Producing The News, Reporting On Myanmar's Rohingya Crisis

Journal of Contemporary Asia
ISSN: 0047-2336 (Print) 1752-7554 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjoc20
Producing the News: Reporting on Myanmar’s

Rohingya Crisis
Lisa Brooten & Yola Verbruggen
To cite this article: Lisa Brooten & Yola Verbruggen (2017) Producing the News: Reporting
on Myanmar’s Rohingya Crisis, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 47:3, 440-460, DOI:
10.1080/00472336.2017.1303078
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JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY ASIA, 2017
VOL. 47, NO. 3, 440–460
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2017.1303078
Producing the News: Reporting on Myanmar’s Rohingya

Crisis
Lisa Brootena and Yola Verbruggenb
a
Department of Radio, Television and Digital Media, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, USA;
b
Independent journalist, Yangon, Myanmar
ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

Since communal violence erupted in Myanmar’s Rakhine State in Published online 28 March
2012 between Buddhist and Muslim communities, the plight of the 2017
Rohingya Muslims has received much media attention both inside
Downloaded by [Tufts University] at 03:14 28 October 2017
KEYWORDS
and outside of the country. Rarely, however, do we get critical Burma; journalism; foreign
analyses of how such reporting is constructed. Research on commu- correspondents; interpreters;
nal conflict and journalism tends to focus on the how-to of conflict- Rohingya; communal
sensitive reporting and the dangers of employing local fixers and conflict
interpreters whose influence is seen to reduce the objectivity of
news, rather than on the actual news gathering strategies used in
specific conflicts. Based on personal observations of a freelance
reporter in Myanmar, and interviews with journalists and “fixers”
working in the country, this article analyses the news production
processes in reporting on the conflict. The article maps out the
various actors involved in the production of news, such as foreign
and local journalists, local producers (the “fixers”) and interpreters,
and the various challenges and limitations they face. These chal-
lenges function to perpetuate a familiar set of reporting routines
and “us vs them” or binary narratives, with consequences for the de-
escalation or perpetuation of the conflict.
The outbreak of conflict between Rohingya Muslims and Rakhine Buddhists in Rakhine State
in 2012 was a spectacular news story. It involved explosive violence and a clear cast of victims,
villains and heroes as well as surprises, including the unexpectedly violent nature of an
increasingly visible segment of the country’s nationalist Buddhists, whose religion is famous
for its tolerance and promotion of non-violence (Brooten 2015; Brooten, Ashraf, and Akinro
2015; Min Zin 2015). Yet the story is a complex one, with a history, a cast of many players,
and nuances that generally do not emerge in news accounts (see Cheesman 2017). How does
the news get constructed in the field in an area of communal violence, given the complexity of
the key players involved in the process and the various constraints they face? What aspects of
that process remain invisible to news consumers but have an impact on the ways the story is
constructed? Our goal in this article is to shed light on these processes and their potential
impact.
The processes of news production are influenced by the ways in which the traditional
foreign correspondent model of international news production is changing, and the fact
CONTACT Lisa Brooten lbrooten@siu.edu Department of Radio, Television and Digital Media, Southern Illinois
University, Carbondale, 1100 Lincoln Drive, Carbondale, Illinois 62901-6632, USA.
© 2017 Journal of Contemporary Asia
JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY ASIA 441
that in many places there has been a significant increase in the use of freelancers and
“parachute journalists.” As digital technologies have become commonplace, new mod-
els and ways of producing international news have and will continue to emerge. This
article is based on the personal reflections of freelance journalist Yola Verbruggen and
the 21 journalists, fixers and others she talked to between November 2014 and
July 2016. Verbruggen shares her experiences, which we then place in conversation
with the experiences of other journalists and local producers and with the literature on
foreign correspondence and how it is changing globally as well as in Myanmar.1
We explore such issues as the logistics of reporting, difficulties with translation,
government restrictions and the various people involved in the production of news,
from foreign journalists to Myanmar journalists and to the local people in Rakhine
State who assist in news production. We explore how news production processes are
affected by the polarisation of the local community, and how they limit the complexity
of the stories reported. We challenge standard representations of local producers or
“fixers” as dangers to the “objectivity” of the news produced, urging recognition of the
limitations and challenges faced in the field by journalists and those assisting them that
are part and parcel of the complexity of the situation. Greater recognition of these
limitations and challenges would offer additional insights that could be useful in
moving away from simplistic, “us vs them” narratives prevalent in much of the report-
ing. These narratives do little to improve relations between those in conflict, which is
perhaps especially important in an era of transition, both in Myanmar and elsewhere,
given the rapidly changing processes of global news production. We begin with some
background on the current transition period and the Rohingya crisis.
The Transition from Burma to Myanmar

For decades Burma was ruled by a military dictatorship that seized power in 1962 and
which perpetrated horrendous and well-documented human rights abuses. These
included the killings of thousands of unarmed demonstrators during massive uprisings
in 1988 and decades of fighting, violence and human rights abuses against ethnic armed
groups and civilian populations. Opponents of the military junta refused to recognise the
change of the country’s name to Myanmar, made unilaterally by military leaders in 1989.
However, Burma began a transition process in the years immediately following
problematic elections in 2010. This transition has had a significant impact on journal-
ism in the country. These initial years saw the release of political prisoners, including
journalists and bloggers; the closing of the censorship body, the Press Scrutiny and
Registration Division; an end to the blocking of international and Burmese exile news
websites; a decrease in surveillance and harassment of journalists; and increasing free-
dom to write on formerly taboo subjects (Reporters Sans Frontières 2013).
Despite positive developments, however, intimidation, arrests and attacks on jour-
nalists have continued, with reports of increasing self-censorship since 2014, as journal-
ists were once again being jailed. Commenting on this, Amnesty International (2015)
stated “Journalists are well aware of what ‘red lines’ they cannot cross – mainly stories
relating to the military, extremist Buddhist nationalism and the plight of the Rohingya
minority – and often shy away from covering these issues…” The government elected
in November 2015 and which took power in late March 2016 is civilian in name but
442 L. BROOTEN AND Y. VERBRUGGEN
composed of many former military leaders. The country’s leadership remains sensitive
to the media, especially regarding coverage of a few key topics, one of which is the
communal violence in Rakhine State. Some of the recent setbacks in journalistic free-
doms gained during the years of transition are related to the coverage of this conflict.
Internationally, the communal violence has received widespread media attention and
is often framed as a test of the recent transition. Myanmar readers, however, often
criticise international news reports for not accurately conveying the complexity of the
surge in anti-Muslim nationalism that has engulfed the nation. These concerns are
important, and an understanding of how this news is constructed must begin with
attention to the structures, practices and values of international news production.
Producing International News

The business of foreign news production has changed a great deal over the past few
decades, and news organisations now face a myriad of new challenges, especially an
increasing pressure to maximise profits and cut expenses. This is compounded by the fact
that audiences for foreign news have dropped, and although it does not sell well, it is
expensive to produce and advertisers are not keen to support it (Hamilton 2009; 2010).
Media outlets have been decreasing their foreign coverage, with the exception of war or
other crises abroad. Time magazine, for example, had 26 bureaus in 1986, 20 in late 1999,
and 14 in 2008, while Newsweek had 16 in the late 1980s and 11 in 2008 (Hamilton 2009,
464). Then there is the impact of more portable and personal technologies, which have led
to the emergence of citizen journalism, eyewitness accounts, and heavy social media use,
all of which developed about the same time as the 24/7 news cycle.
One strategy to deal with funding pressures and to maintain the ability to report
foreign news has been to increase the use of stringers, “parachute journalists” and local
journalists. While foreign correspondence has been the subject of many a memoir and
study, the role of these local correspondents, often called “fixers,” who make foreign
reporting possible, is under-studied and under-acknowledged (see Blussé 2012). This
changed somewhat after the role of local fixers and journalists gained attention during
the US invasion of Iraq, due to the security situation and the shift from permanently
stationed foreign correspondents to rotating foreign correspondents who do not speak
Arabic (see Palmer and Fontan 2007). Murrell (2015, 2) maintains that the “default”
practice in foreign reporting is to hire fixers and local correspondents, yet they “have
largely been airbrushed from the official accounts of international reporting,” a concern
echoed by others (Blussé 2012; Palmer and Fontan 2007). Blussé (2012, 8) was able to
find only three studies, by the same researchers we are citing here, that directly address
the role of the fixer, and she argues that all three “share the presupposition that a good
foreign correspondent works autonomously and thus that the existence of the fixer
stands in opposition to this ideal correspondent.”
These changes in foreign news reporting have generated concerns, especially about the
increase in the use of local fixers and the idea that a bad local assistant can derail or at least
heavily influence a story (Palmer 2007; Palmer and Fontan 2007; Pendry 2015; Wanke 2009).
Yet Murrell (2015) lists several important stories, including some award-winners, suggested
or conceptualised by fixers who often work long and hard hours beside the foreign
correspondents. Despite the range of possible outcomes, much of the existing literature
focuses on the dangers these local assistants pose to correspondents and to “objective”
reporting.
The suspicions commonly raised in the literature regarding fixers’ trustworthiness,
reliability as translators and potential to unduly influence the correspondent may be a
reason why news outlets do not often or openly discuss the actual editorial role played
by fixers. Yet rarely do accounts expressing concerns about fixers ever question the
reliability and trustworthiness of correspondents themselves in working with locals. In a
rare example, Murrell (2015, 146) argues that the hiring of a fixer gives the foreign
correspondent “power without responsibility” as he or she can “put this person at risk
and then jet out to safety.” In addition, the literature on fixers that has emerged thus far
assumes that the correspondents using fixers are foreign to the host country, but there
are instances where urban-based correspondents need help from their local fellow
citizens when they cover stories in unfamiliar, rural or far-flung areas. This article is
a contribution to this relatively unexplored area of inquiry.

The increasing reliance on “parachute journalists” who make brief visits to unfami-
liar places to report on what are usually complex situations has generated concerns,
primarily over the correspondents’ “lack of depth of direct, personal knowledge of the
context from which the events reported derive their significance” and thus the fixers’
ability to influence them (Palmer and Fontan 2007, 22). Despite the rapid changes and
increasing use of local journalists and fixers, there is a lack of scholarly attention to the
processes of newsgathering in the field, outside of the studio or office (Murrell 2015).
New technologies have increased the possibilities for freelance reporters, supported by
several active freelancing sites that connect freelancers with fixers, local contacts,
information on visas, border crossings, regulations, and other forms of assistance.
These changes suggest that the bureau-based correspondent may be an endangered
species and that new perspectives will emerge, perhaps even to challenge long-held
notions of the proper way to do journalism, including the emphasis on “objectivity.”
Ideology and Objectivity

A significant body of research has demonstrated how US corporate media prioritise the
viewpoints of the US and allied elites, and how ideology results in the construction of
some specific and oft-repeated news frames (see Pedelty 1995; Lewis 1999). Especially
powerful is the notion that “objectivity” is possible and is the antithesis of ideology,
when in fact claims of objectivity are highly ideological, “not in the simpler sense of the
term, but as a system that both legitimates and obfuscates relations of domination”
(Pedelty 1995, 8). Ideology functions by being unnoticed, through indirectly repressive
measures. While there are some repressive factors to deal with in reporting, often the
most important influences are disciplinary in nature, as “certain forms of knowledge are
favored and certain discourses privileged” (Pedelty 1995, 5). Unlike repression, which
attempts to silence dissent, “disciplinary regimes overwhelm, co-opt, incorporate, and
transform it” (Pedelty 1995, 6).
What are the consequences of pursuing objectivity in journalism, especially in areas
of communal conflict? “Objective journalism is superficial journalism,” argues Pedelty
(1995, 178), as “the demands of balance and fairness, the emphasis on elite sources, and
the fetishisation of fact lead to a simplistic, and at times, cryptic discourse.” The
emphasis on facts to the exclusion of often equally meaningful affect and the impor-
tance of context within which to place these facts often results in reports that are too
simplistic to enable readers to draw any meaningful conclusions or to gain a sense of
which of the various versions of the “truth” provided in the story is more accurate
(Pedelty 1995). In the context of Rakhine State, an “objective” approach threatens to set
up a “he said/she said” structure of reporting without adequate contextualisation or
analysis of accuracy or verifiability. The quality of news reports relies a great deal on the
working relationship between foreign correspondents and local producers.
Foreign Correspondents and Local Producers

Generally, foreign correspondents from wealthy nations are sent off to cover wars in
other parts of the world for an audience of domestic or transnational consumers.
During the history of foreign news production, “much of what was written reinforced
the romantic one-dimensional view of correspondents,” portraying the foreign corre-
spondent as “a cosmopolitan among cosmopolitans” (Hamilton 2009, 5). In her review
of the literature on foreign correspondents and their news organisations, Murrell (2015,
25) finds that “themes related to individual heroism and free-wheeling autonomy recur
endlessly.” Other research has reinforced this concept of a fellowship of foreign
correspondents around notions of danger, hardship and adventure, so that “the
myths of heroism, exploration and adventure are sometimes also brought together
with a moral calling and a sense of being above the common fray” (Murrell 2015,
27). Pedelty (1995, 24) is scathing about the self-image of the foreign correspondent,
especially the masculinised war correspondent, as independent and heroic, likening this
mythic being to “the accountant who rides a Harley. He [sic.] projects a renegade
identity to himself [sic.] and the world in a desperate attempt to live up to the American
myth of the independent man.” Pedelty (1995) outlines how structural forces influence
reporting before correspondents can even begin to have any significant personal
influence. Murrell (2015, 32) maintains that correspondents then take these embodied
myths with them into their interactions with fixers, whose invisibility reinforces the
lone, autonomous adventurer stereotype of foreign correspondents.
Although it is generally framed as such, news gathering in foreign contexts is not a
“lone sport” conducted by intrepid individual correspondents, but more of a team effort
in which only some – primarily Western – journalists gain full benefits of career
enhancement with less risk than their local assistants or co-producers. In his lengthy
history of US foreign reporting, Hamilton (2009, 465) argues that the changes in foreign
newsgathering of recent years have resulted in the emergence of “a broader, more
variegated class of foreign correspondents that, though still imperfect, ensured a
continued foreign news flow.” He establishes a typography of US foreign correspon-
dents, ranging from the traditional foreign correspondent, or a US citizen sent by an
established news organisation to work and live abroad, to the parachute foreign corre-
spondent, who is dispatched for short-term assignments, among others. Yet the work of
the local fixer is discussed in just a single paragraph, treated as a logistical assistant but
also as evidence that the role of locals is increasing. Hamilton (2009, 465) defines fixers
as “local dragomen who also help correspondents cut through foreign bureaucracy,
arrange interviews, drive the bureau car, take the odd photo, and the like.” Local fixers
do a variety of jobs, but are first and foremost indispensable as translators and a
significant part of their job in this respect is to peruse the local media for information
and story ideas (Blussé 2012, 15). Fixers identify several skills as important to their
work, including being a good “people person” and having social skills to interact easily
with people in the culture in which they grew up (Blussé 2012, 37). This ability to
navigate the local cultural terrain means that the job of a fixer is never purely
“logistical” but requires cultural, communicative and people skills.
The terminology used for these different players in the news production process is
often confusing, and fixers’ vital role as not only linguistic and cultural translators but
also as creative and editorial contributors has provoked a debate about whether we
should even use the term “fixers.” Fixers are sometimes but not always identified
differently from interpreters and also from stringers, who Pedelty (1995, 69) defines
in terms of the outlets they sell their work to, specifically international news organisa-
tions. Murrell (2015, 147) suggests that the term “fixer” needs reassessment given the
high degree of editorial and creative input these local employees contribute. For this
reason, we will employ the term “local producer” when we want to emphasise their
editorial and creative contributions to news production, but use the term “fixer” when
that is the word that would have been used in the context, for example, if that is the
word used by the foreign correspondent or local producer under discussion, or the
scholar whose work is being summarised.
Local producers need to at least partially share the perspective of the correspondent,
and be able to see things as outsiders to their own culture, with foreign eyes (Blussé
2012). Murrell (2015, 150–151) found that the fixers she spoke with had adopted the
language of journalism, with references to objectivity, impartiality and other perspec-
tives “filtered through a professional, educated, middle class prism.” In the end, she
summarises, fixers often have significant influence over stories, but they also often try to
minimise this for the sake of professionalism and in many cases, security. Their names
generally do not appear on the bylines, at times because it is too risky for them, and
their role in foreign news production is generally invisible to outsiders.
The relationship between correspondents and the local producers they hire is often
contested, especially since local producers generally take greater risks than the corre-
spondents who tend to get all the credit for the stories produced. Almost all the Chinese
fixers interviewed by Blussé (2012) report experiencing “resistance” by officials, police,
secret service and others, indicating a high level of risk of imprisonment, of losing one’s
job or of being otherwise harassed. These fixers report never really knowing what risks
they will face. They indicate that the relationship between fixer and correspondent is
usually unequal and that it can be hard for fixers to turn down story ideas even if the
correspondent makes clear that the fixer should only do things they agree to do, and
only if they are not dangerous. They also report that local people may brand them as
traitors for working for outsiders and authorities try to intimidate them, rather than
threatening foreign correspondents, which is more likely to attract the undesired
attention of the international press. Because the Chinese government gives greater
leeway to foreign correspondents than locals, for example, local producers face more
danger than correspondents (Blussé 2012). On the other hand, local producers can have
a strong influence on the news production process. Murrell (2015, 52) discusses how
power in the correspondent–fixer relationship is shifting, contextual and fluid, “where a

fixer plays an important role in story generation, has innate power due to his or her
skills set and can affect coverage.”
Yet the double standards in how they are treated are also a source of frustration for
local producers. In a rare example from the literature, journalists in Afghanistan were
furious in 2009 when a British raid on a Taliban compound to release a kidnapped
British foreign correspondent and his Afghan fixer resulted in the release of the
correspondent and the death of the fixer. News coverage focused on the British journal-
ist, while the death of the fixer was either mentioned only briefly or reported in the
words scrolling across the bottom of television screens (Reynolds 2010). Aside from this
example and the few academic works already cited, discussions of the relationship
between foreign correspondents and local producers are limited.
Before the recent political changes began in Myanmar, the country’s media and local
journalists were tightly controlled by the military dictatorship, and foreign correspon-
dents were rarely welcomed. This situation remains in flux, especially given the sensi-
tivity of the situation in Rakhine State.
The Rohingya Crisis

In 2012, religious tensions between Buddhists and Muslims in Rakhine State boiled over
after the rape of a Buddhist woman by Muslim men in May led to retaliation by
Buddhists. Within weeks, rising tensions ignited deadly violence when Rakhine
Buddhist extremists attacked Rohingya Muslims and their houses and businesses in
Sittwe and in other parts of Rakhine State. Houses were burned, more than 200 people
were killed and more than 140,000 displaced (Min Zin 2015; Southwick 2015). There have
been Rakhine Buddhist victims of both the violence and of displacement, but most
victims were Muslim, and mostly Rohingya, prompting some to argue that the situation
needs to be recognised as genocide (Maung Zarni and Cowley 2014; Southwick 2015).
Since the start of the violence, the Rohingya have become even more marginalised,
politically and economically, as the government maintains “restrictions on the movement
of Rohingya in IDP [internally displaced persons] camps and in Maungdaw and
Buthidaung townships that limit their access to health care and education, make it nearly
impossible to work, and impinge on religious freedoms” (Mathieson 2016, para. 3). By
late 2016, tensions remained high, with many Rohingya Muslims still in camps.
The majority population in Rakhine State is the Rakhine, who are Buddhist, while
the Rohingya Muslims are a significant minority. Many of the Rohingya are denied
citizenship by the government, with the former Thein Sein administration regarding
them as illegal immigrants from neighbouring Bangladesh, calling them “Bengalis” or
“illegal Bengalis” and not by the term “Rohingya,” which they prefer (Southwick 2015;
Chit Win and Kean 2017). The refusal of the Rohingya to accept the term “Bengali” and
the refusal of the previous government and many Rakhine officials to call them
“Rohingya” started a war of words, diverting attention from important underlying
tensions. Many people in Myanmar also use the derogatory term kalar to refer to the
Rohingya.
But not only the Rohingya are oppressed. The Rakhine “also have a long history of
distinctive culture and identity, and ethnic grievance and tensions with the central
government” that led them to take up weapons against the former military regime, like
other ethnic groups (Ekeh and Smith 2007, para. 31). The fear of losing their ethnic
identity has been a long-time concern, as they, like other ethnic groups in the country,
were not allowed to learn their own languages in school and faced cultural restrictions.
Though the Rohingya Muslims are a minority in Rakhine State, the Rakhine Buddhists
fear that they will become a minority, and Muslims will overrun their state. While this
fear is real, the threat may not be. Rohingya Muslims constitute about 30% of the state’s
population, Rakhine Buddhists 60%. While Rakhine Buddhists are a majority in the
state capital of Sittwe, in Buthidaung and Maungdaw, where large conflicts also took
place, the Rohingya Muslims constitute the majority.
The Rakhine Buddhist community has increasingly seen foreign organisations as biased
towards the Rohingya Muslims (BBC, October 18, 2014). After months of harassment of
humanitarian organisations and their local suppliers by “a vocal minority” of the Rakhine
who claim that aid workers have unfairly prioritised Rohingya victims, mobs attacked and
ransacked non-governmental organisation (NGO) offices in Sittwe in March 2014, forcing

approximately 700 aid workers to evacuate (Southwick 2015). The riots broke out after a
foreign aid worker was accused of treating a Buddhist flag disrespectfully (AFP, March 27,
2014). In the months after the violence, Rakhine extremists staged several protests in
Sittwe, including against the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation that visited Rakhine
State in September 2014 to discuss responses to the communal violence.
It was into this context that Verbruggen arrived in neighbouring Thailand in 2012 to
conduct research near the Burmese border into conflict and peacebuilding efforts in
Myanmar. Her experiences will appear throughout our discussion. When, in the middle
of 2012, exiles living in the border town of Mae Sot and in Chiang Mai, Thailand were
invited to return home to Myanmar, she decided to go with them. As a journalist, based
first in Mandalay and later in Yangon, she continued to work on issues related to ethnic
conflict and Myanmar’s transition to democracy. About that same time, conflict
between Muslims and Buddhist communities flared and she made her first reporting
trip to Rakhine State. Her most recent trip to Rakhine State was in June 2016. There,
she witnessed the complex relationship between local producers, interpreters and
foreign and local reporters involved in producing news about the conflict and began
questioning how the news production process influences reporting.
Reporting on Communal Conflict in Rakhine State

Before we explore the process of news production on the situation in Rakhine State, this
section provides an overview of the key players in the production of news, discusses the
complications of working with the authorities, and describes how foreign correspon-
dents identify local producers and translators to assist them.
Key Players
Since the outbreak of communal conflict in 2012, both local and foreign journalists
have travelled to Rakhine State to report. Local journalists work for national, ethnic
minority or foreign media outlets. Journalists, stringers, local producers and inter-
preters, if they are from outside of Rakhine State, are from various ethnic backgrounds,
not only from the majority ethnic Burman population. Those Myanmar journalists new
to the area call in the help of local producers to arrange interviews, transportation and
other practical matters. Many of the Myanmar journalists are subjected to pressure
from Buddhist communities to stop reporting on the conflict, are accused of being
Muslim supporters, and fear for their safety.
Most reporters living in Rakhine State no longer dare to report on the conflict, so
most of the nationals reporting are from outside of the state. Some have studied outside
of Myanmar and their ideas about human rights are more in line with those of foreign
correspondents. While they may understand the broader historical and political con-
text, they are not necessarily more aware of local cultural sensitivities in Rakhine State
than people coming in from outside of the country, as some Myanmar journalists have
only recently returned from exile themselves.
Some local producers are from Rakhine State while others live in Yangon and are
developing an extensive network in Rakhine State. Local producers, generally
Buddhists, arrange interviews outside of the IDP camps while Rohingya local producers
work inside the IDP camps. Only a few young Rakhine men enter the Muslim IDP
camps. One of them, a Rakhine interpreter (I21), said he did not face any safety threats
inside the camps, but faces criticism by his own community for trying to understand
the Rohingya. Many local producers living in Yangon perceive themselves to be more
impartial than local producers in Rakhine State (I1, I2, I9, I10). One (I1) stated: “Fixers
in Rakhine State often have an agenda. When we go there we have to be objective and
professional.” Some of these interpreters and local producers had not been to Rakhine
State before and are still developing their network and understanding of the area.
Global coverage of local issues like the Rohingya situation is ultimately affected by a small
group of key players from the local communities, and many of them thrive on their
entrepreneurial abilities. Visiting reporters get their contacts for local producers and inter-
preters through colleagues, word spreads, and networks develop. The best-known local
producer is a man who lives in Aung Mingalar, the last remaining Muslim quarter in Sittwe.
One journalist (I12) even said this Rohingya man had “tried to create a monopoly of fixing.”
Another by now well-known local producer lives in one of the IDP camps near Sittwe and
has expanded his business by hiring what one journalist (I6) described as an “apprentice.”
Foreign journalists reporting on the communal conflict in Rakhine State are either
based in the country, fly in from other countries in the region in their work as Asia or
Southeast Asia correspondents, or from other parts of the world, as parachute journal-
ists. There is a widespread perception among the Burmese population that foreign
journalists are biased in favour of the Muslim population and that they lack interest in
the perspectives of the Rakhine Buddhists. These foreign correspondents rely on local
people to provide the help they need to navigate the local scene, including gaining
permission to access specific sites.
Authority and Access

The production of news in Rakhine State is made difficult by the uncertainty surround-
ing access to sensitive areas and the way that the places foreigners are allowed to access
often change from one trip – or even one day – to the next, generally without
explanation.2 One foreigner working for local media (I6) said of the process for
obtaining permits to visit the IDP camps: “Every time I went up the permit procedure
was different.” Reporters must then depend on local people to help them navigate
application processes and fulfil requirements. Changes in rules and holding locations
for the displaced are also unpredictable and made under the instructions of the chief
minister of the state or the central government. One local producer (I14) said he helped
report on a story related to Rohingya “boat people” being held by authorities: “We
received permission from the chief minister to go [there] but when we arrived, he had
already informed the police and they had moved the Rohingya [to another place]. We
had no permission to go there.” They were, therefore, unable to get first-hand accounts
of what had happened to this group of “boat people” and had to resort to secondary
sources, affecting the quality of reporting.
The unpredictability of any particular day’s requirement for entrance to the camps is
an issue for journalists on tight deadlines or budgets. Journalists (I4, I5, I8, I12) said
that sometimes the time they could have spent reporting they instead had to spend
waiting for permission. “We’ve always had problems with permits. One place we always
got in if we went through the correct process and were patient. We always got
permission for the camps near Sittwe,” said a foreign correspondent based in Yangon
(I8). The team received permission to travel to Buthidaung and Maungdaw only one
time, despite multiple applications to do so. Another journalist (I13) found himself
unable to access the town of Kyauktaw after a bout of communal violence in 2013. He
said: “Kyauktaw was blocked by soldiers. I spoke to the captain but he did not want to
let us through because he could not provide security.” The journalist added that around
the same time in 2013, he was also denied access to areas in Mrauk Oo where there had
been violence and, in one morning, more than 40 people had been killed.
Sometimes a key issue is the clash between the need to cover breaking news and the
bureaucratic requirements for access. In 2015, journalists flocked to IDP camps in
Sittwe after reports in May that fleeing Rohingya and Bangladeshis, adrift at sea after
a crackdown on human trafficking in Thailand, had returned to the camps there. One
foreign journalist (I8) said that the lengthy application process was too time-consuming
when reporting breaking news where immediate access to certain areas or camps is
required, like when boat people returned to Myanmar after their boats had been turned
away from Thailand. Because of the pressure of the story, his team decided to enter the
camp without permission. “We were eventually interrogated and told to leave. Within a
week we were back with permission,” he said. “We were punished for not playing by the
rules, not because they didn’t want the story told.” The team also possessed a foreign
correspondent green card, which functions as an accreditation and should grant them
access anywhere, according to the reporter, even though the specific rules concerning
the pass are unclear.
Sometimes access involves quite basic difficulties such as accommodation. Every time
a foreigner or local checks into a hotel, the hotel needs to register his or her presence at
the local government administration office, and for this purpose makes copies of ID
cards, passports and visas. This practice was introduced by Burma’s military rulers and
continues today. Since their visas and passport copies are also submitted to the admin-
istration department, journalists cannot remain under the radar in sensitive areas. One
Burmese journalist (I4) claimed that there are persistent rumours that many hotels in
downtown Sittwe, where most journalists stay, are connected to nationalist groups. “We
don’t only have to watch out for officials, but also extreme nationalists,” the journalist
said. It would be easy for anyone displeased with their reporting to obtain their personal
details, which could endanger them.
Issues of access also include which interpreters journalists are able to hire. Recently,
a foreign reporter working with a local publication (I6) found it no longer possible to
visit a camp with only a Rohingya interpreter or local producer. Instead, she was
required to go inside the camp with a government-appointed interpreter. The journalist
commented: “I think it’s a security thing. Police at checkpoints don’t speak English, so
they can’t warn you if they want [to point out a dangerous situation to you].” When
Verbruggen visited an IDP camp on the outskirts of Sittwe in June 2016, unlike her
previous visits, the government did not allow her to hire a Rohingya interpreter inside
the camp, but instead insisted that she hire an interpreter from outside. It is difficult
finding an interpreter to assist in the camp upon arrival in Sittwe, since most Rakhine
Buddhists refuse to enter areas where Muslims live.
There is also unpredictability about visa regulations for journalists entering the
country, since they have changed in recent years. Verbruggen was asked no questions
nor asked for a copy of her visa in 2014, only for the personal details page of her
passport. Other foreign journalists she came to know in Rakhine State had the same
experience. However, by 2016, it was no longer possible to enter the camps on a tourist
visa, and all journalists were required to have journalist visas.
Sometimes restrictions have political motives. After a report about the alleged killing
of Rohingya Muslims in Du Char Yar Tan village in 2014, the government restricted
access to the country by handing out one-month visas to journalists instead of the
three-month visas they were granted before that. The restrictions were a punishment
for stories about the alleged killings, which the government denied had taken place.
Journalists had attempted to gain access to the village to investigate the claims, but were
initially refused entry. One journalist (I15) reported that several colleagues working for
foreign media outlets were briefly detained while investigating this case, despite having
official permission to visit the area. The New York Times (March 1, 2014) reported three
of their journalists had also been briefly detained.
The government has blamed journalists for “incorrect reporting” on the Rakhine
State conflict while at the same time limiting their access to primary sources. When
journalists are unable to access certain areas, they then have no choice but to rely on
secondary sources, which makes it more difficult to check their reliability. Whenever
journalists can gain access, however, their challenges in reporting on the situation –
especially with regard to language differences – have just begun.
Language and Translation

The main languages in Rakhine State are Rakhine, Rohingya, Urdu and Burmese, and
interpreters may be from either outside or inside the state. For those needing inter-
preters, Rakhine Buddhists often interpret outside camps, as many are not willing to
enter them, citing fears for their safety and an unwillingness to interact with the
Rohingya Muslim population. Generally, Rohingya Muslims interpret inside the
camps and are usually hired by journalists for the day, although as already indicated,
this can change when regulations change. Interpreters often speak two or more of the
regional languages and English. Interpreters and some local producers from outside
Rakhine State translate from Burmese as most Rakhine Buddhists speak Burmese, as do
some Rohingya, although fewer than in the Rakhine community.
For Burmese-speaking journalists, it is possible to limit the use of interpreters, but
many Rohingya speak only their own language so they cannot do completely without.
Often Burmese journalists look for anyone in the camps able to speak Burmese, risking
the accuracy and impartiality a more practiced professional would ensure. One Yangon-
based journalist (I4) explained, “My fixer in Maungdaw is a 14-year-old [Rohingya] girl
who can speak Burmese.” Finding interpreters in the camp, however, can be proble-
matic. One foreign journalist working for international media (I12) said that Rohingya
Burmese speakers at times interject their own perspectives into the conversation. For
example, the reporter said, “they [the Burmese speakers in the camp] were answering
questions for the people we were interviewing rather than interpreting.” Several local
producers and journalists who are Myanmar nationals say they try to get by speaking
English, Burmese or Rakhine, also claiming that many Rohingya local producers and
interpreters politicised answers or pushed their own agendas.
While local journalists can often get by without hiring translators, foreigners do not
usually have that advantage. Some foreign journalists find it necessary to hire two
different translators: one interpreter to go along to meetings in Sittwe with Rakhine
Buddhists and another to interviews with Rohingyas in the camps. In one example, a
journalist (I1) hired two interpreters when visiting the Rohingya camps, a Rohingya
interpreter inside the camp who translates from Rohingya into Burmese and a second
interpreter who then translates Burmese to English. The obvious risk here is that the
stories and their cultural and contextual nuances change during multiple translations.
The process of reporting on the Rohingya crisis is complex, involving a myriad of
people with varying degrees of professionalism and personal involvement in the situa-
tion, each with his or her own unique perspective which influences the shape of the
reporting. The political economy of reporting, varying degrees of familiarity with the
local context among correspondents, difficulties in translating the multiple languages
involved, the logistics of covering the conflict, and the promotion of an “objectivity”
which tends to perpetuate an “us vs them” narrative, all function to simplify a complex
situation for international audiences. In the process of simplifying the story, however,
these news production processes may also undermine the ability of local groups to
resolve the communal conflicts being covered. Grasping the complexity of the stories
requires a presence at the scene, and once there, the ability to manoeuvre and com-
municate with others. Nevertheless, much of the process and its influence on news
coverage remains invisible and largely undiscussed.
The Hidden Side of Reporting on Communal Conflict

Reporting on the situation in Rakhine State requires navigating many challenging
situations that remain undiscussed in news reports but affect coverage nevertheless.
Once a foreign correspondent has identified a local producer and translator, the news
production process involves complications such as navigating access or inaccurate
translations. Journalists also tend to simplify the issue and perpetuate a victim narrative
through repeated tropes that reinforce the conflict aspect of the story. Likewise, locals
learn what stories appeal to journalists. Coverage can often further polarise the situation
through the way the story is told. In addition, there are varying degrees of risk, safety
and recognition for foreign correspondents, Yangon-based correspondents, local pro-
ducers or interpreters. The lack of transparency about this process can influence
audience understandings of the situation and the key players involved in both the
story and its construction, which contrary to how it is often presented, is not generally
accomplished by the intrepid lone correspondent but rather through a team effort. And
as the situation develops, given the limited number of local producers and translators,
reporters often find themselves traversing some well-worn paths and constructing
familiar narratives.
Same Old, Same Old…

Especially given the increase in parachute journalism, a well-trod path quickly develops,
leading journalists to the same sites, the same interviewees and relying on the same small
group of local producers and translators. Based on things they have already heard, and
given their short time on assignment, some journalists merely confirm their assumptions
rather than taking the time to investigate new angles to stories. In many cases, of course,
these assumptions are based on news accounts about the situation. Many parachute
journalists check the usual boxes of people to speak to, visit a camp and often leave it at
that, in part due to the costs involved and time constraints. This is not to say that no
thorough reporting is being conducted. Some journalists, especially those backed with the
financial means, such as those with international wire services and large international
media outlets like the New York Times, Reuters and the Associated Press, do spend longer
periods in the area.
Especially in conflict zones, there are generally a limited number of local producers, so
journalists tend to rely on the same small circle of people, both as their initial contacts (often
other journalists) and as local producers (Blussé 2012). This is true in Myanmar where, for
example, local producers will guide journalists to the pharmacy in the Thet Kel Pyin IDP
camp, the clinic nearby and a well-known Rohingya lawyer and former political prisoner.
Outside the camp, in Sittwe, most journalists interview the same people. When trying to get
an idea of the Rakhine Buddhist view on the situation, several journalists (I3, I5, I6, I7, I15)
said they speak mainly to those with extreme nationalist viewpoints. This gives an unfair
image of the Rakhine Buddhist population, who are not all extreme nationalists, making
many moderate Rakhine reluctant to speak up, as they then become targets within their own
community.
A risk of interviewing people who have spoken to many journalists before is that they
come to learn what kind of stories reporters are interested in and what stories end up in the
media. The fact that local people living in the midst of this highly polarised situation want to
tell their stories and have their perspectives heard is understandable, and mining these
attitudes for the complexities they reveal provides important insights. This requires journal-
ists to be especially flexible in their approach to news production. In some cases, it may be
dangerous for those with perspectives that deviate from the narrative to speak or be quoted.
This is especially true when the situation involves polarisation and violence, when issues of
safety become paramount. To increase understanding between different groups and increase
the diversity of voices, translation becomes vital.
Difficulties with Translation

Much of the literature on translation in journalism focuses on trustworthiness and the
“problematics of neutrality” expected of a good translator, concerned primarily with
accuracy and the difficulties of translators’ “embeddedness” within local contexts of
violence, which “can shatter the capacity to act in a detached manner” (Salama-Carr
2007, 2–3). Palmer (2007, 16) argues that three of journalism’s most common concerns
involving the role of translators are their safety, their trustworthiness, and “the extent to
which using them produces biased journalism.” The latter two concerns include claims of
intentional mistranslation and of translators giving false information (Palmer 2007). This
dominant perspective understands translation as an accurate and objective replication of
a text, as part of a transmission of information, rather than translation as it often occurs,
as a creative means of conveying a complex reality that may or may not hold under
expectations of grammatical accuracy. Palmer (2007, 17) explains that for many scholars
of journalism, “any element of dependence involved [in the process of news production]
is potentially a form of noise in the information channel,” and thus a form of contamina-
tion. Yet for even the most scientifically minded among us, as Salama-Carr (2007, 7)
argues, “the time may have come to accept that the mediation of translators and inter-
preters, who themselves are social actors, is not always that of detached observers.”
In the field of translation studies, which emerged in the 1970s, it has long been
understood that translations are not transparent replicas of their source texts, debunk-
ing the “assumption of equivalence,” but rather that translation is “necessarily plural,
de-centered, hybrid and polyphonic” (Hermans 2002, 11). Thus, “translation can then
not be value-free, or neutral, or transparent; nor can the translator be spirited away”
(Hermans 2002, 16).3 Even newer than translation studies is the sub-genre of research
into news translation, which involves not only reproducing but also re-contextualising
or localising the story for other groups or audiences in a form of cultural exchange, and
in this case, incorporating the genre conventions of news production (see Orengo 2005;
Schäffner and Bassnett 2010). And, in an argument Orengo (2005, 179) makes about the
Italian context that also applies more universally, “translation is politicized, since global
news is helplessly recycled as localized partisan argument.”
As a result of its difficulties, a translator’s work “can lead to conflictive representations as
much as it can ensure dialogue and conform with the much used metaphor of translation as
‘bridge-building’” (Salama-Carr 2007, 7). While professional norms of neutrality remain
important, claims to “objectivity” and detachment have been questioned, and as Salama-
Carr (2007, 7) argues, “evidence suggests that neutrality can easily mask complicity and
unilaterality.” Of course, in areas of conflict, translators must be recognised often as being
witnesses themselves, who have worked “between testimony and translation” (Maier 2007,
264). In addition, those reporting on trauma often try not to merely report facts but also
help audiences encounter the experience (Rentschler 2010, 471).
Navigating this terrain in Rakhine State is tricky, especially as skilled assistants in
news production and translation are hard to come by and the political situation is
divisive. Verbruggen worked with one Rakhine interpreter who had taken part in a
protest by Buddhist nationalists against the visit to Myanmar of the Organisation of
Islamic Cooperation in 2013 and was very familiar with the Buddhist Rakhine nation-
alists they interviewed in Sittwe. He kept insisting on going to the camps where the
Rakhine Buddhist IDPs lived, saying they suffered just as much as Muslim IDPs, and
was frustrated by the lack of interest in these camps from visiting journalists. Other
journalists (I4, I7, I17) confirmed that they also had similar discussions with Rakhine
people they worked with or spoke to, demonstrating that local people have personal
stakes in how the situation is reported.
In another case, Verbruggen accompanied a fellow journalist, who did not speak
Burmese, to a meeting with a high official from the Ministry of Information in his office
in Sittwe. There, Verbruggen had a heated discussion with the journalist’s interpreter.
Each time “Rohingya” was used (a term which the two journalists generally tried to
avoid) or “Muslim,” the interpreter would use the derogatory term kalar or “Bengali” in
his translation. The translator consistently transformed open questions into leading
ones until Verbruggen, who understands and speaks Burmese and some Rakhine, asked
him to stop interpreting and conducted the rest of the interview in Burmese without
interpretation. The translator was offended and charged the journalist extra “because
there had been two people,” quite clearly a repercussion for Verbruggen challenging
him in front of a government official.
Even when the attempt is made in translation to be true to the original words, the
problem with an “assumption of equivalence” approach is that it can miss key nuances.
This was exemplified in the approach of the Rohingya interpreter Verbruggen worked
with, when they were interviewing Rohingya men in an IDP camp near Sittwe. The
translator kept rendering references to men carrying machetes as “Rakhine extremists.”
When asked whether the Muslims who were attacked used the term “Rakhine,”
“Rakhine extremists” or “Rakhine nationalists,” the interpreter declared, “He said
Rakhine, but there is a difference between the Rakhine and Rakhine extremists.” He
explained that the men did not know to make this distinction in their speech and when
he asked them if they thought all Rakhine did things like this, the men answered no. “So
only the Rakhine nationalists,” he said again. The translator, used to speaking with
foreigners and a reader of foreign news, understood the way the conflict is framed and
wanted to be careful in his translation to make the distinction between Rakhine
Buddhists and Rakhine Buddhist nationalists, even though the men they were speaking
to did not themselves emphasise this distinction. This is an example of the kind of
translation work that includes a layer of editorial overlay and is not an exact mirror of
what was actually said, but does help to more clearly reflect the nuances of the situation.
In a polarised situation, to expect local interpreters and local producers to be
detached observers is unrealistic. Interpreters play a significant role in news production
in Rakhine State, and since many Rohingya do not speak Burmese, Rohingya inter-
preters are especially important for local as well as foreign journalists. All the Rohingya
living near Sittwe are affected by the conflict. They are not allowed to leave either the
camp or the Muslim neighbourhood of Aung Mingalar in Sittwe. They are under-
standably emotionally involved in the issues that journalists come to talk about. The
same is true of Rakhine Buddhist interpreters, who have also been affected by the
conflict and are not impartial. Nevertheless, the task of the journalist is to navigate these
difficulties to work with these interpreters, as their skills are necessary in the production
of news.4 It therefore becomes vital for journalists to be flexible and vigilant in working
in such a context, finding ways around these limitations while simultaneously under-
standing the reasons for their existence in the first place. Attention to these limitations,
and writing about them transparently, may help to counter the simplicity of the
common “us vs them” narrative by providing a more complex understanding of the
local situation than we are normally provided by news reports on the conflict.
More Risk, Less Recognition

For local journalists, producers and interpreters, the risks of travelling and working in
sensitive areas in Myanmar are often substantially higher than for foreigners. Local
reporters working for foreign news agencies as staff or stringers are often accused by
local journalists working for Burmese publications, as well as by a large portion of the
public, of bias towards Muslims in Rakhine State. While the journalists interviewed for this
article were undeterred by this, some reporters from Rakhine State have stopped reporting
on the conflict out of fear for their safety. For foreigners, deportation is generally the highest
risk, but Myanmar journalists and local producers risk arrest, imprisonment and physical
harm. A local producer in Yangon (I10) stated, “I could disappear or get arrested, so I
calculate my risk.” She added that a lack of health insurance added to the risks. The
government treats foreign and local journalists differently and the lack of transparency
around government restrictions and regulations also increases the risks or, at the very least,
the fear of risk for local journalists and producers.
In some cases, the actions of foreign journalists increase the risks for locals, often
without the foreigners’ awareness. One interpreter (I20) was helping a foreign journalist
who asked why it was not possible to just take a motorbike around the IDP camp. The
interpreters said that they were afraid the police would give them trouble if they drove a
motorbike with a foreigner on the back and pleaded with her to take the car, which she did.
One consequence of the risks in reporting on conflict is that local producers,
interpreters and journalists generally do not get public acknowledgment for their
work. Most are not included in bylines. “Sometimes, when we are working on con-
troversial issues like this, it is better to hide our identity,” explained a local producer in
Yangon who has visited the Rohingya IDP camps about ten times since late 2012 (I1).
While resigned to not being mentioned in most stories she helps to produce, she said
that it might be a good idea to give local producers, who she referred to as fixers, a
byline not just to acknowledge their work, but also to give them some responsibility
over the story. Instead of “contributed,” she suggested the use of “fixed by” as a byline.
The dangers local journalists and producers face may lead them to take fewer risks
with their reporting and decrease their likeliness to challenge the dominant news
narratives. This also reinforces the impression of the lone, intrepid foreign correspon-
dent, including their willingness to take risks in entering situations that are ultimately
more dangerous for local people than for the foreign reporters involved. Increasing the
complexity not only of the story being told, but also of our knowledge of how these
stories are produced would increase the visibility of local producers, and possibly their
sense of responsibility and willingness to challenge simplistic narratives.
Perpetuating the Narrative of Victimhood: Finding Dying Babies

The famous dictum known to all journalists, “if it bleeds, it leads” indicates that
highlighting conflict is a central concern of news production, which tends to focus on
extreme, violent or crisis events at the expense of what “normal” life is like for people
living in affected areas. It must be acknowledged that the situation for many victims in
Rakhine State is dire, exemplified by stories of the violence people have been subjected
to, and the small living space in tents erected in camps, with no privacy and a lack of
food, firewood and other basic provisions. When she was reporting from a Rohingya
IDP camp near Sittwe in November 2014, Verbruggen and her interpreter spoke with
groups of mainly men and children dressed in little more than rags, who emotionally
recounted frightening experiences of the conflict. These people voiced their anger over
what had happened to them as they said they were attacked by Rakhine men carrying
machetes and sticks, dragging Muslims out of their houses to be killed on the street, in
front of their families. Children also revealed they had seen people hacked to death.
These stories need to get told, but repeated out of context they create a distorted
picture.
The news production in Rakhine State is clearly influenced by a search for misery to
show the plight of the Rohingya in a pattern that distorts the situation by focusing only
on the Rohingya as victims. In the IDP camp Verbruggen visited this became all the
more clear when she met a foreign photographer who despaired, saying “I don’t see any
dying babies!” A foreign journalist told Verbruggen that she thinks reports from
Rakhine State are sometimes misleading. “It is misleading when people only shoot
dying babies, photos that have the most impact,” she said. When Verbruggen herself
arrived in the IDP camp near Sittwe, from all the photos she had seen, she expected
desperate misery. For this reason, after driving through the camp for 30 minutes, she
started thinking that they had not actually entered the IDP area yet, since all she saw
was small villages, not much different from other small towns in the country. This was
not the first place she had seen without a hospital, or even a doctor or a school.
Yet the stories of those living here are indeed very different from most rural villagers,
and the internally displaced have learned through their frequent interactions with
foreigners to describe their experiences in ways that fit the dominant narratives. One
evening in December 2014 a friend introduced Verbruggen to a Rohingya man. The
meeting had to take place after dark and at a teashop in Yangon where no one would
listen to the conversation. The man, hesitant at first, eventually told her a story about
his cousin who had been smuggled to Thailand. He recalled the phone calls she had
made to her family left behind in the camp, begging them to give her traffickers money
so they would release her and put an end to the rape she had to endure. No question it
was an incredibly sad story, but it was not the first time Verbruggen had heard a story
like this. Her friend later explained: “He was surprised you did not cry because the last
person he told it to cried. I told him you have been to the camp and you have met many
Rohingya, so you are used to it.” The seriousness of the situation clashes with the
cynicism that often arises in situations that feel scripted or shaped to fit a specific
narrative, no matter how impoverished the victims or how sympathetic the audience.
For journalists on the ground, the experiences of daily life can provide telling
examples of the constraints facing camp residents without seeking out tales of extreme
misery. In the IDP camp in November 2014, Verbruggen and her interpreter rushed
around all day conducting interviews since she was not sure she could afford to return.
They made appointments by telephone while their driver sped through sandy and
muddy lanes. Reporters must leave the camp before dark and, as they had driven far
to a village on the furthest side of the camp, it was already dark when they got back to
the gate. The rickshaw driver waiting for them shouted at Verbruggen angrily that this
was not allowed and he had told her to be back in time. As her rickshaw pulled out of
the gate, she saw her translator hurriedly walking away, afraid his late presence at the
gate would result in trouble. He came from a rather wealthy family and earned a living
by helping visiting journalists, but even such a relatively privileged man must live with
such fears on a daily basis. Reporting on conflict need not rely on an imposed focus on
misery, as these details of everyday life can bring home the situation facing camp
residents. At that moment, it was clear how desperate and hopeless the situation of the
Muslims locked inside the heavily guarded camp was, even without seeing any “dying
babies.”
Conclusion: Implications for Audience Understanding

Journalists’ presence on the scene covering the crisis in Rakhine State is vital to producing an
understanding of these events, but is also fraught with difficulties. These include logistical
issues such as costs, language barriers, government restrictions, and difficulties with transla-
tion, especially when journalists must rely on local people understandably emotionally
involved in the polarised situation. Because of this polarisation, most people from Rakhine
State are afraid to report on this issue, so those reporting are outsiders, mainly from Yangon
or foreign countries. Thus, except for a small pool of Rakhine and Rohingya local producers,
the reporting tends to leave out the perspectives of those with the deepest understanding of
the complexity of the situation. What results is a reliance on the same sites and interviewees,
and familiar news frames that tend to reinforce the “us vs them” narrative.
Difficulties in dealing with national, regional and local authorities affect the ways the
story is told, as the authorities limit which areas can be visited and journalists cannot
always be sure that the areas that are accessible are also representative of the overall
situation or are instead “showcase” sites. Access to key sites is often restricted and the
rules around these restrictions often change without notice, which can lead to a
dependence on secondary or tertiary sources, undermining the reliability of the infor-
mation. The expenses of travelling and reporting on the situation in Rakhine State at
times limit even the biggest and wealthiest news agencies, and make the possibility of
in-depth or investigative reporting impossible for many news outlets. Other restrictions
include limits on the ability of foreign correspondents to hire Rohingyas as assistants or
the need to have an outside person with them in the camp, restrictions that change in
unpredictable ways. Foreign correspondents face visa regulations that have at times
been used as means to encourage self-censorship among journalists whose permission
to enter or stay in the country could be at risk.
Another factor influencing the production of news is the difficulties in translation.
Interpreters are often hired to translate interviews with people from their own communities
and expecting them to maintain “objectivity” in such a situation is unrealistic. Journalists
working with local interpreters need to be aware of the various key players and their
interests. Hiring locals is an unavoidable challenge, as their knowledge and skills are vital to
producing news that is as accurate and reflective as possible of the situation on the ground.
Media outlets survive on familiar and repeated tropes, including an emphasis on
extreme or violent situations. The perpetuation of such familiar narratives tends to present
the situation in simplistic, perpetrator–victim narratives that do not reflect the complexity
of the situation but instead strengthen the Rohingya–Rakhine binary. In addition, local
people also learn what stories appeal to journalists who may consciously or unconsciously
repeat the dominant tropes of international news. Always portraying Rohingya as victims
and Rakhine as perpetrators simplifies and essentialises these groups, and leaves out of the
dominant narrative any representations of, on the one hand, Rakhine who do not take an
extreme nationalist position, or on the other, violent Rohingyas. This reinforces an “us vs
them” understanding of the situation that can in turn perpetuate violence, including
violence towards foreigners such as NGO staff working to counter communal violence.
This trope can also be perpetuated when the friends and families of those with moderate
perspectives intimidate them, should they be quoted in news stories.
The complexity of the situation in Rakhine State would perhaps be more accurately
reflected in news coverage if such news included more transparency about the process
of reporting and a move away from the notion that local producers and translators may
be “contaminating” otherwise “objective” reporting. This would require more reflection

on the constraints faced in reporting and the differences between foreign correspon-
dents and local producers in terms of the risks involved and the recognition they receive
for their work. The dangers local reporters and producers face influence their will-
ingness to take risks in their reporting, and perhaps to challenge their invisibility in the
reporting process as well as the dominant news narratives produced. This in turn
reinforces stereotypes, including that of the lone, intrepid foreign correspondent.
Complicating the discussion would help avoid the simplistic victim–perpetrator binary
that does little to resolve the conflict, and offer a more complex narrative that provides
greater understanding of the perspectives of all key players, the complexity of the
situation, and the possibility of finding common ground.
Notes
1. The journalists and local producers interviewed about their experiences reporting from
Rakhine State will all remain unidentified and are referred to in the text in the manner
each requested. A list of the interviewees can be found at the end of this article, along with
more general details about them.
2. As this article goes to press in early 2017, violence has broken out again several times in Rakhine
State, and more lives have been lost (see Cheesman 2017). Rules regarding access for journalists
to sensitive areas are likely to have changed again as security concerns have mounted.
3. A more in-depth discussion of the complex issues involved in translation and interpretation,
and for that matter the meaning of the terms themselves, is beyond the scope of this article.
4. Rohingya producers and interpreters working inside the camps are predominantly men and
only one of the interviewees knew about a woman doing the same job. As a result, stories
about how the lives of women are affected in the camps are barely reported. In the Muslim
communities living in the camps, women often feel uncomfortable talking about their
problems, especially to men. Rohingya men mostly take the lead during interviews and
answer on behalf of the women.
Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
List of Interviewees
Of the 21 interviewees for this article, 15 were Myanmar nationals, 11 of them living in Yangon
at time of interview. The ethnicities of the Myanmar journalists and local producers include five
Rakhine, two Rohingya, one Karen, two Kachin and five Burman. Three of the Myanmar
interviewees were Muslim, three Christian and all others were Buddhists. In cases where the
ethnic background of the Myanmar producers could reveal their identities, this information is
not included in the list and their ethnicity is stated simply as “Myanmar.” The journalists from
outside of the country came from Australia, UK, USA and Southeast Asia. Some were living in
Myanmar at the time of the interviews, while others were not. To guarantee anonymity,
interviewees requested not to be identified by their base or home country and thus this
information is not included in the list below. For this same reason, age spans by decade are used.
The list below states each interviewee’s role in the news production process, whether they are
Myanmar or not, their age, gender and place and date of the interview.
I1 Local producer, Myanmar, 20–29, female. Yangon, June 23, 2015.

I2 Local producer, Myanmar, 30–39, male. Yangon, June 1, 2016.
I3 Local producer, Myanmar, 20–29, male. Yangon, September 18, 2015.

I4 Journalist, Myanmar, 20–29, female. Phone conversation, June 22, 2015.
I5 Journalist, Myanmar, 30–39, female. Yangon, June 24, 2015.
I6 Journalist, foreign correspondent, 20–29, female. Yangon, May 26, 2016.
I7 Journalist, foreign correspondent, 30–39, male. Phone conversation, June 21, 2016.
I8 Journalist, foreign correspondent, 30–39, male. Yangon, June 7, 2016.
I9 Local producer, Myanmar, 30–39, female. Yangon, June 16, 2016.
I10 Local producer, Myanmar, 30–39, male. Yangon, June 7, 2016.
I11 Journalist, Myanmar, 30–39, male. Yangon, June 22, 2016.
I12 Journalist, foreign correspondent, 30–39, female. Yangon, June 23, 2015.
I13 Local producer and journalist, Myanmar, 30–39, male. Yangon, June 8, 2016.
I14 Local producer and journalist, Myanmar, 20–29, male. Yangon, July 8, 2015.
I15 Journalist, foreign correspondent, 20–29, female. Yangon, June 8, 2016.
I16 Journalist, foreign correspondent, 20–29, male. Phone conversation, July 28, 2015.
I17 Local producer and journalist, Myanmar, 20–29, male. Yangon, July 29, 2015.
I18 Journalist, Rakhine, 20–29, male. Sittwe, June 29, 2016.
I19 Local producer, Rohingya, 30–39, male. Sittwe, November 10, 2014.
I20 Local producer, Rohingya, 20–29, male. Sittwe, November 10, 2014.
I21 Interpreter, Rakhine, 20–29, male. Sittwe, June 29, 2016.
References
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Producing The News, Reporting On Myanmar's Rohingya Crisis

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Journal of Contemporary Asia

ISSN: 0047-2336 (Print) 1752-7554 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjoc20

Producing the News: Reporting on Myanmar’s

Lisa Brooten & Yola Verbruggen

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2017.1303078

Published online: 28 Mar 2017.

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Download by: [Tufts University] Date: 28 October 2017, At: 03:14

Producing the News: Reporting on Myanmar’s Rohingya

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

The Transition from Burma to Myanmar

Producing International News

a contribution to this relatively unexplored area of inquiry.

Ideology and Objectivity

Foreign Correspondents and Local Producers

power in the correspondent–ﬁxer relationship is shifting, contextual and ﬂuid, “where a

The Rohingya Crisis

ransacked non-governmental organisation (NGO) oﬃces in Sittwe in March 2014, forcing

Reporting on Communal Conﬂict in Rakhine State

Authority and Access

Language and Translation

The Hidden Side of Reporting on Communal Conﬂict

Same Old, Same Old…

Diﬃculties with Translation

More Risk, Less Recognition

Perpetuating the Narrative of Victimhood: Finding Dying Babies

Conclusion: Implications for Audience Understanding

be “contaminating” otherwise “objective” reporting. This would require more reﬂection

I1 Local producer, Myanmar, 20–29, female. Yangon, June 23, 2015.

I3 Local producer, Myanmar, 20–29, male. Yangon, September 18, 2015.

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