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INTRODUCTION

The WTO's 13th Ministerial Conference (MC13) took place from 26 th February,
2024 to 2nd March, 2024 in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. Ministers from
across the world attended to review the functioning of the multilateral trading
system and to take action on the future work of the WTO. The Conference was
chaired by H.E. Dr Thani bin Ahmed Al Zeyoudi, UAE's Minister of State for
Foreign Trade.
The opening session took place on Monday 26 February followed by a
ceremony to mark the accessions of Comoros and Timor-Leste and a ceremony
for the latest acceptances of the Fisheries Subsidies Agreement. On the same
day, two "ministerial conversations" were held on "Trade and Sustainable
Development, including Trade and Industrial Policy and Policy Space for
Industrial Development" and on "Trade and Inclusion".
A "scene-setting" Heads of Delegation meeting on 27 February included reports
by Geneva chairs. From 27 to 29 February, working sessions were held on
various topics followed by convergence-building sessions. A Heads of
Delegation meeting was held at the end of each day. On 29 February, it was
decided to extend the conference by one day, until 1 March, in order to facilitate
outcomes on the main issues at stake. The closing ceremony was held in the
early hours of 2 March.
FUNDAMENTAL AGENDA OF THE MEETING
The agenda included a forward-looking reform agenda, with ministers adopting
a Ministerial Declaration. Some of the key areas of focus included:
1) Special and differential treatment: Ensuring fair treatment for developing
and less developed nations
2) Equal voice: Ensuring representation and participation for all members
3) Dispute settlement mechanism: Maintaining an effective resolution
4) Plastics pollution: Outlining concrete action to tackle plastics pollution
5) Trade and environmental sustainability: Mapping a path to concrete
outcomes by MC14
6) Fossil fuel subsidy reform: Unveiling a plan to ramp up efforts
HELD IN THE MEETING
WTO members concluded the 13th Ministerial Conference (MC13) in Abu
Dhabi on 2 March with the adoption of a Ministerial Declaration setting out a
forward-looking, reform agenda for the organization. Ministers also took a
number of ministerial decisions, including renewing the commitment to have a
fully and well-functioning dispute settlement system by 2024 and to improve
use of the special and differential treatment (S&DT) provisions for developing
and least developed countries (LDCs). They also agreed to continue
negotiations in all areas where convergence was elusive at MC13.
The Ministerial Conference brought together nearly 4,000 ministers, senior
trade officials and other delegates from the WTO's 164 members and observers
as well as representatives from civil society, business and the global media.
Members adopted the Abu Dhabi Ministerial Declaration, where they
committed to preserve and strengthen the ability of the multilateral trading
system, with the WTO at its core, to respond to current trade challenges.
The Ministerial Declaration underlines the centrality of the development
dimension in the work of the WTO, recognizing the role that the multilateral
trading system can play in contributing towards the achievement of the UN
2030 Agenda and its Sustainable Development Goals. It also recognized the
contribution of women's economic empowerment and women's participation in
trade to economic growth and sustainable development.
On dispute settlement reform, members adopted a Ministerial Decision
recognizing the progress made with the view to having a fully and well-
functioning dispute settlement system accessible to all members by 2024.
Ministers instructed officials to accelerate discussions, build on the progress
already made, and work on unresolved issues. WTO Director-General Ngozi
Okonjo-Iweala stressed the progress made with contributions from members.
On electronic commerce, ministers adopted a Ministerial Decision instructing
the General Council to hold periodic reviews on the E-commerce Work
Programme with a view to presenting recommendations for action to the
Ministerial Conference. Members also agreed to maintain the current practice of
not imposing customs duties on electronic transmissions until the 14th Session
of the Ministerial Conference (MC14) or 31 March 2026, whichever is earlier.
The moratorium and the Work Programme will expire on that date. Ministers
also adopted a Ministerial Decision to extend the moratorium on non-violation
and situation complaints regarding the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) until MC14.
Momentum behind the Fisheries Subsidies Agreement continued to pick up
pace, with South Africa presenting its instrument of acceptance to DG Okonjo-
Iweala just before the closing of the Conference.
Earlier in the conference, ten WTO members — Brunei Darussalam, Chad,
Malaysia, Norway, the Philippines, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Togo,
and Türkiye — deposited their instruments of acceptance of the Fisheries
Agreement, bringing the total number of WTO members to have formally
accepted the Agreement to 71 and putting the historic agreement for ocean
sustainability on track for entry into force at a record pace.
On agriculture, despite the intense negotiations during MC13, members were
not able to find convergence. Divergences remained on public stockholding
(PSH) for food security purposes and in respect of timelines, expected outcomes
and the scope of the flexibility to be provided to food imports by the most
vulnerable countries from export restrictions.

Other issues
MC13 also saw the entry into force of new disciplines on services domestic
regulation, which is expected to lower trade costs by over USD 125 billion
worldwide. Supported by 72 WTO members, this joint initiative is designed to
facilitate services trade by streamlining and simplifying regulatory procedures.
It includes the first-ever commitment in a WTO agreement to ensuring non-
discrimination between men and women when they seek permits to supply
services.
Ministers adopted a Ministerial Declaration on strengthening regulatory
cooperation to reduce technical barriers to trade (TBT). The Declaration affirms
that cooperation assists members in meeting cross border and global challenges,
and builds confidence between trading partners through mutual understanding
and dialogue. This contributes to the development of effective and efficient
technical regulations and avoiding regulatory differences and unnecessary
divergence.
AGREEMENTS AND DISAGREEMENTS
Success at last week’s Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization
was always going to be a long shot. The unfortunate alignment of the political
stars virtually assured the meeting in Abu Dhabi would end badly.
Looming elections in India, the United States, and Mexico, plus a newly
installed administration in Indonesia, severely restricted the room for maneuver
and crushed any inclination to compromise.
Where the negotiating efforts fell short of agreement – in agriculture, fisheries
subsidies, and reform of the organization’s crippled dispute settlement system –
the outcome was almost preordained. India was not going to risk blowback from
its farmers or fishers and the US was not going to yield on a newly minted
Appellate Body.
In her concluding press conference, WTO Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-
Iweala referenced the many strong headwinds confronting MC13 including the
wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, slumping demand in many economies,
and pending elections in more than 60 countries in 2024. She tried to put a
brave face on the results from the five-day meeting by suggesting what trade
ministers achieved was “pretty amazing” and that the glass was "three-quarters
full."
To be sure, there were some positive results, including the accessions of
Comoros and Timor Leste and the entry into force of the 2021 agreement on
Domestic Regulation in Services.
But on the major issues, WTO members came up empty.
1. No deal on agriculture
Agriculture talks ran asunder on India’s demand to make permanent a "peace
clause" agreed in 2013 which shields New Delhi from any legal ramifications
for breaching its limits on allowable farm subsidies used in its public
stockholding program. The building of food stocks is permissible under WTO
rules, but India purchases rice from farmers at inflated levels through its Market
Price Support system which leads to greater production. Many of India’s trading
partners believe the rice reserves, meant to build up domestic stocks, are later
exported.
During one small group meeting, Thailand’s ambassador to the WTO,
Pimchanok Vonkorpon Pitfield, alleged that 40% of rice held in the subsidized
Indian public stocks was being exported.
2. No deal on fisheries
Negotiations to expand on the 2022 agreement curtailing fisheries subsidies
likewise ran aground. The agreement struck at MC12 banned subsidies for
illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. This was an important achievement
but the subsidies most responsible for depleting fish stocks globally are those
that lead to overfishing and overcapacity. The goal at MC13 was to ban
subsidies for fishery-related shipbuilding, labor, and fuel, among other things.
Once again, India was front-and-center arguing that its fishers should be able to
receive unlimited subsidies if fishing in sovereign waters. Developed countries,
India proposed, would meanwhile ban all deepwater subsidies while developing
countries could continue such support for 25 years.
Pacific island nations argued that subsidies for deepwater fishing must be
banned, something the Chinese could not accept. About one-third of the world’s
fishing vessels are Chinese-owned and many of them fish waters throughout
Asia but also off the coast of Africa and Latin America. China also objected to
US demands that any vessels that use forced labor must register themselves as
such.
3. No deal on dispute settlement
Earlier efforts to reform the dispute settlement system had borne fruit in the
form of a document produced by former Guatemalan delegate Marco Molina.
Molina’s text, widely praised by delegates, proposed increased emphasis on
arbitration and mediation and stricter limits on the length of submissions.
Molina avoided in his text the fractious issue of the WTO’s Appellate Body,
which remains scuttled by a US embargo on bench appointments. But none of
this mattered when Molina was mysteriously fired by his own government
shortly before MC13 began.
Without Molina, it seems a tall order to bridge the vast differences separating
members on appellate reform.

Pyrrhic victory on e-commerce


Even the surprising decision to extend a moratorium on the application of
import duties on e-commerce transmissions rang hollow.
The hardline taken by India, South Africa, and Indonesia led many to suspect
that compromise was not on the cards. But India has a close relationship with
the MC13 host United Arab Emirates.
The pledge to keep digital trade duty-free will come to an end at the next
ministerial meeting or 31 March 2026, whichever comes first. Individual WTO
members may choose to roll the moratorium over or make it permanent, but as
an organization the duty-free commitment will be dropped. For the first time,
the WTO will open the door for tariff hikes and create the conditions for the
unprecedented application of duties on trade in services.
Plurilaterals make small gains
Plurilateral agreements are a way for smaller groups of WTO members to build
consensus as it gets increasingly harder for the full membership to move as one.
However, India and South Africa have long opposed plurilateral negotiations.
This hostility was made plain in Abu Dhabi when the two members blocked
proponents’ efforts to incorporate plurilaterally agreed text on Investment
Facilitation for Development into the WTO rulebook.
The plurilateral agreement on Domestic Regulation in Services met a better fate.
The legal structure of this agreement, which includes 71 participating members
and covers 92% of world trade in services, is based on individual members’
commitments to the others and is thus much more difficult to undermine. Aware
of the shaky legal foundation of their objections, India and South Africa
partially lifted their blockade on the agreement, allowing it to come into force.

CONCLUSION
So, six key takeaways in the aftermath of MC13:

 The WTO is not going anywhere. Prognosticators enjoy using phrases


like death knell when examining the WTO’s shortcomings but the
collapse of the organization and the system it oversees is not going to
happen. A foundation based on 75 years of rulemaking is too ingrained in
the trading practices of nations and businesses. If every country applied
different and variable tariffs on its trading partners, chaos would swiftly
ensue. The question about the WTO is not whether it will continue to
exist, but how relevant it will be.
 MC13 underscored that if members want to accomplish anything,
plurilateral negotiations are the only viable option. Some important
lessons were learned in Abu Dhabi about how results from these
negotiations might be implemented. This will have meaningful
ramifications particularly with respect to the 90-member negotiations on
electronic commerce. The plurilateral process is increasingly the WTO’s
only e-commerce game in town.
 When the new dispute settlement is reformed, it will have a very different
look. Many smaller, poorer members seek ways to access the complex
and costly process of dispute resolution. One way to do that would be
through incentives to use mediation and arbitration. It’s unclear how a
new Appellate Body would look but it’s inconceivable that there will be a
return to a powerful WTO "court." A pared-down and less heavy-handed
mechanism is inevitable.
 Economies still want to join the WTO. With the accessions of Comoros
and Timor-Leste, the WTO will have 166 members. There are 22
candidate countries still in the accession queue. None of the current
members have ever expressed a desire to leave. Whatever criticisms there
may be on the WTO, governments still believe there is value in
membership.
 Several major systemic issues were not really addressed at MC13,
including the use of national security exemptions. The dispute settlement
cases on the national security exception have strained the system to its
breaking point. Given the tense state of the world today, such cases are
unlikely to disappear. There are also unresolved questions over China’s
formal status in the WTO as a developing economy that is also the
world’s largest trading nation.
 Okonjo-Iweala’s future is uncertain. Her term expires at the end of
August 2025. The process of reappointing her or choosing her successor
will start in December. The US may not back her for a second term,
especially if Donald Trump wins. In Abu Dhabi, Okonjo-Iweala worked
around the clock and to the very end to broker deals. But her tactics
angered two powerful members, India and Brazil, and some delegates in
Geneva say they are weary of her work style.

INDIA’S ROLE IN THE MEETING


India will strongly oppose a China-led proposal for an investment facilitation
pact besides pressing for finding a permanent solution to public stock holding of
grains for food security and protection of the interests of fishermen at the
upcoming WTO ministerial meeting.

The Indian delegation is led by Commerce and Industry Minister Piyush Goyal.

The four-day 13th ministerial conference (MC13) will start on February 26 in


Abu Dhabi, the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Trade ministers of 164 member
countries of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) are meeting against the
backdrop of the uncertain global economic situation due to the Red Sea crisis,
the Ukraine-Russia war and the Israel-Hamas conflict.

Here are some of the key areas on India's agenda at the meeting:

Food security issues


Under the public stockholding (PSH) programme, the Government procures
crops like rice and wheat from farmers at a minimum support price (MSP), and
stores and distributes foodgrains to the poor.
India stresses the need for PSH for its large, vulnerable population and wants a
permanent solution from the MC13.
Food procurement, stockholding, and distribution are crucial to India's food
security strategy.
MSP is normally higher than the prevailing market rates and sells these at a low
price to ensure food security for over 800 million beneficiaries.
However, the WTO's Agreement on Agriculture limits the ability of a
government to purchase food at MSP.
Under global trade norms, a WTO member country's food subsidy bill should
not breach the limit of 10 per cent of the value of production based on the
reference price of 1986-88.
As part of the solution, India has asked for measures like amendments in the
formula to calculate the food subsidy cap.
However, developed nations are of the view that such programmes distort global
trade prices of food grains.
Joint Support Initiatives (JSIs) or plurilateral agreements
India opposes this move being pushed for certain nations.
E.g., India is strongly opposing the efforts of a group of countries led by China
to push a proposal on investment facilitation for development agreement at the
WTO.
India has maintained that this agenda falls outside the mandate of the global
trade body.
Agricultural reforms
India's stance is to protect farmer livelihoods and ensure equitable market
access.
However, developed nations are pushing to reduce domestic support and
increase market openness irrespective of the fact that they provide large
subsidies to their rich farmers.
WTO reforms
India supports fair reforms that take into account the needs of developing
countries.
This is in response to proposals from developed nations for easier negotiation
processes, moving away from unanimous decision-making, and adding non-
trade issues to the WTO without agreement from everyone.
India supports efforts to improve the working of the WTO but its key pillars to
be retained. These pillars are:
special and differential treatment for less developed and developing nations,
equal voice and
dispute settlement mechanism.
India also seeks a revamp of the Appellate Body to ensure fairness.
Fisheries subsidies
The members have already reached the first part of the agreement in 2022 under
which subsidies will be prohibited for illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU)
fishing.
Now they are negotiating to curb subsidies that contribute to overfishing and
overcapacity to promote sustainable fishing.
India champions a balanced approach on the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities.
India, being a low fisheries subsidizer, emphasizes that advanced fishing nations
have historically provided substantial subsidies and contributed to fish stock
depletion.
Hence, they should bear more responsibility based on the 'polluter pay
principle'.
India has proposed that:
developing countries be allowed to give subsidies to their poor fishermen to
catch fish till EEZs or up to 200 nautical miles from the shore;
rich countries engaged in fishing beyond this zone should stop providing any
kind of subsidies for the next 25 years.
Extension of customs duties moratorium on e-commerce trade
The ongoing moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions, in
place since 1998, is a contentious issue facing the WTO.
India, alongside several other developing nations, has historically called for the
termination of the moratorium.
India has specific demands at MC13 to achieve this goal.
Developed nations, however, are pushing for the permanent adoption of a duty-
free flow of digital transmission.
Barriers to trade
India would maintain its stand that issues like labour, and environment are non-
trade issues and they should not be discussed at the WTO.
It also emphasised that trade barriers like the EU's carbon tax and deforestation
regulation should not be erected under the guise of sustainable development.
As per India, there are different multilateral forums like in the United Nations
where these issues can be discussed.
Developed countries are also pushing to include women economic
empowerment issues in the WTO talks.

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