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LOST GLORY
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 4/6/2018, SPi
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 4/6/2018, SPi
Lost Glory
India’s Capitalism Story
SUMIT K. MAJUMDAR
University of Texas at Dallas
1
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3
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Preface
viii Preface
economy. She is a paradox of entrepreneurial dynamism versus low-level
economic attainments. She is the trope of poverty among plenty. Her collection
of dynamic capitalists responds with alacrity to incentives. They have invested
substantial sums in her over the last generation.¹ She has the world’s largest
pool of energetic humanity supporting capitalism. Her economy generates an
income very large in absolute size. She has world scale. But she is not world
class. Her extremely low per-person income rank is obdurately stagnant. Why?
This enigma about India remains persistent.
In the last three decades, world order has been changing. For India, trend
reversal is underway. India is catching up, albeit glacially. India’s growth has
been a reason for such relative standing change. Growth is fundamental.
Continuously higher economic growth steadily leads to high world rankings.
Shared high growth outcomes enhance financial well-being and human exist-
ence quality. Where does sustainable growth come from? Growth is the
outcome of the dynamics of capitalism, principally predicated on an industri-
alization process driven by entrepreneurial urges.² Capitalism is how capital is
organized, managed, and utilized. Capital and its proper utilization lead to
growth. The capitalist process is driven by productive efficiency,³ the pivot
around which growth revolves. The nature of capitalism directly impacts
growth and life quality. Every society experiments with different capitalism
models. Understanding growth requires appreciating the unique industrial
capitalism story for an economy.
Capitalism is key. In this story of India’s economy, I narrate the outcomes of
India’s postindependence capitalism experiments. I focus on efficiency, and its
materiality, as a performance enhancer. Using the late Harvey Leibenstein’s
definition of efficiency,⁴ as attaining actually feasible performance levels,
I evaluate India’s efficiency patterns to consider whether these have been
consistent with her possibly regaining world economic standing, and recoup-
ing her image as a Temple of Mahalakshmi; and if productive efficiency has
mattered for India’s growth. These issues are crucial. I focus first on overall
productive efficiency outcomes for an almost seventy-year period, as the key
results from India’s capitalism experiments.
Organization plays a key role in capitalism and industrialization phe-
nomena. Organizational forms represent capitalism’s administrative structur-
ing modes. Organizational form variations impact productive efficiency.
I thereafter analyze organizational form and efficiency relationships, for a
period of over four decades, to deconstruct organizational dimension outcomes
from India’s capitalism experiments. These analyses, of India’s organizational
contingencies, are unique. However, I leave out discussions on many topics,
such as administered pricing, agriculture, demography, fiscal policy, gender
Preface ix
equality, income distribution, information technology, labor markets, outsour-
cing, natural resources, and services. All these factors, directly and indirectly,
impact the nature of offerings made to and the benefactions emanating from
the Temple of Mahalakshmi.
I use the crores (10 million) measure in dealing with numerical quantities.
The word Government, in capitals, signifies the political agency for India’s
governance, rather than the political concept. The word State, in capitals and
not italics, refers to the abstract intellectual political concept; the word State, in
capitals and italics, refers to the administrative agency for India’s policy making
and governance. I have also used old city names, such as Bombay, if relevant.
I gratefully acknowledge much help in producing this book, and privileged
associations with several knowledgeable persons. I have benefited from nu-
merous India-related conversations with V. Balachandran, R. B. Barman,
D. M. Blake, S. Gupta, R. Jha, J. G. Kanga, V. L. Kelkar, A. Lahiri, S. Mullick,
G. Owen, S. Ramamoorthi, D. Sakhuja, I. Sanyal, K. Sen, and A. Shinde. Drs.
A. K. Bagchi, R. Deb, V. Jacob, M. J. Leaf, P. Lewin, A. K. Nag, and D. N. Prasad,
as well as P. Baijal, A. Banerji, L. Mansingh, K. V. Seshadri, A. Sonde, and
K. Venugopal were insightful manuscript commentators. At Maruti Suzuki
India Limited, I met numerous managers who were generously forthcoming
about their company’s operations, and special recognitions are due to
R. C. Bhargava, S. Ramani, and P. K. Roy for their many acts of kindness.
I recognize anonymous referees for their important comments. Many com-
mendations are due to my editors at Oxford University Press, Ms. C. Kennedy,
and D. Musson and A. Swallow, for their cheerful forbearance and project
support. Our administrative specialists, Mrs. Aylin Calisir and Mrs. Marjorie
Wu, deserve singular approbation for their innumerable best quality support
acts over many years. To all, many grateful thanks!
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Contents
1. Prologue 1
India’s World Position 1
Change 2
Recovery in India’s Position 5
The Growth and Importance of Capital 9
India’s Capitalism Experiments 15
Book Structure 18
2. Capital and Capitalism 21
Introduction 21
Capital 21
Organizing Contemporary Capitalism 26
State Role 29
National Industrial Development 36
Industrial Strategy 39
Industrial Strategy in India 42
3. History and Background 45
Historical Background 45
Industrial Policy in the First Part of the Twentieth Century 49
Nationalism and Industrialization in the Early Twentieth Century 56
The Bombay Plan and Government and Business Symbiosis 59
Creating National Industrial Capabilities 67
Getting on with It 69
4. India’s Growth Story 71
Introduction 71
The Changing Composition of India’s Economy 71
Economy Composition by Decade 73
Assessing India’s Growth Patterns from Two Generations Ago 76
Assessing India’s Later Historical Growth Patterns 85
Institutional Disruption and Growth from the 1990s Onward 98
Deinstitutionalization and Deindustrialization in the 2010s 103
5. India’s Mixed Economy Experiments 110
The Historical Structure of India’s Economy 110
State Involvement in the Mauryan Age as Precursor to Modernity 113
History of State Involvement in Modern India 114
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xii Contents
State Involvement before Independence 116
State Involvement after Independence 118
Outcomes of State Involvement in India’s Economy 122
Public Opinion and Reactions to State Involvement 125
State Involvement in a Management Experiment 130
Privatization and Current State Involvement Status 135
The Molecular Economy 138
6. Productive Efficiency Analysis over Six Decades 144
Efficiency Matters 144
Productive Efficiency Calculations 145
Employment Patterns over Six Decades 148
Capital Inputs and Output Patterns over Six Decades 151
India’s Technology Profile over Six Decades 155
Productivity Patterns over Six Decades 163
Assessing Productive Efficiency Dynamics 167
Assessing Latent Attitudes towards Industrial Resources 171
Waste and Inefficiency Estimates 175
Concluding Remarks 182
7. Productive Efficiency and Growth 185
The Efficiency–Growth Relationship 185
Inefficiency and Lost Growth 192
Early Conclusions on India’s Industrialization Experiment 195
Determinants of Productive Efficiency 197
What Impacts Productive Efficiency? 203
8. Organization Type and Productive Efficiency 207
Calculations Framework 207
Industrial Stucture Patterns over Four Decades 208
Inputs Consumption Patterns over Four Decades 211
Organization Type and Industrial Performance 215
Waste and Inefficiency Estimates by Organization Type 220
Maruti Suzuki Case Study 223
Concluding Remarks 233
9. Final Thoughts 237
India’s Challenge 237
Evidence from Capitalism Experiments 239
Outcomes of Industrial Organization Experiments 247
An Administrative Reform 252
A Structural Reform 255
A Behavioral Reform 259
Appendices 263
References 275
Index 297
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List of Figures
List of Tables
3.1 CSIR units and Ministry of Natural Resources and Scientific Research
agencies in 1954 69
4.1 Sectoral composition of the Indian economy over the past six decades 72
4.2 Annual changes in the past six decades in sectoral composition of the
Indian economy 74
4.3 India’s annual growth rates from 1950–51 to 2013–14 77
4.4 A comparison of growth rates per decade relative to previous decade 90
5.1 State-owned firms and organizations in 1954 under the Ministry of
Production 122
6.1 Average values and growth of human capital inputs over the past
six decades 149
6.2 Average values and growth of capital inputs and outputs over the past
six decades 152
6.3 Capital intensity patterns in Indian industry over the past six decades 157
6.4 Relative resource investment strategy patterns in Indian industry over
the past six decades 160
6.5 Statistics of basic industrial performance measures over the past six decades 164
6.6 Statistics of industrial productive efficiency measures over the past
six decades 165
6.7 Percentage of attention paid to different industrial resources over the past
six decades 172
6.8 Percentage waste of resources in industry inputs and outputs over the past
six decades 176
6.9 Quantities of wasted industrial sector resources over the past six decades 180
7.1 Efficiency and national income and per-capita national income growth,
1951–52 to 2013–14 187
7.2 Efficiency and national income growth from 1951–52 to 2013–14 188
7.3 Efficiency and per-capita national income growth from 1951–52
to 2013–14 191
7.4 Evaluation of the impact of industrial performance on GNP growth 192
7.5 Evaluation of the impact of industrial performance on per-capita GNP
growth 194
7.6 Determinants of Indian industrial efficiency from 1950–51 to 2013–14 204
8.1 Proportion of factories and outputs by organizational category 209
8.2 Proportion of inputs by organizational category over four decades 212
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List of Boxes
List of Appendices
Prologue
Utopia
At the beginning of the first millennium of our contemporary era (CE), India
was the largest economic power on earth, and accounted for about a third, or
32 percent, of the world’s economy. Just under two thousand years later, by the
closing stages of the second millennium, in 1980 CE, it accounted for just
3 percent of the world’s economy. India’s closest rival around 1 CE was China.
It accounted for 25 percent of the world’s economy. By 1980, China too did
not amount to much. It accounted for 5 percent of the world’s economy. These
patterns suggest a phenomenon of continuous and deep decline. What hap-
pened to bring the once global giant that was India to its knees? Have the
trends gone just one way, in a fast race to touch rock bottom? Should despair
be terminal? Or have India’s global economic fortunes reversed?
First, historical facts; for this, a visualization is useful. Figure 1.1 tells the story
of India’s comparative economic performance, relative to that of China, Western
Europe, and the United States, for over two thousand years. For 85 percent of that
time, during the first two millennia, till 1700 CE India was the largest economy
on earth. The Indian Industrial Commission (IIC) had noted, a hundred years
ago, that: “At a time when the west of Europe, the birthplace of the modern
industrial system, was inhabited by uncivilized tribes India was famous for the
wealth of her rulers and for the high artistic skill of her craftsmen.”¹
Dystopia
Is a dystopian view legitimate? In 1000 CE, India’s share of the world economy
was 28 percent, followed by China with 23 percent. Five hundred years later, in
30
28
27
25 25 25
25 24
23 22 22 22 21
20 19 19
17 18
16 16
15 14
12 12 13
9 9 9 9
10
8 7
5 5
5 4 4 4
1.8 3
0.3 0.4 0.3 0.1
0
1 CE 1000 CE 1500 CE 1700 CE 1820 CE 1870 CE 1913 CE 1950 CE 1980 CE 2008 CE
1500 CE, India still accounted for 24 percent of the world economy, though by
now China had beaten it to first place and accounted for 25 percent of the
world economy. But then, they changed places. By 1700 CE, India was back at
the top, accounting for 25 percent of the world’s economy, while China
accounted for 22 percent. Then, the tables turned again. By 1820 CE, India
accounted for just 16 percent of the world economy, while China accounted
for 33 percent. What dreadful disaster had happened to create this massive
decline in India’s position? Briefly, India suffered immiseration through
colonization and deindustrialization.
CHANGE
From the beginning of the nineteenth century onward, for India there was a
steady decline in its relative position in the world. By 1870, its share of the
world economy had fallen to 12 percent, while by 1913 it was at 8 percent.
Within less than a century, it had lost half the share of the world economy it
had possessed in 1820. In 1950, around the time of the formation of the Indian
republic, India’s share of the world economy was at 4 percent, which again was
just half of what it had been less than half a century ago. By 1980 CE, its share of
the world economy was 3 percent. This was just an eighth of what it had been
less than three hundred years earlier. India had touched rock bottom.
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Prologue 3
Meanwhile, what of China? In 1870, China had still accounted for 17 percent
of the world economy, but it fell back consistently thereafter. Its share of the
world economy was 9 percent in 1913, 5 percent in 1950, and 5 percent in 1980.
This was about a quarter of what it had been about three hundred years ago.
What had happened to China? China, too, experienced a process of immiser-
ation, but this time through opium and internal disorganization.
In the dynamics of displacement, what were the roles played by Western
Europe and the United States? At the beginning, in 1 CE, Western Europe, as
understood to comprise countries including France, Germany, Great Britain,
Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain, accounted for 4 percent of the world’s
economy. The land mass of North America—which we now know politically
as the United States—accounted for a meager 0.3 percent of the world’s
economy. This numerical pattern was the same a thousand years later, in
1000 CE. Five hundred years later, by 1500 CE, Western Europe’s share had
doubled to 9 percent of the world economy, but it was still in single digits
given China’s and India’s dominance. The United States was still at a trivial
0.3 percent share of the world economy. Two centuries later, by 1700 CE,
Western Europe’s share of the world economy was 12 percent, while that of
the United States was now just 0.1 percent. Well into the later stages of
the second millennium, China and India together accounted for half of the
world’s economy.
Prologue 5
respectively. For the United States, this was a fivefold increase in half a
century! The American economic success story is one of growth after the
Civil War had ended in 1865. Around the time the First World War began, in
1913 the United States accounted for 19 percent of the world economy. The
Western European share was still the largest, at 22 percent; but India’s and
China’s shares were in single digits. India and China had, by that point, lost
the industrialization and economic growth race.
After the first half of the twentieth century, thanks to being the major
supplier of ammunitions, arms, troops, food, and equipment to the Allied
cause during the Second World War, allowing its manufacturing sector to
benefit from economies of scale and scope, by 1950 the United States was
the world’s dominant economy with its share at 27 percent. The postwar
Western European countries accounted for 16 percent of the world’s econ-
omy. These trends continued till 1980. The Western European and United
States economies had 13 and 21 percent shares of the world’s economy; this
was lower than their shares had been in 1950, because of the emergence of
Japan as a major player on the world’s economic stage between the 1950s
and 1970s.
R E C O V E R Y I N I N D I A’S P OS I TIO N
Reversal of Fortunes
In the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, there has been a fundamental change in world
economic order composition. As far as India is concerned, reversal of fortunes
might be in process. For the first time in ages, a steady decline in India’s
relative standing in its share of the world economy has been halted. The
direction of change has altered. By 2008 CE, India’s share of the world economy
stood at 7 percent, now marginally behind that of Western Europe. China’s
share of the world economy had leapt to 18 percent, catching up with that of
the United States, while the shares of Western Europe and the United States
had dropped to 9 and 19 percent respectively.
The patterns of change, rise and fall, are important. India’s share of the
world economy has risen back to where it was just over a hundred years ago, in
1913. China’s share of the world economy has risen back to where it was in
1870. Western Europe’s share of the world economy has declined the most,
and has fallen back to where it was in 1500 CE, while the share of world
economy of the United States has fallen back to where it was in 1913. If the
dynamics of changing positions are evaluated, though for centuries the largest
economy on earth, in the last two millennia India’s position in the world
economic order had been in perpetual decline. Its share of the world economy
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kept decreasing from 1 CE to 1980 CE. After almost two thousand years, have
green shoots appeared? Trends are displayed in Figure 1.2.
Between 1980 and 2008, there have been positive accretions to India’s
share of the world economy. Details are provided in Figure 1.2 for India,
China and the United States. These show diverse patterns. The dynamics of
China’s relative position in the world order has waxed and waned, as there
have been dramatic losses of their share, and equally dramatic gains of their
share of the world economy. The United States had steadily gained in its
share of the world economy from 1820 to 1950, but since then its share has
steadily declined over more than half a century.
What accounts for such outcomes? Relatively better growth performance,
compared to other countries, has been positively associated with changes in the
relative standing of countries in the world economy, while relative lackluster
growth has led to a decline in relative world economic standing. Though many
reasons can be advanced, in the aggregate one factor propelling the transform-
ation in India’s position, and changes in that of other countries as well, has been
its relative growth performance. An already rich economy will grow more slowly
than a poor economy, and China and India have been much poorer relative to the
United States. Correspondingly, over the 1980 to 2008 period evaluated, and
given its relative growth performance, India has gained an additional 4 percent
share, China has gained an additional 13 percent share, and the United States
has lost a 2 percent share of the world economy. Such have been the dynamics
of changes in relative world economic rankings. Superior economic growth has
led to a possible commencement of a reversal in India’s fortunes.
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Prologue 7
It is worthwhile reviewing data on growth for the years 1992 to 2008. Based on
the late Angus Maddison’s world data for the years 1 CE to 2008 CE, for these
years 1992 to 2008 the performance of each of the three of the world’s key
economies, China, India, and the United States are reviewed relative to each
other’s growth. The relative performance of the three economies is displayed
in Figure 1.3. The first column for each year represents the relative growth of
India versus the United States. The second column for each year represents the
relative growth of China versus the United States. The third column for each
year represents the relative growth of China versus India. Consistently, India’s
growth has been on average 3.45 times greater than that of the United States.
China’s economic growth has been on average 4.37 times greater than that of
the United States, and China’s growth has been on average 1.34 times greater
than that of India’s growth. Nevertheless, though India has grown steadily,
there has been little change in the per-capita incomes gap between India and
the United States or Britain. The gap is persistent, and relative positions since
1950 have changed very little.¹⁰
Achieving higher growth is vitally important. India is the second largest
country in Asia, and one of the world’s largest. It cannot remain marginalized
and obstinately poor. The Asian region is dynamic and fast growing. The
mimetic influences of China’s growth, and of other Asian countries, ought to
20.00
17.65
17.53
18.00
16.00
13.43
14.00
12.00
10.00
7.44
7.31
8.00
5.66
5.62
6.00
4.32
3.51
3.48
3.37
3.27
3.26
2.88
2.83
2.83
2.67
4.00
2.40
2.39
2.24
2.21
2.17
2.16
2.05
2.02
2.02
1.99
1.86
1.80
1.73
1.76
1.61
1.52
1.51
1.45
1.36
1.34
1.18
1.17
0.99
1.08
1.06
1.10
0.93
1.10
0.93
0.55
0.52
2.00
0.27
0.07
0.05
0.00
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
India relative to the United States China relative to the United States China relative to India
¹⁰ Bhattacharyya (2011).
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Background
It is useful to understand India’s current income position, as well as its growth
performance over the course of the last several decades. India is still, compared to
China, Japan, and South Korea, a poor country. Presently, it has a per-capita
income which is about 46 percent of that for China, 15 percent of that for Japan
and 18 percent of that for South Korea, the latter two being Asian countries that
were impoverished but which achieved miracles in transformations of living
standards.¹² India’s per-capita income is 12 percent of that of the United States
and 14 percent of that of Western Europe. There is still a great deal of catching up
to do.
Based on Reserve Bank of India data, I have tracked the growth rates of the
Indian economy for a 63-year period, from 1950–51, the time it became the
Republic of India, to 2013–14. India achieved independence on August 15, 1947,
was a Dominion within the British Commonwealth till January 26, 1950, and since
then has become the Republic of India. Till independence, India’s annual growth
rate was 0.5 percent per annum. Colonization impoverished India.¹³ In the first two
years after independence, growth rates were low because of postwar inflation, law
and order problems, and a major refugee crisis. Only after a formal process of
economic planning was instituted in India, in 1950, did growth rates start rising.
Freda sobbed over this; she was surprised to find, among the
mingled emotions which the note roused in her, a strong feeling of
reluctance to the idea of going back to the convent. The excitement
of the strange life she had led since leaving it had spoilt her for the
old, calm, passionless existence. What! Never again to leave the
shade of those quiet walls? Never to wander, as she now loved to
do, about the ruined church of Saint Hilda, whose roofless walls, with
their choir of wailing sea-birds, had grown to her ten times more
sacred than the little convent-chapel? Never to see her father?
Never to see—Dick?
At this thought she broke down, and resting her head upon her
hands, let the tears come. And poor Dick had looked half-starved, so
John Thurley said! There began to steal into her heart a
consciousness that, if things had been different, as it were, and if
she had not been brought up in, and for, a convent, as one might
say, she too might perhaps, to use John Thurley’s words, “have
known what falling in love was.”
She was startled, in the midst of her tears, by the sound of John
Thurley’s voice in the hall, outside. He was talking to Nell, asking
“the way to Oldcastle Farm.” Freda sprang up in alarm. What if the
farm were her father’s hiding-place? It was the probable, the most
horrible explanation. The man who had spoken to Thurley that
morning was certainly a member of the London police force, and he
had said that he was on the murderer’s track. It might be, then, that
he had got wind of the fact that the farm was to be Captain
Mulgrave’s hiding-place. If not, what did Mr. Thurley want there?
It took Freda only a few minutes, when these thoughts had
occurred to her, to make up her mind what she should do. She
waited until, by the more distant sound of their voices, she knew that
Thurley and Mrs. Bean had retreated into the passage leading to the
precincts of the latter; and then ran upstairs to her own room,
dressed hastily for walking, and crept out of the house without being
seen by any one.
It was Saturday, and market-day at Presterby. Barnabas Ugthorpe
would be at market; and Freda, in her short acquaintance with him,
had gained enough insight into that gentleman’s tastes and habits to
be sure that, instead of making the best of his way home as soon as
the business of the day was done, he would at this moment be
enjoying himself at the “The Blue Cow,” or “The Green Man,” or one
or other of the small hostelries which abutted on the market-place.
So it was in this direction that she turned her steps, flitting among the
old grave-stones and hopping down the hundred and ninety-eight
worn steps, until she reached Church Street.
It was six o’clock, and the streets swarmed with a noisy rabble.
Crowds of children, as usual, played about the steps; riotous fisher-
lads, in parties of half-a-dozen or so, streamed into the streets from
the Agalyth, a row of tumble-down houses, much out of the
perpendicular, that nestled right under the cliff, and some of which
fell down, from time to time, into the sea. Knots of women stood
gossiping at the doors; girls, in preposterous “best” hats, flaunted
down the street in twos and threes. Poor Freda, with her crutch and
her quaint dress, was laughed at as she sped along, her progress
from time to time impeded by the crowd. At last she reached the little
market-place, where business was long since over, but where
women were still busy packing up their baskets, and groups of men
stood about, discussing the news of the day. At the lower end a line
of primitive-looking carts and gigs stretched from one side of the
market-place to the other, and straggled into the narrow side-street.
From a nest of little beetle-browed and dingy taverns came a noise
of mingled merriment, wrangling and loud talking; it was in these
unprepossessing quarters she must look for her friend, Freda knew.
The hunt was not a pleasant task. She had to stand some rude
“chaff” from the sailor lads, as she stood about the doors peeping in
when she could. She was, however, so very simple-minded and
unsophisticated, that she bore this ordeal better than an ordinary girl
could have done. And then, too, her mind was so steadfastly fixed on
its object that many remarks intended for her failed to reach her
understanding. She had convinced herself that Barnabas was not in
either of the three taverns on the right hand side, and was beginning
to despond, when she recognised, among the horseless carts, the
one in which the farmer had brought her to the Abbey. Her spirits
went up again, and with brisker steps she continued her search.
Down into the little side-street she went boldly, and at last with a
heart-leap of triumph she ran the farmer to earth.
It was in a narrow slip of an inn that Freda, peeping in at the door,
spied the burly Barnabas laying down the law at the bar in a way that
he never dared do at home. Indeed, the girl had recognised his voice
some yards away. Without the least hesitation, she lifted up her
voice, without entering, causing all the guests to look round.
“Barnabas!” was all she said.
The farmer turned as if he had been shot.
“The Lord bless my soul!” he ejaculated. “It’s t’ little missie!”
“Come,” she cried peremptorily, “come at once.”
He obeyed as unhesitatingly as if he had received a mandate from
the queen. Leaving his glass of ale untasted on the counter, he
followed the girl down the street; for without waiting she led the way
straight to where his cart stood.
“Get your horse, Barnabas,” she said as soon as he came up, “you
must drive me to Oldcastle Farm.”
“But——” began the bewildered farmer.
She would not let him speak, but stamped her crutch impatiently
on the stones. Barnabas was as weak as water with any one who
had a will; whistling to himself as if to prove that he was carrying out
his own intentions instead of somebody else’s, he went straight to
the place where his horse was put up. Within ten minutes the cart
was jogging down slowly through the crowded street, with Barnabas
and Freda side by side on the seat, the farmer shouting to the crowd
to keep out of the way.
For a long way they did not exchange a word. As they proceeded
down the stone-paved street the throng grew less and less, until,
when they got to that point where the houses on the one side give
place to the river, they passed only an occasional foot-farer. They
were now on the outskirts of Presterby. The lights from the other side
twinkled on the water; the distant sounds of the town, and the voices
of men calling to each other from the barges, came faintly to their
ears. Then for the first time Barnabas, drawing a deep breath, looked
down at his companion.
“Eh, but ye’re a high-honded lass. What’s takin’ ye to t’ farm?”
“Never mind what’s taking me. I have something to say to you,”
said Freda with decision. “Barnabas, you know you didn’t keep that
secret!”
“What secret?” said he uneasily.
Freda lowered her voice.
“About the dead man, and—the person you found beside him.”
Barnabas shuffled his feet.
“Ah doan’t knaw as Ah’ve said a word——”
“Oh, yes, you have. You haven’t meant to, perhaps, but you’ve let
out a word here, and a hint there, until——”
Freda stopped. Her voice was breaking.
“Weel, Ah’m downright sorry if Ah have. Mebbe Ah have let aht a
word that somebody’s picked oop, and—and—weel, Ah hope no
harm’s coom of it.”
“There’s only this harm come of it,” answered the girl bitterly, “that
you have perhaps put the police on the track of—of——”
“A dead mon. Weel, and where’s t’ harm of that?”
Freda was silent. She had forgotten her father’s pretended death.
“Mind ye, missie, there’s no good of being too sentimental, and,
asking your pardon, t’ Capt’n’s reputation was none so good, setting
aside that little business. So, as Ah said, there’s small harm done.
And now mebbe you’ll tell me what’s taking you to Owdcastle Farm.
There’s ne’er a pleace Ah wouldn’t sooner be droiving ye to.”
“Why?”
“Because there’s bad teales towd of it; an’ there’s bad characters
that goes there.”
“Oh, Barnabas, I’m getting used to bad characters. I mean——”
She stopped. The farmer scratched his ear.
“Weel, but it’s t’ bad characters that are fahnd aht that’s t’ worst. T’
other sort, that keeps dark, aren’t near so degreading. An’, by what
Ah’ve been told, Ah reckon there’s some that’s fahnd aht at
Owdcastle Farm.”
Not a word of explanation of this dark hint could Freda get from
him. With Yorkshire obstinacy he shut up his mouth on that one
subject, and, although she plied him with entreaties, all that he would
add on the subject was:
“Weel, now, ye’re warned. Folks that tek’ oop wi’ dangerous
characters must be prepared to tek’ t’ consequences.”
After this speech, Freda fell into frightened silence; and for the rest
of the journey there was little conversation between them.
CHAPTER XXX.
From time to time, when they got into the open country, Freda was
alarmed by the sight of another cart some distance behind them on
the road. For long tracts the hedges, the winds in the road, the hills
and vales, hid it from her sight, but again and again it would
reappear, filling her with misgivings.
“Barnabas,” she said at last, when the farmer asked what it was
she was turning round to look at so constantly, “there’s another cart
following us; I am sure of it. Who do you think it is?”
“Fred Barlow, moast loike,” answered he, with a glance back.
“He’s generally home early, an’ he lives only two moile aweay from
wheer Ah do.”
And there was silence again.
But Freda was not satisfied; however long it might be before it
reappeared, that cart was sure to come in sight again, and as for
Fred Barlow, he would surely come in a little vehicle the size of the
one she was driving in, not in a big, lumbering conveyance like that!
Before Barnabas turned up the lane that led to the farm, though, the
big cart had been lost sight of for so long that the girl’s fears had
calmed a little, and by the time they drew up at the front door, she
had forgotten everything but Dick, and the object of her journey.
Barnabas got down and pulled the bell, but no one answered. He
pulled it a second time, and came back to speak to Freda.
“Toimes are changed here,” he said, with a sagacious nod. “Ye
woan’t find a merry welcome and troops of servants to weait on ye
this toime.”
As nobody had yet come to the door, he gave it a kick with his
hob-nailed boots, and called out lustily:
“Here, here! Is noabody cooming to open this door? Here’s a leady
weating, an’ aht of respect to t’ sex, Ah’ll burst t’ door in if soombody
doan’t open it!”
This frank-spoken summons succeeded. The door opened at once
and Dick looked out. But was it Dick, this haggard, cavernous-eyed
creature with his clothes hanging loosely upon him? He looked like a
hunted criminal, and Freda felt a great shock as she noted the
change.
“What do you want?” asked he shortly.
“Ask t’ leady,” said Barnabas in the same tone.
Dick started when he caught sight of the girl.
“You! Miss Mulgrave!”
She held out her hands.
“Help me down, please,” she said in a husky voice, “I want to
speak to you. Let me come inside.”
“Are you coming too?” said Dick, not very graciously, to Ugthorpe,
as he helped Freda down.
“No, no, don’t you come, Barnabas,” said the girl quickly, turning to
the farmer. “I want to speak to Dick by himself. You wait for me.”
Barnabas, laughed with some constraint.
“Ah doan’t knaw what Ah’m to seay to that.”
“Why, do as she wishes. She shan’t come to any harm, Ugthorpe,”
said Dick with a break in his voice.
But the farmer still hesitated.
“Ah’m not afreaid of you, Mr. Richard. But—who have ye gotten
abaht t’ pleace?”
Dick flushed as he answered quickly: “Nobody who can or will do
any harm to Miss Mulgrave.”
This answer, while it reassured Barnabas, alarmed Freda. For it
seemed to confirm her fears that it was her father who was in hiding
about the farm.
“Yes, Barnabas, let me go,” she urged, touching his arm in
entreaty.
“Well, Ah give ye ten minutes, an’ ye must leave t’ door open, and
when toime ’s oop, Ah shall fetch ye.”
“Thank you, thank you, good, dear Barnabas,” said she.
But he began instantly to scoff.
“Oh, yes, we’re angels while we let ye have your own weay, an’
devils if we cross ye. Ye’re not t’ first woman Ah’ve hed to deal with,
missie,” he grumbled.
But Freda did not heed him. She was walking very demurely down
the unlighted passage with Dick, saying never a word now she had
got her own way, and keeping close to the wall as if afraid of her
companion. He felt bound to try to make conversation.
“I’m afraid you’ll find a great change in the place since my aunt
left, Miss Mulgrave. This is only a bachelor’s den now, and you know
a man with no ladies to look after him is not famous for his
orderliness, and in fact—I’m hardly settled here yet you know.”
They were passing through the passage, at right angles with the
entrance-hall, which ran alongside the servants’ quarters. No sounds
of merry talk and laughter now, no glimpses of a roaring fire through
the half-open kitchen door. Nothing but cold and damp, and a smell
as of rooms long shut-up to which the fresh air never came. Freda
shivered, but it was not with cold; it was with horror of the gloom and
loneliness of the place. Poor Dick! They passed into the huge ante-
room; it was entirely unlighted, and Dick turned to offer her his hand.
“You will hurt yourself, against the—walls. There is nothing else for
you to hurt yourself against,” he added rather bitterly.
She gave him her hand; it was trembling.
“You are not frightened, are you? If you knew what it is to me to
touch a kind hand again, and—and yours——”
He stopped short, putting such a strong constraint upon himself
that Freda felt he was trembling from head to foot.
“Don’t, don’t,” she whispered.
Dick made haste to laugh, as if at a joke. But it was a poor attempt
at merriment and woke hoarse echoes in the old rafters. They had
reached the door of the banqueting-hall.
“You must be prepared for an awfully great change here,” he said,
with assumed cheerfulness. “My aunt wanted the furniture of this
room; of course she didn’t think I should use such a big place all by
myself. But I’ve got used to it, so I stick to it in its bareness. You
won’t mind my showing you in here; the fact is the—the—drawing-
room’s locked up.”
“No-o,” quavered Freda, who knew that all the furniture of the farm
had been seized and sold either before or immediately after Mrs.
Heritage’s departure, “not at all. In fact I would rather.”
“I don’t know about that,” rejoined Dick dubiously as he opened
the door.