done what was
fair by him after they were married. You see she liked to torment him, and she
did, once too often. Well, Paul, is you going away tomorrow now?” asked the
negro, looking fondly at his young master.
“Yes, Pompey, I am going if nothing happens to prevent me, as I have a great
mystery to solve and I cannot do it if I stay here.”
“Why Massa, de ’riginal ob dat picture is dead; Massa told Missus so; I heard
him tell her.”
“My man, there is a mystery about it and I must find it out!” exclaimed the
young man in a decisive tone.
He placed the papers carefully back and handed the box to his servant, saying,
“Keep this carefully, Pompey, as by and by the papers will be of great
importance to me.”
“I will do as you tells me,” answered the servant, taking the box from his
young master’s hand.
Many injunctions were given for the future, then each one returned to his
respective chamber, but not to sleep, as Pompey was thinking of his young
master, who was going away early the next morning and would not tell him
where he was going or when he should hear from him.
“Poor soul, I’s afraid he will neber come back. Oh, how I lub dat boy. May de
good Lawd watch ober him and keep him from bad company!”
Thus the negro mused until daylight dawned.
Paul threw himself on the bed but could not sleep. He was deeply troubled as
he lay thinking of his mother’s troubles, the mortgage, and lastly of his journey
on the morrow, and as morning dawned he had made up his mind where he
should go.
“I do not care; I will take the stage for New York and trust to Providence for
the rest.”
Thus he pondered until the servant’s bell rang.
He hastily dressed and went down stairs. As he made his appearance earlier
than usual Pompey said, “Guess you did not rest bery well, Massa?”
“No,” answered Paul, “I did not. Please hurry breakfast, as I have a long ride
this morning, Pompey, and should be on the road.” Soon breakfast was ready,
and after eating Paul bade his servants goodbye and started for the village.
Soon the same stage that bore Nettie on her homeward journey bore the sad,
broken-hearted young man from his once happy home. One desire caused him
to travel. Perhaps he would be able to find a person who resembled the picture
he had closely hidden in his pocket, or, find his lost love.
It was a year since Nettie returned home. Time drearily passed by and brought
momentarily each day the same longing thought: “Where is Paul?” She had
read of Paul’s mother’s death in the village paper and it deeply grieved her to
hear that he was all alone with no relative to bear the sorrow with him—no
one to console him in this trial. Warren had written her a letter, stating Paul
had started to the city.
She murmured as she sat in the little arbor by her home, “Oh, God, why did I
leave him as I did; he is alone, all alone; no kindred friends to comfort him;
Oh, why did I leave him?”
She was weeping piteously when a hand was laid on her head, and the owner
said, “Found at last, my own. Were you weeping for me?” asked the manly
voice by her side.
Nettie looked up in the manly face as she answered, “Forgive me, love, for
doubting you.”
She was overcome with joy, and fell fainting at his feet. He picked her up and
bore her into the cottage.
As he laid her down on the lounge he called, and Nettie’s mother came to her
side. As she returned to consciousness Paul stood motionless, gazing at the
mother and daughter.
“Can it be!” he exclaimed aloud.
“Can it be what?” asked the mother, looking up at the young man for the first
time, as she had been busily applying restoratives to her child and had
forgotten everything else, whom she had never seen in this condition before.
She noticed how thin and pale Nettie had grown lately, and it grieved her
deeply.
When she looked at the stranger she turned as white as her daughter and sank
on the floor by the side of the lounge.
“Sir, why did you come here? What have I done to be persecuted in this way,”
she asked.
She was gazing wildly at him, and it troubled him very much.
“My dear madam, you are laboring under a great mistake, as there is a mystery
here we must try to solve,” said the young man, taking the picture out of his
pocket and handing it to her saying, “Madam, did you ever see this?”
She took it with trembling hands and opened it and exclaimed passionately,
“Sir, where did you get this?”
“It was left in a little tin box for me by my mother,” answered Paul.
“How came she to have it? It was my picture I gave to a young man many
years ago. It is the same one, as here is the lock of hair and the initials of my
maiden name,” said the lady as she sat gazing at it earnestly and deeply
thinking.
It brought back memories of the past.
“How happy I was when I gave the picture to him; no shadow obscured the
fair horizon of my life; but time will change all things; babes will grow to be
men and women, and soon will grow to old age if God spares them to this
world of sorrow. I for one have borne many trials. Whenever cast down, the
thought will ever arise, ‘God doeth all things well.’ How strange it is that a
stranger should have a picture given to a friend twenty-five years ago,” said the
lady in meditation.
“Madam, it is strange, very strange indeed. It is a mystery. My father supposed
you dead and in time married my mother. Yet one of my servants told me my
father loved the picture so much that when he was told it was burned up he
went away and never has been heard of since. He left home when I was a babe
on my mother’s breast. I am going to find him if he is alive,” said the young
man vehemently.
“I must find him if he is in the land of the living.”
He bent over the couch where Nettie lay listening to her mother’s and lover’s
passionate words and she said, “My little love, your mother thinks she had
been deceived by my poor father, and now his son is trying to deceive her only
child. I am going away, and when I find my father or hear something definite
about him then I will return. All I ask is to prove faithful to me until I return.”
He pressed a kiss on her fair brow as he said, “God bless and keep you both
until I return.”
In a moment the door closed on the manly form of Paul Burton.
He went directly to the hotel where he was stopping and packing his little
wardrobe prepared to travel.
He thought of going to England but decided he would first go to the pleasure
seekers’ sea-side resorts.
Days and weeks went slowly by to the ones left in the cottage. At last it was
nearly Christmas; the inmates were looking out of the window at the people
hurrying along the thoroughfare. Presently the mother said, “Nettie, I wonder
if anyone thinks enough of us to give us something. Our little money is nearly
gone and what we have we cannot spare for niceties as it is all we have to keep
the wolf from the door.”
“God will provide for us,” answered Nettie.
“I wonder where Paul is today. It is a long time since he went away. Oh, if he
would only come back to us it would be all the pleasure I would ask. I care not
for presents. Oh, why does he not come!” exclaimed Nettie, looking wistfully
at her mother while the tears were springing to her eyes.
“My child, God grant that he may come back and bring good news. We can
only wait, watch, and pray,” answered the mother sorrowfully.
A few days after the above conversation they were looking out on the busy
people along the way. Many happy faces were to be seen. It was the long-
looked-for, happy day among the little children. One little one was standing in
the street viewing the shop windows when a runaway horse came dashing
along, and before she could have gotten out of the way a middle aged man
came running out of a shop near and caught her up in his arms, not soon
enough, however, to clear the danger as they were thrown down violently on
the sidewalk.
Mrs. Spaulding was the first to lend a helping hand, as it was just before her
door. Soon she bore the little inanimate form of the child into her own cottage
and laid her on lounge, where Nettie once lay, and began applying restoratives.
Soon she had the pleasure of seeing her open her bright blue eyes and feebly
ask for ‘mama.’
CHAPTER VIII.
“My dear little one, your mama will soon be here, as I have sent Nettie out to
see if she can find any one claiming you.”
Soon Nettie came with the parents of the child. How thankful they were to
find her not seriously hurt. The doctor said there was no bone broken, only
bruises, and she would be well soon. Many were the presents lavished upon
Mrs. Spaulding and Nettie.
The gentleman was bruised very badly. The first question he asked the
bystanders was, “Who is that lady who took the little one in the cottage.”
“It is Mrs. Spaulding, a widowed lady,” answered several people.
“How is the child? I tried to save the little one from harm, but I fear I have
not.”
A young man came up to where the people were huddled together, and seeing
the stranger sitting on the sidewalk he said, “What is the matter here?”
“A little girl came near getting killed by a runaway horse, and this gentleman
was badly hurt trying to save her,” answered one.
The young man came to him and extending his hand said, “Sir, please let me
help you up. You can bear on my arm, and I will help you to a place where you
can rest.”
The stranger was gazing earnestly at the young man, as he said, “Kind sir, pray
what is your name? Do not think me impertinent; you resemble a person I
know.”
“Paul Burton, of Pine Island,” modestly answered the young man.
“Pray, sir, what is your age?”
“Twenty-four my last birthday.”
“My son, my son, my babe I cruelly deserted years ago!”
Paul looked at the stranger critically as he said, “Is this my father who left me
in my faithful old servant’s arms, and cruelly deserted my mother and left her
broken hearted?”
“My son, I have done wrong, I admit, but my wife told me to go; she did not
wish ever to see me again. She burned a picture I had, and we quarreled like
many other hot headed people have done, and she told me to go, and I did. I
was very angry then, as my English temper had risen; but, my son, I am going
home to ask forgiveness, and be reconciled to her,” said the father, while his
tears were falling silently.
“My mother is dead: she died last spring. She gave me this to give to you if I
should ever see you,” handing him the picture, before refused him.
With trembling hand he took it. As his son gave him the letter in which Paul’s
mother said, “Tell him I died loving him and our child—he who never saw me
out of temper,” the father buried his head in his hands and wept like an infant.
“Oh, why did I let my temper get the better of me? My son I have done
wrong. I have wronged her and you. God forgive! I intended to return before
now. I went back to England. My father was sick and wished for me to stay
with him until he died. My mother was a frail woman, and I stayed till she was
placed beside my father. Then I started to come back. The merchant ship I set
sail in was taken by a pirate vessel, and I was left on an island with several
other people whom they did not wish to murder in cold blood, and I only
returned to England about a year ago. I thought of you and your mother many
and many a night and prayed to God to spare your lives until I returned home.
My son, can you forgive your poor wretch of a father, for I am your father by
the laws of nature?”
Paul wept violently. As soon as he could command his voice he said, “My dear
father. I forgive you, and you shall go with me to our faithful old servants and
to our sad home; sad indeed has that home been to me since mother died.”
“Thanks, my son, for your kindness. May God deal gently with you.”
They were walking slowly along, as the father was weak and could not have
walked without the aid of something to lean on. It was beautiful indeed to see
the father leaning on and protected by the manly arm of his son, whom he
deserted in childhood. Forgiveness is a blessing we all can bestow on our
fellow beings. As God forgives us we should in return forgive our friends and
neighbors. Soon they reached the hotel where Paul was staying. He had
returned from his tour the day before and until now was ignorant of his
father’s whereabouts. Before he started to England he desired to visit his lady
love, and was on his way there when he found his father. After seeing his
father well cared for he prepared to go on the street again.
As he went to his father’s side he said, “Have you looked at the picture yet?”
“No, my son, I do not care to. The original of that picture has long been dead,
and why should I care to draw back sad memories of the past?”
“Father,” said Paul, solemnly, “the grave may give up its dead: or, in other
words, she may be living. Are you positive she is dead?”
“My son, the ship she sailed in was wrecked, and none of her crew ever was
heard from, and of course she went to the bottom of the deep blue sea with
them,” answered the father sadly.
“You may be mistaken in the ship she sailed in. How did you find out what
ship she went in?”
“By my father, when I returned from the war. No, my son, there is no
happiness for me on earth but to live near my child,” answered the father
piteously.
“Cheer up, father. I have good news. If you were able to walk back the place of
that accident we would be able to solve this great deliverance satisfactorily. I
was going to the cottage where the child was taken, when I found you,” said
Paul, buttoning up his overcoat.
“My son, if you will order a horse and cutter I will go with you, as I am deeply
interested in what you have been telling me,” answered the father, getting up
off the couch.
He could scarcely stand without the aid of something, but it being Christmas
day he wished to give something to the poor children he saw gazing in at the
shop windows, and thus it was that he came to be near enough to save one
little one from death.
Soon his son came with a horse and cutter, and helping his father in, they went
down the street where they first met, three hours before. Soon the cottage
door was reached. Paul kindly helped his father out of the cutter, and told the
driver to call for them in an hour.
They hurried up the steps to the cottage door, and tapping lightly, Nettie bid
them come in. Mrs. Spaulding was in the parlor where the child and her
parents were, and as soon as Nettie saw who the newcomers were she ran
lightly to her mother as she said:
“Mother, there is a gentleman in the sitting room anxious to see you.”
Mrs. Spaulding came in, and Paul said, “Mrs. Spaulding, this is my father. We
have called to see how the little girl is getting along.”
Mr. Burton, senior, came to the lady and said, “Minnie, is this you, who I
thought dead so many years? My son has given me a happy surprise this
Christmas day.”
Mrs. Spaulding stood as one in a trance. Finally she said, “Sir, how came you to
think I was dead?” She spoke sorrowfully.
“Dear lady, or my dear Minnie, (if I may call you so as of old) when I came
home from the army my father told me you had sailed in the vessel that sank
off the coast of S——, and as none of the crew lived to tell the sad tale, I
supposed you suffered the same fate, as I could not get any trace of you in
Liverpool.”
“No,” answered the lady, “your father was mistaken in the ship, as we landed
safe, and I am among the living, as you see.”
As she extended her hand he grasped it and pressed it to his lips and said,
“Mrs. Spaulding, my first and only love, forget the past and let us be friends as
of old. My son has doubtless told you of my past life—how I left his mother
when he was a babe and I have been a wanderer from my home ever since. I
am very sorry. My past conduct does not deserve any kindness from my noble
son. He tells me my wife died loving me, who does not deserve the love of any
one. I married her because she loved me and I supposed her rich; and thinking
you dead, desired to try to be happy with her; but it was not to be. She saw
your picture, and it made her angry to think I had loved one before her. She
wanted me to burn it. We had a few words about it, and she told me to go and
never let her see my face again. I went away. I was going home now to ask her
forgiveness when I met my son, he who I left in my old servant Pompey’s
arms. As God is my witness, what I tell you is the truth. Will you forgive me,
Minnie, and let the past be forgotten?” said Mr. Burton, taking the hand of the
lady and looking fondly in her face.
“Paul, can it be that after twenty-five years we are to meet in the presence of
our children?” said the lady, sinking on the breast of her old lover.
“Mother and father,” said both the young people, advancing towards them
from the parlor, “give us your blessing, and God grant we may all be happy
together this ever-to-be-remembered Christmas.”
“What say you, my love,” asked the senior Paul Burton. “God bless you, my
children! May the blessing of God ever fall on your pathway and strew it with
flowers,” said the father, placing Nettie’s hand in that of his son. “And if your
mother will be my wife we will begin our lives anew.”
“One week from today; what say you, Minnie?” said the gentleman.
A letter was written then and two days before New Year’s they started for that
place, and when it became known at the house of Paul that he was going to
bring a wife home, and had found his father, what a hustle-bustle there was
among the servants to make everything look its best. Pompey said, “Paul is
coming home wid his fadder and wife, and day shall see what a good ole man
and woman Paul left to see to things. Golly, I’s in hopes she’ll be a better wife
to him than his mudder was to his fadder.”
They did not know yet that the father was going to fetch a wife with him, as
that part was kept a secret, yet all the people about knew that Paul was coming
home with a wife and that he had found his father, who they all supposed
dead.
All was made ready at the farm house for the wedding. Just as the sun was
going down New Year’s evening the two couples came. Many kind greetings,
were exchanged between the parties, and Paul’s father was kindly received by
all.
Soon the minister came, and Paul and Nettie were made one, and the minister
was closing the book when Paul, senior, said, “One more couple is waiting to
be united.”
All eyes were turned to see who they could be, when he went to Mrs.
Spaulding and extending his arm they went before the minister and were
united. Only one person there had an idea who the second couple could be,
and that was John Hilton. He recognized Paul Burton, senior, but did not
mention it, as he did not wish his sister to know his thoughts. Happy were all
the friends on that New Year’s day.
The next morning the newly married couples went over to their home, where
Paul Burton, junior, called his servants together and told them they had a new
mistress, and he wished them to obey her and also his father’s wife. They all
seemed delighted.
Paul, senior, stayed until spring, then he took his wife over to England to live
there on the estate left him by his father.
Some ten years later we enter the home of Paul Burton, Jr. Two little curly-
headed boys are playing on the floor, and the mother, a frail, sickly little being,
was sitting in the arm chair where Paul’s mother used to sit. Traces of tears
were on her pale cheeks, when a familiar voice said, “Cousin Nettie, why have
you been weeping?”
“Oh, Warren, I suppose our house is to be sold if we can not raise the balance
of the mortgage. The mortgagee is a cold stern man, and will not give Paul
one day’s time on it, or part of it even. There is only five hundred back. I don’t
see how we can get it in five days. Oh, if I could only sell my manuscripts and
raise that amount, what a happy surprise I could give my noble husband,” said
Nettie, lowering her head on her hands and weeping violently.
“Nettie, let me see the manuscripts and perhaps I can dispose of them for
you,” said her cousin.
She went to a secret drawer and brought him the writings.
He read them through and told her he was going to the city and he would see
what he could get for them, promising her he would be back in four days’ time
to pay the mortgage. She made him promise not to let Paul know anything
about it.
“I have written them unknown to him, and when I could not do anything
else,” she explained.
Warren took the papers, and the same evening started for the city.
After Warren had gone Paul came home. He had been out to see if he could
raise the money. He was down hearted. He sat down by Nettie’s side as he
said. “In four days, we’re homeless if I cannot raise the money. If I only had
time to get it from over the water—but I cannot get it anywhere. Oh, Nettie,
what will we do? I have worked hard to pay this old debt, but it is impossible
for me to get that amount of any one, as I have sold everything we can spare
and the mortgagee will not release it so I can give another mortgage on it to
get the balance. Oh, dear, what shall we do?”
“Trust in God. He will not see us suffer,” answered his trusting little wife, as
she put her arms around his neck and kissed his fair brow. “God doeth all
things well.”
Time flew drearily away. Four days were gone; the fifth came bright and clear.
The mortgagee had come for his pay, and the five hundred remained unpaid.
With sad and sorrowful hearts the husband and wife sat, when a man drove up
to the door and handed the wife a package. She tore it open, and out rolled
eight hundred dollars. She handed it to her husband as she said, “A friend in
need is a friend indeed.”
“My dear, how did you come to get such an amount of money?” asked her
husband, while the tears stood in his eyes.
“My dear,” answered his wife, “I have earned it, when I was not able to do
anything else, with my pen, and by God’s help I have been able to help you a
little while you were doing all you could.”
“God bless you, my noble little wife.”
The mortgage was paid, and one little home was made happy; and a happy
surprise it was to this noble young farmer to think he had a lovely little
helpmate.
The End.
Transcriber’s Notes
The Table of Contents for this eBook was created by the transcriber for the reader's
convenience.
Except for the places noted below, spelling and grammar has been retained from the
original text
Pg. 5 - Corrected typo: Missing space inserted: “Warren,the eldest”
Pg. 5 - Corrected typo: ‘.’ > ‘,’: “pleasure it afforded. except”
Pg. 5 - Corrected typo: Missing ‘s’: “her cousin were”
Pg. 5 - Corrected typo: ‘boquet’ > ‘bouquet’
Pg. 5 - Corrected typo: “Her cousin. Nettie” > “Her cousin, Nettie”
Pg. 6 - Changed ‘surprized’ > ‘surprised’ to match rest of text
Pg. 8 - Corrected typo: ‘your’ > ‘young’: “What a handsome your man”
Pg. 9 - Corrected typo: ‘for’ > ‘far’: “wandered for out”
Pg. 9 - Corrected typo: ‘.’ > ‘?’: “great act of kindness.”
Pg. 11 - Added missing close quote at chapter end
Pg. 12 - Removed extra comma: “Why, does mother not tell me”
Pg. 13 - Missing ‘.’ inserted at paragraph end: “this little lady”
Pg. 13 - Corrected typo: “resolved never to do” > “resolved ever to do”
Pg. 14 - Corrected typo: “The depth of love I owe” > “The debt of love I owe”
Pg. 15 - Corrected typo: ‘.’ > ‘,’: “in the street. springing”
Pg. 16 - Changed Tis > ’Tis to match rest of text
Pg. 17 - Corrected typo: ‘boquets’ > ‘bouquets’
Pg. 19 - ‘?’ moved inside quote: “where is cousin”?

Pg. 20 - Corrected typo: ‘.’ > ‘,’: “No. no, I can not”
Pg. 20 - Corrected typo: single quote to double: “since Monday?’”
Pg. 21 - Removed extraneous single quote: “‘As he spoke he”
Pg. 22 - Removed extraneous opening quote: ““Warren saw he was”
Pg. 22 - Missing double quote inserted at paragraph end: “packing your trunk.”
Pg. 30 - Corrected typo: ‘then’ > ‘than’: “sooner then”
Pg. 31 - Changed double quotes to single: ““no” for an answer”
Pg. 32 - Removed extraneous opening quote: ““Nettie was speaking”
Pg. 33 - Corrected typo: ‘sustaine’ > ‘sustain’
Pg. 33 - Added missing ‘.’: “in this country”
Pg. 33 - Removed extraneous closing quote: “from the story.”
Pg. 34 - Corrected typo: ‘farwell’ > ‘farewell’
Pg. 35 - Corrected typo: ‘abscence’ > ‘absence’
Pg. 35 - Added missing opening quote: “The young man”
Pg. 35 - Corrected typo: “here in America” > “here to America”
Pg. 41 - Removed extraneous closing quote: “about her.””
Pg. 41 - Changed nested quote marks to single: ““No, no, I never ... for a while.””
Pg. 42 - Removed extraneous closing quote: “dearly loved her.””
Pg. 43 - Missing closing quote added at paragraph end: “from prying eyes.”
Pg. 45 - Corrected typo: ‘sincerly’ > ‘sincerely’
Pg. 46 - Added missing comma: “to his servant, saying “Keep”
Pg. 46 - Corrected typo: ‘bourne’ > ‘borne’
Pg. 47 - Corrected typo: ‘drearly’ > ‘drearily’
Pg. 49 - Corrected typo: ‘friends’ > ‘friend’: “to a friends”
Pg. 49 - Corrected typo: ‘passonate’ > ‘passionate’

Pg. 50 - Corrected typo: ‘hr’ > ‘her’
Pg. 51 - Changed single quote to double to match end: “‘Who is that lady”
Pg. 52 - Added missing ‘.’: “see me again She burned”
Pg. 53 - Missing closing quote added at paragraph end: “of the past?”
Pg. 55 - Added missing opening quote: “And if your mother”
Pg. 56 - Corrected typo: ‘ond’ > ‘and’

The Rise and Return of The Indo Pacific Doyle Full Chapter

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The Rise and Return of the Indo-Pacific

The Rise and Return of the Indo-Pacific

The Rise and Return

Seminar on Indian Ocean Regional Security, Fudan University, Shanghai, China

Naturally, in the very complex and demanding endeavour involved in writing

1. Introduction: Constructions of the Indo-Pacific Region 1

4.1. Perceived potential US adversaries 56

4.1. India’s strategic partnerships 60

Structure of the Book

2 The Rise and Return of the Indo-Pacific

of traditional geopolitical concepts throughout the key nation-states of the

there has been a revival of classical geopolitical language in twenty-first-century

4 The Rise and Return of the Indo-Pacific

(Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal), as well as the previously inadequately

Constructing the Indo-Pacific

The Indo-Pacific, constructed either as an oceanic region, super-region, or non-

6 The Rise and Return of the Indo-Pacific

8 The Rise and Return of the Indo-Pacific

Whilst acknowledging the primacy of nation-states, another way in which place

bureaucratic and epistemic communities within and outside of governments,

1. All regions are human constructions.

Indo-Pacific regionalism, then, is at once a challenge to non-differentiated

10 The Rise and Return of the Indo-Pacific

of national geostrategy) and at the same time to promote an agenda sometimes

1. A shift to a post-Cold War world—perpetuation of Cold War mentality and

The Epistemological Continuum: Essentialist

Within the study of geopolitics and international relations, there is an

Introduction: Regions, Oceans, and Sea Spaces

The Social Construction of Maritime Space

Maritime Regional Theories 13

of the Braudelian paradigm of historical research, ‘for historians of premodern

14 The Rise and Return of the Indo-Pacific

Maritime Regional Theories 15

Somewhere in the middle of these different paradigms, the Mediterranean Sea

Indo-Pacific as Region, Oceanic Neighbourhood,

16 The Rise and Return of the Indo-Pacific

Maritime Regional Theories 17

Bose deterritorializes Indian nationalism, arguing that regional/civilizational

18 The Rise and Return of the Indo-Pacific

economies (though these exist as subservient traditions). Rather, these regional

Maritime Regional Theories 19

Realist Constructions of Indo-Pacific

20 The Rise and Return of the Indo-Pacific

system’ or ‘Islamic world economy’, centred particularly in Gujarat. This ­replacement

Maritime Regional Theories 21

In statecraft, the Arthasastra conceptualizes a geostrategic and a geopolitical

This is very similar to the Chinese understanding of neighbourhood mentioned

22 The Rise and Return of the Indo-Pacific

Maritime Regional Theories 23

Universalist, Non-Differentiated Constructions

Phillip Steinberg’s work on the social construction of sea space is particularly

24 The Rise and Return of the Indo-Pacific

unholy alliance of neo-mercantilism and neo-liberalism. This views the

Conflicting notions coincide even within the US bureaucratic establishment

Maritime Regional Theories 25

The concept of Maritime Asia is quite similar to what the US Department of

26 The Rise and Return of the Indo-Pacific

Maritime Regional Theories 27

Traditional Geopolitical Ideas

In the twenty-first century, it is highly likely that traditional geopolitical thinking

The Return of Traditional Geopolitical Thought 29

30 The Rise and Return of the Indo-Pacific

Central to Haushofer’s Indo-Pacific strategy was the need to check the

1. Introduction: Constructions of the Indo-Pacific Region 1

4.1. Perceived potential US adversaries 56

4.1. India’s strategic partnerships 60

system’ or ‘Islamic world economy’, centred particularly in Gujarat. This replacement