Ratio Juris. Vol. 14 No.

1 March 2001 (34±46)

The Concept of Law RevisedÐ

Directives and Norms in the
Perspectives of a New Legal Realism
WERNER KRAWIETZ

Abstract. Legal theory usually distinguishes only two kinds of legal realism: the
American and the Scandinavian. Another school of this theoretical perspective is
German legal realism, which refers to scholars like Ihering, Weber, and Schelsky.
According to German legal realism, the author outlines what legal theory can do to
persuade modern jurisprudence to face the social reality of law, conceived as
institutionalized normative communication. The latter always occurs with reference
to already valid and effectively operative legal norms which are used in an
established, normatively binding legal practice in a given regional society.

I. Introduction
1. In current discussions concerning the different trends or currents of legal
thinking and the development of particular schools in legal theory, for
instance, the analytical-philosophical, and the realistic schools, we find a
vivid interest in deeper insights into the structures of law and legal systems.
Analytic-hermeneutical schools, especially in the past, have often been
accused of isolating the study of law from the socio-linguistic and social
sciences and of neglecting the study of law as a normative study of society,
while the realistic schools (including the historical schools of law of the
19th century) had often neglected to build theories in such a way that the
hypotheses derived (or, at least, derivable) could be tested against the reality
of legal activities. During the last decades Enrico Pattaro was among the first
of the continental European theorists and philosophers of law to make an
empirical and critical assessment of the social premises and underpinnings
and the consequences of modern legal realism. In his fruitful investigations,
especially in recent years, he has shown how much the schools of legal
realism have contributed to the study of law as a psycho-social phenomenon
and to the integration of the study of law and the social sciences.
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 The Concept of Law Revised 35

a) In the following, the term ``school in legal theory'' is meant to cover

what some authors call ``schools in jurisprudence'' or ``schools in legal
philosophy.'' For obvious reasons, new schools areÐto some extent, at
leastÐnew variants of previously existing schools. This also applies to the
development of a legal formalism and of legal realism, the latter marked
today by empirical rational attitudes.
b) Enrico Pattaro undoubtedly belongs to those who very early on dis-
covered the fundamental significance of legal theory for the philosophical,
psychological and sociological foundations of basic research in jurispru-
dence, and then went on to advance and enrich this field through his own
independent research. This contribution cannot be rated highly enough
considering that even today modern legal theory still has to contend with
strong anti-psychological and anti-sociological attitudes which have per-
sistently hindered a comprehensive exploration of the different normative
mechanisms of all law.
c) As a countermove and in response to this problem Pattaro (2000b) has
developed a psychological norm concept according to which the norm itself
is the widely accepted belief that one ought to behave in a certain way. For
him law is a complex cultural, i.e., linguistic, psychological and behavioural
social phenomenon in which the notion of duty plays an integral part. By
analysing this form of a new normativism (nuovo normativismo) which he has
characterised as a normative legal realism (realismo normativistico) Pattaro
expresses his affirmation of the normativity of law which he does not
want to be neglected (cf. Pattaro 1998, 337ff., 341ff.). He also wishes to
distinguish his concept of legal realism from the North-American version of
legal realism and pragmatism which he considers anti-normativist.
2. The debate on a socially adequate concept of legal realism is still
blurred by a number of controversies within legal theory and philosophy.
Usually only American legal realism and Scandinavian legal realism are
regularly mentioned in the relevant literature with reference to the critique
of natural law and metaphysics (de Groot 1997; Kamenka et al. 1986).
Reference is seldom made to German legal realism (Gromitsaris 1989;
Schulte 1993; Weber-Grellet 1997, 89±91; Werner 1995; Wyduckel 1986) even
though it is historically older and has decisively influenced or even deter-
mined the other two while remaining entirely distinct from them.
a) A socially adequate understanding of legal realismÐseen here as a
research orientation of sociological jurisprudence or legal and social
theoryÐis frequently obstructed because some authors erroneously
interpret and explain legal realism in terms of the contrast between idealism
and realism (cf. Wintgens 1998). This philosophical dualism was never
relevant for the development of a (self-) critical normative legal realism
which had already occurredÐin its earliest and most consistent form in
German legal realismÐby the end of the 19th century. The latter had
already moved beyond the positions of natural law and the law of reason and
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36 Werner Krawietz

the appertaining metaphysics of argumentation and justification. It had also

outgrown the concept of state legal positivism. Instead, it had begun to
understand the law and the entire legal system of modern society as a
normatively structured, institutionalised system of communications and
actions which exists in the real social world.
b) In his recent contribution ``Language and Behaviour'' in which Pattaro
(2000a) lays down the foundations of his theory of norms he defines his
current interpretation of the relationship between ``directives and norms'' as
follows:
Directives are Language. Norms are Behaviour. A directive is a linguistic expression
by which somebody is told to do something, and it is a directive whether it is
effective or not. A norm is a pattern of behaviour, which is performed because it is
conceived (felt, lived) as obligatory, and it is performed independently of any
directive. This, of course, does not mean, that there are no relevant factual con-
nections between directives and norms. These connections need to be properly
spelled out. (Pattaro 2000a, 267)

In the following I intend to outlineÐin terms of German legal realismÐ

what legal and social theory can do to persuade modern jurisprudence to
face reality, especially the social reality of law in the sense outlined above.

II. Individualism or Communitarianism and Beyond

1. Legal practice and legal science do, undoubtedly, require normative
standardisations and patterns of social behaviour for the orientation of
individual action. They also need, however, socially adequate theories
making it possible to impute individual (concrete) acts of behaviour to
certain persons. It is one of the tasks of a theory and philosophy of law to
register, observe and reconstruct these processes of attributing legal respon-
sibilities (rights and duties, etc.) analytically and conceptually in order to be
able to describe, interpret and explain them.
a) From the point of view of the practice and theory of law, legal com-
munication is nowadays seen as the fundamental operation in this process,
since it is legal communication that produces normative information and
communicates it in such a way that it can be understood. The distinction
between communication and action makes possible the continued develop-
ment and elaboration of normative systems of meaning, especially those of
law.
b) The communicative structure of legally patterned facts and the concrete
legal action and juridical decision which occur in normatively structured
communication in accordance with the norms and rules of law have to be
clearly distinguished from each other. Rather than being inescapably deter-
mined, this structuralisation leaves room for spontaneity in the production
and reproduction of law within the legal system. In other words, it allows
for spontaneous law.
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 The Concept of Law Revised 37

2. A realistic conception of law and legal systems must not fall back into
the individualistic misunderstanding that society consists basically of
individuals or groups of individuals. According to this view of
methodological, legal and moral individualism, all law is simply the result
of the properties and the decisions of individuals, that is, it flows from the
unified will expressed by the assembly of such individuals or of their
formations in groups and in this way serves as a universal means of
bringing about a binding order. Contrary to this view, I should like to put
forward a version of legal thinking that is informed by history and society.
In my view, all lawÐwith reference to all members of a legal community
who are included in its normative systemÐis a normative, emergent societal
structure. It is always found at a deeper socio-structural level than are all
actual individuals or their formations in groups whose behaviour is
regulated on the basis of and in accordance with the standards of this legal
system (Krawietz 1998a, 180ff., 193ff.; 2000, 108f.).
a) One cannot, therefore, determine, describe or explain the law only by
means of analytical-theoretical toolsÐby taking principally the unbound
individual as one's point of departure without having already determined
the emergent properties and characteristics of the legal system itself. The
legal system as a whole is and remains a subsystem of society. Law gives
effect to, mirrors or is otherwise expressive of the prevailing social relations.
This is precisely the central insight of the legal and social theory which I
share with German sociological jurisprudence and legal realism, the socio-
logical institutional theory of law and systems theory. I shall return to this
point below.
b) Thus it is simply not the case that all law can be understood as a
subsequently imposed limitation and restriction, as it were, on individuals
and formations of groups affected by law who are a priori not restricted but
are absolutely ``free.'' As a result, I have never been able to share the love
that both analytical philosophy and American idealism have shown for
socio-philosophical individualism and an individualistic theory of action
which seeks to trace all human action to the properties of the individual, the
acting individual, that is, to trace them to a priori life essences informed by
reason. These approaches do not manifest an interest in the concrete social
forms of life and interaction between human beings, or an interest in the
organised social relations accessible through experience and observational
methods of analysis in the social sciences, let alone an interest in the social
reality of the law.
3. Compared with the present state of research in communications, it
appears that the research trends of formal logic, language analysis and
analytical hermeneutics as well as their applicability to law and juris-
prudence are, in their fundamental aspects at least, developing satisfactor-
ily. In contrast, it would seem that research concerning a theory of legal
communication is lagging behind somewhat.
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38 Werner Krawietz

a) In view of the special characteristics of legal communication which in

the approach advocated here is to be regarded essentially as practical legal
action in a social context (and not as a merely cognitive act of thought and/or
language or even as a merely hermeneutic intellectual activity!), legal
research on the various levels on which the construction of the theory is taking
place will have to respond much more than previously to the requirements
and insights emerging from basic research in law (in its broadest sense).
b) Important impulses are emerging from a new cultural anthropology
and legal ethology (Hof 1996, 75ff., 145ff., 183ff.) as well as a new kind of
ontology of norms, in particular, a new ontology of law. Their findings have
to be considered in the light of the insights gained by a theory and sociology
of law which has been engaged in the construction of a theory of norms
and action for a considerable time. This theory aims, above all, at penetra-
ting the relations between normative expectations of behaviour and concrete
legal action both empirically and analytically (Krawietz 1989, 115ff., 121ff.;
1993a, 371ff., 377). The theory of normative communication, especially legal
communication, which is my main concern here, is an empirical theory
of law based on experience and observation as the foundations of all legal
(re-)construction. A scientific observer can maintain detachment in the face
of facts of every kind. He can follow those facts to whatever empirical
conclusion they may lead, but not further.

III. One World, One Culture, One Law on a Global Scale?

1. The concept of normative communication employed in the following
reflections coversÐboth empirically and in terms of legal norm sentences or
norm propositionsÐthe field of legal communication, in other words, (1) the
level of national (state) law, (2) the level of the European communities and
the law of the European Union and (3) the level of the international law or
norm propositions of nations and other communities. It comprises within it,
therefore, the entirety of directives and norms which are produced self-
referentially in the legal systems of modern society, i.e., with continual logical
and social reference of the respective legal system to itself, its constitution,
previously passed laws, etc. The concept of legal communication extends to
all forms of legal action and all kinds of normative attributions of legal
responsibility, in particular to the attribution and imputation of rights and
duties as we know them today in the realms of civil law, criminal law and
public law. Such a communicative social system of law is conceived of as
self-referring, self-maintaining and self-reproducing.
a) From the point of view of a theory of norms and action, the legal
systems of modern society as a whole in their form, structure and functions
couldÐvirtually, at leastÐbe regarded as one single information and com-
munication system, although this has not been achieved completely as yet.
Society everywhere is served in its orientation and in the way it steers
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 The Concept of Law Revised 39

human action by the normative networks of the legal systems which are
formulated and fixed by the language of law. In other words, in respect of
the complexities of the circumstances of life, all legally relevant matters
undergo a dichotomisation into norms and facts which in terms of social
structure is a characteristic feature based on socially generalising (factual/
normative) expectations of law (SchroÈder 2000, 54f., 66ff.; Veddeler 1999,
118ff., 130ff.). It is their social function to induce the addressees of the law to
act in the way they (i.e., the normative networks) prescribe, that is, to make
sure they adhere to the norms. This occurs when the latter fulfil the pre-
scribed behavioural expectations which have been fixed and generalised
by the language of law, e.g., when their behaviour conforms to or deviates
from the norm. Thorough research is needed, however, to understand
exactly how legal communication takes place in reality, i.e., how the norma-
tive obligation and social impact of law are actually brought about.
b) A concept of law based solely on the state and concerned exclusively
with formal state law without taking account of the manifold informal social
conditions and prerequisites for the production of law seems, by contrast,
far too narrow an approach. By normative self-reference, I mean the insti-
tutional legal fact that self-organisation and self-production of the legal
system and of the required laws take place in the legal systems of modern
society, i.e., the communicative system is conceived as self-referring, self-
maintaining and self-reproducing. There is a continual self-reproduction of
the legal system in the sense that it continually refers back to itself in all its
factual/normative operations, i.e., it takes into account other operations and
actions it has previously undertaken. Law does not, however, only come
into existence in specific bodies set up by the state or in highly bureau-
cratised states with their legal staffs. The state has neither a monopoly nor a
prerogative for the creation of law.
2. From the point of view of the theory of law and of systems theory, law
comes into existence in all social institutions and systems, namely in interactive
systems, organisations and in the variety-pool of society, be it regional society
orÐon a higher level of abstractionÐglobal society as a whole. What I mean
by global society is notÐas in Luhmann's approachÐworld society in its
differentiation into independent functional subsystems of society, but the
social reality of law in its interaction and organisation systems as well as in
state or non-state legal systems which also involve organisation systems
(Krawietz 1998a, 181f., 193; Werner 1992, 204f., 210ff.; Schemann 1998, 576f.).
My institutional and systems-theoretical approach to law differs from
Luhmann'sÐapart from the fact that he does not mention state legal
systemsÐabove all, because the concept of law and society used by me here
rests on the differentiation between regional and global society, meaning
society, as a whole. This distinction appears to me to be of fundamental
importance as a guiding principle for the social observation of law. It is only
by adhering to it that the theory of law can avoid the danger of missing the
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40 Werner Krawietz

access to the social reality of law in its observations and of getting lost in
speculations about the world society of law as such. Unless I am wholly
mistaken, turning to the social reality of law in legal and social theory has
now not only become possible but indispensable!
a) This is whyÐwith a view to the requirements to be met by a theory of
normative communicationÐan attempt is here being made to sketch the
outlines of a socially adequate framework theory of legal communication
which rejects as a matter of principle the narrow limitations imposed on
legal thinking by individualistic actor- and subject-centred theoretical
approaches.
b) When analysing the information and communication systems of
modern law in terms of legal and social theory, it is vital to base this
analysis on the difference between regional and global society (global system,
world society). From the point of view of an intercultural comparison of
law and legal systems the first elements and components linking up to
form a global society may well already exist, especially so in the world of
technology. A runway is a runway, no matter where in the world pilots
approach it. We recognise it when we see it. The same situation may become
true for the law and legal systems due to the technological advances and
possibilities in juridical communication which appear to allow a worldwide
network of law to spread. At present, however, we have neither one global
law nor one global state, nor one global culture of law (Krawietz 1998b, 260f.;
Riechers 1998, 555f.). There are also a number of reasons why it is highly
unlikely that they can or will ever exist. LawÐseen here as a normatively
structured communication system comprising all its interactions and
organisationsÐon the level of global society is no more than a system of legal
systems which integrates all the different national legal systems within it.

IV. A Realistic Theory of Legal Communication in Outline

1. Following the distinction between directives and norms advanced by the
contemporary analytical-normative theory of law in Scandinavian legal
realism of Danish, Finnish and Swedish as well as Polish provenance or by
German legal realism and sociological jurisprudence, it can be said that the
legal system procreates itself by self-referentially linking new legal directives
and legal norms to previously validated ones.
Legal validity is a social product of the legal system and is worked out
and extended from case to case. In this way further starting-points for
further directives and legal norms are formed and these at the same time
produce and reproduce the legal system. Both in form and content it presents
itself as an internally consistent normative whole, formed by the primary and
secondary social systems of the law. We are, consequently, dealing not only
with a system of norm sentences butÐand this should be taken note ofÐ
with a societal system consisting of the entirety of all relevant juridical
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 The Concept of Law Revised 41

communications as well asÐfrom the dynamic-functional point of viewÐ

embracing the constant flow of new communications and legal actions.
b) One might say, therefore, that the legal system gains its normative
social identity as a result of its self-generated (deliberate) legal-normative
activities. The directives and norms proceeding from them are not issued in
accordance with a preconceived plan, but pragmatically and in each case
according to requirement, and at certain points ad hoc, as it were. Directives
and norms emanate from previous directives and norms, which in turn give
rise to new directives and norms and so on (cf. Opaøek 1986; 1989; 1995;
Krawietz 1993b, xii±xix).
2. An information and communication theory dealing with the relation-
ship between norms and action is not a finished product. Constructing and
developing it is a highly demanding task which remains as yet largely
unaccomplished. In pursuing this purpose a very broad concept of com-
munication in the context of the modern institutions and systems theories of
law has to be used as a basis. This concept takes its orientation from the
dichotomisation into institutional facts and norms or norm sentences which
are used in the language of law.
a) Starting-points are practical linguistic information and normative com-
munications or, at least, those can be formulated linguisticallyÐwith a social
relationship to the law without this being necessarily provided by the state.
Law is a specific form of social relation, but not all law is formalised. There is,
as I pointed out above, not only a formal law but also an informal one.
b) All forms of social behaviour which serve to establish, concretise and
change legal norms, be they general or individual ones, are to be counted as
legal communications. In accordance with a social differentiation estab-
lished in German legal thinking as early as the nineteenth century, we shall,
however, in the following make a distinction in our analysis of law, both
from a structural and from a functional point of view, between primary and
secondary social systems. In legal communication we regard the day-to-day
legal actions undertaken in everyday life by citizens and legal subjects who
derive the orientation for their behaviour from already socially established
legal expectations as part of the primary system of law, while all decision-
taking activities by the highly organised and bureaucratised legal staff of
the state, i.e., the legislative, executive and judiciary, belong to the secondary
system of law.
3. From the point of view of a juridical communications and systems
theory, the normative communication of law consists of a tripartite selection
process (cf. Krawietz 1999). In social-structural and dynamic-functional
terms, this process binds together (i) information, (ii) utterance and (iii)
understanding in a single emergent legal unit. Separately these components
haveÐdeontically or deontologicallyÐno independent existence. It is only
when and if the selectivity of the three operations has a social congruence
in the realm of law, i.e., if they coincide with each other, as it were, that a
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42 Werner Krawietz

normative communication actually takes place. The following may serve as

an example: The legislator (1) passes a law by setting down the normative
information required for it in the form of an if-then regulation, (2) he
publishes the law in the usual form by addressing it and communicating it
to those whom it concerns, so that (3) the addressees of the law who have to
comply with it, namely (a) the citizens and legal subjects and (b) the legal
staff of the state, have knowledge of it and the opportunity to understand it.
Whether this communication of law is transmitted technologically or takes
place in the conventional way (publication in the law gazette, official
records etc.) can here be left open.
a) In the following we have to identify (i) the elements and components
that constitute the individual normative communication of law and (ii) to
clarify which institutional and systemic requirements have to be fulfilled for a
piece of information to be conveyed successfully and a legal communication
to be considered socially adequate. In any case, what matters is that the legal
communication actually reaches the respective addressee and is, therefore,
able to direct him to adhere to the behaviour intended and prescribed by the
law, i.e., that it becomes socially effective.
b) The factual/normative informationÐwhichever way it is producedÐ
does not only have to be uttered but also needs to be understood, because a
legal communication is only possible on the basis of understanding. From
the normative-realistic point of view the understanding on the part of the
recipient has to be regarded as a partial aspect of selecting normative meaning. It
is both empirically and analytically distinct from information and utterance
and always has a degree of independence. Among the conditions for the
positivity of all law there is, therefore, no such thing as automatic production
of law. The success of a normative communication is not measured by the
fact that something has been conveyed correctly or wrongly but by the fact
that a piece of normative information has been produced, uttered and
understood and may, but does not have to, provide a link for further juridical
communications to issue from it. It only has to be possible in practical terms
to react to the communicated legal text (law, contract, etc.) by acceptance/
rejection which presupposes in any case that it has been understood. The
juridical rationality which finds expression in the legal communication can,
consequently, be seen as a normative structural coupling, i.e., as a rationality of
linkage (Krawietz 1992, 250ff., 259ff.; Schemann 1992, 224ff.).
c) Legal communication is, then, successful if the addressee and recipient
has understood the factual/normative utterance directed to him by the
lawgiver and has, therefore, been put into the position of finding his own
orientation by conforming with or deviating from the norm. The ensuring
behaviour which expresses the acceptance/rejection is, however, already to be
regarded as the beginning of a further, new communication. It produces a new
(factual and normative) piece of information which may be followed by
further communications and actionsÐbe they conforming or rejecting.
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To sum up! The most fundamental unit in social interactions and trans-
actions spanning a variety of organised social systems is, therefore, not the
human being, the individual, the person or the subject as the voluntarist agent of
human action but the normative-socially structured juridical communica-
tion which interlinks with other juridical communications and thereby
invests the social order of law with normative stability and a concrete,
binding character. It follows that the information and communication
system of law is a vast network made institutionally permanent and
composed of systemic operations consisting of directives and norms.

V. Concluding Remarks
1. Institutionalist legal theories both of old and new provenance are so
much in vogue again today because basic legal research has in the last two
decades more clearly than previously exposed the hidden deficiencies by
which the merely analytical approaches in modern legal theory have always
been afflicted, and from which they are still suffering to this day, namely
(i) the positivist restriction of its norm theory and (ii) their shortcomings
in legal and social theory. In continental Europe this applies, for instance, to
the various types of pure theories of law which probably constitute the
purest embodimentÐalbeit each to a different extentÐof analytical juris-
prudence in its present form.
a) It is quite obvious today, however, that the exaggerated legal
positivism of these schools of thought supported and strengthened by
the postulate for purity which they advocate has hitherto prevented
these approaches of analytical jurisprudence from ascertaining addition-
ally and to a sufficient degree the presuppositions and foundations of
norm theory provided by legal and social theory. The renewal of institu-
tionalist forms of jurisprudence taking place at present does, on the other
hand, appear to offer a suitable way of compensating the deficiencies in
the analytical-hermeneutic legal theories which basic research in legal
and social theory has diagnosed. My own impression is that more ques-
tions are raised than answered in the context of these institutional theories
of law.
b) Every modern legal system, understood as a societal subsystem consist-
ing of both the primary and secondary social system of law can be observed,
described and explained in socially adequate terms with the tools of
normative legal communication. Other than the more pragmatic American
legal realism and also other than its Scandinavian versions which Pattaro
has so aptly described, the legal realism advocated here is founded on a
sociologically based concept of law reflected by a theory of norms and
action. Such a conception does, however, have to be reconstructed and
complemented by a theory of institutions and social systems, as I have
pointed out elsewhere.
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44 Werner Krawietz

2. A socially adequate empirical access to a theory of normative com-

munication in the field of law will, consequently, not be achieved until
law is conceivedÐentirely in the sense of Max Weber and Ludwig
WittgensteinÐas something that can only be interpreted, understood and
explained as embedded in human behaviour and in the diverse forms of
societal life. To this extent, the regulation of life by law is to be perceived as
the result of directives and other associated activities which establish norms,
with the help of which the legal order continually (re-)produces itself. It
is, however, in the deep structure of society as a whole that the normative
premises and hidden underpinnings of legal communication are to be
found.
3. Understanding and explaining law, legal order and legal systems in
this situation involves a grasp of the very sources from which the com-
municative structures of modern law have emerged. Law emanates from the
societal system as well as from the legal system itself. The legal system is
able to qualify its own operations as law/non-law, legally valid/legally invalid,
legal/illegal, lawful/unlawful, right/wrong, just/unjust, etc. (cf. Herget 1995;
1996). The coding is what gives normative communications their legal
meaning. When viewed as a dynamic, functional legal system valid law
continuously produces valid law through its communicative operations.
Through self-reflection the system constructs a legal world that mirrors or
duplicates its environment (including other social systems in its environ-
ment), but only legally relevant operations are operative within the legal
system.
4. In this internal world only what is legally correct, legally permitted,
legally forbidden, etc. is correct, permitted or forbidden. Thus an order of legal
meaning is created, and we can identify the various forms of normative
beliefs and expectations, institutional patterns and social structures from a
legal perspective. From the point of view of legal and social theory, the legal
order is not, in my opinion, primarily a matter of words or norm sentences
and their meaning but of a set of forms, norms and ways of living and
doing, i.e., a matter of different institutions and social systems.
5. What distinguishes legal communication structurally and functionally
from other forms of normative communication in the realm of religion,
ethics, etc. is, above all, the fact that it always occurs with reference to
already valid and effectively operative legal norms (or to norm sentences in
the symbolising form of the legal language) which are used in an assumed,
already established, normatively binding legal practice (vested with binding
normative powers) in a particular regional society. In modern society, moral
discourse is excluded from legal communication by the binary code of the
legal system. The binary code which qualifies the different operations as
law/non-law, legally valid/legally invalid, legal/illegal, lawful/unlawful, right/
wrong screens out other kinds of discourse. Its aim is, therefore, the
production (which always also means reproduction) of legal decisions in a
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 The Concept of Law Revised 45

self-referring legal system of directives and norms which by way of linking

communications differentiates itself increasingly through further directives
and norms. Whether these are laws, administrative or judicial decisions,
contracts or other directives in their normative form makes no difference
from the point of view of the theory of norms and action.

University of MuÈnster
Chair of Sociology of Law
Legal and Social Philosophy
Bispinghof 24/25
D-48143 MuÈnster

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