Kotabe 2015

On Integrating the Components of Self-Control
Author(s): Hiroki P. Kotabe and Wilhelm Hofmann

Source: Perspectives on Psychological Science, Vol. 10, No. 5 (SEPTEMBER 2015), pp. 618-638
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. on behalf of Association for Psychological Science
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aps mĒĒĒmmĒm
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PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE
Perspectives on Psychological Science

2015, Vol. 10(5) 618-638
On Integrating the Components of © The Author(s) 2015
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DOI: 10.1177/1745691615593382
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Hiroki P. Kotabe1 and Wilhelm Hofmann2
department of Psychology and Center for Decision Research, University of Chicago, and
2Social Cognition Center, University of Cologne
Abstract
As the science of self-control matures, the organization and integration of its key concepts becomes increasing
important. In response, we identified seven major components or "nodes" in current theories and research bearing
on self-control: desire , higher order goal, desire-goal conflict , control motivation, control capacity, control effort , and
enactment constraints. To unify these diverse and interdisciplinary areas of research, we formulated the interplay
these components in an integrative model of self-control. In this model, desire and an at least partly incompatibl
higher order goal generate desire-goal conflict, which activates control motivation. Control motivation and contr
capacity interactively determine potential control effort. The actual control effort invested is determined by seve
moderators, including desire strength, perceived skill, and competing goals. Actual control effort and desire stren
compete to determine a prevailing force, which ultimately determines behavior, provided that enactment constrain
do not impede it. The proposed theoretical framework is useful for highlighting several new directions for research on
self-control and for classifying self-control failures and self-control interventions.
Keywords
self-control, self-regulation, willpower, desire, temptation
Science is built up with facts, as a house is with studied and discussed in isolation, making it difficult to
stones. But a collection of facts is no more a science grasp how they interconnect. For example, the construct of
than a heap of stones is a house. desire itself has recently received theoretical treatments on
- Jules Henri Poincaré, Science and Hypothesis how it emerges and operates (Hofmann & Van Dillen,
2012; Kavanagh, Andrade, & May, 2005; see also Hofmann
& Nordgren, 2015). Goals and goal pursuit have a long his-
Self-control has fascinated and perplexed many of the
tory in psychology (Carver & Scheier, 1982; Kruglanski
great thinkers of our past, dating back to Socrates (470-
et al., 2002). Intrapsychic conflict, pertinent to understand-
399 BC), Plato (437-347 BC), and Aristotle (384-322 BC).
ing incompatibilities between desires and higher order
For millennia, such giants have asked the same quintes-
goals, has received considerable attention by cognitive
sential question of self-control that we ask today: Whyneuroscientists (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen,
do we act on passion when reason knows better? 2001; Carter & Van Veen, 2007). Self-control motivation is a
Contemporary psychologists have been investigating the
major topic in self-control research (Fujita, 2011; Muraven
question now for almost half a century, beginning with & Slessareva, 2003), with some explicitly pitting it against
Walter Mischel and his colleagues studying the ability of the idea that self-control relies on some depletable (physi-
children to delay gratification (Mischel & Ebbesen, 1970;
ological) resource or capacity (Beedie & Lane, 2012;
Mischel, Zeiss, & Ebbesen, 1972). Since then, many Inzlicht, Schmeichel, & Macrae, 2014; Molden et al., 2012).
insights have been made, shedding light, bit by bit, on
Others assume depletable self-control resources explain
this unique part of the human condition.
Yet, researchers find themselves overwhelmed by a
Corresponding Author:
large collection of facts that do not easily cohere. One Hiroki P. Kotabe, Department of Psychology, University of Chicago,
major challenge, a consequence of "zooming in," is that5848 South University Ave., Chicago, IL 60637
self-control involves several components that are often E-mail: hkotabe@uchicago.edu
Integrative Self-Control Theory 619
failures at self-control Higgins,

(Baumeister, Vohs,
2010) case at this time may & Tice, 20
have several benefits,
includingEffort,
Heatherton & Wagner, 2011). stimulating discussion
per of the characteristics
se, is the and topic
determinants of two(Brehm
now classic article in psychology qualitatively different psychological1989) a
& Self,
has recently received forces,
considerable attention
their neuropsychological foundations (e.g., trig- (Ko
Botvinick, 2014; Kruglanski et
gers and mechanisms al.,processing
of reward 2012; in the Kurzban
case of
desire; executive
Duckworth, Kable, & Myers, 2013). operations in the case of higher
Behavioral order
constrain
goal pursuit),
important in understanding why and how they conflict; drawing
people attention to
sometimes do n
act on desire even when "internal
possible constraints"
differences in how people deal with asymmetric fail
catching the attention ofD-G conflicts versus symmetric
behavioral D-D or G-G conflicts (e.g.,
economists interes
Hofmann, Fisher, Luhmann,
in designing choice environments that Vohs, & Baumeister, 2014);
facilitate self-con
(Thaler & Sunstein, 2009; suggesting
Wansink, 2004).
qualitatively different All which
ways through of self-these r
evant research areas are control
not can clearly
fail or succeed (e.g., desire may be mentallymakin
connected,
difficult to see how the components of
overwhelming - a "hot" route - or self-control
commitment to higher
order goals may be too weak - a "cold" route); and, finally,
together as a unified whole.
An opposite challenge, a consequence
highlighting ofin "zoomi
novel ways to improve self-control the
out," is that research on long run (e.g., changing desire
self-control isexperiences
often through eval-
conveyed
vaguely defined terms uative such conditioning or motivational retraining while
as "self-regulation," "w
power," and "ego" that boosting impede progress
goal commitment toward
through risk education pro- a m
rigorous, mechanistic view of self-control.
grams). Moreover, as it is not yet clear how similar We
or dif- take
stance that self-control can be broken down into more ferent the D-D and G-G cases are to the D-G case, we
clearly defined components. However, an integrative decided to conservatively focus on the last case because
framework is needed to understand how these compo- it is most clearly about controlling a problematic desire
nents work together. To this end, we drew on current (i.e., temptation). It is possible that the former cases are
theories and frameworks bearing on self-control to moreiden-about prioritization or time management, whereas
tify a coherent set of components involved and to formu-only the latter involves self-control.
late their interplay in what we call integrative self-control
theory (SCT). We broadly review relevant empirical find-
A Glance
ings from various psychological disciplines to evaluate
at the Seven Components
the model's various propositions. We then derive from Before
its expounding SCT, it would be helpful to get
acquainted with its main components.
theoretical framework a classification system for self-con-
trol failures and self-control interventions.
1. Desire. Desire is a driving force that begins as a
subcortically mediated visceral state of "wanting"
Scope
(as defined by Berridge, Robinson, & Aldridge,
SCT applies to all prototypical cases of self-control, which 2009), usually followed by cognitive elaboration,
are characterized by the intrapsychic conflict between that directs a person toward immediate reward-
desire (colloquially referred to as "passion") and a higher related stimuli.
order goal (colloquially referred to as "reason").1 Human 2. Higher order goal. A higher order goal is a more
behavioral phenomena included are manifold and include cortically mediated and largely cognitive construct
the dieter tempted by a mouthwatering desert, the desig- associated with an endorsed end state that moti-
nated driver tempted by free cocktails, the faithful spouse vates instrumental psychological (cognitive, affec-
tempted by an attractive colleague, the ex-smoker tempted tive, and behavioral) activity. Unlike desires,
by a pack of cigarettes, the frugal consumer tempted by higher order goals are often pursued intentionally
fashionable but expensive clothes, and the student and associated with declarative expectations of
tempted to sleep in after another long day of exam prepa- long-term benefits.
rations. The commonality among these cases is that they 3. D-G conflict. A D-G conflict is a form of response
revolve around desire-goal ( D-G) conflicts. We acknowl- conflict caused by the coactivation of a given desire
edge a broader set of motivational/self-regulatory phe- and an at least partly incompatible higher order
nomena that includes, for example, desire-desire (D-D) goal. D-G conflict turns desire into temptation and
conflicts (i.e., conflicts between two desires, such as to eat the higher order goal into a self-control goal.
vs. to have sex) and goal-goal {G-G) conflicts (i.e., con- 4. Control motivation. Control motivation is the aspi-
flicts between two goals, such as to study vs. to do the ration to control desire. Thus, control motivation
laundry). However, we think that focusing on the "asym- is determined by the higher order goal as well as
metric" (Hofmann, Friese, & Strack, 2009; Scholer & additional sources.2
620 Kotabe, Hofmann
5. Control Cohen, 1999), we hold that D-G

capacity. conflict levels are
Control c
tial nonmotivational
affected by the activation strengths ofcogniti
the competing
person possesses to control
responses. We extend conflict-monitoring theory by dis-
attention, cussing the implications of varying
inhibitory incompatibility.
capacity)
6. Control Further, like some Control
effort. other recent self-control models, we
effo
control assume that conflict detection is the primary trigger for
capacity.
7. Enactment constraints. Enactment constraints are effortful self-control (e.g., Inzlicht & Legault, 2014;
environmental factors that limit one's behavioral
Myrseth & Fishbach, 2009).
options. With regard to control motivation and control capac-
ity, we see these components as determining one's poten-
tial effort. Thus, their reduction from prior self-control
Insights From Earlier Theories and
Frameworks exertion may limit subsequent self-control performance
(Baumeister et al., 2007; Muraven & Slessareva, 2003). A
In this article, we draw on several current theories
currentand
debate concerns the interplay and relative contri-
frameworks regarding self-control and extend bution
them by of motivation and capacity processes to self-
articulating how they synthesize. Here, we brieflycontrol
review (Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & Chatzisarantis, 2010;
the main theoretical inputs of SCT. Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 2012). Furthermore, it was claimed
Our conception of desire as a distinct construct was
that glucose is the key depletable physiological resource
underlying self-control capacity (Gailliot et al., 2007).
informed by Kavanagh et al.'s (2005) elaborated intrusion
theory of desire and Berridge and Robinson's (1998) However,
con-more recently, researchers have cast doubt on
ception of wanting (also known as incentive salience ).
this hypothesis (Beedie & Lane, 2012; Inzlicht et al., 2014;
Kavanagh et al€ (2005) described the conditions thatKurzban
trig- et al., 2013; Molden et al., 2012; see also
Schimmack, 2012). In SCT, we do not make assumptions
ger and fuel desire as well as how desire affects cognition
and action. Their model distinguished betweenabout the biological basis of the depletion of "control
associa-
tive processes that trigger intrusive thoughts aboutRather, control capacity encompasses cognitive
capacity."
reward-related stimuli and controlled processes of resources
cogni- such as directed attention (also known as exec-
tive elaboration that usually follow those thoughts.utive attention ; Kane & Engle, 2002; Kaplan & Berman,
Berridge and Robinson (1998) convincingly argued 2010),that
the availability of which fluctuates depending on
dopamine systems specifically mediate wanting (alsoand depletion. Therefore, whether the glucose
allocation
known as incentive salience), and not liking (also hypothesis
known is correct has no bearing on our conception
of control capacity and its interplay with control
as hedonic impact) or learning (also known as predictive
motivation.
associations and cognitions). Of these three processes,
our conception of desire is most closely associatedOur with analysis of self-control effort also integrated
wanting, and thus, we see it as possible to desire insights
some- from cognitive energetics theory (Kruglanski
thing without liking it or expecting to like it. et al., 2012). This theory illustrates how energetic forces
Regarding our conception of higher order goals, determine
we goal-directed thinking, which is proposed to
be propelled
drew on goal-systems theory (Kruglanski et al., 2002) that by a driving force and opposed by a num-
takes a cognitive approach to goals and motivation. ber of obstacles (the restraining force). In this theory, a
Goal-
potential
systems theory assumes that goals systems, like other cog- driving force represents how much energy a
nitive systems, have structural properties that stemperson
from possibly could invest, whereas an effective driv-
their cognitive interconnectedness and allocational ing force represents how much energy a person actually
proper-
ties that stem from limited attentional resources. These invests. Potential driving force is determined by momen-
principles inform our conception of the interactions
tary goal importance and cognitive resources. Effective
driving force represents the amount of energy one actu-
between higher order goals and desires. Specifically regard-
ally spends to try to overcome the restraining force. The
ing violations of the higher order goal, cybernetic princi-
magnitude of the restraining force is determined by a
ples posit that such violations introduce serious disorder
into the person as a goal-directed system, which may person's inclination to conserve mental resources, cur-
rent task demands, and competing goals. In our exposi-
explain why control efforts are usually aimed at inhibiting
tion on self-control exertion, we explain how these
desire in favor of maintaining the higher order goal (Carver
& Scheier, 1982, 1990; Powers, 1973). concepts relate with self-control.
Our formulation of D-G conflict determination is Finally, in regard to enactment constraints, we built on
informed by cognitive neuroscientific research onour earlier conception of opportunity constraints (Hofmann
moni-
& Kotabe, 2012) and integrated research on choice archi-
toring for and detecting response conflicts (Botvinick,
Cohen, & Carter, 2004; Carter & Van Veen, 2007; Yeung,
tecture (Thaler & Sunstein, 2009) - the proactive designing
of environments to facilitate better decision making - and
Botvinick, & Cohen, 2004). Specifically, in line with conflict-
monitoring theory (Botvinick, Nystrom, Fisseli, Carter,self-commitment
& (Brocas, Carrillo, & Dewatripont, 2004;
Pre-Behavior Behavior
I #
i EXERTION
j CLUSTER
: I Prevailing Force Is I .1 0,. , _ - : - - 1

; : ; J ge Effort
Activation I Desire vs SC Effort 1' Iterative J Eq"'"brlum, Reprocessing I ■EgjaH

I
! Prevailing Force Is I 1 kJ - ñ - : - ř - I - I - I
i : ■ñ Degjre
i Facilitation/ ;
! Inhibition ACTIVATION i
j CLUSTER
Fig. 1. A diagram of integrative self-control (SC) theory. The

desire-goal (D-G) conflict, which triggers SC exertion processes
the upper limit of control effort (see Figure 2 for further ex
enactment constraints do not prevent higher order goal enactm
constraints do not prevent desire enactment.
Bryan, Karlan, & Nelson, 2010)

coordinate motivations - the
resulting process
from multiple dedicatedof l
subsystems
oneself into a certain course ofin the brain (Livnat
action to & Pippenger,
prevent 2006). wea
These motivations
of will. We also drew from P theory consist not(Finkel,
only of bodily needs and
2013), a
reflexive impulses
eral theory of human behavior to stimuliholds
that in one's context
thator environ-
any h
behavior can be ment but by
predicted also social and long-term motivations
examining the arisingmain
interactive effects of Instigators
from the sophisticated (i.e.,
ability to imagine
factorsfuture outcomes
that no
(Morsella, 2005; Tooby
tively afford a certain behavior), & Cosmides, 1992). To
Impellors effectively
(i.e., factor
increase the likelihooddeal of with enacting that
such motivational conflicts, behavior
an optimal deci-
Inhibitors (i.e., factors that sion-making system may require
increase the at least two concerted
likelihood of
riding the effects of instigators faculties: a faculty for
and the detection of conflict (e.g.,
impellors) in a g
situation. In SCT, we view Botvinick desire
et al., 2001; Livnat
as & capturing
Pippenger, 2006; Yeung the
ling force and distinguish et al., between
2004) and a faculty internal
for the resolution (control
of internal m
vation, control capacity, control
conflict (Egner, 2008). We adopteffort) and ex
this general perspective
(enactment constraints) by distinguishing between
inhibiting an "activation cluster"
factors. We and an
also di
how the combination of these various factors can result in "exertion cluster" in SCT (see Figure 1).
a classifiable variety of behavioral outcomes. It is important to note that our analysis is at the level
of the main components of self-control and their interac-
tions. The degree to which these components are sup-
An Integrative Theory of Self-Control ported by relatively more controlled or automatic
Self-control can be understood as an evolutionarily adap-
processes is currently under debate. In line with influen-
tive function that has emerged from the need to tial models of desire and wanting (Berridge et al., 2009;
622 Kotabe, Hofmann
Kavanagh et toward
al., immediate,
2005), rewarding stimuli.
we A person
as c
emerges in a relatively
experience desire even when he or she does aut
not know
resource-independent) man
why he or she is experiencing desire (e.g., imagine
centers in the
gamblerbrain
wants to take another evaluate
chance at roulette eve
background of
though he internal
thinks he is done for the night). need Desire orig
(for a more natesdetailed
as a state of wanting (Berridge explan et al., 2009) whe
Dillen, 2012).subcortical
In reward contrast,
processing regions (e.g., the we nucle
nisms involved accumbens)
inevaluate external stimuli (instigating
effortful selfac-
tively controlled
tors) against the (i.e.,
backdrop of internal rule-bneed states and
manner. one's learning history
However, a (impelling
strict factors; Hofmann on &
and control Kotabe,
to 2013).
different Fast associative processes give
leve rise t
ble for at least
apparentlythree
spontaneous, intrusive reasons.thoughts about the
evidence suggesting
appetitive target. When those thatintrusive thoughts des sign
processes the possibility
(e.g., planning of pleasure or relief, cognitivewher elaborati
motivated usually ensues (Kavanagh et al.,
reasoning) as 2005). itThroughen cogni-
becomes more elaborated
tive elaboration, desires can "crowd out" concurrent (De co
Ridder, 2013; nitive activity associated with higher
Hofmann, order goals
Fries
2011; Hofmann (Hofmann et& al., 2011;
VanHofmann & Van Dillen,
Dillen, 2012;
Nordgren & Kavanagh et al., 2005). Such
Chou, elaborative processes main-
2013; Van
2013). tain the desired
Second, some target in working memory
contro over an
effortful extended period.
self-control may tur
processes Desire and time
over related concepts (e.g., impulse,
as craving)
they
(Fishbach, Friedman,are studied from various levels of psychological
& analysis.
Krug
Drolet, 2013; Approaches Ouellette that help bridge the social-cognitive
& and
Woo
hierarchical nature
neural levels of analyses have of action
been particularly fruitful
1982, 1990; Powers,
here. From such a perspective, 1973),
the current consensus is con
a higher order that the wanting
goal aspect of desire
may is mediated by largely
indu
more automatic subcortical neural systems that include mesolimbic dopa-
subsystems i
tion, response selection, and response execution mine projections. Research has shown that specific parts
(Dreisbach & Haider, 2009; Folk, Remington, & Johnston, of the nucleus accumbens in the ventral striatum medi-
1992; Miller & Cohen, 2001). From such a hierarchical ates opioid-stimulated increases in wanting (Berridge
perspective of automaticity and control, effortful self- et al., 2009; Pecina & Berridge, 2005). Reward signals
control must work with an auxiliary of automatic pro- from midbrain regions are then forwarded to regions in
cesses. For these reasons, we refrain from subsuming thethe brain involved in reward representation and integra-
components of self-control into a strict automatic versus tion, with the orbitofrontal cortex being among the
controlled dichotomy. Rather, we assume that each com- regions most consistently implicated in the conscious
ponent has automatic and controlled aspects, and their representation of desire (Van der Laan, De Ridder,
interplay within and across components is an important Viergevera, & Smeetsa, 2011). Broader behavioral neuro-
topic for future research. scientific models, such as the balance model by
Heatherton and Wagner (2011), suggest that humans fail
to control desire when lateral prefrontal cortical (PFC)
The activation cluster
regions do not exert enough top-down control over sub-
cortical
The activation cluster comprises the first three reward-processing due to either strong reward
compo-
signals
nents of SCT: desire, higher order goal, and D-G (desire) or impaired prefrontal function due to
conflict
(see Figure 1). contextual factors (e.g., depletion of control capacity).
Desire is necessary but not sufficient for the activation
of effortful
Desire . Although the term desire is colloquially used to self-control processes. To activate effortful
refer to all kinds of wishes and wants (e.g., self-control,
"he desires one needs to activate both a lower order
desire and
to build his own car"; "the student desires straight a conflicting higher order goal. It is important
A's"),
to note at this
we advance a technical definition to help distinguish it point that our analysis is at the subjective
level
as a unique construct: Desire is a psychological throughout. The absence of self-control activation
driving
force that varies in strength and is rooted indoes not or
innate imply that a given desire is nonproblematic
when judged
learned need states (e.g., for food, alcohol, drugs, sex, by an outsider (e.g., parent, spouse, policy
rest, social connection, gambling). It directs maker).
a person Some desires are consensually harmful yet are
enacted because the person does

models (e.g., Botvinick et al., not
2001). That hold a is conf
is, D-G conflict
higher order goal. For
inducedexample,
by the "coactivation of a heroin
mutually incompatible addi
overdose after acting on a (Yeung
responses" nonconflicting desire
et al., 2004, p. 931). It follows that D-G f
oin. For the heroin addict
conflict shouldto engage
have the same basic function self-contro
as other response
she would need to at least minimally
conflicts: motivating internalize
conflict resolution through cognitive and t
sider's perspective. behavioral adjustment (Botvinick et al., 2001; Kerns et al.,
2004; Yeung et al., 2004). Recently, models of self-control
Higher order goal . A have higher order
included the monitoring goalof response
for and detection is a rela
"cool" cognitive construct,
conflicts as keylargely mediated
processes in the activation of effortful self- by c
circuitry (Miller & Cohen,
control (e.g., 2001; see
Inzlicht & Legault, 2014; also Berridge
Milkman, Rogers, &
2009), which is associated with
Bazerman, 2008; Myrseth &an endorsed
Fishbach, 2009). When self-con- end
that motivates instrumental psychological
trol processes are activated by D-G conflict, the desire (cogn
affective, and behavioral) activity (Moskowitz
becomes a temptation, and the higher order goal becomes a &
2009). Unlike desires, higher
self-control goal. order goals are ofte
sued intentionally and are
Neural modelsassociated
of conflict monitoring and with
detection dec
expectations of long-term benefits. A higher
propose that the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) responds ord
can motivate action that to occurrences of response conflict (for reviews, see
either purely inhibits (a "d
higher order goal) or overrides (aThe"do"
Botvinick et al., 2001, 2004). higher
conflict-monitoring the- ord
that of the focal desire.ory, supported
For example,by several experimentsaand simulations
dieter ma
"do not" goal to not eat (e.g., Botvinick
junk et al.,
food2001; van orVeen &a Carter,
"do" 2002; goa
Yeung et al.,
vegetables instead of junk 2004), assumes
food. Both that ACC activation, in
types of go
response to conflict,
in common that they associate withfunctionsalike an internal "alarm
long-term and
eficial state of "healthfulness,"
bell" that triggers abut subsequent they
adjustment differ
in cognitive in t
former is aimed at purely inhibiting
control processes occurring in various desire
regions of the enac
whereas the latter is aimed atwords,
PFC. In other overriding
conflict monitoring and itdetection
with beh
compatible with the higher order
involves an evaluative goal.
process that helps determine how
Mental representations much control needs to be exerted to with
associated resolve conflicthigher
to
goals may typically be more
advance the intendedabstract
goal. We adopt thisthan those
idea by sug-
ated with desires (Fujita, 2011).
gesting that the detectionFor example,
of D-G conflicts is the primary whe
with a tempting food, a for
trigger dieter may
control motivation, associate
and thus, it bridges the ab
ideas, such as weight activation
loss, and exertion
with clusters.
the higher orde
whereas desire is more associated with concrete features D-G conflict differs from other motivational conflicts
of the tempting food, such as its color, smell, texture, and in its main determinants and some of its consequences.
so forth. Also, higher order goals may be more stronglyBy definition, D-G conflict is induced by the coactivation
associated with a person's values and virtues than of lower order and higher order motivational processes.
desire (Hofmann, Baumeister, Forster, & Vohs, 2012). To illustrate this asymmetry, researchers have identified
Consequently, goal-consistent and goal-inconsistentvariants of these two determinants as "vices" and "virtues"
behaviors may be more likely to be linked with self-con-(Read, Loewenstein, & Kalyanaraman, 1999), "inner
scious emotions such as pride and guilt, respectivelydemons" and "better angels" (Pinker, 2012), and "want
(Eyal & Fishbach, 2010; Hofmann & Fisher, 2012; self" and "should self" (Bazerman, Tenbrunsel, & Wade-
Hofmann, Kotabe, & Luhmann, 2013; Kotabe, Righetti, &Benzoni, 1998). Recent research has suggested that trait
Hofmann, 2013). self-control is associated with how well people deal with
Like desires, higher order goals vary in strength. At aD-G conflicts, but not with how well they deal with other
cognitive level, higher order goal strength may corre-motivational conflicts, supporting that D-G conflict dif-
spond with the accessibility of the associated target endfers from other motivational conflicts, and it uniquely
state and supporting cognitions in memory (Fishbach & defines the temptation case (Hofmann et al., 2014). There
Ferguson, 2007). Further, higher order goal strength is seems to be a particular interest in such conflicts, per-
determined by at least two (often correlated) factors: haps because of their special consequences: Assuming
importance and commitment. Whereas importance refersthat violating a higher order goal is relatively more dis-
to the degree to which a goal represents a high-priorityruptive to the person as a goal-directed system than not
objective (Fishbach et al., 2003), commitment refers toenacting desire, D-G conflict should, under normal cir-
one's determination to achieve a goal (Klein, Wesson,cumstances, signal the need to control desire, effectively
Hollenbeck, & Alge, 1999). making desire (partially) unwanted, whereas the higher
order goal remains endorsed. There is some imaging
D-G conflict. At bottom, we posit that D-G conflict is a formresearch supporting the D-G conflict distinction. Unlike
of response conflict as defined by cognitive neuroscientific in conflict monitoring and cognitive control in response
624 Kotabe, Hofmann
conflict tasks (see

activation of higher order goalsBotvinic
among people who suc-
struggles involve cessfully control desires but inhibit higher order goals
subcortical
brain activity among people who are less successful at controlling
(Heatherton
the presence desires of (see also Papies, Stroebe, & Aarts, 2008;
desire. This Stroebe, is
ous neuroimaging Mensink, Aarts, Schut, & Kruglanski,
research 2008). Conversely,
Li & Sinha, strong 2008; higher order goals may Somervi
help to reduce desire-
Volkow et al., related processing
2010; through goal shielding mechanisms
Volkow
2008). Further, (Shah, Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2002).
neuroimagin
sion making This discussion highlights
has shown two general routes through
that
ated with more immediate outcomes, whereas PFC which desire can be controlled: (a) through the inhibi-
activity is associated with more long-term outcomestion/down-regulation of desire at the outset of the self-
(Huettel, 2010; McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein, & Cohen, control episode and (b) through effortful self-control that
2004). Relatedly, a recent self-control model centered onis triggered by D-G conflict. One may note the topo-
affect suggests that D-G conflict is a particularly distress- graphical similarities between these two routes and
ing form of response conflict that signals that there is aGross's (1998) process model of emotion regulation.
potential for things to go wrong (Inzlicht & Legault,Insofar as desire is an emotional construct (see Hofmann
2014). Together, this research suggests that, at least in& Kotabe, 2013), the process model should apply: The
some respects, D-G conflict is determined and dealt withinhibition/down-regulation of desire may be aided by
differently from other response conflicts. situation selection, situation modification, attentional
deployment, and cognitive change, whereas response
On the components of the activation cluster work- modulation occurs after the emergence of D-G conflict.
ing together. Our conception of the activation cluster Magen and Gross (2010) proposed a process-oriented
suggests that D-G conflict may be predicted reasonably model of self-control that proposes multiple possible
well as a function of (a) desire strength, (b) higher orderstages of self-control in this very way. In real life, self-
goal strength, and (c) the degree of incompatibilitycontrol may often involve a combination of these two
between the two. Determining this function is an impor-processes: Some of self-control is mediated through the
tant goal for future research. Taking a cyberneticmore automatic inhibition/down-regulation of desire,
approach, we suggest that when incompatibility betweenand some is mediated through effortful self-control -
the two forces is high, strong - as compared with weak -with effortful self-control having to deal with the residual
desires would seriously threaten higher order goal pur- effect of desire remaining after such early-stage inhibi-
suit, thus increasing D-G conflict. Further, as the possibility tory/down-regulative mechanisms have had effect. An
of violating strong - as compared with weak - higher important direction for future research is to investigate
order goals poses potentially serious disruption to the how individuals and situations differ with regard to the
person, higher order goal strength should also increasedegree to which these two routes are involved.
D-G conflict. However, incompatibility is not always
extreme. The implication is that the presence of a strongThe exertion cluster
desire and a strong higher order goal does not necessar-
ily translate to strong D-G conflict: It depends on howThe exertion cluster of SCT comprises control motivation,
incompatible the higher order goal is with the active control capacity, and control effort (see Figure 1). On the
desire, or vice versa (see Riediger & Freund, 2004). Imag-basis of the cognitive neuroscientific and motivational lit-
ine that we held constant the strength of a desire (e.g., eratures on intrapsychic conflict resolution (Botvinick
for junk food) and an incompatible higher order goal inet al., 2001; Carter et al., 1998; Hofmann, Baumeister,
a person while varying the degree of incompatibility et al., 2012; Inzlicht & Legault, 2014; Myrseth & Fishbach,
between the two (e.g., by substituting a strong dieting2009; Yeung et al., 2004), we propose that D-G conflict -
goal with an equally strong exercise goal). Then, D-Gthe output of the activation cluster - triggers operations
conflict would be weaker in the case of the exercising of the exertion cluster through control motivation.
goal to the extent that exercising, compared with dieting,
is less incompatible with the desire for junk food. Control motivation . We define control motivation as
We should mention here that the strengths of desire the aspiration to control desire. On the basis of research
and the higher order goal are not necessarily indepen- on conflict detection and subsequent control engage-
dent. There is evidence that desires and higher order ment, we propose that control motivation is activated by
goals influence each other dynamically by exerting acti- and correlated with D-G conflict. Converging evidence
vating and inhibiting effects on each other. Research byfrom researchers using neuroimaging and electroenceph-
Fishbach et al. (2003) suggests that desires facilitate the alography supports that the ACC monitors for and detects
response conflicts and guilt. Recent research suggests engages

subsequently that anticipating pride
PFC r
primarily in the lateral areas,
from avoiding to
desire and resolve
anticipating guilt fromthat
enacting con
desire can result
(Carter & Van Veen, 2007). The in decreased
level desireofenactment (Kotabe,
control e
ment has been shown to Righetti, & Hofmann, 2013; see with
correspond also Patrick, theChun, & deg
Macinnis, 2009).
response conflict (Botvinick etTangney,
al., Stuewig,
2001). and Mashek (2007)
made a corresponding argument,
As implied by this relationship, controlsuggesting that such
motiva
may be partly determined
secondary byemotionaltherewardsstrength of the
may substitute for foregone
order goal as mediated primary
via pleasures.
D-GAgain, conflict. That
this may be a source of controlis, a
higher order goal, compared
motivation largely with
independenta weak
of that one,
transmitted through ma
D-G conflict.
nal" through D-G conflict that This discussion suggests it
violating that there
is a may be
major
cern, and therefore, desire should
several additional be motivation
sources of control controlled beyond
Carver & Scheier, 1982;what is transmitted via D-G conflict.
Kruglanski et al., 2002). Lik
control motivation may also be partly determined
Control capacity.
strength of desire mediated via ControlD-Gcapacityconflict.
refers to all the A
desire, compared withnonmotivational
a weak one,
cognitive may
resources one has signal
in a given th
D-G conflict that it is a moment
major to override
threat desire with
toa higher
higher order goal
order
(see Baumeister
fulfillment, and therefore, & Heatherton, 1996; Carver
controlling & Scheier,
it is impo
1996). As aforementioned,
Beyond these sources of control motivation, on the basis of the neuro- ther
be several other sources of control motivation. psychological evidence, lateral and other PFC regions
First, one of the axioms in psychology is that people seem to compose the main neural substrate for effortful
control processing, suggesting that these regions of the
aspire to be effective and in control. Versions of this axiom
brain are critical to control capacity (Heatherton &
have been referred to as striving for self-efficacy (Bandura,
Wagner, 2011). In one study, transcranial magnetic
1977), valuing control (Higgins, 2011), the need for com-
petence (Deci & Ryan, 1985), and effectance motivation stimulation to the lateral PFC apparently caused people
(White, 1959). The underlying principle is that people to
arechoose more immediate rewards over larger delayed
rewards (Figner et al., 2010). This view corresponds
chronically motivated to feel effective (competent, in con-
trol, etc.). As a basic motive (Fiske, 2003), this goal to with
be the contemporary neurodevelopmental theory
effective may be superordinate and independent of the that children and adolescents are more impulsive than
strength of the higher order goal in conflict with desire.adults because of an immature capacity for self-control
Further, it may be pursued simultaneously. For example, associated
a with the relatively slow development of the
dieter may aspire to control food desires to pursue hisPFC or (Casey, Getz, & Galvan, 2008; Diamond, 2002;
her higher order goal to lose weight, but he or she may Kotabe, Hardisty, Weber, & Figner, 2013). Beyond the
PFC, individual differences in self-control capacity
farther aspire to control these desires purely for the sake
of feeling in control. Therefore, we argue that this can
might also relate with prefrontal-subcortical connectiv-
independently contribute to control motivation. Second,ity (Heatherton & Wagner, 2011).
expectations of future higher order, goal-related behav-Control capacity is closely linked with a set of cognitive
iors and beliefs regarding how D-G conflicts should constructs
be called executive functions (Hofmann,
balanced over time may also affect how strongly one Schmeichel, & Baddeley, 2012; Kaplan & Berman, 2010).
aspires to control desire in the present through goal-bal-
Executive functions subserve a wide range of cognitive
ancing mechanisms (Fishbach & Dhar, 2005; Fishbach,processes, and their operations also rely heavily on the
Zhang, & Koo, 2009). If people expect to make progress PFC in humans (Alvarez & Emory, 2006; Miyake et al.,
toward or violate their higher order goals in the future,
2000). Recently, a convincing argument was made that
they may aspire less or more, respectively, to control their
executive functions and what we call control capacity rely
desires in the present - not because their desires or higher
on the same depletable and restorable cognitive resource:
order goals change in strength but rather to counterbal-
directed attention (Kaplan & Berman, 2010). The impor-
tance of executive functions to self-control is clear. It was
ance future higher order, goal-related behaviors. Further,
people may hold certain beliefs about how to strike the
shown that executive functions may help reduce the influ-
"right" balance between desire and higher order goal ence of impulsive predispositions toward tempting stimuli
on actual behavior (Hofmann, Friese, & Roefs, 2009;
enactment in their daily lives that specifically affect con-
trol motivation (e.g., one may believe that one spur-of-
Hofmann, Rauch, & Gawroński, 2007). Moreover, a recent
the-moment purchase at the end of the month is okay). review suggests that the three basic executive functions
Third, people may aspire to control desire to experience
from Miyake et al.'s (2000) framework - updating, inhibit-
positive self-conscious emotions, such as pride, or to not
ing, and shifting - independently contribute to self-control
experience negative self-conscious emotions, such performance
as (Hofmann, Schmeichel, & Baddeley, 2012).
/
626 Kotabe, Hofmann
More the issue of how much

specifically, of the available stock of control
individual di
ory capacity capacity
may people actually and effectively use to battle
moderate t
behaviors in desire. The central point is that people
tempting often do not use
contexts
higher order thegoals
full amount of their- available
withcontrol capacity, peo
for a
capacity variety of reasons
guided more - sometimes to by the benefit desi
of self-
ing memory control
capacity(in that cognitive resources are conserved,
guided
(Hofmann, whereas desire is still not enacted) but other times
Gschwendner, to its
Fries
In addition, detriment (in that insufficient
people high cognitive
in resources
wor are
be better at used toward controlling desire): (a) The desire at
suppressing hand
the
appraising may be weak so that it does not require
emotional stimulithe full use of a
Volokhov, & prepotent
Demaree, 2008).
control capacity or so overwhelmingly strong
Evidence is that mounting
the person disengages from the higher that order goal
restored in the (Atkinson, 1957; Brehm, Wright, Solomon, Silka, & Green-
short-run and
According to the
berg, 1983), (b) the personstrength
may perceive him- or herself
restore control capacity
as skillful at controlling a given desire so he or she uses in
(Baumeister, less control effort, or (c)
2002; there may be concurrent
Tyler & com- B
Maddox, & Markman,
peting goals to which the person needs2011). to invest some of
research showing his or her available control capacity. Whether self-control
relationshi
resources (Spiegel, succeeds depends on whether there is enough control
Tasali, Le
and, oppositely, effort. Some of the reasons for reduced
rest control effort
disturb
et al., 2004). described Some earlier suggest a researche
situation in which not a lot of
capacity can controlalso
effort would be needed
be to successfully
booste control
(Gailliot et al., 2007; Heatherton & Wagner, 2011; desire (e.g., desire is weak), whereas others suggest a
Masicampo & Baumeister, 2008), although this hypothe- situation in which not enough control effort is invested
sis has been doubted recently. Our take is that what is leading to self-control failure (e.g., desire is so strong it
leads to disengagement; when one conserves too many
temporarily impaired are cognitive abilities that rely on
directed attention (Kaplan & Berman, 2010), and althoughcontrol resources for competing goals). Thus, sometimes
these cognitive abilities (e.g., working memory) do relypeople will fail at self-control not because of insufficient
on glucose (as demonstrated by positron emissioncontrol motivation or control capacity per se but rather
tomography), their breakdown is not a simple function ofbecause of a reduction in actual control effort due to
glucose consumption. moderators.
Other research suggests long-term strategies that do
not improve self-control performance by replenishing On
a the components of the exertion cluster working
temporarily depleted resource but rather by expandingtogether. On the basis of recent formulations of effort in
overall control capacity. These include regular self-cognitive energetics theory (Kruglanski et al., 2012), con-
management exercises such as managing money and trol motivation and control capacity may determine the
sticking to work and exercise regimens (Muraven, potential control effort that can be invested in a given
moment. As previously indicated, how much control
Baumeister, & Tice, 1999; Oaten & Cheng, 2006a, 2006b),
capacity is actually used in battling desire is dynamically
participating in programs designed to improve executive
functions (Houben, Wiers, & Jansen, 2011), and mindful-
moderated by additional factors, including desire strength,
ness and meditation training (Alberts, Mulkens, Smeets, &perceived skill, and competing goals. A similar distinction
Thewissen, 2010; Kaplan, 2001; Papies, Barsalou, &between potential and actual effort was made by Brehm
Custers, 2012). and Self (1989); however, in their model, they did not
include cognitive resources as a major determinant of
potential effort, and actual effort expenditure was solely
Control effort . Generally speaking, effort refers to the
mobilization of mental energy to carry out instrumentala function of task demands. Adapting formulations from
behavior (Gendolla & Wright, 2009). More specifically,cognitive energetics theory to the topic of effortful self-
control, potential control effort (£P) may be proportional
effort refers to the actual amount of mental energy a per-
son invests to effectively reach a certain goal, given to the product of control motivation (M) and control
capacity (6) at a given point in time:
obstacles and barriers to fulfillment and the principle of
energy conservation (Brehm & Self, 1989; C. L. Hull,
1943; Muraven, Shmueli, & Burkley, 2006; Tolman, 1932;
Wright & Kirby, 2001). We adapt these general views to Ep ~ M xC, where 0 < M < 1.
MODERATORS
y* Desire strength
/ z* Perceived skill
// • Competing goals
Potential
Effort
^ ļj|gļj[ļj|^_ Effort
Activation
Fig. 2. A close-up of the exertion cluster. Desire-goal conflict activates control

motivation that, together with control capacity, determines potential control effort.
Potential control effort is moderated by desire strength, perceived skill, and compet-
ing goals to yield actual control effort.
The multiplicative relation implies that, in terms of using cognitive effort or "taking it easy") resemble labor
determining the level of potential control effort, control leisure decisions predicted by economic models of lab
motivation and control capacity are functionally inter- supply. The point is that multiple streams of researc
changeable (see Kruglanski et al., 2012). Further, the converge on the idea that people tiry to efficiently al
terms imply that how much control effort could be cate control effort to effectively deal with the desire
invested in principle is a joint function of the various hand. Thus, it follows that people usually allocate les
sources that factor into control motivation and of trait dif- effort to control weak desires than strong desire
ferences (e.g., in executive functions) and state influ- (Hofmann & Van Dillen, 2012; Kavanagh et al., 200
ences (e.g., cognitive load, alcohol intoxication, However, this linear relationship holds up only to th
stereotype threat) that factor into control capacity. Thepoint where the desire strength is too high in relation
range of M implies that potential effort is capped by theone's potential control effort - resulting in (temporar
control capacity at a given time. disengagement (see Brehm & Self, 1989; Gendolla
Why do people not always fully exert themselves in aRichter, 2010). For example, take the relationship between
self-control episode? Control motivation and control
desire strength and actual control effort at different lev
capacity determine how much control effort can beof potential control effort because of depletion reduci
exerted, but how much control effort is actually exertedcontrol motivation and control capacity (Baumeister
may depend on additional moderators (see Figure 2). Vohs, 2007; Muraven & Slessareva, 2003). Whereas
Formally stated, actual control effort expenditure CEA) is depleted and nondepleted people would invest similar
limited by potential control effort (Ą>) and is reducedamounts of control effort in controlling weak desires,
further by additional moderators of control effort CEM): depleted people would disengage much sooner as desire
strength exceeds potential control effort CEP), leading to
higher rates of control failure.
El=Ev-Eu.
A second moderator is perceived skill. Some people
may see themselves as more tacitly able to use their avail-
First, according to the effort mobilization ableliterature,
control capacity in the service of self-control than oth-
actual control effort investment should depend on the
ers (Reber, 1989; Wagner & Sternberg, 1985). Additionally,
some people
difficulty of controlling desire. Most centrally, effort allo-may believe that they have more or better
cation is assumed to be guided by a basic concern for strategies at their disposal in a given situation
self-control
energy conservation (Brehm & Self, 1989; Fiskethan others (see Sheppes & Meiran, 2008). In both cases,
& Taylor,
1991; Kruglanski et al., 2012). Further, recent research
the degree of perceived skiļl would inversely vary with
control
suggests that cognitive effort is intrinsically costly effort engagement because of energy conservation
(Kool,
McGuire, Wang, & Botvinick, 2013). These views concerns.
supportThe emphasis on perceived skill suggests that
that, like the use of money or time, the use people
of effort
may downplay the difficulty of combating a given
should be economical and contingent on one'sdesireavailable
or make overly confident judgments about their skill
"budget." In fact, Kool and Botvinick (2014) showed that it, perhaps because of unrealistic perceptions
in controlling
labor/leisure decisions in humans (i.e., choosing between
of self-efficacy. Such "control illusions" may lead them to
628 Kotabe, Hofmann
actually them less

allocate apart from the internal capacity for effo
control inhibition.
a mismatch between desire
factors include finite resources, st
such as time and m
effort) and as well as physical
might thus and social
lead barriersto
that can
se k
Van person
Harreveld, &from
Vanenacting Der
desire evenPligt,
when there a
Third, as self-control
"inner constraints" operating. Thus, does enactment no constr
may (have to) allocate
represent the often overlooked control
but important fact
tionally, to even when desires are strong goals
competing and internally unfett (H
2009; Kruglanski additional things et need al.,
to fall into2012;place to enact t
For example, Furthermore,
imagine in the very samea way, perso
whether a "do" h
or not eat a order goal can be enacted also
tempting depends on the pres
cookie a
his or her or absence ofIf
diet. enactment constraints.
another From a choice archi- goa
ning what to tecture
say perspective (Thaler & Sunstein, 2009),
next), then introduc- h
cognitive ing desire-enactment constraints
resources to and reducing
use higher tow
wise was going to
order, goal-enactment be
constraints used
into a choice environ- for
cookie. Thus, menteven though
is therefore an effective pot
recipe for facilitating self-
be high in thiscontrol. From a self-regulatory perspective,
example, a one can
con
goal is that proactively enough
not manipulate enactment constraints on poten-
availab
cated to tial future behaviors to support
effectively prevent desire enactment or tothe
In sum, whereasfacilitate enactment of behaviors compatible with
control the
capa
tion factor intohigher order goal (Hofmann & Kotabe, 2012). Such self- th
determining
trol effort that can
regulatory strategies can be verybe used
effective, and thus peo- a
control effort is to them
ple are attracted invested
- as evidenced by the popularity ma
effects of at of self-commitment
least three devices, such as modera
long-term gym
ceived skill, memberships (Brocas
and et al., 2004; Bryan et al., 2010).
competing g
control effort expenditure wo
strength is high,
Behavioral enactment perceived s
goals are absent. Conversely, a
diture would The
be final lowest
big question is, whichwhen psychological force d
ceived skill desire high,
is or control effort - "wins" and and why? com Because
This formulation enactment constraints,
of itcontrol is not simply a matter of whic ef
with the force is greater. First, toof
formulation predict goal-di
the outcome of a se
energetics control episode, it(Kruglanski
theory is important to determine whether th
are some keyperson pursues a "do" or "do not" higher order
differences. Lik goal
theory, controlthe case of motivation
a "do not" higher order goal, if the prevai a
determine theforce potential
is desire, then desire enactment will occur if t
effor
given moment. force overcomes
Additionally,all enactment constraints worki
how much against it. If the prevailing
control capacity force is control effort, h
is
desire is ever, desire will not be enacted,
dynamically moderat and enactment c
ceived skill, straints would be
and irrelevant because fulfillment of a "do
competing go
theory, task not" higher order goal is not contingent
demands are on enactment
fact
force, and constraints. Formally
actual stated, the resulting
skill behavior (5) is
increas
attainment).3 a functionself-control,
In of desire strength CDS), actual control effort pe
desire seems CEa), and desire
to enactment constraints (EC^)'
strongly influ
control effort is mobilized (N
what follows, we deal with th
B = DS - EA - ECDi where DS * EA.
actual effort mobilized is goin
the enactment of a given desir
Note that for the formula to apply, desire strength can-
not match actual control effort, as this results in equilib-
Enactment constraints
rium (Lewin, 1951) and iterative reprocessing (see left
Enactment constraints are neither part of theside of Figure 1), which does not constitute a "true"
activation
nor exertion cluster. They are environmental behavioral outcome but rather is an interim process. If
factors often
not under the person's immediate control thatDS - Ea is a positive value greater than ECDl then B rep-
constrain
the range of available behavioral options inresents
a giveninhibitory
situ- failure . That is, if desire strength
exceeds
ation. Thus, they are a subset of a broad class actual control effort and prevails over enactment
of inhibit-
constraints,
ing factors (Finkel, 2013), and their external nature setsthen desire enactment will occur because of
inhibitory failure. For desire

example, imagine
if his friend destroys awill
the cigarette. He also mannot try
quit cigarettes is enact
offered athe higher order goal ofat
cigarette chewing nicotine gum
a party. He is
icated so he
little instead uses
resistance effort,
if he left his nicotine gum at home. If DSand- EA is beca
negative
cigarette is being directly and greater thanto
handed ECG in absolute terms,
him, there then B are v
ally no enactment constraints. Thus,
represents self-control success because ofdesire
sufficient con- is en
because of pure trol effort
inhibitory mobilization and If
failure. successful
DS enactment
- EA of theis a pos
value less than or equal"do" tohigher order goal
ECD, {higher order
then B goal enactment). In
represents
itous control. That is, this if desire
case, strength
the smoker inhibits the desire for aexceeds
cigarette
control effort but does not exceed desire enactment con- and overrides it by doing something else - chewing nico-
straints, then desire enactment will not occur because tine of gum instead. To summarize, when a "do" higher
the fortunate presence of these constraints. Now imagine order goal competes against control effort, there are also
the intoxicated man is offered a cigarette, but this time three classes of outcomes: inhibitory failure, no enact-
his sober friend intervenes and destroys the cigarette. ment, and higher order goal enactment.
Now the man cannot smoke the cigarette, not because of One insight we derive from this analysis is that in the
the success of his inner restraint but because of the enact- case of "do not" higher order goals, one may achieve suc-
ment constraint posed by his friend. If DS - EA is a nega- cess because of purely external reasons, whereas internal
tive value, then B always represents inhibitory success ,and external reasons are prerequisites for the successful
and the value of ECD is irrelevant in terms of B. That is, if enactment of "do" higher order goals. That is, in the case
control effort exceeds desire strength, then desire enact- of "do not" higher order goals, one may achieve inhibi-
ment will not occur because of the effective internal inhi- tory success completely because enactment constraints
bition of desire. Now imagine the man is not intoxicatedprevent desire enactment. In contrast, to enact a "do"
when he is offered the cigarette. Soberly, he considershigher order goal, one has to mobilize enough control
the long-term ramifications, and then he puts his foot effort to overcome any enactment constraints to achieve
down and successfully resists the tempting offer. To sum- success. Thus, one may successfully achieve a "do not"
marize, when a "do not" higher order goal competesgoal by lucky circumstance, but achieving a "do" goal
against actual control effort, there are three classes ofrequires sufficient control effort.
behavioral outcomes: inhibitory failure, fortuitous con- Some issues should be discussed. First, this model
trol, and inhibitory success. posits that self-control success or failure emerges from a
In the case of a "do" higher order goal, the behavioralcompetition of the relative forces behind desire and con-
function is slightly different. Because any difference trol effort. This implies that self-control failure can hap-
between DS and EA represents a behavioral tendency thatpen because of quite different reasons. As Sir T. S.
depends on enactment constraints, we take the absolute Clouston once said, "the driver may be so weak that he
value of that difference. Related to that, because enact-cannot control well-broken horses, or the horses may be
ment constraints can prevent either desire-driven behav-so hard-mouthed that no driver can pull them up" (James,
ior or higher order, goal-driven behavior, EC c an represent1890, p. 540). Whether control effort prevails hinges on
either desire enactment constraints (£CD) or higher order the strength of the desire against which it competes.
goal enactment constraints (ECq), depending on which-Therefore, any approach that neglects either side of the
ever behavioral tendency is more potent: desire-control effort interplay would be incomplete.
Second, a diversity of contextual factors may have
moderating effects on the components that determine
B = I DS - Ea I -ECd/g, where DS * Eh.
desire and control effort strength. For example, contex-
tual factors such as acute alcohol intoxication may
If DS - Ea is positive and greater than ECD, then B increase desire strength or decrease control capacity
represents inhibitory failure. That is, like in the case of a (Hofmann, Friese, & Strack, 2009). This implies that
"do not" higher order goal, if desire strength exceeds whether a person can resist a desire at one time or
control effort and also overcomes all respective enact- another would vary depending on the contextual bound-
ment constraints, then desire enactment will occur ary conditions at each time and their (downstream)
because of inhibitory failure, just like in the earlier exam- effects on desire strength and actual control effort.
ple, except for that the smoker has a "do goal," such as Third, we are purposefully mute about how long self-
reaching for nicotine gum whenever he is offered a ciga- control episodes last. Struggles with desire can take place
rette. If the absolute difference between DS and EA is less in just an instant, or they may even continue for pro-
than or equal to ECd/g, then B represents no enactment. longed periods without a clear "winning" motivation
That is, regardless of the outcome of the competition emerging. Such equilibrial "ties" between desire strength
between desire strength and control effort, enactment and control effort may be unstable and accompanied by
constraints will prevent any behavioral enactment. Like aversive feelings and the experience of conflict (Inzlicht
in the earlier example, the smoker will not enact the & Legault, 2014; Lewin, 1935). Eventually one should exit
630 Kotabe, Hofmann
Self-Control
Failures
Conflict-Based Control Effort-

Failures Based Failures
Desire- Higher Order Control Control

Based Goal-Based Motivation- Capacity-
Failures Failures Based Failures Based Failures
Fig. 3. A taxonomy of self-control failures derived from integrative self-control theor
this equilibrial state and gravitate

activationtoward
and exertion one attractor
clusters suggest two broad forms
state or the other (Carver & Scheier,
of self-control 2002; Lewin,
failure: conflict-based and 1935).
control-effort-
Until that happens, we proposebased.
that Eachsuch
of these struggles occur into two
can be further decomposed
nested categories (desire-based and higher order, goal-
over time through iterative processing.
based; and control-motivation-based and control-capacity-
based, respectively). Distinguishing among different types
Summary of the model and framework
of self-control failures has both theoretical and applied
SCT provides a global, seven-component analysis
advantages. Theoretically, of self-
the proposed taxonomy allows
control. It shows that self-control involves
situating the research
one's specialized interplay of
on self-control and its
two clusters of psychological failure
components
in the context of- the activa-
self-control phenomena more gen-
tion cluster and the exertion cluster. The output
erally. In application, identifying the ofprimary
the reason for
activation cluster - D-G conflictwhy certain- emerges
problem groupsfrom the
or individuals fail at self-
coactivation of a lower order desire
control can and anthe
facilitate at least
selection partly
of the most appropriate
incompatible higher order goal. D-G conflict, by trigger-
treatment.
ing control motivation, provides the conceptual bridge to

the exertion cluster. The output Conflict-based
of the failures.
exertion These cluster
failures comprise
-
control effort - emerges from the interplay
desire-based and higher order, of control
goal-based failures. Basi-
motivation, control capacity, and several
cally, both moderators
types of failure result when there isof
insufficient
control effort. The resulting control
effect ofeffort isWethe
D-G conflict. net
suggest force
that this happens when
that opposes the net force of the focal
people desire.
temporarily Thea D-G
fail to detect behav-
conflict that they
ioral outcome of this competitionwould normally detect.4
between forces There depends
are two reasons one may
on whether the person is pursuing overlook D-G a conflict:
"do" (a) or "do
desire maynot"
be so strong as to
higher order goal and whether "blind" he or she
someone faces
of his enactment
or her higher order goals ( desire-
constraints. based control failure ), or (b) at the outset of a self-control
episode, one may be preoccupied with low-level details
of the situation to the extent that the higher order goal is
Applications neglected, which allows desire to operate "freely" ( higher
order, goal-based failure). The main difference is thus that
Classifying self-control failures
in the former, potent desire causes higher order goals to
One way SCT can be usefully applied is in distinguishing
temporarily be neglected (because of desire consuming
forms of self-control failure (see Figure 3). SCT suggests
attentional resources), whereas in the latter, temporarily
that several psychological components need to collaborate
neglected higher order goals (because of excessive low-
to achieve self-control success, which implies that there
level processing at the outset) allow desire to operate
are several ways through which self-control can fail.with
The less (or without) interference.
Integrative Self -Control Theory 631
reducing
Desire-based failures. These effectivefailures
self-control (Clarkson, Hirt, Jia, &
resonate w
folk concept of overpowering passion. Accordin
Alexander, 2010). Moreover, recent work suggests that
elaboration-intrusionmerely
theory ofconsumption,
expecting glucose desire (Kavana
compared with
2005) and a recent review of the role of desire in self- actually ingesting it, is sufficient to buffer against typi-
control (Hofmann & Van Dillen, 2012), the dynamicalcal depletion effects (Molden et al., 2012; Sanders, Shirk,
reprocessing of desire stimuli uses up space in work- Burghin, & Martin, 2012).
ing memory that otherwise could be engaged in other Self-control research has also lately been linked closely
competing and concurrent cognitive tasks. In this way, awith motivated reasoning (De Witt Huberts et al., 2013;
potent desire may temporarily consume mental facultiesKunda, 1990). The core idea in this research suggests that
that otherwise could be used to represent higher ordercontrol motivation may be susceptible to reasoning that
goals. In such cases, potent desire may cause the higher promotes desire or demotes higher order goals. Motivated
order goal to be temporarily "forgotten" (Hofmann et al., reasoning is thought to bias people toward particular
2011; Hofmann et al., 2008). preferred conclusions by making cognitions that support
the preferred conclusions more accessible. In our discus-
Higher order ; goal-based failures. This type of failuresion on different sources of control motivation, we noted
results when attention to higher order goals is temporar- that people may hold specific beliefs about how to bal-
ily lacking at the outset of the self-control episode. Peo-ance between desire and higher order goal enactment in
ple may enter a self-control episode neglecting higher their daily lives. When these beliefs offer too much lee-
order goals because they are processing at a low-level way for motivationally driven interpretations, motivated
of construal (Fujita, 2011) or because they are intoxi- reasoning may result in self-control failure. For example,
cated and affected by alcohol myopia (J. G. Hull, 1981;a dieter who lapses once at self-control by drinking a
MacDonald, Fong, Zanna, & Martineau, 2000). In thesemilkshake with dinner may think, "oh what the hell, diet-
cases, people fail to experience D-G conflict not because ing is done for today," and then subsequently indulge
desire consumes them but because higher order goals again by eating ice cream for dessert (Herman & Mack,
are not represented when they need to be. 1975). Or, a person may rationalize indulgence in the
here and now by instilling a sense of deservingness or
Control-effort-based failures . These failures com- justify why controlling oneself is unwarranted by aug-
prise control-motivation-based and control-capacity-menting the costs of self-control or downplaying possible
based failures. Their commonality is that desire enactment risks of desire enactment. For example, Kivetz and Zheng
occurs because of a lack of control effort. Their differ- (2006) showed that people are more likely to purchase
ence is in whether this lack of control effort is due to tempting goods when they can point to hard work as
insufficient control motivation or insufficient control justification. More recently, such self-licensing effects
capacity. Either way, potential control effort (Ep), as it is have been shown with regard to tempting food (De Witt
determined by control motivation and control capacity, Huberts, Evers, & De Ridder, 2012). A sense of deserving-
may be critically reduced. Because Ep limits EA, this criti- ness may also stem from the perception that one has
cal reduction increases the likelihood of self-control already committed to a virtuous act in the past (Khan &
failure. Dhar, 2006; Mukhopadhyay & Johar, 2009) or has made
substantial progress advancing a higher order goal
Control-motivation-based failures. Self-control fail- (Fishbach & Dhar, 2005). Motivated reasoning can lead to
ure because of lack of motivation has been a topicbehaviors
of that are arguably insensible. For instance, a
debate in the philosophical literature on weakness of will
dieter may find no reason to control the desire for a ridic-
(Davidson, 1980). It is gaining traction among psycholog-ulously unhealthy entree because he or she got it with a
ical researchers interested in this topic, as evidenced diet
by soda (Chernev, 2011; Chernev & Gal, 2010).
the apparent shift from strictly capacity-based accounts
of self-control failure to broader models that capture the Control-capacity-based failures. Regarding control-
interplay between motivation and capacity (Inzlicht capacity-based
& failures, we assume that limitations in
Schmeichel, 2012; Vohs, Baumeister, & Schmeichel, 2012). control capacity can be attributed to both trait-level
One recent stream of research that serves as an example and state-level effects. A wealth of evidence suggests
of this development shows that one's expectations and that people vary in their trait ability to use the execu-
implicit beliefs of the concept of "willpower" can shape tive functions that subserve self-control (Hofmann, Fri-
self-control outcomes (Job, Dweck, & Walton, 2010; ese, see & Roefs, 2009; Hofmann et al., 2011, 2008; Hofmann,
also Bandura, 1977). Related research has shown thatSchmeichel, & Baddeley, 2012). Additionally, executive
the mere perception of being resource-depleted may functions seem to generally follow a developmental trajec-
sometimes be more impactful than actual depletion in tory such that they tend to mature late (Figner, Mackinlay,
632 Kotabe, Hofmann
Wilkening, scope, & we developed

Weber, SCT, a model and theoretical frame-2009
Harshman, 2007)
work that integrates and
seven different emphases in self- dege
2004). As forcontrol research.
its We drew onstate
concepts and findings from comp
temporarily a wide suffer
range of areas. For example, we integrated
becaus key
meister et elements from basic
al., psychological research on reward
2007), concu
Schmeichel, processing,& Baddeley,
conflict monitoring and detection, executive
(Hofmann &functions, and effort allocation, as well as from
Friese, applied
2008),
et al., 2009). psychological research on self-control interventions.
Through this integration, we believe SCT makes several
useful contributions. First, it moves researchers beyond
Classifying self-control interventions dual-component (e.g., dual-systems, dual-motives)
Our theoretical framework can also be applied to create approaches to a more widely compatible approach that
a taxonomy of self-control interventions. For example, may serve as a foundation for a more rigorous analysis of
interventions in which desire is targeted include (a) those self-control episodes. Second, it provides a general
that prevent desire from occurring (e.g., Houben, framework of self-control that self-control researchers
Havermans, & Wiers, 2010) and (b) those that reduce can use as a context in which to embed their research to
desire strength after desire starts operating (e.g., understand its broader theoretical implications and to
Florsheim, Heavin, Tiffany, Colvin, & Hiraoka, 2008). As identify future directions. Third, it puts forward an expla-
for interventions targeting higher order goals, examples nation of self-control exertion that emphasizes the differ-
come from traditional health psychology. These ence between what people are willing to do, what they
approaches aim to get people to set goal intentions and are able to do, and what they actually do. Fourth, with
to boost commitment to goals, for example, via educa- SCT we discuss self-control and related motivational phe-
tional campaigns that inform about health-behavior links nomena using clearly defined language. Specifying the
and potential risks and long-term consequences of impul- language will surely help reduce ambiguities moving
sive behavior (Ajzen & Albarracin, 2007; Godin & Kok, forward.
1996; Janz & Becker, 1984; Strecher et al., 1995). Regarding Our main goals in this article were to promote integra-
conflict, there is a long history of cognitive behavioral tion, organization, and definition in the science of self-
therapeutic interventions aimed at increasing self-moni- control: integration of the hitherto disconnected
toring (Cohen, Edmunds, Brodman, Benjamin, & Kendall, components involved in self-control, organization of the
2012). Additionally, interventions aimed at increasing large and growing bodies of research on self-control, and
mindfulness (for a review, see Baer, 2003) of inner states definition of the nuanced constructs involved in self-
may be useful in that they may help people identify D-G control. We hope we have ably conveyed that SCT can
conflict and respond to it effectively. As for control moti- advance each of these goals and, by doing so, can help
vation, in one prominent approach, researchers target people understand - and improve - the way that they
control motivation by using motivational interviewing to deal with the age-old problem of unwanted wants.
elicit self-motivational statements (e.g., Senay, Albarracin,
& Noguchi, 2010; Tullett & Inzlicht, 2010). Recently, Acknowledgments
capacity has become a promising intervention focus. This We thank Ayelet Fishbach, Chin Ming Hui, Anirudh Tiwathia,
trend has been inspired by experimental research in cog- and Timothy Lewis for their useful comments and suggestions.
nitive psychology suggesting that executive functions can
be trained (e.g., Jaeggi, Buschkuehl, Jonides, & Perrig,
Funding
2008; Olesen, Westerberg, & Klingberg, 2003). Finally,
one only needs to look to behavioral economics for We are grateful to William R. Waters and Phyllis Jean Waters for
interventions targeting enactment constraints - the popu-

establishing the Sidney Davidson Doctoral Fellowship that
funded this research.
lar though controversial concept of "nudging" involves
authority figures proactively altering choice environ-
ments in ways that get people to make healthier deci- Declaration of Conflicting Interests
sions (Thaler & Sunstein, 2009). The authors declared that they had no conflicts of interest with
respect to their authorship or the publication of this article.
Concluding Remarks Notes
The ways humans resolve their internal conflicts between 1. A case pertinent to the one described here could be ca
passion and reason have major implications at the per- "dread control." Whereas self-control concerns controlling ap
sonal, social, and societal levels. In this article, we argued titive behaviors driven by desire, dread control concerns cont
that such conflicts may serve as a basis for a clear defini- ling fearful behaviors driven by dread. Biopsychological stud
tion of self-control. From this perspective and within this of rat behavior suggest that the intensely felt motivational st
sions with competing

of desire and dread are related ininternal
that preferences.
they Academy of
are bot
by the same subcortical Management
circuits Review, 23involving
, 225-241. the nuc
bens, but they differ inBeedie, C. J., & Lane, and
valence A. M. (2012).
in Thethe
role of glucose
way in they
self-control: Another look&
enced (Faure, Reynolds, Richard, at the evidence and an alterna-
Berridge, 2008;
Berridge, 2008; Richard &tive conceptualization. Personality
Berridge, 2011). and Social Psychology
Although
Review, 16, 143-153-
and dread control may involve the same control pr
Berridge, K. C.,
do not make this assumption and & Robinson,
suggestT. E. (1998). What
that is the role
answer
an important direction for future
of dopamine research.
in reward: Hedonic For no
impact, reward learn-
on the typical self-control
ing, or incentive
case salience?
involving
Brain Research Reviews, desires
28,
order goals. 309-369.
2. Not to be confused with desire for control (Burger & Cooper, Berridge, K. C., Robinson, T. E., & Aldridge, J. W. (2009).
1979), which is defined as the motivation to control the events Dissecting components of reward: "Liking," "wanting," and
in one's life. learning. Current Opinion in Pharmacology, 9, 65-73.
3. Note that actual skills such as inhibitory capacity and atten- Botvinick, M. M., Braver, T. S., Barch, D. M., Carter, C. S., &
tional control are subsumed under the control capacity compo- Cohen, J. D. (2001). Conflict monitoring and cognitive con-
nent of SCT. Thus, actual skills increase the likelihood of higher trol. Psychological Review, 108, 624-652.
order goal attainment by increasing potential effort. Botvinick, M. M., Cohen, J. D., & Carter, C. S. (2004). Conflict
4. This is different from when a person does not hold the higher monitoring and anterior cingulate cortex: An update.
order goal at all. In both cases, the person would likely not Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8, 539-546.
inhibit acting on desire, but only when this is due to a tempo- Botvinick, M. M., Nystrom, L. E., Fisseli, K., Carter, C. S., &
rary self-monitoring lapse can the person be said to fail at self- Cohen, J. D. (1999). Conflict monitoring versus selection-
control in that the desire is incompatible with a higher order for-action in anterior cingulate cortex. Nature, 402, 179-181.
goal to which the person otherwise is committed. Brehm, J. W., & Self, E. A. (1989). The intensity of motivation.
Annual Review of Psychology, 40, 109-131.
Brehm, J. W., Wright, R. A., Solomon, S., Silka, L., &
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On Integrating the Components of Self-Control

Author(s): Hiroki P. Kotabe and Wilhelm Hofmann

Perspectives on Psychological Science

failures at self-control Higgins,

5. Control Cohen, 1999), we hold that D-G

: I Prevailing Force Is I .1 0,. , _ - : - - 1

Activation I Desire vs SC Effort 1' Iterative J Eq"'"brlum, Reprocessing I ■EgjaH

Fig. 1. A diagram of integrative self-control (SC) theory. The

Bryan, Karlan, & Nelson, 2010)

enacted because the person does

conflict tasks (see

response conflicts and guilt. Recent research suggests engages

More the issue of how much

Fig. 2. A close-up of the exertion cluster. Desire-goal conflict activates control

actually them less

inhibitory failure. For desire

Conflict-Based Control Effort-

Desire- Higher Order Control Control

Fig. 3. A taxonomy of self-control failures derived from integrative self-control theor

this equilibrial state and gravitate

ing control motivation, provides the conceptual bridge to

Wilkening, scope, & we developed

interventions targeting enactment constraints - the popu-

Concluding Remarks Notes

sions with competing

Chernev, A. Fishbach, A., & Dhar, R.The

Herman, C. P., & Mack, Hofmann,

Kivetz, R., & Zheng, Y.

self-control? Social PsychologicalSanders, M. A., Shirk, S.& Personality

Tullett, A. M., &inhibits

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