Burying Jihadis: Bodies Between State,

Territory, and Identity Riva Kastoryano

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BURYING JIHADIS
 COMPARATIVE POLITICS
AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES SERIES
Series editors, Christophe Jaffrelot and Alain Dieckhoff
Series managing editor, Miriam Perier

The series consists of original manuscripts and translations of notewor-

thy manuscripts and publications in the social sciences emanating from
the foremost French researchers.
The focus of the series is the transformation of politics and society by
transnational and domestic factors—globalization, migration and
­religion. States are more permeable to external influence than ever
before and this phenomenon is accelerating processes of social and
political change the world over. In seeking to understand and interpret
these transformations, this series gives priority to social trends from
below as much as to the interventions of state and nonstate actors.
 RIVA KASTORYANO

Burying Jihadis
Bodies Between State,Territory,
and Identity

Translated by
Cynthia Schoch

1
 1
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Riva Kastoryano.
Title: Burying Jihadis: Bodies Between State, Territory, and Identity /
Riva Kastoryano.
Description: Oxford [UK]; New York: Oxford University Press, [2018]

ISBN 9780190889128 (print)

ISBN 9780190934644 (updf)
ISBN 9780190934866 (epub)
 CONTENTS

List of Maps vii

Introduction 1

PART I
BODY, LAND AND TERRITORY
1. The Power of Discourse 17
2. The Question of Burial: A Name, a Place and What’s Left 33
3. The Territory at Stake: To Die for Palestine 57

PART II
9/11—NEW YORK
4. Trajectories and Burials 67
5. Local History and Its Global Representation 87
6. The Global Nation and Its Enemies 99

PART III
11M—MADRID
7. Trajectories and Burials 113
8. Between Spain and the Maghreb: The Transnational Issue 139

PART IV
7/7—LONDON
9. Trajectories and Burials 155

v
 CONTENTS
10. The Homegrown Terrorist 177
11. The End of Multiculturalism? 193
Conclusion 201
Notes 211
Bibliography 249
Index 277

vi
 LIST OF MAPS

1. Paris Attacks, 13 November 2015: Trajectories of the ten

terrorists 54
2. Paris Attacks, 13 November 2015: Burial of the ten
terrorists 55
3. New York Attacks, 11 September 2001: Trajectories of the
four hijacker-pilots 84
4. New York Attacks, 11 September 2001: Trajectory of the
organizer, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed 85
5. Madrid Attacks, 11 March 2004: Trajectories of the two
organizers and the seven terrorists who committed suicide
three weeks after the attacks 136
6. Madrid Attacks, 11 March 2004: Burial of the seven terror-
ists who committed suicide three weeks after the attacks 137
7. London Attacks, 7 July 2005: Trajectory of the four suicide
bombers and the recruiter 175
8. London Attacks, 7 July 2005: Burial of the four suicide
bombers 176
9. A typology of the use of space 210

vii
 INTRODUCTION

This book addresses the question of space and territory in globaliza-

tion. It takes as a case study the jihadis who declared jihad, a global war,
on states. Through an analysis of the trajectories and burials of the
suicide bombers who carried out the attacks of 11 September 2001 in
New York (9/11), 11 March 2004 in Madrid (11-M) and 7 July 2005
in London (7/7) (and updated with the Paris attacks of January and
November 2015), this study highlights forms of spatiality in globaliza-
tion, underscoring the nature of the issues states are now obliged to
face: global, transnational and diasporic. The issue is global when
­suicide bombers move freely from place to place, leaving no trace, as
was the case for 9/11. It is transnational when the jihadis are first-
generation immigrants and maintain permanent relations with their
country of origin, such as the perpetrators of the Madrid bombings.
And it is diasporic when young jihadis are recognize as “homegrown”,
born in the country of immigration, socialized and radicalized in the
country where they hold citizenship, coming and going between their
real “ancestral” land—or an imagined one, such as Pakistan or Syria—
and their country of citizenship, as was the case of the London bombers
and the attackers in Paris.
Their burial, taken as the state’s response to their use of global space,
completes the elaboration of these issues. The burial of suicide bombers
increases the tension between globalization and state sovereignty, in
which each case corresponds to a different reaction. States do not rec-
ognize suicide bombers as warriors; their burial is thus neither a legal,
nor a political nor a diplomatic issue. On the contrary, it is an unwel-

1
 Burying Jihadis
come, embarrassing question, usually ill-received by public officials and
even more so by victims’ families and public opinion. What matters
more to the state is identifying the perpetrators of a suicide attack,
retracing their itinerary, situating their environment, and tracking their
connections with the organization they belonged to. As in classic war-
fare, the aim, to paraphrase Clausewitz, is to control the territory and
the people who live there, even if jihadi warfare is not territorial.
Jihadis do not request burial. They express no particular wishes in
this regard prior to committing suicide attacks. They are convinced that
their sacrifice will be rewarded after their death even if they are not
buried. Jihadis imagine they will find glory in death and play a game of
enacting their funeral.1 They are drawn into a single narrative of
belonging to the ummah—the reimagined worldwide Muslim com-
munity in which national, religious and worldly attachments are all
jumbled together. They have been convinced of their moral obligation
to wage jihad as long as the ummah is in danger, just as men feel it their
duty to go off to war when their nation and its army come under
attack.2 Only the websites that played a role in these individuals’ indoc-
trination display their portraits, Kalashnikov in hand. It is through such
websites that young people become familiar with the rhetoric of radical
Islamic leaders who have drawn them into a single narrative of belong-
ing to the ummah. These sites also post images of the martyr, his body
like a weapon ready to explode.
States’ reactions to these bodies have primarily a symbolic signifi-
cance. Dick Howard sees here the symbolic question as primarily one
of identity. According to him, “it could be that of the jihadis as individu-
als, or that of the networks without which they do not exist. It could
be that of the nations after they have been affected by the action. Or
perhaps it is that of the ummah, that imaginary territory without limits
that they have made into the root of their self-identity.”3 These various
levels of identification correspond to the jihadis’ subjectivity in their
use of space and the issues facing states.

NewYork, Madrid and London … and Paris

This book analyzes and compares the responses of the United States,
Spain and Great Britain in relation to the matter of burying the human

2
 INTRODUCTION
remains of the suicide attacks in New York City and against the
Pentagon in 2001 (9/11), in Madrid (11-M), and in London (7/7).
These three attacks took place in the West and were claimed by
Al-Qaeda, which declared a non-territorial war against the United
States and its allies. But the itineraries of the perpetrators of the attacks
in these three countries were not identical. The handling of the bodies,
or their remains, which varied from one country to another, evinces a
link between, on the one hand, the jihadis’ trajectories, their move-
ments, their networks of relations at the local, regional and global level
as proof of their use of space; and on the other, the states’ reactions
with regard to their burial.
Each case raises different questions and brings different issues into
play. For the United States, the attacks targeted two of the most promi-
nent symbols of the country’s wealth and power and of its military
capabilities—the twin towers of the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon building, the Defense Department headquarters, respec-
tively. These spectacular attacks were carried out by nineteen young
jihadis of different nationalities, social backgrounds and educational
levels, who had travelled worldwide prior to blowing themselves up in
the south of Manhattan, in Washington and in Pennsylvania. Burial—a
non-issue for the United States—expresses the rejection of the jihadi
suicide bomber as enemy, who when alive belonged to the ummah and
whose body when dead does not (or should not) leave a trace in his-
tory. Their global movements, with no place and no trace of burial,
embodying the very issue of globalization, enabled the United States to
assert itself as a world power above any normative consideration. With
the “War on Terror” launched by President George W. Bush, the United
States expressed its determination to appear as a “global nation” out to
pursue its enemy wherever it was found.
In Madrid, on the other hand, the seven young men who perpetrated
the attacks on suburban trains heading into the Atocha railway station
on 11 March 2004, and who committed suicide a month later when the
Spanish police raided their hideout in the town of Leganés, were first-
generation migrants. They had come from Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria
and maintained close ties with these countries and their families who
had remained behind. The Madrid attacks showed the ties of solidarity
that bind the country of origin and the country of immigration, and the

3
 Burying Jihadis
establishment of cross-border networks in which new forms of interac-
tion prevail based on economic transfers, of course, but also on cultural,
social, political and even ideological transfers. Like most young first-
generation migrants, their supposed burial back home highlighted the
transnational dimension of the phenomenon in life and death. Through
such transnational relations, and with Spain as a port of entry into the
Schengen Area, these attacks represented a challenge to free movement
within the European Union, a de facto transnational space.
In London, the 7 July 2005 attacks on the underground system and
on a bus were perpetrated by four youths holding British citizenship:
three of whom were born in Great Britain, the fourth having arrived
from Jamaica at a very young age. The public authorities classified these
criminals as “homegrown terrorists,” which has become the most com-
mon jihadi profile. The term “home” referring to the land or country of
origin, for Great Britain means their country of citizenship and “natu-
ral” place of burial. Ties with Pakistan, their parents’ homeland for
three of them as well as the country where training took place, create
ambiguity in establishing a diasporic space marked by an attachment to
the ancestral land and integration in the host country. The burial of the
perpetrators of 7/7 placed the homegrown terrorist phenomenon
within the larger issue of territory and belonging that connects citizen-
ship and transnational networks, nationality and the extent of the dias-
pora. Citizenship and territorial attachment were the focus of public
reaction regarding the handling of the bodies of these youths, and
prompted a reconsideration of so-called multicultural policies as the
democratic basis for recognizing identities. They are now linked to the
problem of security on either side of the border.
A decade on from the London bombings and the 2005 riots in
France, the attacks on the satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo in January
2015, and on the Bataclan concert hall, Stade de France stadium and
various sidewalk cafés in Paris in November, became a “French 9/11”,
claimed by so-called Islamic State (IS). The involvement of three young
French “homegrown” jihadis, in the case of Charlie Hebdo, and eight
others in the case of the Bataclan, raises the same questions of territo-
rial attachment—these were Belgian and French citizens, and some
held dual citizenship (Algerian/French or Moroccan/Belgian). They
belonged to a diaspora. But in the case of France, the diasporic space

4
 INTRODUCTION
did not include their parents’ country of origin but instead referred to
Syria, defined as the land of an “imagined caliphate” and henceforth the
ancestral land of resistance, a land to be reconquered and for which
one must fight. The matter of their burial, extensively and recurrently
debated in the media after each attack in France, creates the same
ambiguity as in the UK, meaning the establishment of a diasporic space
marked by an attachment to the ancestral land and integration in
France. The difference arises in the representation of the “ancestral
land”, which is not the parents’ country of origin that enables them to
form diasporic ties, but an “imagined diaspora” in reference to the
caliphate. That being the case, the burial of the perpetrators of Charlie
Hebdo and 13 November in Paris places the homegrown terrorist phe-
nomenon, as in the British case, within the larger issue of territory and
belonging that connects citizenship (single or dual), transnational net-
works and the extent of an “imagined diaspora”.

The Body of the ummah

The act of burial, like the place of interment, connects individuals to
their community and to their ancestors. These bodies, instruments of
war and objects of sacrifice, are driven by ambiguous rhetoric as to
their attachment to the ummah, a global “imagined community” that
calls into question the link between body (blood and identity) and
nation, and, consequently, between citizenship, nationality and terri-
tory. Radical Islamist leaders counsel young jihadis to break off ties
with family authority and to reject nationality and citizenship as a basis
for their identity. All that remains is the ummah, the community of
believers. Burying their bodies, which as a representation of global
power escape state control, amounts to re-territorialising them.
For Kantorowicz, the body, a political object centred on the human
being, assumes a tangible aspect, that of the sovereign individual; and
a symbolical aspect, that of the body politic, the state, which has a
collective dimension.4 The body of the combatant forms part of the
nation. National war histories are full of examples of the “repatriation”
of soldiers who “died for their country” on enemy soil or tributes to
unknown soldiers. All of this fits in with a process that is at once social
and political, accompanied by a rhetoric that highlights the link

5
 Burying Jihadis
between body and territory in its modern definition: that of the
nation. On the other hand, the body of a jihadi or, as President George
W. Bush put it, the “unlawful combatant”, does not belong to any
national community or any state, any more than it has any status in
international law. His burial is not an issue in itself, whether political,
social or legal. No state, no community, no individual explicitly claims
his body. It is not made into a “founding moment” of national con-
struction, as in the case of embarrassing bodies whose burial is an
issue for the historical reconstruction of the nation—as in the case of
the “body of il Duce.”5 The pain caused by suicide attacks is borne by
the public, but mourning in their case secretly associates the family
sphere with that of the local community.
Burial, according to Engseng Ho, “the act of combining a place, a
person, a text, and a name”, thus reflects a territorial attachment.6 In
his essay “Long Distance Nationalism”, Benedict Anderson refers to
Bossuet, Bishop of Meaux in the seventeenth century and known for
his sermons and funeral orations, who wrote: “Men feel connected to
something powerful when they consider that the same earth that bore
them and nourished them when they were living will receive them into
its bosom when they die.”7 Anderson contrasts this individual immobil-
ity characteristic of feudal societies with the remarks made by the
nineteenth-century British historian and political thinker Lord Acton,
who conversely believed that “exile is the nursery of nationality” or
national sentiment. For Bossuet, one’s land is one’s native soil, the
village of one’s birth, and for Lord Acton the nationality he describes
refers to a territorial attachment. This attachment, like any identity
reference, is not fixed in time or space. Given the scale of human
migration, place of birth or even native lands as territorial attachment
become abstract and distant references, whereas places of interment
mark the points of passage or the settlement of a generation.
In the case of jihadis, driven by an identity narrative related to their
belonging to the ummah, there is no question of territorial attachment.
What fate can be reserved for these bodies transformed into human
bombs? It should be noted that even though suicide attacks are hailed
on the internet as glorious, the act of suicide bombing erases all real or
virtual trace of their physical remains. It is not followed by any public
ceremony or glorification by their family or community.

6
 INTRODUCTION
As for the countries targeted by attacks, in keeping with the respect
for human rights, they are often faced with dilemmas, as they must at
once take into account the families’ duties to their dead, and worry
about their own sovereignty. The question of sovereignty leads them to
use all possible means to “punish the dead” who murdered civilians and
who escaped their justice, as if to serve “the vengeance of the Prince
and contain the anger of the people.”8 This is reminiscent of Creon, the
king in the Sophocles tragedy who denied Antigone’s brother
Polyneices a burial, considering him a traitor.
The burial of jihadis who died on the soil of these constitutional
states raises different issues, however. Whereas in Antigone, King Creon
orders Polyneices to be “left unwept, unmourned, unburied and con-
demned to feed the birds of prey” and even wishes “deprivation of a
sepulcher his punishment,” jihadi burial is not part of any sort of sanc-
tioning strategy aimed at the family or local communities. Nor does it
enter into state strategies for fighting terrorism. State counter-radical-
ization policies often encourage mutual cooperation in border protec-
tion and the security of their citizens, while continuing to subject them
to the normative constraints imposed by human rights declarations and
supranational institutional regulations, particularly with respect to civil
liberties. Despite such cooperation at various levels, which tends to
align the policies of various states, major differences arise in the way
the burial of jihadis is envisaged.
“Dying to kill”:9 this imperative is not specific to jihad or to radical
Islam. All religions have known the phenomenon of martyrdom, even
if sacrifice or voluntary death in the name of a national or religious
cause were not explicitly referred to by this term.10 During the Second
World War, Japanese kamikazes downed their planes in enemy terri-
tory in the name of God and the nation.11 But the current interpreta-
tion of the jihadist narrative, which took root in the colonial period,12
refers to belonging to the ummah, a global nation imagined as the basis
for a new identity which, instead of relating to a territory, follows the
thread of networks beyond borders. In other words, the mobile body
delineates the territory of the ummah.Youths who have chosen the path
of jihad thus turn state territories into a cross-border space of move-
ment to affirm a transnational identity. They thereby mean to blur
boundaries and define a nation and a nationalism without territory.13

7
 Burying Jihadis
The use of the body as a war tactic and a victim-targeting strategy
contrasts two opposing conceptions of power: territorial power and
non-territorial power. So-called transnational political acts, those that
reach beyond borders, today are helping to create a space of identifica-
tion beyond national societies; a space that, in its quest for power, seeks
to combine the local and the global. The mobile body thus outlines a
new, denationalized and deterritorialized geography that is transform-
ing states: national borders are still clearly drawn, but they are tra-
versed by a mesh of networks that criss-cross in space as if to define a
new form of territoriality, characterized nevertheless by the extension
of state sovereignty.

Redefining Territoriality
Al-Qaeda brought to the fore this new aspect of interconnected rela-
tions in a deterritorialized and denationalized space. “Mobile” or “shift-
ing” territories are presented by radical Islamist leaders as places where
jihad should be conducted. These are the lands of jihad. They follow the
contours of the Al-Qaeda nebula: its local cells in Africa, the Middle
East and Asia, and more precisely in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Chechnya,
and Bosnia in the 1990s, and since 2003 in Iraq and Syria. The process
reduces territory to the places where power is exercised through vio-
lence and where networks intersect, forming “hubs” that change loca-
tion depending on the density of encounters to shape “geographies of
threats or fear,” to use Stuart Elden’s expression,14 which he considers
to be a means to attain political objectives that involve influencing gov-
ernments by fear. According to Arjun Appadurai, these spaces represent
the “geography of anger”15 formed by those who identify according to
the ummah, and become globalized through their mobility. As for what
are known as transnational actors, such as “pirates, bandits, criminals,
smugglers, youth gangs, drug lords, warlords, Mafiosi, traitors, terror-
ists,” and jihadis too, they exercise a “de facto sovereignty” in these
geographies that is manifested by “the ability to kill, punish, and disci-
pline with impunity wherever it is found and practiced, rather than
sovereignty grounded in formal ideologies of rule and legality.” These
groups “persist and mutate despite state laws and powerful institutions
entrusted with the responsibility of eliminating them.”16 Through their

8
 INTRODUCTION
actions they induce states to extend their sovereignty beyond their
territory when tracking their networks.
This new dynamic transforms territorial wars into extraterritorial
wars. But in a Westphalian world, territory remains the space where
power is concentrated. When a faction of Al-Qaeda took control of an
area the size of the UK on the border between Syria and Iraq, pro-
claimed itself “Islamic State,” named Al-Baghdadi its caliph in June 2014
(during Ramadan that year) and expanded its territory by conquering
neighbouring areas to cover a territory as large as Great Britain,17 it
had no legitimacy in the eyes of international law and the nations con-
cerned.Yet, it confirmed the essential role of territory within the tac-
tics of war and an expansionist strategy.
Several studies point out the similarities as well as changes and/or
continuity between Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State organization. “They
are both the product of a history of Sunni Islamic revivalist movements
that have sought to empower Muslims against what they describe as
Islam’s enemies, both external and internal.”18 The ideological diver-
gence of views between Osama Bin Laden and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,
and their operational differences—namely territorial aspirations and no
longer simply a web of networks—converge when it comes to mobiliz-
ing young men for jihad, both having the same rhetorical force and
discourse about belonging to the ummah. Whereas Al-Qaeda had
embarked on a global, deterritorialized jihad, Islamic State propaganda
reminds youths of the “religious duty of hijra (migration to Iraq or Syria)
to join the caliphate,” and that “migration is the purpose of the Jihad.”19
The ummah’s army for jihad is made up of youths of all social and
national origins having a variety of educational and occupational back-
grounds. It is virtually impossible to determine a typical profile. They
meet in cybercafés, bookshops and neighbourhood mosques to view
videos about the wars in Chechnya or Bosnia, and of course the Israeli–
Palestinian conflict. They are affected by scenes of suffering and
speeches about “Islam humiliated,” harbouring a desire for revenge that
drives them to violence. Some have travelled to Afghanistan, Pakistan
or Yemen to join training camps there.
Since 2011, many of them have been streaming into Syria. They are
“invited”, or say they are “drawn”, by videos and images that promise
them heaven on earth if they take part in jihad. Messages and photos

9
 Burying Jihadis
circulate on social media: images of parties and great luxury, and selfies
showing smiling men out to prove their happiness and newfound
peace.20 Showing the happiness and harmony that reigns in Islamic State
territory is also important in attracting young women who are wanted
as brides, and to remind them that the Islamic State group subsidizes
youths who rally to its organization and its cause.21 Such mobilization
follows the rationale of any social movement that aspires to bring about
a new society,22 using the rhetoric of “justice to be restored” and
“revenge” for the domination its followers have been subjected to. It
convinces them to sacrifice themselves for the ummah by using their
body—a source of blood and identity—as their weapon of war. This war
is a non-territorial war propagated over the internet, which has opened
new spaces for communication, mobilization and power.
Patrick Cockburn asserts that the movement generated by the
Islamic State organization is “a hundred times bigger and much better
organized than the Al-Qaeda of Osama Bin Laden.”23 He proceeds,
“What makes their threat particularly alarming is that their base area,
the land where they are in control, is today larger by far than anything
an Al-Qaeda type of group held before.”24 Recruitment is also more
systematic. The leaders target disadvantaged neighbourhoods in
European cities with high concentrations of Muslims, such as Roubaix,
Brussels and the Seine-St-Denis banlieue of Paris: all places where
youth unemployment is far above the national average. These areas are
presented as conflict zones between civil society and the police,
between generations and cultures. From Mosul, the self-proclaimed
caliph, Al-Baghdadi, underlined the duty of jihadis to unify the ummah
and asked all “fighters to swear allegiance to the caliphate or give up
their weapons.” But despite the call to territorial jihad, all reports con-
cur that the organization’s threat lies mainly in these jihadis’ intention
to act anywhere in the world. This makes territorial jihad a global jihad.
Such territorial detachment under the influence of globalization rejects
“the existing territorial domain in favour of alternative identities. The
homeland in this case is not a reservoir of an emotional attachment, but
a persistent barrier to religious and economic aspirations.”25
As its name suggests, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, (or Al-Sham
in reference to Greater Syria in the ideological jargon) expresses its
intention to form a state, appoint a caliph, define its territory, “and

10
 INTRODUCTION
following the Prophet’s example,” plant its flag “as a symbol to rally
people to its cause” in reference to black flags “flown by the prophet in
his war with the infidels.”26 Even more, to mint its own money, raise an
army, and procure weapons and land are focal to the strategy of the
self-proclaimed caliphate.
The areas seized serve to attract not only the young Muslim dias-
pora, but also others from Europe, from the Middle East and North
Africa, the Caucasus and Asia, coming together with local tribes to
form an “army”. According to James Clapper, Director of the US Office
of National Intelligence, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services
Committee on 9 February 2016, more than 38,200 foreign fighters,
including at least 6,900 from Western countries, have travelled to Syria
from more than 100 countries since 2012.27 In Europe, France and
Belgium are the largest sources of recruitment. In the Middle East, it
is Jordan, Egypt and Tunisia. From Asia, Pakistan, India and Bangladesh
provide most of the recruits.
These young people, regardless of their national origin, see them-
selves as mobilizing for the caliphate. They have made it their “home-
land,” the homeland of an imagined diaspora of the ummah. Whether
organized in groups, or local or global networks, whether they act
individually or in a collective, organized fashion, their identification—
individual and/or collective—with the ummah seems to find fertile
ground in this “diasporic” aspect of dispersion. The discourse that
underlies the idea of transforming the ummah into a global nation relies
on its members finding unity based on overlapping identities (national,
regional, religious, linguistic). It also relies on shared experiences
(colonization, exile or emigration). Furthermore, it relies on constant
references to a denationalized and deterritorialized “we” that estab-
lishes itself within the conceptions of the diaspora and the nation.
If diasporas encourage a sort of “nationalism” that is abstract yet
anchored in a physical territory, the ummah generates new impulses
based on the transnational communities and networks that seek to
consolidate themselves through the strength of a single story fed by
symbols, images and objects. So-called Islamic State may have lost a
large amount of the territory they had amassed, but the soldiers of the
caliphate continue their work in a “deterritorialized” way. They attack
where they are, and thus recall the objectives of both territorial “state

11
 Burying Jihadis
building” as well as a global expansion through the “imagined diaspora”
that motivates foreign fighters. Every attack—even the most isolated
and individual—is now claimed by Islamic State. It uses these claims to
further its global ambitions and appropriate a war wherever the self-
identified, self-recruited soldiers and/or combatants act.

The Book
For each attack, official reports specify the terrorists’ place of birth,
their travels and sojourns throughout the globe, as well as the complex
web that links individuals together. Once mapped, these trajectories
clearly mark out the size and scope of transnational networks, as well as
the cities that become hubs or places of intersection. Interviews with
experts and with public and intelligence officials in the three cities
struck by suicide bombers (New York, Madrid and London) help us to
grasp the logic of the official reaction to the burial of the enemy/crimi-
nal who died within these countries’ borders. They express how and to
what extent the burial of suicide bombers poses practical questions
above all, leading to a variety of interpretations as to the value of their
body. The symbolic importance of burial is political and moral. It
touches on the nature of war, the enemy’s legitimacy and recognition of
his cause, as well as his death. What plot of earth will, or will not, be
allotted to him, and where?28
Meetings with security authorities in New York confirm the view of
the suicide bomber as enemy. Meetings with representatives of local
communities in the country of origin—Morocco in the case of the per-
petrators of the Madrid attacks—or the country of residence—such as
Beeston Hill, a suburb of Leeds that was home to the youths who blew
themselves up in the London underground—provide additional and
contradictory elements to the matter of their burial, despite the silence,
secrecy and censorship surrounding these three situations.
The first chapter discusses various cases of embarrassing or incon-
venient bodies and situates them on the one hand with respect to the
discourse of radical Islamist leaders about national territorial and non-
territorial religious belongings, the importance of death for jihad, and
sacrifice for the ummah, and on the other with respect to states’ reac-
tions. These radical discourses on the body, identity, nationality, the

12
 INTRODUCTION
army, jihad and the ummah, or again on the land of Islam, are evidence
of a “strategic ambiguity”, a way of expressing a powerful global vision
leaving the field open to local interpretations as to its meaning.29 The
following chapters examine the link between the jihadis’ itineraries and
their burial. Each case gives rise to a different perspective on globaliza-
tion with respect to territory.
The Palestinian cause at the heart of all discourse on jihad imposed
a detour via Israel, leading that state to experience an increase in the
number of suicide attacks in the wake of the second Intifada. This made
it possible to gauge the territorial and non-territorial issues of the
cause and of burial. Comparing public statements and testimonials of
families in refugee camps in Nablus, for instance, reveals two different
rationales of war—territorial and non-territorial—despite the “dis-
pute” over these territories, making burial a bargaining chip in peace as
well as war.
It has not been possible in my research to locate actual places of
burial, often kept secret or censored, or at the least shrouded in
silence, but I do hope at least to reveal the logic of states, which varies
according to their history, geography, experience with terrorism, and
their relationship to immigration and the integration of policies of
recognizing differences.

13
 PART I

BODY, LAND AND TERRITORY

Radical Islamist rhetoric on martyrdom on one side and the reactions of

states on the other both reflect different representations of the body and
its relationship to land and territory. Through the body, different con-
ceptions of power in a globalized world are expressed. While the body
represents the power of mobility, it is also recognized by its ties to
nation and a national territory. However, the rejection of territory
preached by radical Islamist discourse is contradicted by the localized
exercise of power that is expressed through violence. In tracking the
enemy wherever he is found, states, conversely, act outside the bound-
aries of their territory, proving their sovereignty beyond their borders.

15
 1

THE POWER OF DISCOURSE

Radical Islamist leaders use a whole repertoire of historical religious

concepts such as jihad, ummah, lands of Islam and the caliphate, to
mention only the most frequently used terms, and infuse territory with
a particular cultural content, conceived as denationalized.1 Their
approach expresses a mental and discursive geography of power that
fits in with globalization. Interpretations are multiple and contradic-
tory. Jihad, as a political cause that makes reference to holy war, pur-
sues various aims: to reconquer lost lands of Islam, to restore the
caliphate and to reestablish its territorial power, or again, to define the
boundaries of the community of believers—the ummah. Radical
Islamist thinkers and activists demand loyalty to the ummah, a reimag-
ined community that blends all kinds of attachments: to the nation, to
religion, and to the land. Jihad becomes a duty when the ummah is
attacked,2 just as war becomes a necessity when a nation and its army
are attacked. From this perspective, the ummah and the nation are one
and the same, and jihadis sacrifice themselves in its name as proof of
their loyalty to the nation.
Jihadist combatants are self-declared martyrs. Some have made their
body into a weapon of war. Their act is coupled with rhetoric about “a
warrior’s heroic self-sacrifice,” offering himself up “for his lord and
master (rather than for a territory or an idea of ‘state’).”3 Jihadis refer
to the homeland as “the invisible community of heaven and the celestial

17
 Burying Jihadis
city” for which saints gave their lives: “a final return to that fatherland
in Heaven should be the normal desire of every Christian soul while
wandering in exile on earth.”4
The conjoined use of terms such as jihad, ummah, caliphate and “land
of Islam” calls up an historic definition of the nation and nationalist
sentiment. But in this case, instead of “unifying” a people on a territory,
it strives to bring together geographically dispersed people under the
same religious and transnational banner. The people of the ummah share
the same goals—resistance, struggle and emancipation—a sense of
belonging to one and the same history and projection into the same
future. It echoes the “imagined community” on which modern nations
are founded, but without territory, or with many territories at once.
Analysis of the discourse of radical Islamist thinkers sheds light on the
ambiguity of their position concerning territory and state, territory
and sovereignty, and territory and nation. It is a case of “strategic ambi-
guity,”5 which aims to express a strong global message and prompts
local interpretations.

“The Ummah is our body. If one part hurts, the whole body aches.”
This hadith on one of the deepest Islamic principles, that of the
ummah—the global community that unites all Muslims—was pro-
nounced by Osama Bin Laden in January 2004.
The statement likens the ummah to “a body politic” and “the mem-
bers thereof are his subjects.”6 “Fighting in the cause of God is … the
pinnacle of our religion,” Bin Laden stated on 4 January 2004. Jihad is
therefore “a pressing need for our nation’s life, glory, and survival.”7
Jessica Stern reports that in an interview, an operative told her, “I pray
for death every day. During my studies, reading the Koran, I decided to
sacrifice my life for jihad. If I die for jihad, I go to paradise. This is my
dream.”8 Sacrificing oneself for God is not specific to Islam, of course.
In Christianity, the best example is the crusades preached by the Pope
during the Middle Ages.
In Bin Laden’s speeches, to fight to protect the ummah is to fight for
Allah. “[…] Pan-Arabism, socialism, communism, and democracy. All
these ideologies have failed … and the present governments in the
Muslim world have proved themselves incapable of defending Islam

18
 THE POWER OF DISCOURSE
and the ummah.”9 According to the Encyclopaedia of Islam, the word
“ummah” “occurs some sixty-two times in the Qur’an in the sense of a
religious community.”10 Ejaz Akram reports that, “in the later discourse
throughout Muslims history, the understanding of ummah has evolved
as a distinct Muslim ummah.”11 There it refers to a community with
political authority and autonomy, as well as possessing religious and
social characteristics.12 The idealized community in Mohammed’s time
extended beyond the Arabian Peninsula in the era of the caliphate, but
later came under domination first by the colonial powers and then
through the acceptance of secularism by post-colonial societies in the
lands of Islam. This new world order “is a humiliation to the Muslim,”
says Ayman al-Zawahiri, an influential figure in Al-Qaeda who became
the organization’s leader after Bin Laden’s death. He describes jihad as
a “community obligation.”13 Following the founders of the Muslim
Brotherhood, he calls on the community to unite against the allied
secular regimes of the West. “If it is not possible to push back the
enemy except by the collective of the Muslim people, then there is a
duty on the Muslims to ignore the minor differences among them-
selves; the ill effect of ignoring these differences […] is much less then
the ill effect of the occupation of the Muslim’s land by the main Kufr
[infidel],”14 said Bin Laden in his August 1996 declaration of war.15
Bin Laden asked for the liberation of Islam from the “imported”16
state system it is caught up in: “It is essential to fight the main enemy
who divided the Ummah into small and little countries,”17 he claimed.
Here he was drawing on the rhetoric of Muslim humiliation in various
geographic spaces in several instances in the past and present. In the
past are the loss of Andalusia and the end of Ottoman rule and the
caliphate; present humiliations involve discrimination against Muslim
post-colonial immigrant populations in Europe. Jihad is thus a liberat-
ing force for all Muslims, even those living in anti-Islamist Arab states
that have espoused the Western model. These are territorialized peo-
ples whose governments are allies of the United States. A political
decision therefore guided his rhetoric and lies behind attacks targeting
these states and their governments.
Bin Laden declared that the 11 September attacks were “a reaction
from the young men of our ummah against the violations of the British
Government”18 (meaning the British occupation of Palestine from 1920

19
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
nojatuolissa, ja hänellä oli kirja polvillaan, mutta hän luki vähän.

Hänen silmänsä vaelsivat laiskasti Suuren joen leveää, sileätä

pintaa, ne seurasivat vasemmalla olevan Ngombin metsän tummia
ääriviivoja ja oikealla olevan Isisin alavaa maata. Siellä täällä näkyi
kylistä kohoavia savuja. Pienet kalastajainkanootit, jotka olivat
ankkuroidut sopiviin paikkoihin, papukaijojen käheät huudot, pienten
marakattien tirkistelevät naamat, joita hän näki laivan tullessa
rannemmaksi syvään veteen, kaikki nämä huvittivat häntä enemmän
kuin olivat tehneet — oh, pitkään, pitkään aikaan.

Kun hän sivuutti kylän, niin hän veti höyrypillin nuoraa, ja pikku
laiva huusi tervehdyksen rannalla viittoville olennoille.

Lasi kädessään, lukematon kirja polvillaan hän tuijotti

hajamielisesti ja huvittuneena maisemaa.

Ruorimies Bogindi, joka seisoi katoksen alla käsi ruorirattaassa,

mainitsi hänen nimensä.

— Herra, edessäpäin on kanootissa mies, joka haluaa puhua

kanssasi.

Sanders varjosti silmiään. Aivan laivan tiellä oli kanootti poikittain,

ja siinä seisoi mies, jonka ojennetut kädet puhuivat halusta tärkeään
palaveriin.

Vain suuret asiat, kapinat ja sellaiset, oikeuttavat kuninkaan laivan

seisauttamiseen.

Sanders nojautui tuolissaan eteenpäin ja käänsi merkinantajan

ensin osoittamaan: »Seis» ja sitten: »Hiljaa taaksepäin.»
 Hän nousi ja katsoi miestä kiikarilla.

— Tämä on nuori mies, Abibu, sanoi hän, — ja luullakseni

isisiläisiä; varmastikaan hän ei ole päällikkö pysäyttääkseen minut.

»Zaire» laski hitaasti kanootin luo, ja siinä oleva tuli laivan viereen
käyttäen tarmokkaasti melaansa ja nousi laivaan.

— Kuka sinä olet, kysyi Abibu, — ja mikä suuri asia sinulla on

pysäyttääksesi herramme hänen loistavalla matkallaan?

— Olen Isisin Kobolo, Togobonobon kylästä, sanoi nuori mies, —

ja rakastan päällikön tytärtä.

— Lähettäköön Jumala sinut vesien pohjaan, kirosi äkäinen Abibu,

— että tuot saastaisen ruumiisi tälle laivalle ja häiritset herraamme
hänen korkeissa mietiskelyissään. Tule, kafferi, ja sillaikaa kun sinä
puhut Sandin kanssa, minä menen etsimään ruoskaa, jota hän
varmasti sinulle määrää.

Niin Kobolo tuli Sandersin eteen, ja Abibu esitteli hänet sanoin,

jotka eivät olleet mairittelevia.

— Tämä on outo palaver, sanoi Sanders melkein ystävällisesti, —

sillä ei ole tavallista, että nuoret miehet pysäyttävät kuninkaan
komissaarin laivan sen vuoksi, että rakastavat tyttöjä.

Nuori mies oli pitkä, suoraryhtinen ja leveäolkainen, eikä hän

näyttänyt ensinkään katuvan outoa tekoaan. Pikemminkin hän näytti
olevan hyvin vakavissaan.

— Herra, sanoi hän, — rakastan Niminiä, joka on päällikköni tytär,

Togobonobon kylän päällikön. Ja kun hän on kaunis tanssija, miehet
tulevat katsomaan häntä kaukaa, ja hänen isänsä vaatii hänestä
kaksituhatta matakoa, ja minä olen köyhä.

— »Isä on aina oikeassa», siteerasi Sanders, — sillä sanotaanhan

Joella: »Esine on hintansa arvoinen, ja se, mitä annat pois, ei ole
minkään arvoinen.»

— Tämä nainen rakastaa minua, sanoi nuorukainen, — ja hänen

vuoksensa olen säästänyt tuhat matakoa, joka, niin kuin sinun
ylhäisyytesi tietää, on suuri omaisuus.

— Mitä minä voin tehdä? kysyi Sanders hymyillen harvinaisuuden

vuoksi.

— Herra, sinä olet voimakas, sanoi kiihtynyt nuorukainen, — ja jos

sanot hänen isälleen…

Sanders pudisti päätään.

— Ei käy, sanoi hän.

Kevätilmassa oli jotakin, hänen veressään oli jotakin, joka pani

hänet toimimaan niin kuin teki, sillä hetken kuluttua hän kääntyi
Abibuun.

— Ota tämä mies, sanoi hän, — ja anna hänelle…

— Herra, minulla on ruoska valmiina, sanoi Abibu

ymmärtäväisenä. —
Sillä tiesin tämän hupsun loukkaavan sinua.

— Anna hänelle varastosta tuhat matakoa, jotta hän voi ostaa

toiveittensa naisen.
 Abibu hämmästyi hieman ja meni hitaasti täyttämään isäntänsä
käskyä.

— Herra, sanoi Kobolo polvistuen komissaarin eteen, — olet kuin

isäni ja äitini, ja minä maksan sinulle hyvillä sanoilla ja ajatuksilla.

— Maksa matakoilla, sanoi käytännöllinen Sanders. — Mene, ota

tyttö ja
Jumala sinua auttakoon!

Mutta hän ei silti ollut kyynillisellä tuulella. Pikemminkin hänen

sävynsä oli lempeä, kauan kateissa olleen tunteen ailahtelua,
omituista sydämen lempeyttä, joka sopi puiden tuoreuteen ja hänen
ympärillään heräävään keväiseen elämään.

Hän seisoi katsellen alkuasukasta, kun tämä meloi rantaan laulaen

matalaäänistä laulua, jossa ei ollut muuta säveltä kuin siinä
vallitseva ilon sointu. Huvittuneena Sanders katseli. Tämä mies, joka
oli vain hiukan eläintä korkeammalla tasolla, kuunteli niitä elämän
kirjoittamattomia lakeja, joita Sanders sivistyneisyydessään uhmasi,
ja kiiruhti putkineen onnelliseen elämään, majaan ja vaimon luo,
kasvattamaan lapsistaan miehiä — kohtalonsa vaaroihin ja
vastuksiin, mutta korkeimman tarkoituksensa täyttämiseen.

Komissaari katseli, kunnes näki kanootin tapaavan rantaan,

miehen hyppäävän siitä ja kiinnittävän sen.

Sanders pudisti päätään ja käänsi merkinantajan osoittamaan

täyttä vauhtia.

Hän ei yrittänytkään lukea; hänen mielenkiintonsa oli muualla. Hän

nousi ja meni hyttiinsä. Hän veti verhon oven eteen, jottei kukaan
olisi päässyt todistamaan hänen hupsutteluaan; sitten hän otti
taskustaan avaimen, avasi seinään vuoteensa pääpuolelle tehdyn
varmuuslokeron ja otti esille pienen ruskean kirjan.

Sen hän laski pöydälle ja käänteli lehtiä.

Se oli Coxin rannikkoasiamiehen talletuskirja, jonka talletussumma

kohosi viisinumeroiseen määrään puntia, sillä Sanders oli ollut
huolellinen mies ja oli ostanut maata Lagosista silloin, kun puvun
hinnalla vielä sai hyvän tonttimaan.

Hän sulki kirjan, asetti sen paikalleen ja palasi kannelle.

Seuraavana päivänä hän saapui päämajaan.

Myöhään iltapäivällä »Zaire» hitaasti peräytyi pieneen satama-

altaaseen, jonka Sanders suurella vaivalla oli rakennuttanut. Se oli
pieni kuivatelakka, hänen ylpeytensä, sillä siinä oli betoniseinät ja
jykevä portti, jotka oli tehty silloin, kun »Zairea» korjattiin. Sanders ei
koskaan silmäillyt laitosta tuntematta sisäistä tyydytystä. Se oli
»lapsi», joka odotti hänen paluutaan, hänen mielensä ylpeys, kun
hän sen tullessaan tapasi. Ja satama-altaalta asuntoon vei asfalttitie
— sen hän oli rakennuttanut. Kummallakin puolen oli isisiläispalmuja
— ne olivat hänen istuttamiaan.

Asuntoaan hän katseli ilottomana.

Se oli pienellä kummulla, aaltopeltikatosta kivijalkaan asti

sievyyden ja järjestyksen perikuva.

— Jumala siunatkoon paikkaa! sanoi Sanders katkerasti.

 Sen vanha viehätys oli kadonnut, ennen miellyttävä oli tullut
vaivaavaksi ja viheliäiseksi toimitukseksi. Ja talo oli yksinäinen ja
tarvitsi jotakin.

Se tarvitsi kättä, jota hänellä ei ollut.

Hän käveli kyllästyneenä läpi huoneiston, sytytti piipun, kopautti

sen jälkeen tyhjäksi ja meni hitaasti hausain asunnoille päin.

Valkopukuinen kapteeni Hamilton nojautui kuistinsa kaiteeseen.

— Kotona taas? sanoi hän keskustelun aluksi.

— En, sanoi Sanders kieltävästi, — olen Joen latvamailla kärpäsiä

pyytämässä.

Hamilton pani pois piippunsa.

— Olet lukenut jonkin amerikkalaisen lehden sunnuntailiitettä,

sanoi hän tyynesti, — mikä on joko luonteen voimattomuuden tai
heränneen huumorintarpeen merkki.

Hän kutsui palvelijaansa.

— Ali, sanoi hän juhlallisesti, — valmista herra Sandille kuppi

sellaista teetä, jota ihanat immet paratiisissa valmistavat kaliifille
suurena päivänä.

— Mitä roskaa sinä puhut, Hamilton! sanoi Sanders ärtyisenä

miehen mentyä. — Tiedäthän, ettei kaliifi juo muuta kuin joskus
turkkilaista kahvia.

— Kuka tietää? virkahti filosofinen Hamilton. — No, miten sinun

hyvä kansasi jaksaa?
 — Mainiosti, sanoi Sanders istuutuen suureen tuoliin.

— Tavallisia murhia, konnuuksia ja tihutöitä, sanoi Hamilton

irvistäen. — Hyvä Bosambo istuu Ochorin metsissä kiilloittaen
sädekehäänsä ja laulaen huvittavia lauluja!

— Bosambo — oh, hän on nykyisin alakuloinen! sanoi Sanders

tuijottaen miehen tuomaa teetä. — Hän on paras päällikkö tällä
joella, Hamilton, ja jos minulla olisi valta, jos olisin Englannin hallitus,
niin tekisin hänet näiden seutujen päälliköksi.

— Silloin olisi sota kymmenessä minuutissa, naurahti kapteeni, —

mutta hän on hyvä mies. Alakuloinen, vai mitä sanoit?

— Tavattomasti — en ole koskaan nähnyt häntä niin huolissaan, ja

kunpa tietäisin edes, miksi!

Hamilton hymyili.

— Se osoittaa, että kurja sotilas parka, joka ei ole perehtynyt Joen

oloihin, voi olla viisaampi kuin joku patenttileimalla varustettu
komissaari, sanoi hän. — Bosambo on hyvin ylpeä kanovaimostaan.

— Tiedän sen, poikani, sanoi Sanders, — ja hyvä vaimo puoliksi

tekee miehen. Niin, mitä on mies ilman…

Hän näki toisen omituisesti nauravien silmien tähyilevän itseään,

ja päivetyksen alla hänen kasvonsa punehtuivat.

— Olet kovin innokas, Sandi Labolo, sanoi hän käyttäen

komissaarin alkuasukasnimeä, — et ajattele…

— Mitä Bosambon vaimosta? keskeytti Sanders äänekkäästi.

 Hausa katseli häntä epäluuloisesti.

— Bosambon vaimosta, kertasi hän, — oh — hän menee

naisväen tietä!
Bosambo toivoo ja pelkää — miesten tavoin. Hänellä ei ole lasta.

— Ahaa — en tietänytkään. Kuka on kertonut?

— Mieheni, he laulavat siitä pikku laulua — minun täytyy esittää

sinut rykmentin runoilijalle.

Tämän jälkeen tuli hiljaisuus; kumpikin mies istui mietteissään.

Sitten
Hamilton kysyi:

— Tietysti kävit Kosumkusussa?

— Kävin — kyllä, Sanders näytti vastahakoiselta jatkamaan.

— Entä neiti Glandynne?

— Hän — oh, hän oli viehättävä.

Hamilton hymyili.

— Lähetin hänelle kimpun kirjeitä, jotka saapuivat viime postissa,

sanoi hän. — Luultavasti sivuutit kanootin paluumatkallasi?

Sanders nyökkäsi, minkä jälkeen syntyi toinen hiljaisuus

— Hän on melko sievä, eikö olekin? kysyi Hamilton.

— Hyvin, vastasi Sanders tarpeettoman innokkaasti.

 — Todellakin sievä tyttö, jatkoi Hamilton hajamielisesti.

Sanders ei vastannut pitkään aikaan — sanoi sitten:

— Hän on viehättävä nainen, Liankin hyvä…

Hän pidättäytyi.

— Hyvä…? uteli Hamilton.

— Hyvä — hyvä tällaiseen elämään, sammalsi Sanders

lämpimänä ylt'yleensä.

Hän nousi äkkiä.

— Minun on kirjoitettava muutamia kirjeitä, virkahti hän ja lähti

nopeasti.

Ja Hamilton, joka katseli asuntoonsa kiirehtivää valkeata miestä,

pudisti päätään surullisesti.

Sanders ei kirjoittanut kirjeitä. Hän aloitti monta, repi ne ja pani

palaset taskuunsa. Hän istui ajatellen, kunnes palvelija tuli tuomaan
valoa huoneisiin. Hän tuskin maistoi päivällistä, ja lopun iltaa hän
vietti kuistilla tuijottaen pimeyteen, mietiskellen toivon ja
hämmennyksen vaiheilla. Läheisessä kylässä olivat vihkiäismenot
käynnissä, ja sieltä kuuluva rummun ääni soveltui hänen
ajatuksiinsa.

Ei seuraavakaan päivä vienyt häntä lähemmäksi ratkaisua, eikä

seuraava eikä sitäkään seuraava.

Tyttö oli liian hyvä hänelle — hän ei voisi pyytää tyttöä elämään
kanssaan maassa, jossa kukaan ei tietänyt, mitä päivä toi mukanaan
— maassa, joka oli täynnä tropiikin tauteja ja ihmissyöjiä, joiden
suhde häneen saattoi muuttua minä päivänä tahansa. Sitä ei olisi
sovelias kysyä — ja kuitenkin oli tyttö sanonut rakastavansa maata;
hän rupesi jo ymmärtämään kansaa. Ja kesän kuumina kuukausina
hän voisi matkustaa kotiin; Sanders ottaisi lomaa siksi ajaksi.

Miehen tulisi olla naimisissa; ja hänelle karttui vuosia — lähes

neljäkymmentä.

Hän pelästyi.

Ehkä hän oli liian vanha? Se oli kauhea olettamus. Hän havaitsi,
ettei tietänyt omaa ikäänsä, ja etsiskeli kaksi päivää ahkerasti
henkilötodistuksiaan saadakseen tarkan tiedon. Ja niin meni kolme
viikkoa, ennen kuin hän kirjoitti lopullisen kirjeensä.

Koko sinä aikana hän näki vain vilaukselta hausain kapteenia. Hän
ajatteli jo kerran kertoa hänelle suunnitelmansa, mutta luopui
ajatuksestaan viime hetkessä.

Hän tuli eräänä iltana Hamiltonin asuntoon.

— Huomenna lähden Yläjoelle, sanoi hän väkinäisesti.

— Lähden niin pian postilaivan tulon jälkeen kuin mahdollista —

odotan kirjettä kuvernööriltä.

Hamilton nyökkäsi.

— Mutta mistä tämä luottamuksen osoitus? kysyi hän.

— Sinä et usein kerro suunnitelmistasi.

 — No niin, alkoi Sanders, — aioin kertoa jotakin muuta, mutta
jääköön se tällä kertaa.

Hän vietti lopun iltaa pelaamalla pikettiä ja hävisi huomattavasti.

Hän oli jalkeilla päivän koitteessa valvomassa »Zairen»

matkavalmistelua, ja kun kaikki oli valmista, hän odotti
kärsimättömästi postilaivan tuloa. Kun siitä näkyi vain heikko
savujuova taivaanrannalla, hän meni rannalle, vaikka tiesi, että sen
tuloon vielä kuluisi ainakin tunti.

Hän seisoi hietikolla kädet hermostuneesti tyhjää hypistellen selän

takana, kun Abibu juoksi hänen luokseen.

— Herra, sanoi käskyläinen, — jumalanainen tulee.

Sandersin sydän sykähti, ja sitten hän tunsi kylmevänsä.

— Jumalanainen? kysyi hän. — Mikä, kuka jumalanainen?

— Herra, se, jonka jätimme viime kuussa Kosumkusuun.

Sanders juoksi rannalta suoraan hausaparakkien ohi joenrantaan.

Kun hän tuli telakkansa portille, hän näki tytön kanootin kääntyvän
joen mutkasta.

Hän meni tervehtimään tyttöä ja auttoi hänet maihin. Hän oli

Sandersin mielestä maailman rakastettavin ilmestys. Lumivalkea
päästä jalkoihin; vakavat harmaat silmät hymyillen hatun leveän
laidan alta.

— Tuon teille tyydyttäviä uutisia, sanoi tyttö, — mutta sanokaa

ensin, onko postilaiva mennyt.
 Sanders sai puhekykynsä.

— Jos se olisi mennyt, sanoi hän, — niin minä en olisi täällä.

Sitten hänen kurkkunsa tuli kuivaksi, sillä tässä olisi tilaisuus, jos
vain rohkeus ei pettäisi; mutta rohkeutta hänellä ei ollut.

Hänen aivonsa olivat sekaisin. Hän ei pystynyt muodostamaan

kahta järkevää ajatusta. Hän sanoi jotakin jokapäiväistä ja häntä
itseään tympäisevää.

— Tulkaa aamiaiselle, saattoi hän vihdoin sanoa, — ja kertokaa —

sanoitte minun tulevan tyytyväiseksi eräästä uutisesta.

Tyttö hymyili, eikä Sanders ollut nähnyt hänen milloinkaan

hymyilevän sillä lailla — vallatonta, onnellista, inhimillistä hymyä.
Niin, sen hän näki ensi kerran: inhimillisen naisen edessään.

— Menen kotiin, sanoi tyttö.

Sanders oli menossa asuntoonsa, ja tyttö käveli hänen rinnallaan.

Sanders pysähtyi.

— Kotiin? sanoi hän.

— Menen kotiin.

Hänen silmissään oli läikähdyksiä ja väriä, jota Sanders ei ollut

ennen nähnyt.

— Ettekö ole iloinen? Olen ollut sellainen hoidettava teille — ja

pelkään olleeni pettymys lähetyssaarnaajana.
 Se ei näyttänyt tyttöä kuitenkaan surettavan, sillä hän oli
onnellinen.

— Kotiin? kertasi Sanders hölmistyneenä.

Tyttö nyökkäsi.

— Uskon teille salaisuuden, sanoi hän, — sillä olette ollut niin

hyvä ystävä, että teidän pitää saada tietää — aion mennä naimisiin.

— Naimisiin? toisti Sanders.

Hänen sormensa hypisteiivät kirjettä, jonka hän oli kirjoittanut ja

joka oli hänen taskussaan. Hän oli aikonut lähettää sen kanootilla
lähetysasemalle ja saapua itse päivää jälkeenpäin.

— Aiotte mennä naimisiin, sanoi hän jälleen.

— Niin, sanoi tyttö, — olin… olin hyvin hupakko, hra Sanders.

Minun ei olisi pitänyt tulla tänne — riitelin — tiedättehän, että
sellaista sattuu.

— Tiedän, sanoi Sanders.

Tyttö ei voinut odottaa aamiaista. Postihöyry tuli satamaan ja

lähetti purtensa rantaan. Sanders valvoi hänen matkatavarainsa
lastaamista, otti postin toiselta perämieheltä ja tuli sitten sanomaan
hyvästejä tytölle.

— Ette ole toivottanut minulle — onnea, sanoi tyttö.

Hänen silmiensä sisimmässä näkyi rauhaton omatunto, sillä hän

oli nainen ja oli ollut Sandersin seurassa lähes tunnin, ja naiset
näkevät asian tunnissa.
 — Toivotan teille parhainta onnea, sanoi Sanders sydämmellisesti
ja puristi tytön kättä niin, että tämä vavahti.

Tyttö oli astumassa purteen, kun kääntyi Sandersiin.

— Olen usein ihmetellyt…, aloitti hän, mutta vaikeni.

— Niin?

— Se on tunkeilevaista, sanoi tyttö nopeasti, — mutta olen joskus

ihmetellyt ja ihmettelen nyt sitä enemmän, kun oma onneni antaa
siihen enemmän aihetta — miksi ette ole mennyt naimisiin?

Sanders hymyili omaa vaisua hymyään.

— Kerran melkein kosin, sanoi hän. — Hyvästi ja hyvää onnea.

Hän läksi samana aamuna Yläjoelle, vaikka hänen käyntinsä aihe

olikin mennyt laivalla, joka vei tyttöä onneaan kohti, läntisen
taivaanrannan taa.

Päivän toisensa jälkeen »Zaire» höyrysi pohjoista kohti, ja sen

päällikön sydämessä oli kivistävä tyhjyys, joka ei helpottanut
päivässä eikä tunnissa.

Eräänä päivänä he tulivat kylään ja aikoivat sivuuttaa sen, mutta

hänen vieressään seisova Abibu sanoi:

— Herra, tämä on Togobonobo, ja täällä on mies, jolle sinun

ylhäisyytesi antoi tuhat matakoa.

Sanders näytti hampaitaan.

 — Katsotaanpa tätä onnellista miestä, sanoi hän arabiaksi, — sillä
Profeetta on sanonut: »Ystäväni ilo puhdistaa sydämeni surusta.»

Kun »Zaire» tuli rantaan, olisi Sanders lähettänyt hakemaan

nuorta aviomiestä, mutta tämä mies oli jo odottamassa häntä,
onneton olento, joka tuli komentosillalle kasvot surullisina.

— Huomaan, sanoi Sanders, — että tytön isä vaati enemmän kuin

voit maksaa.

— Herra, sanoi nuorukainen, — toivon, että hän olisi vaatinut, sillä,

herra, olen surullinen mies.

— Onko nainen kuollut?

— Herra, sanoi nuori mies, — jos paholainen olisi vienyt hänet,

niin olisin onnellinen: sillä tämä nainen, vaikka hän on vielä tyttö, on
lujatahtoinen ja tekee mitä haluaa eikä ota minua lainkaan
huomioon. Ja kun puhun hänelle, niin hänellä on kirpeä kieli, ja
herra, tänä aamuna hän antoi minulle raakaa kalaa ja haukkui minua
rumilla nimillä, kun oikaisin häntä. Ja, herra, sanoi nuorukainen
järkyttyneellä äänellä, — padallakin hän heitti minua koko kylän
nähden.

— Se on paha palaver, sanoi Sanders, — mutta sinun pitää antaa

hänelle myötä, Tobolo, sillä hän on sinun vaimosi, enkä voi sallia…

— Herra, sanoi nuori mies tarttuen hänen käteensä, — olen

velallisesi, ja velkani on tuhat matakoa — jos herramme nyt erottaa
meidät, niin maksan mielelläni.

— Mene rauhassa, sanoi Sanders, ja kun nuorukainen näytti

vastahakoiselta lähtemään, niin Abibu heitti hänet veteen.
 Tapaus antoi Sandersille miettimisen aihetta — ja muutakin oli.

Kaksi päivää jokea kuljettuaan hän tuli Ochoriin ja tapasi

Bosambon kansan surullisena.

Päällikkö odotti herransa tuloa majansa pimeydessä, ja Sanders

meni katsomaan häntä.

— Bosambo, sanoi hän vakavasti, — tämä kuulostaa pahalta.

— Herra, valitti päällikkö, — toivoisin, että olisin kuollut — kuollut

kuin esikoiseni, joka makaa vaimoni majassa.

Hän vääntelehti tuskissaan sinne tänne, sillä Bosambolla oli

lapsen sydän, ja hänen pieni poikansa, joka oli elänyt vain
muutaman päivän, oli koko hänen elämänilonsa keskipiste.

— Jumala olkoon kanssasi, Bosambo veljeni, sanoi Sanders hiljaa

ja laski kätensä mustan miehen kumartuneille hartioille, — nämä
asiat ovat määrätyt aikojen alusta.

— Niin on kirjoitettu, sanoi Bosambo nyyhkytystensä lomassa ja

tarttui herransa käteen.

*****

Sanders kääntyi myötävirtaan, ja sinä iltana, kun hän laittautui

makuulle, päällikön suru oli tuoreena hänen mielessään.

Ennen vuoteeseen menoaan hän otti taskustaan kirjeen, repi sen

sataan palaan ja heitti ne hytin ovesta jokeen.

Sitten hän meni vuoteeseensa ja sammutti valot.

Hän ajatteli Isisin nuorta miestä, ja hän ajatteli Bosamboa.

— Jumalan kiitos, etten ole naimisissa, sanoi hän ja nukahti.

 *** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK JOEN KANSA
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