Logical Argument Structures in Decision-making

JANE MACOUBRIE

Department of Communication
North Carolina State University
Campus Box 8104, 204 Winston Hall
Raleigh, NC 27695-8104, U.S.A.
E-mail: jane_mac@ncsu.edu

ABSTRACT: Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s practical reasoning theory has attracted a

great deal of interest since its publication in 1969. Their most important assertion, however,
that argument is the logical basis for practical decision-making, has been under-utilized,
primarily because it was not sufficiently operationalized for research purposes. This essay
presents an operationalization of practical reasoning for use in analyzing argument logics
that emerge through group interaction. Particular elements of discourse and argument are
identified as responding to principles put forward by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, and
are viewed as fitting together in a kind of logical argument structure that is well suited to
the study of practical arguments in decision-making. Both the content elements and the logical
argument structure are illustrated using examples from two studies examining decision logics
in public participation and jury decision-making. Advantages of this approach and proposed
recognition of a new ‘filtered’ type of argument structure are discussed.

KEY WORDS: argumentative case, argument content, filtered argument, logic structures,
Perelman

Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969); Perelman (1979,

1980), in their theory of practical reason, proposed that argumentation is
a form of reasoning for action, i.e., the form of reasoning used for decision-
making. They did not, however, formalize a model of practical reasoning,
nor did they specify how others interested in modeling arguments should
map the content ‘liaisons’ that they view as the source of an argument’s
logic. This essay addresses that need, extending practical reasoning theory
by operationalizing it for the study of interactive, decision-making rea-
soning. The essay also describes a kind of argument structure particularly
well suited to discovery of a discursive logic, or the relationship between
interactants’ substantive thoughts and propositions that logically leads to
a particular decision.
A logic, as the previous paragraph suggests, is formed by and concerned
with the substantive content of a decision. The concern of this article
is thus delineating and specifying how certain content elements interact
to form an emergent, interactive logic. In the view presented here, the
content of an argument is both the substance and the means of decision-
making, as Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca proposed (Perelman, 1979,
1980; Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969).1

Argumentation 17: 291–313, 2003.

 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
292 JANE MACOUBRIE

The type of argument structure discussed here addresses a dimension

of argument that has been little studied and is poorly understood: complex
argument structures (Jacobs, 2000). What is new in this essay is the inte-
gration of certain existing knowledge and delineation of how it can be used
to locate logical argument structures in interactive discourse. Complex and
interactive argument structures have component parts but also have to be
understood as a whole, as an entire set of premises, reasons, and their rela-
tionships (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969; Simon, 1979). Substantive
logic structures are just one dimension of or one ‘garb’ for argument (Barth
and Krabbe, 1982), but one that is important and understudied.
The essay will proceed in three steps. Since it may not be obvious to
all readers that a new way to understand the logic of argument is needed,
the reasons for a new approach will first be explained. The essay then
defines content and discusses specific principles of interaction and argument
that can support the discovery of interactive logics. In discussing what
counts as content, the reasons content must be clearly differentiated from
the individual process steps of interaction will be addressed. Finally,
building on those principles, the essay identifies a necessary and suffi-
cient set of discourse and argument components that can comprise an
emergent argument logic, and the content ‘liaisons’ or relationships that
result in a logic. Three levels of propositional structures are identified that
together can illuminate logical, interactive argument structures; the essay
also presents the idea of a filtered argument.
Throughout this article, the ideas presented will be illustrated with
examples from (with one exception) the author’s studies (1996, 1998,
2001)2 investigating complex, interactive argument logics. This is not
intended to be a full research report, but selected examples from research
will be used to clarify and illustrate the type of argument structure pre-
sented. The author has so far investigated argument logics in two decision-
making arenas: in mock and real juries deliberating criminal law charges
and in citizen groups participating in forming public policy.

WHY A NEW ARGUMENT STRUCTURE?

Before presenting a new form of argument structure, the reason a new

form is necessary should be addressed. Currently, there are four central
ways to understand the logical structure of arguments: Toulmin’s argument
structure (1958/1988), formal logic’s syllogism, Perelman’s liaisons (1969),
and dialogue logic (Barth and Krabbe, 1982; Lorenzen and Lorenzen,
1978). These approaches have made important contributions to under-
standing the logic of argument, but at present, no theory or model supplies
or intends to supply a systematic way to model complex arguments (Jacobs,
2000).
To understand complex arguments, then, a new kind of argument struc-
 LOGICAL ARGUMENT STRUCTURES 293

ture is needed, as Jacobs (2000) noted. It has also been argued for some
time that the syllogism, the oldest of these four argument structures, is
poorly suited for the task of explaining reasoning in ordinary decisions.
Toulmin (1958) first made this point; Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969)
also asserted that arguments for action require a flexible structure, must
often be based on conditional proof, and often include value choices. The
syllogism, of course, dictates a fixed structure, requires conclusive proof,
and excludes value justifications as part of logic. Toulmin (1958, p. 184)
concluded that formal logic is ‘idealized theory . . . [we] should retain no
illusions about its application to practical arguments.’ Toulmin’s (1958,
1988) model of an argument’s logical structure (Figure 1, below) is also
problematic when applied to interactive argument. Toulmin’s model easily
describes the logical structure of discrete claims but does not provide a way
to model the overarching logic of a complex argument structure.
Dialogue logic provides, in addition to Toulmin’s model, another way
to look at the logic of arguments. Lorenzen and Lorenzen’s work on
dialogue logic (1978) represents an effort to specify the linguistic rules
that enable logical argument, such as logical constants (common under-
standing of terms) and logical connectors (e.g., and, or, if, etc.). Barth and
Krabbe’s work on dialogue logic extended this idea (1982; also now called
formal dialectics) and delineates a system of rules for the conduct of
conflict-resolving discussion (formal dialectics3), with the use of logic
features such as logical constants, etc. (formal dialectics2). Van Eemeren
and Grootendorst’s pragma-dialectics (1984) links their own system of
dialectical rules with certain functional speech acts that are highly relevant
to conflict resolution, and includes rules for determining the winning
argument.
As noted earlier, none of these theories provides or intends to provide
a means to model the coherent connections between components of
complex, multi-tiered arguments. In pragma-dialectics, for example,
argument is examined as an exchange of speech acts, and speech act
analysis is used to discover elements of an argument that are relevant to
resolving differences of opinion. Toulmin’s model (1958, 1988) works well
for specific, statement-level arguments but not for complex ones, and
Lorenzen and Lorenzen’s, Barth and Krabbe’s, and van Eemeren and
Grootendorst’s work all theorize argument as a process, established via
the specific moves made in an argument (Wenzel, 1979, 1990).

Figure 1. Toulmin’s argument structure (1988).

294 JANE MACOUBRIE

Complex arguments are usually reduced to their component pieces,

Jacobs says, because there is ‘a lack of any systematic attention to how
messages might or might not function to express informational assemblies
. . . without systematic theoretical modeling, it looks like there is nothing
systematic to model’ (2000, p. 264). Most importantly, we need a way to
model complex arguments because the appropriate unit for understanding
practical decision-making is the combined premises underlying a decision
(Simon, 1976; Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969).
Separating decisions into individual premises cannot explain a complex
logic; the problem of uniting them into their coherent logical state is what
needs addressing. A new model for understanding complex argument struc-
tures could also be important to researchers studying interactive decision-
making. To discover logics that emerge through discourse between people,
we need to understand logic without any help from organization via text
structure or formal debate case structures. The problem addressed here,
then, is how to model and make visible the overarching, substantive inter-
active argument structure that leads to a certain decision, called a decision
logic.

PRINCIPLES OF DISCOURSE RELATED TO LOGICS

Three basic principles of interactive discourse previously delineated by

others can be a foundation from which to map interactive discourse logics.
These are not sufficient by themselves to permit mapping overarching
logical argument structures, but they are fundamental principles from which
to begin. The principles involved concern three things: how content should
be defined, the specific kind of discourse structure that is most appropriate
to discovering a reasoned, interactively-constructed logic, and the level of
argument that should be investigated.

Defining ‘content’
First of all, a specific definition of what counts as content is needed. As
stated earlier, logics should be concerned with substantive content, so a
clear definition of that is important. The definition of the term content that
will be used here is the generally accepted one: content is the substance
of a conversation, the substantive matters being discussed. Regardless of
the form a statement takes, all statements speak to something, and the
‘thing’ under discussion is called the substantive content. What communi-
cation is about, researchers call the topics (Cappella, 1994; Cegala et al.,
1989, 1992; Tracy, 1982, 1983), the substantive subject matter, or the
substantive content of discussion (Ervin-Tripp, 1964; Foster and Sabsay,
1982).
Differentiating substantive content from other aspects of discourse is
 LOGICAL ARGUMENT STRUCTURES 295

essential to understanding complex argument logics, interactive or other-

wise. An argument logic should deal with content, as previously mentioned,
which means that content must be examined and understood as a distinct
entity. Content should also be defined carefully because researchers some-
times say they are applying various forms of analysis to ‘the content.’ This
loose definition of content (which seems to mean everything that is said)
is problematic, especially if what is then analyzed is the form of messages
(speech acts such as questions or accusations, for example). Content can
be as important to know as function, as ‘I have a hangnail’ and ‘I am sched-
uled to die tomorrow at sunrise,’ both assertions, address radically different
matters (Sykes, 1990).
That form and content are two different aspects of discussion (Foster,
1986; Sykes, 1990), intertwined in interaction but still separable from it,
can be illustrated by considering the following dialogue:
‘OK?’
‘I guess so.’
‘Why not?’
‘I don’t know.’

Each turn above can be easily labeled as a functional move or speech act
(an explanation, a query, or agreement). The substantive issue is not visible,
however. Statements have substantive subjects and make functional moves;
these are not the same things.
It could be argued that content and interactivity are so interdependent
that they should not be analyzed separately, on the grounds that issues are
negotiated in interaction and particular moves affect content. Having said
these things, however, we have inherently recognized substantive issues
and content as conceptual things that exist in their own right, separately
from each move: functional moves affect issues and content is a thing on
which negotiations operate. We can and do differentiate content from other
aspects of discourse, and although a particular move can affect subsequent
content (insult vs. agreement, for example), content has to be understood
as a separate entity just to gauge that effect.
Content can be separated from particular interactive steps, the foregoing
shows. Further, complex content structures must be separated from inter-
active steps to be understandable. The reason for this lies in the essential
fact that every substantive statement makes a point about something. The
substantive issue can be located in just one statement, but in complex
argument, one would expect not to find each statement as a stand-alone
topic, but that many would relate to larger matters under discussion. The
larger matters under discussion are built from local turns or issues, then,
but local turns and issues are only understandable in relation to the larger
argument structure.
Research has shown that people track discourse by mapping each point
or localized issue onto the relevant larger issues (Keenan and Schieffelin,
296 JANE MACOUBRIE

1976; Reinhart, 1981; van Dijk, 1980). Understanding complex arguments

thus requires two things: examining the content of discrete propositions
and mapping them onto the more general issues. When any local proposi-
tion is mapped onto the larger issues, the turn-by-turn introduction of propo-
sitions is lost, but the larger argument frame is revealed. Such a discursive
argument structure must still be considered to be inherently interactive,
however, as it was constructed through interaction and is based on turn-
by-turn argument (rather than discourse) analysis.
An example can help to make this clearer. Suppose that in a jury’s
deliberation, two jurors assert that ‘his fingerprints don’t match’ and then
‘maybe the cap isn’t really his; my brothers switch caps all the time.’ These
statements introduce two local issues, fingerprint match and cap owner-
ship. Both statements are also related to a larger-scope matter, this defen-
dant’s correct identification. Resolution of the cap or print issues, that is,
are not stand-alone matters: They are important in helping to resolve the
identification issue, which exists at a higher level in an issue hierarchy.
Resolution of identification, of course, in turn bears on yet a higher-level
issue, guilt or innocence. Without a map of the higher-to-lower substan-
tive structure, each statement makes a proposition or introduces a topic
but remains simply a stand-alone feature of discourse.
Mapping local issues onto the larger issue structure is necessary, if we
would understand complex argument, and that means the local points or
issues have to be extracted from their turn-by-turn locale. Statements
support or negate a higher-level proposition, and their effect is cumula-
tive. Local issues combine to establish whether identification has been
established, for example, and the chronological interaction structure cannot
reveal the cumulative effect of various points made on a larger issue. In
discourse, propositions and issues are not discussed in a linear, top-to-
bottom fashion, in neat packages. Simply mapping local issues or adjacent
turns would not reveal the substantive framework of a complex argument;
that has to be reconstructed from chronological turns.
This article is interested in grasping the entire set of major premises
underlying a logic, or the argument structure into which smaller issues fit.
The overarching topical structure must be reconstructed from (and exists
separately of) the chronological flow of issues or specific interacts. Debates
over definitions and differing frames are not ignored in this approach,
however. Instead, they are represented in proportion to their emphasis in
the larger-frame argument. A dispute over how to define the issue will
surface as an important topic in the overarching logic. The meaning of a
fact is negotiated, but its relevance to a complex argument lies in the rela-
tionship to the whole.
Content structures are based on but are separable from interactive moves.
A close examination of each turn is still important, for two reasons. One
is that the content structure can only be derived from that level of exami-
nation. As well, the complete basis of a logic relies both on understanding
 LOGICAL ARGUMENT STRUCTURES 297

the larger argument structure and on understanding the types of reasons

used and which ones dominate discussion.
Larger-frame content structures spell out the major issues under dis-
cussion, but a reasoning structure also has an influential lower-level type
of content: the kinds of reasons used to make choices. For example, saying
‘but his fingerprints don’t match,’ has fingerprint match as its substantive
subject, and then ‘it’s clear he’s guilty, he confessed’ changes the subject
to confession. The content of both of these justifications, however, is a
substantive, physically verifiable material fact, as opposed to a principle
or value statement (i.e., he shouldn’t have confessed). Since a decision
based on facts is different in kind from one based on principle, this lower
level of reasoning is important to understand. Together with differences in
substantive topics/issues, collectively examining the use of particular
justification types, especially in relation to particular topics, may help locate
important differences in logics within or between groups.
It is perhaps surprising that substantive content assemblies are a poorly
understood and under-theorized basis of decision-making (Sykes, 1990),
although to review other decision theory here is not possible. Small group
decision-making theorists have certainly studied interactive argument, but
to date, functional speech act analysis has most often been the object or
method of these studies (e.g., Bales, 1951; Gouran and Hirokawa, 1996;
Gouran et al., 1993; Hirokawa, 1983, 1985; Meyers and Brashers, 1998;
Van Lear and Mabry, 1999). In the area of substantive content’s effect on
group decisions, only the inference level of argument has been previously
investigated (Gouran, 1983, 1986).
The present project presents a way to map the cumulative substantive
structure of logics that emerge through interactive discourse, a particular
area of argument analysis that is under-theorized, that precedes the analysis
of functional moves’ effect on a substantive logic, and that is an essential
first step towards evaluation of the quality of a logic. The objective here
is to describe the substantive, overarching logical structure that develops
and is negotiated throughout the discourse.

Discourse proposition structures

Describing substantive content structures separately of interactive moves
is a necessary part of discovering interactive argument logics. For this, it
will also be helpful to recognize that discourse has three kinds of struc-
ture (Reinhart, 1981): functional, text-based, and propositional.
In the functional structure (Reinhart, 1981), conversation builds up in
sequences of functional acts or speech acts. Functional structures are
generally described by identifying particular speech acts, or labeling state-
ments as fulfilling a particular function, such as assertion, agreement,
justification, or accusation (see, for example, McLaughlin, 1984). A second
type of discourse structure, a text-based structure, organizes discourse in
298 JANE MACOUBRIE

yet a different way, through organizational features such as sentences,

paragraphs, adjacency pairs of utterances, and so forth.
The propositional structure of discourse, however, is most relevant to
discovering substantive argument structures that emerge through interac-
tion. The propositional structure of talk (Reinhart, 1981) refers to interac-
tants’ topical references, which are sometimes implied in conversation. For
example, ‘But this is really important’ or ‘I don’t understand’ inherently
refer to and propose ‘This discourse is about X’ (the subject, problem, or
issue).
In interaction, propositional references (‘This is about fingerprints’)
introduce or continue a topic and are best understood as existing within
topic hierarchies. Topics are, in the most general sense, an entity about
which something is said (Tracy, 1982), and they are also either local (what
a particular turn or sentence is about), or global (the larger issue to which
the local topics relate) (Tracy, 1983; Reinhart, 1981). Interaction has, in
short, a topical macrostructure under which specific localized topics cohere.
Conversation’s coherence is a function of a local unit’s relatedness to the
macropropositions, ‘this conversation is about X,’ and accumulated state-
ments proposing a view of X (Keenan and Schieffelin, 1976; Reinhart,
1981; van Dijk, 1980). People comprehend conversations not by tracking
the local topics, but by understanding the more general, global topics
(Planalp and Tracy, 1980).
The substance of discussion is best understood as a topic hierarchy, with
issues/topics at higher and lower levels, from the most general (global) to
the most specific (local) (Foster and Sabsay, 1982, McLaughlin, 1984;
Tracy, 1983). Suppose in conversation that someone says ‘I went to Miami
on vacation and saw Aunt Margaret on the beach!’ Aunt Margaret on the
beach could not be understood, would not fit into the discourse context,
without reference to the larger subject of my vacation.
Dialogue is ordered, in other words, by nested sets of topical hierarchies,
whether in interaction or text; the most general topics are at the top of the
hierarchy and within them are the more specific, local topics (Reichmann,
1978). To locate the coherence of a complex substantive argument will
require identifying the global topics and propositions on them, making these
two of important ingredients in a logical propositional structure.

The appropriate sense of ‘argument’

Recognizing that substantive content is oriented around global topics and
topic hierarchies, it follows that the sense of argument most relevant to
understanding decision-making is the argumentative case (Rieke and
Sillars, 1997). This derives from understanding that in decision-making,
the local/global topical hierarchy is more than merely a property of
discourse.
In a tenure decision, for example, the most general topics might be A’s
 LOGICAL ARGUMENT STRUCTURES 299

papers, A’s books, and A’s teaching. In fact, the decision topic of tenure is
literally devoid of content without its specific global topics (books, papers,
etc.); propositions on these global topics are actually the basis for a decision
on tenure. (See Figure 2 for a graphic example display.)
Individual statements gain their coherence from alignment under global
topics (Planalp and Tracy, 1980); the justifications given in discussion
inherently either support or deny a global proposition and eventually ‘add
up to’ the end decision, or make an argumentative case (Reike and Sillars,
1997). An argumentative case is related to Wenzel’s (1979, 1990) sense of
argument as product or logic, but since in Wenzel’s conceptualization the
product of argument may be just a particular conclusion, the argumenta-
tive case is similar in type but fundamentally different in scale.
The most appropriate sense of argument involved in complex logics,
the argumentative, case refers to an overarching, combined argument. This
is the sense of argument that seems to be meant when someone says ‘What
are your points? What is your argument?’ The argumentative case subsumes
individual statements, or argument as process, i.e., local propositions
(Wenzel, 1979, 1990) or specific rhetorical strategies such as definitions,
analogies, tropes or figures of speech (e.g., Warnick and Kline, 1992). In
interaction, the argumentative case is also not necessarily related to the
chronological steps of argument. Specific interactive moves delineate
argument as procedure (Wenzel, 1979) (or dialectic, 1990), such as is
addressed in dialogue logics (Lorenzen and Lorenzen, 1978; Barth and
Krabbe, 1982) and in the pragma-dialectic approach to understanding logic
(van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1984). The argumentative case, as it exists
across an interaction, is oriented around the global questions or issues
whose resolution ‘adds up’ to or logically leads to a decision.

LOGICAL ARGUMENT STRUCTURES IN INTERACTIVE DISCOURSE

The previous section introduced the idea that to discover interactive

logics, we need to recognize the substantive content as a global/local topic
structure. The global topics are critically important, since their description
inherently displays the higher-level substance of a decision-making dis-

Figure 2. Example of global and local topic hierarchy.

300 JANE MACOUBRIE

cussion. We could call the global topic structure propositional structure 1

(PS1), as it sits at the highest level of a discourse. Propositions on these
global issues represent another propositional level (PS2) and form one basis
for a decision. The lowest level of an interactive argument structure is the
positive or negative local propositions (PS3). Finally, the links between
global issues, global propositions, and different types of reasons delineate
an argumentative case that emerges in discourse.
Together there appear to be four elements of interactive discourse that
can be systematically examined to reveal the logic of decision-making
argument. These are: 1) global decisional topics (PS1), 2) decisional topic
propositions (PS2), 3) the types of justifications or reasons that assert facts
or values (PS3) and add up to propositions on the decisional topics, and
4) global proposition relationships, whether convergent, dependent, or
filtered (the latter will be explained shortly). If a specific argument acts as
a logic, as well, one would expect the decision made to logically follow
from the global topic propositions. The particular integration of these com-
ponents is original to the author, although it draws on work by others.
The structure of an interactively created decision logic, in this view,
has two tiers. The upper tier is formed by decisional topics, propositions
on them, and links between them. Choices on these are supported by jus-
tifications (facts or principles, for example), so that both the lower level
of logic (justifications) and the upper level (global decisional topic propo-
sitions) are relevant to understanding the basis for choices and/or sub-
stantively different logics.

Decisional topics
It will be argued here that the term decisional topics should be used to
identify the global, substantive issues relevant to a particular decision.
Using this specialized term solves a number of problems. First, not all
global topics may be substantive ones (others may be social, etc.), and the
term decisional topics differentiates substantive concerns from others.
Second, many other terms already in use are overly general. Issues, for
example, is a term often employed to mean arguables in discourse, or any
point of disagreement (Inch and Warnick, 1997), and in stasis analysis
(Davis, 1981; Kline, 1979) includes all definitions, questions of fact, cir-
cumstances, or procedural issues (Wenzel, 1979). Other terms, such as
themes, criteria, and goals also are overly general.
Most problematically, none of these terms can differentiate local from
global concerns, or social from substantive concerns, and so make dis-
covering a substantive logic more interpretative and idiosyncratic than is
desirable. It is preferable to identify decisional topics as the substantive
global topics of interest, so that the object of study is specific, research
results can be systematic and reliable, and global and local topics are not
confounded. Global topics can be reliably identified in discourse, as
 LOGICAL ARGUMENT STRUCTURES 301

documented by studies examining subjects’ topic identification and inter-

coder reliability checks (Cegala et al., 1992; Planalp and Tracy, 1980; Tracy,
1982).

Reasons or justifications
Decisional topics (PS1) identify ‘this is about X’ or what a discourse is
about, and then views or propositions on those global issues create a dif-
ferent propositional level (PS2) that exists in decision-making. In addition,
the PS2 propositions made can also be based on different types of justifi-
cations (PS3), or propositions that support PS2 views on X or Y. As
Perelman (1982) asserts, similar conclusions may be motivated differently,
and the nature of these differences represent different reasoning paths. Even
when the decisional topics are the same and the same final decision has
been reached, the basis of choice by either individuals or groups may have
varied, either in different propositions or types of justifications used.
After identification of global decisional topics, there are two critical
sources of an interactive argument’s logic: the propositions made at the
decisional topic level (PS2) (i.e., yes on books and yes on articles), and
the justificational propositions (PS3, such as facts and principles) used to
develop them. Theorists have previously differentiated kinds of reasons
such as moral obligations, social pressure, and authority (Rieke and Sillars,
1997), and these form a different kind of basis for a decision.
To date, in the author’s research (1996, 1998, 2001) eight types of
justifications or reasons are sufficient to understand the logics found. The
first five – material facts (or particulars), principles, values, situations,
and consequences – are drawn from Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s work
(1969). Three other kinds of justifications – needs, speculations, and expe-
riential judgments – have been useful in delineating with precision the
complete structure of both public and jury arguments, although they also
have not to date been a dominant force in any logic found so far.
Definitions of these eight justification types are provided in Table I;
the examples given in discussion, below, will be drawn from the author’s
studies of interactive argument in decision-making group interaction.
Material facts (or particulars, in Perelman’s terms), or concrete, verifi-
able evidence, are one key type of justification or reason. Facts, like other
types of justifications, inherently make a local proposition on a decisional
topic. Saying ‘All the health studies over the last 50 years show not one
person ever became seriously ill from this product’ presents a fact derived
from research. ‘He said he was at the beach,’ if said by a juror in deliber-
ation, counts as a fact because it can be physically verified. (The truth-
value of any such ‘fact’, of course, is a different matter.) Toulmin (1988),
after Ryle (1949/1976), distinguishes six logical types of fact statements
or assertions, such as stated facts about the past, present, or moral judg-
ments.
302 JANE MACOUBRIE

Table I. Justification types (PS3)

1. Material Facts: concrete, physically verifiable evidence

2. Principles: decision rules other than moral values
3. Values: good/bad, right/wrong moral decision rules
4. Situations: circumstances indirectly related to the substantive problem
5. Consequences: results of actions taken by deciders
6. Needs: civic or personal needs as decision rules
7. Experiential Judgment: personal experience
8. Speculation: hypothetical, speculative statements

In this project, however, it is preferable to define ‘fact’ more simply, as

concrete, physically verifiable evidence. Under that definition, the material
facts in a legal case are those presented at trial, and the material facts in
a business decision are those available for physical verification. Whether
people are generally rational in decision-making, of course, and what uses
they make of facts versus principles (etc.), is an interesting question.
Principles, defined here as decision rules other than moral rules, would
be apparent in statements such as ‘it has to be beyond reasonable doubt’
or ‘there is a risk of 4 deaths in 10,000.’ Principles guiding decision-making
can be completely pragmatic, as in ‘we don’t know exactly where the
restaurant is, but we know it’s on the water, so let’s just follow the streets
along the shoreline.’ Pragmatic principles and moral principles need to be
differentiated, as logics based on either are different in kind. It is also
preferable to use the term principles rather than values, which can mean
anything preferred (Rokeach, 1979).
Values are then defined as moral justifications invoking good/bad,
right/wrong rules, such as ‘we should not convict unless we are certain.’
Identifying values separately from principles makes a distinction between
moral and other types of principled justification, which may be important
to discern. Safety is a principle, under this definition, because it does not
represent a moral judgment or fundamental philosophy of right or wrong
but a pragmatic concern.
Consequences are outcomes of a choice used to justify a decision and
have been used to reason about a decision if someone said, ‘If we are
wrong, think what will happen. His life will be ruined.’ A situation justi-
fication is invoked when a statement references a circumstance outside
the substantive matter being addressed. For example, in a decision to vote
for a particular candidate, one might discuss experience, policy preferences,
or principles. But saying ‘this is the best option available’ does not have
to do with the candidate per se, but with the failure of all candidates to
meet expectations, and so is an example of a situation justification.
Needs are either personal or civic, pragmatic or idealistic, e.g., ‘lets
just decide so we can go home’ or ‘we need a community center here, not
boating access.’ Speculations are hypothetical statements used to under-
stand situations and justify judgments: ‘Maybe he just wanted to talk to
 LOGICAL ARGUMENT STRUCTURES 303

her’ or ‘I don’t think he really meant to hurt her,’ in a jury discussion on

motive. Finally, experiential judgments invoke personal experience as a
justification for a conclusion, such as ‘I was in a robbery once, and I
couldn’t identify correctly.’
These eight types of reasons reveal the different basis of choices on deci-
sional topics regardless of the kind of content involved in a choice (i.e.,
legal matter, vacation destination, tenure) and so seem to be field-inde-
pendent (Toulmin, 1958, 1988). With the typology of justifications just
explained, whether a logic is based on facts or values (or consequences,
etc.), or what combinations are persuasive, becomes open to discovery.
Justifications are one basis of a logic’s reasonableness, and both practical
and theoretical significance may obtain from being able to discern the
content of justifications. Whether some types of justifications are more
dominant in particular fields could be an interesting area for research, for
example. Differences in the types of principles employed by scientists
versus citizens could also be revealing.
In practical reasoning, justifications are not rationalizations (Perelman,
1982) but are legitimate reasons to support accepting a belief or an action.
Justifications give permissible reasons and do not attempt to exonerate an
individual from responsibility for actions or decisions, as do excuses
(Antaki, 1994). Perelman also makes a distinction between conclusions
derived from reasoning, and conclusions that are, as he puts it, merely
justified: ‘[We] need judges where reasoning does not end in a conclu-
sion, but justifies a conclusion’ (1982, p. 144). The dual meaning of
‘justify’ is slightly confusing, but Perelman appears to recognize a differ-
ence between logically developed arguments for a choice (i.e., choices
that logically follow from certain facts or reasons) versus those that are
merely rationalized. The difference seems to be that in some cases, deci-
sions are a result of reasoned consideration, while in others, justifications
are merely top-dressing, applied to make an action look as if it were
reasoned.

Decisional topic propositions

It is critical, in understanding a decision logic, to understand the overall
decisional topic structure, such as books and teaching in tenure, together
with the kinds of reasons that dominate decision-making. Reasons or
justifications are the lower-tier ingredient in an argument’s logic, as dif-
ferent choices can be based on facts, principles, consequences, or experi-
ential judgment. But as has already been discussed, it is the propositional
macrostructure (PS2) (Foster, 1986; van Dijk, 1980) that provides coher-
ence to a discourse and hence to an emergent decision logic. How this
part of an interactive logic is identified thus needs to be addressed.
Macropropositions propose, ‘This argument is about X,’ (PS1) and
propose a view of X. The global propositions made by ‘views’ would form
304 JANE MACOUBRIE

PS2, and identifying them systematically in interaction is the concern of

this section of the essay. In interactive decision-making, the valence, or
positive/negative position (+/–) of justification statements helps in the iden-
tification of macro, global propositions. In other words, justifications or
reasons offered inherently propose valenced macropropositions.
PS2 (propositional structure 2) thus can be located by identifying global
topics and justifications related to them and by noting the valence of
justifications. For example, ‘I was in a robbery once and I couldn’t identify
correctly’ (experiential judgment justification) argues against the credibility
of an eyewitness’ testimony. Likewise, saying ‘there should be zero risk
to public health’ (principle) or ‘twenty years of studies show no one got
sick’ (fact) support opposite propositions on a concern about public health
risk, either no risk or too great a risk. The valence of justifications provides
a simple means to identify the overarching propositional structure (PS2),
the propositions whose resolution leads to a particular decision.
Locating logical argument structure components in interaction would
proceed in four steps: 1) noting the local topics, 2) locating the global topics
to which they relate, 3) identifying justifications in relation to each global
topic, and 4) identifying the valence of justifications, as inherently making
a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ proposition on each global topic. For discovering decisional
topics, the analytic unit (part of discourse that receives a topic label) has
first been the local topic of a sentence, although global topics are then
derived from the comprehensive local topic list.
That is, to discover the global, decisional topics, first all local topics
are identified. Semantic differences over local topic labels are then elimi-
nated. For example, in a jury deliberating on a drug possession case, two
people might say ‘it was her name on the baggage tags’ and ‘aren’t they
legally hers if she puts her name on there?’ One person might call the
local topic of the second example, the tags. Another might say the local
topic is legal ownership. People are very poor at agreeing on local topic
labels (Cegala et al., 1989; Planalp and Tracy, 1980; Tracy, 1982), probably
because the topical hierarchy lets people easily confuse the local with the
global issues. Decisional topics are global topics, so as the foregoing shows,
any semantic differences in local topic labels are unimportant as long as
there is agreement about where each fits in a global topic array, the frame-
work of the larger argument structure.
After all local topics have been agreed upon, the author and assistants
involved in a study have then independently specified the global topics
under which they cohere, and tested agreement or reliability. In the author’s
studies of juries and public participation groups, global topic reliability
among different members of a research team has been consistently been
stable at 0.74 and 0.75 or above (using Scott’s pi intercoder reliability
statistic), without any effort to reconcile differences. With reconciling
discussion, agreement has risen to from 0.84 to 0.94; 75 is the minimum
level generally accepted by statisticians and social scientists. (Intercoder
 LOGICAL ARGUMENT STRUCTURES 305

reliability studies are used in social science research to help verify a study’s
internal validity and replicability.)
The unit of analysis for identifying justifications, in the author’s research
to date, has been a sentence or one-half of a compound sentence; the latter
accommodates the fact that multiple justifications may be used in one
sentence. Each sentence that provides a justification thus receives a code
identifying it as a material fact, consequence, etc.

Logical argument structures for decision: relating global propositions

So far, I have proposed that identifying decisional topics, different justifi-
cation types, and proposition valence will be helpful in locating an over-
arching logical argument structure. The last component of decision-making
argument that needs to be understood, then, is how to map the logical con-
nections between decisional topic propositions. The term logic intrinsically
implies that such connections exist, since relationships between ideas or
concerns constitute a logic. For purposes of describing practical reasoning,
three kinds of linkages between decisional topics seem essential to recog-
nize. The first two, convergent and dependent relationships, are well known.
A third new type of logical relationship, a filtered relationship, will be
proposed shortly.
In a convergent argument, the choices on decisional topics are inde-
pendent of each other, but each converges on the same conclusion (Walton,
1996). A convergence of reasons, and especially consilience (obtaining
the same results by different methods) may be the ‘most solid foundation
of inductive reasoning’ (Perelman, 1982, p. 142). In one of the author’s
jury studies, juries considered whether a defendant was correctly identi-
fied, had a motive or opportunity, or whether there was any reasonable
justification for the crime. The decision arrived would converge on a choice,
because each of these decisional topic propositions is logically indepen-
dent of each other. Determining a motive for murder does not depend on
determining opportunity, or determining justification, and vice versa, so
these choices are logically independent. They converge on a final decision;
no choice follows from any other.
Dependent arguments (Walton, 1996), on the other hand, are those in
which one choice precedes and then directly influences others: later choices
are logically dependent on the first. For example, in another of the author’s
studies of interactive logics, two competing arguments were found and were
both dependent arguments. This study was of a public citizen group’s
collectively arrived at decision of how to clean up a toxic waste site. Within
the group, the majority and minority arguments that emerged through the
discussion began with consideration of the site’s risk to public health. The
two groups reached different decisions because they reached different
conclusions on the extent of the risk, and all subsequent considerations
were dependent on that one global proposition.
306 JANE MACOUBRIE

Based on the facts available, the majority argument asserted that risk
was low. That being their assessment, they advocated a low cost and low
community-burden solution. By contrast, the minority argued for the highest
degree of cleanup, based on their decision that ‘yes’ there was risk to public
health. Since they believed risk still existed, this minority wanted the safest
clean up method possible and did not concern themselves with cost or other
issues. In both cases, all other parts of each group’s argument follow from
their proposition on the first issue, either yes or no on risk to public health.
The solutions preferred also follow from the global topic propositions, as
well. That is, it follows that if there is no risk, there is no need for a high
cost or burdensome cleanup. Similarly, if there is risk, the safest solution
would be preferred. Interestingly, this study also found that these two argu-
ments had very different justification bases; the majority argument ‘no risk’
was based largely on facts, whereas the minority argument ‘too much risk’
was based primarily on principle.
Filtered arguments represent a third type of argument logic, one that
appears to exist alongside those that are convergent or dependent. In the
proposed filtered argument, one argument element has become a barrier
over which all other choices must pass. In this situation, the argument that
is formed is neither dependent nor convergent, but has a distinctively
different type of construction. An example will illustrate this first, followed
by a diagrammatic contrast between the three argument types.
The initiating example of a filtered logic comes from substantive
arguments in mock juries’ logics. Thirteen mock juries had all debated the
same case so that similarities and differences in their arguments could be
studied. In all 13 arguments, identification of the defendant was heavily
contested. In all the arguments, as well, the principle of ‘reasonable doubt’
was elevated from its normal supporting role (as a reason given); reason-
able doubt, a principle, became a global decisional topic that seems to
function as a filtering decision rule. Reasonable doubt acted as an evalu-
ative criteria, then, but as global-level issue, and the argument structure
was also neither convergent nor dependent.
Resolution of the decision depended on the decision on reasonable doubt,
that is, but it did not help form a dependent logic. That some choices are
derived from others is the essence of a dependent argument. Reasonable
doubt is not part of a dependent logic, because deciding identification or
motive did not depend on either ‘yes’ or ‘no’ on reasonable doubt, and vice
versa. Motive could be decided regardless of one’s thinking on reasonable
doubt, that is, and if the argument is ‘yes’ on reasonable doubt, identifi-
cation does not even have to be resolved. What has happened, then, is that
the other issues in the juries’ deliberation depended on resolution of rea-
sonable doubt, but the logics are not dependent logics as they are presently
defined (Walton, 1996).
Neither is the argument just described merely a convergent argument.
 LOGICAL ARGUMENT STRUCTURES 307

Resolution of reasonable doubt might alone decide the verdict and does not
converge on the verdict with the other propositions. Instead, the other issues
have to pass the test of reasonable doubt: Correct identification of the defen-
dant needs to be beyond a reasonable doubt, and saying ‘yes, had a motive’
needs to be beyond reasonable doubt. Perhaps because the other proposi-
tions are highly equivocal, the propositions cannot converge on a choice;
reasonable doubt then provides resolution. By rising to the global topic
level, reasonable doubt creates a principled barrier against which the other
issues are evaluated.
The logic just described is not convergent and not dependent, then.
Instead, it places reasonable doubt in the role of a screen or threshold, a
final hurdle in the global proposition chain over which all other consider-
ations must pass. To illustrate this idea further, it may help to reduce the
three argument types to simple logic flows:
Dependent: From A, B and C, then X
Convergent: If A, and B and C, then X
Filtered: If A and B, determined by C, then X

The idea of a filtered argument acknowledges a principle that has become

a global-level decision rule, and acknowledges the unique structure of such
an argument. All the other choices, it thus seems, were ultimately subjected
to the test of reasonable doubt: This is the screening concern, the threshold
that must be passed for a guilty verdict to be achieved. I propose, then, that
filtered arguments are a distinct type of argument structure, like conver-
gent and dependent arguments.

Diagramming decision logic arguments

The sort of logical structure of argument (decision logic) that has been
discussed in this essay is formed by 1) decisional topics, 2) the reasons that
support choices, 3) propositions on decisional topics (justification valence),
and 4) their logical connections in convergent, dependent, and filtered
argument structures. Describing logical argument structures in this way
focuses on overarching logics, macro logics, rather than the logic of indi-
vidual, statement-level arguments or conclusions.
To model this kind of logical argument structure, we might use three
types of graphic means for various purposes. For macro-scale argument,
graphic diagrams can only be illustrative, as attempting to reproduce the
entirety of complex argument graphically would be a massive undertaking
and probably also impossible to understand. The simplest kind of graphic
model would be like the one shown in Figure 3. This type of model shows
only demonstrates the flow of global topics, and in this case, illustrates
how some issues might be filtered through a higher-level topic/principle.
This form of representation of a macro-argument logic shows the choice
308 JANE MACOUBRIE

Figure 3. Topical diagram of a filtered argument.

pattern that leads to a decision, but does not provide much clarity about
the types of justifications that created each of those choices, which con-
tribute significantly to understanding a logic.
If the types of justifications used are necessary to understanding an
argument fully, of understanding the genesis of a choice, a second type of
graphical diagramming method is thus proposed (Figure 4).
This second type of diagram is also relatively simplistic, but adds the
dominant justification types to the proposition flow, which as the arguments
below demonstrate, can explain a great deal about the ultimate outcomes
of arguments. In Figure 4 there are two logics: the global propositions and
dominant justification types used by the majority (winning) and minority
community factions debating, in this argument, a toxic waste site’s reme-
diation. The upper structure of the diagram shows the decisional topics,
and the lower portion shows the proposition-related reasons or justifica-
tions. Both diagrams are arranged to illustrate the logical relationships
linking the propositions, which are both dependent arguments.
This second type of graphic representation of an argumentative case or
decision logic reveals more of the essential features that explain the deci-
sions: global propositions, distinctive justification types, and proposition
flow or connections.

CONCLUSIONS

This essay has described a way to resolve a number of problems. First, as

Jacobs (2000) noted, how an argument’s messages function in informational
assemblies is under-theorized. We have focused on component pieces of
argument because a systematic way to assemble these pieces has been
missing. Yet as demonstrated in this essay, some basic principles of dis-
course can be integrated to create a means of systematically describing (and
opening to evaluation) argument logics in discourse. The argument struc-
ture described here uses concepts from linguistics, communication theory,
 LOGICAL ARGUMENT STRUCTURES 309

Figure 4. Qualitative Model 2.

and argument studies in new ways and extends them to explain the genesis
of interactive decisions, argument-based content logics.
The type of logical argument structure proposed in this essay also seems
to have several strengths. First, it is responsive to the substantive content
found in particular arguments and draws its logic from that content and
its relationships, as Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) argued must be
the case. That is, the logical structure explained in this way is derived from
the content of a particular argument, but is found via predictable types of
argument components and connections. That logics may vary in their struc-
ture is not a negative, but a necessity; the logical structure described here
is also flexible enough to describe all types of arguments and very probably
is field-independent, although the types of principles in use may vary (legal
versus pragmatic, for example).
Second, the logical structure discussed here handles complexity easily
and models interactive logics successfully. In decision-making research,
how decisions are reached in groups is often of interest, so that a means
to analyze interactive decision-making could be quite useful. Argument
as informational assemblies are under-theorized as they relate to group
decision-making, where complex decision-making is the rule rather than
the exception.
Perhaps most importantly, the two studies used as illustrations here
support that the proposed substantive structures can reveal logics used in
decision-making, or the interactive construction of an argument that logi-
cally leads to a certain decision outcome. In each case studied (13 juries
and 3 public participation groups), the argument structures discovered via
the techniques described here did logically lead to the decisions made. That
310 JANE MACOUBRIE

is, the author believes a reasonable person using the same decisional propo-
sitions, linked in the same ways and underpinned by the same types of
justifications, would reach the same conclusions. There is a logic of
decision-making in these argument structures, in other words, leaving aside
the issue of whether one would evaluate the logics as correct or the best
possible. Arguments for action, after all, are best understood as adequate
(or not) in comparison to the other arguments that could be made.
Finally, the original contribution of this type of argument structure is
threefold. It provides a means to analyze logics in interaction, opera-
tionalizes practical reasoning theory’s proposal that practical reason’s logic
is formed by content liaisons, and proposes recognition of a new type of
argument logic, a filtered argument.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author wishes to acknowledge the generous contributions of Valerie

Manusov and Barbara Warnick, who mentored the dissertation from which
this article derives, as well as very useful critiques of this article by Valerie
Manusov, Barbara Warnick, Ken Zagacki, Vicki Gallagher, and the anony-
mous reviewers.

NOTES
1
The principles of practical reasoning relied on here are not the best-known concepts of
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s work (Perelman, 1979, 1980, 1982; Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969). The present essay directs attention to their thinking about overar-
ching logics, rather than to the logic of discrete conclusions or inferences (e.g., Warnick
and Kline, 1992). This article also does not make use of their most-known concept, that of
the universal audience (Fisher, 1982; Golden and Pilotta, 1986). As well, although their
idea of justifications is used here, justifications in this view are not functional speech acts,
as they are often utilized in group argument research (e.g., Canary et al., 1995; Meyers and
Brashers, 1988).
2
The author has completed two studies of interactive argument logics and a fourth is
presently in progress. The first study (1996) pilot-tested the analytical scheme explained here
and examined the logics used by a community group deciding on the appropriate way to
remediate a toxic waste site. Interviews were the source of argument data. In the second
study (1998), 13 mock juries’ deliberation was studied; transcripts of the deliberation were
the data source. Actual U.S. juries cannot be studied without state Supreme Court permis-
sion, and mock juries are valid for study when certain conditions are met. Because of the
quantity of data from these juries, log linear modeling was used to describe the relation-
ships between particular justification types and their respective decisional topics, as well as
to provide a model of the decisional topics themselves. Log linear modeling is a type of
non-additive chi square, a statistical technique for locating beyond-chance relationships
between categorical variables.
 LOGICAL ARGUMENT STRUCTURES 311

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