Populist and Pro-Violence State

Religion: The Diyanet’s Construction of

Erdo■anist Islam in Turkey Ihsan
Yilmaz
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PALGRAVE STUDIES IN POPULISMS
SERIES EDITOR: IHSAN YILMAZ

Populist and Pro-Violence

State Religion
The Diyanet’s Construction
of Erdoğanist Islam in Turkey
Ihsan Yilmaz · Ismail Albayrak
 Palgrave Studies in Populisms

Series Editor
Ihsan Yilmaz, Alfred Deakin Institute, Deakin University, Burwood,
VIC, Australia
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 Ihsan Yilmaz · Ismail Albayrak

Populist
and Pro-Violence
State Religion
The Diyanet’s Construction of Erdoğanist Islam
in Turkey
Ihsan Yilmaz Ismail Albayrak
Alfred Deakin Institute for Faculty of Theology and Philosophy
Citizenship and Globalisation Australian Catholic University
Deakin University Melbourne, VIC, Australia
Burwood, VIC, Australia

ISSN 2731-3069 ISSN 2731-3077 (electronic)

Palgrave Studies in Populisms
ISBN 978-981-16-6706-0 ISBN 978-981-16-6707-7 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6707-7

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 Contents

1 From Pro-Kemalist to the Populist and Pro-Violence

Diyanet 1
Erdoğanism and Its Politics: A Zero-Sum-Game Between
Friends and Enemies 12
Religious Populist and Pro-Violence Narratives
of Erdoğanism 16
Friday Sermons 30
Methodology 35
Chapters of the Book 37
References 43
2 The Evolution of the Kemalists’ Diyanet 55
Introduction 55
Kemalists’ Diyanet 56
Building a Sunni Muslim Turkish Nation by the Kemalists 63
Diyanet Islam: State’s Manufacturing of Turkish Islam 70
Diyanet’s Competition with Non-state Islamic Groups 76
Conclusion 79
References 81
3 Redefining Diyanet in the AKP Era 89
Introduction 89
AKP 1.0 (2001–2008): Emergence and Rule of Muslim
Democrats 90

v
vi CONTENTS

AKP 2.0 (2008–May 2013): Authoritarian Drift 94

AKP 3.0 (2016–Present): Erdoğanist Authoritarianism 105
Diyanet’s Role in the Post-coup Erdoğanist State
(2016–Present) 112
Conclusion 117
References 120
4 Swinging Between Turkish Nationalism and Global
Pan-Islamism 129
Introduction 129
The Reinterpretation of National Identity 130
Nationalism in Diyanet Sermons Post-2015 138
Diyanet’s Growing Transnational Politicization 145
The Construction of a Greater Ummah 151
Imagining and Constructing the Geography of Heart 157
Conclusion 161
References 163
5 Antagonism Towards Christians and Interfaith
Dialogue 167
Introduction 167
AKP 1.0: The Globalist, Inclusive, and Pro-Interreligious
Dialogue 168
AKP 2.0 and 3.0: Mobilizing the Ummah Against
the Crusader West 176
Conclusion 183
References 185
6 Islamist Populist Conspiracy Theories and Victimhood 189
Introduction 189
Emergence of Conspiracy Theories in Diyanet Sermons 190
The Warning of Fitna 191
The Source of the Fitna 194
The Trials of the Faithful 201
Conclusion 203
References 207
7 Demonization and De-Humanisation of AKP’s
Opponents 209
Introduction 209
Gezi Park Protests: Diyanet Defaming ‘the Enemy’ 210
 CONTENTS vii

Post-Gezi Protests: Social Media and Diyanet 214

Diyanet’s Attempts to Defame Gülen Movement via Friday
Sermons 218
Use of Fear to Dehumanize and Demonize the Gülen
Movement 229
Portrayal of Fethullah Gülen as an Adversary 234
Diyanet: Villainizing the GM Beyond Sermons 237
Conclusion 239
References 243
8 Pro-violence Islamist Populism: Militarism,
Glorification of Martyrdom and Jihadism 247
Introduction 247
Militarism in Friday Sermons 248
Beyond the Chivalrous Army 251
Glorification of Martyrdom in Friday Sermons 255
Jihadism in Friday Sermons 262
Covert Pro-violent Practices of AKP-Diyanet Partnership 267
Conclusion 272
References 274
9 The Future of the Mosque–State Relations in Turkey 279

Appendix A: List of Acronyms 291

Appendix B: Glossary 293
Bibliography 295
Index 329
 CHAPTER 1

From Pro-Kemalist to the Populist

and Pro-Violence Diyanet

“The mosques are our barracks

The domes our helmets
The minarets our bayonets
And the believers our soldiers”
(Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, 1997)1

These verses are from a poem recited by Turkish President Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan during a rally in Siirt in 1997 (Friedman 2016). When Erdoğan
recited these verses, he caused a great stir in Turkey. At the time, Turkey
was dominated, or under the ‘tutelage’ of the Kemalist elite and mili-
tary forces, who insisted that the country be governed according to strict
secular principles (Çelik 2018). Erdoğan was himself mayor of Istanbul
when he read these verses, yet his position did not protect him from the

1 This poem was not written by Erdoğan, but he was imprisoned for reciting it. Erdoğan
and his supporters always claimed that the poem was written by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s
intellectual father, Turkish nationalist, Mehmet Ziya Gökalp in 1912. Gökalp (d.1924)
was a well-renowned thinker of the early twentieth century. His work made considerable
contributions to the pan-Islamic identity that Turkified the heterogenic fabric of post-
Ottoman Anatolia (Devereux, 1968). The name of the poem is “The Soldier’s Prayer.”
But this part recited by Erdoğan was not in the original poem of Gökalp, it was added to it
by someone else: https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/siiri-boyle-montajlamislar-99109; https://
www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/o-siiri-kimin-yazdigi-yillardir-biliniyordu-99423

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022
I. Yilmaz and I. Albayrak, Populist and Pro-Violence State Religion,
Palgrave Studies in Populisms,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6707-7_1
2 I. YILMAZ AND I. ALBAYRAK

wrath of the secularists, who imprisoned him for violating state secularism.
For a public official such as Erdoğan to push a religious, indeed Islamist,
narrative in public was considered criminal by the secular state. The
Kemalists therefore charged Erdoğan with ‘inciting hatred’, imprisoned
him for four months, and banned him from holding office (Friedman
2016).
Today, even though secularism remains embedded in the Republic
of Turkey’s constitution, and therefore in much of what might be
termed its black letter law, the influence of Islamism2 over Turkish
politics and society has increased in an unprecedented manner (Yilmaz
2020; Solomon 2019; Yilmaz and Bashirov 2018; Karaveli 2016). Laws
governing citizens’ micro-dynamics and macro issues, such as state-
sanctioned activities, have all been affected by the rise of Islamism (Saleem
2015). For instance, the AKP ruled state lifted the ban on women
wearing scarves in public offices, and consistently increased its sponsor-
ship of mosque constructions (Agence France-Press 2017; Saleem 2015).
These activities in the past would have been viewed against laïcité and
the secular spirit of the constitution. However, during the almost two
decades Erdoğan has spent in power as Prime Minister and later Presi-
dent of Turkey, the country’s socio-political fabric has been fundamentally
altered, and the power of secularism vastly reduced. Religion is at the core
of this change.
The contemporary Turkish Republic has a history marked by painful
and uneven relationships between the church and state, or in this case
mosque and state. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the father of Turks, embarked
Turkey on a quest for modernization following the fall of the Ottoman
Empire (Çelik 2018). This modernization was based on the Kemalist prin-
ciples of Republicanism, Populism, Nationalism, Laïcism, Statism, and
Reformism (Yilmaz 2021; Ulusoy and Kirval 2017, Kuru and Stephan
2012; Hanioğlu 2011). The stringent formula was viewed as necessary
to stabilize a region that had lost its central power, the Ottoman Empire,
which had ruled for six hundred years. Under an authoritarian single-party
regime, the People’s Republican Party (CHP) led by Atatürk set out to

2 In this book, we use Islamism as politicized version of religion of Islam, meaning

‘turning religion into an ideology and an instrumental use of Islam in politics by indi-
viduals, groups and organizations in order to pursue political objectives’ (Yilmaz 2021:
104). This ideology ‘is not a coherent ideology, it focuses on identity politics rather than
ideas and an appeal to emotions rather than intellect’ (Yilmaz 2021: 105).
 1 FROM PRO-KEMALIST TO THE POPULIST AND PRO-VIOLENCE DIYANET 3

build a new Turkey and reform its institutions. Kemalist ideals enforced
Westernization across the new Republic, and prevented Islam from having
a significant influence over the nation’s institutions and political sphere:
secularism, therefore, was a precondition for nationalism (Yilmaz 2021;
Ulusoy and Kirval 2017, Kuru and Stephan 2012; Hanioğlu 2011).
For nearly eighty years, the relationship between state and mosque was
determined by the government’s secularist ideologies. Diyanet (Direc-
torate of Religious Affairs) has played a central role in redefining Islam’s
place in Turkish society (see in detail Gözaydın 2020). The institution has
an immense bureaucratic structure. Under Kemalist influence, it operated
within the bounds of laïcité and the secular ideals promoted as part of the
Kemalists’ social engineering programme. Under this prototype of dı̄n,
Sunni Islam was promoted through Diyanet, which denied the non-Sunni
plurality of the region and religion. Other places that promoted religious
ideas and practices, such as madrasas, tekkes, and zaviyes (sufi lodges),
were banned in early Kemalist era (Mutluer 2018), making Diyanet the
dominant source of religious authority.
The end of the Ottoman Empire was not merely the termination of
a monarchy. The Empire had its own system of governance and reli-
gious guidance that shaped the laws and norms of the land. At its peak
in the sixteenth century, the empire spread over three continents (parts
of Europe, Africa, and Asia) (Blakemore 2018). Its people took pride
in the monarchy’s position and influence in geo-politics. With its elimi-
nation, the multilingual, ethnically diverse, and religiously plural empire
has lost its identity, and its former Turkish subjects were left with over-
arching ontological insecurity (Yilmaz 2021). This existential crisis came
into being when the nation-state—as a concept and an existing polity—
was taking root across the globe (Kohli 2004). For Turkish people, the
ordeal of defeat and loss, and the growth of nation as the core aspect of
human identity, generated much anxiety and fear.
The infant republic had its fair share of challenges regarding its survival,
economics, and autonomy, but most profound was an intangible chal-
lenge: Overcoming the Turkish people’s lack of collective self-esteem
(Wendt 1999). Due to the Ottoman Empire’s gradual decline in interna-
tional significance, and eventual defeat in the aftermath of the First World
War, the Turkish people—including the leaders of the new Republic of
Turkey, were left insecure and shaken. A humiliating defeat by the Euro-
pean forces had destabilized the self-image of the Turkish elite (Yilmaz
2021).
4 I. YILMAZ AND I. ALBAYRAK

In such conditions, nations are known to overcompensate and ratio-

nalize so that stability can be restored (Mitzen and Larson 2017; Wendt
1999). Turkey did this by disassociating itself from the ‘backward’ tradi-
tions of the sultanate and aspiring to ‘modernize’ like the West. The loss
at the hands of Western powers had instilled in the collective conscious-
ness an idea that Turkey was ‘behind’ and needed to reform to become
a part of the ‘civilized’ world, rendering its heritage obsolete (Çapan and
Zarakol 2019).
Under this historical context and political climate, the Kemalists
embarked on a set of reformist policies, and the population went
through extensive social reengineering in order to become Westernized.
Paradoxically, while the Kemalists wished to emulate the West, there
remained deep-rooted insecurities among them regarding Western inten-
tions towards Turkey. This hybridized ‘ambivalent Westernism’ became
the core of nationalism in Turkey’s newly formed Republic (Yilmaz
2021). The trauma of loss of territory and the end of a glorious empire
suggested to the Kemalists that Turkey needed to ‘modernize’ in order
to catch up with the West. The Kemalists therefore pushed for ambivalent
Westernization in order to construct their vision of a modernized Turkey
(Alaranta 2020). Throughout the turbulent years after the founding of
the Republic, attempts at reforming Islam and creating a purified science-
friendly Turkish religion played a unique and important role in the
Kemalists’ nation-building project. Fear of appearing ‘backward’, inse-
curity regarding European intentions towards Turkey, and a need for a
coherent national identity, led the Kemalist elite to propagate a central-
ized version of Islam that was also highly Turkified (Gözaydın 2020).
In this new religious landscape Islamists, non-Muslims, non-Turks, and
non-Sunnis were marginalized (Yilmaz 2021).
To cement this new version of Turkish identity in its citizens’ minds,
the military led Kemalist regime relied on education. The ‘Sunni Muslim
Turk’ was the idealized in textbooks. The ‘we’ or ‘the people’ of the
Republic were constructed using this mould (Babahan 2014). Over the
years, due to changes in the political tides, state discourse around who or
what is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ has varied, yet Islam has remained an important
influence throughout (Azak 2010). For nearly eighty years schoolbooks
presented the ideal Turkish citizen as a ‘moderate’ Muslim. Under AKP
rule, however, the curriculum has been heavily altered. Many ‘modern’
and scientific ideas and theories, such as Darwin’s theory of evolution,
have been abandoned and replaced by Islamist ideas and explanations.
 1 FROM PRO-KEMALIST TO THE POPULIST AND PRO-VIOLENCE DIYANET 5

Jihad has begun to be promoted in schools, and scientific theories that

do not comply with Islamist interpretations of the Qur’an are rejected
(Yilmaz and Erturk 2021; Altuntaş 2017; Yanarocak 2016). One constant
during both Kemalist and AKP rule has been the promotion of an ‘ideal
Muslim’, though what constitutes an ideal Muslim has changed much
over time (see in detail Yilmaz 2021). While education played an impor-
tant role in the propagation of the ‘ideal Muslim’, so too did the religious
publications and sermons issued by Diyanet. Indeed, Diyanet has played
a central role in Republic of Turkey since the body’s inception.
Diyanet’s position within the state has allowed it to maintain its
presence in the political realm, even as Turkey changed governments
(Gözaydın 2020). The institution has been empowered at instances where
the Kemalist and Erdoğanist have felt the need to attack opposition forces.
The CHP’s main political rival was for many years the Islamist National
Outlook Movement (NOM) of Necmettin Erbakan (Yavuz 2003; Yıldız
2003). Given the rival party’s right-wing Islamic views, Diyanet was used
to counter NOM’s Islamism with its own brand of moderate Islam. Later
in the 1980s, a rather right-wing Kemalist military-led government took
power at a time when socialism or the left was of growing concern. Then
President Kenan Evren used Diyanet to propagate a newer version of
the Muslim nationalism. In this period, the ‘Turkish–Islamic Synthesis’
promoted a certain type of Sunnification of society as a counter to the
socialists, leftists, and Kurdish separatists that had flourished throughout
the mid-twentieth century in Turkey (Saleem 2015; Ünlücayaklı 2012).3
The rise of Erdoğanism has again seen Diyanet used to propagate the
Turkish state’s notion of an ideal citizen.
Established in the Ottoman state’s ruins, the new Turkish Republic
introduced Diyanet under article 429, confirmed by the Parliament in

3 Interestingly, this process has also revealed a strange situation where relations with
Shiite Iran have developed greatly in Turkey, particularly in theology faculties and many
other Islamic organizations. Even, it is observed that frequent visits are made between
Turkey and Iran, and Shia origin professors are employed in divinity faculties first time in
Republican period. To put it differently, we are talking about a period when an interpreta-
tion of particular Sunnism is promoted on the one hand, and on the other hand, there is
closer contact with the Shiite world than ever before. AKP is the party of contradictions.
Just as Erdoğan is getting close enough to establish very warm relations with Iran and
declares it a second address, and on the other hand, supports opposition in Syria while
Iran is standing next to regime. Similarly, while seemingly advertising Sunnism in Turkey,
it is observed that Shia propaganda is made in an interesting way.
6 I. YILMAZ AND I. ALBAYRAK

1924 (Korkut 2016). The institution’s formation was aimed at regu-

lating the public’s religious life, especially organizing the places where
people pray, as well as attempting to influence religious belief (including
by publishing some authentic works thought to be beneficial for society).
Diyanet in its early years was a centralized state institute that had replaced
the offices of Shaykh al-Islām, qād.ı̄s (judges), madrasas, and Sufi lodges.
Thus, apart from Diyanet, almost every single mechanism that provided
religious instructions was closed down and declared illegal (Tarhanlı
1993; Gözaydın 2020; Öztürk and Sözeri 2018; Yilmaz and Barry 2018;
Kara 2000).
For a government pursuing secularism, the Kemalist obsession and
reliance on faith were ironic yet understandable. Divorcing religion from
the Turkish Republic’s public and private discourses was not easy. The
region had remained the seat of the caliphate for nearly four centuries,
and most Turkish people were faithful Muslims. Establishing Diyanet
therefore allowed for the continuation of this core element of Turkish
society and the state, and simultaneously allowed for state control over
most of Turkey’s mosques and thus, the country’s religious life. The
hidden agenda behind the establishment of Diyanet was to build a new
Turkish Republic ideology (Gözaydın 2020). The religious institution
facilitated the formation of a new secular system (Yilmaz 2021; Öztürk
and Sözeri 2018; Yilmaz and Barry 2018; Kara 2000). At the same
time, the state monopoly over religious services in Turkey prevented
backlash from religious Turks following the establishment of new laïcité
norms and values. Equally, the nationalistic version of Islam propagated
by the agency helped cement secular values and norms in place. Thus,
Diyanet has played a central role in the engineering of modern Turkish
nationalism.
Since its establishment, Diyanet has been subject to various phases
and has recently witnessed a fundamental transformational change (see in
detail Gözaydın 2020). Historically, it either enjoyed generous support
or was denied support and privileges by Turkey’s political and mili-
tary authorities. Depending on the political climate, the institute’s need
to counter various opposition forces determined its relevance for the
ruling parties. These two forces have frequently interfered with Diyanet’s
operations.
The influence of Erdoğan led Justice and Development Party (AKP)
has manifested a new role for Diyanet. The institute has been redefined
by the AKP, which is normalizing Islamism as the new national historical
 1 FROM PRO-KEMALIST TO THE POPULIST AND PRO-VIOLENCE DIYANET 7

narrative. This turn of events has made Diyanet once again a focal point
for transmitting a newly engineered national narrative and identity. The
directorate is communicating the AKP’s ideals and legitimizing the party’s
rule through its ‘sacred’ position within Turkey.
Since its inception, the body never focused on empowering ordi-
nary people, fulfilling their spiritual requirements, or paving the way for
people’s religious freedom in multicultural and ethnic ‘Turkish’ commu-
nities. Rather, Diyanet has assumed a mission of legitimizing the current
government’s (AKP) authoritarian policies. It has also played a similar role
for the various CHP led governments and periods of military regimes.
However, its role and significance in the AKP era is unprecedented.
Through the public institution of ‘mosque’/Diyanet and the state/AKP,
Diyanet has increasingly gained legitimacy in the eyes of the people. The
sacred nature of this marriage between Diyanet and the state/AKP has
helped normalize and justify the authoritarian government and its Islamist
ideology.
As the AKP grew confident in its position in power its involvement
with Diyanet increased. In contrast to the party’s earlier (2002–2010)
pro-European Union rhetoric, which stressed the importance of human
rights, sought pluralistic societal understanding, promised democratic
opening out, and promised equity and freedom, the new AKP devel-
oped fascist tendencies and placed great emphasis on the local/native
and the nation above the individual (yerli ve milli duruş ) (Yilmaz 2021;
Yilmaz and Barry 2018; Yilmaz and Bashirov 2018). The transformation
of Diyanet into the AKP’s mouthpiece coincided with this ideological
alteration of the AKP.
Through Diyanet and its weekly sermons, the AKP has communi-
cated its ideology and policies, sending them not only into domestic
localities but also to global audiences. Diyanet’s exportation of AKP’s
politics kills two birds with one stone: on the one hand, Diyanet trans-
fers AKP ideology and policy to the Turkish diaspora; on the other hand,
it gives an impression of the AKP’s Islamist sensitivities to both Turkish
and non-Turkish Muslims outside Turkey (Korkut 2016; Öztürk 2016).
Using Diyanet as the channel to reach and influence the Turkish dias-
pora demonstrates the regime’s exclusionist approach to politics, which is
based upon notions of Sunni Muslim Turks being the core group which
defines Turkish identity. The AKP’s outreach programmes also help the
party construct a transnational support base (Yilmaz and Demir 2021).
8 I. YILMAZ AND I. ALBAYRAK

In this way, Diyanet is gradually becoming a transnational instrument of

the AKP.4
The institution’s importance to the AKP is demonstrated in the scale
of the funding and support it receives from the AKP government. Since
2014, Diyanet had an annual budget of over 1 billion USD, and the figure
is constantly increasing (Öztürk and Sözeri 2018). In 2020, according to
a five-year plan, 2 billion USD were spent on Diyanet, and the direc-
torate’s annual budget is set to increase to 2.6 billion USD by 2023
(Ahval 2019; Duran and Bellut 2019). To support its activities, some
107,000 employees are on the Diyanet payroll, and operating in 36 coun-
tries with 61 branches and publications in 28 languages (Duran and Bellut
2019; Öztürk and Sözeri 2018).
The Ministry of Education and YÖK (High Presidency of Tertiary
Education) spend vast sums on Turkey’s religious schools and universities,
making Diyanet one of the most handsomely financed religious ministries
among Muslim countries (van Bruinessen 2018). Diyanet’s influence is
greater than the Turkish embassies’ offices, as its current funding exceeds
many other ministries. The AKP’s leadership uses Diyanet to construct a
massive global network which conveys their Islamist vision of Turkey to
Turkish citizens and diaspora Turks alike (Duran and Bellut 2019; Öztürk
and Sözeri 2018).
Apart from funding the directorate at a scale hitherto unknown, the
AKP has also made structural changes to legitimatize Diyanet’s role in
Turkey’s domestic politics. The elevation of the President of Diyanet
(başkan) from director to permanent secretary (müsteşar), and the state
protocol of Diyanet’s director’s hierarchy being elevated from 51 to
10, can be considered both symbolic and practical moves (Öztürk and
Sözeri 2018; Lepeska 2015). Under the leadership of Mehmet Görmez,
Diyanet’s new status and increased budget allowed it to establish radio
and television channels. Furthermore, its mandate was expanded to
provide religious services outside mosques, including, for example, in
institutions such as hospitals, prisons, retirement homes, and women’s
shelters (Duran and Bellut 2019).

4 Diyanet is not the only institution in Turkey that has become AKP’s instrument. Imam
Hatip High Schools, Divinity Faculties and many religious ‘civil’ society organizations that
have become AKP at least as much as the Diyanet. Nevertheless, in this study, we will
only focus on Diyanet’s radical change and transformation.
 1 FROM PRO-KEMALIST TO THE POPULIST AND PRO-VIOLENCE DIYANET 9

The unwavering support of the AKP emboldened some of Diyanet’s

personnel, who appear to see themselves as the sole diplomatic represen-
tatives of the state in other countries (Albayrak 2020). Thus, Diyanet’s
mosque personnel have acted as secret agents of the state among the
Turkish diaspora in Europe and other places (Öztürk and Sözeri 2018;
Yilmaz and Barry 2018). Some imams and social attachés (who are usually
Diyanet employees) in embassies and consulates target known opponents
of the AKP regime, and record their moves to report to the government.
For instance, the intelligence shared between Yusuf Acar, Dutch Diyanet
attaché, and the government of Turkey suggests Diyanet’s surveillance
activities targeted members of the opposition Gülen Movement (Öztürk
and Sözeri 2018). Rapid change and enormous transformation in Diyanet
coincided with the directorship of Mehmet Görmez, who played an
important role in marrying the AKP with Diyanet, so that the two became
intertwined. In contrast to his predecessors, Görmez was vocal in giving
his own opinion about almost every issue in Turkey, from social, political,
and economic issues to education and moral matters (Mutluer 2018).
Although Turkish society was not accustomed to a garrulous religious
figure, Görmez’s interest in politics brought Diyanet closer to AKP. If one
analyses Görmez’s statements during his directorship, one can easily see
the stages in which Diyanet was drawn into politics, step-by-step, through
the collaboration of its President and the AKP’s masterminds (Öztürk
2016).
Görmez launched an unofficial partnership between the Diyanet and
AKP. As part of this unofficial partnership, Görmez assumed the role
of the spokesman of the AKP, rather than merely the director of the
High Presidency of Turkey Religious Affairs. A prominent example of
this occurred during and after the 2016 mysterious coup attempt which
sought to end AKP rule. Immediately after it was apparent a coup was
being attempted, Görmez organized the recitation of salā 5 by imams
and muadhdhins in every mosque in Turkey (Tremblay 2016; Albayrak
2020). The symbolic act lent support and religious legitimacy to the
AKP. This was the first step taken to dress a religious garment over
resistance to the coup, essentially implying it was a religious duty to
support the AKP regime. In the following days and months, it became

5 It is a traditional praise for the Prophet to call people to go to mosque or inform

that something happens.
10 I. YILMAZ AND I. ALBAYRAK

apparent that Diyanet was commissioned to idealize—religiously and

spiritually—resistance to the mysterious coup attempt (Tremblay 2016).
Ali Erbaş, who took the baton of directorship from Mehmet Görmez
in September 2017, was determined to continue his predecessor’s pro-
AKP agenda. The new director’s commencement address is symbolic of
what he planned to achieve during his tenure. His symbolic use of a sword
during his initial address, which he held in a traditional Ottoman fashion,
and addressing of the ummah (as opposed to citizens of Turkey) coin-
cide with Erdoğan’s pursuit of transnational neo-Ottomanism (Mutluer
2018). Like Görmez, Erbaş successfully conveys the message and mission
of AKP to the world through Diyanet’s resources (UN 2020). For
example, at the highly controversial reconversion of the ancient Byzan-
tine Church Hagia Sophia to a mosque, Erbaş led Friday prayers and in
his sermon targeted ‘the ones’ who had turned the structure to a museum.
He called these people ‘damned’, and expressed great contentment with
its ‘re-conquest’ (Arab News 2020). This is proof of the increasing joint
activities of the AKP and Diyanet going beyond the mosques and oper-
ating under the guise of a religious gathering, and of their combined
ability to reach people and perpetuate Islamism throughout Turkish
society.
The symbiotic relationship between the mosque and state reached new
heights under Erbaş. Imams encouraged their congregations to vote for
the AKP; AKP candidates freely came to mosques and promoted them-
selves, and even pro-AKP women used this opportunity to address men in
the mosques (Lord 2018). Many Diyanet Qur’an courses turn into conve-
nient AKP polling offices. In the hands of Görmez and Erbaş, Diyanet,
in tune with AKP’s policies, was radicalized and became exclusivist,
polarising, and divisive.
The redefined Diyanet has two dimensions. First, Diyanet has been
supporting various government policies through Friday sermons, where
it also attacks and defames government critics and opposition forces.
The directorate is increasingly able to give the impression that political
dissent is unIslamic, and that even the poor decisions made by the AKP
ought to be supported by Muslims. In doing so, it attempts to reduce
the general dissatisfaction of the people with their government. These
activities have an impact both inside and outside of Turkey. Second, the
mosque is now unquestionably attached to the government, and the two
are enmeshed in a symbiotic relationship. Diyanet, a strong state appa-
ratus, has also become the sole arbiter of ‘correct’ religious discourse in
 1 FROM PRO-KEMALIST TO THE POPULIST AND PRO-VIOLENCE DIYANET 11

the country (Albayrak 2020). To preserve Diyanet’s monopoly on reli-

gious power, the AKP suppressed the religious and social activities of all
non-official religious and non-governmental organizations (except those
that approve of AKP policies and are in close contact with Diyanet). The
gradual expansion of the official business areas of Divinity Faculty gradu-
ates, and the peak employment opportunities enjoyed by these graduates,
especially within Diyanet itself, has made Diyanet a very attractive state
office to work within. As the directorate grows in power and influence,
its leaders begin to think of Diyanet not merely as a religious authority,
but as having ownership over religion within Turkey, and perhaps also
within the Turkish diaspora.
Diyanet goes beyond performing the role of a mosque, or the coor-
dinator of a network of mosques. Indeed, its activities are not limited to
the place of worship alone. Bearing in mind the extensive national and
international network and media coverage featuring journals, radio, tele-
vision (TV), and digital networks it controls, Diyanet has continuously
expanded its hinterland (Mutluer 2018; Öztürk and Sözeri 2018) and
has become a global institution wielding soft power on behalf of the state
of Turkey (Korkut 2016).
Its presence within the Turkish diaspora allows for it to be used as
an effective instrument of the government in controlling Turkish people
outside Turkey. The Turkish diaspora’s religious life and perceptions of
Turkey are generally shaped by this institution, particularly in Europe
(Öztürk and Sözeri 2018). The changing nature of the AKP policies is
constantly revitalized among the Turkish Muslims in Africa, Eurasia, and
Europe by means of Diyanet’s activities in mosques (Öztürk and Sözeri
2018; Korkut 2016; Öztürk 2016). The mosque and its modernized
outreach avenues have become the state’s proxy. One of the important
goals of this newly formed political ambition of Diyanet is to build Salatin
mosques (grand mosques) in various parts of the world, including in
Western Europe, the Balkans, the United States, Kyrgyzstan, Djibouti,
and beyond.
Islamist populism in Turkey under the banner of the AKP and its
leader, Erdoğan, has only increased in the last two decades. Thus, Turkey
is an illustrative case which shows how Islamist populism operates in
power, and redesigns relevant state institutions so that they can be used
to perpetuate Islamist populism. Diyanet provides a valuable case study to
comprehend the AKP’s populism, which uses the directorate to consoli-
date its largely manufactured populist dichotomies. The role of Diyanet in
12 I. YILMAZ AND I. ALBAYRAK

engineering populist appeal through its Friday sermons is an understudied

phenomenon. This book offers a contribution to this insufficiently studied
area.
This book evaluates the content of these sermons in the light of
the marriage between Diyanet and the AKP, and the political and reli-
gious ramifications of this marriage as they are reflected in the sermons.
The state has instrumentalized the mosque in Turkey since its inception.
Under AKP rule, however, the dynamics have drastically changed with
widespread repercussions. Indeed, the poem that Erdoğan had recited
nearly three decades ago is synonymous with the AKP’s use of Diyanet.
The poem’s narrative symbolizes the mosque as the faithful’s armor in
war. In an echo of the verses, Diyanet is the AKP’s key tool with which it
consolidates power at home and overseas, and the armor it wears when it
must defend itself from attacks.
On the other hand, the poem’s focus on violence has also come
become a reality. As we show in this book, Diyanet in the Erdoğanist era
has not only become more religious, populist, and civilizationist, but also
increasingly pro-violence and content with using hate speech, whereby
judicial and even extrajudicial violence is justified against Erdoganism’s
critics who are framed as enemies.

Erdoğanism and Its Politics: A Zero-Sum-Game

Between Friends and Enemies
Erdoğanism is an eclectic ideology and constructed, to a degree, ad hoc.
It is based on the actions and rhetoric of Erdoğan and his supporters. It
is deeply connected with conservatism, Islamism (Yılmaz and Bashirov
2018), Pan-Islamism, Muslim Nationalism (White 2012), majoritari-
anism (Özbudun 2014), Ottomanist nostalgia (Yavuz and Öztürk 2020,
144–178), Islamist populism, Islamist victimhood, resentment, anti-
Westernism, anti-Kemalism, Islamist insecurities, conspiracy theories,
authoritarianism, personalism, patrimonialism, the personality cult around
Erdoğan, pan-Turkism inside and pan-Ummatism outside, Islamist myth-
making, militarism, jihadism, and glorification of martyrdom (Yilmaz
2021).
Erdoğan claims to represent ‘the people’ and ‘the nation’. Neverthe-
less, and similar to other manifestations of populisms in different parts
of the world, his populism is not inclusive. The ‘national will’ (milli
irade) in his discourse is comprised predominantly of the (Sunni)-Muslim
 1 FROM PRO-KEMALIST TO THE POPULIST AND PRO-VIOLENCE DIYANET 13

Turkish nation (Bora 2007). Erdoğanism has a Manichean understanding

of humanity and divides it into two antagonistic and warring parts:
‘us’ versus ‘them’, or ‘we’ versus ‘they’. Here, ‘they’ domestically refers
to the Westernized and non-practicing Muslim sections of society, and
‘we’, refers to the native and national, authentic, religious Sunni-Muslim
Turks (Özçetin 2019: 950). Globally, Erdoğanism’s populist antagonism
is between Muslims—led by Erdoğan himself—and infidels, but especially
the Crusader West.
Erdoğanism sees domestic and international politics as a Schmittian
zero-sum-game between friends and enemies. In a leaked conversation
between 12 top-AKP strategists after an election defeat in 2015, the chief
advisor to the then Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, Ertan Aydın, states:

While President Erdoğan acts along the lines of Carl Schmitt, the Prime
Minister Davutoğlu follows a Habermasian line. Erdoğan’s line exists
within a need for power while Davutoğlu’s line acts within a need for
sympathy.

Carl Schmitt6 was of the opinion that the state must have a dicta-
torial exceptional status above the law, and that state sovereignty and
autonomy must be based on the existential distinction between friend and
foe. This foe can be any person or entity that represents a serious threat
or conflict to one’s own interests (Vinx 2019). His illiberal jurisprudence

6 Carl Schmitt (1888–1985) was a conservative and pro-Nazi German legal, consti-
tutional, and political theorist. Schmitt is seen as one of the most important critics of
liberalism, parliamentary democracy, and liberal cosmopolitanism. Vinx (2019) summarises
his main ideas on politics and underlines that Schmitt argued that liberalism bypasses and
wipes out real politics through ideas such as universal human rights, and parliamen-
tarianism, displacing the sovereign state. Schmitt’s work highlights the importance of a
strong state, executive power, and a homogeneous society. His illiberal jurisprudence and
his passionate anti-Semitic mentality facilitated his support of the Nazi regime. He justified
Hitler’s extrajudicial murders of political opponents. He also elaborated on dictatorship
and argued that any government that can act decisively must include a dictatorial element
in its constitution. In his view, the concept of ‘state of emergency’, allows the executive
from any legal restrictions on its power. This is normal according to Schmitt because
state sovereignty and autonomy must be based on the distinction between friend and foe
and this distinction has to be defined existentially. Such an enmity does not have to be
based on nationality and real substance of hostility can be anything, including internal
actors within a country. This can be any person or entity that represents a serious threat
or conflict to one’s own interests (see in detail Vinx 2019; see also McCormick 1994;
Scheuerman 1999; Mehring 2014).
14 I. YILMAZ AND I. ALBAYRAK

and anti-Semitism led him to support the Nazi regime, and he justified
the regime’s extrajudicial murders of political opponents. For him state
sovereignty and autonomy must be based on the distinction and enmity
between friends and foes. This enmity does not have to be based on
nationality and can be based on hostility internal actors within a country
(see in detail Vinx 2019; see also McCormick 1994; Scheuerman 1999;
Mehring 2014).
Aydın goes on to critically explain Erdoğanism’s Schmittian strategy:

We have religionised our struggle. Thus, when opponents attack us, they
no longer attack only us, but also attack our religion and sacred values.
Because we make mistake of coding the nature of this relationship. We
present our relationship with the opposition as if it were a relationship between
believers (us) and the Meccan polytheists (the opposition). Because of the
ummatism, we remove the Alevis from our target list of potential voters.
This is not a sustainable tension. Our ideology will either go bankrupt or
we will find a way out of here.7

One of the 12 men in the group was Taha Özhan, who is another
Schmittian. Özhan was the chief of AKP’s think tank SETA,8 a pro-
Erdoğanist propaganda outlet. He frequently used Schmitt’s ideas when
attacking Erdoğanism’s critics. He reminded people that ‘it should not
be forgotten that, to state it by borrowing from Carl Schmitt, the one
who is elected by the nation is the one that decides the state of excep-
tion’.9 When describing the Gülen Movement’s opposition to the AKP
and Erdoğanism he used the Schmittian framework again:

In the war that the Gülen Group waged against the AKP as a non-political
actor, while finding new allies its arguments are losing their strength and

7 https://t24.com.tr/haber/akp-secim-tutanaklari-2-13-yilda-elimizde-bir-pipet-her-duy
guyu-somurduk-bu-duygusal-vampirlik,313498.
8 Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research (Siyaset, Ekonomi ve Toplum
Araştırmaları Vakfı), http://setav.org/en/.
9 www.sabah.com.tr/yazarlar/perspektif/ozhan/2012/02/18/27-nisandan-7-subata-
siyasete-mudahale. Two days after this column was published, Erdoğan was speaking
to his party’s youth branch in his public appearance after the incident as he had an
operation. It cannot be a coincidence that Erdoğan made his infamous speech on the
pious generation and for the first time he talked about a ‘vindictive youth.’ This is
discussed in the section titled ‘Erdoğanist Social Engineering: Pious and Vindictive
Youth.’
 1 FROM PRO-KEMALIST TO THE POPULIST AND PRO-VIOLENCE DIYANET 15

its claims become dubious. In contrast, Erdoğan is getting stronger and

more persuasive by putting the Gülen Group, which has opened up war
on him, where it should be in the ‘friend-enemy’ world of politics. This
situation puts the Gülen Group in a dramatic predicament.10

When many left wing and liberal democrat academics signed a petition
asking the state to stop its violence against the Kurds, Özhan together
with his colleague Bekir Gür from SETA published a commentary again
with a Schmittian mindset. Even the title is very striking: ‘Quote of the
day: Traitors cannot be Intellectuals’.11 They state that the commentary
is a tribute to the ‘pseudo-academics’ who objected to the Erdoğanist
violence. They question whether

...it is possible to be both an infidel (gavur) and intellectual? ...What sort of

serious contribution can be expected from someone who lives in this land
but not even once prostrated (secde) to God? Being an infidel is related
to betrayal and loyalty rather than a theological situation. One can be a
non-Muslim but not an infidel on the one hand and on the other, one can
be a Muslim and an infidel. The only criterion is treason.12

They then refer to Schmitt:

There is perhaps no other living example in which Carl Schmitt’s "friend-

enemy" construct fits so well. The Infidel is the enemy. Those who are
with the enemy are also infidels… Worship of the person, the works he
performs, and the domestic masks he uses are evaluated on a separate
level. Likewise, the religion of non-Muslim who is not an infidel is not
important.13

No one from the AKP has ever objected to what Aydın, Özhan and
others have been saying about Erdoğanism’s Schmittian style of politics.

10 www.star.com.tr/yazar/gulen-grubunun-basarisi-yazi-852229/.
11 www.yeniakit.com.tr/haber/gunun-sozu-vatan-haininden-aydin-olmaz-120932.html.
12 www.yeniakit.com.tr/haber/gunun-sozu-vatan-haininden-aydin-olmaz-120932.html.
13 www.yeniakit.com.tr/haber/gunun-sozu-vatan-haininden-aydin-olmaz-120932.html.
16 I. YILMAZ AND I. ALBAYRAK

Religious Populist and Pro-Violence

Narratives of Erdoğanism
Diyanet’s current phase of transformation was engendered by the poli-
tics of AKP. The party increasingly justifies its authoritarian populist style
of governance through Diyanet sermons, allowing Erdoğan and the AKP
leadership to expand the reach of their Islamist populist ideology. More-
over, the ‘mosque’ status of the state within the state has also allowed for
it to blend a combination of emotions rooted in anxiety and anger, to
further increase the populist appeal of the AKP. The book explores the
strategy of survival that the state has used through its instrumentaliza-
tion of Diyanet to extend its emotive populist narrative and in turn gain
legitimacy.
This premise is a part derived from the works of Jan-Werner Muller
(2016: Chapter 2). Muller (2016) argues that populists in power grow
authoritarian in due course. Authoritarian leaders are required to make
their policies socially accepted as a ‘matter of survival’, as their source of
legitimacy, especially in electoral authoritarian settings. Addressing this
emerging ‘need’, we observe the emergence of an alliance, if not the
merger, of two concepts: authoritarianism and populism on the global
political stage.
Populism, which is modified in line with the political culture of the
nation in which it occurs, is emerging as a strategy used by various regimes
in order to legitimize authoritarian rule. Populism in the hands of such
leaders has also been used to ‘construct’ a social ‘reality’, designed to
make their authoritarian rulings acceptable and attain the support of the
government constructed ‘people’. In this regard, religion is increasingly
becoming a key component of populist discourses across the world. From
India to Turkey, Malaysia to the United States, populist political actors
are referring to religious notions to galvanize support. Religion not only
shapes populist ideologies, but also helps generate feelings of belonging,
fear, and anger, thus shaping the performance of populism. In Turkey,
religious populism has been synonymous with the AKP’s shift towards
authoritarianism (Yilmaz 2021).
Emotions play a significant role in religious populism. Stemming from
structural (national and international) as well as affective foundations,
populism has been effective in speaking to the deep emotions of the
masses (Salmela and von Scheve 2017, 2018; Brady et al. 2017; Graham
et al. 2011). Populist political actors are adept at triggering deep rooted
 1 FROM PRO-KEMALIST TO THE POPULIST AND PRO-VIOLENCE DIYANET 17

emotions by tapping into a collective sense of grievances, resentment,

disillusionment, anger, fear, and vindictiveness, (Yilmaz 2021; Bonansinga
2020; Demertzis 2019; Blakemore and Ratri 2018; Rico et al. 2017).
In Turkey, the personalistic style of the President Erdoğan and the AKP
involves a range of strong negative emotions, such as resentment and
fear of other domestic groups, but also positive emotions, such as love
of the homeland and passion for the nation, and mixed emotions like
Ottomanist restorative nostalgia, to galvanize support for their populist
narratives (Yimaz 2021).
Recently, populism has become widely adopted as a frame through
which the political activities of Turkish regime may be understood (Sawae
2020; Taş 2020; Castaldo 2018; Özçetin 2019; Özpek and Yaşar 2018;
Yılmaz 2018; Kirdiş and Drhiemur 2016; Selçuk 2016; Yabancı 2016).
There are studies looking at role of religion in populist appeal of Turkey’s
AKP in general and analysing religious references in Erdoğan regimes’
populist narratives (Yabanci 2020; Yabanci and Taleski 2018). There is
an emerging literature on Diyanet and its political activities. However,
they either discuss how Diyanet is used as an instrument of foreign
relations/policy to create soft-power in some certain regions (Ozturk
2016) or they analyse Diyanet’s activities to change the sociology through
the lenses of de-secularization (Adak 2020). The role of Diyanet in
constructing Islamist populist appeal remains understudied. Addressing
this locum, we critically analyse populist appeal in Diyanet’s sermons. This
is the focal component of the present work.
Populism is not a uniquely twenty-first-century occurrence. The formal
study of populism dates back to Tsarist Russia, nineteenth-century Amer-
ican politics, fascism, and the socialist regimes of Latin America (Glaser
2017; Moffitt 2016; Bjerre-Poulsen 1986). Edward Shils’ work on the
subject refined the concept on bases of three core principles. These
features of populism are first, that ‘the people’ are sovereign and above
their rulers; second, that there ought to be a direct connection between
‘the people’ and their government; third, that the ‘will of the people’ is
an ‘associate with justice and morality’ (Shils 1956).
Yet there has been a great deal of scholarly contestation over whether
these concepts could be said to form a coherent populist ideology, albeit
a ‘thin-centred’ one, or whether they in fact constitute something else
entirely; a type of populist political strategy, or a style of behaviour, or
a discourse. The work of Mudde terms the concept ‘an ideology that
considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and
Another random document with
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1154. Shimnu seems to be the Buddhist word for “devil.” Cf.
Neander, Ch. Hist. vol. II. p. 181. Prof. von Le Coq (J.R.A.S.
1911, p. 300) says it is of Soghdian origin. Chavannes et
Pelliot, op. cit. 1ère ptie, p. 523, n. 3, seek to show that it is the
equivalent of Ahriman.

1155. On this word see p. 323 supra; cf. Chavannes et Pelliot, op.
cit. 1ère ptie, p. 542, n. 2, which seems to summarize all that
there is to be said about it, and p. 342 infra.

1156. This was of course the exact statement of Zervanism, which

the Khuastuanift implicitly condemns. Cf. Mihr Nerses’
proclamation in 450 A.D. quoted on p. 285 supra.

1157. This was the name of the owner, which was Raimast Parzind
in the Tun-huang text of Sir Marc Stein.

1158. This was the name given to the incarnate, as distinguished

from the spiritual, messengers of the God of Light to man.
Thus Zoroaster is always spoken of in Manichaean literature
as a Burkhan, and doubtless the historical Buddha and Jesus
were included in the same category. Cf. Chavannes et Pelliot,
op. cit. 1ère ptie, p. 572, n. 2.

1159. Obviously the authors of the Khuastuanift knew nothing of the

doctrine put forth by the Manichaeans in Christian lands that
the First Man offered himself as a sacrifice to destroy the sons
of Darkness. Cf. n. 2, p. 294 supra.

1160. Because by so doing the existence of the diabolic creation

would be prolonged.

1161. The words “of the Messenger” [God] are not in Prof. von Le
Coq’s version.

1162. Cf. Chavannes et Pelliot, op. cit. 1ère ptie, pp. 503, n. 1. On
this being mentioned in a paper in the J.R.A.S. 1913, Dr F.
Denison Ross said that he thought the date should be put 300
 years later, J. cit. p. 81. He has since withdrawn this (J.R.A.S.
1913, pp. 434-436).

1163. See the luminous historical study by M. Henri Cordier, “Les

Fouilles en Asie Centrale,” Journal des Savans., Paris, 1910,
pp. 219 sqq., especially pp. 249, 250.

1164. Chavannes et Pelliot, op. cit. 1ère ptie, p. 513, n. 1. Müller,

Handschriften-Reste, pp. 20, 22. Von Le Coq, J.R.A.S. 1911,
p. 301.

1165. Ormuzd, “the whole circuit of the sky,” although he calls him,
more Graecorum, Zeus, “the sun and moon, the earth, fire,
water and the winds,” were “the only gods whose worship had
come down to the Persians from ancient times” in the days of
Herodotus. Cf. Herodotus, Bk I. c. 131.

1166. Faustus (Aug. v. Faust. Bk II. c. 4) distinctly says “Jesus Christ

is the son of the First Man.” Cf. also c. 5.

1167. It is very doubtful whether it is referred to or not in the Tun-

huang treatise. Cf. Chavannes et Pelliot, op. cit. 1ère ptie, pp.
515, n. 2, and p. 516, n. 3.
1168. The Power whom Faustus (Aug. c. Faust. Bk XX. c. 2) calls
“God the Son.”

1169. Evidently the incarnate or human messengers, Zoroaster,

Buddha, Jesus, and Manes. The heavenly “legates” are never
depicted as “preaching” to men.

1170. The Past, Present and Future, called the “Three Moments” in
the Tun-huang treatise. See Chavannes et Pelliot, op. cit. 11me
ptie, pp. 114, 116.

1171. Probably the strong or mighty Srôsh or Tertius Legatus.

1172. This may be compared to the Ophite Diagram in which Agape

or Love is made the summit of the Pantheon. See Chap. VIII
p. 68 supra. See also the same dogma in Valentinus, Chap.
IX p. 123 supra.

1173. Flügel, op. cit. pp. 95, 96.

1174. As to these, see En Nadîm in Flügel, op. cit. pp. 97-100.

1175. Chavannes et Pelliot, op. cit. 1ère ptie, p. 543, n. 2.

1176. Augustine, de Moribus Manichaeorum, c. X. Cf. Baur, Das

Manichäische Religionssystem, pp. 248 sqq. Chavannes et
Pelliot, op. cit. 1ère ptie, p. 547, n. 1, examine the question
whether these are borrowed from Buddhism as F. W. K. Müller
and Cumont assert, and incline to the view that Manes took
them from Zoroastrianism.

1177. The word vusanti does not seem to be explained by Prof. von
Le Coq. Has it any connection with the Sanskrit vasanta
“spring”? In that case, the 50 days fast may have been
continuous like the Christian Lent and the Mahommedan
Ramadan. But it seems more likely that it refers to the weekly
fast on Sunday which, the Fihrist notwithstanding, seems to
 have been incumbent on all the Manichaeans, Elect and
Hearers alike. So Chavannes et Pelliot, op. cit. 2me ptie, p.
111, n. 2. See n. 4, p. 349 infra.

1178. Prof. von Le Coq says (J.R.A.S. 1911, p. 307) that this word is
as yet unexplained and may belong to another language than
Turkish. One is almost tempted to see in it a corruption of the
Yom Kippur or Day of Atonement of the Jews. Judaism is the
last religion from which the Manichaeans would have
consciously borrowed; but the Jews have always taken their
goods where they found them, and it may well be that both
Jews and Manichaeans were here drawing from a common
source.

1179. Is this the Tertius Legatus or another?

1180. Augustine, c. Faust. Bk II. c. 5. Cf. Chavannes et Pelliot, op.

cit. 1ère ptie, p. 539, and n. 1.

1181. Chavannes et Pelliot, op. cit. 1ère ptie, p. 573, n. 3.

1182. So Baur, op. cit. This was doubtless true in the West and in
lands where they were exposed to severe persecution.

1183. This explains its translation from its original Pahlavi into the
language of the converts and each copy bearing the name of
the owner.

1184. See Cumont, Cosmog. Manich. p. 56, for authorities. Cf. also
de Stoop, op. cit. p. 22. As has been many times said above,
every religion and sect at the time accused the others of these
filthy practices, without our being able to discern any proof of
the justice of the accusation in one case more than in another.
In any case, St Augustine, here the chief authority, could not
have known of it at first hand, as he had never been more
than a Hearer, and he himself says (contra Fortunatum, Bk I.
App.) that while he had heard that the Elect celebrated the
 Eucharist, he knew nothing of the mode of celebration. Cf.
Neander, Ch. Hist. II. p. 193.

1185. All contemporary authorities are agreed that they were

forbidden to drink wine.

1186. Neander, op. cit. II. p. 170.

1187. Le Coq, Chotscho, Vol. I. Pl. I. and IV.

1188. Aug. c. Ep. Fundamenti, c. 8.

1189. Augustine, c. Faust. Bk XVIII. c. 5, whom he quotes, does not

say however that they kept Sunday as a festival, but merely
that they then worshipped the Sun: Vos in die, quem dicunt
solis, solem colitis.

1190. Aug. c. Ep. Fundamenti, c. 8 and de Stoop, op. cit. p. 27.

1191. Al-Bîrûnî, Chronology, p. 27.

1192. Ib. pp. 121, 190.

1193. A few other undoubted extracts from the Shapurakhan are to

be found in Müller, Handschriften-Reste, passim, and others
quoted at second hand from Mahommedan writers in Kessler,
op. cit., as to which see ib. pp. 180-191.

1194. Al-Bîrûnî, op. cit. p. 225.

1195. See Kessler, op. cit. p. 191 sqq.

1196. Aug. c. Faust. Bk XXXII. c. 7.

1197. See Albert Dufourcq, De Manichaeismo apud Latinos, Paris,

1900, where all these apocrypha are carefully examined. The
Quo vadis story appears on p. 40.

1198. Chavannes et Pelliot, op. cit. p. 508, and n. 1.

1199. Hegemonius, Acta, c. XIII. p. 22, Beeson.
ère
1200.
Chavannes et Pelliot, op. cit. 1 ptie, pp. 399, 400.
ère
1201.
Op. cit. 1 ptie, pp. 509, n. 5, 510, n. 2, 533, nn. 2 and 4.

1202.
Nowhere is this curious theory, which forms the base of most
Mediaeval Cabala and magic, more clearly stated. Thus the
Tun-huang treatise says in describing the fashioning of the
body of man by the devils (as in the Μέρος τευχῶν Σωτῆρος),
“there is not a single formation of the universe (or cosmos)
which they did not imitate in the carnal body” (Chavannes et
Pelliot, op. cit. 1ère ptie, p. 527); and in the next page “The
demon ... shut up the five natures of Light in the carnal body
of which he made a little universe (microcosm).”
ère
1203.
Chavannes et Pelliot, op. cit. 1 ptie, p. 514.

1204.
Op. cit. pp. 528, 529.

1205.
Their Chinese names are discussed by MM. Chavannes and
Pelliot (op. cit. 1ère ptie, pp. 521, n. 1, 542, n. 1, 543, nn. 1, 2,
and 544, n. 1), wherein are gathered nearly all that can be
said about them. The learned commentators decide that their
functions still remain mysterious. But see next note infra.

1206.
W. Radloff, Chuastuanift, das Bussgebet der Manichäer, St
Petersburg, 1909, pt I. pp. 19, 20. Von Le Coq, J.R.A.S. 1911,
p. 294: “when the Gods Kroshtag and Padwakhtag, the
Appellant and Respondent, should have brought to us that
part of the light of the Fivefold God that, going to God, is there
 to be purified.” One is inclined to compare this with Jeû and
Melchizidek receiving and purifying the light won from this
world, or with Gabriel and Michael in the Pistis Sophia bearing
the heroine upward out of Chaos; but the parallel may be
accidental and is easily pushed too far.

1207.
Like the “Twin Saviours” of the Pistis Sophia, whose functions
are never even alluded to in that document.

1208.
See notes 2 and 3, p. 327 supra.

1209.
M. de Stoop’s Essai sur la Diffusion du Manichéisme is most
informing on this head. See also A. Dufourcq’s Thesis quoted
in n. 2, p. 351 supra. A very brief summary of the history of
the sect was given by the present writer in J.R.A.S. 1913, pp.
69-94.

1210.
For the enquiry by Strategius, afterwards called Musonianus,
and Prefect of the East under Constantius, see Ammianus
Marcellinus, Bk XV. c. 13. Cf. Neander, Ch. Hist. IV. 488 sqq.
That the persecution instituted against them by Diocletian
slackened under Constantine and Constantius, see de Stoop,
op. cit. pp. 40, 41.

1211. See the Laws of Theodosius and Valentinian II, quoted by de

Stoop, op. cit. pp. 41, 42.

1212.
Gibbon, Decline and Fall, III. p. 153. Justinian put to death not
only convicted Manichaeans, but those who being acquainted
with members of the sect, did not denounce them. See de
Stoop, op. cit. p. 43.
1213.
The Manichaeans seem always to have been favoured by the
better classes and high officials of the Empire who maintained
for some time a secret leaning towards Paganism. See de
Stoop, op. cit. p. 84. The case of Barsymès, the banker or
money-changer whom Theodora made Praetorian Prefect,
and who was allowed according to Procopius (Anecdota, c.
XXII. 7) to profess Manichaeism openly, was doubtless only
one of many. It is apparently this Barsymès who is invoked in
the Turfan texts as “the Lord Bar Simus,” see Müller,
Handschriften-Reste, pp. 45, 59.

1214.
That this was the professed policy of the sect seems plain
from the words they attributed to Manes himself: “I am not
inhuman like Christ who said: Whoso denieth me, him will I
deny. I say unto you: Whoso denieth me before man and
saves himself by this falsehood, him will I receive with joy, as
if he had not denied me.” Cf. de Stoop, op. cit. p. 46, quoting
Cedrenus; Al Bîrûnî, Chronology, p. 191.

1215.
Von Le Coq, Exploration Archéologique à Tourfan, Confces
au Musée Guimet (Bibl. de Vulg. t. XXXV.), 1910, p. 278.

1216.
de Stoop, op. cit. pp. 86, 144.

1217.
Neander, Ch. Hist. III. pp. 34, 35.

1218.
Op. cit. III. p. 46.

1219.
Sozomen, Hist. Eccl. Bk V. c. 5, for instances. Cf. Neander,
op. cit. III. pp. 66, 67.
1220.
Neander, op. cit. III. p. 96.

1221.
Op. cit. III. p. 100.

1222.
S. Dill, Roman Society in the Last Century of the Western
Empire, pp. 143-166.

1223.
Eusebius, Vita Constantini, Bk III. cc. 64, 65.

1224.
Op. cit. c. 66.
Transcriber’s Notes:
Footnotes have been collected at the end of the text, and are
linked for ease of reference.
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