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Kristie Miller
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Everyday Metaphysical Explanation

Everyday Metaphysical
Explanation
KRISTIE MILLER AND JAMES NORTON
1
3
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Contents
Acknowledgements ix
Introduction 1
1. Metaphysical Explanation 16
1.1 Introducing Metaphysical Explanation 16
1.2 What are Metaphysical Explanations? 22
1.3 Aspects of Everyday Metaphysical Explanation 24
1.3.1 The Worldly-Structure Aspect 25
1.3.2 The Psychological Aspect 30
1.4 Truth-Conditions, Worldly Structure, and Psychology 30
1.5 Propositions 38
1.6 What’s Next? 42
2. Desiderata for an Account of Everyday Metaphysical Explanation 43
2.1 Four Desiderata 43
2.2 Explain Practices 46
2.3 Correct Truth-Conditions 50
2.3.1 Evidence that Truth-Conditions Are Correct 51
2.4 Epistemic Tractability 62
2.5 Phenomenon-Posit Link 63
2.6 Motivating the Need for Empirical Research 63
3. Empirical Evidence about Judgements about Causal and
Metaphysical Explanation 66
3.1 Formulating Hypotheses about Everyday Metaphysical Explanation 67
3.2 The Studies 75
3.2.1 Context-Sensitivity, Subjectivity, and Agent-Relativity 77
3.2.2 Context and the Direction of Explanation 83
3.2.3 Context, Asymmetry, and Disagreement Part I 93
3.2.4 Context, Asymmetry, and Disagreement Part II 99
3.3 Which Patterns and Practices Need Accommodation? 102
4. Grounding-Based Accounts of Everyday Metaphysical Explanation 110
4.1 Grounding 111
4.2 Two Grounding-Based Accounts 111
4.3 Evaluating Strong and Weak Grounding-Based Accounts 114
4.3.1 Correct Truth-Conditions 115
4.3.2 Explain Practices 121
vi 
4.3.3 Epistemic Tractability 124

4.3.4 Phenomenon-Posit Link 125
4.4 Summary 128
5. Three Accounts of R-facts 130
5.1 Candidate Alternative R-facts 131
5.2 The R-facts Are SD-facts 132
5.2.1 Interventionist Models 133
5.2.2 Logical Features of the Symmetric Dependence Relation 137
5.2.3 SD-Relations and Necessitation 144
5.3 R-facts Are N-facts 147
5.4 R-facts Are NCC-facts 151
5.5 The Objection from Non-Explanatory Instances 159
5.6 Summing Up Thus Far 161
5.7 A Worldly Approach to Everyday Metaphysical Explanation 162
5.8 Wrapping Up 167
6. Psychological Role P 168
6.1 Subjective Understanding 169
6.2 Objectual Interventional Representations 173
6.3 Representing Interventional Affordances 176
6.4 Extending P 179
6.4.1 Being Disposed to Subjectively Understand 179
6.4.2 Consistency 180
6.4.3 Objective Understanding 181
6.4.4 Communitarianism about Psychological Role P 183
6.5 What Is to Come 187
7. Tracking R-facts 189
7.1 Reliably Detecting R-facts 190
7.2 The Correlation Detection Mechanism 192
7.3 Reliably Detecting Dependence Relations 201
7.3.1 The Interventional Affordance Detection Mechanism 202
7.3.2 The Causal/Dependence Filtration Mechanism 207
7.3.3 Detecting the Direction of Ground 216
7.4 Wrapping Up 218
8. Tracking Subjective Understanding 219
8.1 Detecting Subjective Understanding in Ourselves 220
8.2 Detecting Subjective Understanding in Others 225
9. Evaluating the Three Accounts Part I 231
9.1 The Quartet 233
9.2 The Duet 236
9.3 The Trio 239
9.4 Non-Monotonicity 244
9.5 Quasi-Irreflexivity 247
 vii
9.6 Non-Symmetry 250

9.7 A Paucity of Necessitation 252
9.8 Introducing the Interventional Conditions 255
9.9 The Interventional Conditions in Action 259
9.10 Taking Stock on Correct Truth-Conditions 269
10. Evaluating the Three Accounts Part II 271
10.1 Epistemic Tractability 271
10.2 Explain Practices 272
10.2.1 Strict Disagreement and Non-Strict Disagreement 272
10.2.2 Genuine Disagreement, Faulty Disagreement, and Genuine
Worldly Disagreement 274
10.2.3 Disagreement 277
10.2.4 Import 281
10.3 Phenomenon-Posit Link 283
10.4 Comparing the Three Accounts 285
10.5 Everyday Metaphysical Explanation 286
References 289
Index 303
Acknowledgements
Lots of people have facilitated the completion of this book. First, we want to thank
our families, Gina and Reuben Norton, and David Braddon-Mitchell and Annie
and Freddie Braddon-Miller, all of whom have lived with this book, in one way or
another, for some time now. Watching someone sitting at a small silver box is not
very exciting, nor are missed weekends and evenings. Your support, patience, and
encouragement are greatly appreciated.
Second, we want to thank Andrew Latham, without whom chapter 3 of this
book would not have been possible. He was a vital member of the team who
designed and ran the studies.
Third, we want to thank the many people who gave us feedback on chapters of
the book. These include, in no particular order: David Braddon-Mitchell, Finnur
Dellsén, Andrew Latham, Michael Duncan, Patrick Dawson, Nathaniel Gan,
Naoyuki Kajimoto, Rory Torrens, Sam Baron, Jonathan Tallant, David Ingram,
Insa Lawler, Alastair Wilson, Mike Raven, Jordan Lee-tory, Lei Wang, and Hasti
Saeedi. Thanks also to Peter Momtchiloff for his encouragement and support of
this project, and to two anonymous readers for Oxford University Press for their
extensive and insightful feedback.
Kristie’s research is funded by the Australian Research Council (grants
FT170100262 and DP18010010). James’ research is funded by the Icelandic
Centre for Research (grant 195617-051).
Figure 1 Freddie Braddon-Miller © David Braddon-Mitchell

Figure 2 Annie Braddon-Miller © David Braddon-Mitchell

Figure 3 Annie and Freddie © David Braddon-Mitchell

Introduction
Many areas of philosophy are in the business of explaining things, and hence of
explaining some things in terms of other things. Sometimes we are explaining the
way things are at one time, by appealing to the way things are at some other time,
and sometimes we are explaining the way things are at one time, in terms of some
other way they are that same time, and sometimes we are explaining one way
things are, atemporally, in terms of some other way they are, temporally or
atemporally. Often, when we are explaining the way things are at one time, by
appealing to the way things are at some other time, we are engaging in causal
explanation: we are explaining the way things are a later time—the effect—in
terms of some earlier cause. When we explain why Usain Bolt runs so fast, by
appealing (amongst other things) to his countless hours of training, we are
providing a causal explanation.
Not all explanations, however, are causal explanations. In general, explaining
the way things are at one time, in terms of some other way they are that same time,
or explaining the way things are, atemporally, in terms of some other way they are,
temporally or atemporally, is not a matter of providing a causal explanation.
Unsurprisingly, it’s controversial exactly which putative explanations are genuine
explanations, and controversial, amongst the genuine explanations (henceforth we
just call these explanations), which are truly non-causal. But various philosophers
have supposed that at least some of the following count as non-causal explan-
ations: our explaining that someone is in a particular mental state (like pleasure)
by appealing to their being in a certain brain state; or that the flag is red, because it
is maroon, or that Annie is a dog because she’s a labradoodle,¹ or that some action
is right because it maximises utility, or that a society is a just society because of the
way it arranges its institutions. Indeed, perhaps sometimes when we explain the
way things are at one time in terms of how they are at some other time, we are
nonetheless providing non-causal explanations. Arguably, when we explain that
some particular building is a church, because of some earlier event of
¹ Annie and Freddie are Kristie’s labradoodles. (They are also David’s Labradoodles. Thanks to
David Braddon-Mitchell for feedback on this issue.) There are pictures of Annie and Freddie in the
front matter to this book. That Freddie is a cream labradoodle and Annie is a black labradoodle are
important things to keep in mind while reading on. For the purposes of this book we will assume that
Annie and Freddie have some quite sophisticated cognitive capacities, and can ask and answer some
quite demanding explanatory questions. If it helps, you can think of them as small humans in fluffy
coats.
Everyday Metaphysical Explanation. Kristie Miller & James Norton, Oxford University Press.
© Kristie Miller & James Norton 2022. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198857303.003.0001
2 
consecration, we are providing an explanation that is at least in part non-causal.

Some non-causal explanations have become known as metaphysical explanations,
and they are the bread and butter of philosophy.
While these sorts of non-causal explanations are common in philosophy, they
are also common outside philosophy. When they are employed to articulate
connections between the subject matters of various scientific subdisciplines they
are sometimes known as inter-level explanations. So, when physicists account for
the macroscopic thermodynamic properties of a system (i.e. its temperature,
pressure, etc.) in terms of the distribution and motion of the microscopic particles
that make up the system, and biologists explain why there is some DNA by noting
that there exists a chain of nucleotides in a certain order, they are articulating the
kind of explanations in which we are interested.
The sorts of explanations in which we are interested can, in fact, be found pretty
much everywhere. They are not a recherché interest of contemporary philo-
sophers and scientists. When Annie explains to Freddie that the painting depicts
a horse because of the way the paints have been arranged on the canvas; when
Freddie explains to Annie that torturing a cat for fun is wrong because of the pain
caused to the cat; when Annie explains to Freddie that he is enjoying the kangaroo
chop because certain neurons are firing in his brain; when Phyllida explains to
Jack that there is a bicycle because some parts have been put together in a certain
way; when Jenny explains to Herbert that in order for society to be just, its
institutions need to be arranged in certain ways, they are all (arguably) engaging
in metaphysical explanation. Engaging in metaphysical explanation, then, is a
mainstay of explanatory discourse whereby we help one another to understand the
world. So while philosophers have, of late, started to seriously theorise about this
kind of explanation, and while this kind of explanation is especially prevalent
within philosophy itself, it is not by any means a uniquely philosophical notion.
This book focuses on that phenomenon: metaphysical explanation. This is, very
roughly, the phenomenon we take to underpin, or perhaps even be partly consti-
tuted by, our behaviours of seeking and providing explanations of a certain sort
(metaphysical), by appealing to certain sorts of structures in the world, in order to
bring it about that we come to understand, or find illumination, or gain new
capacities to intervene in the world.
As we see it, there are two distinct aspects to the phenomenon of metaphysical
explanation: a worldly aspect and a psychological aspect. Correspondingly, there
are accounts that target these different aspects of the phenomenon. What we call
worldly-structure accounts are accounts that focus only on spelling out what sorts
of worldly structures there need to be in order for there to be a metaphysical
explanation present.
The psychological aspect of the phenomenon is concerned with how subjects’
mental states must connect to the presence of that worldly structure if there are to
be metaphysical explanations. Psychological accounts of metaphysical explanation,
 3
then, are ones on which in order to account for metaphysical explanation we need
to appeal to, inter alia, psychological states of subjects. However, this aspect has
received little attention. Indeed, almost all theorising about the phenomenon has
focussed on the development of worldly-structure accounts. There is thus much
work to be done articulating the psychological aspect of metaphysical explanation.
For instance, one might think that whether there is a metaphysical explanation
present will depend on what sort of question we are attempting to answer. For
instance, if Annie asks ‘why is the flower red?’ there are several sorts of why-
questions to which she might be seeking an answer, some of which are not well
answered by someone telling her that it is maroon. Instead, she might be asking
for an evolutionary explanation of why the flower is red, or a biological account of
how it is that the plant produces red flowers, or whether Uncle Andrew painted
the flower red, or asking for something else again.
So there is reason to think that which question one is attempting to answer is
going to partially determine whether the answer one gives is any kind of explan-
ation at all, and also, whether it is a metaphysical explanation. So for instance, one
might think that if Annie asks why the ball is orange and blue (it’s a chuckit) and
Freddie responds by telling her that the grass is green because the grass contains
chlorophyll, that this is not a metaphysical explanation for Annie, since it com-
pletely fails to answer the question she was asking. Freddie’s response was entirely
insensitive to Annie’s explanatory goals. We will call this element of metaphysical
explanation the goal-directed element.
One might also think that whether or not there is a metaphysical explanation
present for a subject is going to depend on broader features of the psychological
state of the subject, and not just her current goals. Perhaps, for instance, there’s a
perfectly good explanation to be had of why Freddie ate a burrito for lunch, by
citing the initial conditions of the universe and the laws of nature. But even if there
is, if you explain to Freddie his choice of lunch by reference to those initial
conditions and the laws of nature, he will most likely tell you that it is no
explanation, or, at best, is an exceedingly poor one. Moreover, Freddie might
insist that the problem with the candidate explanation is not that it is insensitive to
his explanatory goals—he wanted to learn about the cause(s) of his culinary
choice—but that it was insensitive some other relevant psychological states. To
know whether a candidate explanation counts as an explanation for a subject, we
need to know something about their psychological states. We need to know,
perhaps, whether the candidate explanation is in any way illuminating for the
subject in question. Does it seem to her as though one thing explains the other?
Does she understand one thing in terms of the other? Does it seem to her that she
has gained some new capacity to engage with, or intervene in, the world? We will
call this element of the phenomenon the concordance element.
To see how these two elements come apart, suppose that Annie’s goal is to work
out why the ocean trout is on the top of the high bench. Freddie explains to Annie
4 
that it is located there because the humans do not wish her to eat it. Freddie has, it
would seem, provided the right sort of information, given Annie’s why-question.
But Annie just does not understand how it could be that the humans do not want
her to eat the salmon, and so although her why-question is answered, there is no
concordance: for she does not understand the response, and cannot integrate it
into her wider framework for understanding the world.
Although fairly little has been said about either the goal-directed or the con-
cordance elements of metaphysical explanation, Thompson (2019) has recently
presented a view on which metaphysical explanations are answers to a certain
kind of why-question: a what-makes-it-the-case-that question. This account is
inspired by Van Fraassen’s (1980) pragmatic account of scientific explanation.
Van Fraassen notes that explanatory judgements are highly sensitive to which
contrast class is identified. Explaining why Freddie ate the sandwich (rather than
the muffin) is quite different from explaining why Freddie (rather than Annie) ate
the sandwich, and indeed, why Freddie ate the sandwich (rather than using it as a
rather ineffective hat). According to Thompson, whether an answer to a why-
question counts as a candidate metaphysical explanation depends on the back-
ground beliefs, theoretical commitments, explanatory goals, etc., of the question-
asker. In particular, for that subject the answer must be reasonable, proportionate,
intelligible, and relevant. For the candidate metaphysical explanation to, in add-
ition, be correct, the metaphysical explanation must report the obtaining of some
worldly structure.
Very roughly, we can characterise Thompson’s view as one on which meta-
physical explanations are correct answers to a certain kind of why-question. In
turn, an answer to a why-question is correct, just in case (i) the relevant worldly
structure obtains and (ii) the answer is an answer to the relevant question—it is
sensitive to the explanatory goals of the question-asker and (iii) the answer is
intelligible. (ii) maps on to our talk of goal-directed element of metaphysical
explanation, and (iii) maps on to our talk of the concordance element of meta-
physical explanation. While we have taken these to be elements of the psycho-
logical aspect of metaphysical explanation, Thompson talks of both (ii) and (iii) as
epistemic elements of the phenomenon, arguing that on her view “whether
something counts as an explanation or not plausibly depends (in part) on who
that explanation is for. In this sense, explanation is an epistemic phenomenon”
(2019:103). Here, we think she has in mind a broad sense of ‘epistemic’, according
to which an element of metaphysical explanation is epistemic just in case it is
connected to our goals and cognitive capacities.
In this book we will largely set to the side the goal-directed element of
metaphysical explanation. In doing so we assume that whether something counts
as a metaphysical explanation for a subject does not depend on whether or not it
answers any particular why-questions the subject has in mind (assuming they had
any in mind). So suppose, for instance, that Freddie is wondering why the door is
 5
red, and that Freddie asks Annie, and she responds by telling Freddie that torture
is wrong because torture fails to maximise utility. Let’s suppose that Freddie has
the appropriate sorts of psychological states that concordance requires—he under-
stands (let’s suppose that’s what matters) what torture is, that it causes pain, and
hence fails to maximise utility, and he understands the connection between the
two. As we will ultimately put it, Freddie understands one fact (that torture is
wrong) in terms of the other (that torture fails to maximise utility) by representing
those facts, and representing there to obtain a certain connection between them.
So, on our view, this candidate metaphysical explanation meets the concordance
element of metaphysical explanation for Freddie. Then we will say that what
Annie said is a metaphysical explanation for Freddie (holding fixed that there is
some worldly relationship between torture’s being wrong and its causing pain, if
this is required). We will say this even though, quite clearly, what Annie said is not
an appropriate response to Freddie’s question.
We will suppose that the goal-directed element of metaphysical explanation is
best accommodated by appealing to questions about acts of metaphysical explan-
ation (more on this in chapter 1), and that it is only the concordance element that
need be accommodated by an account of metaphysical explanation itself. As a
result, we must allow that even once we have determined what metaphysically
explains what for a subject—where this may or may not have a psychological
aspect—there is the further question of which explanation is appropriate to offer
her, given her goals, in response to a particular explanation-seeking why-question.
Determining which utterance of a metaphysical explanation is appropriate, and
thus an act of metaphysical explanation, is something that will plausibly depend
on the psychological or epistemic characteristics of the explanation-seeking sub-
ject, as these are related to their particular explanation-seeking behaviour.
Developing an account that shows why Annie’s response to Freddie is, while a
metaphysical explanation, not appropriate and thus not an act of metaphysical
explanation, is not something we will attempt; for our focus is on questions about
the psychological aspect of metaphysical explanation itself, not acts thereof.
Quite generally though, it seems right to think that a particular utterance will
count as an act of metaphysical explanation just in case there is a metaphysical
explanation present for the subject and the utterance is appropriate: it answers
the why-question to which the subject wants an answer. If that is roughly right,
then we can be thought of as providing the beginnings of an account of when
something counts as an act of metaphysical explanation: namely, the conditions
under which the proposition uttered is a metaphysical explanation. We leave it to
others to fill in the remaining details about when uttering such a proposition is
appropriate.
Henceforth, then, when we talk about the psychological aspect of metaphysical
explanation, it is only the concordance element of metaphysical explanation that
6 
we will have in mind. We will reflect on the goal-directed element of metaphysical

explanation only insofar as we are discussing acts of metaphysical explanation.
This book attempts to spell out a psychological account of metaphysical
explanation, appealing, inter alia, to psychological states of subjects in order to
articulate the concordance element of the phenomenon. However, our account
does not appeal only to psychological states (call any such view a strict psycho-
logical account). Instead, we will seek to provide an account of (i) what worldly
structure must obtain for a metaphysical explanation to obtain at all, and (ii) what
relations that structure must bear to the minds of subjects in order for a meta-
physical explanation to obtain for those subjects. This is to provide what we call a
complete psychological account: complete because nothing more is required, and
psychological because it requires not only that there is some worldly structure
present but also that the subject have certain psychological states (perhaps in
response to that worldly structure).
Moving on, theorising about the different aspects of metaphysical explanation
can be done in the service of quite different aims. As such, we can distinguish two
rather different projects with which one might engage. One of these is the project
of articulating and accounting for what we will call a philosophical notion of
metaphysical explanation. The other is a project of articulating and accounting for
what we will call an everyday notion of metaphysical explanation.
This is a book about the everyday notion of metaphysical explanation, or, as we
will call it, everyday metaphysical explanation. What is everyday metaphysical
explanation? It is the notion of metaphysical explanation that non-philosophers
deploy, and which is typically manifested in ordinary, everyday situations in
which we ask for, and offer, metaphysical explanations: that is, the particular
sort of non-causal explanation on which we are focussed. So, for instance, when
Freddie asks ‘why is a doctor’s appointment occurring?’ and Annie replies
‘because the patient and the doctor are in a room discussing symptoms, diagnosis,
treatment, etc.’, this is a putative example of an everyday metaphysical explan-
ation. When Freddie asks ‘why did I lose this game of bitey-face?’ and Annie
replies ‘because your face is in my mouth’, that is a putative example of an
everyday metaphysical explanation. When Freddie asks ‘why am I feeling so
stressed?’ and Annie replies ‘because your cortisol levels are very high’, that is a
putative example of an everyday metaphysical explanation.
These are fairly obvious and intuitive putative examples of everyday metaphys-
ical explanations: they are the sorts of explanations that we all, non-philosophers
included, ask for, and receive, in ordinary situations. It is this ordinary notion of
metaphysical explanation—the one that we all employ—that is the subject of this
book. To say that we are interested in the everyday notion of metaphysical
explanation is not to say, however, that we are only interested in the sorts of
ordinary contexts in which we tend to ask for and offer such explanations. For
instance, consider the following examples that one frequently finds in
 7
philosophical discussion. (We use an italicised ‘because’ in what follows, to

distinguish purported cases of metaphysical explanation from purported cases
of other kinds of explanation (such as causal explanation)).
A. The flower is red because the flower is maroon.

B. The painting depicts a cow because of the arrangement of colours on the canvas.
C. Torturing this cat for fun is wrong because it fails to maximise utility.
D. Bert is in mental state M because he is in brain state B.
E. The bicycle exists because of the existence and arrangement of the wheels,
spokes, handlebars, etc.
F. The set {Diogenes} exists because Diogenes exists.
G. The proposition <Diogenes exists> is true because Diogenes exists.
H. God loves X because X is good.
I. Building B is a church because at some earlier time, B was consecrated.
Arguably, a good many of A to I are not ‘everyday’ cases of metaphysical

explanation. It is rare for non-philosophers to worry about whether a set exists
because its members do, or whether a proposition is true because some object
exists. One might think something similar about A and E. Hence, one might think,
these are not candidates to be everyday metaphysical explanations. Not so.
Everyday metaphysical explanation is that notion which we, non-philosophers
included, use in everyday life. Everyday metaphysical explanations need not,
however, occur only in everyday situations. We can (and indeed in this book we
do) ask ordinary folk (i.e. non-philosophers) to make judgements about cases
using their ordinary, everyday, notion of metaphysical explanation, where the
cases in question are not themselves ‘everyday’. There is, of course, nothing very
odd about this. We often try to explicate a particular notion by getting people to
use that notion in a range of circumstances, some of which are not ordinary,
everyday circumstances. Is the wet potable stuff that falls from the skies in some
counterfactual world water? Is a fluffy labradoodle-like object that evolved from
an ancient elephant, a dog? Do you have free will if a nefarious neuroscientist is
poised to prevent you from performing alternative actions? We take cases like A to
I to be putative, or candidate, everyday metaphysical explanations, because
although very few people ordinarily ask whether the set {Diogenes} exists because
Diogenes exists, we can ask non-philosophers to employ their everyday concept of
metaphysical explanation to answer that question, and more besides.
Thus we do not think that everyday metaphysical explanations are confined to
those explanations that we request and provide in everyday situations. Rather, we
take everyday metaphysical explanations to be those things, whatever they are,
that we, collectively, are tracking with our judgements about what metaphysically
8 
explains what, and to be those things (whatever they are) around which we
organise our various practices of asking for, and offering, metaphysical
explanations.
This leaves open that we could make various discoveries about this phenom-
enon. If it turns out that the thing we are tracking with our collective judgements
involves the world’s having a certain kind of structure, then it will turn out, for us,
that everyday metaphysical explanation involves the world’s having that kind of
worldly structure. If it turns out that the thing we are tracking by our collective
judgements involves subjects having certain kinds of psychological states, then it
will turn out, for us, that everyday metaphysical explanation involves subjects
having those psychological states.
By contrast to everyday metaphysical explanation, the philosophical notion of
metaphysical explanation is a specialised notion; it is a notion that philosophers
developed, and are continuing to develop, to do certain sorts of useful theoretical
work within philosophy.
What is the connection between everyday and philosophical metaphysical
explanation? There are three broad views one might take on this matter.
According to the Identity Approach, the philosophical notion is identical with
the everyday notion. So on this view, there is a single notion that is to be
articulated, and which philosophers are attempting to articulate. According to
the Philosophical Explication Approach, in theorising about philosophical meta-
physical explanation we are articulating a notion that is at the very least continu-
ous with that of the everyday notion, and which may be an appropriately ‘tidied-
up’, precisified, and consistent version of the everyday notion. Finally, according
to the Theoretical Utility Approach, in theorising about philosophical metaphys-
ical explanation we are theorising about a specialised theoretical notion that will
do certain work for us in our philosophical theorising. We are, in a sense,
engineering a notion of metaphysical explanation, which may bear little or no
connection to the everyday notion.
We think that many, and perhaps most, philosophers working in this area
probably tacitly endorse something like the Philosophical Explication Approach.
To be sure, they want the philosophical notion of metaphysical explanation to do
certain work for them (as per the Theoretical Utility Approach) but they hold that
the notion that does that work is one that is an extension of, or an explication of,
the everyday notion.
Indeed, some philosophers working on metaphysical explanation have expli-
citly stated that they take themselves to be theorising about a commonly used
notion of explanation that is not uniquely philosophical. For instance, seminal
work by Schaffer (2009:375) makes the case that this kind of explanation is “a
natural and intuitive notion, for which there exist clear examples, and clear formal
constraints”. He mentions that when his first-year students first encounter the
phenomenon in the philosophy classroom, they are already familiar with it.
 9
Dasgupta (2017:74–76) similarly argues that metaphysical explanation—which

he calls ‘constitutive explanation’—is “intuitive and familiar, and at the same time
useful in framing a number of philosophical debates” and that “examples are
ubiquitous. Why is a faculty meeting occurring? Because the faculty are gathered
in a room discussing matters of importance to the department, etc. Why is this
water hot? Because its mean kinetic energy is high. Why have I lost this game of
chess? Because my king is in check-mate”. He adds that it is “an everyday concept
used by the masses. When I explain the concept to non-philosophers they recog-
nize it immediately and talk intelligibly about it, offering examples of [metaphys-
ical] explanations in their own fields of biology, economics, journalism, or
cooking. To them it is not a new concept”.
In his overview of the recent literature, Glazier (2020:121) notes that “[f]or its
enthusiasts, [metaphysical] explanation is both ubiquitous in ordinary life and
central to many of philosophy’s biggest questions”. In Trogdon’s (2013a) termin-
ology, we can say that metaphysical explanation is typically taken to be quotidian:
it is part of ordinary, everyday thinking.
While some of these passages suggest that these philosophers are pursuing the
Identity Approach, if that were so we would expect them to use different methods
to investigate the phenomenon: methods more aligned with those we use in this
book. Instead, we think that philosophers tend to take the quotidian notion of
everyday metaphysical explanation as their starting point, and then attempt to
precisify, refine, amend, clarify, and so on, this notion to be of particular philo-
sophical use. That is to say, they embrace the Philosophical Explication Approach.
Then philosophical metaphysical explanation is distinct from everyday metaphys-
ical explanation, but they are intimately connected insofar as the former takes the
latter as its starting point, and refines the notion from there. That’s what makes
them both notions of metaphysical explanation.
In this book we will not provide an account of philosophical metaphysical
explanation. Instead we are exclusively interested in providing an account of
everyday metaphysical explanation. We are therefore interested in how subjects
like us, as we are, come to make judgements about what metaphysically explains
what, and the conditions under which we do so. So the target in this book—
everyday metaphysical explanation—is the phenomenon with which ordinary
people engage when they judge that one thing explains another (and where that
explanation is metaphysical).
This book assumes that something like the Philosophical Explication Approach
is right, in at least the following respect: sometimes we take the sorts of intuitions
that philosophers have about philosophical metaphysical explanation, and take
these as a (defeasible) starting point in our quest to develop an account of
everyday metaphysical explanation. In some of these cases when we test these
intuitions we find that they do not hold up when it comes to everyday explanation.
But they are, at least, a place to start.
10 
In turn, we think that if the Philosophical Explication Approach is right, then

some of what we say about everyday metaphysical explanation will be relevant to
accounts of the philosophical notion. After all, if the latter is indeed a refinement
of the former, then it would be sensible to have an account of the former to refine!
But nothing we say in this book is intended to convince you to accept this
approach. If you take the Theoretical Utility Approach, then much of what we
say here might turn out to be irrelevant to the project of constructing an account
of philosophical metaphysical explanation. But that does not make the project of
any less interest, since we surely care about the everyday notion as well: after all,
that’s the one that most of us use, most of the time. And of course if you take the
Identity Approach, our account of everyday metaphysical explanation is also an
account of philosophical metaphysical explanation.
Let’s take stock. We’ve introduced the notion of metaphysical explanation, and
separated it into a worldly-structure aspect and a psychological aspect. We set
aside the goal-directed element of the latter to make clear that our account of the
psychological aspect will focus on the concordance element. We’ve also distin-
guished between everyday metaphysical explanation and philosophical metaphys-
ical explanation. All this allows us to state plainly the ambition of the book, which
is to develop a psychological account of everyday metaphysical explanation that
encompasses both the worldly-structure aspect and the psychological aspect.²
We do so because our aim is to develop a naturalistically pleasing account of
everyday metaphysical explanation. Of course, one man’s naturalism is another
man’s metaphysically mysterious bogeyman, so rather than try to define ‘natur-
alistically pleasing’ we will just say something about what we are aiming to do.
First, we want an account of what we are doing when we offer, and receive,
everyday metaphysical explanations, which appeals to subjects’ cognitive
resources.
Second, holding everything else fixed, we want a parsimonious account of what
structure (if any) the world must have, in order for there to be everyday meta-
physical explanations.
Third, we want to provide an account of which cognitive mechanisms are
involved in our coming to make judgements about what metaphysically explains
what. We think that the ultimate aim of this line of enquiry ought be to connect
this mechanistic account to an account of how we come to know what metaphys-
ically explains what.³ In other words, ultimately we want an epistemology of
everyday metaphysical explanation.
² We omit the word ‘complete’ for concision. In what follows, when we talk of accounts of everyday
metaphysical explanation, we intend these to be complete accounts unless we specify otherwise.
³ Some readers will bemoan the lack of ‘to’ after ‘ought’ in this sentence and others like it throughout
the book. We want to flag here that our preferred use is perfectly grammatical, if a little antiquated.
 11
Our current aim however, is narrower than this. We won’t provide an account
of how we know what metaphysically explains what, because we don’t want to take
a stand on what conditions need to obtain for knowledge to obtain. Instead, we
limit ourselves to the project of what we might think of as the beginnings of an
epistemology: a psychological account of how it is that we come to make judge-
ments about what metaphysically explains what, and, as part of that, an account of
how we come to track those features of the world that must obtain if such an
explanation is to obtain. In particular, we aim to offer an account of how we
reliably come to track the relevant features of the world: something that we take to
be necessary, but perhaps insufficient, for providing an epistemology of everyday
metaphysical explanation.
We will suggest that the best way to frame a psychological account of everyday
metaphysical explanation is in terms of the following schema (PA).
PA: A proposition of the form ⌜x because y⌝⁴ is true at a context of explanation,

<w, t, s>,⁵ iff:
(a) [y]⁶ and [x] obtain at w, and
(b) [y] R [x], and
(c) [y] plays psychological role P relative to [x] for the subject, s, at that context.
There is a lot going on in PA, and we will say a little to unpack its various aspects
here. Doing so will help pre-empt the structure of the book, much of which is
devoted to spelling out PA in detail.
Firstly, as we discuss in chapter 1, in this book we will suppose that everyday
metaphysical explanations are true propositions of the form ⌜x because y⌝. Then
propositions of that form are ones in which a proposition is to be substituted for
⌜x⌝ in the schema, and a proposition is to be substituted for ⌜y⌝ in the schema.
When we want to discuss a (potentially distinct) philosophical use of because that
captures philosophical metaphysical explanation, we will talk of ⌜x becauseS y⌝,
where the subscripted S denotes that it’s a specialised kind of because.
Importantly, PA tells us that propositions of that form are true (or not) at
contexts of explanation rather than simply true or false simpliciter. As well as
further explicating the notion of everyday metaphysical explanation, chapter 1
takes up the task of making clear what it is for a proposition to be true at a context
of explanation. For now, we can just think of PA as saying that a proposition of
that form is always true or false relative to a particular subject.
⁴ We use corner quotes to flag that ⌜x because y⌝ is a kind of sentence, rather than a specific
sentence.
⁵ <w, t, s> specifies a world, time, and subject.
⁶ We use square brackets to pick out facts. So ‘[y]’ should be read as ‘the fact that y’. We will have
more to say about facts later in the book.
12 
The rest of the book takes on the task of showing that a psychological account
of the kind we end up with when we appropriately fill in PA can go a long way
towards satisfying the desiderata for an account of everyday metaphysical explan-
ation that we develop in chapter 2. However, you should think of the account we
offer as an interim one. Given what we know so far about everyday metaphysical
explanation, we argue that the account we offer is appealing. But there is much left
to learn about this phenomenon, and throughout the book we will make various
suggestions about how one might add to our account in the light of new empirical
discoveries.
In chapter 2 we outline a set of desiderata for an account of everyday meta-
physical explanation. In particular, we argue that such an account must be
concordant with a plausible account of our practices, must provide correct
truth-conditions, and must be epistemically tractable. Moreover, if the account
posits new worldly structure, there must be a plausible account, arising from the
phenomenon of everyday metaphysical explanation, of why we ought posit such
structure. We argue that in order to satisfy these desiderata, an account must
accommodate the best systematisation of our judgements regarding what meta-
physically explains what. We then make the case that we ought not rely on a priori
reason, or our own intuitions and judgements, or the intuitions and judgements of
other philosophers, about the judgements people make. We thus motivate the idea
that in order to measure an account of this sort against these desiderata we need to
appeal to empirical research. In particular, we argue that we will need empirical
data regarding our practices surrounding metaphysical explanation, and regard-
ing our pattern of judgements about what metaphysically explains what.
Chapter 3 begins by outlining some existing empirical research into people’s
judgements about causal explanation, and uses this to frame some hypotheses
about people’s judgements about metaphysical explanation. We then describe four
empirical studies we ran, and discuss the results. We use this empirical data to
spell out some of the empirical content of the general desiderata that we present in
chapter 2. This will then be used to guide our discussion in the remainder of the
book, of the extent to which various accounts of everyday metaphysical explan-
ation meet the desiderata. Let’s be clear right up front: sometimes the data that we
find as a result of these experiments are quite different from what we predicted on
the basis of philosophers’ judgements about philosophical metaphysical explan-
ation. As a result, our account of everyday metaphysical explanation looks very
different from extant accounts of philosophical metaphysical explanation.
PA tells us that a proposition of the form ⌜x because y⌝ is true at a context of
explanation, only if there is the presence of an R-relation between [y] and [x]. In
chapter 4 we develop a psychological account of everyday metaphysical explan-
ation by appealing, in part, to contemporary work on the worldly-structure aspect
of philosophical metaphysical explanation: namely relations of ground. The ques-
tion we ask is whether we can pair an account of the worldly-structure aspect of
 13
everyday explanation in terms of grounding, with an account of what relation that

structure needs to bear to a subject’s psychology, to develop a psychological
account of everyday metaphysical explanation. We call these kinds of account
grounding-based accounts. We spell out three versions of this kind of account, but
go on to argue that none meets all of the desiderata outlined in chapter 2.
That leaves us with no account of the relevant worldly structure. Chapter 5
remedies this absence. There, we countenance a range of R-relations: relations
which, when they hold between certain facts, provide the kind of worldly structure
that is necessary for an everyday metaphysical explanation to be present for a
subject. Having set aside grounding as a candidate R-relation we consider three
alternative views about the worldly-structure aspect of everyday metaphysical
explanation.
The first two views of worldly structure are monist accounts on which there is a
single R-relation. Motivated by considerations arising from chapters 1 to 4, we
develop a new symmetric dependence account. Here, drawing inspiration from
interventionist models of causation, we will suggest that the R-relation is a kind of
symmetric dependence relation that is both reflexive and monotonic. Ultimately
we will argue that an account that appeals to symmetric dependence, thus
conceived, boasts the kind of flexibility of account that, in chapter 4, we argue
grounding-based accounts lack.
According to the second monist account we develop, the R-relation is the
necessitation relation, where x necessitates y just in case in every world in which
x obtains, y obtains.
The third account is a pluralist account, according to which there is a plurality
of R-relations, each of which is a different kind of non-causal correlational relation
(henceforth just ‘correlational relations’). Correlational relations include modal
relations like necessitation, but also some weaker correlational relations.
Here, then, is a respect in which this book is unapologetically radical: it takes a
radical view of the kind of structure that is necessary for there to be an everyday
metaphysical explanation present for a subject. As we will see in chapters 1 and 4,
it is typically held that no modal relation such as necessitation can generate the
kind of worldly structure that is necessary for metaphysical explanations to obtain.
The reason for this, very roughly, is that modal relations are relations of mere
correlation. As such, we find lots of modal correlations (that is, modal relations)
where there is no genuinely explanatory connection between the correlated facts.
For instance, the existence of Freddie the cream labradoodle necessitates the
existence of the number 2: every world containing the former contains the latter,
because the number 2 exists of necessity (we shall suppose). Yet most philosophers
are strongly of the view that there is no explanatory connection between Freddie
and the number 2. No matter what psychological states are engendered in, say,
Annie, regarding Freddie and the number 2, it cannot be that, for Annie, the
existence of Freddie metaphysically explains the existence of the number 2.
14 
We reject this orthodoxy, at least as it pertains to everyday metaphysical explan-

ation. On two of the three proposals we consider in chapter 5, the R-relation is a
relation of mere correlation. So on our account, if there is a subject who has the
right sorts of psychological states (more on this shortly) regarding Freddie and the
number 2, then it will be true, for that subject, that the existence of Freddie
metaphysically explains the existence of the number 2. Of course, we don’t say
there are such subjects. But we will argue that it is a virtue of our account that it
can accommodate there being such subjects.
A second respect in which this book is radical emerges in chapter 6, which
focusses on explicating the nature of psychological role P: the psychological role
that [y] must play relative to [x] for a subject, if that subject is to count as having
an everyday metaphysical explanation. We argue that [y] plays psychological role
P relative to [x] for a subject at a context, just in case [y] elicits subjective
understanding of [x] in the subject at that context.
Our account of subjective understanding is radical in that it aims to be
maximally flexible in being able to accommodate our judgements about subjects
very unlike us: aliens, say, with very different psychological capacities, or subjects
who have very different abilities to act in and on the world. We, for instance,
cannot really see how what happened at the big bang explains why Freddie chose
kangaroo rather than beef for dinner. But perhaps there are subjects who can. We
want to be able to accommodate our judgements about these kinds of subjects. We
cannot intervene on the sun in order to bring something about. But there are
potentially subjects who could, and we want to be able to accommodate our
judgements about subjects such as these.
For, as we outline in chapter 2, an account of everyday metaphysical explan-
ation ought accommodate the best systematisation of our judgements about what
metaphysically explains what for a great variety of subjects, including subjects who
are unlike us in a variety of ways. For instance, in chapter 3 we present empirical
evidence that when making judgements about which metaphysical explanations
obtain for a subject who can intervene on abstract objects, a majority of people are
inclined to judge that the existence of a singleton set metaphysically explains the
existence of its member. We, subjects around here, cannot intervene on abstract
objects (at least, not directly), but still, we want to accommodate our judgements
about which metaphysical explanations are present for such subjects.
To capture this flexibility, our notion of subjective understanding is purpose-
fully ‘thin’ in the following sense: it is not factive. On our view, a subject—Annie—
can count as subjectively understanding one fact in terms of another, by repre-
senting certain interventional affordances between those two facts, even if the
affordances she represents to obtain between those facts do not, in fact, obtain.
Moreover, Annie can subjectively understand one fact in terms of another even if
she has no justification for representing the affordances between those facts. Our
aim in using this notion of subjective understanding is to show that we can get a
 15
long way in theory construction, and accommodate the data we have collected
thus far, with a very minimal account of psychological role P. This allows, of
course, that we can build on this notion of understanding to make it ‘thicker’ and
more objective should the need arise, and we will gesture at some ways in which
this might be done.
In chapter 7 we offer an account of how we reliably detect R-relations, which
appeals, inter alia, to various evolved cognitive mechanisms. Then in chapter 8 we
explore how we reliably detect states of subjective understanding. Taken jointly,
these two chapters provide an account of how we reliably come to judge that one
thing metaphysically explains another for a subject at a context of explanation.
While our primary aim is to provide the beginnings of an epistemology of
everyday metaphysical explanation, we think that at least some of what we say
will be of use to those developing accounts of philosophical metaphysical
explanation.
The combination of the three new views about the R-relations we outline in
chapter 5, and our account of psychological role P, from chapter 6, yields three
novel psychological accounts of everyday metaphysical explanation. In chapters 9
and 10, we put all three accounts through their paces with regard to the desiderata
we set out in chapter 2 and refined in chapter 3. While we will make the case in
favour of the pluralistic correlation-based account over the alternatives, our
primary aims are to present a range of plausible psychological accounts of
everyday metaphysical explanation, and to show that these accounts need not
appeal to the sorts of worldly structures presented in the literature so far.
Our first task, though, is to better articulate the underlying phenomenon of
everyday metaphysical explanation. We turn to this task in chapter 1.
1
Metaphysical Explanation
This chapter aims to introduce the phenomenon in which we are interested:

metaphysical explanation. We will begin by simply offering some putative
examples of the phenomenon (§1.1) before we turn to the question of what
metaphysical explanations are (§1.2). We then consider some ingredients that
might be required in providing an account of metaphysical explanation, namely,
the existence of some worldly structure (§1.3.1) and of some psychological
features of subjects (§1.3.2). We then turn (§1.4) to consider the connection
between philosophical and everyday accounts of metaphysical explanation.
Finally (§1.5), we’ll briefly discuss how we are thinking about propositions.
1.1 Introducing Metaphysical Explanation
This is a book about the everyday notion ‘metaphysical explanation’. This is the
notion of metaphysical explanation that we all, non-philosophers included,
deploy. What, though, makes something a metaphysical explanation? Earlier, we
introduced the following as some purported examples of the phenomenon.
A. The flower is red because the flower is maroon.

B. The painting depicts a cow because of the arrangement of colours on the canvas.
C. Torturing this cat for fun is wrong because it fails to maximize utility.
E. The bicycle exists because of the existence and arrangement of the wheels,
spokes, handlebars, etc.
F. The set {Diogenes} exists because Diogenes exists.
G. The proposition <Diogenes exists> is true because Diogenes exists.
H. God loves X because X is good.
I. Building B is a church because at some earlier time, B was consecrated.
Claims like A to I appear throughout philosophy, and, indeed, some of them

appear outside philosophy. Think about utilitarian theories of normative ethics,
which say that action X is right iff X maximizes utility. Despite this biconditional
framing, it is natural to understand this theory as telling us that X is right because
X maximizes utility. We can then understand some disagreements in normative
Everyday Metaphysical Explanation. Kristie Miller & James Norton, Oxford University Press.
© Kristie Miller & James Norton 2022. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198857303.003.0002
   17
ethics as disagreements about in virtue of what X is right, or, disagreements

regarding what metaphysically explains X being right. Deontologists might agree
that X is right, but hold that X is right because we have an objective duty to X, or
because we can will that X be universally performed in similar circumstances.
Of course, some of us will think that some of the above claims are false, or at
least, are not examples of metaphysical explanation. But what’s notable is that
most appear to be explanations, and most appear to be metaphysical, rather than
explanations of some other kind. Let’s put aside for the moment the question of
what might distinguish metaphysical explanations from other explanations, and
just focus on the explanatory nature of the claims.
Philosophers have thought a lot about the notion of metaphysical explanation
that they deploy, and a lot about explanation more generally. In this section we
will appeal to these reflections in order to say more about the explanatory nature
of these claims, and, later, about what might distinguish them from, say, causally
explanatory claims. We need to be a little careful in doing so, though. After all, we
are interested in the everyday notion of metaphysical explanation, and it’s possible
that some of what philosophers suppose to be true of explanations generally (and
metaphysical explanations in particular) is not true of this everyday notion. Still,
we think it’s a useful place to start on our quest.
To do this, let’s take a look at some of the more controversial cases amongst
A to I.
First, one might deny H because one thinks that God does not exist. Typically,
philosophers think that one thing can explain another only if both things exist.
(Alternatively, one proposition can explain another only if they are both true).
This feature of explanation is known as factivity, and most philosophers think that
explanations in general, and hence metaphysical explanations in particular, are
factive.
Second, one might deny H even if one holds that God exists, because one thinks
that H gets wrong the direction of explanation. As we will see, most philosophers
think that explanation of any sort is asymmetric.¹ They think that it would not
seem explanatory to us if we reversed the order of the explanandum (the sentence
describing the phenomenon to be explained: in the case of A to I this is the
sentence on the left of ‘because’) and the explanans (the sentence describing the
phenomenon that does the explaining: in the case of A to I, this is the sentence on
the right of ‘because’). For instance, ‘Diogenes exists because the set {Diogenes}
exists’ strikes most philosophers as false (but we will return to this question in
chapter 3, where we run an experiment to test the generality of this intuition).
This appeal to asymmetry is an attempt to capture the idea that explanations
appear to have a direction: they run from the explanans, to the explanandum: from
¹ Following Bromberger (1965), who took Hempel’s (1965) covering law model of explanation to
task for failing to respect the asymmetry of explanation.
18  
Diogenes, to {Diogenes}. Roughly speaking, this is what is meant by the claim that
metaphysical explanations are asymmetric (though we will have reason to clarify
this claim later in the book). Most philosophers working on metaphysical explan-
ation suppose it to be asymmetric.² So one might deny H because one thinks
that X is good because God loves X: one thinks that explanation itself is asym-
metric, and that the direction of explanation is the reverse of the direction
presented in H.³
Third, there are those who will deny D on the grounds that mental state M and
brain state B are one and the same state, and, they contend, nothing can explain
itself. For instance, consider A*: The flower is maroon because the flower is
maroon. That will strike many as false, or at least, as not an explanation. This is
what is meant, very roughly, by the common claim that metaphysical explanation
is irreflexive: that claims such as A* are not metaphysical explanations (again, we
will return to clarify this later). Most theorists working on metaphysical explan-
ation have supposed that it is irreflexive.⁴ Thus one might object to D, on the basis
that because D reports an identity relation, and identity is reflexive (and indeed
symmetric), it follows that D cannot be a metaphysical explanation.
Along with asymmetry and irreflexivity, most philosophers think that explan-
ations in general, and metaphysical explanations in particular, are non-
monotonic. This is a way to say that relevance matters to explanation. Consider
A: the flower is red because the flower is maroon. Suppose this is a metaphysical
explanation (choose another example if you prefer). Now add something irrele-
vant to the explanandum. A**: the flower is red because Jupiter is a very large
planet and the flower is maroon. Jupiter is a very large planet (let’s suppose
largeness is relative to our solar system). So the flower is maroon, and Jupiter is
a very large planet, and thus factivity is satisfied. Yet most of us seem inclined to
think that A** is not a metaphysical explanation: adding in some irrelevant
information (albeit true information) undermines the explanation we already
had. This idea is captured by non-monotonicity. Roughly speaking, for now,
metaphysical explanation is non-monotonic just in case for some true claim of
² See inter alia Schaffer (2009), Cameron (2008), Trogdon (2013a), Audi (2012a; 2012b), Bennett
(2017), and Rosen (2010). Rodriguez-Pereyra (2015), Bliss (2014; 2018), and Thompson (2016) have
argued that there are symmetric instances of grounding, and thus that grounding is merely non-
symmetric. However, Rodriguez-Pereyra explicitly leaves open that an epistemic notion of metaphysical
explanation might be asymmetric. Everyone seems to agree, however, that in a vast majority of cases, if
⌜x because y⌝ is true, then ⌜y because x⌝ is not.
³ Indeed, philosophers of religion and theologians debate exactly this. See Adams (1999), Alston
(2002), Stump (2003), Koons (2012), and Geach (1966).
⁴ General reasons to think that explanation is irreflexive are presented in Scriven (1975:13), who
thinks it “obviously useless to provide information that the inquirer already has. One does not come to
understand a phenomenon described by oneself as X by being told that it exists or that it is called
X (hence explanation and a fortiori causation are irreflexive)”. Fine (2012), Schaffer (2009), Audi
(2012a; 2015), and Raven (2015) think that metaphysical explanation is irreflexive. Once again,
Rodriguez-Pereyra (2015) and Bliss (2018) deny that grounding is irreflexive, but Rodriguez-Pereyra
leaves open that an epistemic notion of metaphysical explanation might be.
   19
the form x because y, if we add some arbitrary claim, j, to y, so that we have x

because y and j, the resulting claim is not guaranteed to be true. Most philosophers
suppose that metaphysical explanation is non-monotonic.⁵ So they suppose that
since A is true and A** is not, metaphysical explanation is non-monotonic.
Finally,⁶ one might reject I because one thinks that metaphysical explanations
never obtain where what is picked out by the explanandum, and what is picked
out by the explanans, are separated in time.
This brings us to the question of what distinguishes metaphysical from causal
explanations. One proposal is that unlike metaphysical explanations, some causal
explanations (all, if causation cannot be synchronic) are such that what is picked
out by the explanandum and what is picked out by the explanans exist at two
different times.⁷
It’s worth noting that this view about what distinguishes metaphysical from
causal explanation does not imply that metaphysical explanations are ones in
which what is picked out by the explanandum and what is picked out by the
explanans exist at the same time. For one might think that in some cases, one or
both of these things exist outside space-time entirely. For instance, some philo-
sophers and theologians think that God exists outside space-time, and many
philosophers think that abstract objects exist outside space-time. If you think
there are mathematical explanations, where mathematical facts are cited as an
explanation either for other mathematical facts or for non-mathematical facts,⁸
then you will think that sometimes what is picked out by the explanandum and
what is picked out by the explanans are atemporal (that is, they do not exist at any
time). Indeed, if F, G, and H are all metaphysical explanations, then they are
metaphysical explanations in which what is picked out by the explanandum, and
by the explanans, do not exist at the same time, but nor do they exist at different
times.
In order to distinguish metaphysical from causal explanations, then, one might
appeal to something about the modal robustness of the connection between what
⁵ Schaffer (2009). For discussion see the introduction to Correia and Schnieder (2012), Trogdon
(2013a), and Raven (2015).
⁶ No doubt there are also other examples in our list that someone or other will take issue with. For
instance, one might resist the idea that determinate properties explain determinable properties, and so
one might take issue with A. For instance, one might have the intuition that while something’s being
scarlet entails its being red, there are contexts in which the former doesn’t explain the latter.
⁷ Williamson (2013:13–14) writes: “The challenger may argue that an object needs non-modal
properties to ground its modal properties. For instance, a lump of clay is malleable (a modal property)
because it has a certain microphysical structure (a non-modal property). The analogous principle in the
temporal case is obviously false: what I was yesterday is not grounded in what I am today, in any
useful sense”. For discussion of this idea see Baron, Miller, and Tallant (2019).
⁸ Compelling examples of extra-mathematical explanation include Baker’s (2005) famous explan-
ation of the life cycles of North American periodical cicadas in terms of the fitness-enhancing nature of
prime numbered life cycles and Lange’s (2013) explanation of why a mother can’t distribute her
twenty-three strawberries equally amongst her three children.
20  
is picked out by the explanans, and what is picked out by the explanandum.
Consider the following:
J. Kylie contracted cancer because ToxicWaste Inc. dumped toxic waste into the
water supply.
K. Helen ran into the tree because she was driving too fast.
L. Annie has four legs because she’s a dog.
J and K are examples of causal explanations, while L can be construed as an

example of a formal explanation⁹ (as this term is used in psychology).¹⁰
While all of A to K seem similar, insofar as they all purport to be explanations,
there appears to be an important difference between A to I, on the one hand, J and
K on the other hand, and L on the third paw (as it were).
Consider once again L: Annie has four legs because she’s a dog. There is some
kind of explanation offered to someone if they are told that Annie has four legs
because she’s a dog. You might think this explanation is causal: you might think,
for instance, that Annie’s four-leggedness is caused by her being a dog, which is
why typically, but not universally, dogs have four legs. Or you might deny that this
is explanation is causal at all. Regardless, you will probably agree that it seems
quite different from the explanations offered in A to I. That is because there are
lots of dogs that don’t have four legs, and lots of things with four legs that are not
dogs. Similar thoughts apply to J and K. It’s possible that despite driving too fast,
Helen doesn’t run into the tree. Likewise, it’s possible that despite ToxicWaste Inc.
dumping toxic waste into the water supply, Kylie doesn’t contract cancer.
By contrast, there is nothing that is maroon and not red; there is no possible
world in which Diogenes exists, but {Diogenes} does not; there is no possible
world in which Diogenes exists, but <Diogenes exists> is not true, and so on. The
tightness, or robustness, of the explanatory connection between the explanandum
and the explanans in A to I seems to be significantly greater than in J, K, or L.
It is for this reason that many philosophers think that metaphysical explanation
is intimately connected in some way with what we call the modal relations. The
modal relations are the relations of necessitation, supervenience, and entailment.¹¹
We call these modal relations because they describe patterns of modal covariation.
For instance, the existence of some entity, A, necessitates the existence of entity
B just in case every possible world in which A exists is a world in which B exists.
Entailment, as we are conceiving of it here, is just the representational analogue of
⁹ Formal explanations explain the presence of certain properties in some instance of a kind, by
reference to that thing being of that kind. See Prasada (2017), Gelman, Cimpian, and Roberts (2018),
Prasada and Dillingham (2009), and Prasada, Khemlani, Leslie, and Glucksberg (2013).
¹⁰ If one thinks of L through the lens of philosophy of biology one will not see it as a formal
explanation, and one might also reject the idea that it is non-causal.
¹¹ Here, we are supposing logic to be classical.
   21
necessitation. In other words, some proposition, A, entails proposition B, just

in case every world where A is true is a world where B is true. While there are
many varieties of supervenience,¹² we will say that A-properties supervene on
B-properties just in case there can be no change in A-properties without a change
in B-properties.
The difference between A to I and J to L is that A to I seem to involve the
presence of a modal relation, while J to L do not. As noted, there is no possible
world in which the flower is maroon, but fails to be red. So being red is necessi-
tated by, and supervenes on, being maroon. Likewise, (at least on the face of it)
every possible world in which the wheels, spokes, and handlebars exist and are
arranged in a certain way, is a world in which a bicycle exists. Hence there being a
bicycle is necessitated by, and supervenes on, there being certain parts arranged in
a certain way.
Importantly, this modal relation does not obtain for all of A to I. The mere fact
that a building, or some ground, was consecrated at some earlier time does not
necessitate that St Brigid’s now exists. After all, in the intervening time the
building might have been knocked down, or the building and land deconsecrated.
Likewise, perhaps the mere arrangement of colours on a canvas does not neces-
sitate that there is a painting that depicts a cow. For perhaps paintings require
artists and artistic intentions, and perhaps a painting only depicts a cow, if it is
appropriately causally connected to cows, or to mental representations thereof.
This is usually thought to show that we need to distinguish partial from
whole explanation, a distinction we flagged earlier. A whole explanation is a
complete explanation; nothing is left out (though there may be other, distinct,
whole explanations). By contrast, a partial explanation of X cites some part of the
explanation for why X, but not the whole explanation. B and I, in our list, are likely
to be thought of as partial explanations. It is true that the act of consecration at
some earlier time is part of the explanation for why St Brigid’s is a church; but it is
not the whole explanation; mutatis mutandis for B.
Most philosophers hold that whole metaphysical explanations involve modal
relations, in the sense that the obtaining of the whole explanans necessitates the
obtaining of the explanandum.¹³ They do not, however, hold that this is true of
partial explanations: for clearly some part of the explanans can obtain, and yet the
explanandum not obtain. By and large, in this book we will be focussing on whole
explanations rather than partial ones. Unless we say otherwise, when we talk of
metaphysical explanation, we mean whole metaphysical explanation.
Of course, when philosophers talk about metaphysical explanations they may
have in mind the philosophical notion of metaphysical explanation. So it remains
¹² See Kim (1984; 1987), Horgan (1982), and Lewis (1986a).

¹³ See Audi (2012b), Correia (2005), deRosset (2010), Fine (2012), Rosen (2010), Witmer et al.
(2005), and Trogdon (2013a; 2013b).
22  
to be seen to what extent what we have said about metaphysical explanation—

regarding factivity, irreflexivity, asymmetry, non-monotonicity, and the connec-
tion to the modal relations—in this section ought be retained by an account of
everyday metaphysical explanation. Still, it is a useful place to start.
Moving on, we take up the question of what metaphysical explanations are.
1.2 What are Metaphysical Explanations?
We begin by distinguishing two views about what sorts of things metaphysical

explanations—whether philosophical or everyday—are: worldly and representa-
tional. It will then become clear that we come down on the representationalist side
of things.
Let’s return to one of our examples:
D is a sentence. It’s actually a complex sentence composed of two sentences, one

on either side of the ‘because’. In what follows when we are talking about sentences
of this form, we will represent this as follows: « Bert is in mental state M because he
is in brain state B ». When we want to talk about the general form of such
sentences, we will represent this as « x because y ». In such cases each of x and y
is itself a sentence. Then if we want to talk of a sentence of the form « Bert is in
mental state M because Bert is in mental state M » we will say that these are
sentences of the form « x because x ».
We don’t think that metaphysical explanations are sentences of the form « x
because y ». After all, it seems that we could translate all of the sentences in our list
into Icelandic, or Urdu, and we would have the same metaphysical explanations,
even though we would have different sentences. That suggests that we want to
move from talk of sentences, to talk of propositions.
What seems obviously right, to us, is that claims about what metaphysically
explains what can be regimented in terms of the following rough schema: ⌜x
because y⌝, where a proposition is to be substituted for ⌜x⌝ in the schema, and a
proposition is to be substituted for ⌜y⌝ in the schema. Then to further suppose
that metaphysical explanations are true propositions of this form is to endorse a
representational conception of metaphysical explanation. For now, let’s set aside
both the issue of what propositions are, and how to distinguish everyday from
philosophical metaphysical explanation on this representational view, and con-
trast this view with the alternative.
The view that metaphysical explanations are representations is to be contrasted
with the view that metaphysical explanations are non-representational entities. Non-
representational entities are entities such as chairs, or labradoodles-fetching-balls.
   ? 23
In what follows we take facts to be worldly entities comprised of objects, properties,

and relations. Hence we are thinking of facts as being much like states of affairs.
We will talk about facts obtaining at a world, where this is just to say that the fact
exists at that world: there are certain objects with certain properties, and standing in
certain relations to one another. A fact that obtains in the actual world, for example,
is the fact that Annie is sitting on the couch, and that fact is comprised of Annie, the
couch, and Annie’s bearing a sitting relation to said couch. So we take facts to be a
paradigmatic kind of non-representational entity.
We call the view that metaphysical explanations are non-representational
entities, a worldly conception of metaphysical explanation. We will understand
the worldly conception of metaphysical explanation to be the view that identifies
metaphysical explanations with certain structures in the world. In particular, we
will suppose that on the most natural worldly conception of metaphysical explan-
ation, metaphysical explanations are complex facts. What are these complex facts?
Consider again Annie the black labradoodle. In particular, consider the follow-
ing two facts: [Annie has a black coat] and [Annie has a coloured coat]. These facts
seem to bear some important relations to one another. Importantly, for our
purposes, one is inclined to say that in some sense, the reason Annie has a
coloured coat is because she has a black coat. Just which (if any) of the relations
that obtain between facts like these is relevant to this inclination is hotly contested.
In this book we will call whatever relation that is, the R-relation. For now,
roughly, the R-relation is a relation that obtains between facts, such that those
facts, thus related, play some important role in metaphysical explanation. So, for
instance, it seems plausible that [Annie has a black coat] bears the R-relation to
[Annie has a coloured coat], but not plausible that [Annie has a black coat] bears
the R-relation to [the number 2 exists]. Being the kind of relation that can play a
role in metaphysical explanation is a necessary condition on being an R-relation.
What makes something an R-relation is controversial, and something to which we
return later in the book.
Then R-facts are complex facts of the form [[Annie has a black coat] R [Annie
has a coloured coat]]. This R-fact is a fact that has three components: [Annie has a
coloured coat] and [Annie has a black coat], and the R-relation that obtains
between those two facts. It’s the fact that obtains just when [Annie has a black
coat] bears the R-relation to [Annie has a coloured coat].
Then, as we will understand it, the worldly conception of metaphysical explan-
ation is one on which metaphysical explanations are to be identified with R-facts.
So, for instance, on this view [[Annie has a black coat] R [Annie has a coloured
coat]] is a metaphysical explanation.
By contrast, on the representational conception metaphysical explanations are
identified with some kind of true representational entity. On our preferred version
of this view, the relevant kind of representational entity is a proposition. On this
view, metaphysical explanations are true propositions that can be divided into
24  
explanans and explanandum—which are themselves propositions—separated by

an operator or what we will think of as a propositional connective (i.e., something
that connects propositions rather than sentences) such as ‘because’. So metaphys-
ical explanations are things that describe, or represent, something in the world.
They are true propositions of the form ⌜x because y⌝. Propositions of that form are
metaphysical explanations iff they are true. There are thus no false metaphysical
explanations, though there may be putative metaphysical explanations: proposi-
tions of the form ⌜x because y⌝ that are false, or whose truth-value is unknown.
In what follows we adopt a representational conception of metaphysical explan-
ation. Indeed, given that our goal is to develop psychological accounts of the
phenomenon, one might think that our hand is forced in this regard. If meta-
physical explanations were R-facts, the thought goes, then we could make little
sense of psychological accounts of that phenomenon: after all, R-facts obtain, or
not, independent of anyone’s psychological states. However, in chapter 5 we will
offer a psychological, yet worldly, account of everyday metaphysical explanation,
in order to show that this can be done. On that view, metaphysical explanations
are response-dependent: whether an R-fact counts as a metaphysical explanation
depends on whether it produces certain mental states in subjects. Clearly, how-
ever, psychological accounts sit more neatly within a representationalist frame-
work, and so it is this framework that we adopt.
1.3 Aspects of Everyday Metaphysical Explanation
In what follows we will call any account that purports to tell us the complete set of
conditions under which a proposition of the form ⌜x because y⌝ is true—and thus
is an everyday metaphysical explanation—at a context of explanation, an account
of everyday metaphysical explanation.
Then the question arises as to which sorts of things need to go into such an
account. The two sorts of things that most naturally spring to mind are worldly
structure, on the one hand, and psychological states, on the other. Let’s start with
the former.
Upon looking at the list we outlined early in this chapter, you might think that
there can only be an explanation of one thing in terms of another if there is some sort
of explanatory connection between the things in question; if there is some piece of
worldly structure that allows there to be an explanation present. For instance, if you
think that there is some important explanatory connection between Freddie and
the set {Freddie}, but not between Freddie and the number 2, or between Freddie
and Annie, then you might think that this is because worldly structure matters.¹⁴
¹⁴ Alternatively, you might think it has something to do with conceptual connections; see Smithson
(2020) and Poggiolesi and Genco (forthcoming).
     25
Let’s call this aspect of the phenomenon of metaphysical explanation the worldly-
structure aspect. With some notable exceptions, most extant accounts of philosoph-
ical metaphysical explanation have focussed on the worldly-structure aspect of the
phenomenon. It is to this aspect that we now turn.
1.3.1 The Worldly-Structure Aspect
Most philosophers hold that the presence of some kind of worldly structure is
necessary for there to obtain a philosophical metaphysical explanation. So it is
reasonable to suspect that worldly structure of some kind might also be necessary
for the obtaining of an everyday metaphysical explanation. Indeed, in the remain-
der of this book we assume that everyday metaphysical explanations do, in fact,
require the existence of some worldly structure or other. This probably won’t
strike most philosophers as controversial. But it is worth noting that it is an
empirical question whether people are inclined to judge that there are everyday
metaphysical explanations only when there is some worldly structure present.
These empirical investigations are, then, important ones to pursue. But they are
not investigations we have completed. So we want to flag that it might turn out
that our provisional account of everyday explanation is unnecessarily demanding
in its requirements regarding worldly structure. For although the structure that we
suggest is quite metaphysically minimal, it might turn out that in fact, no such
structure is required at all.
For now, though, let’s turn to consider what philosophers have said about
worldly structure as it pertains to philosophical metaphysical explanation.
Most philosophers think that a modal relation accompanies philosophical
metaphysical explanations.¹⁵ So a natural thought is that the relevant worldly
structure that needs to be in place for there to be an everyday metaphysical
explanation is the presence of some modal relation obtaining between facts: we
could call this modal structure. Then on this view, in order for ⌜x because y⌝ to be
true, it needs to be that [y] M [x] (where M is either necessitation—such that [y]
necessitates [x]—or supervenience—such that [x] supervenes on [y]).
In fact, however, there are various reasons philosophers have been disinclined
to take modal structure to be the relevant worldly structure when it comes to
philosophical metaphysical explanation.
First, as many philosophers have pointed out, these modal relations do not
have the formal features of asymmetry, irreflexivity, and non-monotonicity that
¹⁵ At least, most philosophers think that a modal relation accompanies grounding. For the orthodox
view see Audi (2012b), Dasgupta (2014), deRosset (2010), Rosen (2010), Loss (2017), and Trogdon
(2013b). For dissent see Chudnoff (2011), Leuenberger (2014), Schnieder (2006), and Skiles (2015). For
the view that grounding implies a certain kind of supervenience, see Chilovi (2021).
26  
we just noted are typically taken to be features of philosophical metaphysical

explanation.¹⁶
First, the modal relations are non-symmetric: they have both symmetric and
asymmetric instances.¹⁷ (Here, we will say that an instance of a relation,
R obtaining between p and q, is symmetric just in case p R q and q R p, and that
instance is asymmetric just in case p R q, but not q R p (or vice versa). Symmetric
relations then have only symmetric instances, and asymmetric relations have only
asymmetric instances, and—given this somewhat non-standard terminology,
non-symmetric relations have both asymmetric and symmetric instances). So,
for example, that Alex is a car-owner necessitates that Alex is a vehicle-owner, yet
that Alex is a vehicle-owner fails to necessitate that Alex is a car-owner, for there
are worlds where Alex owns a motorcycle, but no cars. This is an asymmetric
instance of necessitation. Similarly, Alex’s being a vehicle-owner supervenes on
his being a car-owner, but his being a car-owner does not supervene on his being a
vehicle-owner: so this is an asymmetric instance of supervenience. Finally, Alex’s
being a car-owner entails that he is a vehicle-owner, but his being a vehicle-owner
does not entail that he is a car-owner, so this is an asymmetric instance of
entailment. By contrast, (assuming that numbers exist necessarily), the existence
of 2 necessitates the existence of 3, and vice versa. This is, therefore, a symmetric
instance of necessitation and mutatis mutandis for supervenience and entailment.
Moreover, the modal relations are reflexive. For any A, A necessitates A, and
A-properties supervene on A-properties, and A entails A. It is easy to see why:
trivially, any world where A exists is a world where A exists, and there can be no
change in A-properties without a change in A-properties and if A is true, then A is
true. The modal relations are also monotonic. If A necessitates B, then A and
anything else whatsoever necessitates B, and if B supervenes on A, then
B supervenes on A and anything else whatsoever, and if A entails B, then A and
anything else whatsoever entails B.
Furthermore, we find instances of modal structure even when there appears to
be no attendant explanation. For instance, necessary facts supervene both on any
other necessary facts, and, indeed, on any contingent facts. The truth of impos-
sibility claims does likewise. Any necessary truth entails any other necessary truth.
So, for example (on the assumption that both numbers and universals exist
necessarily), the existence of the universal blueness is (symmetrically) necessitated
by the existence of the number 2, and indeed asymmetrically necessitated by the
existence of an arbitrarily chosen ladybird. Yet we do not intuit, in these cases, that
we have before us a metaphysical explanation.
¹⁶ This is particularly clear in Schaffer (2009).

¹⁷ It common to see p R q and q R p as distinct instances of relation R, each of which might obtain or
not, rather than as a single putative instance that might be symmetric or asymmetric. As will become
apparent, for our purposes it will simplify the discussion to instead use the terminology we define here.
     27
Indeed, many hold that modal structures are not explanatory because they
merely reflect regularities across modal space. So, for example, the fact that every
car-owner—in every possible world—is a vehicle-owner reflects a modal correl-
ation between car-owners and vehicle-owners. To say that A necessitates B is
merely to say that there is a particular kind of modal correlation between A and B:
every world where A exists is a world where B exists. Likewise, to say that
A-properties supervene on B-properties is merely to say that there can be no change
in the A-properties without a change in the B-properties, which is considered
insufficient for there to be an explanatory connection between these properties.
Jointly, these considerations have led many metaphysicians interested in meta-
physical explanation to think that some other worldly structure is necessary for the
obtaining of philosophical metaphysical explanations. To that end, metaphys-
icians have posited a new primitive irreflexive, asymmetric, hyperintensional,
non-monotonic¹⁸ (and sometimes transitive)¹⁹ relation which obtains between
facts,²⁰ and whose obtaining is necessary for there to be a metaphysical explan-
ation. That relation is the relation of ground. The idea, very roughly, is that
grounding structures exist only in those cases, such as A to I, where we are
inclined to say that there is a metaphysical explanation present, and not, for
instance, between Freddie and the number 2.
Before we introduce grounding, some clarifications are in order. For, rather
unfortunately, ‘grounding’ is used in two quite different ways in the literature.
Some authors use the term to pick out a relation in the world, which obtains
between facts. For these authors, grounding is a relation just like being heavier
than, or being taller than.
Other authors use ‘grounding’ as synonymous with ‘metaphysical explanation’.
These authors typically do not think of grounding as a relation that obtains
between worldly facts. Instead, they simply think that ⌜x because y⌝ is synonym-
ous with ⌜y grounds x⌝, where ⌜x⌝ and ⌜y⌝ are propositions.
In this book, by ‘grounding’ we intend to pick out a relation that obtains
between worldly facts. We do not use ‘grounding’ as a synonym for ‘metaphysical
explanation’. After all, we are interested in which worldly structure is necessary for
there to be metaphysical explanations, and that’s clearly not a question we can
answer by appealing to a notion of grounding that is synonymous with meta-
physical explanation.
We have already seen that most philosophers think that explanation is irreflexive.
The overwhelming majority of grounding theorists think that grounding is
¹⁸ See Schaffer (2009), Audi (2012a), Cameron (2008), Trogdon (2013a), Raven (2012; 2015), and
Duncan, Miller, and Norton (2017).
¹⁹ Schaffer (2009), Cameron (2008), Audi (2012a, 2012b), and Raven (2012). See also Schaffer
(2010a), Rodriguez-Pereyra (2015), Krämer and Roski (2017), and Litland (2013).
²⁰ Not all theorists restrict the relata of grounding to facts. See Schaffer (2009) and Cameron (2008).
28  
irreflexive too, precisely because they think it odd to suppose that anything can
metaphysically explain itself.²¹
That’s not to say that there are not puzzles that arise from supposing that
grounding is irreflexive. Fine (2010) points out that it is a fact that everything
exists. Furthermore, the fact that everything exists is grounded by every fact that
obtains. Thus the fact that everything exists is a partial ground for itself. Another
incarnation of this puzzle is that the truth of the proposition that <every propos-
ition is true or not true> appears to be partially grounded by its own truth.²² For
another case we can look to Paseau (2010), who notes that while it is orthodoxy
amongst defenders of grounding that the existence of a singleton set is grounded
by the existence of its member, some people think that the set is identical to its
member. If one holds both these views, one ought not think that grounding is
irreflexive.²³
We have already seen that most philosophers think that philosophical meta-
physical explanations are asymmetric, even if they sometimes disagree about the
direction of particular explanations. As a result, almost all defenders of grounding
have concluded that grounding is an asymmetric relation.²⁴ What explains the
asymmetry of metaphysical explanation, in their view, is the asymmetry of
grounding relations. The former inherits its asymmetry from the latter.²⁵
Finally, let’s turn to non-monotonicity. Grounding is thought to be non-
monotonic. This feature, like that of asymmetry and irreflexivity, is motivated
²¹ See Schaffer (2009), Audi (2012a; 2015), and Trogdon (2013a). ²² See also Krämer (2013).
²³ One might follow Jenkins (2011) in thinking that grounding is instead ‘quasi-irreflexive’. On this
view, it might be that there are reflexive instances of grounding—some facts ground themselves—but
metaphysical explanation is nevertheless irreflexive. So, even though ‘[x] grounds [x]’ is sometimes
true, ⌜x because x⌝ is always false. To use Jenkins’ example, assume that the mind-brain identity theory
is true. We might say that while there is only one thing there, it grounds itself. Yet, while [Gina is in
mental state M] is the same fact as [Gina is in brain state B], given quasi-irreflexivity it can be true that
‘Gina is in mental state M because Gina is in brain state B’ but false that ‘Gina is in brain state B because
Gina is in brain state B’. So, metaphysical explanation can remain irreflexive while tracking reflexive
grounding relations. We will further explore this idea in chapter 3.
²⁴ See inter alia Schaffer (2009), Cameron (2008), and Trogdon (2013a) for the orthodox view. Of
course, there is an exception to every rule. As we flagged above, Rodriguez-Pereyra (2015) has argued
that there are symmetric instances of grounding, and thus that grounding is merely non-symmetric. He
considers that truthmaking is a species of grounding, and thus proceeds by showing that there can be
symmetric instances of truthmaking. For instance, consider propositions C, D, E, and F:
C = <D exists>
D = <C exists>
E = <F is true>
F = <E is true>
The truthmaker for C, it seems, is D, while the truthmaker for D is C. Thus these propositions are one
another’s truthmakers, and hence mutually ground one another. Likewise, the truthmaker for E is F and
the truthmaker for F is E. So the fact that F is true grounds the fact that E is true, and the fact that E is
true grounds the fact that F is true. See Thompson (2016) for a similar example.
²⁵ Another formal feature of grounding, about which we will have less to say, is transitivity. Schaffer
(2010a) argues against the transitivity of partial grounding, and uses the considerations that arise from
his cases to motivate a contrastive treatment of grounding. (See Rodriguez-Pereyra (2015) and Litland
(2013) for responses to Schaffer’s cases.)
     29
by the fact that metaphysical explanations are thought to be non-monotonic. Most

advocates of grounding claim that the relation is non-monotonic, in that if [A]
grounds [B], it does not follow that the plurality of [A] and some arbitrary [J] also
ground [B].²⁶ The J in question can be added to A only if it is appropriately
relevant to the obtaining of B. Thus grounds must be relevant to what they
ground, where the kind of relevance in question is supposed to be something
upon which we have an intuitive grasp. In Dasgupta’s phrase, such constraints are
“one of the central features used to distinguish ground from metaphysical neces-
sitation and logical consequence”. (2014:5).²⁷ Thus, in rough terms, if ‘y grounds
x’ is true, one cannot ‘tack on extra stuff ’ to the left side of ‘grounds’ while
guaranteeing the truth of the grounding claim.
If worldly structure is required as part of an account of everyday metaphysical
explanation, then propositions of the form ⌜x because y⌝ will be true only when
the fact, [y], which corresponds to ⌜y⌝, is R-related to the fact, [x], which corres-
ponds to ⌜x⌝. What is correspondence? Roughly speaking, we will say that [y]
corresponds to ⌜y⌝ only if ⌜y⌝ is true iff [y] obtains, and [y] is what ⌜y⌝ is about, in
the sense employed by truthmaker theorists,²⁸ (or is the fact that is described by
the proposition in question, if one has a view of propositions on which they
describe ways things are or could be). So while any necessary truth is true just in
case some necessary fact obtains, that fact won’t correspond to that truth, unless
the truth is about that fact. So consider an instance of ⌜x⌝, namely the proposition
that Socrates exists. Now consider [x], the fact that Socrates exists (the worldly
state of affairs of Socrates existing). The proposition in question is true iff the fact
obtains, and the proposition is about the fact. Hence this is a case in which the
proposition corresponds to the fact. By contrast, consider the proposition that 2
exists. That proposition is in fact true iff [7 exists] obtains, but the proposition is in
no sense about [7 exists] and thus does not correspond to the fact.
As we have said, worldly-structure accounts are accounts that only focus on
spelling out what sorts of worldly structure there need to be in order for there to be
a metaphysical explanation present. What we might call strict worldly-structure
accounts hold that appealing to worldly structure is all that is required in order
to provide the complete set of conditions under which a proposition of the form
⌜x because y⌝ is true at a context of explanation.²⁹
²⁶ See Trogdon (2013a), Dasgupta (2014), Audi (2012a), Raven (2012), and Rosen (2010). Note also
that this claim can be appropriately translated according to one’s preferred view on the adicity of
grounding.
²⁷ Constraints of relevance will only differentiate grounding from classical consequence; it is less
obvious that they will differentiate grounding from relevant consequence.
²⁸ On aboutness see Merricks (2007), Baron (2013), Baron, Chua, Miller, and Norton (2019), and
Crane (2013:7). Schaffer (2008) and McDaniel (2011) have critiqued the notion.
²⁹ Barnes (2018:66) appears to endorse something along these lines regarding philosophical meta-
physical explanation when she claims that “metaphysical explanation is explicitly non-epistemic. When
we say that x explains y and y explains x, we’re not saying that the way we come to have knowledge of x
is via y, and the way we come to have knowledge of y is via x, or something along those lines.”
30  
Chapter 4 of this book will consider several accounts of everyday metaphysical

explanation that take grounding to be the kind of worldly structure—the
R-relation, that is—which is necessary for the presence of everyday metaphysical
explanations. Having shown that these accounts fall short of satisfying the desid-
erata we develop in chapter 2, chapter 5 of this book will be spent investigating
several proposals for spelling out alternative accounts of the requisite worldly
structure. For now, let’s press on to consider the psychological aspect of everyday
metaphysical explanation.
1.3.2 The Psychological Aspect
Looking at A to I one might wonder whether propositions of the form ⌜x because y⌝

(as epitomised in A to I) being, or failing to be, metaphysical explanations for
some subject, depends on the psychological states of that subject. We distin-
guished, in the introduction, the goal-directed element of explanation from the
concordance element, and clarified that when we discuss the psychological aspect
our focus will be on the concordance element. But, quite generally, one might be
inclined to think that A to I are explanations for a subject only if they answer the
subject’s why-question, or only if they interact with the subject’s psychology in a
particular way: perhaps they illuminate things for the subject, or they bring
understanding, or they allow the subject to make new cognitive connections, or
they provide the subject with new ways to manipulate their world, or some such.
We’ll not say more about this here, but much of the rest of this book will focus
on what sorts of psychological features a subject must have if a proposition of the
form ⌜x because y⌝ is to be concordant for that subject.
Now that we have briefly articulated these two broad aspects, each of which are
candidates to be required for the existence of an everyday metaphysical explan-
ation, a further question arises. Namely, how does the presence of one, or both, of
these aspects connect to the provision of truth-conditions for propositions of the
form ⌜x because y⌝?
1.4 Truth-Conditions, Worldly Structure, and Psychology
So this raises the question of what connection there is between providing an

account of the worldly structure and the psychological aspects of everyday meta-
physical explanation, and providing truth-conditions for propositions of the form
⌜x because y⌝.
Here is one option. Everyday metaphysical explanation only has a worldly-
structure aspect. Propositions of the form ⌜x because y⌝ are true iff [y] obtains,
and [x] obtains, and [y] R [x], and that’s all there is to say. There is nothing
-,  ,   31
interesting to be said about the interaction between worldly structure and our
psychological states. Call this a radical worldly-structure view.
A radical worldly-structure view is distinct from a strict worldly-structure view.
According to the latter, in order to specify the conditions under which ⌜x because y⌝
is true, we need only appeal to worldly structure. But that leaves room to think
that there is nevertheless something important and interesting about the ways in
which subjects’ psychology interacts with worldly structure, and, indeed, that
specifying these ways is part of the more general project of accounting for
everyday metaphysical explanation: it is just that this is no part of the truth-
conditions for propositions of that form. By contrast, the radical worldly-structure
view says that psychological states are just no part of the phenomenon of everyday
metaphysical explanation at all. We set this view aside since it seems to us to be
extremely implausible.
That leaves four broad approaches to thinking about what might be going on.
Our discussion of these approaches draws upon Dasgupta’s (2017) defence of
anti-realism about metaphysical explanation. Dasgupta distinguishes realism
about such explanations—the view that they are objective—from anti-realism—
the view that they are somehow relativised to our interests and concerns, which in
turn “may vary from culture to culture or time to time” (78). According to
Dasgupta’s preferred anti-realist picture “two cultures might offer conflicting
constitutive explanations and yet there may be no fact of the matter who is “really
correct”: each explanation may be correct relative to their respective interests and
concerns.” (89).
Dasgupta proceeds to take grounding theorists to task for overlooking the
possibility of anti-realism, but here we will focus on some tools he offers for
understanding anti-realism. We’ll outline four approaches. (We remain neutral on
whether the right way to think of these is as kinds of anti-realism about meta-
physical explanation. It seems to us that a realist might simply say that these are
kinds of realism. Let not terminology, however, detain us.)
Here is the first approach. We distinguish between everyday metaphysical
explanation, on the one hand, and acts of everyday metaphysical explanation on
the other hand. We then locate the psychological aspects of explanation in a
theory of acts of explanation, and the worldly-structure aspect in a theory of
explanation itself. According to this Act Approach we will say that a proposition of
the form ⌜x because y⌝ is true iff [y] obtains and [x] obtains and [y] R [x] (that is,
just in the case there is some appropriate worldly structure), and hence such
propositions are true, or false, simpliciter. Thus we can give a strict worldly-
structure account of everyday metaphysical explanation. This account is then
paired with an account of acts of everyday metaphysical explanation that spells
out the conditions under which a particular everyday metaphysical explanation is
an act of explanation, and this will of necessity appeal to psychological facts about
subjects.
32  
Here is how such an account might go. Acts of explanation are speech acts that
express true propositions of the form ⌜x because y⌝ that answer a subject’s why-
question and, perhaps, that play a certain sort of role in her mental life.³⁰
Then on the Act Approach, a speech act counts as an act of everyday meta-
physical explanation for a subject S, if and only if (i) that speech act expresses an
everyday metaphysical explanation and (ii) S has a certain psychological state, P.
According to the Act Approach, whether a speech act is an act of explanation is
both subjective and agent-relative. Terms like ‘agent-relativity’ and ‘subjectivity’
are used in a number of ways. Here’s how we are going to use them. We will say
that a speech act’s being an act of explanation is agent-relative iff speech acts are
always acts of explanation for some individual. If acts of explanation are agent-
relative, it makes little sense to wonder whether a speech act is an act of explan-
ation, without identifying a subject relative to whom that speech act might, or
might not, be an act of explanation.
Further, we will say that whether a certain speech act is an act of explanation is
subjective iff whether the speech act counts as an act of explanation depends³¹ on
the mental state of the subject to whom the speech act is offered. In this sense of
subjectivity, then, the fact that Bert is in pain is a subjective matter, since whether
or not he is in pain depends on Bert’s mental states, in particular, his pain states.
Clearly, however, in some perfectly ordinary sense, whether or not Bert is in pain
is an objective matter. It isn’t subjective in the sense that it’s ‘in the eye of the
beholder’ whether or not Bert is in pain. There’s a perfectly good, objective, fact of
the matter regarding whether Bert is in pain or not; it’s just that that fact of the
matter depends on Bert’s mental states.
In this sense—whatever exactly it is—it may well be that whether a speech act
counts as an act of explanation for some subject is an objective matter.
Henceforth, then, when we talk of acts of explanation being subjective, we just
mean that they depend on the mental states of subjects. We don’t mean that
whether or not there is an act of explanation present is entirely a matter of
opinion, or entirely in the eye of the beholder. (That might turn out to be true,
but if it is, it doesn’t follow from acts of explanation being subjective in the sense
we use here).
³⁰ Achinstein (1983) has a view of this sort.

³¹ Here, one might worry that our use of phrases such as ‘determined by’ or ‘depend on’ sound
suspiciously as if they are invoking some kind of metaphysical explanation. Here, and elsewhere, such
phrases can be read as appealing to necessitation or supervenience relations. To say that whether some
instance of ⌜x because y⌝ is true is not entirely determined by some mind-dependent facts, is to say
nothing more than that the truth of such claims does not supervene on mind-dependent facts: having
fixed all the mind-dependent facts, one has not thereby fixed which instances of ⌜x because y⌝ are true.
To say that whether a speech act counts as an act of explanation depends on the mental states of
subjects, is to say that whether such speech acts are acts of explanation in part supervenes on the mental
states of subjects.
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Aamu oli häikäisevän kaunis. Meri oli kuin peili ja kalalokit kiersivät
ilmassa tehden pitkiä, loivia kaaria. Oli kuin ennen muinoin kerran —
eräällä matkalla.
Oli sellainen sunnuntaipäivä, jolloin luulisi kirkonkellojen soivan

aamusta iltaan pelkkää kauneuden hartautta ja kesäisen luonnon
juhlaa.
Isä tuli vastaani loistavin kasvoin käytävässä Yrjön huoneen

edustalla. Tänä aamuna oli tullut käänne parempaan! Ei kuumetta
enää! Se oli kuin ihme — eilen vielä korkea kuume kuten muuten
koko ajan — ja nyt yhtäkkiä ei ensinkään!
Hän oli niin onnellinen, että hänen äänensä värisi.
Aukaisin oven sairaan huoneeseen, ja vuoteesta hymyilivät

vastaani läpikuultavat, mutta iloiset kasvot. Ne todensivat äskeisen
ilosanoman. Ja Yrjö kertoi, miten syvästi hän oli nukkunut, ja miten
virkistävää oli herätä ilman kuumetta.
— Katsos nyt äiti! Nyt tulee terveys itsestään. Niin, niin! — Saisit
lähettää sanan Kaimalle — en ole ennen jaksanut ketään tavata —
mutta nyt tahtoisin hänet nähdä.
Seurasin yöhoitajatarta käytävää pitkin saadakseni kuulla

tarkemmin. Hän kertoi nuoren herran heränneen aikaisin ja heti
näyttäneen tavallista virkeämmältä. Kun isä aamulla oli nukahtanut
lepotuoliinsa, niin poika ei ollut tahtonut puhua edes kuiskaamalla,
vaan oli käsin viittaamalla lausunut toivomuksensa aamuhoidosta,
jonka suhteen hän tähän saakka oli ollut täysin välinpitämätön.
Ankarasti hän oli valvonut, ettei isän unta saanut mitenkään häiritä.
Sitten valmiiksi tultuaan ja levätessään puhtaalla tyynyllään, oli hän
kuiskaten kertonut hoitajattarelle lähimmistä aikeistaan. Hän oli
katsellut käsiään ja naurahtanut niiden kalpeudelle. Miten ne
olivatkaan käyneet laihoiksi ja ohuiksi ja vallan verettömiksi!
Ainoastaan kolme päivää oli hän työskennellyt työpajassa — se ei
vielä voinut niissä näkyä. Mutta terveeksi tultuaan hän harjoittelisi
konepajoissa vaikkapa kokonaisen vuoden. Sittenpähän kädetkin
muuttuisivat karkeammiksi! Ja insinöörikoulun jälkeen tulisivat toiset
koulut — ja sen jälkeen alkaisi hauska aika.
Oliko hän todellakin puhunut niin paljon hänen kanssaan?
Oli hän puhunut. Se oli terveyden merkki.
Hoitajatar oli ylpeä hänen luottamuksestaan ja siitä, että

tervehtyminen oli alkanut hänen valvomisvuorollaan. Hän pani sen
jotenkin omalle tililleen.
Tämähän oli vallan ihmeellinen päivä. Nyt piti Yrjön saada

levähtää oikein rauhassa, nukkua niin paljon kuin suinkin, niin että
hän saisi voimia päästäkseen todella parantumisen alkuun. Me
päätimme oleskella parvekkeen muotoisessa ikkunansyvennyksessä
juuri Yrjön oven ulkopuolella, josta kuulimme jokaisen äänen
sairashuoneesta häntä läsnäolollamme häiritsemättä. Ja katselimme
sieltä välkkyvää meren ulappaa.
Kaupungissa astuivat ihmiset kirkkoon ja urut soivat. Yli koko

maan ne soivat tänä kirkkaana sunnuntaipäivänä, ja virrenveisuu
nousi kuorona kirkot täyttäen ja levisi pitkin siintäviä selkiä ja
metsäisiä rinteitä kauas syrjäisille poluille. Ja kaikissa kirkoissa
puhuttiin tänään Kristuksen kirkastuksesta, miten hän yhtäkkiä nousi
ystäviensä näkyvistä ja katosi auringonpaisteeseen. Se sana kertoi
vapautuksesta ja onnesta, kaikkien toiveitten toteutumisesta. Oli
mahtanut silloinkin olla sellainen sabatinpäivä, jolloin öljyvuoret
tuoksuivat ja laaksot huokuivat lämpöä ja hedelmällisyyttä ja päivä
paistoi täydeltä terältä. Sellainen sabatti, jolloin voi ihmeitä tapahtua
sen takia että päivä itse oli päivien ihme.
Palasin hetkisen jälkeen Yrjön luo. Hän nukkui vielä. Aurinko

paistoi vinosti sisään ja valaisi hänen vuodettaan. Tuokion perästä
hän heräsi ja näytti jotakin ajattelevan.
— Äiti — sanoi hän äkkiä — anna minulle vaatteeni kaapista!
— Ethän aikone nousta?
— En, mutta minun pitää etsiä pientä kuulaa, jonka olen

kadottanut.
Katsoin häneen hämmästyneenä. — Äkillinen ahdistus kouristi

sydäntäni — mitä tämä merkitsi? Hänen katseensa oli tyyni ja kirkas,
mutta hyvin pingoittunut, hänen kätensä harhailivat levottomasti
peitteellä, kuin hän olisi kiireesti tahtonut löytää kuulan.
Kuumehouretta se ei ollut — mitä saattoi se merkitä?
Tein hänelle mieliksi ja otin esille kaapista hänen vaalean

kesäpukunsa, joka hänellä oli ollut yllään hänen saadessaan
ylioppilaslakkinsa ja viimeksi matkalla kotoa. Ja hän alkoi hapuilla
taskuja, sitten takin ja housujen alaskäännettyjä ompeleita. Sitä
tehdessään hän katsoi suoraan eteensä johonkin kaukaiseen
etäisyyteen. Mutta hänen laihat sormensa etsivät ja etsivät,
kopeloivat ja kopeloivat ompeleittenkin alta.
Tulin aivan kuumaksi tuskasta. Jospa lääkäri pian saapuisi!
Silloin astui isä sisään.

— Isä — sanoi Yrjö vakavasti — minun täytyy nyt olla kahden
äidin kanssa. Anteeksi, mutta hän auttaa minua juuri löytämään mitä
etsin.
— Ja mitä sinä etsit?
— Tiedäthän — tuollaista kuulaa — olen käyttänyt sellaisia

valokuvatessani.
— Mutta nythän sinä et sitä tarvitse.
— Tarvitsen minä — ne valaisevat äkkiä — niitä voi milloin

tahansa käyttää.
Isä kalpeni ja katseli poikaa silmänräpäyksen neuvotonna,

nyökkäsi hänelle lempeästi päätään ja lähti huoneesta telefonoimaan
lääkärille.
Jäimme Yrjön kanssa kahden.
— Äiti — sanoi hän taas miltei käskevällä äänellä — anna minulle

kaikki mitä minulla oli päälläni tänne tullessani!
Annoin hänelle lakin, harson, sukat — kaikki — ja hän tapaili taas

reunoja ja ompeleita, silmissä tähystävä, kuulostava ilme.
— Sano, poikani, mitä sinä oikeastaan etsit?
— Sellaista, jota tarvitaan matkoilla.
— Mutta ethän sinä nyt tule matkustamaan.
— En tiedä — katsohan äiti, nouse tuolille ja katso, onko se

vasemmalla hyllyllä — tuon kaapin — tuon — minä tarvitsen sitä
välttämättä.
Tein mitä hän pyysi.
— Ei, Yrjö, täällä ei ole mitään.
Astuin alas tuoliltani ja näytin hänelle tyhjät käteni.
Silloin hän huokasi syvään ja lakkasi etsimästä.
Sydämeni oli kuin kivi rinnassani, kun käänsin hitaasti kokoon

kaikki nuo hänen matkatamineensa ja asetin ne takaisin kaappiin.
Hyvä Jumala — oliko hänellä sittenkin matka edessään!
Hän oli kääntynyt ikkunaa kohti ja piti kätensä hiljaa peitteellä.

Näytti siltä kuin hän olisi unohtanut sen, mikä äsken oli häntä
askaroittanut. Annoin hänelle siemauksen viiniä, järjestin tyynyt
hänen päänsä alla ja näin että hän nukahti.
Käytävässä puhelimme hiljaa keskenämme. Emme voineet tätä

selittää. Lääkäri oli saaristossa huvilallaan ja oli luvannut tulla tunnin
kuluttua. Emme saaneet muitakaan käsiimme, sillä olihan sunnuntai
ja kesän helteisin aika, jolloin lääkärit nauttivat vapauttaan, ja ne
harvat jotka olivat kaupungissa, olivat tällä tuokiolla työssä muualla.
Meidän täytyi odottaa. Istuuduimme taas nojatuoleihin käytävän
ikkunan ääreen ja koetimme toivoa parasta. Ehkäpä tämä olikin
käänne, jota aina odotettiin tällaisessa tapauksessa — olihan kuume
laskeutunut, ja tästä päivästä alkaen ehkä saisimme seurata hänen
varmaa paranemistaan.
Silloin kuulin äkkiä huudahduksen. Hypähdin pystyyn — katsahdin

ympärilleni — se tuli kuin hyvin kaukaa:
— Äiti!
Ääni oli voimakas kuin olisi se voinut tunkeutua sairashuoneen

kiviseinien läpi.
Kiiruhdin sisään.
Yrjö oli noussut kyynärpäilleen vuoteessaan ja katsoi minuun,

selittämätön ilme silmissään. Hänen kasvonsa loistivat ja hänen
silmänsä säteilivät jännitettyä odotusta.
— Äiti, kuka sieltä tulee?
— Kuuletko jonkun tulevan? — ehkäpä tohtori? — ehkäpä Kaima

—!
— Oletko sanonut hänelle — olen odottanut — en ole ennen

pyytänyt — mutta nyt —
— Olen Yrjö — jo lähetettiin sana.
Hän vaipui tyynylle ja varjo kulki hänen kasvojensa yli —.
— Äiti, minä en voi hengittää — —
Samalla silmät sulkeutuivat puoleksi — ja harmaa kalpeus levisi yli

otsan — suun —
Heitin oven auki ja isä juoksi sisään. Hän näki silmänräpäyksessä

kaiken, kiersi käsivartensa poikansa ympärille ja nosti hänet istualle
rintaansa vasten.
Mutta yhä syvempi varjo peitti hänen kasvonsa.

— Yrjö! Yrjö!
Yrjö ei enää kuullut meitä.
Hänen päänsä lepäsi raskaana isän rinnalla ja hänen silmänsä

olivat murtuneet.
38.
Siinä me ihmislapset olimme maahan lyötyinä — masentuneina —

menehtymäisillämme.
Siinä olimme avuttomina vihlovan tuskan vallassa — tietämätöntä

tietämättä — uskomatonta uskomatta — käsittämätöntä
käsittämättä.
Katsoimme poikamme kalvenneita kasvoja — ja valoviirua, jonka

hän oli jälkeensä jättänyt kadotessaan näkyvistämme.
Oi kaikkien kysymysten kysymystä!
Ja kaikkien arvoitusten arvoitusta!
Sinä olevaisuuden avain, jolla Jumala sulkee ja taasen avaa —!
Olimme siinä poikamme vuoteen ääressä — kuoleman voiman

iskeminä —
Jumalan sormen koskettamina.
39.
Ja mummo tuli kotoa kukkia tuoden.
Hän lyyhistyi tuolille peittäen vanhat kasvonsa käsiinsä ja hiljaa

valittaen.
Hiljaa ja tuskissaan valittaen — kuin jos olisi hänen sydämensä

lävistetty.
*****
Mutta sinä Yrjö, minne olit hävinnyt? Mikä käsittämätön arvoitus!
Siinä olit sinä, mutta et sittenkään enää ollut.
Äsken puhuit — äsken katsoit sinä — minne pakenit?
Itse — itse — minne katosit sinä?
Yhtäkkiä ainiaaksi poissa!
Mutta voima ei kuole.
Ihmishenki ei sammu.
Olit lähtenyt luotamme, emmekä saaneet sinua häiritä

kaipauksellamme ja kysymyksillämme.
Ainoastaan sydämemme pohjasta kiittäen sinua siunata.
40.
Muukalainen, joka oli käynyt meitä tervehtimässä, oli aamupäivällä
ollut sairaalassa kysymässä Yrjön tilaa ja saanut kuulla hänen
olevan parempana. Päivä oli tukahduttavan kuuma ja autiot kadut
painostavan helteiset. Matka oli ollut pitkä, ja asuntoonsa palattuaan
hän paneutui levolle.
Hän nukahti.
Jonkun tunnin kuluttua hän heräsi jälleen, nousi istualleen

vuoteessansa, katsoi kysyvänä vanhaa, hienopiirteistä miestä, joka
istui nojatuolissa hänen vieressään, ja sanoi:
— Mitenkä mahtaa olla Yrjön laita? Näin hänestä niin ihanaa unta.
Mies laski kirjansa pöydälle, nojasi tuolin selustimeen ja odotti. Ja

nainen kertoi:
— Olin seisovinani sairaalan edustalla. Eilen illalla kävelimme

siellä yhdessä, Yrjön äiti ja minä — mutta nyt oli aamu. Katselin
merta, mutta kun käännyin mennäkseni sisään, tuli Yrjö astuen alas
sairaalan portaita. Hän oli puettu vaaleanharmaaseen
kesäpukuunsa, kuten viimein hänet nähdessäni, ja käsissään
hänellä oli suuri määrä kukkia, värikkäitä ja minulle outoja, mutta
ikäänkuin juuri puutarhasta poimittuja. Hän tuli kiirehtien siivekkäin
askelin, ja hänen kasvonsa loistivat ilosta.
— Mitenkä? — kysyin hämmästyneenä. — Minne olette menossa?
— Menen matkalle — vastasi hän reippaasti.
— Te matkalle? — Ja tietävätkö ne tuolla sisällä teidän

aikeistanne?
— En ennättänyt heiltä kysyä.
— Ettekö te ajattele heidän kauhuansa, kun huomaavat teidän

lähteneen?
— Kauhuako? — Enhän minä kauas matkusta ja pääsen milloin

tahansa takaisin.
— Niinkö? — Mistä teillä sitten on nuo kauniit kukkaset

käsissänne?
— Ne sain heiltä — ne ovat heidän rakkautensa minuun!
— Ja kuitenkin te riennätte heidän luotaan pois?
— Ah, ei se mitään merkitse. — Sanokaa te heille, että kaikki

minkä ovat minulle antaneet, sen lähetän heille takaisin —
moninkertaisesti. Sanokaa heille, että tulen takaisin monin tavoin —
tuhansin muodoin! —
Ja näin että kellertävä valo ympäröi häntä. Se oli kuin

auringonnousun enne — se kasvoi — se punertui — se hehkui
kullankarvaisena. Muistin nähneeni sentapaista joskus ennenkin —
jonkun maalarin mielikuvituksen ja pensselin tuotteena —? Missä —
Roomassa? — Guido Renin aamuruskon taivaana Auroran takana.
Tiedäthän!
Vanha mies nyökkäsi päätään.
— Ja Yrjö seisoi keskellä aamuruskoa ja kiirehti pois. Mutta

aurinko kultasi kiviportaat, veistokset, seinät, puut ja puistot. Se heitti
heijastuksensa yli kiiltävän ulapan, se sulki maat ja taivaat
hohteeseensa. Ja nuori mies oli hohteeseen hävinnyt.
41.
Sitten sytytimme ne kahdeksantoista kynttilää, jotka olivat hänen

elämänsä kahdeksantoista vuotta. Liekkukoot ne hautakappelin
hämärässä ja sammukoot yksitellen, kuten hänen vuotensakin olivat
sammuneet.
Noudimme kotoa sen korkean kellokukan, joka täydessä kukassa

ollen oli kuin valtava vahakynttilä, ja asetimme sen hänen
leposijansa pääpuoleen. Taittukoon ikkunasta tuleva valovirta sen
lumivalkoiseen kruunuun.
Hymiskööt sitten urut hänen lapsuutensa laulua säestäen. Se oli

häntä varten säestetty ja vuosittain jouluna laulettu hänen kodissaan.
Hänelle oli hänen isänsä tehnyt virren ja Kaima aamuhymnin, ja

vanha perheenystävä professori kauniin muistorunon. Ei tarvinnut
hänen hahmonsa lähteä laulutta, runotta eikä kukatta maan poven
lepoon.
*****
Kiviä ja santaa!
Ja kuitenkin tahdoimme viettää hänen muistojuhlaansa eikä hänen

hautajaisiaan.
42.
Syksy oli saapunut. Silloin palasi matkaltansa hän, jota Yrjö ei
koskaan väsynyt saattamaan ja taasen kohtaamaan ja jota mekin
olimme malttamattomasti odottaneet, saadaksemme puhua hänen
kanssaan pojastamme.
Hän tuli rata vallin portaita alas. Katsomatta ympärilleen hän astui
suoraa päätä liejuisen maantien yli odottavaa kohti.
Ja hän sulki odottajan syliinsä ja painoi poskensa poskelleni.

Minkälainen kevät ja kesä hänestä uhkui! Kyyneleet valuivat hänen
silmistänsä ja kostuttivat hänen kasvojansa, mutta hän katsoi vain
kosteitten silmäripsien lomitse eteensä kotiamme, joka siinä näkyi
koivujen takaa.
— Miksi? — Miksi piti sen tapahtua?
Kuljimme vaieten käsikädessä syksyisen pilvitaivaan alla

lautakäytävää pitkin. Molemmin puolin kiilsivät mustat peltomaat ja
maantienkuopat olivat vettä täynnänsä. Ne peitti ohut jääkuori, joka
särkyi pienestäkin kosketuksesta. Harmaata ja liikkumatonta oli
kaikki. Surullista oli kaikki. Lakastunutta oli kaikki.
Siinä oli veräjä. Niin monta kertaa iloisesti auki temmattu.

Hakanen nousi ja portti sulkeutui itsestään. Siinä oli tuttu tie,
ruusupensaat molemmin puolin. Kun ne juhannuksena kukkivat, oli
käytävä valkoisten ruusulehtien vallassa. Sivuutimme hitaasti
korkeat koivut.
Tien käänteessä verannan ovella seisoi isä meitä vastassa.
Hän oli iloisen näköinen, sillä olihan nyt Marja luonamme. Hän,
joka tiesi pojastamme enemmän kuin kukaan muu ja joka ei väsyisi
hänestä kertomasta.
Marja riippui isän kaulassa ja Kirsti odotti vain vuoroansa

lentääkseen hänen syliinsä. Palvelijatkin kiersivät keittiön portaita
häntä tervehtimään.
Mutta hän, joka ennen vallatonna oli rynnännyt sisään ja sitten

vihurina huoneitten läpi ja portaita ylös yläkertaan, astui nyt
vitkalleen miltei seiniin painautuen. Äänetönnä hän lähenteli sinun
huoneesi ovea, Yrjö, peitti kasvonsa käsiinsä ja nyyhkytti rajusti. Ovi
oli raollaan, kuin olisit juuri lähtenyt huoneestasi ulos.
Ja Marja hoiperteli sisään.
Voi sen pienen huoneen muistoja! Jokainen esine oli hänelle tuttu.
Kirjojesi rivit hyllylläsi, monet kerrat yhdessä katsotut.
Kirjoituspöytäsi laatikot, yhdessä pengotut. Pikku tavarat pöydälläsi
— kynätelineesi, suurennuslasisi — kaikki entisellään. Tuossa oli
lamppu, jolla olit näyttänyt hänelle tietä rappusissa. Tuossa
avainkimppusi — tuossa nuo pikkuesineet, joita olit kantanut
taskuissasi. Sinulla oli tuskin mitään, jota et ollut hänelle joskus
näyttänyt.
Siellä oli myöskin kehityspuitteet ja siinä kuva, jonka olit

auringonpaisteessa kehittänyt istuessamme mäellä viimeisenä
päivänä ennenkuin menit konepajaan. Marja otti sen käteensä ja
katseli sitä. Hän näki siinä sinut ja itsensä Kaivopuiston juhlan
jälkeisenä päivänä, jolloin Martti veli oli valokuvannut teidät yhteisine
kukkinenne Marjan kodissa.
Miten arvoituksellinen oli elämä! Mikä tarkoitus mahtoi siinäkin

olla, että Marjan piti seistä tuossa itkemässä? Miksi piti isän
menehtyä kaipaukseensa ja suruunsa — miksi piti kotimme jäädä
autioksi kuin hävitystään odottaen?
Mutta turhaa on kysyä. Tule, Marja, tule isän huoneeseen ja anna

hänelle nuoruutesi lohdutusta. Sinulla on tulevaisuutesi, kaikesta
huolimatta. Itse et siitä nyt tiedä, mutta tuolla tienkäänteessä se
sinua odottaa. Silti tämä nuoruutesi tarina ei menetä pyhyyttään
elämässäsi, ja se tulee sitä aina tuhannesti rikastuttamaan. Tule,
anna isän se aavistaa, anna hänen katsoa elämään nuorilla
silmilläsi. Ja puhu hänelle siitä jota hän aina ikävöi, puhu meille
molemmille Yrjöstä!
Silloin Marja puhui sinusta, Yrjö. Kuinkahan kauan me siinä

muistojamme täydensimme, sitä en aavista. Kysyimme häneltä
tiettyäkin, vain houkutellaksemme häntä kertomaan lisää. Ja
kaikkien kysymystemme alla piili arkana se yksi ja tärkein, jota
emme voineet keneltäkään suoraan tiedustella. Mutta Marja aavisti
sen sanojemme alta. Ja kun hän vakuutti, että sinä olit kodissasi
onnellinen ja että teillä molemmilla oli tapana kilvan kehua
kotejanne, niin se oli kuin juomaa erämaan janoavalle vaeltajalle.
— Sanoiko Yrjö sen milloinkaan suoraan?
— Sanoi toki monta kertaa. Silloinkin kun tapasimme viimeisen

kerran ennen matkaani ja hän kertoi minulle siitä yöllisestä
keskustelusta.
— Miten hän silloin sanoi?
— Että hän oli sen yön jälkeen kokonaan vapautunut ja että hän
nyt vasta oikein tiesi, miten paljon hän teistä piti.
Emme kysyneet enempää — eikä meidän tarvinnut enää
kaipauksella ikävöidä Yrjön omaa suoraa vastausta.
43.
Sen jälkeen kun sinä, Yrjö, lähdit, ei meillä ole arkea ollutkaan.
Sinä olet kokonaan täyttänyt jokaisen sunnuntain kuten tänään, ja se
sama sunnuntaitunnelma on seurannut meitä läpi viikon, kunnes on
koittanut uusi sunnuntai, joka on vaeltanut päivää kohti ja
laskeutunut iltaan, kuten tämäkin päivä, jolloin olemme yhdessä
entisiä muistelleet.
Sentakia meistä nyt perästäpäin tuntuu siltä kuin olisi elämäsi ollut
yhtämittainen, päivänpaisteinen pyhäpäivä. Oli sunnuntai, kun
maailmaan saavuit, ja sunnuntai, kun lähdit. Ja sunnuntain olet
jättänyt jälkeesi kodillesi.
Se onkin meille tarpeen. Sillä emme ole jaksaneet vielä

arkitouhuihin antautua.
Katso isää tässä, Yrjö! Milloin luulet sinä hänen voivan elämää
ajatella? Kasvot ovat kalvenneet, katse sisäänpäin kääntynyt.
Maailma on niin kaukana, ettei mikään ääni sieltä saavuta häntä.
Vaikka hän kuulee ääntemme sorinan, niin luulee hän ehkä sittenkin
vain kuuntelevansa omien ajatustensa kulkua. Jospa hän jaksaisi
luottaa siihen, että niin rikkaana lähdit, että sentakia taaksesi katsot
ja viivähdät meillä! Mutta kysymykset eivät jätä häntä rauhaan. Hän
kysyy kysymistään saamatta mistään vastausta — — kysyy tuota
kysymysten kysymystä, johon elämä ja iäisyys eivät vastaa — tuota
tuskallista miksi ja mitä varten?
Mutta mehän emme tiedä miksi ja mitä varten, emmekä saa tietää.
Lähdit pois ja tulit takaisin ja muistat sinäkin menneisyyttämme ja
menet edelleen ja tottelet Korkeimman tahtoa. Luulen, että olit jo
opittavasi oppinut, olit jo ennen jossain koulusi käynyt ja olit jo
tullessasi miltei valmis. Mutta kai sinulla oli muutamia jumalallisia
sanoja vielä tajuntaasi painettavina, ja kun olit ne oivaltanut, sait
kutsun pois. Hyvä olisi meistä ollut, jos olisit jäänyt tänne meidän
muiden tähtemme, sillä me kaipaamme kipeästi sinunlaisiasi
ristiriitaiseen maailmaamme. Mutta kai tehtäväsi oli suoritettu ja
sinulla oli tärkeämpää tehtävää muualla. En tiedä.
Emmehän varmuudella tiedä mitään kaikkein syvimmistä asioista.

Niiden suhteen voimme ainoastaan aavistaa. Olen sentakia lakannut
kysymästä, kun en sittenkään saa mihinkään vastausta, ja sen sijaan
uskon. Uskon lujasti siihen, että vaikka lähditkin, olet kuitenkin
luonamme uudella tavalla ja täytät elämämme uudella voimalla, josta
meillä ei ole ennen ollut aavistustakaan. Eikä minun tarvitse edes
uskooni turvautua, sillä tunnen sen, huomaan sen kaikesta.
Koettakaamme saada isäkin huomaamaan se. Hän on tähän asti

katsonut vain siihen raollaan olevaan oveen, jonka taakse katosit, ja
siihen valosäteeseen, jonka jälkeesi jätit. Joskus tuntuu kuin hänkin
olisi nähnyt jotakin sen oven takana häämöttävän ja saanut sen
hivuttavan ikävän. Sinuako hän niin katkerasti kaipaa? Sinuako,
Yrjö? Vai olisiko hänkin valmis?
En tahdo ajatella sitä ajatusta loppuun asti. Hän on tänään

kanssamme muistellut kaikki yhteiset muistomme ja hänen
kiikkutuolinsa jalas on pysähtynyt. Hänen otsansa vaot ovat
silenneet ja hänen silmäinsä ilme on käynyt eloisammaksi. Hänen
sydämensä taakka on tänä rauhaisana sunnuntai-iltana keventynyt.
Katso, hän ottaa kätensä pois silmiltään ja hymyilee meille.
Ja talossa on niin äänetöntä, ettei kuulu hiiskahdustakaan.

Lampun valossa näemme huurteisten oksien tuskin huomattavasti
huojuvan ikkunaimme edessä.
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Everyday Metaphysical Explanation Kristie Miller Full Chapter

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Everyday Metaphysical Explanation

Everyday Metaphysical Explanation

4.3.3 Epistemic Tractability 124

9.6 Non-Symmetry 250

Figure 1 Freddie Braddon-Miller © David Braddon-Mitchell

Figure 2 Annie Braddon-Miller © David Braddon-Mitchell

Figure 3 Annie and Freddie © David Braddon-Mitchell

consecration, we are providing an explanation that is at least in part non-causal.

we will have in mind. We will reﬂect on the goal-directed element of metaphysical

philosophical discussion. (We use an italicised ‘because’ in what follows, to

A. The ﬂower is red because the ﬂower is maroon.

Arguably, a good many of A to I are not ‘everyday’ cases of metaphysical

Dasgupta (2017:74–76) similarly argues that metaphysical explanation—which

In turn, we think that if the Philosophical Explication Approach is right, then

PA: A proposition of the form ⌜x because y⌝⁴ is true at a context of explanation,

everyday explanation in terms of grounding, with an account of what relation that

We reject this orthodoxy, at least as it pertains to everyday metaphysical explan-

This chapter aims to introduce the phenomenon in which we are interested:

1.1 Introducing Metaphysical Explanation

A. The ﬂower is red because the ﬂower is maroon.

Claims like A to I appear throughout philosophy, and, indeed, some of them

   17

ethics as disagreements about in virtue of what X is right, or, disagreements

   19

the form x because y, if we add some arbitrary claim, j, to y, so that we have x

J and K are examples of causal explanations, while L can be construed as an

   21

necessitation. In other words, some proposition, A, entails proposition B, just

¹² See Kim (1984; 1987), Horgan (1982), and Lewis (1986a).

to be seen to what extent what we have said about metaphysical explanation—

1.2 What are Metaphysical Explanations?

We begin by distinguishing two views about what sorts of things metaphysical

D. Bert is in mental state M because he is in brain state B.

D is a sentence. It’s actually a complex sentence composed of two sentences, one

   ? 23

In what follows we take facts to be worldly entities comprised of objects, properties,

explanans and explanandum—which are themselves propositions—separated by

1.3 Aspects of Everyday Metaphysical Explanation

     25

1.3.1 The Worldly-Structure Aspect

we just noted are typically taken to be features of philosophical metaphysical

¹⁶ This is particularly clear in Schaffer (2009).

     27

     29

by the fact that metaphysical explanations are thought to be non-monotonic. Most

Chapter 4 of this book will consider several accounts of everyday metaphysical

1.3.2 The Psychological Aspect

Looking at A to I one might wonder whether propositions of the form ⌜x because y⌝

1.4 Truth-Conditions, Worldly Structure, and Psychology

So this raises the question of what connection there is between providing an

-,  ,   31

³⁰ Achinstein (1983) has a view of this sort.

Oli sellainen sunnuntaipäivä, jolloin luulisi kirkonkellojen soivan

Isä tuli vastaani loistavin kasvoin käytävässä Yrjön huoneen

Hän oli niin onnellinen, että hänen äänensä värisi.

Aukaisin oven sairaan huoneeseen, ja vuoteesta hymyilivät

Seurasin yöhoitajatarta käytävää pitkin saadakseni kuulla

Oliko hän todellakin puhunut niin paljon hänen kanssaan?

Oli hän puhunut. Se oli terveyden merkki.

Hoitajatar oli ylpeä hänen luottamuksestaan ja siitä, että

Tämähän oli vallan ihmeellinen päivä. Nyt piti Yrjön saada

Kaupungissa astuivat ihmiset kirkkoon ja urut soivat. Yli koko

Palasin hetkisen jälkeen Yrjön luo. Hän nukkui vielä. Aurinko