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The Will to Nothingness
 The Will to
Nothingness
An Essay on Nietzsche’s On
the Genealogy of Morality

B E R NA R D R E G I N ST E R

1
 1
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 Contents

Pre/act vii

Introduction

I. Genealogy and Critique 11

I.I Genealogyas Epistemic Dtbu11king 13
J.2 Genealogy and Naturalism 19
1.3 "Moralities Are Only a Sign La11g11age oftlicAffeds" 23
1.4 Sentimental Pragmatism 29
J.S Genealogy and History 35
1.6 "The Fundamental Failh of the Metaphysicions" 37
J.7 Tu'O Problems: Dysfunclionalityand Multiple Functionality 4l

2. Resst11timenI 49
2.1 The Cause ofResscnlilttettt 51
2.2 Res.se11tin1tnt andWill to Power 58
2.3 Power and Reality 65
2.4 Strength and Weakness 71
2.5 Revenge 75
2.6 "An Act of the Most Spiritual Revenge" 78
2.7 Negation and Reaction 83

3. Good and Evil 89

3.1 Equality 90
3.2 Preedom ofWill 98
3.3 "A11 Imagi nary Revenge" 107
3.4 A "Self-D«:eption oflmpolence" 114

4. Guill and Punishment 121

4.l "The Right to Make Promises" 125
4.2 Conscience 129
4.3 Guilt and Punishment 134
4.4 Sad Conscience 143
4.S "Guilt befo"' God" 148

5. Asceti cism 153

5. l What Is an Ascetic Ideal? 155
5.2 Th• Paradox of Asceticism 158
vi CONTENTS

5.3 "Suffering Under the Perspective ofGuilt" 161

5.4 Meaning, Power, Relief 167
5.5 Whal Is the Genealogical Critique ofMorality? 173
5.6 Asceticism and Sickness 177
5.7 The Will to Nolhingness 184

Bibliography 1.89
Index 199
 Preface

The present study is a work of interpretation. While I attempt to make phil-

osophically compelling the ideas and concepts Nietzsche deploys in the
Genealogy, I try to keep as much as possible to the actual resources on offer
in this book (and related works). Nevertheless, given that both the overall
shape of the argument and its substantive details are left rather sketchy,
some of the interpretive claims I defend might still strike some readers as
strained, perhaps even implausible. Most readers of Nietzsche’s works, and
of the Genealogy in particular, know that it is very difficult, if not outright
impossible, to produce an interpretation of that book that does not incur
exegetical costs. Those I chose to live with are consequences of the assump-
tions framing my interpretation: the genealogies are “psychological studies”
and they aim to expose and assess the functional role that the Christian
moral outlook—and the distinctive evaluative and descriptive beliefs that
compose it—is well suited to play in the emotional economy of moral
agents. Specifically, Christian morality is well suited to express the ressenti-
ment, and to serve the will to power, of agents who have been beset with a
feeling of impotence by chronic frustrations; and this functional role pro-
vides the unifying thread for the three studies that compose the book.
There have been several new translations of the Genealogy in the recent
past. Nevertheless, I have opted to use Walter Kaufmann’s original transla-
tion, in part because it remains a common reference in the scholarly litera-
ture. While it captures nicely the liveliness of Nietzsche’s prose, I have
occasionally made minor modifications to Kaufmann’s translation, usually
inspired by some of the more recent translations of the work. I also occa-
sionally refer to those of Nietzsche’s notes that were gathered posthumously
in the volume known as The Will to Power. Since the status of these notes is
controversial (leaving aside their particular organization into an alleged
book, which has no bearing on my use of them), I cite them only when they
echo, and sometimes clarify, claims Nietzsche makes explicitly in his pub-
lished works, particularly in the Genealogy.
I should note that some of the ideas in this book have appeared in various
articles I have published over the past few years. However, the form in which
these ideas appear here is often different—and hopefully better—than the
viii Preface

more tentative discussions of them I offered in those prior publications. In

some cases, the ideas resemble older incarnations in name only; in other
cases, while the resemblance is closer, the details of their articulation and
development are different in crucial respects. For this reason, I do not cite
or mention most of these articles in the present book, which super-
sedes them.
I owe a considerable debt of gratitude to many people who have helped
my research in one way or another, and always with a generosity I had no
right to expect. Work that more or less closely contributed to the present
study was presented in many venues, including Amherst College, Brown
University, Columbia University, the Federal University of Minas Gerais in
Belo Horizonte (Brazil), Georgia State University, Haverford College,
Northwestern University, Princeton University, the University of
Amsterdam (Holland), the University of California at Riverside, the
University of Oregon, the University of Southampton (United Kingdom);
and meetings of the London University Nietzsche Seminar, Nietzsche in
New England, the British Nietzsche Society, the International Society for
Nietzsche Studies, and the North American Nietzsche Society. I am indebted
to, and grateful for, comments and questions I received from all these
audiences.
I have also benefited from exchanges with Mark Alfano, Lanier Anderson,
Jessica Berry, Maudemarie Clark, David Christensen, Manuel Dries, David
Dudrick, Guy Elgat, Ken Gemes, James Gilligan, Beatrice Han-­Pile, Andrew
Huddleston, Christopher Janaway, Scott Jenkins, Anthony Jensen, Scott
Johnston, Peter Kail, Paul Katsafanas, Brian Leiter, Simon May, Mark
Migotti, Alexander Nehamas, Alexander Prescott-­Crouch, John Richardson,
Josh Schechter, Nicholas Smyth, Avery Snelson, Thomas Stern, Chris Syke,
Gundrun von Tevenar—and no doubt others, to whom, pleading a defective
memory, I can only apologize—as well as from discussions with the gradu-
ate and undergraduate students in a seminar on the topics of this book
given at Brown University in the fall of 2018. I also want to extend my
thanks to two anonymous reviewers who wrote extensive comments on an
early version of the manuscript for this book. They will hopefully recognize
their mark on the finished product. Last, but not least, I want to express my
heartfelt gratitude to my wife, Stephanie, who was an unfailingly open and
judicious interlocutor in my clumsy attempts to develop the sometimes
strange ideas discussed in this book, and to my two daughters, Iliana and
Talia, simply for being who they are.
 Introduction

On the Genealogy of Morality stands out among Nietzsche’s works as his

most cohesive and self-­contained book. Each of its three essays is devoted to
an explicitly stated topic, which it subjects to a fairly sustained and system-
atic treatment. The topics are unified insofar as they are the conceptual ele-
ments of a coherent outlook. And the essays devoted to them turn out to be
linked in various ways: each draws on the findings of the others, while also
shedding light on them. The contrast with Nietzsche’s other writings is
striking, and fuels the expectation that a clearly delineated, well worked-­out
critical analysis of morality can be found in the book. Moreover, the book
makes some arresting claims about morality: most prominently, that its
invention is an act of revenge.
This might explain why it is arguably his most read, and most influential
work. A cursory review of the scholarly literature, which I conducted when
I began to contemplate writing the present book, revealed that in the pre-
ceding twenty-­five years, a major work of scholarship—be it a book-­length
monograph, a collection of articles exclusively devoted to it, or a new trans-
lation with substantial introduction and notes—had been published on this
book alone, in the English language alone, on average nearly every year.
And this does not include hundreds of articles, as well as works in disci-
plines other than philosophy.
It is not just the inviting allure of the book or its tantalizing claims that
explains this abundance, however, but also the perplexity it continues to
inspire. Bernard Williams expressed a widespread feeling when he described
the book as having “the property of being at once extremely compelling, in
particular because it seems to hit on something with great exactitude, and at
the same time of being infuriatingly vague.”1 And it is, indeed, a frustrat-
ingly elusive book. To this day, despite the abundance of scholarly literature
devoted to it, there is no consensus on the precise character of its critical

1 Williams (2000, 157).

The Will to Nothingness: An Essay on Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morality. Bernard Reginster.
Oxford University Press. © Bernard Reginster 2021. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198868903.003.0001
2 Introduction

ambitions or on the analysis of the most important concepts it brings

into play.
The Genealogy formulates “a new demand” for a genuine “critique” of
morality, the execution of which requires an inquiry into its origin and
development (GM Preface §6). The morality it targets refers (roughly) to
Christian morality, which has, in its more or less original Christian form or
in its modern secular variants, become dominant in Western culture and
beyond. More specifically, Nietzsche focuses on certain distinctively central
aspects of it, including the evaluative concepts “good and evil,” the concepts
of guilt and punishment, and the idealization of asceticism enshrined in the
idea that what is most valuable in life transcends, and therefore excludes in
whole or in part, natural well-­being. While it appears undeniable that the
genealogies Nietzsche produces for these aspects of morality should have
critical implications for our assessment of it, there is no scholarly consensus
on precisely what critical bearing they could legitimately claim to have.
But it is not just the overall shape of the genealogical critique that is
unclear, the details of its execution are also recalcitrantly vague. Thus, there
is no agreement on the analysis of the most important concepts on which it
draws: for example, the nature of ressentiment, or the exact relation of guilt
to indebtedness, or the precise character of the problem of suffering, which
asceticism is intended to address, or even the fundamental claim that the
invention of Christian morality is a kind of “revenge.”
In the present study, I make a fresh attempt at understanding the critique
of morality Nietzsche develops in the Genealogy. My approach is inspired
by his characterization of the three essays the book comprises as “psycho-
logical studies” (EH III, “Genealogy”). Specifically, I take the genealogical
inquiries to be applications of his claim that moralities, and moral
­judgments in particular, are “signs” or “symptoms” of affective states
(BGE §187; TI “Improvers” §1). And his critique of the moral outlook is
directed at the role it is suited to play in the affective life of the agent who
subscribes to it.
In one respect, the genealogies the book offers are just what one would
expect. They explain the existence and character of certain concepts by trac-
ing their emergence out of the contingent combinations of other, older con-
cepts, just as, by revealing the lineage of a particular individual, a
genealogical tree sheds light on where she came from and, to a certain
extent, on who and what she is. The genealogical development of the moral
concept of guilt out of trading practices and contractual relations, social
 Introduction 3

disciplinary regimes, a basic linguistic structure of Indo-­European lan-

guages, and (in the Christian case in particular) a certain conception of
divinity, is a straightforward example of this approach.
At the same time, however, the genealogies have a decidedly psychologi-
cal dimension. The “origins” they aim to uncover for morality do not merely
consist of the random combination of social practices, concepts, and lin-
guistic structures; they ultimately are the affective states that motivate if not
the combination of these elements, at least the persistence of this combina-
tion, by putting it to a particular use. The Christian concept of guilt, for
example, is revealed to be an invention of ressentiment. In fact, this affective
state is the unifying thread running through all three genealogical inquiries:
it figures prominently in the explanation each provides for the particular
moral concept on which it focuses. And it is this fact, rather than the histor-
ical contingency of these concepts, that underwrites Nietzsche’s critical sus-
picion toward them.
Nietzsche’s genealogies thus show that the moral outlook, and the basic
judgments that frame it, is well suited to play a certain functional role in the
emotional economy of moral agents. It can serve as a vehicle for the expres-
sion of their ressentiment, and the fulfillment of the emotional need that
underlies it. Since, as he also argues, this functional role is pernicious, the
genealogies bring to light the distinctive danger morality poses.

* * *
Its thematic unity notwithstanding, the Genealogy is a complex work, and
its inquiries take us through a great variety of topics. In order to maintain a
relatively tight focus, I have found it necessary to leave out certain themes,
which some scholars have considered important aspects of the book. For
example, I omit Nietzsche’s discussion of the ideal of truthfulness, because it
is only a particular incarnation of the “ascetic ideal” (GM III §§25–7), and
not a separate analysis of it;2 and I also leave out his famous discussion of
the perspectival character of knowledge (GM III §12), because it is explic-
itly presented as a digression from the main line of argument. Even so, it is
advisable to supply the reader with an outline of the argument of the pres-
ent study. By bringing together into a coherent narrative the various elabo-
rate “imaginings” that, in Nietzsche’s view, went into the invention of
“morality,” this outline aims to display their functional unity. My purpose, in

2 I discuss relevant issues in Reginster (2013).

4 Introduction

so doing, is not to offer a detailed or complete description of the contents of

each chapter. Such a description can be found at the beginning of each of
them. Instead, it only indicates what contribution each makes to the overall
narrative.
The critical approach Nietzsche develops in the Genealogy is inspired by
a curious observation:

There is a human being who has turned out badly, who does not have
enough spirit to enjoy it but just enough education to realize this; he is
bored, disgusted, and despises himself; having inherited some money, he
is deprived even of the last comfort, “the blessings of work,” self-­
forgetfulness in “daily labor.” Such a person who is fundamentally ashamed
of his existence . . . eventually ends up in a state of habitual revenge, will to
revenge. What do you suppose he finds necessary, absolutely necessary, to
give himself in his own eyes the appearance of superiority over more spir-
itual people and to attain the pleasure of an accomplished revenge at least
in his own imagination? Always morality; you can bet on that. Always big
moral words. Always the rub-­a-­dub of justice, wisdom, holiness, virtue.
(GS §359; see BGE §219)

In this passage, Nietzsche observes that “morality” is the instrument of

choice for people bent on revenge for an existence that causes them shame
and disgust. He suspects that this is no accident: something in the very
nature of morality invites this pernicious use, and this makes morality itself
problematic or, as he puts it, “dangerous” (GM Preface §6). In On the
Genealogy of Morality, he undertakes to explore this suspicion systematically.
To do so, he must formulate an approach to morality that is designed to
show how it is so well suited to, and indeed invites, this particular use. Thus,
he develops a genealogy of morality. In Chapter 1, I argue that genealogies
are causal histories of a certain sort for some of the basic beliefs that frame
the Christian moral outlook. Their purpose is not to call into question the
epistemic standing of those beliefs, but to expose their functional role in
serving particular emotional needs of moral agents. The aim of this method
is to show that morality is, by its very nature, well suited to serve the
revengefulness of individuals who find themselves in the condition of
shame and self-­disgust he describes and, for this reason, it is apt to inspire
them to put it to such a use. The genealogical inquiries show this by reveal-
ing the ways in which morality was, or plausibly could have been, devised
by people bent on revenge.
 Introduction 5

All of the genealogies Nietzsche develops in the book locate the “origin”
of morality in a particular affective state, ressentiment. In Chapter 2,
I undertake an analysis of this elusive concept. Ressentiment is a response to
suffering, understood broadly as the thwarting of one’s will, when it is con-
strued as demeaning or degrading. It is a response to a threat to one’s stand-
ing, understood here in a non-­moral sense, as being ‘somebody’, being
someone who counts, or whose presence in the world makes a difference in
it. Ressentiment is thus an affective orientation generated by a special drive,
the will to power. The will to power is the drive to impose “one’s own form”
on the world, or to bend it to one’s “will” (BGE §259; Z II “On Self-­
Overcoming”). Being agents committed to certain values and aspirations is
the distinctive “form” of human beings, or their “will.” Human beings have
power, then, not simply when the world conforms to their values, but also
when such conformity is a product of the effective exercise of their agency.
Ressentiment motivates “revenge,” which Nietzsche takes to be an asser-
tion of power: the aim of revenge is to buttress or restore one’s standing
when it has been threatened or damaged. In the Genealogy, Nietzsche refers
to the character the passage above places center stage—the “human being
who has turned out badly,” who is “disgusted with himself ” and “fundamen-
tally ashamed of his existence”—as the “man of ressentiment.” This is the
individual in whom ressentiment is accompanied by a “feeling of impo-
tence,” and becomes entrenched as a defining character trait. Unable to
restore his power by bending the world to his will, this individual is forced
to resort to a peculiar kind of revenge, the “spiritual revenge” of a revalua-
tion of existing values and ideals (GM I §10). The underlying mechanism of
this revenge is simple enough: unable to bend the world to his will, but
nonetheless consumed by a will to power, the “man of ressentiment” alters
his conception of what “power” amounts to by altering the content of his
will (his values).
Chapters 1 and 2 thus explore the method of Nietzsche’s Genealogy and
the psychological factors and processes involved in its application. The
remaining three chapters examine the execution of this genealogical project
in each of the book’s three essays. In Chapter 3, I examine the genealogy of
the moral concepts “good and evil” as it is developed in the First Essay. This
essay focuses on the transition from an aristocratic ethic of “order of rank”
(BGE §257)—which he calls “master morality”—to the “democratic” egali-
tarian ethical outlook of Christian morality and its modern secular
­variants—or “slave morality.” In “master morality,” the “higher rank”—social
or political “superiority” (GM I §§5–6)—as well as the well-­ being or
6 Introduction

“happiness” that results from the gratification of one’s natural desires in the
natural world (GM I §10) and is presumably facilitated by that superiority,
are dominant values. In this outlook, the higher rank is something that an
individual has to earn through the effective exercise of his agency. Even if he
inherits it by birth, he still has to prove himself worthy of it. For instance,
when he is not granted the respect due to his “higher rank,” he must take
action to regain it, by force if necessary. Whining indignantly about the
insult done to him will not do.
In an ethical climate dominated by “master morality,” the character in
which Nietzsche is interested finds himself, like most people, unable to
achieve (or maintain) the higher rank. The resulting threat to his standing
in the world arouses his ressentiment, which his inability to gain (or regain)
the higher rank compounds with a “feeling of impotence” (GM I §7). He is
thus forced to resort to “an act of spiritual revenge” (GM I §10): he repudi-
ates the value master morality places on the “higher rank” and holds that all
agents possess equal worth (BGE §219)—for example, they are “children of
God,” or in a secular variant of this Christian idea, they all have dignity. This
dignity entitles each to the respect of others, and his privations and frustra-
tions call for their benevolent concern.
The devaluation of the higher rank might appease the feeling of impo-
tence elicited by his inability to achieve it, but it cannot suffice to restore his
“feeling of power.” To do so, he must come to see the fact that he does not
occupy the higher rank as a product of the effective exercise of his agency.
Thus, he invents a certain conception of free will. His repudiation of the
higher rank is a product of his choice: “weakness is being lied into some-
thing meritorious” (GM I §14). Nevertheless, if he believes himself possessed
of dignity, then he also has an obligation of self-­respect. When faced with
disrespect or mistreatment on the part of others, he ought to stand up for
himself. If, however, standing for himself in this manner required him to
secure the respect of others, by force if necessary, then he would still be con-
fined to a world in which his not getting his due remains evidence of his
impotence. He would continue to be a weak “lamb,” incapable of resisting the
violent, predatory mistreatment of the stronger “birds of prey” (GM I §13).
He avoids this problem by attributing freedom of will to them and hold-
ing that, in one crucial respect, standing up for one’s dignity is not the same
as defending one’s rank. While he can compel others to acknowledge his
higher social rank with the end of his sword, he cannot similarly compel
others to respect his dignity. The response commanded by a higher rank
 Introduction 7

may be at bottom, a kind of fear. But the respect dignity calls for is unlike
fear: it cannot be coerced but can only be granted freely. For this reason,
blaming others for their disrespect or mistreatment is all that standing for
himself requires. In this moral outlook, in other words, nothing more is
required of him than “that invalid’s Phariseeism of loud gestures that likes
best to pose as ‘noble indignation’” (GM III §14). Hence, even if his blame
fails to alter the behavior of others, their continuing mistreatment of him is
not evidence of the ineffectiveness of his agency.
In this case, in fact, he can see himself as “superior” to his tormentors.
They fall short of the relevant ethical standards precisely by subjecting him
to mistreatment, whereas he lives up to them precisely by not retaliating in
kind. From the perspective of his new values, not retaliating is now what
counts as bending the world to his will. What was impotence from the point
of view of the old aristocratic ethic—the inability to retaliate successfully
and to inspire the right kind of fear in his tormentors—is now transmuted
into power, even if he cannot actually put an end to their persecution: “his
inability to revenge is called unwillingness to revenge” (GM I §14).
Yet, for someone who repudiates the aristocratic ethics of social domi-
nance and espouses an egalitarian morality in order to rekindle his feeling
of power, this morality poses new problems. He is likely to fail to live up to
his new values periodically, and this creates a fresh threat to his sense of
himself as an effective agent. He seeks to fend off this threat by inventing the
concept of guilt. In Chapter 4, I turn to the genealogy of the concepts of
guilt and punishment. Insofar as it is linked to the concept of free will, the
concept of guilt allows him to see his occasional moral shortcomings as
something he could have avoided, and therefore not as evidence of the inef-
fectiveness of his agency. He may find some comfort in the thought that,
after all, he “could have done otherwise” (GM II §4).
But his failure to live up to his values—his falling into the temptation
created by conflicting inclinations—is still bound to create doubts about his
power in someone as preoccupied with it as the “man of ressentiment.”
Hence, he is likely to feel an anxious urge to demonstrate it, and therefore to
put these doubts to rest. Thus, in the Second Essay, Nietzsche almost entirely
leaves out the connection of guilt with free will in order to focus on its link
with indebtedness, and on a conception of punishment as restitution. He
defines guilt as the affective registration by the agent of his failure to keep
faith with his evaluative commitments. And punishment (including the
self-­inflicted punishment of penance) is an alternative way of discharging
8 Introduction

the obligation he had undertaken by making these commitments in the first

place. Punishment, in this way of seeing, it is an alternative way of paying
what he owes—it expunges guilt.
As Nietzsche had already noted in the First Essay, the inability to achieve
or maintain a higher social rank by the “man of ressentiment” also exposes a
deeper and more pervasive kind of impotence. Well-­being depends, in part,
on the ability to master the external world. On his own, any individual is
helpless and vulnerable, largely unable to shape the external world so as to
make it hospitable to his well-­being. To do so, then, he requires the assis-
tance of others. A high social rank, by virtue of which he can command this
assistance, is therefore a condition of the very possibility of achieving “hap-
piness.” His failure to achieve a position of social superiority therefore
exposes not just a particular kind of social impotence, but also the broader
inability to achieve the happiness typically enjoyed by those who occupy
this higher rank—the “well-­born” (GM I §10).
It is therefore no surprise to find his ressentiment take aim at the very
aspiration to well-­being (GM III §11). He thus adopts an evaluative outlook
in which it is devalued: the “ascetic ideal,” or the ideal of “holiness.” In
Chapter 5, I examine Nietzsche’s treatment of this idea in the Third Essay.
The invention of the ascetic ideal is a form of revenge insofar as it aims at
repairing a damaged feeling of power. What counts as power, in this ethical
perspective, is “self-­denial,” the renunciation of his “natural instincts.” While
the ascetic ideal persists in attenuated forms in its modern secular variants,
it assumes a particularly radical guise in Christian morality. The ideal of
“holiness” it promotes is not just a normative demand, compliance with
which may require him to renounce his natural inclinations; it is the nor-
mative demand to renounce these inclinations (GM II §22; III §11).
If his ultimate aspiration is “holiness,” the complete renunciation of his
natural instincts, then it becomes virtually impossible for him, given his
natural constitution, not to fail chronically in his attempt to comply with its
demands. He does not occasionally sin, but he becomes a “sinner” (GM III
§20). His guilt becomes habitual and, for this reason, inexpiable. This does
not imply that punishment is pointless, but rather that it is “eternal.” It
allows him to interpret any suffering that comes his way as “punishment”
(GM III §§20, 28), and therefore to come to see it as a way of expressing his
power. And if no such suffering befalls him, he will seek it out in voluntary
penance (GM III §20).
The invention of the ascetic ideal is the culmination of a process designed
to repair the damaged feeling of power of the “man of ressentiment.” The
 Introduction 9

radical form it assumes in Christian morality brings to light the “danger” it

poses. When it aims at the restoration of a feeling of power, the adoption of
an ascetic moral outlook proves to be self-­undermining. While the pursuit
of holiness may restore a feeling of power in the “weak and impotent,” it
does so by worsening the very condition of “weakness and impotence” that
caused damage to his feeling of power and inspired that pursuit in the first
place (GM III §11). For this reason, Nietzsche concludes, when the will to
power seizes upon ascetic morality in this manner, it effectively becomes a
“will to nothingness” (GM III §28).
 1
Genealogy and Critique

In the Preface to On the Genealogy of Morality, Nietzsche calls for a “new”

critique of “morality”:

Let us articulate this new demand: we need a critique of moral values, the
value of these values themselves must first be called into question—and for
that there is needed a knowledge of the conditions and circumstances in
which they grew, under which they evolved and changed. (GM Preface §6)

The “morality” that is the intended target of this critique refers to a broad
but distinctive evaluative outlook, which has its roots in Christianity and
has become so dominant that it claims exclusivity for the label “morality”
(BGE §202). This evaluative outlook involves certain conceptual innova-
tions such as, for example, the substitution of the “good/evil” pair for the
“good/bad” pair (GM Preface §3). But the primary target of Nietzsche’s
genealogical inquiries appears to be a cluster of framing beliefs, including
evaluative beliefs (such as ‘Compassion is good’) and descriptive beliefs
about the character of moral agency (such as ‘Moral agents are contra-­
causally free’). The moral outlook is also manifest in feelings, such as the
feeling of guilt, and practices, such as the practice of punishment, but the
feeling of guilt constitutively involves a belief, and the practice of punish-
ment (more precisely its meaning) is typically framed by beliefs.
Accordingly, I will generally assume that Nietzsche’s genealogies have moral
beliefs as their objects.
The new critique proposed here requires a genealogy of moral beliefs,
which appears to be a causal history of their emergence. Just what role a
genealogy of moral beliefs plays in their critique has been a source of puz-
zlement. While Nietzsche explicitly exonerates his genealogical approach
from the charge of genetic fallacy (e.g., GS §245; WP §69n, 254/KSA
12:2[131], 12:2[189]), he also leaves it unclear what precise role an inquiry
into the origins of moral values is supposed to play in their critique.

The Will to Nothingness: An Essay on Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morality. Bernard Reginster.
Oxford University Press. © Bernard Reginster 2021. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198868903.003.0002
12 Genealogy and Critique

Many scholars argue that the form of critique best served by a genealogi-
cal approach should be understood as “putting into question,” or “prob-
lematizing.”1 In the Preface, Nietzsche suggests that the genealogy is
designed to address a particular worry: “one has taken the value of these
‘values’ as given, as factual, as beyond all question” (GM Preface §6). To
problematize moral values thus consists in uncovering in their history
grounds for challenging the self-­evidence that has become associated with
them. But scholars disagree on the critical significance of this strategy of
problematization.
On the weaker reading, the strategy of problematization simply exposes
problems in our beliefs about moral values. For example, it reveals that they
are the products of an epistemically suspect causal history. The aim of the
strategy, on this reading, is only to destabilize our moral beliefs: while they
have come to seem self-­evidently true, we do not have good reasons for
them, and we should therefore call them into question. On the stronger
reading, the strategy of problematization exposes problems in moral values
themselves: it shows not just that they could well not be what we take them
to be, but that they actually are not. For example, it reveals that they are not
the objective normative realities or the unqualifiedly useful practical guides
we take them to be. The aim of problematization, on the stronger reading, is
not to undermine moral values altogether. This would amount to a full-­
fledged “revaluation” of these values, which goes beyond the declared aim
of their genealogical “critique” (see GM III §27; EH, III “Genealogy of
Morality”). But it alters our relationship to them in more profound and per-
manent ways than does the destabilization of our beliefs in them. For desta-
bilization need not be permanent: the discovery of adequate epistemic
grounds for our moral beliefs could, in principle, restore the stable relation-
ship we had previously enjoyed with them.
In this chapter, I develop an analysis of Nietzsche’s conception of a gene-
alogical critique. Specifically, I argue for a pragmatic interpretation of this
critique. The objective of a genealogy of morality is, in the first place, to
uncover its function by identifying the particular problems this practice
was ‘designed’ to solve—for example, the particular needs it is suited to
address. In the second place, the objective is also to form an assessment of
morality by making it possible to ask how well, if at all, it solves these prob-
lems. This pragmatic interpretation of the genealogy supports the stronger
reading of its critical significance: it reveals problems about morality itself.

1 E.g., Geuss (2002); Koopman (2013).

 Genealogy as Epistemic Debunking 13

As Nietzsche puts it, it poses a significant “danger” to the “health” of the

agents who subscribe to it (GM Preface §6).
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 1.1, I examine the weaker,
epistemic, form of problematization and argue that interpreting the geneal-
ogy in its terms faces fatal difficulties. In Section 1.2, I circumscribe the
naturalistic ambitions of Nietzsche’s genealogical project, namely, how it
aims to show that morality in general, and moral values in particular, should
be treated as essentially natural phenomena. In Section 1.3, I assess the cur-
rently prevailing view that Nietzsche’s naturalistic account of moral value is
a variety of sentimentalism. I show that the causal relation this view posits
between moral values and the affects that explain them is not the relation
his genealogies typically uncover. In Section 1.4, I develop a pragmatic
alternative to sentimentalism, which consists in explaining moral beliefs in
terms of what they do for the moral believer. While affects still explain
moral values, in this view, their relation is not expressive, but functional: the
genealogies explain moral values in terms of their functional usefulness in
serving some of the moral believer’s emotional needs. In Section 1.5, I show
how this pragmatic interpretation of Nietzsche’s genealogical inquiries
allows us to see why they involve a peculiar combination of historical docu-
mentation and fictional narrative. In Section 1.6, I circumscribe the critical
implications of such naturalistic account of moral beliefs. Specifically,
I show why, in his view, simply uncovering the “natural” origins of moral val-
ues does not suffice to deprive them of their “value.” But by locating this
“value” in their function, it opens them up to a critique: specifically, it allows
to raise the question, “Have they hitherto hindered or furthered human
prosperity?” (GM Preface §3) Finally, in Section 1.7, I examine two prob-
lems posed by the pragmatic approach to genealogy: the problem of dys-
functionality and the problem of multiple functionality.

1.1 Genealogy as Epistemic Debunking

It has become commonplace to assume that the genealogy challenges the

self-­evidence of our moral values by exposing their historical contingency.2
They are not inevitable since they turn out to be absent from entire periods
of human history. If we had lived in different historical circumstances,
we might have ended up with very different values. The more cautious

2 E.g., Nehamas (1985); Williams (2000, 2002); Koopman (2013).

14 Genealogy and Critique

interpreters take this contingency to reveal a weakness in our beliefs about

these values: they do not merit the confidence we place in them. By itself,
however, their historical contingency does not necessarily give us a reason
to lose confidence in our moral beliefs. On the contrary, we might discover
with some relief that the processes that explain why we came to hold them
in our particular historical circumstances are epistemically reliable—for
example, by virtue of being sensitive to, or informed by, relevant evidential
considerations. The realization that our moral beliefs could have been dif-
ferent is a legitimate cause for worry, then, only by way of revealing that the
processes that brought them about are epistemically unreliable.
In other words, in order to have critical implications, a genealogy must
show that our moral beliefs are the products of processes that are not simply
historically contingent, but epistemically unreliable. Peter Kail crisply sum-
marizes this line of interpretation:

Nietzsche’s account of the emergence of the beliefs distinctive of [moral-

ity] destabilizes the beliefs by uncovering the fact that the mechanisms
productive of the beliefs are epistemically unreliable. Knowledge of this
fact provides a reason to treat such beliefs with suspicion unless and until
some further justification for them is forthcoming.3

In this line of interpretation, the genealogical critique supposes moral

beliefs to be truth-­apt reports on realities of a certain kind.4 And it shows
that the causal mechanisms explaining them are epistemically unreliable.
The scholarly literature suggests roughly two conceptions of the way in
which the etiologies of moral beliefs uncovered by Nietzsche’s genealogical
inquiries are unreliable. According to one conception, the history of our
moral beliefs reveals them to be the products of the haphazard combination
of heterogeneous elements. In a history of that sort, some of the factors that
played a causal role in the emergence of our moral beliefs might prove to be
irrelevant to their truth, thus making it a pure coincidence that they would
lead us to it.5 Such a coincidence cries out for explanation, and if none is
forthcoming, we have reason to withdraw our confidence from them.6
On close scrutiny, however, Nietzsche’s genealogies do not reveal that our
moral beliefs have an entirely haphazard and heterogeneous history; on the

3 Kail (2011, 22); cf. Williams (2000, 20–1); Leiter (2004, 192–3).
4 On this point, see Mason (2010, 770–8).
5 E.g., Nehamas (1985, 112–13); Geuss (1994); Williams (2002).
6 Schechter (2018).
 Genealogy as Epistemic Debunking 15

contrary, they expose the operation, in their development, of a specific psy-

chological mechanism, rooted in the affect of ressentiment. This points to a
different conception of the way in which the etiology of moral beliefs is
epistemically unreliable. Ressentiment is a source of epistemic interference
akin to wishful thinking insofar as it induces the agent under its spell “to
take a false and prejudiced view of the object before him” (GM II §11; see
I §10). In this case, the genealogy reveals that our moral beliefs have been
caused by distorting factors.
Ressentiment is often thought to be distorting by virtue of interfering with
the proper exercise of our cognitive faculties. As in the case of wishful think-
ing, it motivates the agent to adopt evaluative beliefs because they satisfy a
desire (for example, the desire for “power”). By believing what he wishes to
be true, the wishful thinker commits himself to the truth of the proposition
believed, and therefore must take his attitude to be answerable to relevant
epistemic considerations. This might lead him, for example, to overestimate
the evidence that favors his belief, or underestimate the evidence that goes
against it: “The desire misleads us into purchasing bad reasons for good
ones” (HH I §131). But while the influence of his wish corrupts the exercise
of his faculties, it does not necessarily damage them. In a moment of cold
reflection, when the agent is no longer under the influence of the wish, he
can come to see that his cognitive faculties were not properly engaged and
produce an epistemically reliable review of the belief. For example, he can
come to a more accurate estimation of the pertinent evidence.
To rule out the very possibility of such a corrective review, we would have
to suppose the influence of the distorting psychological factor to be unre-
lenting. But Nietzsche recognizes that it is simply implausible to suppose
that agents who hold moral beliefs always do so out of ressentiment (e.g.,
D §103). To resolve this difficulty, Kail offers the following suggestion:

Now, even though I acquire this belief without any self-­deceptive mech­an­
ism, the sins of the ultimate source rebound on me. Suppose I acquire a
belief that p from Fred, and Fred is no liar, but Fred got it from Mabel,
who is. Assuming that Fred merely transmits the beliefs (and doesn’t add
any justification) I am in just as bad a situation as if Mabel had told me.
The beliefs become institutionalized and passed on, but knowledge of
their originating causes requires me to justify them rather than just
accept them.7

7 Kail (2011, 230).

16 Genealogy and Critique

In this case, ressentiment does not corrupt the exercise of my cognitive

­faculties, but it vitiates the evidential grounds on which they rely. The agent in
the example exercises her cognitive faculties correctly: she forms her belief
by relying on the testimony of another, whom she knows to be a generally
reliable purveyor of moral information, or on the fact that the propositional
content of her belief is sanctioned by a long-­standing tradition. Reliable tes-
timony is legitimate (if defeasible) evidential ground for belief, as is the fact
that many people over long periods of time converge on the same belief.
The problem lies in the provenance of that evidence: the origin of that testi-
mony or of that tradition in the ressentiment of a certain group of people in
our historical past undermines their evidential value.8
Suppose I believe that bullying the weak and vulnerable is wrong. A
genealogical inquiry reveals that I hold this belief because my parents and
teachers taught me that bullying is wrong. Let us also suppose that I accept
what my parents and teachers told me because they generally are reliable
providers of information: they are scrupulous on matters of morality, they
are fairly open-­minded, they have no reason to deceive me, and so on.
Suppose, moreover, that this belief lies at the core of a long-­standing tradi-
tion (from which my parents and teachers may have inherited it). Reliance
on the testimony of my parents and teachers, or on the authority of tradi-
tion, is epistemically legitimate. Suppose now that I discover that the people
who initially formed and propagated the belief that bullying is wrong did so
because, having themselves been victims of bullying, they were left filled
with impotent ressentiment toward their bullies, which eventually motivated
them to adopt the belief that bullying is wrong. Suppose, moreover, that this
belief became dominant because of certain psychological factors (for exam-
ple, the fact that most people are likely to identify with the victims of bul-
lies) and social factors (for example, the operation of mechanisms of
cultural transmission), which explain the transmission and spreading of the
belief without any reference to its truth. Upon uncovering this genealogy,
I may no longer regard as reliable either the testimonies of my parents and
teachers or the dictates of my tradition on this matter, since both have been
vitiated by the influence of ressentiment.

8 See, e.g., Doris (2009, 710). Nietzsche’s genealogies would supply higher-­order evidence, or
evidence about the evidence or arguments on which moral beliefs are based (see
Christensen, 2010). Some scholars take Nietzsche to apply this approach to the basic intuitions
of moral philosophers: see, e.g., Hill (2003, 196) and Owen (2007, 5).
 Genealogy as Epistemic Debunking 17

This epistemic interpretation of Nietzsche’s genealogical critique faces

several difficulties. I will argue later that it ignores his emphatic claim that
the epistemic standing of moral beliefs—their truth or their justification—
has no bearing on their “value” (GS §345; BGE §4). But even when it is
taken on its own terms, it is not clear how new the genealogical critique
really is on this epistemic interpretation. It shows that our moral beliefs rest
on inadequate epistemic grounds, but so do the lively debates about the
“rational foundations” of morality in modern philosophy (BGE §186).
Readers exposed to the views of Hume, then Kant, and then Schopenhauer
might emerge uncertain over the rational foundations of morality. The
genealogical form of the argument is new, to be sure, insofar as genealogical
arguments are debunking. This means that they do not charge the believer
with a lack of epistemic diligence: they concede that she may have good
evidence for her beliefs (for example, reliable testimony or a convergent tra-
dition); but they reveal problems with the provenance of that evidence. By
contrast, for example, Schopenhauer charges Kant directly with overlooking
relevant evidence and producing invalid arguments.9 Still, the upshot of the
genealogical critique is the same: to show the believer that her moral beliefs
rest on shaky grounds.
The “new critique” of morality Nietzsche calls for is a critique of the
“value” of moral values. Perhaps, the traditional disputes over the “rational
foundations” of morality fall short in this respect, because they continue to
take the “value” of moral values for granted:

What the philosophers called a “rational foundation for morality” and

tried to supply was, seen in the right light, merely a scholarly variation of
the common faith in the prevalent morality; . . . indeed, in the last analysis
a kind of denial that this morality might ever be considered problematic—
certainly the very opposite of an examination, analysis, questioning, and
vivisection of this faith. (BGE §186)

The traditional disputes are only over whether the “rational foundations” of
morality have been correctly identified. But they remain hampered by the
“common faith in the prevalent morality,” which is to say that they operate
under the assumption that there are such foundations, an assumption the
new critique Nietzsche calls for aims to challenge.

9 See, respectively, On the Basis of Morality, §7 and The World as Will and Representation I,
Critique of the Kantian Philosophy, 553–4/620.
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The Project Gutenberg eBook of History of
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 This ebook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United
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Title: History of anthropology

Author: Alfred C. Haddon

A. Hingston Quiggin

Release date: November 17, 2023 [eBook #72158]

Language: English

Original publication: London: Watts & Co, 1910

Credits: Peter Becker and the Online Distributed Proofreading

Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced
from images generously made available by The
Internet Archive) Last Edit of Project Info

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF

ANTHROPOLOGY ***
E. B. Tylor.
 HISTORY OF

ANTHROPOLOGY

BY

A L F R E D C . H A D D O N,
M.A., Sc.D., F.R.S., Fellow of Christ’s College,
University Reader in Ethnology, Cambridge,

WITH THE HELP OF

A . H I N G S T O N Q U I G G I N,
M.A., formerly of Newnham College, Cambridge

London:
WATTS & CO.,
JOHNSON’S COURT, FLEET STREET, E.C.4
 Printed in Great Britain
by Watts & Co.,Johnson’s Court,
Fleet Street, London, E.C.4
 PREFACE

It is with great diffidence that we offer this little book to the public, it
being, so far as we are aware, the first attempt at a history of
Anthropology. A book of small size which deals with so vast a
subject, comprising, as it does, so many different studies, cannot
satisfy the specialists in the several departments. In many branches
the investigations are so recent that they can hardly be said to have
a history, and in some cases their originators are still alive.
Doubtless many will criticise the amount of space allocated to certain
authors, and wonder why others have been omitted or have received
but scanty recognition. All we can say in extenuation for our
selection is that the task has been by no means an easy one, and
we have partly been guided by the fact that our readers will mainly
be of British nationality. It has been impossible to mention all of the
more important of living workers, whether investigators, collectors, or
systematisers; but this is not due to any lack of appreciation of their
labours. In most cases references are given in the text; a few
supplemental works will be found in the Bibliography at the end of
the book. The two dates which follow a name refer to the years of
the individual’s birth and death; a single date refers to the date of
publication of the book or memoir.
We hope we have in all cases referred to the authors to whom we
are indebted for information; and for personal assistance we desire
to thank Dr. C. S. Myers, of Gonville and Caius College; Mr. E. E.
Sikes, Tutor of St. John’s College, Cambridge; and Mr. Edward
Clodd.
A. C. H.
October, 1910.
 CONTENTS

Preface v

Introduction 1-5

PHYSICAL ANTHROPOLOGY.

CHAPTER I
The Pioneers of Physical Anthropology 6-27

Definition of the word “Anthropology.” Fundamental conceptions.

Race discrimination: in Bushman paintings, in the art of ancient
Egypt, Assyria, etc., in Vedic literature. Hippocrates. Aristotle.
Vesalius. Spigel. Tyson. Pygmies. Linnæus. Buffon. Blumenbach.
Monsters and Wild Men.

CHAPTER II.

The Systematisers of Physical 28-49

Anthropology
 Craniology: Blumenbach, the founder of Craniology. Camper and
the facial angel. Various early craniologists. Retzius and the
Cephalic Index. Grattan. Broca. Topinard. De Quatrefages. Virchow.
Sergi. Hagen’s and Macalister’s criticisms of craniometry.
Anthropometry: White and others. Measurements and observations
of living populations: Beddoe. Virchow. Methods of dealing with
anthropometrical data: Indices. Averages. Seriations. Curves.
Mathematical treatment: Quetelet. Galton. Karl Pearson. Scientific
and practical value of anthropometry: In the origin and differentiation
of man. Racial history. Heredity. Galton. Miscegenation. The effect of
the environment. Test of physical fitness. Identification of criminals.
Bertillon. Galton.

CHAPTER III.
Anthropological Controversies 50-69

Origin of man. Polygenism and Monogenism. Lawrence. Lord

Monboddo. Lamarck. Cuvier. Étienne Saint-Hilaire. Robert
Chambers: Vestiges of Creation. Herbert Spencer. Darwin: Origin of
Species. The negro’s place in nature. James Hunt.

CHAPTER IV.
The Unfolding of the Antiquity of Man 70-78

Fossil man. Cannstadt, Neanderthal, Spy, and other finds. Homo

Heidelbergensis, Homo primigenius, Pithecanthropus erectus.

CHAPTER V.
Comparative Psychology 79-87

Phrenology. Psychical research. Methods and aims of Psychology.

Ethnical psychology. Bastian. Folk psychology. Experimental
psychology. Eugenics.
 CHAPTER VI.
The Classification and Distribution of Man 88-98

Race description and classification. Bernier. Linnæus.

Blumenbach. Other classifications. Pruner Bey. Bory de S. Vincent.
Isidore Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire. Haeckel. Broca and Topinard. Flower.
Deniker. Keane. Man’s place in nature. Huxley. Vogt.

CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY.

CHAPTER VII.
Ethnology: Its Scope and Sources 99-110

Definition. Sources. Herodotus. Lucretius. Strabo. Travellers.

Missionaries. Systematic works on Ethnology. Prichard. Other
generalisations. Ethnology and the Classics. Ethnology and Political
Science.

CHAPTER VIII.
The History of Archæological Discovery 111-125

Prehistoric man. Flint implements. Denmark. Caves: Oreston.

Kirkdale. Liège. Kent’s Cavern. Lake dwellings. Irish crannogs.
Swiss pile dwellings. Brixham Cave. Boucher de Perthes.
Subsequent progress of Archæology. France. Britain. Germany, etc.
Tertiary man. Eoliths.

CHAPTER IX.
Technology 126-127

Pitt-Rivers. Otis T. Mason. H. Balfour. H. Colley March. Stolpe.

 CHAPTER X.
Sociology and Religion 128-143

Comparative Ethnology. Tylor. Avebury. Sociology. Comte. Buckle.

Herbert Spencer. Bachofen, Morgan, McLennan, and others. Magic
and Religion. Anthropology and Religion. Folklore. Comparative
Religion.

CHAPTER XI.
Linguistics 144-148
The Aryan controversy. Language and Race.
CHAPTER XII.
Cultural Classification and the Influence 149-152
of Environment

Gallatin. Wilhelm von Humboldt. Hippocrates. Buffon. Alexander

von Humboldt, Ritter, and Waitz. Buckle. Ratzel. Reclus. Le Play.

Retrospect 153
Bibliography 155
Index of Authors 157
 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

PAGE

E. B. Tylor Frontispiece
Bushmen Raiding Kafir Cattle 9
Race Portraiture of the Ancient 10
Egyptians
J. F. Blumenbach 24
Upper and Side Views of Skulls 29
Paul Broca 36
Skull of the Fossil Man of La 74
Chapelle-aux-Saints
P. W. A. Bastian 83
J. C. Prichard 105