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Kandidatuppsats i praktisk filosofi, 15 hp | Ämneslärarprogrammet

Höstterminen 2022

Aristotle and Romantic Love

– A Study of Romantic Love and If It Can Be Part of
Aristotle’s Eudaimonia

Anna-Maria Inzsöl

Handledare: Martin Berzell

Examinator: András Szigeti

Linköpings universitet
SE-581 83 Linköping
013-28 10 00, www.liu.se
Abstract

This essay will research aspects of romantic love, as well as aspects of Aristotle’s
Nicomachean Ethics. The purpose of the essay is to discuss if romantic love can be part of
virtue ethics and eudaimonia. The philosopher Raja Halwani presents two concepts of
romantic love that are relevant to the discussion. The concepts are romantic love 1 and
romantic love 2. The first one is a new love, where the partners only want to be with each
other. The second type of love is closer to companionship where the partners are familiar with
each other and have been together for a long time. To contrast this, I will use Martin
Hägglund’s theory concerning romantic love. In Hägglund’s theory love is built upon the care
we feel for our partners. However, it is the fear that the loved one can be taken away from us
that constitutes this care. In the end, one of the two concepts Raja Halwani were determined
to be virtuous and part of eudaimonia. Hägglund’s theory was partly virtuous due to the care
he deems that we feel for our loved ones.

Sammanfattning

Denna uppsats kommer att undersöka aspekter av romantisk kärlek, samt aspekter av
Aristoteles Nichomachean Ethics. Uppsatsen syfte är att diskutera om romantisk kärlek kan
vara en del av dygdetiken och eudaimonia. Filosofen Raja Halwani presenterar två olika typer
av romantisk kärlek som är relevanta för diskussionen. Dessa två typer är romantic love 1 och
romantic love 2. Den första är en typ av ny kärlek där personerna endast vill vara med
varandra. Den andra typen av kärlek är närmare engelskans companionship. Här är partnerna
väldigt nära varandra och har varit tillsammans under en lång tid. För att kontrastera detta så
kommer jag använda Martin Hägglunds teori som har att göra med romantisk kärlek.
Hägglunds teori bygger kärlek på omsorgen vi känner för våra älskade. Dock är det rädslan att
våra älskade kan tas ifrån oss som utgör denna omsorg. Till slut klargjordes det att en av
Halwanis typer av kärlek var dygdig och del av eudaimonia. Hägglunds teori var till viss del
dygdig på grund av omsorgen han fastställer att vi känner för våra älskade.

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Table of Contents
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 3

2. Background .............................................................................................................................. 4

3. Aristotle and Romantic Love ..................................................................................................... 7

3.1 Aristotle, Eudaimonia and the Good Life ............................................................................. 7

3.1.1 The Human Good ........................................................................................................ 7

3.1.2 Happiness .................................................................................................................. 8

3.1.3 Pleasure ...................................................................................................................... 9

3.1.4 Friendship and Companionship ...................................................................................11

3.2 What Is Love? (Baby Don’t Hurt Me) – Raja Halwani ..........................................................13

3.2.1 RL1 and RL2................................................................................................................13

3.3 Martin Hägglund and the Mortality of Love .......................................................................16

4. Discussion and Analysis ...........................................................................................................20

Bibliography ................................................................................................................................27

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 1. Introduction

For many, love is part of everyday life. It comes and goes, brings pain and joy. But what
exactly is love? There are several theories that all determine what love is. It can be the love
between romantic partners, between parent and child, the love one has for one’s material
things and so forth. Evidently, love can be many things. In addition, love can be part of ethics
as well. Ethics can give us an inkling as to how we should lead our lives and how we should
act in certain situations. What if the two are combined? Is love truly a part of ethics? These
are also the main research questions of the essay.

The topic of the essay comes from a curiosity of how love can be a part of our
lives and how Aristotle’s ethics would consider different types of love. As mentioned before,
love is part of every day of our lives. It is incredibly difficult not to love something. Even if
one does not love any person, there will most likely still be something that they love. Be it a
book or the way the wind rustles the leaves. However, the essay will focus on aspects of
romantic love, as well as relevant aspects of The Nicomachean Ethics. The philosophy of love
is a topic that is of interest to me. I would like to research different topics when it comes to
love, seeing as it is present in everyday life. Aristotle’s ethics is also of great interest as it can
give us a new perspective when it comes to love. The purpose of the essay is thus to see if
romantic love can be part of Aristotle’s ethics and his conception of eudaimonia.

The second part of the essay will touch upon a few definitions of romantic love.
The purpose of this is to contrast the definitions of romantic love that will be delved into later.
It will also provide an idea of how romantic love has been discussed earlier. Additionally,
virtue and eudaimonia will be presented to provide an understanding of those concepts. The
third part of the essay will be one of the two main parts of it. It is the main research section.
Firstly, Aristotle’s ethics will be presented. All parts of his ethics will not be discussed, rather
those that are relevant for romantic love. The parts that will be presented are the human good,
happiness, pleasure and friendship along with companionship. I have chosen to refer to
friendship as companionship many times due to it being described as a type of companionship
rather than only friendship. Secondly, Raja Halwani’s two concepts of love will be discussed.
The last part of the research section will present Martin Hägglund’s theory of love. The very
last part of the essay will analyze and discuss all the concepts and theories.

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 2. Background

Love is a concept that can be defined in many ways. There is the love between long-time
partners, the one between a parent and their child, the one between friends, the one that a
collector holds for their collection, and so the list goes on. For example, in most cases, we do
not love our long-time partner the same way we love our car. In Philosophy of Love, Sex and
Marriage, Raja Halwani focuses on romantic love and its definition. No consensus has been
reached when it comes to romantic love. As with many other concepts in philosophy,
philosophers have yet to agree on what romantic love is 1.

One possible interpretation of romantic love is that love is partly a social

construction. Love makes us feel some type of desire to do things with the recipient of our
love, some of which are socially constructed. For example, marriage is a rather normalized
social construction. Sometimes, marriage is seen as a token of love, an expression of the
romantic love between partners. According to this view, love makes us value certain
things/people, it makes us want to be with certain objects/people. According to Philosophy of
Love, Sex and Marriage all feelings, including love, are both part of a social construction and
part of our nature. Thus, love as a social construction makes lovers do certain things that are
deeply engrained and defined by society. However, Raja Halwani does not see this view as
complete. He means that this view requires expanding, and a deeper, more genuine meaning 2.

Oftentimes, love is seen as an emotion, something that people feel deeply within
themselves. In contrast with this, there is the view that love is something else: desire.
Emotions seem to contain some type of belief. If x is happy that the sun is out, then x
necessarily must believe that the sun is out. Romantic love on the other hand seems to not
contain the same beliefs as emotions. People can love something or someone without holding
any special beliefs about the object of their love. We might have fallen in love with someone
depending on their qualities, though the reasons why we love someone can change. In this
case, love is constant. The love does not change, even if the reasons for loving someone
change. Love is then a set of desires. The lover might desire to be with the person they love,
or desire to give them gifts etc. These desires might change depending on the object of love,
or the one expressing love. At times, one does not know why they have fallen in love. Love is

1
R. Halwani, Philosophy of Love, Sex, and Marriage – An Introduction, 2nd edn., New York, Routledge., 2018, p.
9-10.
2
Ibid, p. 13-15.

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just there without any special reason, just as we do not know why we desire certain things at
certain times 3.

Moreover, love can be seen as a virtue. According to Aristotle, virtues help us to

act right and make the right decisions. Virtues are morally excellent, essentially making them
perfect. At first glance, romantic love is not moral, neither is it immoral. Instead, it is the
surrounding factors that decide whether it is moral or not. At times, love makes the afflicted
act out of character. The world around them can fade with the lover being the only thing they
see. There are several factors that determine the morality of romantic love. Amongst these are
the object of love, how love is expressed and the beliefs within it. All the mentioned aspects
have to be virtuous in order for romantic love to be virtuous. For example, if Peter, an
extremely virtuous person, were to love Carl, an unvirtuous person, then their love would in
turn not be virtuous. This particular example lacks virtue in the second person in the
relationship 4.

Virtue, what precisely is it? Aristotle defines it as a state of character, a quality

existing in one’s soul. There are things of three kinds that can be found in the soul. These are
passions, capacities, and states of character. Passions refer to our feelings, ranging from joy to
hatred. Capacities make it possible for us to feel our passions, to feel our feelings. Since we
are supposed to be praised for our virtues and character, our passions cannot be praiseworthy.
Neither can we be blamed for them. The reason for this is that we choose to be virtuous or
not. Passions and capacities are not a choice in the same way virtue is. State of character is
what makes someone a good person, and what makes them act in a virtuous manner. In order
for someone to be virtuous, they need to have a state of character that is moderate. Virtue for
one person is not the same for the other. What is moderate for one might be excessive for
another, or insufficient for another. In accordance with many other aspects in Aristotle’s
theory, virtue is good in when it is intermediate, just the right amount 5.

On the contrary, eudaimonia, is not a state of character. Eudaimonia entails

virtuous activity exercised over a lifetime. It is only after a virtuous life that we can reach
eudaimonia. It is rather different to how a modern person would define happiness. Happiness
for some might be money, being able to travel or having a happy family. According to

3
R. Halwani, Philosophy of Love, Sex, and Marriage – An Introduction, 2nd edn., New York, Routledge., 2018, p.
15-16.
4
Ibid, p. 18-19.
5
Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. D. Ross, Oxford, University Press, 2009, p. 28-30.

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Aristotle, eudaimonia is more of a satisfaction that comes after having lived a good life.
Happiness is the chief good in Aristotle’s ethics. Due to this, Carlotta Capuccino finds that we
cannot ask questions such as “Why do you want to be happy?”. We do not need a reason to be
happy. Eudaimonia is a sufficient reason in itself. There is no account of what eudaimonia is
in the end. However, it needs to be sufficient enough to pursue for its own sake 6.

6
C. Capuccino, ‘Happiness and Aristotle’s Definition of Eudaimonia’, Philosophical Topics, vol. 41, no. 1, 2013,
p. 3-5.

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 3. Aristotle and Romantic Love

In this section of the essay, Aristotle’s ethics will be presented. After that, Raja Halwani’s
theory concerning romantic love will follow. Lastly, Martin Hägglund will be presented and
discussed.

3.1 Aristotle, Eudaimonia, and the Good Life

3.1.1 The Human Good

In life, there must be a final good that is sufficient in itself. For the final good to be just that,
all other things must be done for its sake. All things have an end, which is the result of an
activity that we choose to do. For example, the end in medicine is for people to be healthy.
The final good for man cannot be chosen for the sake of something else, it has to be chosen
for itself. For the final good is an end that is final and sufficient in itself. In Aristotle’s virtue
ethics, happiness is considered to be this final good. All other virtues and reasons are chosen
because of happiness. In addition, happiness cannot be attained over a short period of time or
from one activity. Since happiness is concerned with virtue, one must lead a virtuous life to be
happy 7. Eudaimonia is commonly translated to happiness. Eudaimonia, or happiness, is
considered to be the greatest good in The Nicomachean Ethics. However, it on not happiness
in a sense that many would interpret it as. It is a deeper and more genuine function than
normal happiness. To reach eudaimonia is then the good humans must reach for 8

When it comes to virtuous actions, one cannot perform any action and have it be
virtuous. An activity must be done in the right way, in combination with the state of our
character. If we have a bad state of character and perform an activity that would be considered
virtuous, then the activity is no longer virtuous. Virtues cannot be acquired automatically. On
the contrary, acting virtuously is like training a muscle. Gaining strength in one’s muscles
does not happen overnight. Likewise, becoming a virtuous person does not happen after one
virtuous act. We are able to acquire these virtues, but we need to exercise them in order to be
virtuous ourselves. Thus, we need to be virtuous people before we can be truly happy. Yet,
Aristotle does not establish exactly what actions are virtuous. Though, he does establish a few

7
Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. D. Ross, Oxford, University Press, 2009, p. 10-13.
8
J. Karuzis, ‘On Proper Action and Virtue: An Essay on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics’, IAFOR Journal of Ethics,
Religion & Philosophy, vol 2, no. 1, 2015, p. 5-6.

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guidelines that virtuous actions must follow. First and foremost, virtuous action can neither be
excessive nor insufficient, as it is ruined by both. Take courage as an example. Too much
courage can make one careless and too little makes one a coward. An exact amount is needed.
By habit we will become accustomed to virtuous action, meaning that we will partake in
virtuous activity with the right amount of virtue and with the right state of character. An
indication of a virtuous state of character is taking pleasure in doing virtuous acts 9. Therefore,
taking pleasure in doing a virtuous activity can mean that we choose the activity for itself, and
not for another reason. We want to do the virtuous activity because it brings a good feeling
with it.

Nonetheless, some do not consider happiness to be the final good. Some might
think that it is pleasure we should strive for, some think it is the political life that contains the
final good. Aristotle identifies three types of lives: the life of pleasure, the political life and
the contemplative life. As mentioned before, the life of pleasure seeks out enjoyment in life.
Be it wine, food, or people, the final good for them is pleasure. This life is what most humans
are drawn to 10. Aristotle refers to these people as being ‘evidently quite slavish in their tastes,
preferring a life suitable to beasts’ 11. The political life seems to be a better alternative, but not
the best life out of the three. Honor is important for people that lead this life. Though, they are
more refined than those who live a life of pleasure. They seem to seek honor in order to prove
that they have accomplished something of worth 12. Out of the three lives, the contemplative is
the most desirable one. It will be explained further on.

3.1.2 Happiness

Happiness is not said to be amusement, it is rather good activity. Like virtue, happiness is
something sought after for itself. Happiness cannot be amusement due to the nature of it. We
would not go through life with all hardships only for the end of it to be amusement. It is even
stated that seeing amusement as the end in life is childish. However, we do need some
amusement since it provides relaxation and a break from work etc 13.

9
Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. D. Ross, Oxford, University Press, 2009, p. 23-26
10
Ibid, p 5-6.
11
Ibid, p 6.
12
Ibid, p. 6-7.
13
Ibid, p. 192-193.

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 Happiness and virtue are closely related. Due to happiness being an activity in
accordance with virtue, it is amongst the highest goods, if not the highest. The activity that is
closest to happiness and virtue is contemplative one. Happiness is not honor or pleasure, it is
activities in accordance with virtue. These activities are then contemplative. However,
Aristotle finds that there is some pleasure in the contemplative life. The most pleasant activity
is found in contemplation and the contemplative life. Those who take part in the
contemplative life are using their time in a more desirable way. Contemplative activities are
also purer and last longer. A conclusion one can come to is that contemplative activities can
be likened with things such as deep discussions and philosophical activities. From Aristotle’s
account of happiness and eudaimonia, this seems like a legitimate conclusion. Moreover, the
contemplative life is better lived with others. Contemplative activities might be better when
having companions around you, even if those who take part in the contemplative life are fully
self-sufficient. Since practical activities almost always generate a product, these cannot be
performed for their own sake. Contemplative activities, on the other hand, do not generate a
product. Thus, they are chosen for their own sake. Activities that are self-sufficient must then
be those who help us feel happiness. Choosing the contemplative life is choosing a life for
oneself, as well as a life of reason. Contemplation is thought to be something divine and holy.
It is not because we’re human that we chose a contemplative existence, it is because of
something divine in us. We must try to strive for the contemplative life. Even if one can only
devote a small portion of life to contemplation, it is still more desirable than not having any
contemplation. Reason is then one of the highest goods of man and part of the essential nature
of us 14. Lastly, while Aristotle rejects the idea that the contemplative life needs many external
goods, he does not completely reject the need of them. Someone who lives the contemplative
life still needs some external goods to be able to function. Here the idea of excess and
insufficiency is also applied. External goods in a moderate amount are what is needed 15.

3.1.3 Pleasure

According to The Nicomachean Ethics, pleasure is not only one thing. Some things that give
us pleasure are necessary in themselves, some are excessive but still worthy of choice in
themselves and lastly, some are worthy of choice in themselves while not being necessary.
Pleasures that are excessive but worthy of choice include bodily pleasures, such as good food

14
Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. D. Ross, Oxford, University Press, 2009, p. 194-196
15
Ibid, p. 197-198.

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and sexual intimacy. Many are often guilty of indulging in these to the point of excess.
Victory and honor are amongst those pleasures that are worthy of choice but not necessary.
Furthermore, to indulge in bodily pleasure to the extreme is seen as a vice. As with almost any
other pleasure, excess is unvirtuous. Virtue is one of the few things one can perform to an
excess, with the right intentions behind it 16. However, if bodily pleasures do not interfere with
virtue, then they are worthy to pursue. According to David Henry, Aristotle divides pleasure
into two categories. There are alien pleasures that correspond to excessive bodily pleasures.
On the contrary, proper pleasures are chosen because they are rewarding in themselves. They
are good in themselves 17.

Every person is active in their own lives, seeking their own pleasures and
fulfilling activities. We seek the things in life that we love the most. For example, the painter
is active in choosing the paints and active when painting the artwork. Thus, their activity is
completed by pleasure precisely since they love that activity. Pleasure completes life. These
types of pleasure seem to be more desirable compared to bodily pleasures. Each pleasure
depends on the activity it accompanies. As had been mentioned before, there is a hierarchy of
the pleasures where alien pleasures are amongst the least desirable ones. They are described
as destroying the activity in the same way pain does, only at a slower pace 18.

Moreover, continence and incontinence are two polar opposites to one another.
One is desirable and virtuous when the other takes pleasure in excess and overflow of
abundance, which is unvirtuous. A continent person chooses not to act on their impulses and
desire for pleasure, since they know that it is unvirtuous. The incontinent person, on the other
hand, acts upon their impulses out of passion, while knowing what they are doing is wrong 19.
Aristotle claims that people who are under the influence of their passions are in a similar state
as to people who are drunk, mad or asleep. He finds that our sexual passions or pleasures, as
well as other passions, make us this way. It alters the way our body functions. Thus, the more
one succumbs to one’s desires, the harder it is not to succumb. The continent and incontinent
person have one thing in common: pleasure 20.

16
Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. D. Ross, Oxford, University Press, 2009, p. 124-125
17
D. Henry, ‘Aristotle on Pleasure and the Worst Form of Akrasia’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, vol. 5, no.
3, 2002, p. 258, 262-264.
18
Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. D. Ross, Oxford, University Press, 2009, p. 189-192.
19
Ibid, p. 118-119.
20
Ibid, p. 122-124.

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 Furthermore, there is a certain hierarchy to incontinence. Some forms of
incontinence are worse than others. For example, incontinence of anger is better than
incontinence of bodily pleasures. Anger is hasty and abrupt, but it can still yield to some
reason. If we are hurt or insulted by someone, reason steps in and tells us it is something to be
bothered by. Consequently, anger is a response to whatever hurt us. Therefore, it is better to
be angry and driven by reason than it is to be driven by appetite. Appetite, or bodily pleasures,
on the other hand do not listen to reason the same way, or at all. Even when it comes to
appetites there is a form of hierarchy. Some appetites are natural to man and necessary, while
others are only excessive. As had been mentioned before, bodily pleasures are accepted in
moderation. They are part of our nature. It is only when they become excessive that they are
harmful 21.

In addition, there is a clear distinction between a self-indulgent person and an

incontinent person. The one that is clearly worse in Aristotle’s eyes is the self-indulgent
person for they have no regrets about partaking in excess. The incontinent person does have
regrets. Self-indulgence is like an incurable disease, the person affected by it will never be rid
of it. Thus, incontinence is not vice. Vice is concerned with choice whereas incontinence is
not. The incontinent person has sense enough to know that their actions are undesirable, yet
they perform these acts 22.

3.1.4 Friendship and Companionship

Why would friendship and companionship be needed in a happy life? Aristotle means that it
would be strange for the happy man not to have friends when they are considered the greatest
external good. It is also considered a virtue to do well by people. Thus, the happy and good
man will need friends to do well by 23.

For people to live a virtuous life, friends and companionship are needed.
Friendship is or implies a virtue according to Aristotle. They help us in life, they make it
worth living. Without friends we would have no place to turn to when it gets hard. To be
friends there must be some kind of reciprocity and wishing of goodwill between two parties.
This must also be mutually recognized by both parties, otherwise the friendship will not be

21
Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. D. Ross, Oxford, University Press, 2009, p. 127-129.
22
Ibid, p. 131-132.
23
Ibid, p. 176.

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known. To further understand Aristotle’s account of friendship, we must understand his
account of love. There are three possible reasons for people to love something or someone. In
addition to this, there are three corresponding kinds of friendship. Firstly, there is the love for
inanimate objects. This type cannot necessarily be called friendship since it has no reciprocity.
An inanimate object does not love the person who owns it back. It can be the love an author
has for their work, or the love a child has for their toy. Secondly, there is love out of utility.
This is a more selfish type of love or friendship. As the name entails, this love is based on
something the other person has to offer. The people themselves are not the important part, it is
rather what they have to offer. These companionships are not made to last. They only last as
long as one of the parties finds use in the other. Lastly, there is the virtuous type of friendship
here those involved are alike in virtue. These friendships are chosen because of the people in
themselves 24.

The last type of love or friendship is the most virtuous one. Aristotle even calls
this a perfect friendship. One might get something out of the friendship, but it is built upon
mutual care and respect. One wishes their friend well because of their sake and not only
because of their services. They are good to each other without qualification or need for a
service. Unlike the two former types of friendship, mutual friendship has a better chance of
succeeding and spanning over a lifetime. Due to this, these friendships are not common.
People who truly value each other because of the people themselves are rare. Moreover, like
virtue, these friendships take time to establish. Just one virtue does not make one virtuous,
just as one act of friendship does not make two people life-long companions. Furthermore, it
is only good people who can be friends of this kind. Two bad people or one bad person and
one good person cannot be friends because of themselves. Immoral people then base their
friendships on utility or pleasure. Living together with one’s friends is also something that is
characteristic of friendship. Aristotle means that those who live together must be pleasant,
since only pleasant people are fit to live with each other 25

There are also friendships that are unequal. Amongst these are the relationship
between man and wife. Friends are equals and are able to give each other the same things in a
relationship. Man and wife are not able to give each other the same things. Thus, that type of
friendship or love is unequal. In unequal relationships, love should be divided proportionally.

24
Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. D. Ross, Oxford, University Press, 2009, p. 142-145.
25
Ibid, p. 145-146, 148.

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Meaning that the one who is better in the relationship should be loved more, and so forth 26.
Aristotle likens this friendship with that of the aristocracy; each party gets what they are
worth. Moreover, it seems to be determined by nature for humankind to form couples, or
bigger groups that form towns. Thus, it only natural for marriage and alike to occur 27.

As has been mentioned before, care and mutual respect are both part of a
successful friendship. A type of goodwill to be more specific. If one only bears goodwill for a
person, without the other aspects of friendship present, then it is not true friendship. Goodwill
is merely a characteristic of friendship. Goodwill can be felt towards the people closest to
oneself, but it can also be felt towards complete strangers. While companionship includes a
friendly feeling, goodwill does not. Consequently, goodwill can be seen as a beginning of a
friendship rather than the finished product 28. In addition, unlike friendship, goodwill does not
need to be mutual. Even if one feels very strongly about another person, it is not friendship
until it is reciprocated. Friendship requires some sort of intimacy, that goodwill does not
have 29.

3.2 What is Love? (Baby Don’t Hurt Me) – Raja Halwani

3.2.1 RL1 and RL2

Many likely associate romantic love with companionship and a long-time partner, but it does
not have to be this. It can also be the first stages of a relationship where everything is new and
exciting. Raja Halwani divides romantic love into two categories, RL1 and RL2. Questions
arise as to which of these two is the better option. Or rather, does one of them have a higher
moral status and thus is better when considering eudaimonia?

RL1, or romantic love 1, characterizes the early stage of love. This is a

consuming type of love where the lovers often are utterly captivated by one another. Love in
this stage is intense and filled with desires. The lovers have intense sexual desires, want to
spend time with each other and are often preoccupied with thoughts about one another. It is
not given that the lovers will stay together after the intense period of RL1 is over. Over time,
the intense period and desire will ebb out and for some the relationship will ebb out as well.

26
Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. D. Ross, Oxford, University Press, 2009, p. 150.
27
Ibid, p. 157-159.
28
Ibid, p. 170.
29
J. Annas, ‘Plato and Aristotle on Friendship and Altruism’, Mind, vol. 86, no. 344, 1977, p. 535.

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While it might sound that this stage is purely sexual desire, there are other components of it.
There is some form of concern for the beloved, but it is not an integral part of the stage 30.
Thus far, RL1 may sound like infatuation. However, Halwani means that it might not only be
this. Infatuation does have significant similarities with RL1. Similar to RL1, infatuation is
also characterized by sexual desire and a deep longing to be with the beloved. Although,
infatuation seems to have a short duration, while RL1 continues for longer period of time.
Halwani does not elaborate further as to how long each of the stages are. Infatuation could be
combined with RL1, seeing as they have similar characteristics. Infatuation could thus be the
beginning stages of RL1 31.

RL2 on the other hand does not seem to have the same characteristics as RL1.
This is a less frantic stage, where the lovers have settled into companionship with one another.
Halwani compares the two by stating that RL1 is more a set of desires, compared to RL2 that
would be an emotion. As has been mentioned before, if RL2 were an emotion then it would be
based on beliefs about the object of love. We might fall deeply in love with someone, RL2,
due to them having quality x. There is always the possibility of quality x ceasing to exist in
the lover. Even if quality x ceases to exist, the love in RL2 does not have to end 32. According
to Halwani, ‘the lovers commit to each other […] or […] RL2, like many other emotions, can
outlast its reasons’ 33. However, it is still possible that the lovers do not stay together after
quality x is gone. Choice seems to be a cornerstone of RL2. The lovers choose to stay
together, or not, if the beliefs that they have about each other change.

Even if RL2 is a less intense type of love, it is not void of feelings and love for
the other. Without warmth, emotional intimacy, and a want to be with the beloved, RL2
would not be successful. Cases where the people have been together for a period of time, such
as RL2, but are resentful towards each other or do not desire the others company are
unsuccessful. In this stage of love, there is no hatred towards the other. In addition, there is
less sexual desire compared to RL1, however, there is a greater emotional intimacy. Important
to note, there is not a complete lack of sexual desire in RL2, only less of it. While RL2 lacks
part of the sexual desire, RL1 lacks some of the emotional intimacy. One could say that there

30
R. Halwani, Philosophy of Love, Sex, and Marriage – An Introduction, 2nd edn., New York, Routledge., 2018,
p. 20-22.
31
Ibid, p. 23-24.
32
Ibid, p. 16.
33
Ibid, p. 16.

14
is a certain type of happiness in simply being with the other person in RL2. There is a strong
desire to spend the rest of one’s life with the other in RL2 34.

While Halwani’s account of the two types of love gives a sound explanation of
what love is, it still has its faults. The main focus for Halwani is the period where love has just
begun, as well as the period when it had been going on for a long time. Within RL1 and RL2
there is no place for what happens after RL2 has ended. For example, does the love between a
couple die if one of them passes away? Both RL1 and RL2 seem to portray a happy and quite
content view of love. As has been mentioned before, there is a lack of major resentment and
fights in RL2. Halwani puts an emphasis that there must be a lack of this for RL2 to even be
successful. It gives the impression that one big fight ruins romantic love for the couple. While
a relationship maybe should not contain constant major disagreements, it is only natural that
there will be arguments and alike in a relationship. RL2 is unsatisfactory when it comes to
disagreements and love. If one were to refine the theory to include some exceptions for
disagreements that do not ruin the relationship one could find the theory to be more
satisfactory.

As mentioned before, RL1 and RL2 focus on successful and ongoing love. In
does not take into account that a relationship can have an abrupt end. Love can still live on
even if the loved one is not there anymore. To only claim that love is possible when both of
the parties are present or alive is unsatisfactory. If RL2 is as strong a love as Halwani claims,
then it seems impossible for it to cease to exist in one singular moment. Especially for RL2
where love has a solid and strong foundation. The sudden passing of a loved one is not
something that one can prepare for, in many cases. What can follow is a time of grief and
yearning for the person to come back. This corresponds with RL2’s want to be and live with
the loved one, the comfortable intimacy.

I propose that a third type of romantic love could be a solution to the problem.
To be clear, this is my own addition to Halwani’s two types of love. RL3, or romantic love 3,
could be a type of love that lives on after we do. It is what lingers after the passing of one’s
spouse, the fond memories one looks back on. While it has many similarities with RL2, they
would not be exactly the same. With a loved one’s passing there will almost always be some
sort of grief involved. Therefore, RL3 would have many similarities with RL2, but with the

34
R. Halwani, Philosophy of Love, Sex, and Marriage – An Introduction, 2nd edn., New York, Routledge., 2018,
p. 21-22

15
addition of sorrow and a longing for the loved one. The longing in RL2 and RL3 are of
different kinds. The longing in RL2 is for something attainable and that one already has,
whereas the longing in RL3 is for something lost. RL3 is still partly a happy type of love,
though a more mellow version.

Love between partners can, of course, end in more ways than one of them
passing away. A partnership ending by choice, say a couple chooses to break up or one of the
partners choosing to break up is different to how love ends in RL3. Choice is the major
difference in this case. When a couple breaks up, it is often a choice one or both of them
made. This allows for RL2 to end more or less fully. RL3 does not have the same choice
when the companionship ends. By breaking of a relationship, RL2 is no longer successful in
that case. RL2 specifies that there must be a longing or want to be with the other person.
There is at least one person that does not want the relationship when it is ended.

3.3 Martin Hägglund and the Mortality of Love

Martin Hägglund’s Vårt enda liv, is concerned with secular faith, love, and loss. Love should
not be something holy and unending, that would defeat the very purpose of love. While
Christianity promotes this everlasting love, it seems to be something tied to time. It has a
beginning and an end. The everlasting aspect of love takes something crucial out of it, the risk
that it can be lost. There are no risks when it comes to immortal love, no reason as to why we
should cherish it. If we knew for certain that we would not lose our loved one, then we might
not value them as highly. Hägglund points out that it is the mortality of love that makes it
important to us. The fact that we can lose our partner at any given moment makes them
valuable. There would be no need to put any energy into immortal love since it would be there
no matter what. The risk of losing a loved one’s passing is not negative according to
Hägglund, quite the contrary. It is what makes love worth fighting for, what makes life worth
living. One must believe in love, but also that love can be lost 35.

In accordance with this, life is built upon uncertainties. One can never know
what will happen next. Love is no exception to this. As Augustinus states, the love and
affection another person shows you will never be certain. Even if one is sure that they are
loved, they will never know for certain. Since we cannot be sure, we always have to believe

35
M. Hägglund, Vårt enda liv – Sekulär tro och andlig frihet, Stockholm, Volante., 2019, p 60-63.

16
that the actions or affections of the other person are true. There is always the element of belief
when it comes to other people. Hägglund calls this the necessary unsureness of belief.
Humans always need other people to flourish and thrive, even if it brings in the element of
unsureness 36. This is precisely why we care about people. It is not a given factor that we get
to keep what we have and value. There is always the risk of losing that we keep closest.
Despite this, we need to trust that life will go on, that the heart of our lover will continue
beating 37.

Devotion is central to the view Hägglund presents. The devotion C.S Lewis felt
for his late wife exemplifies and summarizes the whole idea Hägglund wants to present.
Lewis was passionately devoted to a life that could end at any point. This devotion requires
time, limited time to be more specific. We never have endless time with our loved ones, the
threat that it will end it is always imminent. While this aspect is frightening to many, it is still
partly positive. Being with a loved one requires some aspect of time. The lovers think about
their future together, they plan for it. It is this aspect of time and love that makes this
relationship valuable. Love can only truly be felt if we at the same time feel the essence of
time and vulnerability. Lewis does not want an endless and eternal love, for it would take
away the vulnerable aspect of it. He wants his wife and what they shared back; not for it to
reach some type of eternal existence. Love would then be endless and not timeless. Love
always has an expiration date whether we want it to or not. In Lewis’s case, the love for his
wife was endless. Evidently, due to his wife passing, their love was not timeless 38.

Moving on, the things that we care about are all based on some type of belief.
For example, if Robin is jealous of Kim’s new shoes, then Robin must believe that the shoes
have some type of worth. Robin might believe that they would look great on them, or that
Kim does not deserve the new shoes. Either way, there is the belief that the shoes are
valuable. We are all dependent on these beliefs, one way or another. One might think that one
is not dependent on anyone and is fine alone, but then they believe in the worth of being alone
and independent. It is the same for love and for the people we love. We hold the belief that
they are valuable, and that love is something desirable 39.

36
M. Hägglund, Vårt enda liv – Sekulär tro och andlig frihet, Stockholm, Volante., 2019, p. 91-92.
37
Ibid, p. 95.
38
Ibid, p. 58-61.
39
Ibid, p. 64.

17
 The fragility of life and the relationships we have with other people are precisely
what makes life worth living, according to Hägglund. Our ambitions are based on finite
relationships that can be lost. This would rather point towards a belief in a persistence when it
comes to life, as opposed to an infinite existence. To love is to actively choose to believe in it.
We have to throw ourselves into an uncertain future where anything could happen. We must
commit to live on. The happiness we feel in life is solidly rooted in our idea of a purpose, a
belief. Love is not infinite. It is on the contrary fixed in the past and the future. Current time is
preoccupied by memories of the past and visions of the future where we think of our lives.
We plan for the future, for a time when we do not exist anymore. People having children are
partly for their legacy to live on. While memories can become murky with time, that we
create might not become murky 40.

As is evident, time is present at every moment, of every second of our lives. We

tend to want to hold on to moments in time where we might be the happiest or where we felt
good. However, despite how much we try, we can never stay in those moments. We always
try to reach for something when wanting to keep our memories. As with time, reaching for
things is present in our everyday lives. For instance, when we rest, we are reaching for the
goal of letting a calmness settle in us. Every activity we do cannot be reduced to one instance,
one moment. Thus, all that we do is limited to time. Even love is limited to time 41. Aaron
Smuts agrees that if we were immortal, meaning that time would not be a hinderance, it would
be more of a limitation to us than an advantage. We would complete all our goals and
aspirations, which would result in a lack of motivation to keep living. An immortal life would
result in a meaningless existence, since we would in the end lose interest in the things we
love 42.

Even when love is maintained perfectly, it will always be a threat to us.

Everything one holds dear can be taken away and subject us to pain. The very aspect that
everything can be taken from us is precisely why we care. It works as a motivation for people
to continue to take care of what they love. We can never be sure that our love will live on,
anything could happen in the future. Thus, one must believe that love will live on, that the
relationship can withstand challenges 43. However, the fact that we are vulnerable is not
negative. We should not try eliminate the vulnerability, quite the contrary. The vulnerability is

40
M. Hägglund, Vårt enda liv – Sekulär tro och andlig frihet, Stockholm, Volante., 2019, p. 77-79.
41
Ibid, p. 91.
42
A. Smuts, ’Immortality and Significance’, Philosophy and Literature, vol. 35, no. 1, 2011, p. 7.
43
M. Hägglund, Vårt enda liv – Sekulär tro och andlig frihet, Stockholm, Volante., 2019, p. 95-96.

18
part of something good. It can teach us about the limited time we have, that it is not a
hinderance. Even if we realize this it will not make us invulnerable to the finite life. We still
need other people in order to survive. It makes us open to the world and open to the love of
other people 44.

44
M. Hägglund, Vårt enda liv – Sekulär tro och andlig frihet, Stockholm, Volante., 2019, p. 102-103.

19
 4. Discussion and Analysis

In the previous parts of the essay, Aristotle’s ethics have been considered, paying close
attention to happiness, love and the human good. Aristotle points out that happiness is the
chief human good. However, it is not happiness as in amusement, it is rather satisfaction. In
addition to this, to live a virtuous life is to live a happy life. Pleasure was also researched,
since it becomes relevant for the discussion about romantic love. Further on, romantic love
has been researched and discussed. RL1 and RL2 in Raja Halwani’s Philosophy of Love, Sex
and Marriage has given am understanding of romantic love and how it works. While it might
have its faults, it still provides an understanding of how romantic love works. To contrast this
and Aristotle’s ethics, Martin Hägglund’s view of love and life has been presented.

As was discussed in 3.2.1, Halwani’s understanding of romantic love is to some

extent unsatisfactory. It is a rather joyous and positive view of love, which in itself does not
seem bad. However, it leaves one asking the question of whether love really is that joyous in
real life. Love can be a sickness for some, it can hurt and be disastrous for others. In these
cases, Halwani might say that it was not real love. But why cannot real love hurt? Is it even
real love if it does not hurt at some point? Halwani’s idealistic type of love does not give
room for relationships where two people dearly love each other but might not cover all the
premises that RL1 and RL2 posits. To make RL1 and RL2 more satisfactory, one could
introduce other types of romantic love. For instance, RL2 is not successful if there are major
fights or major resentment in the relationship. One could argue that it still was RL2 up until
the fights started, or the resentment set in. In my opinion, love can still be successful even if it
ends in bitterness. Just because it ends up in a less desirable way, does not entail that it never
was successful. It can be a successful case of RL2 that ends in a bad way. On the other hand,
it is understandable that one cannot call it a successful case of RL2 if the resentment is present
during the whole relationship.

Martin Hägglund, on the other hand, presents more of a reasoning of why we

love and how we love. Contrary to Halwani, Hägglund’s love is not always good and not
always pretty. He acknowledges that love can hurt a lot at times. This is not a reason for us to
shy away from it, or to call it unsuccessful. Hurt and pain is what makes love valuable. If this
were to be incorporated into RL1 and RL2, we might get a more satisfactory theory. For
instance, the fear that our loved one might be taken from us could be what makes RL2
successful. If we do not in some way care for or want our loved one to be well, then it is

20
possible that we do not love them. Hägglund allows love to hurt in a way that Halwani does
not. The basis Hägglund provides for love seems to be sounder than Halwani’s theory of love.
Where RL1 and RL2 are like love stories and movies, Hägglund’s is more realistic. Love
should be allowed to hurt. It is nothing to shy away from.

However, Hägglund’s theory comes across as somewhat pessimistic. In a way,

love feels like it is always rushed. Time is always a reminder of what we stand to lose. While
love is still possible, it still seems like we cannot enjoy it fully due to the anxiety that comes
with it. Though, this is supposed to be something positive. Hägglund means that this is
precisely the reason that shows our care for other people. Even if he sees it as something
positive, it still entails something negative. The imminent death of a loved one should not be
the sole reason why we care about them, or why we do things for them. It takes away part of
their humanity and worth as individual people. Hägglund does say that we are afraid to lose
the loved one because we value them so highly. The fear, in my opinion, overshadows the
loved one to some degree. Even in the happiest moments, it seems like there will always be
some nagging fear in the back of one’s mind. It takes away the possibility of caring for or
loving one’s partner for the sake of themselves. In Hägglund’s theory, we seemingly do not
care for the loved one for themselves, we rather care for them due to the risk of losing them.

Aristotle might not agree with everything in a modern theory of love. There is
some tension between RL1 and Aristotle when it comes to romantic love. Excess might be
what is the least desirable in Aristotle’s theory. Everything needs to be in moderation, except
virtue that is almost welcomed in excess. When it comes to RL1, one of its defining
characteristics seems to be desire in excess for the beloved. Lovers that are possessed by RL1
seem to think of nothing less than their object of love. Every fiber of their being seems to long
for their lover. What is it if not excess? Halwani describes it as a deeply intense stage. In
addition to this, RL1 cannot be virtuous or part of the highest good just because it is
excessive. Evidently, RL1 has to do with bodily pleasures. Aristotle is not wholly opposed to
bodily pleasures, he even states that it is necessary. Although, RL1 is exactly what Aristotle
deems unvirtuous. Thus, it cannot fully be part of eudaimonia.

Nonetheless, there is still a possibility that RL1 could be included in eudaimonia

if it is subject to some changes. First and foremost, it is needed to remove the excessive aspect
of RL1. The lovers would to some extent need to be less involved with each other. However,
it is difficult to state exactly to what degree the desires need to be lessened. One definite
answer would be that the desire for bodily pleasure needs to be lessened. However, Halwani

21
does state that there simply needs to be sexual desire in RL1, not that the people involved
need to partake in it. This would make it possible for the original RL1 to be a bit more
approved in Aristotle’s theory. However, even if the lovers do not act on their desires, they
would still be there. It is still a type of excess. If we are to take Aristotle’s theory to heart,
then one needs to have the right state of character when performing virtuous actions. Even if
one does not act on it, intense sexual desire is still not virtuous. It does not indicate the right
state of character since it is based on excess. What would make it possible for RL1 to be
virtuous is, as mentioned before, if the desires were lessened. Though, desire is such an
integral part of RL1, that taking it away would make it something else than RL1. In
conclusion, the original definition of RL1 cannot be virtuous and part of what Aristotle
defines as eudaimonia.

RL2, on the other hand, is better suited to Aristotle’s ethics. Love in RL2 is a
slower, less intense type of love. Where RL1 is more part of the life of pleasure, RL2 is more
part of the contemplative life. RL2 is characterized by much less sexual desire, comfortability,
and a longing to share one’s life with the loved one. The contemplative life seems to be a
slower life, filled with long discussions and meaningful actions. This corresponds to RL2’s
comfortability and less intense nature. While RL2 can be part of the contemplative life, it is
not what constitutes it wholly. Contemplative activities are chosen in the same way virtues
are, for their own sake. This means that they yield no product other than enjoyment of the
activity itself. Love can be said to be chosen for its own sake as well. It does indeed sound
strange to choose love because it yields some type of result. For example, if Bob were to love
Kath to get access to her money as a result, then he would not be in the relationship for the
right reason. In this case, Bob does not choose love or Kath for themselves. If he were to love
Kath simply for her, then he would choose both love and Kath for themselves. As I interpret
it, loving someone for themselves is also choosing love for itself. Love and the beloved are in
a way one and the same. Without the beloved there would not be love, and without love the
beloved would not be loved.

In addition, Aristotle states that any life, and especially the contemplative life,
is better lived with companions. They cannot be any companions however, as it seems they
need to live a similar type of life. Companions and friends have a rather important role in The
Nicomachean Ethics, as they are needed to live a virtuous life. They play the role of
companions, where the quality of life is much better when they are present. Amongst the
types of friendships, it is the last one that is the most desirable one. Being built upon mutual

22
respect and care, it is made to last. It is also stated that this type of friendship is not common.
If we compare this type of friendship to RL2, then it is evident that they have many
similarities. Both RL2 and companionship are built upon mutual respect, they establish care
between people and seem to promote a general love between people.

Furthermore, the main difference between them is that Halwani writes about
romantic love, while Aristotle is seemingly writing about a more platonic love. It is also stated
that the relationship between man and wife is unequal, meaning that they need different things
in the relationship. Halwani does not seem to share this opinion. His theory emphasizes that
there should be mutual care, and that the partners are equal in the relationship. This would
mean that RL2 is not entirely virtuous as well. Despite this, the similarities are still
considerable. There are only minor differences between Aristotle’s friendship and RL2.
Aristotle’s definition of friendship can be likened with a type of companionship. It is about
people who care for each other, and that have known each other for a long time. This is very
similar to RL2, with the addition of romantic love. RL2 can also be likened with
companionship, due to the deep familiarity of the partners. Ultimately, it can be established
that RL2 is virtuous and is part of happiness and the good life. It is too closely related to
Aristotle’s companionship to be anything other than virtuous. However, while it is part of
eudaimonia, it does not constitute it wholly. Eudaimonia would be the satisfaction and
happiness after a well-lived life. Companionship evidently is part of it, but not the whole.

Eudaimonia is what one reaches after living a happy and virtuous life.
Oftentimes, eudaimonia is translated to happiness. However, it is not happiness as one might
think. It is rather the satisfaction one feels after having lived a good life. It is not reached after
one day, or after one month. It must be consistent throughout one’s whole life. A happy
relationship, as has previously been established, can certainly be part of this. However,
unhappy relationships might not have the same place in a happy life. Both Aristotle and
Halwani’s theories mostly revolve around successful relationships, where unhappiness does
not have as great a place. Unhappy relationships do exist, but is this a reason to call them
unvirtuous or unsuccessful? Halwani certainly does seem to think that any relationship is
unsuccessful if does not fulfill all the requirements of RL2. In reality, many relationships
might not reach all the requirements of RL2. This does not mean that they are unsuccessful
cases of love. One might love a certain person, but the relationship could at the same time be
unstable and riddled with fights. I do agree that it is not RL2, since it does not fulfill the

23
requirements, or even a healthy relationship to begin with. But it does not mean that there is a
lack of love.

Earlier in the essay, RL3 was presented, which was love after death. Some
relationships do not reach the conditions that RL1 and RL2 stipulate. Some relationships are
turbulent and not peaceful as RL2 is. This type of love could then have similarities to RL2 in
regards that it is mutual between the parties involved and that it has been ongoing for a period
of time. If love in has not been ongoing for a period of time, it might become slightly too
similar to some aspects of RL1, which is already a quite chaotic stage. This would then be the
type of love that still after some time is turbulent and, in some cases, unhappy. The
relationship might not be as good for the parties involved.

In a turbulent relationship there might be major disagreements and general

uncertainty. A relationship like this is probably not desirable due to the very nature of it.
Although, despite its rocky nature, there is still love in the relationship. Especially a desire to
be with the lover. It is important that love is reciprocated in this version of romantic love.
Romantic love entails a willingness to be with the beloved. Without this, it would be
unrequited love, or possibly a version of love that is unrequited. This does then represent an
“unattractive” type of love where love is not always pretty. In some cases, it might even be
destructive for the parties involved.

Furthermore, turbulent love would not be virtuous in the same way RL2 is.
Virtue is quite stable and set in what it is. An unstable or unhappy relationship is neither, quite
the opposite. There may be parts of it that are virtuous, but as a whole turbulent love is not
virtuous. One must be in the right state of character in order to be virtuous. This would most
likely not include a relationship that is bitter or contains a lot of disagreements. Too many
disagreements could indicate that one or both in the relationship have an excess of anger if
they lash out often, or an excess of pride if they refuse to relent. In addition, the ideal
companionship Aristotle describes seems to not have major disagreements. At least no
disagreements that would be harmful to the companionship. Many most likely are aware that a
relationship that contains a lot of major disputes is not the healthiest one. Incontinence would
therefore be a part of turbulent love as well. The incontinent person cannot help themselves to
do certain actions, even knowing that the actions are wrong. However, Aristotle does claim
that friendship and companionship implies some virtue. As I want to liken Aristotle’s
friendship with both platonic friendship and with romantic love, it means that it is in part
virtuous.

24
 On the other hand, Hägglund’s theory is a bit harder to determine whether it is
part of eudaimonia or not. For both Hägglund and Aristotle, devotion seems to be a central
concept. Aristotle wants us to be devoted to virtue and the virtuous life. Hägglund’s theory is
devoted to time and the loved one. They are both reaching for the ultimate good. However,
they do not agree on what this good is. In Hägglund’s theory of love, it would be the value see
in the loved one. It is the value they have in themselves that makes them worth caring for. We
are devoted to what we love. Aristotle, on the contrary, is devoted to virtue and the good life.
While there is more worry and maybe an excess of worry in Hägglund’s theory, it is still
devoted to something good. This theory is at least in part virtuous, due to the deep care
Hägglund finds that we feel for our companions. However, there is a possibility that there is
too much fear in Hägglund’s theory. As he has stated, the love we feel for others is built upon
a worry that they can be taken away from us at any given moment. The question is whether
Aristotle would see this as an excess of worry contrary to the normal worries one has for
one’s friends. The key word here would be moderation. As long as the worry does not become
excessive, then it could be virtuous. It could even be encouraged since it shows care for
something good, something that helps us reach eudaimonia. Yet, if the worry becomes
excessive and makes us focus more on it than on virtue, then it would be wrong. Virtues must
be performed with the right state of character. Some worry can help us be more virtuous since
it shows care and devotion.

If Hägglund’s theory was combined with Halwani’s RL2 and possibly RL3, a
satisfactory theory that is virtuous as well could be created. To begin with, there are certain
components from RL2 that are important for a new theory, Namely, the companionship of the
lovers. Familiarity, a longing to be with the lover and the emotional intimacy are important
for romantic love. However, even if there are major fights, as long as they are temporary, it
can still be labeled as successful love. In addition, it can be argued that there still are moments
to be virtuous even in disagreements. One could choose to take the high ground and not
indulge in excess of irritation or anger. This would in turn allow one to learn from it and for it
to help one reach eudaimonia. A complete lack of disagreements would most likely be
impossible for any relationship, platonic or romantic.

However, Halwani does not give a proper reason as to why we love someone.
Much like Hägglund’s, the reasoning behind love should in some manner be to care for
another person. Whether or not this care comes a worry that the beloved could be taken from
us is another question. What it boils down to is care. In the end, it is care for another person

25
that makes us love them. We care about some attributes they possess, or care about some
aspect of their appearance that is pleasing. Love without care is like talking to a complete
stranger that we cannot see. Without care, there is nothing to hold on to, nothing to connect
love to. It is unimaginable to love someone and not care about them in any way at all. This
theory could be considered to be virtuous, and part of the good life, due to the companionship
that is the basis for the relationship. Love can be considered a virtue if it is moderate. This
love would be moderate as well, since it in a way corresponds to Aristotle’s definition of
companionship.

To summarize and conclude, love can certainly be part of the good life and
eudaimonia. It might not constitute eudaimonia wholly, but it is certainly part of it. RL2,
rather than RL1, is the type of love that would be part of it. RL1 was even found to be
unvirtuous, due to the intense and excessive nature of it. In addition, it is focused more on
sexual desire, which Aristotle opposes if it is excessive. Halwani does not provide an entirely
satisfactory account of what happens if one of the partners in a relationship passes on.
Therefore, another type of love was suggested. That would be RL3, which is a more mellow
and sorrowful love. Love after death to be more precise. Later on, Martin Hägglund’s theory
of love was accounted for. He provides a reasoning for love, where the fear of losing the
loved one results in care for them. In the end, the theories were analyzed and put together. As
mentioned before, with the materials at hand, certain types of love were found to be a part of
eudaimonia. Problematic relationships were found to mostly not be virtuous since they to
some degree are not virtuous. However, some part of those types of love can be virtuous.
Lastly, Halwani’s and Hägglund’s theories were combined to create a theory where love has
sounder reasoning.

26
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