Journal of the Indian Ocean Region

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India’s Act East policy: strategic implications for

the Indian Ocean

Isabelle Saint-Mézard

To cite this article: Isabelle Saint-Mézard (2016) India’s Act East policy: strategic
implications for the Indian Ocean, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, 12:2, 177-190, DOI:
10.1080/19480881.2016.1226753

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/19480881.2016.1226753

Published online: 20 Oct 2016.

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JOURNAL OF THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION, 2016
VOL. 12, NO. 2, 177–190
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19480881.2016.1226753

India’s Act East policy: strategic implications for the Indian

Ocean
Isabelle Saint-Mézard
French Institute of Geopolitics, University of Paris 8, Saint-Denis, France

ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
Since the Modi government came to power in June 2014, it has Look East policy; Act East
invested diplomatic capital in announcing the transformation of policy; Bay of Bengal; South
India’s ‘Look East’ policy into a new ‘Act East’ policy. While this new China Sea; Indian Navy
semantics has mostly involved a few nuances and adjustments –
rather than a drastic change – in India’s strategic posture, it is
nevertheless interesting to analyze the implications of the ‘Act East’
policy for the Indian Ocean Region, and more specifically for its
Eastern part – the Bay of Bengal. In this respect, the article shows
that India’s ‘Act East’ policy has led to its growing involvement in
the Bay of Bengal, especially in the field of maritime affairs. It has
also led India to acknowledge its security responsibilities. More
generally, India’s recent advances in maritime domain awareness,
its interests in enhancing joint patrols and humanitarian assistance
and disaster relief (HADR) cooperation, as well as its efforts to
contribute to the maritime security of its neighbors, including
through weapon transfers, reflect that India is in a nascent
positioning as a net security provider, or at least is in an attempt to
progress along that line.

The ‘Look East’ policy (LEP) has arguably been one of India’s most successful foreign
policy initiatives in the post-Cold War era. Launched in the early 1990s by Prime Min-
ister Narasimha Rao, the LEP aimed at reactivating India’s links with its Southeast
Asian neighbors, as well as Japan and South Korea, after three decades of relative
neglect. While the initial incentive was mostly of an economic nature, as India
wanted to attract East Asian investments and technology, the LEP acquired a strategic
dimension by the late 1990s, under the BJP-led government of Prime Minister Vajpayee.
In this context, the Indian Navy and coast guards became increasingly active in the Bay
of Bengal, while making regular forays in the Western Pacific to promote maritime
cooperation with Japan and Vietnam. Thanks to this multifaceted endeavor, India devel-
oped substantial links with its eastern neighbors, as reflected by the institutionalization
of an Asean-India Summit meeting in 2002 as well as its admission into a number of
Asean-led regional organizations such as the Asean Regional Forum in 1996 and the
East Asia Summit in 2002.
However, after 20 years of ‘Looking East,’ a debate emerged on the need for India to
give a new momentum to its East Asia policy. This debate was encapsulated in the

CONTACT Isabelle Saint-Mézard i.stmezard@gmail.com

© 2016 Indian Ocean Research Group
178 I. SAINT-MÉZARD

notion that India had to ‘Act East’ instead of just ‘Look East.’ Interestingly the expression
‘Act East’ was first suggested by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on her visit to
Chennai in July 2011 (Clinton, 2011). In urging India ‘not just to look East, but to
engage East and act East as well,’ the then US Secretary of State hoped to encourage
India to play a larger security role in Southeast Asia and assert itself as an influential
power in the Indo-Pacific region. However, the Manmohan Singh government turned a
deaf ear to the US suggestions. In its view, India’s best interest was to maintain a
business-oriented approach and to avoid getting involved in the security issues plaguing
the region. This cautious approach was partly dictated by the fear of alienating China,
which was at the center of rising tensions in the South China Sea. It was also attributed
to the fact that the Manmohan Singh administration was too absorbed in domestic
issues to devote attention to Southeast Asia and the larger Indo-Pacific region. Thus,
India’s aloofness became a source of frustration not only for the US, but also for many
countries in East Asia, including Singapore, Vietnam, Indonesia and Japan (Saint-Mézard,
2016).
It took a change of government and the coming to power of a BJP-led administration in
June 2014 for India to adopt the ‘Act East’ concept. As early as August 2014, External Affairs
Minister Sushma Swaraj briefed the Indian Heads of mission in Southeast and Northeast
Asia and urged them to ‘Act East’ (The Economic Times, 2014). Then, Prime Minister
Modi himself officially declared that India’s Look East policy had become Act East policy
on the occasion of his first participation to the India-Asean and East Asia Summits of
November 2014 in Myanmar. He delivered this message on multiple occasions, including
in the prestigious Singapore Lecture he gave in November 2015. In this context, the objec-
tive of this article is to analyze the implications of India’s ‘Act East’ policy for the Indian
Ocean Region, and more specifically for its Eastern part, that is to say the Bay of Bengal.
Indeed, the Bay of Bengal has been described as an area that ‘is fast becoming a key
zone of strategic competition in Asia and (that) is of vital strategic importance to India’
(Brewster, 2015). In keeping with this observation, this paper primarily adopts a strategic
point of view, and while keeping in mind the economic objectives of India’s Act East policy,
it focuses on its defence and security dimensions. Thus, in a first part, the article analyses
the Act East policy in the context of the Modi government’s external initiatives, also taking
into account the shifting geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific region. In a second part, the article
focuses on the impact India’s ‘Act East’ policy is likely to have on the Bay of Bengal strategic
dynamics.

Contextualizing the ‘Act East’ policy

Since it came to power in June 2014, the Modi government has invested much diplomatic
capital in announcing the transformation of India’s old Look East policy into a new Act East
policy. On a closer look, though, this new semantics has mostly led to a few nuances and
adjustments – rather than a drastic change – in India’s strategic posture. Perhaps the most
interesting dimension of the Act East policy has lain in its coherent convergence with two
other external initiatives of the Modi government – the reinvigoration of the partnership
with the US and a renewed focus on the Indian Ocean. Taken together, these three foreign
policy orientations have contributed to reinforce India’s posture in the Eastern part of the
Indian Ocean.
 JOURNAL OF THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION 179

The nuances between the Look East and the Act East policies
As per the official statements of the Modi-led government, ‘Acting East’ meant that India
would put the whole Indo-Pacific region at the very top of its diplomatic priorities. As
Prime Minister Modi reminded his audience at the 2015 East Asia Summit: ‘Since my gov-
ernment entered office 18 months ago, no region has seen greater engagement from India
than the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean Region’ (Ministry of External Affairs, 2015a).
Indeed, since June 2014 the Prime Minister’s Office and Ministry of External Affairs have
cultivated intense exchanges with South Asian and East Asian countries, with Singapore,
Myanmar, Vietnam and Japan standing out as partners of choice. As evidence of its com-
mitment to intensify its engagement, India set up a mission with a full-fledged Ambassa-
dor to Asean in April 2015. It also sent a high-level delegation led by Defence Minister
Manohar Parrikar to the Shangri La Dialogue in June 2016 in Singapore, thus showing
its renewed interest in the security debates in the region (no Indian Defence Minister
had attended this Dialogue for the past four years) (Mukherjee, 2016).
While the tempo and visibility of India’s interactions with the East Asian region have
accelerated, the tenets of the ‘Act East’ policy have been in the continuity of the LEP.
India has maintained its strong adhesion to the principle of Asean-led regionalism and
its development agenda has remained central to its interest in the region. A nuance
has certainly been brought by the personal style of Prime Minister Modi, who has
made it a point to instill more determination to India’s initiatives as well as a greater
focus on implementing them. However, it remains to be seen whether the Modi govern-
ment can really improve India’s mixed track record on that matter. Another nuance has
been the extension of the geographical area to be covered by the ‘Act East’ policy. First,
Prime Minister Modi has made it very clear that the ‘Act East’ policy began with Bangla-
desh. He officially conveyed this message on the occasion of Bangladesh President
Abdul Hamid’s visit to India in December 2014. Interestingly, the inclusion of Bangladesh
in India’s ‘Act East’ policy has coincided with an improvement in bilateral relations, the
best illustration of which was the successful finalization of the Land boundary agreement
in June 2015. Then, in the Far East, Prime Minister Modi has pushed the extent of the ‘Act
East’ policy to Fiji and 13 other small island nations of Oceania, as reflected by the inau-
guration of the Forum for India-Pacific Islands Countries in November 2014 (Sajjanhar,
2016).
But the main nuance brought by the Act East policy has involved the strategic field.
Indeed, the Modi government has suggested that political and security issues would
gain a new salience in India’s approach. In other words, India would try to be a more cred-
ible player in the region, so as to meet the expectations of its partners in East Asia. Not only
would India step up its effort to contribute to regional peace and stability, it would do so in
a spirit of partnership and with a view to protecting the so-called ‘global commons’ in Asia.
In fact, the ‘global commons,’ which primarily designate the freedom of navigation, cyber-
security and space, has become an important notion in the Act East policy. As Prime Min-
ister Modi explained in his November 2015 Singapore Lecture:
India will work with countries in the region and beyond, including the United States and Russia,
our East Asia Summit partners, to ensure that our commons – ocean, space and cyber – remain
avenues of shared prosperity, not become new theatres of contests. India will lend its strength to
keep the seas safe, secure and free for the benefit of all. (Press Information Bureau, 2015a)
180 I. SAINT-MÉZARD

In many ways, the reference to the ‘global commons’ – a notion pervasive in the US rheto-
ric – has embodied India’s new sense of responsibilities, especially with respect to mari-
time security and the freedom of navigation. It has led India to become less hesitant
about taking a stand on the South China Sea disputes, even if Beijing resented it. In con-
trast to the previous government of Prime Minister Singh, the Modi government has men-
tioned the issue regularly in its parleys with Asean collectively and with its various
members individually, especially with Vietnam, as well as with Japan (and the US as we
shall see later), calling for a settlement under the United Nations Convention on Law of
Sea (UNCLOS) and the adoption of a Code of Conduct. Without explicitly naming it,
India even urged China ‘to show utmost respect for UNCLOS’ after Beijing rejected the
July 2016 ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration of The Hague stating that it had
‘no legal basis’ to claim historic rights to the disputed waters in the South China Sea (Min-
istry of External Affairs, 2016a). Admittedly, India has been in a good position to comment
upon China’s assertive behavior in the South China Sea, as it settled its own maritime
boundary with Bangladesh in July 2014 under UNCLOS.1
India’s strengthened rhetoric on the South China Sea could also be seen as a response
to China’s growing naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Indeed since late 2013, China has
strongly pushed its Maritime Silk Road initiative – a signature project of president Xi
Jinping, which plans for major infrastructure developments in the Indian Ocean – while
its submarines have made port-calls in Sri Lanka and reportedly in Pakistan (Ghosh,
2016). Both developments have been unsettling for New Delhi, which has then deemed
it necessary to adjust its strategic positioning vis-à-vis China. Getting more involved in
the security debate in East Asia in general – and on the South China Sea in particular –
has precisely been a way for the Modi government to put pressure on China in its own
backyard. In this respect, the Act East policy could be understood as an attempt at
strengthening India’s strategic posture in response to China’s growing maritime ambitions.

A convergence between the ‘Act East’ policy and the revitalization of the Indo-US
strategic partnership
While developing its ‘Act East’ policy, the Modi administration strongly reengaged with the
United States. In point of fact, it lost no time in reviving ties with America, as Prime Minister
Modi organized a summit meeting with President Obama in Washington just four months
after his coming to power, in September 2014. In so doing, the new Indian Prime Minister
hoped to contain the sense of drift that had pervaded the bilateral relationship since 2013.
He succeeded to a large extent, especially as he hosted President Obama in New Delhi, in
January 2015 and had another summit meeting with him on this occasion. Six months
later, in June 2015, India and the US renewed their 10-year defence framework agreement,
originally signed in 2005. A mainstay of the Indo-US strategic partnership, the agreement
planned for high-level exchanges between their militaries as well as strategic consultations
on a large spectrum of issues. An important addition was that the agreement paved the
way for joint development of defence equipment, including jet engine and aircraft carriers
technologies, as planned in the Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI).
Interestingly, India chose to reinvigorate its partnership with the US not only in a bilat-
eral framework, but also in the larger context of their shared interests in Asia. The conver-
gence between India’s ‘Act East’ policy and its revived partnership with the US was clearly
 JOURNAL OF THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION 181

embodied in an official document called ‘U.S.-India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-
Pacific and Indian Ocean Region’ issued in January 2015 (The White House, 2015). This
document, which was released at the end of the January 2015 visit of president Obama,
envisioned a closer partnership to promote ‘peace, prosperity and stability’ in the
Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean region. It underscored the convergence between the US
rebalance to the Asia-Pacific and India’s ‘Act East’ policy and stressed the importance of
promoting shared values, such as human rights and democracy. More importantly, it
put a strong emphasis on expanding maritime security and protecting the freedom of
navigation in the Indian Ocean and the Asia-Pacific, including in the South China Sea.
India’s willingness to openly mention the South China Sea issue in its consultations with
the US represents a new development that is in keeping with its ‘Act East’ policy. However,
India’s strengthened rhetoric on the security issues in the Asia-Pacific in general, and the
South China Sea in particular, does not imply that it considers getting directly involved in
that distant region, at least in the short to medium term. Joining the growing expression of
malaise with China’s maritime assertiveness is one thing, deploying naval assets in the
South China Sea to help the US and its regional allies restrain China’s activities is
another thing altogether. This nuance brings to light an underlying discrepancy
between the US and India’s strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific region (Singh, 2015;
Joshi, 2016). Indeed, while Washington and New Delhi share deep misgivings about
China’s expanding influence in the Indo-Pacific region, the focus of their respective
anxieties diverges, as the US is primarily committed to the strategic stability of the
Western Pacific in contrast to India, which is mostly concerned about the Northern
Indian Ocean.
However, to some extent, both countries have managed to overcome their diverging
interests, especially as the US calculates that, in the event of a an escalation of tensions
in the South China Sea, India could play a useful role West of Malacca by putting pressure
on Chinese assets in the Indian Ocean. As for India, it took a significant decision in April
2016, as it agreed ‘in principle’ to sign the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement
(LEMOA), thus bringing to an end a 12-year period of rejection of this proposal (Pandit,
2016). As per this agreement, the Indian and US militaries would be able to use each
other’s bases for repair and replenishment of supplies. While India has clarified that the
LEMOA would not work in the event of a US military action against ‘friendly countries,’
the adoption of this so-called foundational agreement has signaled its growing interest
in facilitating naval interoperability with the US Navy as well as its newfound sense of stra-
tegic proximity with the US, especially on maritime issues. Moreover, Washington and New
Delhi have also agreed to launch a new maritime dialog and to enhance their exchanges
on anti-submarine warfare, an initiative that could be seen as a response to the growing
presence of Chinese submarines in the Indian Ocean.

The ‘Act East’ policy and India’s renewed focus on the Indian Ocean: two
complementary initiatives
Among the many initiatives it took during the first two years of its tenure, the Modi gov-
ernment signaled a strong interest in maritime affairs. Significantly, the first visit of Prime
Minister Modi outside New Delhi was aboard the aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditiya, in June
2014. His government also cleared major projects to strengthen the Indian Navy’s
182 I. SAINT-MÉZARD

capabilities, with a strong emphasis on submarine forces, as well as on indigenization. In

October 2014, it confirmed a USD 11 billion plan to build six conventional submarines with
foreign inputs. Then, in its 2015 defence budget, it approved a USD 8 billion plan to build
six nuclear-powered attack submarines and seven new frigates. Finally, in a show of con-
fidence, India’s Eastern Naval Command conducted an International Fleet Review off Visa-
khapatnam in February 2016 (this was only the second such event conducted by India,
with the first one taking place in 2001, in Mumbai). According to Chief of Naval Staff
R. K. Dhowan, Visakhapatnam was selected as a host city because this was congruent
with the Act East policy (Bambha, 2015). About 50 countries participated in the event,
including most Southeast Asian nations, as well as the US, China, Japan and Australia.
Prime Minister Modi has also tried to chart out the future roadmap of India’s approach
to the Indian Ocean region. He did so on the occasion of his visits to Sri Lanka, Seychelles
and Mauritius in March 2015. His vision – encapsulated in the catchword SAGAR (Security
and Growth for All in the Region) – underscored the overall imperative of improving
cooperation among the Indian Ocean Rim countries, with a view to developing a ‘blue
economy’ based on ocean resources and to promoting dynamics of collective action in
the maritime security field. Admittedly, this is not the first time that India conveys its ambi-
tion to foster cooperation in the Indian Ocean. However, what makes this new initiative
interesting is that it reflects the Modi government’s resolve to propose a sound and cred-
ible alternative to China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative.
It also shows that India’s renewed maritime ambitions have primarily focused on the
Indian Ocean, with a view to asserting India’s prominence in this region. The theaters of
the Western Pacific in general and the South China Sea more particularly have remained
as areas of secondary interest. The Indian Maritime Security Strategy released in 2015 con-
firmed this approach. While taking due note of the Act East policy and its expanding
‘engagement and relations to its East, across the Indo-Pacific,’ the document underlined
that the focus of the Indian Navy remained primarily on the Indian Ocean (Indian Navy,
2015). More precisely, it underscored that India’s primary areas of interest were ‘the
Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal, Andaman Sea, and their littoral regions,’ as well as the
‘South-West Indian Ocean, including IOR (Indian Ocean Region) island nations therein
and East Coast of Africa littoral regions’ (Indian Navy, 2015). To give substance to its
stated ambitions, the Modi government has enhanced India’s assistance to the islands
states of the Indian Ocean, so as to improve their maritime security capabilities. This is
especially the case with respect to Seychelles and Mauritius, two countries that have
been wooed by China in recent years.2
India’s renewed ambitions have also taken concrete shape in the field of maritime
domain awareness. In November 2014, India inaugurated the Information Management
and Analysis Centre (IMAC) at Gurgaon (Sakhuja, 2014). The center, which is jointly
managed by the Navy and Coast guards, operates as a naval intelligence network to
track ships in real time and to assess threats at sea.3 IMAC is to be the backbone of a
larger scheme called the national maritime domain awareness (NMDA) project, the objec-
tive of which is to put India at the center of a nascent maritime domain awareness network
across the Indian Ocean. To this effect, India has started to reach out to the countries of the
Indian Ocean littoral, from the East African coast to Southeast Asia, with a view to convin-
cing them to join a data-sharing agreement on white shipping. In particular, New Delhi has
already forged a series of agreements with Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Mauritius and
 JOURNAL OF THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION 183

Seychelles to install Coastal Surveillance Radar Systems that are to provide IMAC with real-
time data on the central and Southwestern Indian Ocean.
While India has started to position itself as a security provider for the island-states of the
Indian Ocean, it has also remained focused on strengthening its posture in the Eastern part
of this ocean. In fact, when one tries to identify the common thread running through
India’s Act East policy, the Indo-US Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian
Ocean Region and India’s renewed oceanic ambitions, one finds that the Eastern Indian
Ocean emerges as a critical common denominator, lying at the intersection of all these
major policy orientations.

‘Acting East’ and raising India’s profile in the Bay of Bengal

India’s positioning in the Bay of Bengal has been driven by three different – yet comp-
lementary – dynamics. The first one has consisted in taking new steps to improve shipping
connectivity across the Bay of Bengal. The second one has been focused on strengthening
bilateral maritime security cooperation with the countries of the subregion. The third one
has been to get more involved in a network of maritime mini-laterals and multilateral part-
nerships across the Bay of Bengal.

Developing shipping connectivity across the Bay of Bengal

For about two decades, India has talked about developing connectivity and infrastructure
links across and around the Bay of Bengal. However, progress has been slow on this
matter. The modest achievements of BIMSTEC – a subregional organization launched in
1997 and bringing together India, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Bangladesh and Myanmar –
stand as a case in point. Inland, India has made some progress toward completing its
part of the trilateral highway that is to connect Moreh in Manipur to Mae Sot in Thailand
via Myanmar – yet again at a rather slow pace. Interestingly though, new steps have been
taken since 2014 to promote connectivity – including shipping connectivity – across the
subregion. During his visit to Malaysia in November 2015, Prime Minister Modi proposed
a USD 1 billion line of credit to develop connectivity between India and Asean (Sajjanhar,
2016). India and Asean have also started talks on a maritime transport agreement, with a
view to developing shipping connections between them. Indeed, their maritime links have
remained underdeveloped, with only few direct shipping lines operating between Indian
and Southeast Asian ports. As a result, cargo has to be shipped through feeder routes, thus
entailing higher costs and longer time for maritime transport in most of the Bay of Bengal.
At the bilateral level, India has pushed for the development of maritime links with
Myanmar. In an interesting development, the Shipping Corporation of India launched a
direct bi-weekly container shipping service to Myanmar in October 2014. Admittedly
this shipping line has been run on strategic grounds, more than on economic ones, as
its commercial viability has remained uncertain (Chitravanshi, 2014).4 Nevertheless, in
India’s vision, this shipping line is to supplement the Kaladan multi-modal project,
which aims at creating a transport connection between India’s eastern littoral and the
landlocked Northeast Region through Myanmar. More precisely, the project consists in
developing Myanmar’s Sittwe port as well as the Kaladan River up to Northern
Myanmar so as to reach Mizoram and other Northeastern States. India also reached an
184 I. SAINT-MÉZARD

agreement to launch coastal shipping with Bangladesh in June 2015. As with Myanmar,
the final objective is to use Bangladesh’s Chittagong port for trans-shipment to the North-
east. In the same perspective, India has expressed interest in contributing to the develop-
ment of the Payra deep-sea port in Patuakhali on Bangladesh’s southwestern coastline, not
far away from its littoral. Further east, it has also looked at initiating freighter services with
other Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand, Vietnam and Cambodia.
The Modi government has also acknowledged the poor state of India’s port infrastruc-
tures and has revived the Sagarmala project initiated by the government of Prime Minister
Vajpayee in 2003. The objective is to expand the capacity of existing ports as well as create
new ones, so that they can become drivers of economic development. Indeed, despite its
huge coastline of 7500 km, India’s port infrastructure has remained underdeveloped,
especially on the eastern coast (Wingnall & Wingnall, 2014). As part of the Sagarmala
project, India hosted the first Global Maritime Summit in April 2016, with a view to reviving
the national shipping and maritime industry. The event was organized in partnership with
South Korea, one of the world’s most experienced countries in the sector of shipbuilding.
Moreover, major conglomerates such as the Adani Group have committed to developing
ports in India, while looking to build new terminals in the Bay of Bengal countries, with a
middle-term strategy to boost shipping connections between Indian and Southeast Asian
ports (Satish, 2015).
In its ambition to develop connectivity across the Bay of Bengal, India has maintained
an ambiguous posture vis-à-vis China. On the one hand, it has finally agreed to make a try
at the BCIM (Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar) project, an inland subregional initiative
pushed by China, which is to link Kolkata and India’s Northeast to Yunnan, through Ban-
gladesh and Myanmar. On the other hand, New Delhi has remained suspicious of China’s
forays on the littoral of the Bay of Bengal. In point of fact, it has felt more comfortable at
the prospects of partnering with Japan than with China in developing connectivity in the
subregion. A good illustration of this can be seen in the fact that India has invited Japan to
invest in infrastructure development in two strategically sensitive regions, the Northeast
and the Andaman and Nicobar islands (Barry, 2016). In the same fashion, New Delhi has
been quite supportive of Prime Minister Abe’s ‘Bay of Bengal Industrial Growth-Belt
(BIG-B) Initiative,’ the objectives of which are to contribute to infrastructure development
in the Dhaka-Chittagong-Cox’s Bazar corridor and to help Bangladesh become a hub in the
Bay of Bengal. More to the point, India has been quite relieved to see Bangladesh cancel
China’s Sonadia port project in late 2015 and favor the Japanese one at Matarbari as part of
the BIG-B Initiative (Ramachandran, 2016).

Enhancing maritime security with the Bay of Bengal countries

As part of the Act East policy, the Modi government has increased its focus on the strategic
dimensions of India’s positioning in the Bay of Bengal. Singapore has been one of the first
countries to reap out the benefits of this new orientation. This should come as no surprise,
as the city–state has been one of India’s closest partners, be it at the economic level or at
the defence level. In November 2015, Prime Minister Modi and his counterpart, Prime Min-
ister Lee Hsien Loong, concluded a strategic partnership and signed a revised Defence
Cooperation Agreement (DCA). As part of the DCA, both parties agreed to have a
regular dialog at the Defence Ministers’ level and to enhance bilateral exercises
 JOURNAL OF THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION 185

between their armed forces. They also decided to strengthen maritime security
cooperation, with a special emphasis on maritime domain awareness (MinDef, Singa-
pore, 2015). Important steps had been taken earlier that year, with India accrediting
an International Liaison Officer to the Changi Regional HADR (Humanitarian Assistance
and Disaster Relief) Coordination Centre. Moreover, in July 2015, their respective
Navies signed a technical agreement on white shipping information sharing. This agree-
ment opened the way for the exchange of real-time information on the movement of
cargo ships between Singapore’s Information Fusion Centre and India’s Directorate of
Net Centric Operations. Both countries also agreed to explore further areas of
cooperation in the field of HADR.
The Modi government has also sought to increase maritime patrols and maritime
domain awareness with other Bay of Bengal countries. Admittedly, India’s naval inter-
actions with many of these countries had improved since the late 1990s. In particular,
the biennial MILAN exercises hosted by the Indian Navy in the Andaman & Nicobar
Islands since 1995 have greatly helped in building confidence among the Navies of
the Bay of Bengal. In the Andaman Sea more particularly, the Indian Navy has devel-
oped close links with the Indonesian Navy and the royal Thai Navy, two forces with
which it has conducted coordinated patrols twice a year since 2002 and 2005, respect-
ively. While it has been reported that coordinated patrols with Indonesia were losing
steam, maritime cooperation with Thailand has been further enhanced since Prayut
Chan-o-cha, the head of the military junta and serving Prime Minister visited India in
June 2016. On the occasion of this visit, the two countries decided to increase joint
military exercises and patrolling in the Indian Ocean, as well as to complete the nego-
tiations for the signing of the White Shipping Agreement (Ministry of External Affairs,
2016b).
The Modi government has also been keen on pushing cooperation with Malaysia, a
country with which maritime interactions have lagged behind. Malaysia has been inclined
to prevent foreign powers, including India, from increasing their security role in the Strait
of Malacca. In the same fashion, it has not shown much interest in conducting coordinated
patrols with the Indian Navy in the Andaman Sea and has participated in the Milan exer-
cises on an irregular basis (Suprianto, 2016). While taking into account the inbuilt limits to
its naval cooperation with Malaysia, India has nevertheless tried to build on the experience
of their joint search operations for the missing Malaysia Airline MH370 airliner in the Bay of
Bengal in March 2014.5 In November 2015, Prime Minister Modi and his counterpart, Prime
Minister Abdul Razak, launched annual talks between the Indian Coast Guards and the
Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency as well as established a mechanism for
sharing of information, including for HADR and white shipping (Press Information
Bureau, Government of India, 2015b).
India has also stepped up its engagement with Myanmar, especially since this country
embarked on a path of political reforms in 2011. More specifically, it has sought to expand
military ties beyond the sole land border issues. This has allowed for new developments in
the maritime area. In March 2013, two ships from the Myanmar Navy called at an Indian
port, Vishakhapatnam, for the first time in the history of their bilateral relations. Following
the port call, the two Navies conducted their first bilateral exercise and made coordinated
patrol along their maritime boundary. Until then, naval interactions between India and
Myanmar had only developed in the multilateral framework of the MILAN exercises.
186 I. SAINT-MÉZARD

Three other joint patrols followed over the next two years. The two countries gave another
sign of their shared maritime interests in February 2016, when they signed an agreement
on Standard Operating procedures to facilitate the conduct of joint patrols. Myanmar has
been only the third country after Thailand and Indonesia, with which India has signed such
a formal agreement (Press Information Bureau, Government of India, 2016).
Finally, another area in which India may start developing a niche is that of weapons
transfers. The Modi government has shown a specific interest in boosting India’s
defence exports to support its Make-in-India Initiative. It has engaged discussions with
various Southeast Asian countries with a view to collaborating in defence procurement,
including through funding and technology transfers. In fact, New Delhi has already
started supplying a number of Southeast Asian militaries. This is especially the case with
Myanmar. In 2013, Indian state-owned firm Bharat Electronics Limited concluded a USD
29 million contract with Myanmar for the transfer of three sonar systems. Designated as
Hull Mounted Sonars–Export (HMS-X), the sonars were to be installed on the Myanmar
Navy’s Aung Zeya-class guided-missile frigates (Press Information Bureau, Government
of India, 2015c). Moreover, on the first meeting of the India–Myanmar Joint Consultative
Commission in July 2015, New Delhi confirmed its ‘commitment to cooperate with
Myanmar in building a professional and capable Myanmar Navy to safeguard and
ensure its maritime security’ (Ministry of External Affairs, 2015b). Beyond the Bay of
Bengal, India has cultivated close defence links with Vietnam. It is to provide Vietnam
with naval vessels through a USD 100 million line of credit. It has also engaged discussions
on the transfer of the BrahMos – a supersonic cruise missile developed with Russia – as
well as HMS-X2 sonars. Incidentally, the BrahMos, the HMS-X sonars as well as India’s off-
shore patrol boats have raised the interests of various Southeast Asian countries. If pushed
in a consistent way, weapons’ transfers may give India additional leverage to expand its
influence in the Bay of Bengal and beyond, in the South China Sea.

India’s multilateral engagements in the Bay of Bengal

As part of the ‘Act East’ policy, India has shown a newfound interest in intensifying multi-
lateral cooperation with regional and extra-regional powers in the Bay of Bengal. One of its
most significant decisions in this regard has been to host a multinational field training
exercise – ‘Force 18’ – under the framework of the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting
(ADMM) Plus forum, thus involving the 10 nations of Asean as well as their height
dialog partners (Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand, Russia South Korea, US). This multi-
national exercise – one of the largest ever hosted by India – took place at the headquarters
of the southern command of the Indian Army in Pune from 2 to 8 March 2016 and focused
on humanitarian mine action and peacekeeping operations. It can be interpreted as a clear
signal of India’s interest in raising its profile in the regional security dynamics (Mishra,
2016).
India has also decided to resume the trilateral naval exercises with the US and Japan off
its Eastern coast. The drills, which were conducted in the Bay of Bengal in October 2015,
were only the second ones to take place on India’s Eastern coast, after the inaugural 2007
edition. Indeed, when conducting these exercises, India preferred to hold them away from
its waters, in the Western Pacific. Moreover, New Delhi went as far as inviting Japan to par-
ticipate in the annual Malabar naval exercises as a permanent member. Heretofore, the
 JOURNAL OF THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION 187

Manmohan Singh government had agreed to open the Indo-US Malabar exercises on an
on-off basis, and despite Tokyo’s and Washington’s pressures, it had more often than not
proved reluctant to institutionalize the trilateral format. The main reason was to be found
in its fear of further irritating Beijing. Indeed, over the past decade, China has constantly
expressed its disapproval of a strengthened trilateral cooperation between Japan, the
US and India.
However, the Modi government has discarded India’s previous inhibition with China
and shown a proclivity to explore mini-lateral formats. Another indication of this evolution
could be seen in New Delhi finally agreeing to raise its dialog with the US and Japan to the
ministerial level. The dialog, which was initiated in December 2011 on a biannual basis,
was until then conducted at the level of joint secretary. Not surprisingly, the trilateral min-
isterial dialog hosted by the US Secretary of State John Kerry in New York in September
2015 stressed upon the freedom of navigation and overflight in the Indo-Pacific, including
in the South China Sea, which could be seen as a clear signal to China. The three countries
also decided to have an experts-level group on HADR. They launched another expert-level
group to promote regional connectivity, ‘including between South and Southeast Asia,’
which was in line with India’s own efforts as part of its Act East policy (US Department
of State, 2015).
In the same perspective, the Modi government agreed to hold a trilateral India–Japan–
Australia security dialog in June 2015 and February 2016. This new development was
made possible after Prime Minister Modi took it upon himself to boost the Indo-Australian
relationship in the defence and security arena. Indeed, while India and Australia had clearly
identified common interests in Indian Ocean security and joined their efforts in reviving
the Indian Ocean Rim Association, their bilateral relations had remained stalled. It took
Prime Minister Abbott’s visit to India in June 2014 and that of Prime Minister Modi to Aus-
tralia in November 2014 to bring the bilateral relations to a new level. In particular, Prime
Minister Modi’s state visit to Australia led to the conclusion of a Framework for Security
Cooperation planning – among many other things – for an annual summit meeting at
the Prime minister level, as well as regular Defence Ministers’ exchanges and naval
drills. As a follow-up to this agreement, India and Australia conducted their first bilateral
naval exercise off Visakhapatnam in September 2015. The following month, in October,
the two countries signed a technical agreement for an information-sharing mechanism
on white shipping, thus adding a new building block to a maritime domain awareness
and search and rescue architecture in the region.
Clearly, the Modi government has shown a greater willingness than his predecessor to
experiment with mini-laterals with the US and its allies in the region, just as Washington
had been suggesting for a long time. India has nevertheless refrained from reactivating the
Quadrilateral initiative, thus declining the US suggestion that Australia be invited to the
October 2015 Malabar exercise with Japan. Whether the Quad can re-emerge or not
remains to be seen. In the meanwhile, India has also started to get involved in major
US-led multilateral exercises in the region. It was an observer at the multilateral Cobra
Gold exercises in Thailand for the first time in 2015, before reiterating its participation
in 2016. Hosted by Thailand, along with its US ally on an annual basis, the Cobra Gold exer-
cises are one of the largest military drills in Southeast Asia. Further east, in the Western
Pacific, India also agreed to join the Rim-of-the-Pacific (RIMPAC) multilateral naval exercise
in 2016.
188 I. SAINT-MÉZARD

Conclusion
India’s ‘Act East’ policy demonstrates its growing involvement in the Bay of Bengal,
especially in the field of maritime affairs. Admittedly, when it initiated the ‘Act East’
policy in mid-2014, India had already developed substantial naval cooperation across
the subregion and the ‘Act East’ policy has built on this sound footing. However, an inter-
esting dimension of the ‘Act East’ policy may lie in that fact that it has openly acknowl-
edged India’s security responsibilities. In the same fashion, in its Maritime Security
Strategy, the Indian Navy stated that its objective was to ‘shape a favorable and positive
maritime environment, for enhancing net security in India’s areas of maritime interest.’
More generally, India’s recent advances in maritime domain awareness, its interests in
enhancing joint patrols and HADR cooperation, as well as its efforts to contribute to the
maritime security of its neighbors including through weapon transfers, all these different
initiatives reflect a nascent positioning as a net security provider, or at least an attempt to
progress along that line.
However, there is no denying the fact that India’s ‘Act East’ policy and its positioning in
the Bay of Bengal have also been driven by China’s growing influence in that same area.
Interestingly, while India has a real interest in developing connectivity across the Bay of
Bengal, it has so far abstained from joining the China-led Maritime Silk Road Initiative,
the objective of which is precisely to develop lines of communication across Southeast
Asia and the Indian Ocean. On that matter, India has looked to Japan, a country that
also has misgivings about China’s mega-project. Similar to India’s renewed interest in
exploring mini-laterals with the US and its Asian allies, Japan’s and Australia’s involvement
in the region can be interpreted as a reply to China’s growing presence in the Indian
Ocean. In this respect, responding to China’s multidimensional expansion in the Indian
Ocean in general, and in the Bay of Bengal in particular, stands as the single most impor-
tant challenge faced by India’s ‘Act East’ policy.

Notes
1. India fully abode by the July 2014 verdict of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, even though
it tilted in Bangladesh’s favour.
2. India recently gave a Dornier surveillance aircraft to Seychelles and delivered an Indian-made
offshore patrol vessel to Mauritius.
3. The IMAC project was actually launched in 2012 by the Manmohan Singh government. It can
be seen as a direct consequence of the November 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks. Following
these attacks, the Singh government took a number of policy initiatives between 2009 and
2012 to strengthen India’s maritime surveillance capabilities.
4. The service line departs every fortnight from Chennai and travels to Krishnapatnam, Yangon
and Colombo before returning to Chennai.
5. On this occasion, India deployed six ships and seven aircrafts, including at Subang airbase in
Malaysia, to help in the search campaign across the Bay of Bengal.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
 JOURNAL OF THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION 189

Notes on contributor
Isabelle Saint-Mézard is a Senior Lecturer at the French Institute of Geopolitics of Paris 8 University,
and an Associate Research Fellow with the Ifri (Institut français des relations Internationales) Center
for Asian Studies. Her research focuses on the geopolitics of South Asia with a particular focus on
strategic and security issues in India.

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