ARE THE LAWS OF LOGIC NECESSARY

OR CONTINGENT?

by Anna Sherratt
I

T he question of the title appears reasonable, and interesting.

At first glance, it seems it could be answered either way.
Here is an argument to show that the laws of logic are neces-
sary. A law of logic is, by definition, topic-neutral. If the law of
the excluded middle is true, it applies not only to tables and
chairs, but to atoms and quarks and to every sort of stuff.
Because of this topic-neutrality, the laws of logic hold of any
world, whatever it is like. So the laws of logic are necessary. This
is a persuasive argument. But the necessity of logic has not gone
unquestioned. Descartes, for one, believed the laws of logic to be
contingent.1 God decided that there should be no true contradic-
tions. But he chose freely; he could have instantiated a different
law. Or we may appeal to Quinean holism. No tenet of our
theory is sacred. Any law may be revised in the light of recalci-
trant experience. Since everything is revisable, nothing—not even
a logical law—is necessary.
I do not know which of these positions is right; I do not know
how the question of the title should be answered. But I feel that
it is a good question. It is substantive, worthy of discussion.
Unfortunately, given two assumptions about the nature of
modality, the question has no interesting answer. The laws of
logic are not contingent. If they have any modal status at all,
they are necessary in a most trivial sense. It is unclear what moral
should be drawn from this conclusion. Perhaps it sheds light on
the nature of logic. Or perhaps my argument shows that the
assumptions about modality need some rethinking. I say a little
more about this in the last section of this paper.

II
The argument of the next section depends upon two assump-
tions. Neither assumption is uncontroversial, but each seems
1. Or so, at least, some argue. See, for instance, (Frankfurt 1977).
380 ANNA SHERRATT

plausible. The first is this. There is some interesting relation

between modality and the laws which govern the actual world.
Here is a neat way to express this relation. A proposition p is
physically necessary if it is necessary given the actual laws of
physics; physically possible if and only if compatible with the
actual laws of physics.2 Or more generally, for any Φ notion of
modality (physical, biological, natural, logical...),3 p is Φ-ly
necessary if and only if it is necessary given the Φ laws, and Φ-
ly possible if and only if compatible with the Φ laws. To put the
same assumption in terms of possible worlds (this formulation
will be useful in the argument that follows),4
(A1) Φ 䊐 p ↔ in every world in which the Φ-laws are true, p
Φ 䉫 p ↔ there exists a world in which the Φ-laws are
true and p.
My second assumption is about the comparative strength of
the modalities. I take it that logical necessity is at least as strong
as any other sort of necessity. That is: if p is logically necessary,
then it is necessary in every other (non-deontic, non-epistemic)
sense. Given the interdefinability of necessity and possibility, it
follows from this that logical possibility is at least as weak as any
other notion of possibility: every other sort of possibility implies
logical possibility. Take Φ-necessity to be any notion of necessity,
and Φ-possibility to be any notion of possibility. Then we can
put the second assumption like this. For any proposition p,
(A2) Logically 䊐 p → Φ 䊐 p
Φ 䉫 p → logically 䉫 p.5

2. Cf. Hale (1996, pp. 93–94).

3. A qualification: I do not intend either (A1) or (A2) to apply to epistemic or deontic
modalities. From now on, this qualification will be left implicit.
4. Formulating (A1) in terms of worlds makes my point vivid. I should emphasise,
however, that such a formulation is merely a device. My argument can be run without
adopting possible world semantics.
5. An objection. Suppose that it is logically necessary that (Av™A). If so, by (A2),
it should be syllogistically necessary too. But this cannot be right. The syllogistic laws
tell us nothing about disjunction. Response: if syllogistic necessity is understood in
terms of (A1), the law of excluded middle is syllogistically necessary. Provided that
the worlds in which the syllogistic laws are true are worlds in which the logical laws
are true, everything logically necessary will be syllogistically necessary. The objector
may continue: this only shows that (A1) miscontrues syllogistic necessity. Perhaps—
but if so, I doubt that we are dealing with a genuinely alethic modal notion. Thanks
to Michael Potter for bringing this objection to my attention.
 ARE THE LAWS OF LOGIC NECESSARY OR CONTINGENT? 381

(A1) formulates the relation between the actual and the modal.
What is the motivation for (A2)? Usually, an unargued distaste
for the logically impossible.6 If (A2) were false, then things would
be possible that are not logically possible. But logical impossi-
bilities—square triangles, true contradictions and the like—are
very peculiar things. Too strange, it seems, to be possible in even
the weakest sense of the word.
I have set out two assumptions. Both, I hope, are tempting.
Yet together they lead quickly to the conclusion mentioned
earlier: that there is no interesting sense in which the laws of logic
are either necessary of contingent. The following argument shows
that this is the case.

III
Are the laws of logic necessary or contingent? Let us look at
both possible answers. Suppose first that the laws of logic are
contingent. In this case, it is possible that they should be false.
But in what sense is it possible? It cannot be logically possible.
For, by (A1), it is logically possible that the laws of logic be false
if and only if there is a possible world in which the laws of logic
are true, and the laws of logic are false. And this surely cannot
be the case! In every possible world, the laws of logic are either
true or false: no reasonable sense of possibility allows that they
could be both.7
If the laws of logic are contingent, then it is possible that they
should be false. As we have seen, it is not logically possible that
they are false. So it must be possible in some other sense. But
what sense is this? According to (A2), every notion of possibility
implies logical possibility. If it is Φ-ly possible that p, then it is
logically possible too. We have already seen that it is not logically
possible that the laws of logic be false. Therefore, by (A2), it is
not Φ-ly possible either.
The laws of logic are not contingent. They must be necessary.
But here we should repeat our question: in what sense are they

6. But for argument for (A2), see Hale (1996, pp. 96–97) and McFetridge, (1990,
p. 138).
7. I assume here that our logic contains some version of the law of non-contradiction.
It is not logically possible for the laws of logic to be both true and not true. Thus
my argument will not appeal to paraconsistent logicians.
382 ANNA SHERRATT

necessary? Again, (A1) and (A2) allow us no satisfactory

response. Here, though, the problem is rather different. By (A1),
the laws of logic are logically necessary if and only if the laws of
logic are true in every world in which the laws of logic are true.
This, of course, is indeed the case: the laws of logic (like every-
thing else) are true whenever they are true. The trouble is that
this seems an extremely trivial and uninteresting claim to make.
When we say that the laws of logic are necessary, we mean to do
more than claim that they are true whenever they are true. (After
all, this claim can be made about the laws of biology, and most
of us consider the laws of biology contingent.) We mean to say,
rather, that the laws of logic are always true; true in any possible
set of circumstances. An appeal to logical necessity does not
allow us to make this claim.
If the laws of logic are necessary in a non-trivial sense, they
are not just logically necessary. They must be Φ-ly necessary,
where Φ-necessity is some non-logical modal notion. Unfortu-
nately, this too is trivial. Suppose, for instance, that we try to
capture the necessity of logic by claiming that the laws of logic
are physically necessary. By (A1), this claim is true if and only if
the laws of logic are true in every world in which the laws of
physics are true. Since logical necessity implies physical necessity
(by A2), the set of worlds in which the laws of physics are true
will be a subset of the set of worlds in which the laws of logic
are true.8 So the laws of logic are physically necessary if and only
if they are true in a subset of the worlds in which they are true.
Again, this claim is correct—but trivial. Since the laws of logic
are true whenever they are true, they will be true in every subset
of worlds that they are true. But this does nothing to address the
issue that we are interested in. We accept that the laws of logic
are true whenever they are true. We want to know: could these
laws have been false? Might the laws of logic have been different?
The laws of logic are physically necessary—but trivially so.
The same will be the case whatever modal notion we substitute
8. A proof by reductio. Suppose that the set of worlds in which the laws of physics
are true is not a proper subset of the set of worlds in which the law of logic are true:
there exists a world in which the laws of physics are true, but the laws of logic false.
If this is the case, then some proposition p will be true in all the worlds in which the
laws of logic are true, and yet false in some of the worlds in which the laws of physics
are true. By (A1), p is logically, but not physically necessary. But this contradicts
(A2).
 ARE THE LAWS OF LOGIC NECESSARY OR CONTINGENT? 383

for physical necessity. According to (A2), logical necessity

implies every other sort of necessity. So for every Φ, the set of
worlds in which the Φ-laws are true is a subset of the worlds in
which the laws of logic are true. As a result, the claim that the
laws of logic are Φ-ly necessary will true, but uninteresting. The
unwelcome conclusion cannot be avoided: the necessity of logic
is trivial.

IV
If we grant my two assumptions, the question of the title is
neither reasonable nor interesting. We should not ponder over
the status of the logical laws; we should not wonder whether God
could have realised a true contradiction. For (resorting now to
metaphor) there is no room in logical space for him to do so.
What should we make of this conclusion? I see it as presenting a
trilemma. We must either accept the trivial necessity of logic, or
abandon one of our two assumptions. Which one? Reject (A1)
and we lose the neat relation between the modal and the actual.
Perhaps, then, we should reject (A2). But in the long run, this
will not help. Briefly, suppose that we posit a notion of Φ*-
necessity, which is stronger than logical necessity. There is now
room for the logical laws to have an interesting modal status.
But we face the question: are the Φ*-laws necessary or contin-
gent? And at this point the argument above reproduces itself; the
Φ*-laws turn out to be trivially necessary. The moral is: given
(A1), some laws or other will have no interesting modal status.
And if we have to accept the trivial necessity of something, the
laws of logic seem the most appealing candidate.9

Department of Philosophy
Uniûersity of Sheffield
Sheffield S10 2TN
A.Sherratt@sheffield.ac.uk

9. Thanks are due to Bob Hale, Chris Hookway, Rosanna Keefe, Steve Makin, and
Ian White. Also to the participants in the Joint Session 2000 for many challenges
and queries—I regret that I have been able to address so few of them here.
384 ANNA SHERRATT

REFERENCES
Frankfurt, H., 1977, ‘Descartes on the Creation of the Eternal Truths’, Philo-
sophical Reûiew, 76, 36–57.
Hale, B., 1996, ‘Absolute Necessities’, ed. J. Tomberlin, Philosophical Perspec-
tiûes, 10 (Oxford: Blackwell).
McFetridge, I., 1990, ‘Logical Necessity: Some Issues’, ed. J. Haldane and Roger
Scruton, Logical Necessity and Other Essays, Aristotelian Society Series, 11.