Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Source: Harvard Law Review , Jun., 1994, Vol. 107, No. 8 (Jun., 1994), pp. 1977-1994
Published by: The Harvard Law Review Association
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* A revised version of this Note is currently under consideration in the 1994 Nathan Burkan
Memorial Competition, which is sponsored by the American Society of Composers and Publishers
(ASCAP).
1 BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT I (I967).
2 See also Leo J. Raskind, The Continuing Process of Refining and Adapting Copyri
Principles, I4 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS I25, 128 (I990) ("A cursory review of the crit
literature discloses a repetitive theme of dissatisfaction with the case law extension of traditi
copyright principles to new works."); cf. LYNN SPIGEL, MAKE ROOM FOR TV: TELEVISION AN
THE FAMILY IDEAL IN POSTWAR AMERICA I82 (I992) (describing America's profound amb
lence about technological change).
3 See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Modifying Copyrighted Software: Adjusting Copyright Doc-
trine to Accommodate a Technology, 28 JURIMETRICS J. I79, I88-92 (I988); see also Jason S.
Berman, The Music Industry and Technological Development: Are We Winning the War?, in
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORG., WIPO WORLDWIDE SYMPOSIUM ON THE IMPACT OF
DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY ON COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS 93, 94-95 (I993) [hereinafter
WIPO DIGITAL SYMPOSIUM] (indicating that these commentators often speak in terms of im-
pending disaster).
4 See I33 CONG. REC. SIO275 (daily ed. July 2I, I987) (statement of Sen. Lloyd Bentsen).
5 Alan J. Hartnick, Aidfor Copyright Lawyers in International Transactions, N.Y.L.J., Dec.
7, I990, at 5 (quoting RICHARD WINCOR, COPYRIGHTS IN THE WORLD MARKETPLACE (1990)).
I977
6 Digital technology is "the basic computer code that records all information . . . in a series
of zeroes and ones." Copyright World Duels With Digital Dilemma, CHI. TRIB., Apr. I, I993,
? 3, at 3.
7 This Note focuses on the entertainment products that can be characterized as visual art
and specifically those that will most likely be affected by digital technology. Other entertainment
media, such as music, literature, and dance, are profoundly affected by digital technology; an
extended discussion, however, is beyond the scope of this Note. For a taste of some of the
other areas in which digital technology has an impact, see Randy S. Kravis, Comment, Does a
Song by Any Other Name Still Sound as Sweet?: Digital Sampling and its Copyright Implica-
tions, 43 AM. U. L. REv. 23I, passim (I993); David Nicholson, The Brave New World of
Electronic Publishing, WASH. POST, Aug. 8, I993 (Book World) at 8, 9; James Warren, In
Transition: Technology, Shift to Part-Time Employees Threaten TV-Radio Union, CHI. TRIB.,
July 25, I993, ? 5, at 2.
8 See Anne W. Branscomb, Who Owns Creativity?: Property Rights in the Information Age,
TECH. REv., May/June I988, at 38, 40.
9 See Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and Com-
puter-Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, io6 HARV. L. REV. 977, I049-5I
('993).
10 See Visual Artists Rights Act of I990, Pub. L. No. IOI-650, I04 Stat. 5I28, 5I28-33
(codified in scattered sections of I7 U.S.C.).
11 See John Burgess, Internet Creates a Computer Culture of Remote Intimacy, WASH. POST,
June 28, 1993, at Ai, A8.
12 See, e.g., id. at Ai ("[I]ncreasingly the [Internet] network is shuttling video footage, pho
government studies, novels, dissertations, music, sounds - information of all kinds in . . .
digital form ...."); Bernard Sharratt, Please Touch the Paintings, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV.,
Mar. 6, 1994, at 3, i8 (describing an art collection on CD-ROM). For an extreme example of
the view that digital technology is ideal for increasing accessibility to copyrighted works, see
David H. Rothman, The World at Your Fingertips, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 1993 (Educ. Rev.),
at 5, proposing that, in order to facilitate a network containing full-text books, "[a]ll material
longer than io,ooo words, and intended for publication, would have to be in digital form before
the government would grant copyrights."
13 See House Passes High Technology Information Bill, J. PROPRIETARY RTS., Sept. 1993,
at 26.
who can now make quality products with affordable digital equip-
ment. The decentralization of creators, users, and distributors makes
the prospect of informal arrangements between those parties formid-
able, and practitioners worry that present contract and licensing sys-
tems cannot accommodate these more fluid relationships.
24 See Russell J. DaSilva, Droit Moral and the Amoral Copyright: A Comparison of Artists'
Rights in France and the United States, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y I, 11-14 (I980); see also
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright (I), 45 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 5o6-
07 (1945) ("[I]ntellectual property is, after all, the only absolute possession in the world ....
The man who brings out of nothingness some child of his thought has rights therein which
cannot belong to any other sort of property." (quoting Thorvald Solberg, Copyright Reform, 14
NOTRE DAME LAW. 343, 358 (1939) (quoting Harvard geologist Nathanial S. Shaler (I878)))).
There are four main types of moral rights: the droit de divulgation, which allows the author
to decide whether and when to publish his work; the droit de retrait ou de repentir, which
gives the author the right to withdraw his work from publication or modify his published work;
the droit d la paternite (paternity or attribution right), which gives the author the right to be
credited with his work; and the droit au respect de l'oeuvre (integrity right), which prevents
third persons from altering, mutilating, or destroying the author's work and even gives artists
in France the right to prevent excessive criticism of their works. See DaSilva, supra, at 3-4,
17-37. This Note uses the French system as a model because "France is considered to be in
the vanguard of protection of the artist's rights of personality." Id. at 2. However, because the
Berne Convention mandates only the paternity right and the integrity right, see infra note 50,
the remainder of this Note focuses on those two sticks in the bundle of moral rights.
Although some of the continental moral rights jurisprudence does not seem to regard artists'
rights as coinciding with the interests of the public, see, e.g., Martin A. Roeder, The Doctrine
of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors and Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554,
557 (I940), moral rights do have a public-interest element, see id. at 577. In addition to
stimulating creative work, moral rights preserve a society's cultural heritage by protecting
creators against the mutilation or destruction of their works. The public interest element of the
moral rights regime, however, is different in emphasis from that of the Anglo-American system,
which is discussed at pp. I982-84 below.
25 See, e.g., DaSilva, supra note 24, at ii.
Although it is tempting to think of moral rights as "moral" in the philosophical sense, and
although some aspects of the moral right are explained in terms of a natural right to one's
creations, the manifestations of the moral right do not necessarily derive from a Lockean or
other natural-law property notion of intellectual property, such as the one developed by Professor
Wendy Gordon. See Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and
Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1540-83 (I993).
26 See DaSilva, supra note 24, at I6-17.
27 See Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d I4, 24 (2d Cir. I976) ("[T]he
economic incentive for artistic and intellectual creation that serves as the foundation for Amer-
ican copyright law . . . cannot be reconciled with the inability of artists to obtain relief for
mutilation or misrepresentation of their work to the public on which the artists are financially
dependent." (citations omitted)).
28 See, e.g., DaSilva, supra note 24, at I2 (describing one commentator's characterization of
the artist protected by moral rights as "profoundly romantic . . . , perhaps conjuring up visions
of poets in garrets, burning their lyric masterpieces for heat in the icy Parisian winter"); cf.
Roeder, supra note 24, at 557 ("When an artist creates, . . . he projects into the world part of
his personality and subjects it to the ravages of public use.").
29 The bias against corporate authors is reflected in the fact that most European countries
do not have a "work for hire" doctrine - in other words, they do not give corporations the
copyrights in their employees' creations. See Anne Moebes, Negotiating International Copyright
Protection: The United States and European Community Positions, I4 LoY. L.A. INT'L &
COMP. L.J. 301, 320 (1992). Similarly, although the Berne Convention "seems neutral on the
possibility of nonhuman authorship," historically the civil law countries have not recognized
nonhuman authors. Miller, supra note 9, at IO50.
30 U.S. CONST. art. I, ? 8, cl. 8.
31 See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 20I, 2I9 (I954). But see Chafee, supra note 24, at
5o6-07 (arguing that the primary purpose of copyright is to benefit the author).
artistic worth, political beliefs, moral concepts or what is it to be?"), aff'd, 87 N.Y.S.2d 430
(App. Div. I949).
Indeed, not until California's I979 Art Preservation Act, CAL. CIV. CODE ? 987 (West i982),
did a state confer moral rights on artists by statute. See DaSilva, supra note 24, at 2.
42 See I7 U.S.C. ? Io6 (I988).
43 See id. ?? I07-II2.
44 Whether the paradigmatic artist needs the economic incentive of the copyright to create
is certainly open to debate. Cf. Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of
Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 28i, 282 (I970)
("Authors in ancient times, as well as monks and scholars in the middle ages, wrote and were
paid for their writings without copyright protection.").
45 See Miller, supra note 9, at I053 n.358 (discussing novelist John Hersey's stance during
the CONTU hearings, during which Hersey opposed copyright protection for computer pro-
grams).
46 See, e.g., id. at I059-66. For a work to be copyrightable, it must be an "original
work[ ] of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression." I7 U.S.C. ? I02 (i988).
Originality for purposes of copyright means little more than originating with the author; thus,
copyright does not contain an artistic-merit test, and "Congress has been hostile to content-
based restrictions on copyrightability." Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater,
604 F.2d 852, 855 (5th Cir. I979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 9I7 (I980). Instead, any tangible form
of expression that originates with an author will be protected. See I PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPY-
RIGHT ? 2.2, at 62-73 (i989). However, a relatively recent case, in which the Supreme Court
held that assembling the white pages of a phone book "does not possess the minimal creative
spark required by the Copyright Act and the Constitution," Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Tel. Serv. Co., iII S. Ct. I282, I296-97 (1991), casts doubt on whether the originality threshold
is as low as was previously assumed.
47 See Miller, supra note 9, at 1042-72.
48 As early as 1945, and perhaps earlier, "[a]gitation to revise our copyright law so as to
make the United States eligible for membership" was already "constant and powerful." Roeder,
supra note 24, at 557.
49 See Berne Convention Implementation Act of i988, Pub. L. No. Ioo-568, ? 2, I02 Stat.
2853 (Oct. 3I, i988). For the legislative history of the United States's decision to join the Berne
Convention, see H.R. Rep. No. 609, iooth Cong., 2d Sess. (i988); S. Rep. No. 352, iooth
Cong., 2d Sess. (i988), reprinted in i988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3706.
50 The Berne Convention provides that:
Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of said rights,
the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any
distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to,
the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honour or reputation.
Berne Convention art. 6 bis, reprinted in 4 DAVID NIMMER & MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT 27-6 app. (I993).
51 See H.R. Rep. No. 609, iooth Cong., 2d Sess. (i988); S. Rep. No. 352, iooth Cong., 2d
Sess. (i988), reprinted in i988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3706.
52 See Final Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Conven-
tion, IO CoLuM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 5I3, 547-57 (I986).
53 VARA ? 602, I7 U.S.C. ? IOI (SUPP. IV I992).
54 See I7 U.S.C. ? Io6A(c)(3) (Supp. IV I992).
55 See VARA ? 602, I7 U.S.C. ? IOI (SUPP. IV I992).
56 H.R. Rep. No. 5I4, IOIst Cong., 2d Sess. I4 (I990), reprinted in I990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
69I5, 6924.
57 See I7 U.S.C. ? io6A(a).
58 See id. ? io6A(e).
visual art work to another party who then exercises his derivative-
work right in a way that the artist feels violates his integrity right.59
In such a situation, it is likely that the owner of the copyright will
prevail; as Professors L. Ray Patterson and Stanley Lindberg note,
"property is a favored child of the common law, personal rights a
stepchild. When there is a conflict between the two, the property
rights almost invariably prevail."60 Thus, even formal moral rights
protection has built-in limitations in the United States, although
VARA does purport to protect the rights of visual artists as required
by the Berne Convention.
VARA gives the visual artist two types of integrity rights. First,
the artist has the right
Because the most common art forms that use digital technology
are not covered by VARA, moral rights cannot affirmatively encourage
artists to create digital works.75 Most digital works will not meet the
definition of visual art in VARA because they will not be signed
limited editions. As indicated above, works made for hire and the
most common mass-marketed art forms, such as films, are expressly
excluded from VARA's definition of visual art. More important than
active encouragement, however, is the question whether the moral
rights that are available to visual artists, in combination with the rest
of the Copyright Act, will impede full legitimate exploitation of digital
technology. This inquiry is a critical one because in many ways digital
technology itself promises to fulfill the goals of access and dissemi-
nation.
Although many predicted that incorporating moral rights into the
American system would disrupt the balance between encouraging cre-
ativity and ensuring access to new creations, digital technology itself
makes it desirable to adjust that balance. Certain moral rights do,
however, have the potential to impede the access and development
that is the constitutionally mandated purpose of copyright. For ex-
ample, international commentators recognize that the author's moral
right to withdraw his work, which is not mandated by the Berne
Convention, may need to be restricted in a digital age.76
The VARA rights available to traditional artists may impede the
development of digital art work. Because VARA is limited to certain
types of entertainment products, it creates "artificial distinctions" be-
tween traditional and nontraditional works that may not be "opera-
tional in facing the growing diversity of technological possibilities."77
Digitally based works will most likely suffer under such a system.
Whereas the copyright system has a low originality threshold, VARA
is applicable only if an artist's reputation or honor is harmed, which
generally requires some mutilation of a "work of recognized stature."78
75 For example, multimedia works are unlikely to be affected by VARA, except perhaps in
the area of overseas distribution. See William A. Tanenbaum & William K. Wells, Jr., Mul-
timedia Works Require Broad Protection, NAT'L L.J., Nov. I, I993, at Sii, SI2.
76 See, e.g., Ashok Bhojwani, Digital Recording Technologies and Intellectual Property:
Promises and Pitfalls for Development, in WIPO DIGITAL SYMPOSIUM, supra note 3, at 79, 85.
77 Andre Lange, The Impact of Digital Technologies on the Author's Right and Neighboring
Rights, in WIPO DIGITAL SYMPOSIUM, supra note 3, at 227, 234.
78 I7 U.S.C. ? io6A(a)(3)(B) (Supp. IV I992). This is not, however, intended to be a hard
and fast rule. Although the two concepts are related, "honor or reputation" is distinguished
from "works of recognized stature" in the legislative history of VARA. See H. Rep. No. 5i4,
IoIst Cong., 2d Sess. I5, reprinted in I990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 69I5, 6925-26.
79 A more fundamental problem is identifying who should get the moral right in a d
work. Copyright has not viewed a publisher or end user as an author, although with digital
technology each performs many creative functions. See Jon A. Baumgarten, Digital Use of
Scientific and Technical Information, in WIPO DIGITAL SYMPOSIUM, supra note 3, at 63, 64.
Fearing that the integrity right would impair the full exploitation of digital technology by
preventing alteration and limiting the use of preexisting works as building blocks for other
works, broadcasters and others are vehemently opposed to moral rights. See Cathy Seidner &
Kimon P. Timon, Preserving Intangible Rights in Films Shown on Television, N.Y.L.J., May
25, I990, at 5. However, VARA exempts such uses.
80 See Jennifer Clark, Italo Court: TV Ad Breaks Violate Moral Rights of Pic's Helmer,
VARIETY, Oct. I8-24, I989, at 6, 6.
81 Id. (quoting the court).
42 Id.
33 See supra pp. I979-80. One British lawyer warns that "emerging multimedia technology
which allows seamless and virtually indetectable copying - 'makes a nonsense of moral
rights."' Victoria Slind-Flor, International Bar Group Meets but Finding a Consensus Proves
Elusive, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 20, I993, at I2 (quoting Jack Black of London's Radliffe's & Co.).
90 See id.
91 See, e.g., Report of the Register of Copyrights, United States Copyright Office, Washing-
ton, D.C. (Mar. i989), reprinted in Report, Technological Alterations to Motion Pictures and
Other Audiovisual Works: Implications for Creators, Copyright Owners, and Consumers, Io Loy.
ENT. L.J. I, IO3 (I99O) [hereinafter Register's Report on Technological Alteration]; see also
Seidner & Timon, supra note 79, at 6 ("The only time I lose my integrity as a filmmaker . . .
is when my films go on TV ...." (quoting Steven Spielberg)). Today, the basic agreement of
the Directors Guild of America requires that the director be notified and consulted about such
editing, but that the director does not get the "final cut.' Certain recent bills reflect the directors'
concerns. See, e.g., I39 CONG. REc. S835I, S8353-54 (daily ed. June 30, I993) (statement of
Sen. Simpson) (introducing the Film Disclosure Act of I993, S. ii8i, Io3d Cong., Ist Sess.,
which would amend Lanham Act ? 43(a) to require that materially altered films include labels
disclosing the nature of the alteration and any objections on the part of the artistic authors).
92 See H. Rep. No. 514, ioist Cong., 2d Sess. I7 (I990), reprinted in I990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6915, 6927.
93 Significantly, however, the implications of digital technology are not explicitly addressed
in the legislative history of VARA.
94 H. Rep. No. 5P4, ioist Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprinted in I9gO U.S.C.C.A.N. 69I5, 6924.
95 But such activities might violate the derivative work right or the distribution right. See
17 U.S.C. ? io6 (I988 & Supp. IV 1992).
96 See Moebes, supra note 29, at 320.
97 Cf. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., II4 S. Ct. II64, II13 (I994) (stating that a rap
song's parody "reasonably could be perceived as commenting on the original or criticizing it, to
some degree").
98 See, e.g., H. Rep. No. 5'4, ioist Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (I990), reprinted in I990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 69I5, 69I6.
Digital technology does, however, make it exceedingly difficult to police the unauthorized
use of a copyrighted work. See Lange, supra note 77, at 230-31. Because end users can alter
digitized works almost effortlessly, the transaction costs would be prohibitive for an artist who
wanted to approve or disapprove even the most trivial "transformative" use of his art work.
Cf. Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1105, I'll (1990)
(proposing that fair use turn on whether a given use is "transformative," defined as a use that
is "productive" and employs the original work "in a different manner and for a different purpose
from the original").
99 Indeed, Professors Patterson and Lindberg argue that:
The vice of the copyright monopoly unlimited by the moral-rights doctrine (and barely
limited by the fair-use doctrine) is that copyright ceases to be merely a monopoly for
protection against competitors; it becomes a monopoly also against both authors and
users. Thus, authors are severely restricted, not only in the right to protect their own
products but also in the use they may make of the works of other authors to create new
works . . . . And the monopoly against users inevitably inhibits the fulfillment of the
constitutional purpose of copyright, the promotion of learning.
PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 6o, at 172.
100 See supra p. I983.
101 Kwall, supra note 40, at i8; see also Roeder, supra note 24, at 575 ("The application of
so many different doctrines to a subject matter which is intrinsically homogeneous produces
confusion; choice of theory becomes dependent on a fortuitous combination of factors, rather
than on the basic needs of the problem." (footnote omitted)).
102 See The Visual Artists Rights Act of I989, Hearings on H.R. 2690 Before the Subcomm.
on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, ioist Cong., Ist Sess. 37 (I989) (statement of Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights).
Former Congressman Robert Kastenmeier notes that
popular culture and information have become export commodities of immense economic
value. That value is badly eroded by low international copyright standards. Berne
standards, by contrast, are appropriately high and are widely accepted by the interna-
tional copyright community. By lending our prestige and power to those standards, we
have improved domestic copyright law and bolstered our own credibility in the interna-
tional legal system.
Robert W. Kastenmeier, The I989 Horace S. Manges Lecture - Copyright in an Era of
Technological Change: A Political Perspective, I4 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS I, 12 (I989).
V. CONCLUSION
Recognition of moral rights in the United States imposes little additional cost when entertainment
products are vulnerable to attack on moral rights grounds in other countries that are major
markets for these products. See Tanenbaum & Wells, supra note 75, at S12.
103 Membership in Berne required the United States to eliminate or modify many of the
formal requirements for a valid copyright -- notice, deposit, and registration - that had
characterized the i909 Copyright Act. See Jane C. Ginsburg & John M. Kernochan, One
Hundred and Two Years Later: The U.S. Joins the Berne Convention, i3 CoLuM.-VLA J.L. &
ARTS 1, 12-I6 (I988).
104 Cf. David Streitfeld, Copyright Controversy: Artists, Library at Odds Over Registra
WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 1993, at C2 ("[M]any important unpublished works have come to t
[L]ibrary [of Congress] under copyright deposit, including a first edition of a Dvorak opera
choreography by Agnes de Mille." (referring to the testimony of Librarian of Congress
Billington before the House Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks, Mar. 4, 1
105 Any attempt to characterize such rights in terms of the public interest, though pro
the easiest way to assimilate them into the American system, will have its own problems: m
rights justified in terms of the public interest would be limited by the Takings Clause, wit
public interest in art preservation weighed against the burden on the individual who seeks
use his property in a way contrary to that interest. See Craig A. Wagner, Note, Motion Pic
Colorization, Authenticity, and the Elusive Moral Right, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 628, 722-24
106 17 U.S.C. ? io6A(3)(B) (Supp. IV 1992).
107 Indeed, this goal is reflected in the legislative history of VARA. See H. Rep. No.
IOIst Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (I99O), reprinted in I99O U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 69I6 (statement of R
Edward J. Markey).