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Praise for
Adventures of the Symbolic breckman
( c o n t i n u e d f r o m f r o n t f la p ) Marxism’s collapse in the twentieth cen-
tury profoundly altered the style and substance
Breckman uniquely situates these important “Adventures of the Symbolic is a trailblazing journey into forbidding terrain. It ad- of Western European radical thought. To build
theorists within two hundred years of European dresses one of the most controversial and fascinating trends in postwar European so- a more robust form of democratic theory and
thought and extends their profound relevance cial thought—the dismantling of the Marxian paradigm and the emergence of a new action, prominent theorists moved to reject
to today’s political activism. species of theory that casts light on the radically open and postfoundational character revolution, abandon class for more fragmented
of democracy. Castoriadis, Lefort, Laclau, Mouffe, Gauchet, Žižek—these are names models of social action, and elevate the political
to conjure with, but to understand their contributions is another thing entirely. War- over the social. Acknowledging the constructed-
Warren Breckman is professor of modern ren Breckman has the rare combination of theoretical lucidity and political acumen to ness of society and politics, they chose the “sym-
European intellectual history at the Univer- bolic” as a concept powerful enough to reinvent
guide us on this adventure. His achievement is simply stunning, a genuine milestone
leftist thought outside a Marxist framework.
C O LU M B I A S T U D I E S I N P O L I T I C A L T H O U G H T/P O L I T I C A L H I S TO RY
Columbia Studies in Political Thought/Political History
Dick Howard, General Editor
Pierre Rosanvallon, Democracy Past and Future, edited by Samuel Moyn (2006)
Robert Meister, After Evil: Human Rights Discourse in the Twenty-first Century (2011)
Stephen Eric Bronner, Socialism Unbound: Principles, Practices, and Prospects (2011)
David William Bates, States of War: Enlightenment Origins of the Political (2011)
Adventures of the Symbolic
P O S T- M A R X I S M A N D R A D I C A L D E M O C R A C Y
Warren Breckman
Columbia University Press books are printed on permanent and durable acid-free paper.
This book is printed on paper with recycled content.
Printed in the United States of America
c 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
cover image: Dieter Roth, Literaturwurst (1969). Copyright © Dieter Roth Estate.
Courtesy Hauser & Wirth. Copyright © The Museum of Modern Art/Licensed by
SCALA / Art Resource, NY.
References to Web sites (URLs) were accurate at the time of writing. Neither the author
nor Columbia University Press is responsible for URLs that may have expired or changed
since the manuscript was prepared.
For Cordula
Contents
Acknowledgments xvii
CHAPTER ONE
The Symbolic Dimension and the Politics of Young Hegelianism 24
CHAPTER TWO
The Fate of the Symbolic from Romantic Socialism
to a Marxism in extremis 57
CHAPTER THREE
From the Symbolic Turn to the Social Imaginary:
Castoriadis’s Project of Autonomy 96
CHAPTER FOUR
Democracy Between Disenchantment and Political Theology:
French Post-Marxism and the Return of Religion 139
CHAPTER FIVE
The Post-Marx of the Letter: Laclau and Mouffe Between Postmodern
Melancholy and Post-Marxist Mourning 183
CHAPTER SIX
Of Empty Places: Žižek and Laclau; or, The End of the Affair 216
Epilogue 262
Notes 289
Index 341
Foreword
Dick Howard
But if there is not an exact parallel there is, to use a term from the Roman-
tics that Breckman stresses elsewhere, an analogy between the projects.
Just as Merleau-Ponty began his story with an account of the constitution
of his object of study, the dialectic, from the work of Max Weber, so
Breckman begins his history with the constitution of its object, the sym-
bolic. Breckman begins with the problem posed to the young (or “left”)
Hegelians by the insistence of the late Schelling and his Romantic follow-
ers that the real is not only, or truly, the rational; how, then, is one to
understand the irreducible otherness of the world to thought? This is ter-
ritory that Breckman had covered from one perspective in Marx, the
Young Hegelians, and the Origins of Radical Social Theory; he retraces in this
new work, compactly, the process by which the Hegelian opposition, and
finally Marx, built their theory on a desymbolization, the reduction of the
transcendent to the immanent and the secularization of social relations.
But Marx had no monopoly on radical social theory; in his second chap-
ter Breckman underlines the place of another line of leftist theory whose
first formulation he finds in the “romantic socialism” of Pierre Leroux.
This alternate orientation sets the stage for the climb back to a resymbol-
ization of radical thought whose avatars were the fathers of what came to
be known as “French theory”: Lévi-Strauss, Althusser, and Lacan. Breck-
man interprets this process of resymbolization, which is often referred to
as the “linguistic turn,” as an attempt to “rescue radical thought from
Marxism” and its dialectical misadventures. While this claim is question-
able in the case of Althusser’s structural Marxism, Breckman’s interpreta-
tion of the structuralist movement is suggestive.
These first two chapters are only the beginning of Breckman’s attempt
to present “a more or less coherent narrative that has something like a be-
ginning, a series of variations that rearticulate that first insight, and a
conclusion that returns to that beginning in order to reaffirm its basic in-
sights.” He then turns in the second section to the central chapters of the
book, which treat first Cornelius Castoriadis, then Claude Lefort. The for-
mer comrades, ex-Trotskyists become Marx critics, bring front and center
the problem of democracy. Broadly interpreted, resymbolization replaces
the base/superstructure account with a vision of the social world as “con-
structed”; it replaces the determinism of historical materialism by a recog-
nition of indetermination and stresses democracy rather than a state-cen-
tered, planned political world. But this changed perspective poses a new
xiii
FOREWORD
question: what is the foundation of social relations? The search for the
grounds of social relations and the source of social values points beyond
the immanence of secular society toward the dimension of transcendence
that had been the domain of theology before the avatars of modernity and
Marxism challenged its credibility. The challenge of Schelling to Hegel’s
rationalism returns, now in the various forms of deconstruction, of which
Breckman offers a coherent panorama that richly repays reading. But he
goes on to point to the richness of the alternate paths proposed by Casto-
riadis and Lefort.
The fact that reason here recognizes its limits does not mean that it
lapses into unreason; rather the idea of a society whose relations could be
rationalized is replaced by the search for the grounds of what both Casto-
riadis and Lefort call “the political.” Although they define it differently, as
Breckman shows, their basic insight is that the political is a symbolic
power that structures or institutes both society and social institutions.
Their respective critiques of totalitarianism led them to challenge the
Marxist reduction of the political to the social. For Castoriadis, the politi-
cal depends on the interplay between what he calls the (social) “imagi-
naire” and the “radical imaginary,” which creates the conditions for hu-
man and social autonomy. Autonomy, in its literal Greek sense of autos +
nomos, means that the law is self-given; its only justification is the will of
the participants, and this is just what is entailed by democracy. For Lefort,
the modern concept of the rights of man—which should not be confused
with classical liberal philosophy—becomes the foundation of a demo-
cratic politics that is radical because it can never overcome the difference
between its symbolic foundation (the rights of man) and its socially bound
reality. The result, says Breckman, is a “robust theory of the uncertainty
and indeterminacy of the democratic condition,” which leads Lefort to
praise democracy “not [for] what it does, but [for] what it causes to be done ”
(000f). Because the political transcends the society that it institutes, it can
never be incarnated (by the proletariat, the party, or any social institu-
tion); it can only be represented because, in itself, it must always remain
“an empty place.” The same logic holds for democracy, the rule of the
demos: because the people can never be incarnate in any institution, all
institutions can claim to represent the people, and their competition (in
the separation of powers) protects the rights and freedoms of democratic
individuals.
xiv
FOREWORD
turbing” some of Žižek’s bluster and his “inconsistent and at times deeply
disturbing pronouncements,” but here as elsewhere the reader will come
to appreciate the historian who makes the strands of the past cohere in a
narrative. At the same time, the political thinker will recognize the way in
which the guiding thread through this maze is suggested by the retrode-
velopment from symbolic political socialism to reductionist Marxism that
was dissected in part 1. For example, Žižek attempts to combine reduc-
tionism and voluntarism into what he (and Alain Badiou) calls a “positive
vision” that he identifies now with “communism,” now with “Leninism,”
and then again with the terrorist actions taken by self-defined leftist groups
in Peru or Vietnam. In so doing, says Breckman, Žižek is trying to “fill in
the hole,” to overcome the indeterminacy, and to secularize the transcen-
dence of the political to the social. And that, after all, is just what the
young Marx proposed to accomplish in his “On the Jewish Question”
(1843), the missing link in his move away from Hegelianism and toward the
discovery of the proletariat as the subject-object of history. From that point
forward, Marx would interpret religious and ideological questions as the
expression of social relations and soon would interpret political problems
in terms of economic relations.
It is of course a broad step to lay responsibility on the flighty figure of
Žižek, whose rhetoric could change tomorrow. But, if it changes, he would
have a material explanation for the new position. The point is that his evo-
lution testifies to the culmination, apparently real, of the adventures of the
symbolic. With it comes the end of the hope of saving radicalism by resym-
bolizing Marxism. Breckman admits his frustration with this conclusion, for
there remains much indeed to criticize about contemporary capitalism.
But this is no reason to accept the surface plausibility of Žižek’s (or Badiou’s
or others’) return to Marxism-Leninism; perhaps, ironizes Breckman, cit-
ing Žižek, miracles do happen, but don’t count on them, for the desym-
bolizing project is doomed to political failure. Breckman himself stands
on the critical left; but his left is built on the democratic imperative. Yet
democracy, he concludes sagely, is “not a solution; it is a problem, insepa-
rably philosophical and political.” Breckman has no solution; that’s not
his job. But his historical reconstruction of the modern history of political
thought is innovative, refreshing, and a marvelous mirror through which
we can see more clearly how we have come to be who we are and why we
have the theorists that we have.
Acknowledgments
THIS BOOK TOOK A LONG TIME TO W RITE. Along the way, there have
been many distractions, mostly good, some bad. What has remained unwav-
ering throughout is my gratitude to the many people who have supported,
encouraged, fed, entertained, and sparred with me. One of the many perks
of finally finishing a project like this, beyond a huge sigh of relief and a
moment of existential angst about what comes next, is the opportunity
finally to offer thanks.
I should begin by acknowledging the institutions that allowed me to pur-
sue this work. The University of Pennsylvania supported a year of leave,
which allowed me a long sojourn in Paris, and the École des hautes études
en sciences sociales welcomed me as a visiting scholar while I was there.
Penn proved flexible in allowing me to take time away from teaching when
further opportunities presented themselves. The Institute for Advanced
Study in Princeton provided support and a tranquil environment in the
otherwise turbulent year of 2001. A fellowship from the Alexander von
Humboldt-Stiftung in 2004–2005 allowed me to spend a wonderful year
in Germany affiliated with the research group on “Symbolische Kommu-
nikation und gesellschaftliche Wertsysteme vom Mittelalter bis zur fran-
zösischen Revolution” in Münster. Though personal circumstances led me
to live in Berlin, I am grateful to the Münsteraner for their hospitality. The
opportunity to serve as the academic director of the Berlin Consortium
for German Studies in 2008–2009 brought me back to that city, and
xviii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
though it was a year full of official duties, it was a time of great strides
toward completion of this book.
I have presented elements of this project at many conferences and in-
vited lectures in America, Canada, Europe, Turkey, and Israel, and I am
thankful for these invitations and the engaged audiences who responded
to my work. Many people discussed my ideas with me, read and improved
my drafts, and generally bore with me as I groped around for the proper
paths. For all sorts of help, criticism and encouragement, thanks go to
Andrew Arato, Andrew Baird, Jonathan Beecher, Michael Behrent, Ben-
jamin Binstock, Julian Bourg, James Brophy, Roger Chartier, Andrew
Chitty, Jean Cohen, David Ames Curtis, Laurence Dickey, Ben Dorf-
man, Johan von Essen, Bernard Flynn, Don Forgay, Peter Gordon, An-
thony Grafton, Stephen Hastings-King, Andreas Hetzel, Dick Howard,
Gerald Izenberg, Martin Jay, Andreas Kalyvas, Randy Kaufman, Domi-
nick LaCapra, Ernesto Laclau, Anthony La Vopa, Claude Lefort, Suzanne
Marchand, Paola Marrati, Clara Gibson Maxwell, Allan Megill, Douglas
Moggach, Dirk Moses, Samuel Moyn, Carmen Müller, Theresa Murphy,
Elliot Neaman, Andrew Norris, Heiko Pollmeier, Jean-Michel Rabaté,
Anson Rabinbach, Ulrich Raulff, Michèle Richman, Wolfert von Rah-
den, Camille Robcis, Paul Rosenberg, David Ruderman, Hans Christoph
Schmidt am Busch, Ulrich Johannes Schneider, Joan Scott, Bernd See-
staedt, Jerrold Seigel, Ralph Shain, Jonathan Sheehan, Ludwig Siep, Gar-
eth Stedman Jones, Andrew Stein, Christian Strub, Tom Sugrue, Judith
Surkis, Luke Thurston, Lars Trägårdh, Hent de Vries, Norbert Waszek,
Richard Wolin, and Rachel Zuckert. I’m indebted to Lynn Hunt in a
slightly perverse way. Her invitation to contribute a volume on European
Romanticism to her series with Bedford/St. Martin’s sidetracked me for at
least a year, but it forced me to think more deeply about that pivotal phe-
nomenon. More straightforwardly, as my colleague at Penn, Lynn first
encouraged my idea to depart radically from the field of my first book on
Karl Marx and the Young Hegelians and embark on a project on recent
thought. Zoé Castoriadis opened her doors to me and attended patiently
as I worked in the well-organized archive now housed in the home she
had shared with her husband Cornelius. Claude Lefort was generous in
meeting with me while I lived in Paris in 1998. My undergraduate and
graduate students at Penn have risen to the challenges of seminars taught
on various aspects of my project, and they’ve often given back at least as
xix
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
IN THE DA RK DAYS OF L ATE 2008, as the world economy slid toward the
abyss, commentators in Europe began to notice a curious side effect of
this unfamiliar sense of epochal crisis. People were reading Karl Marx
again. The collapse of the East Bloc in the late 1980s and early 1990s and
the triumphant march of liberal capitalism across the globe had made it
easy to relegate Marx to the dustbin of history. His diagnosis of capital-
ism’s tendency toward crisis seemed fully belied not only by the disappear-
ance of any serious alternative world order but also by steadily accumulat-
ing profits and the evident capacity of states and markets alike to learn
from past mistakes how to manage risk. How quickly those beliefs re-
versed in the months after September 2008. The learning curve of markets
and governments turned out to be more like a Möbius strip where strate-
gies of risk management twined in a feedback loop with self-confirming
models of perpetual growth. Steadily accumulating profits turned out to
be largely illusory, resting on dubious financial instruments and credit
conjured out of thin air. Before the fall some observers had described a
strong tendency toward ever intensifying concentrations of wealth, but as
long as profits rose the new “gilded age” seemed robust enough to spread
the goods. With the collapse disparities of wealth suddenly became con-
spicuous, the spectacle of bankers and financiers cavorting like ancien ré-
gime aristocrats objectionable. It was enough to make one nostalgic for
the good old days when capitalists at least made things, but the captains of
2
INTRODUCTION
industry surrendered their ships to the pirates of finance long ago. Even
in America, where any mention of social class in public discourse in the
1980s and 1990s was met with crushing opprobrium, high profile opinion
makers seemed just about ready to endorse Bertolt Brecht’s claim that rob-
bing a bank is nothing compared to founding one.
Within this suddenly changed environment, it seemed that Marx had
something relevant to say. In Germany, sales of Das Kapital rose to levels
not seen in decades. Reinhard Marx, Roman Catholic archbishop of Mu-
nich, issued his own protest against capitalism in a book called Das Kapi-
tal: Eine Streitschrift. Even if Reinhard Marx—no relation to Karl—is in-
terested mainly in moderating, and not overthrowing, capitalism through a
renewal of Catholic humanism, he shares some of Karl Marx’s outrage at
the effects of an unbridled market and his yearning for social justice. Al-
though Reinhard Marx considered his book to be an argument against
Marxism, it opens with a “letter” to his namesake. That opening, plus the
intentional confusion created by the two Marxes and the two Das Kapi-
tals, had the effect of putting Marx on the agenda as indispensable inter-
locutor. Marx’s return to public visibility reached what may be its climax
when Time magazine published a story on Marx in early February 2009.
Though it was only the European edition of February 2 that placed
Marx’s image on the magazine cover, the article asked what Marx might
have to say about the economic crisis. The answers were predictably trite,
but the mere fact that Marx was presented not as the godless enemy of
liberty but as a potential source of insight was itself striking. In light of
this reversal of Marx’s fortunes, one must agree with various commenta-
tors who have ventured that Marx may have been wrong about commu-
nism, but he may have been right about capitalism.
Yet that proposition itself suggests the real situation of Marxism: the
possibility that Marx may speak again to an age that has discovered anew
the fragility and inequity of capitalism coupled with the complete col-
lapse of the political alternative that Marx had envisioned. Indeed, it may be
that the mainstream media has been willing to invoke Marx precisely
because he no longer represents something positive, some other possibility.
Shorn of this dimension of radical otherness, Marx becomes a marker
within a discourse of contradiction that capitalism has fully absorbed into
its own self-referential cosmos. It is not just that the communist experiment
in the twentieth century proved to be such a tragic failure that political
3
INTRODUCTION
projects aligned with Marxism have lost credibility, whatever the distance
between Marx and the regimes that ruled in his name. The romance with
revolution has evaporated, and along with it the fear of revolution—at
least in Europe and North America, as both the left and right have come
to acknowledge the complex and resilient structures of the existing social
order. Insofar as governments in late 2008 began pouring billions of dol-
lars into the economy, they did so partly in order to rescue capitalism
from its own excesses and partly to alleviate the misery inflicted on mil-
lions of people. But they did not do so to avert revolutionary upheaval.
Even the surprising return of popular protest in 2011 does not contradict
this assertion. The rebellions that overturned regimes in parts of the Arab
world objected to authoritarian governance, but not to the regime of pri-
vate property and the capitalist structuring of the economy. Likewise, Oc-
cupy Wall Street, which spread from New York to other cities in America
and Europe in the autumn of 2011, objected to what many Americans
deemed an excessive and unbearable level of economic inequality and the
corporate manipulation of democratic politics. But the Occupy move-
ment rebelled against a certain kind of capitalism, not against capitalism
as such. Undoubtedly, the paranoid use of police force to contain the oc-
cupiers and eventually expel them from their encampments would seem
to lend new credibility to Marx’s view of the bourgeois state as the guard-
ian of private property, but a Marxist call for revolution could not be
counted even as a minor key in the chorus of protests rising from the
Occupy movement.
The intellectual underpinnings of Marxism have also crumbled. Gone
is belief in a dialectic objectively operating in history and with it the pri-
macy once assigned to class as both the bedrock of social analysis and the
agent of historical change. That in turn has dealt a death blow to the old
Marxist, and especially Marxist-Leninist, belief in the unity of theory and
praxis, a belief that assigned a central role to revolutionary intellectuals.
Even as affirmative an assessment as that of Göran Therborn, whose pan-
oramic survey of contemporary leftist politics and intellectual activity
certainly supports his claim that “left-wing intellectual creativity has not
ceased,” concedes that “its greatest moments may have passed.” Speculat-
ing on the future, Therborn writes, “Twenty-first-century anti-capitalist
resisters and critics are unlikely to forget the socialist and communist ho-
rizons of the past two hundred years. But whether they will see the dawn
4
INTRODUCTION
had enjoyed among French intellectuals after World War II. That promi-
nence was the outcome of a confluence of circumstances: the politiciza-
tion of intellectuals during the Second World War; the prestige of the
Soviet Union, which was seen as the country that had borne the brunt of
Nazi furor, turned the war’s tide at Stalingrad and shared the greatest
credit for the Allied victory; the success of the postwar communist left in
grafting itself to the memory of the Resistance; the widespread conviction
that the Bolshevik Revolution was the legitimate heir to Jacobinism; the
more or less contingent fact that a number of particularly gifted intellec-
tuals like Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir chose to champion
Marxism. The power of Marxism lasted right up to 1968, and then it began
to unravel. Corresponding to the intensity of the experience of Marxism’s
collapse was the vigor with which certain French intellectuals have sought
new paradigms of radical thought beyond Marxism. These efforts extend
also to non-French thinkers who have heavily drawn upon the resources of
French thought. The mere fact that French intellectuals experienced the fall
of Marxism in a particularly intense way would not be enough to justify
my decision to concentrate so heavily on this French and French-inflected
discourse. After all, the intellectual crisis of Marxism has international
dimensions, which could embrace an enormous cast of characters ranging
from Jürgen Habermas to Barry Hindess, Paul Hirst, and Judith Butler, to
name just a few; moreover, a narrative of the crisis could encompass much
of the twentieth century, as Stuart Sim implies when he chooses to title a
chapter of his history of post-Marxism “Post-Marxism Before Post-Marxism:
Luxemburg to the Frankfurt School.”
What makes the French case so powerful and influential is the fact that
the collapse of Marxism coincided with a larger phenomenon of radical
skepticism. This has gone under various rubrics, none of them entirely satis-
fying: French theory, poststructuralism, deconstruction, postmodernism.
The general contours are too familiar to detain us here. The point is that
from the heyday of structuralism in the 1960s and on through the works
of Derrida, Lacan, Lyotard, Deleuze, Nancy, Lacoue-Labarthe, Kristeva,
and numerous others, French thinkers waged a highly influential attack on
the rational norms, transcendental grounds, and metanarratives that had
provided the foundations for modern philosophical discourse. Th is un-
relieved skepticism contributed significantly to the undermining of the
philosophical grounds of Marxism. The epistemological realism that had
6
INTRODUCTION
The mask or head straps are arranged in the same way as on the
latest M-2 mask, i.e., one elastic band is placed across the top of the
head and the other across the back; the two are joined by an elastic.
Below these two straps is an adjustable elastic neck band. The drum
is made of metal similar in shape to the German drum and fits in the
mouth-ring by means of a thread. It is made tight by a rubber ring as
in the German mask. The thread differs from that on the German
mask, making an interchange of canisters impossible. The canister
or drum includes a bottom screen, springs and wire screens between
the layers. It is closed by a perforated bottom. There are three
layers. On the top is a thin layer of absorbent cotton. Beneath this is
a central layer of charcoal, which is a little finer than the German
charcoal. The lower layer consists of soda-lime, mixed with charcoal
and zinc oxide and moistened with glycerine.
German Mask
The early type of German mask probably served as the model for
the French A. R. S. mask. The facepiece was made of rubber, which
was later replaced by leather because of the shortage of rubber. The
following is a good description of a typical German facepiece:
“The facepiece of the German mask was made of one piece of
leather, with seams at the chin and at the temples, giving it roughly
the shape of the face. The leather was treated with oil to make it soft
and pliable, also to render it impervious to gases. The dressed
surface was toward the inside of the mask. A circular steel plate, 3
inches in diameter, was set into the facepiece just opposite the
wearer’s nose and mouth, with a threaded socket into which the
drum containing the absorbents screwed. A rubber gasket
(synthetic?) held in place by a sort of pitch cement, secured a gas-
tight joint between the drum and the facepiece. There were no
valves, both inhaled and exhaled air passing through the canister.
The eyepieces were inserted by means of metal rims with leather
washers, and were in two parts: (a) a permanent exterior sheet of
transparent material (‘cellon’) resembling celluloid, and (b) an inner
removable disc which functioned as an anti-dimming device. This
latter appeared to be of ‘cellon’ coated on the side toward the eye
with gelatin, and was held in position by a ‘wheel’ stamped from thin
sheet metal, which screwed into the metal rim of the eyepiece from
the inside. The gelatin prevented dimming by absorbing the
moisture, but wrinkled and blistered and became opaque after a few
hours’ use, and could not be changed without removing the mask.
The edge of the facepiece all around was provided with a bearing
surface consisting of a welt of finely woven cloth about one inch wide
sewed to the leather. In some instances this welt was of leather of an
inferior grade. The edge of the facepiece was smoothed over by a
coat of flexible transparent gum, probably a synthetic compound.”
Fig. 50.—German Respirator.
Fig. 51.—The German Respirator
Absorbents.
American Mask
At the entrance of the United States into the war, three types of
masks were available: the PH helmet, the British S. B. R. and the
French M-2 masks. Experiments were made on all three of these
types, and it was soon found that the S. B. R. offered the greatest
possibilities, both as regards immediate protection and future
development. During the eighteen months which were devoted to
improvement of the American mask, the facepiece underwent a
gradual evolution and the canister passed through types A to L, with
many special modifications for experimental purposes. The latest
development consisted in an adaptation of the fighting mask to
industrial purposes. For this reason a rather detailed description of
the construction of the facepiece and of the canister of the respirator
in use at the close of the war (R. F. K. type) may not be out of place.
The mask now adopted as standard for the U. S. Army and Navy is
known as the Model 1919 American mask, with 1920 model carrier,
and will be described on page 225.
Fig. 53.—Diagrammatic Sketch of
Box Respirator Type Mask.
In order to protect the flutter valve from injury and from contact
with objects which might interfere with its proper functioning, the later
types of valve were provided with a guard of stamped sheet metal.
Canisters
During the development of the facepiece, as discussed above,
the American canister underwent changes in design which have
been designated as A to L. These changes were noted by the
different colored paints applied to the exterior of the canister.
Type A canister was exactly like the British model then in use,
except that it was made one inch longer because it was realized that
the early absorbents were of poor quality. The canister was made of
beaded tin plate and was 18 cm. high. The area of the flattened oval
section was 65 sq. cm. In the bottom was a fine wire dome 3.4 cm.
high. The valve in the bottom was integral with the bottom of the
container, there being no removable plug for the insertion of the
check valve. The absorbents were held in place by a heavy wire
screen on top and by two rectangular springs.
Inhaled air entered through the circular valve at the bottom of the
canister, passed through the absorbents and through a small nipple
at the top.
The filling consisted of 60 per cent by volume of wood charcoal,
developed by the National Carbon Co., and 40 per cent of green
soda lime, developed and manufactured by the General Chemical
Company, Easton, Pa. The entire volume amounted to 660 cc. The
early experiments with this volume of absorbent showed that ⅖
soda-lime was the minimum amount that could be used and still
furnish adequate protection against the then known war gases. It
was, therefore, decided to use ⅖ soda-lime and ⅗ charcoal by
volume and this proportion has been adhered to in all of the later
types of canisters. It is interesting to note that these figures have
been fully substantiated by the later experimental work on canister
filling.
The charcoal and soda-lime were not mixed but arranged in five
layers of equal volume, each layer, therefore, containing 20 per cent
of the total volume. The layers were separated by screens of
crinoline. At the top was inserted a layer of terry cloth, a layer of gray
flannel, and two steel wire screens. The cloth kept the fine particles
of chemicals from being drawn into the throat of the person wearing
the mask.
This canister furnished very good protection against chlorine and
hydrocyanic acid and was fairly efficient against phosgene, but it was
useless against chloropicrin. These canisters were never used at the
front, but served a very useful purpose as experimental canisters
and in training troops.
It was soon found that better protection was obtained if the
absorbents were mixed before packing in the canister. This
procedure also simplified the method of packing and was used in
canister B and following types. Among other changes introduced in
later types were: The integral valve was replaced by a removable
check valve plug which enabled the men in the field to adjust the
valve in case it did not function properly. The mixture of charcoal and
soda-lime was divided into three separate layers and these
separated by cotton pads. The pads offered protection against
stannic chloride smokes but not against smokes of the type of
sneezing gas. The green soda-lime was replaced by the pink
granules. In April, 1918, the mesh of the absorbent was changed to
8 to 14 in place of 6 to 14.
About July 1, 1918, the authorities were convinced by the field
forces of the Chemical Warfare Service that the length of life of the
chemical protection of the standard H canister (the type then in use)
was excessive and that the resistance was much too high. Type J