Hasan, Noorhaidi - Faith and Politics The Rise of The Laskar Jihad in The Era of Transition in Indonesia

Faith and Politics: The Rise of the Laskar Jihad in the Era of Transition in Indonesia
Author(s): Noorhaidi Hasan

Source: Indonesia, No. 73 (Apr., 2002), pp. 145-169
Published by: Southeast Asia Program Publications at Cornell University
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FAITHAND POLITICS: THE RISEOF
THE LASKARJIHADIN THE ERAOF
TRANSITIONIN INDONESIA'
NoorhaidiHasan
Introduction
The turnof the twenty-first centurywitnessedthe eruptionof Islam into the

politicallandscapeoftheIndonesiannation-state. Signsof thisreassertion of political
Islammightbe seenin a varietyof social movements thatutilizeIslamas a discursive
center,rangingfromtheestablishment ofIslamicpoliticalpartiesto mounting demands
the
for implementation of theIslamic Muslim
sharfa, jurisprudence. More dramatically,
theresurfacing of politicalIslam on the recentpoliticalscene of Indonesia,afterthe
outbreak of a multidimensional socio-politicaland economic crisis, has been
demonstratedby the emergenceof a numberof Muslim paramilitarygroups,
characterized by theirdistinctive appearance:wearingcertainuniforms and carrying
different kindsof weapons. Exploitingreligioussymbols,theybehave as if theyare
militarymenand haveconducteda varietyofradicalactionsin thepublicsphere.This
phenomenonundoubtedly spreadsa sortofprivatizedmilitancy and violence.
Amongsta dozen such Muslimparamilitarygroups,threemajor groups have
recentlycometo theforeand made headlinesby takingto thestreetsto demand the
implementation of the Islamicsharfa,conducting razziasat caf6s,discotheques,and
casinos,and, mostimportantly, sendingthousandsof militiatroopsto the Moluccan
islands.Thesethreemajoractivegroupsare theLaskar Jihad(the JihadParamilitary
Force),theLaskar PembelaIslam (the Paramilitary Forceof the Defenderof Islam),
' I am critical
ofthisarticleand gaveinvaluable,
toa numberofpeoplewhoreadtheearlierdrafts
grateful
comments, Martin
particularly van M.
Bruinessen, KhalidMasud, and JohanHendrik Meuleman.
Indonesia73 (April2002)

146 NoorhaidiHasan
and theLaskarMujahidinIndonesia(theIndonesianHoly WarriorParamilitary Force).

Theyhave complemented and facilitatedthe development of similarmilitantyouth
groupsorganizedby a numberof politicalparties,mass organizations, and the ruling
regime. Among these groups are the Pemuda Pancasila (Pancasila Youth),theBarisan
Pemuda Ka'bah (Ka'ba YouthSquad), the Satgas PDIP (Task Force of Indonesian
DemocraticParty-Struggle), the Banser Anshor (AnshorAssistance Unit for All
Purposes), the Pamswakarsa (Self-ServiceSecurityForce), the Pendekar Banten
(BantenWarriors), the Gerakan Pemuda Islam (MuslimYouthMovement),the Front
Hizbullah(God's ArmyFront),and the FrontPemuda Islam (The Frontof Muslim
Youth).
The sudden proliferation of these Muslim paramilitarygroups has certainly
attractedthenoticeof manyobserversat homeand abroad. Manyof themspeculate,
withoutanyattemptto givea criticalassessment,thatthisproliferation is due simply
to theattempts ofsomemilitary and civilianpersonalitiestomobilizecertaingroupsin
thesocietyfortheirown politicalcauses.Such speculationis certainly not sufficientto
explainthecomplexity of thisphenomenon, particularlysincereligionand politicsare
likelyinterwoven in it.It seems imperative, then,topresent analysisoftheseMuslim
an
paramilitarygroups in a broader framework, combininghistorical,theological,
sociological,and politicalapproaches.
Thispaperwillfocusprimarily on theLaskarJihad, themostambitiousand radical
manifestation of politicalIslamin Indonesiatoday. In thispaper, I shall explorethe
processofthecreationofthisparticularMuslimparamilitary groupand thebackdrop
ofits emergence in thecontextof themajorchangestakingplace in thesocio-political
and economicrealmsin Indonesiaafterthecrackdownfollowing themultidimensional
crisis.
The LaskarJihadand SimilarGroups

The Laskar Jihadmightbe consideredthe most exclusiveMuslimparamilitary
groupthatemergedafterthecollapseof theNew Orderregime. It consistsof around
ten thousandyoungmembers,militantswho preferto wear jalabiyya,long flowing
robes,and longbeards.This grouphas also beenthemostactivein sendingvoluntary
militiasto the Moluccan islands. It has emergedon the scene as an undoubtedly
militantIslamicgroup,overwhelming muchofthecountry through theonwardmarchof
itsmemberswillingtomartyr themselvesforthecauseofGod.
The LaskarJihadis a paramilitary divisionof theForumKomunikasiAhluSunnah
wal-Jama'ah (Communication ForumoftheFollowersoftheSunnaand theCommunity
oftheProphet),2 or,in short,FKAWJ,an organization whichis, in fact,not supported
2
Thedoctrine ofthisgroupis nottobe confused ahlal-sunna
withthedoctrine waal-jamaiadevelopedby
theNahdhatulUlama(NU),thebiggestorganization MuslimsinIndonesia.AmongNU
oftraditionalist
members, thedoctrine simplymeansSunniIslam,whichstrictlyfollowsoneofthefourorthodox schoolsof
Islamicjurisprudence; UlamadanIslamdi Indonesia:
see M. Ali Haidar,Nahdatul PendekatanFikihdalam
Politik
(Jakarta:GramediaPustakaUtama,1998),p. 316;see also Martinvan Bruinessen, NU: Tradisi,
Relasi-relasi
Kuasa, PencarianWacana Baru LKIS,
(Yogyakarta: 1994),p. 21. The NU leader,Hasyim
Muzadi,has questioned theuse ofthistermbytheLaskarJihadmembers, andhighlighted thattheNU's
doctrineahlal-sunna waal-jamd'ashouldnotbe confusedwiththatoftheLaskarJihad.

Faithand Politics:LaskarJihad 147
by mainstream IndonesianIslam.The FKAWJwas establishedby Ja'farUmar Thalib,

and officially
inaugurated at a tablighakbar,a mass religiousmeeting,in Solo, Central
Java,on February14, 1998. Even beforeits officialfoundation,the FKAWJwas
alreadyin existence.It had its beginningsin thedevelopment of the Jama'ahIhya al-
Sunnah(TheCommunity oftheRevivaloftheSunna),whichwas basicallyan exclusive
da'wa (propagationof Islam) movement, insistingon the correctimplementation of
Islamicsharr'a.Even thoughwe cannotdenysome parallelswiththe majorIslamist
movements in theMuslimworldduringthetwentieth century,particularly theMuslim
Brotherhoodand the Jama'at-iIslami,the Ihya al-Sunnahcommunity was more
influenced
significantly by Wahhabism,an officialschool of Saudi Arabia. Indeed,it
was part of theso-calledSalafisociety,adoptingthemostpuritanicalSaudi styleof
Islam.ThisSalafisocietybegantoproliferate inIndonesiainthebeginning ofthe 1990s,
after
particularly thereturn of younggraduates from Islamicuniversitiesin theMiddle
East.3
Wahhabismwas a majorrevivalist movement byMuhammadibn 'Abd al-
initiated
Wahhab (1703-1787), who drew inspirationfromthe teachingsof Ahmad ibn
Taymiyyah(1263-1328),a medievalscholarof Hanbalism,the strictestof the four
legalschoolsof SunniIslam. Assistedby a local prince,Muhammadibn Sa'ud, this
movementgained a considerablesuccess in the Arabian Peninsula. With their
puritanicalspirit,theWahhabisset out to fightagainstthesuperstitions prevalentin
Arabiansocietyand to attackthosewho claimedto be Muslimbut whose behavior
was, intheirview,un-Islamic. Theytooka hardlinein defining who could be regarded
that
as a believer,stating no deviation from thesharia was permitted,and theydrewa
firmdistinction betweentheworldof believersand that of unbelievers.4 By drawing
theirinspiration moresignificantly fromWahhabism,the Salafi societydistinguished
itselffromearlierIndonesianMuslimorganizationsby its strictadherenceto an
extremepuritanism, manifested in theirappearanceand in theenforcement of religious
observance.
The LaskarJihadbeganto catchthepubliceyewhentheyhelda tabligh akbarat the
Senayanmainstadiumin Jakartaat thebeginning of April 2000. Attendedby about
100,000participants, thistablighakbardecriedthe"disaster"thathad been afflicting
theMoluccanMuslims,who wereperceivedto be confronted by a genocidalthreat.
Seekingto counteractthe threat,Ja'farUmar Thalib, the leader of this group,
proclaimedthenecessityof raisingthebannerof jihad,which,forthisleader,means
armedholybattle.5Openly,he statedthedetermination of his membersto go to the
battlefieldin theMoluccanislands and to stand withthe MoluccanMuslimsfighting
againsttheirChristianenemies.Subsequently, he establisheda paramilitary training
camp in a
Bogor, region near Jakarta, to trainthousands of young men declaring
themselves preparedtoengageincombatin a numberoftroubledspotsin Indonesia.
thissociety tomention buta few,theIhyaal-Turath the

3 BesidestheIhyaal-Sunnah, includes, community,
Al-Sofwa, and the As-Sunna foundation,with branchesand schoolsscatteredall overIndonesia.
4 JohnObert Voll,Islam:Continuity andChangeintheModernWorld, 2nd edition(Syracuse:Syracuse
University Press,1994),pp. 53-56.
thetermjihildhasa spectrum
5In fact, ofmeanings,includingstruggleagainstone'sowninnermost selfish
tendencies;fora detailedexplication BruceB. Lawrence,Defenders
ofthisterm,see,forinstance, ofGod:
TheFundamentalist RevoltagainsttheModernAge(Columbia:University ofSouthCarolina,1989),p. 217.

148 NoorhaidiHasan
Afterthistablighakbar,theLaskarJihadmarchedto thepresidential palace. They

demandedthatthegovernment restoresocialorderand curbtheethno-religious conflict
in theMoluccas.Six representatives of theLaskarJihadmetPresidentAbdurrahman
Wahid. They were Ja'farUmar Thalib, Ayif Syafruddin,BrigadierGeneral(ret.)
RustamKastor,Ali Fauzi, Abu Bakar Wahid al-Banjari,and TasrifTuasikal. They
accused the presidentof favoring Christiansin the Moluccas and of havingled his
country into the set
trap by eithera West-cum-Zionist a
conspiracyor, alternatively,
communist plot,as indicatedby the escalation of theconflict
occurringin theislands.
The meetingcameto an abruptend afterWahidhad themthrownoutofhisoffice.6
Followingthe firstmassive demonstration, the Laskar Jihad decided to do
something concrete and senttheirfirst an
mission, investigation team,to theMoluccas.
This teamwas chargedwitha special duty,namelyto surveyand carefully map the
areas of conflictand the latestpositionof Muslimsin the islands. Even thoughthe
political and militaryleaders in Jakartaforcedthemto cancel this mission,the
membersof theteam eventuallysucceededin landingin Ambon.At the port of the
island,one memberofthismissionrecounted, theywereenthusiastically welcomedby
some military men,who greetedthemby saying,"Welcometo thejihad battlefield,"
and theywere immediately providedwitha numberof standardmilitary weapons,
including AK-47s and SS-14s.7The successof thismissionapparentlyconvincedthe
LaskarJihadthattheirstruggle to rescuetheirMuslimbrothers in theMoluccasshould
be continued.Firedby jihad fervor, waves of Laskar Jihadfighters have leftforthe
Moluccanislands.
WhiletheLaskar Jihadwas verymuchconcernedwithwhat theycalled thejihdd
action in the Moluccas, the Laskar PembelaIslam preferred to focus on sweeping
actionsagainstcaf6s,discotheques, casinos,and othervenuestheyaccused of being
densofiniquity.Despitetheirsimilarities, fromtheformer,
thelattergroupis different
particularly in terms of their and
origins institutional The
profiles. Laskar Pembela
Islamis, to a largeextent,not foundedon as firman ideologicaland organizational
basis as theLaskarJihad.It is theparamilitarydivisionoftheFrontPembelaIslam (the
Frontof the Defendersof Islam,FPI), whichis oftenassociated with a numberof
military and civilianpersonalitieswho are not ashamedto mobilizepreman, gangsters,
and otherviolence-prone groupsin orderto maintaintheirpoliticalinterests.This
groupis led byHabibRizieqShihab(b. 1965), a youngArab froma familyof sayyids,
descendantsoftheProphet.HabibRizieqShihabstudiedat KingMuhammadibnSaud
Universityin Riyad under the sponsorshipof the Organizationof the Islamic
Conference(OIC), a forumforpoliticaland economiccooperationbetweenMuslim
countriesestablishedin 1962.8 A numberof otherleadingfiguresamongthe sayyid
familiesarealso involvedintheleadershipoftheFrontPembelaIslam,including Habib
6 Thiseventwas reported "EnamWakilLaskarJihadBertemu
byvariousmassmedia.See,forinstance,
Presiden,"Kompas,April7,2000.
7Interviewwitha member oftheteam,CempakaPutihTengah, December
Jakarta, 2000.
8 derIslamischen
See Hasan Moinuddin,Die Organisation Konferenz und
als ForumPolitischer
(Bochum:Brockmeyer,
Kooperation
Wirtschaftlicher 1984),pp. 170-176.

Huseinal-Habsyi(b. 1955), the leader of the IndonesianMuslimBrotherhood,9 who

servedtenyearsofa twenty-year prisonsentenceforhis activitiesassociated withthe
bombingoftheBorobudurstupain 1985.
The LaskarPembelaIslamfirstmade its presencefeltin a massivedemonstration
on August 17, 1998, whereit publiclychallengedthe different elementsthat had
opposed J.B. Habibie as the presidentto succeed Suharto. This groupemergedat a
timewhenthe Pamswakarsa,the FrontHizbullah,and the GerakanPemuda Islam
begantobe morevocalintheirsupportforHabibie.Thesegroupswereinitiallyformed
bySuharto'ssupporters in responsetothegrowingoppositionto theformer president.
Aftertheirinitialappearance,theLaskar PembelaIslamheld earnestdemonstrations
to voicea varietyofdemandsrelatedto Islam,repeating thesloganal-amrbi al-ma'`rif
wa al-nahy'an al-munkar (enjoininggood and forbidding evil). On one occasion,the
membersof the Laskar Pembela Islam attackedthe Komisi Nasional Hak Azazi
Manusia(NationalCommissionofHumanRights, KOMNAS-HAM),condemning them
foractingunfairly towardsMuslims. At thattime, the commission was occupiedwith
an investigation concerning thepast actionsof certainarmygenerals,particularly the
then-minister ofdefense,Wiranto, who was suspectedofhavingviolatedhumanrights
duringmilitary operations in EastTimor.'o
Similarly,thousandsof membersof the Laskar Pembela Islam marchedto the
headquartersof the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR, People's Consultative
Assembly)duringits session in August2000, demandingthat the MPR enforcethe
JakartaCharter, onceintendedtobe thepreambletotheconstitution. In thisdocument,
a statement "withtheobligationto carryout theIslamicsharia forits adherents"was
added to the firstprinciple(Beliefin God) of thePancasila,theideologyof thestate,
whichwouldhavegivenconstitutional statusto thesharra.It is worthnotingthatthe
debate on the JakartaChartercan be tracedback to the 1950s, when the Majelis
Konstituante (Constituent Assembly)consideredthe proposal of Muslimparties to
establish Islam as the foundation of the state in place of the Pancasila; the debate
continueduntilthedissolutionof the Majelis Konstituante in 1959." For the Laskar
Pembela Islam, the implementation of the JakartaCharterwould lead to the
revitalizationofthesupremacyoftheshari'a.
The revitalizationof supremacyof the Islamicsharra also constitutesthe main
themevoicedbythemembersoftheLaskarMujahidinIndonesia.This groupis a loose
alliance of a numberof minorMuslimparamilitarygroups and Muslim hard-line
organizationsscatteredacross various cities in Indonesia,where the Darul Islam
rebellionshad theirroots.Includedin theLaskar MujahidinIndonesiaare,to mention
but a feworganizations, the Laskar Santri(MuslimStudentParamilitary Force),the
LaskarJundullah (God's ArmyParamilitary Force),theKompiBadr (Badr Company),
the Brigade Taliban (Taliban Brigade), and the Pasukan Komando Mujahidin
(MujahidinCommandForce).
9 Theestablishment allegedlyan Indonesianbranchoftheoriginally

ofthisorganization, Egyptian
movement
religious-political ofthisname,was madepublicon October17,1999,thoughithad existedas an
underground movement
political forseveralyears.
10See "Habibdi PanggungPolitik," Gatra08/VI(January
8,2000).
" See B. Boland,
J. The of
Struggle Islamin ModernIndonesia 1971).
(TheHague: Nijhoff,

150 Noorhaidi
Hasan
Organizationally, the Laskar MujahidinIndonesiais underthe umbrellaof the

Majelis MujahidinIndonesia(IndonesianHoly WarriorAssembly),establishedas the
resultof the so-called "firstnationalcongressof mujahidin,"whichtook place in
Yogyakartain 2000. This congress,indirectly supportedby a numberof Islamic
and
organizations politicalparties from the modernist end of thespectrum, discussed
one centraltheme:theenforcement of the sharfaas absolutelynecessaryto curbthe
variousproblemsand disastersafflicting contemporary Indonesia.Withinthe context
oftheimplementation ofthesharfa,thenotionsofkhildfa Islamiyya(Islamiccaliphate),
imama (imamate), and jihad(holywar) were also discussed.'2
The congressopened on August 5, 2000 and ended on August 7 with the
establishment of theMajelisMujahidinIndonesiaby theparticipants.It seems to me
that this date was not accidental.On the same date fifty-one years earlier,S. M.
Kartosuwirjoproclaimed the Negara Islam Indonesia (Islamic State of Indonesia),
an
pursuing independent Islamicstate within Indonesia.'3This so-called Darul Islam
rebellioninspiredtheclandestineNegaraIslamIndonesia(NII) movement, whichfirst
manifesteditselfin 1978 when a group using the name Usrah,literallymeaning
"family,"was formedin Bandung.The movement spread intovariouscities;in the
process, it was oftenidentifiedby differentnames,suchas theJama'ahIslamiyahin
Solo,theGenerasi554inJakarta, and theNII Cirebonin Cirebon.'4
A numberofleadingpersonalities, includingDeliarNoer,MochtarNaim,Mawardi
Noor,Ali Yafie,Alawi Muhammad,AhmadSyahirulAlim,and A. M. Saefuddin,some
ofwhomarealso former members ofMasyumi,wereappointedas members of theso-
called ahl al-hall wa al-'aqd-literally"those who have the power to bind and
unbind"-a kind of supremebody in the organization whichresemblesan advisory
council.'"Thisbodyis led byAbu BakarBa'ashir,theleaderof theNgrukiPesantren, a
conservative Islamicboardingschoolin Solo, who was arrestedin November1978 for
his responsibilityforallegedlyleadingtheJama'ahIslamiyah.Givinga speechat "the
firstnationalcongressof mujahidin," he proclaimedthatthe applicationof Islamic
sharrawas absolutelyessential,and arguedthatits rejectionmustbe counteredby
jihad.'6The congressitselfwas initiatedby IrfanS. Awwas, now the chairmanof the
executivecommittee (lajnatanfidhiyya) of
of theassembly.He was the editor-in-chief
thebannedmagazineArrisalah in Yogyakarta, and servednineyearsof a thirteen-year
prison sentencefor his activitiesassociated with the Negara Islam Indonesia
movement.
"2IrfanS. Awwas,ed.,RisalahKongres Mujahidin I danPenegakan Syari'ahIslam(Yogyakarta: Wihdah

Press,2001).
"3 See C. van Dijk,Rebellion
undertheBanner ofIslam:theDarulIslaminIndonesia (TheHague: Nijhoff,
1981),p. 1.
"' See JuneChandraSantosa,Modernization, Utopia,andtheRiseofIslamicRadicalismin Indonesia
(PhD
dissertation,BostonUniversity, 1996),appendix3.
15
Theconceptofahlal-hallwa al-'aqdis closelyrelatedtotheconceptshura(consultation),whichis,in
modemIslamistliterature, as
usuallyinterpreted thebasicelementof democracy. Theconcept deniesthe
legitimacy ofauthoritarianruleand makesthecommunity thesourceofexecutive power.See,forinstance,
AhmadS. Moussalli,Moderate andRadicalIslamicFundamentalism: TheQuestforModernity, Legitimacy,
and theIslamicState(Gainesville:UniversityPressofFlorida,1999),p. 121.
16 Awwas,RisalahKongres Mujahidin,p. 139.

The emergenceof these Muslim paramilitarycivilian groups leads to some

fundamental in relationto the processof how theycame into
questions,particularly
existence.In orderto deal withthisissue, I will focus on the Laskar Jihadin my
analysis. It is a good example of a group that has arisen as a consequenceof
interrelated developmentsat both the domestic and the internationallevels. In
addition,thisgroupbestexemplifies thecombination ofdifferent bothreligious
factors,
and political,in forging
itsactivismand militancy.
BiographicalSketchof theLeader of theLaskarJihad

The establishment and growthof theLaskarJihadhas beendetermined to a great
extentby theroleof theircharismatic and millenarianleader,Ja'farUmar Thalib.A
centralfigureamongthe Laskar Jihadvoluntary fighters,he was active not only in
settingup this Muslimparamilitary group,but also in definingits directionand
activism.He was bornintoan Arab familyin Malang,East Java,on December29,
1961. His fatherwas active in the al-Irshadmovement,a reformist organization
establishedin 1913byArabslivingin theNetherlands East Indies,who wereinvolved
in a conflictwiththe sayyidcommunity. Togetherwiththe Muhammadiyah and the
PersatuanIslam (IslamicLeague),'7the al-Irshad,underthe leadershipof Ahmad
Soorkatti(1872-1943),stroveto purifyIndonesianMuslimsof the so-called tahayyul
bid'a(innovations),
(superstitions), (deviations)in theirreligiousbelief.18
and khurafa
Ja'farUmarThalibcompletedhisearlyeducationat hisnativetown,Malang.After
havingfinished secondaryschoolat theIslamicTeacherTraining Schoolof Malang,he
continuedhisstudiesat a pesantrenofthePersatuanIslamin Bangil,EastJava,in 1981.
Disappointed with the pesantren, wentto Jakartato continuehis studies at the
he
Institutefor Islamic and Arabic Studies (LIPIA), an instituteof higherlearning
sponsoredby the Saudi Arabiangovernment. Whileat the LIPIA, he was not only
activein learningArabic,but also becamea leaderof thestudentorganizationof the
al-Irshad,whichstrongly opposedthePancasila.
Ja'farUmarThalibstudiedat theLIPIA foronlythreeyears,butin 1986he had the
opportunity to continuehis studyat theMaududi IslamicInstitute in Pakistan.In the
mid-1980s,many Indonesian studentswere giventhe opportunity to studyin Saudi
Arabia and Pakistanunderthe sponsorshipof Dewan Dakwah IslamiyahIndonesia
(IslamicPropagationCouncilof Indonesia,DDII). Thisprojectwas consideredcrucial
because it trainedbelieverswho were prepared to conduct da'wa activitiesin
oppositionto Christianmissionaries. The Dewan Dakwah IslamiyahIndonesia was
establishedin 1967 by MuhammadNatsir(d. 1993), the former leader of Masyumi,
who was obsessed with the idea that Islam was under siege primarilybecause of the
expansionofChristian
missionary a personalrelationof its leader,
Through
projects.'9
7TheMuhammadiyah was foundedbyAhmadDahlan(1869-1923) inYogyakarta in 1912,whilethe
PersatuanIslam,knownas thePersis,was foundedbyAhmadHassan(1887-1958) inBandungin 1920.
1"
DeliarNoer,TheModernist MuslimMovement 1900-1942(Singapore:OxfordUniversity
in Indonesia:
Press,1973),pp. 63-85.
One FormofIslamicPoliticalThoughtand Action
'9 See R. WilliamLiddle,"MediaDakwahScripturalism:
in New OrderIndonesia,"in Towards a NewParadigm:RecentDevelopments in IndonesianIslamicThought,
ed. MarkR. Woodward(Arizona:ArizonaStateUniversity Press,1996),pp. 328-329.

152 Noorhaidi
Hasan
the Dewan Dakwah IslamiyahIndonesiahas becomeassociated withthe Rabitatal-

Alam al-Islami(MuslimWorldLeague),functioning as its representativein Indonesia
since 1973.20The Rabitawas one of theprincipalorganizations used by Saudi Arabia
in spreadingSalafi-Wahhabipropaganda.21 The developmentof Salafi-Wahhabi
propaganda,whichurgedfollowersto avoid issues of politicalpower,began as an
attemptby Saudi Arabia to protectits geo-strategic position,particularly againstthe
challenges raised by secularArabnationalism, which was being fueled by such leaders
as Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt.Thispropagandawas extendedand intensified in
the1980saftertheoutbreakoftheIranianrevolution, whichcontestedthelegitimacy of
thekingdom.'Withinthiscontext, theRabitahas played a centralpart in distributing
Saudi monies,whichfundthe proliferation of the SunniSalafi-Wahhabinetworks
throughout the Muslim worldand in Westerncountries as well.23
Beforegoingback to his countryof origin,in 1987 Ja'farUmar Thalib had the
opportunity to visitAfghanistan,
wheremujtihidin werewagingwar againsttheSoviet
the
Union.During war, the Rabita, cooperationwiththe MuslimBrotherhood
in and
otherArab Islamistorganizations, played a crucialrole in sendingyoungmujdhidin
volunteers fromtheMiddleEasttoengagein combatside-by-side withAfghanfighters.
The policy of the Rabita, the Muslim Brotherhood,and other Arab Islamist
organizations was implemented by thePakistaniJama'at-i theirprincipallocal
Islami,24
counterpart, whichcreatedcamps formilitarytraining, wherethe youngmuja-hidin
volunteers trainedbeforebeingsenttothefront.'
Therewerea numberof factionswithintheAfghanmuja-hidin thatwereknownto
have receivednot only Saudi Arabian financialaid, but were also providedwith
voluntaryfighters.26 They were, for instance,the Ittihad-iIslami Bara-i Azadi-yi
Afghanistan, led by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf,the Jami'at-iIslami,led by Burhanuddin
Rabbani,and the Hizb-i Islami,led by GulbudinHekmatyar.Ja'farUmar Thalib
joinedone ofthesefactions.Subsequently,
initially however,he supportedtheJama'at
al-Da'wa ila al-Qur'an wa Ahl-i Hadith,27a strict Salafi faction and Saudi
"principality" led by Jamilal-Rahman,who applied the doctrineof takfir, requiring
Muslims to excommunicate any sovereign considered apostate, and to resort to
20 On thelinkbetweentheDewanDakwahIslamiyah IndonesiaandtheRabita,see Reinhard Schulze,

Islamischer Internationalismus Im20 Jahrhundert (Leiden:E. J.Brill,1990),p. 260.
21 See Barnett R. Rubin,"ArabIslamistsin Afghanistan," in PoliticalIslam:Revolution,
Radicalism,or
Reform?, ed. John L. Esposito(Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997),p. 185.
22 See OliverRoy,
TheFailureofPolitical Islam,trans.CarolVolk(Harvard:HarvardUniversity Press,
1996),pp. 112-117; see also Shireen T. Hunter, The Future of Islamand theWest: Clashof or
Civilizations
Peaceful Coexistence? (Westport: The Center for Strategicand International Studies,1998),pp. 155 ff.
23
An exampleis theRevivalofIslamicDa'wa society, whichis headquartered inToronto, Canada.See the
homepage of this at This
group http://www.troid.org.society was mentioned the
by spokesman ofthe
FKAWJ, whenI askedhimaboutthekitabs (guidebooks) and 'ulamas (guidelines)commonly toby
referred
theFKAWJ members.
24 On
thispoliticalorganization, see SeyyedVali Reza Nasr,TheVanguard oftheIslamicRevolution
(London:I. B. Tauris,1994).
25 Rubin, "ArabIslamistsinAfghanistan," pp. 184-186.
21 On theflowofSaudi armsandmoney toAfghanistan, see alsoAhmedRashid,Taliban, Islam,Oilandthe
NewGreatGameinCentral Asia(London:I. B. Tauris,2000),p. 85.
27 See "ProfilJa'farUmarThalib:PeloporJihadke Ambon,"Forum Keadilan,No. 7 (May20,2001),p. 37.

violence,shoulditbe necessary.28 This factionhad special relationswiththePakistani

Ahl-i Hadith, a reformist movementfoundedin the Indian sub-continent in the
nineteenth century. This movement was inspiredby theteachingsof Shah Wali Allah
al-Dihlawi(1702-1762).Overthecourseof history, thismovement transformed itself
intoa politicalparty,enjoyingdirectsupportfromSaudi Arabia (in collaboration with
in
theUnitedStates) itsattempts to supportAfghanmuj-hidn'. For the same reason,a
Salafi Ahl-iHadith-basedmilitant armedIslamicgroup,Da'wa al-Irshador Lashkar
Tayyiba, was even establishedin 1987 in Pakistan.This groupinculcatedthespiritof
jihadand providedmilitary for
training potentialmuj-hidin.29
In 1989, Ja'farUmar Thalib landed in Jakarta.Back in Indonesia,he was
immediately involvedin teachingactivitiesin a pesantren of the al-Irshadin Salatiga,
CentralJava.In 1991,he wentto Yemenin orderto widenhis insightinto Wahhabiya
teachingswitha Yemeniteacher,MuqbilibnHadi al-Wadi'i,knownforhis linkswith
theconservative IslamistIslahpartyand theSaudi-fundedSalafi-Wahhabi movement
in Yementoday.30Duringthehajjmonths, he repeatedlywentto Mecca and Medina to
perform thehajj.Whileperforming thehajj,Ja'farUmarThalibsoughtoutand attended
religiouslecturesheld by a numberof prominentSaudi Salafi-Wahhabiteachers,
includingMuhammadNasral-Dinal-Albani(d. 1999) and 'Abd al-'Aziz 'Abd Allah
bin Baz (1912-1999).Bornin Albania,Nasr al-Dinal-Albanihad lived and studiedfor
a longtimein Damascus beforemovingto Saudi Arabia,wherehe became a well-
knownscholarof the prophetictradition.He wrotesome workson the validityof
hadiths,includingSilsilaal-Ahaddth al-Sahiha(The valid genealogyof the hadiths).
Expertise in hadith linked Nasr al-Din al-Albanito 'Abd Allah bin Baz, who was
knownas theofficial grandmufti of Saudi Arabia.'Abd Allah bin Baz had enjoyeda
remarkable careeras a university teacherand a judgebeforehe becamea grandmufti.
His fatwdsare collectedin his greatestbook,Majmfi'al-Fatdwd(The compilationof
fatwas).Some otherSaudi Salafi-Wahhabiteacherswerealso visitedby Ja'farUmar
Thalib,particularly Rabi' ibnHadi 'Umar al-Madkhali,a hadithlecturer at theIslamic
University of Medina, who has written a number of works,including Manhajal-Anbiyd
fial-Da'wa ila Allah (The method of the in
prophets calling towards Allah). Thisbook
containsguidelinesforthepracticeofthe Wahhabi da'wa.31
Ja'farUmarThalibreturned to Indonesiain 1993,choosingto livein Yogyakarta.In
thiscity,he beganto makehis voiceheardby givingreligiouslecturesand sermonsat
theMuslimstudents'discussiongroups,knownas the kelompok pengajianor halaqah
studycircles),
(literally, around university campuses Yogyakarta.As a figurewho
in
28 Roy, The FailureofPoliticalIslam,p. 36.

29 For further
information about the Lashkar Tayyiba,see Saeed Shafqat,"Religious Groups: Rise of
Dawat-ul-Irshad/Lashkar-e-Tayyabaand the Problemof DemocraticFrameworkin Pakistan,"
unpublishedpaper presentedin theseminarorganizedby PakistanStudyGroups,Paris on December 13,
1999.
30
Look throughhttp://www.al-bab.com,fordifferent subjectsand articles.His name is also writtenas
SheikhMuqbil al-Wada'i. As forthe connectionbetweenYemeni Salafi and al-Islah,see Eric Watkins,
"Islamismand Tribalismin Yemen," in IslamicFundamentalism, ed. Abdel Salam Sidahmed and
Anoushiravan Ehtshami(Colorado & Oxford: Westview Press,1996),pp. 215-225;see also Paul Dresch
and BernardHaykel, "Stereotypesand PoliticalStyles:Islamistsand Tribesfolkin Yemen," The
International ofMiddleEast Studies27 (1995):405-431.
Journal
31 Various interviewswiththe Laskar Jihadmembers,Yogyakartaand Jakarta,September-November2000.

154 Noorhaidi
Hasan
had mastereda wide rangeof religiousknowledge,Ja'farUmar Thalib quickly

numerousfollowers
attracted amongtheparticipants.In 1994,he decided to establish
a pesantren called"Jama'ahIhyaal-Sunnah"at Kaliurang,Yogyakarta.
and community
The Manhaj Salafi: Doctrineand Ideologyof theIhya al-Sunnah

As impliedby its name,theIhyaal-Sunnahplaced emphasison therevitalization
ofIslamin all aspectsoflifethrough thepracticeofreturning to themodelof theSalaf
the
al-Salih, pious Muslims of the firstgeneration. backdropof this call was its
The
claim that Muslims, induced by varietyof temptations
a offered by thecontemporary
secular,Westernworld,have neglectedtrueIslamas taughtby theSalaf al-Salih.This
abandonment, accordingto theIhyaal-Sunnah,has brought aboutthecollapse of the
glory of Islam.The Ihyaal-Sunnahcommunity was convinced thatonlyby a return to
thedoctrineoftheSalafal- Salihwould Muslims be able to steer away from deviations
in theirpractice of the faith,and this would lead Muslimsto regaintheirlost
triumphs.32 Referred tobytheIhyaal-Sunnahas either"ManhajSalafi" (The systemof
thepious ancestors)or "ManhajAhl al-Hadith"(The systemof the followersof the
Prophet'straditions), thisdoctrineundoubtedly represents thesearchforauthenticity,
whichimpliespuritanical ideals,betterknownin Islamas Salafism.
As I have indicatedbefore,unlikeearlierMuslimmodernistorganizationsin
Indonesia,whichweremoresignificantly influenced by Muhammad'Abduh (1849-
1905) and Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865-1935), two premier Muslimreformists, the
was
Ihyaal-Sunnah squarely within the puritanicalSalafi-Wahhabi This
tradition. can
be seen, for instance,in the fact that amongthe membersof the Ihya al-Sunnah
community, thecanonicalbooks written by Muhammadibn'Abd al-Wahhab,Ahmad
IbnTaymiyyah, and MuhammadAbu BakribnQayyim,thediscipleofIbnTaymiyyah,
werewidelyreadas guidelinestounderstanding and defining Islam.In theirbooks,the
Qur'an and the Sunna are givenparticularemphasisas the basis for the Wahhabi
definition oftrueIslam.
Trueto theiradvocacyoftheespousalof thereturn to thedoctrineof theSalaf al-
Salih accordingto theSaudi Wahhabimodel,theIhyaal-Sunnahcommunity avoided
discussingpolitics,or, more precisely, engaging of
questions politicalpower. Instead,
theyconcentrated on re-Islamizing society at a grassrootslevel by insistingon the
correct implementation ofthesharfabyindividuals, particularly through preachingand
the establishment of Islamized spaces. Withinthis context,the Ihya al-Sunnah
memberspersistentlyencouragedpeople to go to mosques to performprayers
collectivelyfive times a day and persuaded them to join the Ihya al-Sunnah
community.In addition to that, the Ihya al-Sunnah members have attempted to
develop an exclusive patternofperformance, clothing,and social relations,which they
claimed were modeled on patternsfollowedby Salaf al-Salih. They have preferred,for
instance, to adopt traditional clothing--a long white shirt,baggy trousers gathered
See editorialnotesofthefirst
32 publishedbytheIhyaal-Sunnah(Salafy1,
editionofthejournalSalafy,
1995),p. 1.

above the ankle,and headgear-and allowed theirbeards to growlong.33 Theyalso

rejectedall distractions:
music,theater, of
and places pleasure and such
entertainment,
as caf6s, discotheques,and dance clubs.4 Perfume,the cinema, television,and
photographs wereevenconsideredanathemato Muslims.35 Femalemembers worelong
blackdressesand coveredtheirfaceswithveils.Theyweresecludedfromthemenand
wereonlyallowed to have contactwithmalesin thepresenceof theirhusbandsor of
mahrims, thecloserelativeswhomtheyare not allowed to marry.In short,theirsocial
interactionswerehighlyrestricted.36
TheIhyaal-SunnahbelievedthatifeveryMuslimconsistently followedthedoctrine
oftheSalafal-Salihin his orherdailylife,societywould automatically becomeIslamic.
in
This, turn, would change theface of the When
state.37 thathappened,fortheIhyaal-
Sunnah,therewould no longerbe any need to establishan Islamicstate. Given its
attitude,it was not surprising thatthe Ihya al-Sunnahdid not see eye-to-eyewith
movements that soughtto turnIndonesiaintoan officialIslamicstate, such as the
NegaraIslamIndonesia.Ja'farUmarThalibalso criticizedthedoctrineof the Muslim
Brotherhood, whichadvocated the revivalof the Islamiccaliphate,khildfa Islamiyya.
Umar
Ja'far Thalib believedthat such a goal would concentrate all Muslim minds and
on
energies politicalinterests, and he contended thatthisprinciplehad already caused
bloodyconflicts amongMuslims.38
As faras theIhyaal-Sunnahcommunity is concerned,the implementation of the
sharraby individuals,as describedabove, was thus much more important than the
establishmentof an Islamic state. Such a tendencyis called by Olivier Roy
"neofundamentalism," a movement thatbeganto spreadacrossthepoliticallandscape
of the Muslimworldin the mid-1980s.Its proliferation was caused partlyby the
failureofrevolutionary Islamism,a modernIslamicpoliticalmovement whichclaimsto
re-createa trueMuslimsociety, notmerelybytheapplicationofthesharfa,but also by
creatinga new Islamicorder through revolutionary and militantpoliticalactions.39
The Halaqahs: Site of Recruitmentof theIhya al-SunnahCadres

The primerecruits targetedby the Ihya al-Sunnahda'wa movementwere initially
in
participants the halaqahs,whichhave spread widelysince the 1980s throughout
thebeardis considered wicked,sincesuchan actbringsMuslimsintoinvidiouscomparison with
33Cutting
infidels.See AbuNu'aimM. FaisalJamilal-Madani,"Jenggot dalamPandanganIslam,"Salafy7 (1996):35-
37.
34Musicand movies,forinstance, wereconsidered heretical entertainmentsthatshouldbe avoided;see
"Jebakan-jebakan Iblis,"Salafy24 (1998): 24.
3 On their
ofthesethings,
rejection see thefatwusoftheAhluSunnahpublishedin Salafy.
36See,forinstance, AbuZakiFathurRahman,"HukumBerjabat TangandenganWanitaBukanMahram"
and "HukumKeluarnyaSeorangWanitaMemakaiMinyakWangi,"Salafy 4 (1996):6-7.Thesearticles
compile some fatwasof thegrandmufti ofSaudi Arabia, 'Abd al-'Azizibn Baz, on theissuesofwomen
shaking hands with men and usingperfume. Neitheris allowed.
37See Ja'farUmarThalib,"DakwahSalafiyahdi Persimpangan Jalan,"Salafy1 (1995):39-42.
UmarThalib,"FitnahSururiyah
38 See Ja'far
MemecahBelahUmat,"Salafy2 (1996):17.
39 Roy,TheFailureofPolitical Islam,p. 25.

156 NoorhaidiHasan
many campuses of "secular" universitiesin Indonesia,includingGadjah Mada,

National Veteran,Diponegoro,Airlangga,BandungInstituteof Technology,Bogor
Instituteof Agriculture, and theUniversity of Indonesia.These halaqahswere groups
whichinsistedon theneed fora moralrevolution in orderto confront theincreasingly
secularized, decadent world.40
Thegrowthofthehalaqahscan be studiedagainstthebackground of thebeginning
of the 1970s, when ImaduddinAbdurrahim, who receivedpersonalsupport from
MuhammadNatsir,introducedthe programcalled LatihanMujahidDakwah(Da'wa
ActivistTraining)at the Salman Mosque of the BandungInstituteof Technology.
Abdurrahim was a former secretary of theIslamicInternational Federationof Student
Organizations(IIFSO), a Rabita-linked student organization.41Specifically,thistraining
programwas aimed at training new cadres amonguniversity studentspreparedto
conductda'waactivities in thebroadersociety.
Therecan be littledoubtthatthespiritand euphoriainspiredby thesuccess of the
Iranianrevolution in 1979 contributed a greatdeal to theexpansionof thehalaqahsat
universitycampuses throughout Indonesia. This revolutionprovided not only
inspiration, but also a blueprint for Muslims all over the world to strugglefor the
creationofIslamicstates.In theyearsthatfollowed,theMuslimworldwitnessedwhat
JohnEspositocalls an "Islamicresurgence," markedby an increasing interestamong
Muslimsinimplementing religiousteachings intovarious of
aspects life.42
Thiscurrent ofIslamicresurgence coincided,at thenationallevel,witha restrictive
policyprohibiting university students fromplayingan active part in politics.This
policy,knownas theNormalization of Campus Policy(NKK, BKK), to a largeextent
closed public spheresat university campusesand limitedthe dynamicsof student
organizations. Itwas later strengthened bygovernment enforcement ofthePancasila as
the sole foundation(asas-tunggal) of all politicaland mass organizations.In these
distressing and discouraging circumstances, the religiouslocus was one of the few
remaining open spaces attractive to students.
The halaqahswereparticularly appealingto studentswho came fromeithersmall
townsorruralareas,ortheurbanlower-middle classes.Benefiting fromthegovernment
program of mass education, which broadened the chances of the younger generationto
receivea university education,they were able to continuetheir studies at different
prestigious universities in the cities of Indonesia.In the cities,however,theywere
vulnerableto cultureshock,as theywereimmediately grantedaccess to the world of
pleasure,luxury and consumption, but suffered conflict whentheycould not detach
themselves fromtheirruralroots. This problem was exacerbatedby theiranxietyabout
the futureand job prospects.The government's programto recruitmoreuniversity
studentsled to studentoverpopulation,which inevitablycreated fiercecompetitionfor
40 See M. M. Billah,"GerakanKelompokIslamdi Yogyakarta," in GerakanIslamKontemporer di Indonesia,

ed. AbdulAziz,ImamTholkhah, Soetarman PustakaFirdaus,1989),pp. 293-295.
(Jakarta:
41 On theroleplayedby
ImaduddinAbdurrahim intheproliferationofhalaqahsand hisproximity toNatsir,
see Asna Husin,Philosophical and Sociological
Aspects ofDa'wah:A StudyofDewanDakwahIslamiyah
Indonesia (PhD dissertation,ColumbiaUniversity, 1988),p. 168.
42 John Islam(New York:OxfordUniversity
L. Esposito,VoicesofResurgent Press,1983),p. 17.

jobs, since the numberof university graduatesenteringthe job marketincreased

significantly.
In such an atmosphere, Ja'farUmar Thalib offeredparticipantsin the halaqahs
whatmightbe called an appropriatechanneland new zeal, forhe promisedthemthe
opportunity to createalternativecommunities that would provide themwith more
in
security facing thefuture.As a result,many thesestudents,particularly
of fromthe
universities in Yogyakartaand CentralJava,soon becamepart of the Ihya al-Sunnah
community.43 most of the studentswho joined the Ihya al-Sunnah
Interestingly,
community came from thescientific
and technical particularly
disciplines, fromschools
ofmedicine, forestry,
engineering,mathematics, and the natural The
sciences. students
in thesedisciplinesweretrainedin theframework of mathematic formulas.Theywere
veryenthusiasticabout Ja'farUmar Thalib's ideas, which they took literally.In
addition,manystudentsfromsuchbackgrounds experienceda kindof spiritualvoid
and a "guiltyfeeling,"given their with
fascination the progressof theWestin termsof
scienceand technology. A desireto compensateforthisfascination,whichtheysaw as
mistaken, impelledthemto join the Ihya al-Sunnahand othersimilargroups."After
graduating fromtheuniversities,manyof thosewho had been involvedin theIhyaal-
Sunnah community maintainedtheirengagement
enthusiastically with Ja'farUmar
Thaliband hisbrandofactivism.
The FKAWJ:Organizationand Membership

As I shallelaboratebelow,themajorchangestakingplace in thesocio-politicaland
economicrealmsofIndonesiaaftertheeruptionof themultidimensional crisisin 1998
likelystimulated thetransformation oftheIhyaal-SunnahintotheFKAWJ.Thischange
also meanta shiftin orientation: da'wa intopoliticalactivism.45
fromthenon-political
WhenJa'farUmar Thalib establishedthe FKAWJ,the Ihya al-Sunnahmembership
immediately providedenthusiasticsupport. They served as the backbone of the
organization, formulatingand organizingvariousprogramsand actionsof theFKAWJ.
It was also fromamongthemthatJa'farUmarThalibrecruited his best soldiersto fill
theavailablepositionsin theFKAWJorganization.
Different fromtheIhyaal-Sunnah, whichwas an informal organization based on a
sharedinterpretation ofIslam,theFKAWJis a formal,centralizedorganization, which
enablesJa'farUmar Thalib to mobilize his for
followers collectiveaction. William
Gamson'sseminalstudyof collectiveaction concludesthat such highlycentralized
bureaucratic organizationsare themosteffective mechanismsforrealizingsuccess in
43 "TargetKamiMenyingkirkan Gus Dur,"Interview withJa'farUmarThalib,PanjiMasyarakat 01,IV

(April 26, 2000).
44 am
I gratefultoM. KhalidMasud,whointroduced metothistermandsharedhisperspective withme.
45 Thisshiftintopoliticalactivismcausedconflict and fragmentation inSalafisocietyinIndonesia.Abu
Nida,whoplayedan important theSalafida'wain Yogyakarta,
rolein initiating preparedto opposeJa'far
UmarThalib'sFKAWJ. Similarly,Abu Faiz Asifuddinand Yazid Jawwasstrongly criticized Umar
Ja'far
Thalib'spoliticalactions.Abu Nida has beenoccupiedwithhisowngroup,Jama'ahIhyaal-Turath, while
Abu Faiz and JazidJawwasestablished Jama'ahal-Sunnahand al-Sofwah, respectively.

158 Noorhaidi
Hasan
social movements
because of thereadilyavailablesourcesof labor,efficient
decision-
and a highdegreeofcombatreadiness.46
makingstructures,
The FKAWJhas a relativelymodem organizationalstructure. It has a central
executiveboard,whoseheadquarters are locatedin Yogyakarta.This executiveboard
is led by Ayib Safruddin,a young graduate of the psychologyfaculty at
Muhammadiyah UniversityofSurakarta.He is assistedby a secretary,Ma'rufBahun,
an engineerfromHaluoleo University in CentralSulawesi.The executiveboard has a
numberof divisions,each of whichis headed by a divisionalleader.The majorityof
the divisional leaders are universitygraduates.47This central executiveboard
branches.Provincialbrancheshave beenestablished
supervisesprovincialand district
in twenty-four
provinces ofIndonesia.Eachprovincialbranchhas a numberof district
branches.
In the organization'shierarchy,an advisorybody has authority overthe central
executiveboard;thisadvisorybodyis actuallya supremereligious board led by Ja'far
Umar Thalib. This advisory body is comprised of fifty-four young religious
themajorityof whomhave been trainedby Salafi-Wahhabiteachersor
intellectuals,
have studiedat different universitiesin the Middle East, includingKingMuhammad
IbnSaud and Medina IslamicUniversities. Each memberof thisboard is responsible
forgivingreligiouslecturesin different branchesof the FKAWJ.Togetherwith the
university graduateswho becomethe organizersof the FKAWJ,theyconstitutethe
movement's leaders,and areresponsible formobilizing all FKAWJcollectiveactions.
Most of the rank-and-file membersof FKAWJare low-incomepeople, university
students,and theunemployed.Mostare youngpeople fromruralareas whereFKAWJ
brancheshavebeenestablished. EverybranchoftheFKAWJorganizesregularreligious
lectures,through which the Salafi-Wahhabi teachingsare disseminatedamong the
participants from the surrounding areas. In addition to this,the FKAWJmaintains
twelvepesantrens throughoutIndonesia.The chieftask of thesepesantrens is to educate
orphansand neglectedchildren whoareold enoughto go to school.In thesepesantrens,
such conventionalsubjectsas Arabic, Islamic theology,Islamic jurisprudence, the
theoriesof theQur'an,and the hadith are taught. From these pesantrens, the student
elementin theFKAWJmasses is generally recruited.The total numberof all FKAWJ
membersis estimatedat approximately forty thousandpeople.48
new members
In orderto recruit and collectmoneyfromsympathizers, theLaskar
Jihadhas also set up "stands" nearmosques,schools,traffic lights,and otherpublic
venues.Withouthesitationor reluctance, theyfrequently address passers-byto tell
themabout theferocity of Christian enemies. They also distributethe bulletinMaluku
Hari Ini (The MoluccasToday), containing the Laskar Jihadversionof the Moluccan
46 WilliamA Gamson,TheStrategyofSocialProtest
(Homewood:DorseyPress,1975).
7On the as
personsappointed members of theexecutive In mid-2001,
board,see http://www.fkawj.org.
thereweresomesmallchangesintheorganizational oftheFKAWJ
structure see thesame
and itspersonnel;
homepage.
48InterviewwithHardiyanto,Kaliurang,
Yogyakarta,November toMuhammad
3,2000;I am grateful
Wildan,whohelpedmeinconducting thisinterview.

conflictin daily reports.Theyhave insistedthat theyare ready to do anythingto

defendIslam,including sacrificingtheirownlives.49
Althoughthereare a numberof rumorsassociatingthe FKAWJwithmilitaryand
civilian political personalities,the FKAWJitself claims to be an independent
organization.In an interviewwith the fortnightly Panji Masyarakat,the modernist
MuslimIndonesianmagazine,Ja'farUmarThalibtotallyrejectedall speculationabout
theinvolvement of eitherWiranto(theformer militarychiefand ministerof defense),
Fuad Bawazier (the formerministerof finance,associated with the al-Irshadand
knownas havingtiesto theSuhartofamily),or any otherpoliticalfiguresassociated
withHabibiein FKAWJactivities.?? In my interview, the representatives
nevertheless,
of theFKAWJdid not denyhavingreceivedsome financialand othersupportboth
fromIndonesiaand abroad,particularly Malaysia,Japan,and theMiddle East.51
The FKAWJ'sorganizational symbol-twocrossed swords with the words "La
ildhailla Allah,MuhammadRasulAllah"(Thereis no God but Allah and Muhammad
is His messenger) printedon them-givesa clearindication ofthemilitancy withwhich
are
they prepared to defend their This
beliefs. militancymanifested itselfon January
30,2000, with theestablishmentof theLaskar a
Jihad, special militarydivisionwithin
theFKAWJ.As soon as itwas established, a commandstructure resembling thatof the
army was created: the Laskar Jihad consists of brigades,battalions,companies,
platoons,and teams,and it evenhas its own intelligence service.Ja'farUmar Thalib
himselfwas appointedcommander-in-chief of the Laskar Jihad.He is assisted by a
numberoffieldcommanders, includingAli Fauzi and Abu BakarWahidal-Banjari.
The LaskarJihaditselfhas approximately tenthousandmembers. Of thatnumber,
bySeptember 2000,therewerearoundthreethousandmemberswho had beenengaged
in combatin theMoluccas.52The numberof the Laskar Jihadfighters involvedin the
Moluccanconflict has remainedfairlyconstant,with new fighterscomingto theislands
to replacethosereturning home.
The MultidimensionalCrisis:TurningPointoftheIhya al-Sunnah

As I have indicated,the transformation of the Ihya al-Sunnahinto the FKAWJ
occurredwhena significant changetookplace in thepoliticallandscape of Indonesia,
followingthemultidimensional thecountry.
crisisafflicting Thiscrisisnotonlyacted as
the catalystthat ultimately forcedSuhartoto resignfromthe presidency;it also
stimulatedthe forging of freepoliticalspace. The so-called Reformation Era has
the livingconditions
arrived,but, ironically, of the people have steadily worsened.
Many have lost their
jobs, and with them theirfuturesecurity.These problemshave
" oftheLaskarJihadhad diedintheMoluccas.
ByDecember2000,aroundtwenty fighters
50 See "TargetKami,"PanjiMasyarakat IV
1, (April26,2000).
51 Interview CampakaPutihTengah,Jakarta,
withHardiyanto, December9,2000.
52
Interview Sabili7,VIII(September
withAyibSafruddin, 20,2000).

160 Noorhaidi
Hasan
producednumerousdemonstrations
thathaveoccasionallyexplodedintoviolenceand
riots.3
WhenHabibiewas appointedSuharto'ssuccessor,he was facednot onlywiththis
multidimensional crisis,but also, and immediately, with strongopposition from
different elementsin society,particularly those supportingMegawatiSukarnoputri,
who protestedagainstHabibiepersistently, demandinghisresignation. At one pointin
time,Megawati'ssupporters threatened that,if Habibie were not preparedto step
down at theextraordinary sessionof theMPR in November1999, "People Power,"a
unitedfrontcomposedof leftiststudentsand theBarisanNasional (National Front),
as well as otherpro-Megawati groups,wouldforcehimoutofoffice.
In reactingto this pressure,Habibie's supporters,mobilizedby various Islamic
organizations fromthemodernist end of thespectrum-including thePartaiPersatuan
Pembangunan(People United Party),the Dewan Dakwah IslamiyahIndonesia,the
Badan KerjasamaPondok PesantrenSeluruhIndonesia(the IslamicBoardingSchool
CooperativeCouncilofIndonesia),theKomiteIndonesiauntukSolidaritasDunia Islam
(IndonesianCommittee forIslamicWorldSolidarity),and the CentreforInformation
and DevelopmentStudies-came out in force to stand behind Habibie.4 These
organizations weresupportedbya numberofinfluential figures,suchas Hamzah Haz,
Anwar Harjono,HartonoMardjono,M. KholilRidwan, Ahmad Sumargono,Eggy
Sudjana, Fadli Zon, and Adi Sasono, some of whom were well-knownallies of
LieutenantGeneral(ret.)PrabowoSubianto.5 Prabowo (son-in-lawof Suharto)was
dismissedfromthearmyduringHabibie'spresidency forhisallegedrolein kidnapping
someactivists, and also forhisrolein theviolentriotsof March13-14,1998, whichhe
is suspectedof havingtriggered in an attemptto discreditpopular oppositionto
Suhartoand,at thesametime,to forceWiranto, hisstrongestrival,intoa comer.5
Followingthepressureand protestsagainstHabibie,rumorsthata Christian-cum-
Zionistplot or an evil communist alliancewas workingto undermine and seriously
harm the most populous Muslim countryin the world suddenly became more
prevalent,inevitablyshockingmany people.57 Such rumorswere believed to be
producedby Ahmad Sumargono, EggySujana, and Fadli Zon, all knownfortheir
prominence amongregimist Muslims,in theireffortsto seek an issue that mightunite
and mobilizeMuslimsagainstopposingforces.58
As thepressureagainstHabibiemounted,theIhyaal-Sunnahcommunity becamea
participantin thepoliticaldiscourseof thestate.Its officialpublication,the monthly
magazineSalafy,lost no timein publishing the Ihya al-Sunnahstandpointconcerning
3 On theviolenceand riotsfollowing
inDespair:Indonesia
thecrisis,see Cees vanDijk,A Country between
1997and2000(Leiden:KITLV Press,2001),pp. 111-113.
" Adam Search 2ndedition(Colorado:Westview
Schwarz,A Nationin Waiting: Indonesia's forStability,
Press,2000)pp. 349 and 368-369; see also van Dijk, Country Despair,pp. 332-333.
A in
5 On theproximity ofPrabowoand thesefigures, see "MengapaPrabowoMendekat," Sabili4,VI
(September 2, 1998):10-11.
56 See Robert
W. Hefner, CivilIslam:MuslimsandDemocratization inIndonesia Princeton
(Princeton:
University Press,2000),p. 206.
57On theserumors, see Schwarz,A NationinWaiting, pp. 347-348.
58 Hefner,CivilIslam,p. 207

recentdevelopments in thepoliticalrealm.Theycondemnedthe practiceof Western

democracy and identified Zionist-cum-Christian and/or communistconspiratorsas
thepartiesallegedlyresponsibleforthespread of democraticand communist ideas in
thecountry. In one of his articles,Ja'farUmarThalibreferred to democracyas an un-
Islamic,troublesome institution visitingdisasteruponIndonesiatoday.He is convinced
thatsovereignty does notbelongto people; it belongsabsolutelyto Allah. Allah is the
onlysovereignwhoshouldbe obeyed.Thereis no law exceptthelaw ofGod.59
The ApelSiaga (Call forReadiness)heldby the FKAWJin Solo in February1999
obviouslyreflected thegrowinganxietyoftheFKAWJaboutthepoliticaldevelopments
ofthetime.AtthisApelSiaga,theFKAWJwarnedMuslimsnotto fallintothetrap set
by theirenemies.Accordingtothem,thebestwayto guardagainstsuch an eventuality
was to supportconsistently an Islamicgovernment led by a pious Muslim.The meeting
also declaredthatMuslimswererequiredto wage war againsta government led by an
infidel(seorangyangkafir),6 a declaration that called to mind the of
doctrine takfirof
SayyidQutb.61
As thegeneralelectionof June1999 approached,therivalrybetweenHabibieand
Megawatigained momentum. In effortsto attack the otherparty, various issues
exploitingethnic, and otherprimordial
religious, sentiments wereraisedby supporters
ofeach party.One remarkable example was the case of Theo Syafei,a RomanCatholic
who was an influential of
supporter Megawati. He made a speech,a tape of which
was widelycirculated,about a plan by members of the politicalelite to transform
Indonesiaintoan Islamicrepublicby theyear2010. Commenting on thisproposal,he
statedthatChristian, ratherthanIslamic,notionshad inspiredand been thebasis for
Indonesia'spenal code and humanrightsideals,so thatthe role of Christiansin the
historicalcourseof theIndonesiannation-state should not be neglected.This speech
inspiredharshprotestsfroma varietyof Muslimorganizationsand individuals,
particularlyfromthe KomiteIndonesiauntukSolidaritasDunia Islam (Indonesian
Committee forIslamicWorldSolidarity, KISDI) and theIkatanCendekiawanMuslim
se-Indonesia(IndonesianAssociationofMuslimIntellectuals, ICMI),and manyofthese
groupsused itas a weaponagainstMegawati.62
In thethickofthisrivalry, a mercilessdebateemergedoverwhetherornota woman
couldbe president. As theleaderoftheIndonesianDemocraticParty-Struggle (PDI-P),
Megawati was a strongpotential candidate to challenge Habibie, who was closely
associatedwithIslam.ForMegawati'ssupporters, thetimehad indeedcometo stand
behindhertowintheelectionat all costs.Somepro-Megawati groupsin Surabaya,for
instance,statedtheirdetermination to die forMegawati,demonstrated by a petition
signed in blood. In their counter-arguments, Habibie's supporters insisted that
" UmarThalib,"MenyoalDemokrasi,"Salafy30 (1999):4-5;see also "SuaraRakyatTundukpada
Ja'far
Suara Tuhan,"SuaraHidayatullah (July1999):1-6.
60 "ApelSiaga UmatIslam,"Salafy 30 (1999):44.
61 On theanalysis and SayyidQutb'sthoughts
ofthisdoctrine ingeneral,see AhmadS. Moussalli,Radical
IslamicFundamentalism: TheIdeological ofSayyidQutb(Beirut:AmericanUniversity
andPoliticalDiscourse
of Beirut,1992).
in Despair,pp 380-381.
62 See van Dijk,A Country

162 Noorhaidi
Hasan
Habibienecessarily
defending meantdefending ofthestate.
Islam,and theIslamization
the of
Consequently, campaigns both sides to even
resorted aggressivetactics, violence.
As part of the campaignto disqualifyMegawatias a candidate, picturesof
Megawati praying at a Balinese Hindu temple had appeared in Indonesian
newspapers.Megawati'sdetractorsimmediately seizeduponthisimagetosuggestthat
she was a Hindu. A. M. Saefuddin,a Partai PersatuanPembangunan(PPP, Unity
DevelopmentParty)minister in Habibie's cabinet,wenteven further,asking:are we
readytobe led by a Hindupresident?Infuriated Balinese
by Saefuddin'sinsinuation,
Hindusheld a demonstration demandingthat HabibiedischargeSaefuddinfromhis
cabinet.
Concernedabout Megawati'scandidacy,the Ihya al-Sunnahcommunity asked
Ibrahimibn Amiral-Ruhaili,a Saudi Salafi muftiwho was a lecturer at the Islamic
ofMedina,abouthow theyshouldreactifshewereelected.On thebasis of
University
thequestions,afatwd(religiousdecree)was issued.Thisfatwddeclaredthat:
To appointa womanto be theleaderof a Muslimstate is disavowed [munkar].
We arenotallowed to choosea Muslimwomanto be theleaderof Muslimmen,
just as we are not allowedto appointa sinfulman to be the leader.But if the
womanhas alreadybeen electedto be president, but thensignsof hersinfulness
emerge,we would not be allowed to resistagainsther.In principle,a woman
cannotbe appointedto be a leader.To appointa womanas presidentis an act
whichcontradicts theguidanceoftheProphet.'
IslamizationPolicyand theResurfacing ofPoliticalIslam

ThelinkagebetweenHabibieand his Muslimsupporterscan be tracedback to the
Islamizationstrategyestablishedby Suharto'sNew Orderin thelastdecade of its rule.
Beginning in the 1990s, Suhartointroducedan Islamizationstrategy,particularly
focusing on the accentuationof Islamic symbols in public discourse and the
accommodation of religioussocio-politicalpowers.In the contextof this strategy,a
numberoforganizations and institutionsthatmade use of Islamicsymbols have come
to thefore.The IslamicCourtBillwas introduced, followedby thepresidentialdecree
on the Compilationof IslamicLaw. Islamicsharfabanks and insurancecompanies
sprangup everywhere, and thousandsofmosqueswerebuiltunderthesponsorshipof
thestate.Mostimportantly, theICMI was establishedunderSuharto'spatronage,and
Habibie, as a close associate of Suharto, was appointed the leader of the
At thesametime,therewas also a growthin popularityof thejilbab,an
organization.64
Islamichead covering forwomen,the hajj,pilgrimage to Mecca, and religiousrituals
and festivals.65In the wake of the introduction of this conservativeIslamization
strategy,within a very short time,the state drasticallymoved away fromits former
secularposition,and prominent Muslimfigures emergedas actorsin nationalpolitics.
63 "SikapUmatIslamBilaMegawatiJadiPresiden,"Salafy33 (1999):53-54.
64
Martinvan Bruinessen, "IslamicStateorStateIslam?Fifty RelationsinIndonesia,"
YearsofState-Islam
in Indonesien AmEndeDes 20. Jahrhunderts:
Analyses zu 50 Jahren
Unabhaengiger Deutschein
Entwickling,
Indonesien, ed. IngridWessel(Hamburg:Abera,1996),pp. 48-49.
65 Ibid.,p. 47.

This Islamizationstrategy was believedby a numberof scholarsto be a way to

containthespread of thelegitimacy crisisexperiencedby the New Orderaftermore
than twentyyears of power.66This crisisoccurredpartlybecause the state, while
failingto fulfilltherequirements of social welfare,was unwilling to providesufficient
space for all of to
segments society express themselvesand pursuetheirinterests.In
spiteoftheconsiderableroleplayedby Muslimsin founding and supporting theNew
Order,theexpressionofpoliticalIslam,forinstance, had beenmarginalizedthroughout
Suharto'stenureand evenrepressedbytheauthoritarian state.
Indeed,the marginalization of politicalIslam was responsiblefor a numberof
protests. Different Islamist uprisingslabeled ekstrem kanan (extremeright),which
for the
demanded, example, application of theJakartaCharter,had brokenout since
theend ofthe1960s. Suchprotestswereoftenfollowedby thedamagingof Christian
churchesand thedestruction of nightclubs and gambling casinos.67Islamistrebellion
movements also emerged, liketheKomandoJihad(JihadCommand),whichadvocated
theestablishment ofan Islamicstate.Thesemovements wereconsistently and violently
crushedby thestate.68 In thefaceof theNew Orderrepression, all attemptsto protest
and rebelwereboundto end withfailure,inevitably creating feelingof deprivation
a
and frustration among their constituency. This frustrationreachedits peak whenthe
state successfully forcedall socio-politicalorganizations to accept the Pancasila as
theirsole foundation. Manywereforcedeithertodisguisetheirreal "faces" or to move
theiractivities underground.
The state-run Islamizationprojectwas supportedby manyIslamistgroups,who,
lost
having hope, affiliated themselves withtheproject,or at least feltthattheywere
going in that direction. Indeed,manygroupssaw this as a promisingopportunity.
Muslimswho had been forcedto remainon the periphery, or who had been given
limitedspace in nationalpolitics,founda new way to enterthepolitical,social, and
economicarenasofthestate.Theybelievedthattheywould be able to changethefate
oftheirsociety,theirnation,and theirstate--notto mention bringing about changesat
the personallevel.In thissense,the strategyof the regimeappeared to succeed in
"subduing"a varietyof Muslimoppositiongroups.Suddenlythereemergedwhat
RobertHefnercalls "regimist Islam,"whichdid not recoilfromshowingitselfto be a
realpartnerof thestate.69 WhenSuharto'sNew Orderwas beingseverelychallenged,
not longbeforeits collapse,theregimist Islamistsstroveto show theirloyaltyto the
presidentand attemptedto help himmaintainhis positionby, amongothertactics,
spreadinganti-Chinese rumorsand theZionist-cum-Christian conspiracy theory.
Nevertheless, the fall of Suhartowas inevitable.By the timehe leftoffice,the
optimism of the regimist IslamiststhattheIslamizeddirectionof the state would be
maintainedwas fading.Theironly hope was thatHabibie would be able to sustain this
66 See,e.g.,DouglasRamage,Politics inIndonesia:Democracy, ofTolerance

Islam,andIdeology (London:
Routledge, 1995).
67 See HaroldCrouch, "Indonesia,"in ThePolitics ed. MohammedAyoob(London:
ofIslamicReassertion,
CroomHelm,1981),p. 203.
68 On theserebellionsandtheindications oftheinvolvement see
agentsintherebellions,
ofsomeintelligence
van Bruinessen, "IslamicStateorStateIslam?,"pp. 43-46.
69
See Hefner,CivilIslam,pp. 128-143.

164 Noorhaidi
Hasan
strategy.However,the embattledHabibie could not do so. Pressuredby various

elementsin Indonesiansociety,he accommodatedthe demand for a new general
electionin June1999and facilitated
thatelection.
In thisgeneralelection,theconstituency ofregimist Islam,scattered throughout such
differentparties as the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan(PPP, the Unity and
DevelopmentParty),thePartaiBulanBintang(PBB,theCrescentand StarParty),and
theGolonganKarya(Golkar,Partyof Functional Groups),demonstrated theirsupport
for Habibie. Nevertheless, this scarcelymounteda serious challengeto Megawati
Sukamoputri with her PDI-P;35.7millionvoteswenttoherparty,makingitthewinner
ofthe1999generalelection.However,partlybecauseof thepoliticalmaneuversof the
PorosTengah(MiddleAxis), a politicalallianceof Muslimpartiesled by AminRais,
theelectionfailedto giveMegawatithepresidency. Instead,it broughtAbdurrahman
Wahidto power.
Abdurrahman Wahid'saccessiontopowerwas welcomedwitheuphoriaby many,
including Muslims. He was considereda leaderwho would be able to diminishthe
tensionsbetweenthesupportersof Habibieand Megawati.Nevertheless, as a public
figurewho had often produced controversialstatements and policies, Abdurrahman
Wahidsoon had to confront opposition from different elements in Indonesiansociety.
During his to
efforts restructurethe militaryleadership, waves of protestsagainsthim
mountedconsiderably and led to an oppositionmovement in parliament.
Whileprotestand oppositionescalated,theeconomicand social conditionsin the
nation worsened.The value of the rupiahdropped again. Manufacturers stopped
producingand exporting products.International trustplummeted. The ethno-religious
conflictin theMoluccasspun increasingly out of controland cost hundredsof lives.
Observing theserecent developments, Ja'farUmarThalibarguedthat theseproblems
wereverymuchrelatedtotheperformance ofthegovernment, thebreakdownof socio-
culturalboundaries,thesystematic condemnation of theIndonesianmilitary, and the
increasein securitydisturbances.70 As a consequence, theFKAWJfeltthattherewere
sufficientgrounds to demand Abdurrahman Wahid's resignation.
In addition,fortheFKAWJ, Abdurrahman Wahidwas believedto be indifferent to
thefateof Muslims.Fromtheirperspective, Abdurrahman Wahid had failedto show
strongsupportforMuslimsand so had effectively collaborated withIsraeli-Zionist and
Christianpowers and thus facilitateda communistresurgence.They cited the
welcoming of an Israelitrade delegation,the proposal to revivethe Partai Komunis
Indonesia,the widespreadavailabilityof leftistand communist-leaning books, and,
the
most importantly, increasing conflicts
ethno-religious in the Moluccas and other
areas in Indonesiaas examplesof Abdurrahman Wahid's intimacywith "the three
main powers whichare hostileto Muslims."On thesegrounds,Ja'farUmar Thalib
cameto theconclusionthatAbdurrahman Wahidwas al-sultan al-ja'ir(an unjustruler),
whoshouldno longerbe obeyed."7
70 Ja'farUmarThalib,"SaatnyaMengobarkanJihad,"Salafy34 (2000):2.
71 "TargetKami,"PanjiMasyarakat
1,VI(April26,2000).

Jihddin theMoluccas
As we havenoted,inconjunction
withtheincreasingethno-religious
conflictsin the
Moluccanislandsand otherareas in theIndonesianarchipelago,rumorsabout an evil
conspiracybetweenthe enemiesof the Muslimsworkingto undermine the power of
Islambecamemoreprevalent. The conflict
in theMoluccas,in particular,
was believed
to be partofa Zionist-cum-Christian led
project, by the RepublikMaluku Selatan(the
SouthMoluccanRepublic,RMS), a separatistmovement withheadquarterslocatedin
theNetherlands.
Accordingto theLaskarJihad,theZionist-cum-Christian internationalpowersare
to
working damagethegloryof Islamin Indonesiaby fomenting of
the disintegration
the countryand "Christianizing" IndonesianMuslims.The Moluccan islands are
simplya "pilotproject"in thislargereffort, thesuccessof whichwill determine their
subsequentagenda. Laskar Jihadinsiststhatjihadis the only solution to counterthe
evil efforts
oftheZionist-cum-Christian conspiracy.72
The Moluccanconflict brokeout at thebeginning of 1999. Sinceits eruption,
it has
providedprimarily storiesofthedefeatof Muslimson almostall fronts.A numberof
newspapers and magazines,suchas theSabilifortnightly magazine,witha circulation
reaching more thanseventythousand, have covered such storiesvigorously.Certainly,
the anxietyand furiousangerof many IndonesianMuslimswere aroused, which
resultedin an explosionofralliesand demonstrations demandingthegovernment curb
theviolence.
In reactingto thedeteriorating situation,Salafypublishedsomefatwasabout what
theFKAWJreferred to as "theMoluccanwar."Therehavebeensevenfatwas,issued by
sevendifferent muftfs, concerning thehukm (legalposition)of beingengagedin thewar
in theislands.Thesefatwaswereissued following thefirstmassivedemonstration of
theLaskarJihad,and emphasizedtheseriousnessofthecontactsthe LaskarJihadhad
made withtheirauthoritative Saudi Salafimuftis beforelaunchingtheiractions.
In theopinionof'Abd al-Muhsinal-'Abbad,a MedinaSalafimufti, to the
traveling
battlefieldin theMoluccasto defendtheMuslimsin theislandsis lawful(disyariatkan),
providedthatit is not harmfulto Muslimsthemselves, and that Muslimsare in a
defensiveposition.Ahmadal-Najm,a member of theSaudi senior'ulama committee,
agreedwiththenecessityof wagingjihadin Ambonand suggestedthatMuslimswere
obligatedto help theiroppressedbrothers.But thismuftiwarned the Laskar Jihad
fighters firstto takethefollowing steps:(1) to choosea representativewho would meet
the ruler,to advise and approach him; (2) if the rulertook theirsuggestionsinto
consideration, he shouldbe obeyed;(3) iftherulerrejectedtheirsuggestions, Muslims
wereallowedto rebelagainsthim,as longas theyhad sufficient power.
Moreobviously,theengagement of Muslimsin the Moluccanwar was judged by
Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi'i, a Salafimuftiin Yemen,tobe an individualduty(fard"ain)
forIndonesianMuslimsand to be a collectiveduty(fardkifa~ya) forMuslimsoutside
Indonesia.Takingthesame tone,Rabi' ibnHadi al-Madkhali,a Salafi muftiin Saudi
72
Ja'far Bangsadan NegaraIndonesia,"Salafy34
UmarThalib,"JihadfiSabilAllah:SolusiProblematika
(2000): 33.

166 NoorhaidiHasan
Arabia,arguedthattheengagement of Muslimsin theMoluccanwar was a fard ain,

sinceMuslimswerebeingattackedbyChristians.
The necessityof helpingtheMoluccanMuslimswho werebeingattackedby their
Christianenemieswas also declaredby Salih al-Suhaimi, a Salafi muftiin Medina.He
stated thatjihadis compulsory in troubledareas, providingMuslimshave sufficient
powerto undertakeit.The samepointwas arguedbyWahidal-Jabiri, in
a Salafi mufti
Medina.He was oftheopinionthatto defendMuslimsbeingattackedby theirenemies
is compulsory.
Finally,in hisfatwsa, MuhammadibnHadi al-Madkhali,a Salafi muftiin Medina,
confirmed the lawfulnessof the threesteps that the Laskar Jihadhad takenbefore
going to Ambon. He said thesesteps, includingthe tablighakbar,the meetingwith
Abdurrahman Wahid,and themilitary trainingin Bogor,werelawful,and sufficient to
legitimizejihldactions in the Moluccas. Abdurrahman Wahid's prohibition jihsd in
of
Ambonwas judged unlawful,and consequently therewas no longerany need to obey
him.Quotinga hadithof theProphet,he said, "It is notallowed to obey someonein
committing disobedienceofAllah."7
On thebasis ofthesefatwas,Ja'farUmarThalibdeclaredtheMoluccanwar a holy
war againstChristianenemiesattacking Muslims.He emphasizedthat engagement in
the war was a dutythat shouldbe fulfilled by Muslimsin orderto honor Allah's
Ibn
message.7Quoting Taymiyyah, Umar
Ja'far Thalibsaid, "Shouldourenemyattack
Muslims, to confront the attack would be an obligationincumbent on theMuslimswho
are beingattackedand it would be compulsory forotherMuslimsto help them."75
AccordingtoJa'farUmarThalib,thiswas obligatory, becausesinceit had succumbed
to thepressurefromZionist-cum-Christian internationalpowers,the government did
nothave theabilityor thepowertoend thewar.76
Afterthesefatwashad been distributed,the storiesabout martyrsthat were
meticulously recounted in a specificcolumnintheSalafymagazineapparentlybeganto
resonateamongLaskar Jihadloyalists."The war in the Moluccas has provides a
goldenopportunity to becomea martyr, who can look forwardto beingwelcomedin
heavenby angels,"said one candidateoftheLaskarJihadvolunteers. The LaskarJihad
fightersbelieve itis thetime to conduct al-akbar,
al-jihdd the trueIslamicjihad.7
Authorizedby thefatwas,the"holywar" in theMoluccashas apparentlybecome
integrated intotheinternational jihadmovement, whichdemandsthe participationof
theumma,Muslimcommunity. The Laskar Jihadindeedportraysitselfas beingthe
defenderand guardianof theumma,whoselivesare in jeopardy,so longas thestate
does not have sufficient powerand politicalwillto protectthem.In such a situation,
7 See "FatwaPara Ulama tentang

see
Jihaddi Maluku,"http://www.laskarjihad.or.id/risalah/fatwa;
also Ja'farUmarThalib,"MenepisRekayasaFatwaSeputarJihaddi Maluku,"Salafy34 (2000):6-9.
7'
Fora detaileddiscussionofthewaytheradicalIslamists theterm"jihid,"see J.J.G. Jansen,
understand
Neglected Duty:TheCreedof Sadat'sAssassins
and Resurgence theMiddleEast (London:
Islamic in
Macmillan,1986),pp. 15-31.
75"FatwaParaUlamatentang Jihaddi Maluku,"p. 7.
76 Ibid.,p. 10.
77 Interview withmembers oftheFKAWJ, December

CempakaPutihTengah,Jakarta, 2000.

jihddis believedto be theonlyway to rescuetheumma,as practicedby the Prophet

MuhammadwhenMuslimswere defending themselvesfromthe kfirharb(attacking
infidels). "Muslims should wake up and wage jihdd against the harb enemies
threatening who had justreturnedfrom
Muslimlives,"statedone LaskarJihadveteran,
theMoluccas.78
The spiritand motivation forbothdefending thereligion of Allah and revivingthe
glory of Islam are persistently pumped into the Laskar Jihadfighters. Motivated to
obtaina rewardfromAllah,thousandsof theLaskar Jihadfighters have leftfor the
Moluccas;theyclaimto have travaledat theirown expense.Theyinsistedthat they
werenotreluctant toselltheirproperty, likemotorcycles or domesticcows takenfrom
theirparents,to financetheirtravelto the islands. Upon theirreturnfromthejihdd,
thosewho survivednarratetheirheroicstoriesto audiencesof prospectivemujalhidin
and to reporters forvariouspublicationsof theLaskar Jihad.Severaldozen of them
havebeenmartyred in theislands.
The portrayalofthisconflict as a war betweenMuslimsand Christiansentailsthe
projection of the medieval Christian crusades into the present.The Laskar Jihad
fighters indeedfrequently associate theMoluccan war witha ProyekKristenisasiSalib
(Christianization Crusade Project).Such an associationprovides a valid reason to
the
reject incorporation oftheWorldofIslamintotheglobalization process.
It is not surprising that,in thiswar, the integration betweenjihad and da'wa has
been emphasized.Jihddis portrayedas a formof Islamicpropagationintendedto
build an ideal society,an alternative societyfreefromWesternculturalstains.It is part
of propagationactivitiesaimed at "givinga correctunderstanding of prescriptions
covering'aqida (faith),ibdda(rituals),and mu'dmala(social life)."79 Workingin close
cooperation with local Muslims, Laskar Jihadfighters have also establisheddozens of
healthclinics,refugee camps,schools, and mosques.By integrating jihdd with da'wa,
theattemptto resistglobalizationhas founda firmer basis, sincethe waging war is
of
only consideredpart of da'wa. Reordering societyaccordingto their own ideal
model-whichcontrastswiththeexistingglobalizedworld order-seems to be much
moreimportant tothem.
Epilogue
As thedemandsfortheimplementation of the sharfahave becomemorefluently
acrossthecountry,
articulated LaskarJihadfightershave attemptedto provethatthey
are indeed readyto espouse sharfa.At the end of March 2001, the Laskar Jihad
enforceda rajmsentenceagainst one of its members,who committedrape in Ambon.
He was stoned to death afterbeing interrogatedby a Laskar JihadShari'a Court led by
Ja'far Umar Thalib. He admitted his crime and accepted his punishment without
protest.Beforethe sentencewas handed down to him,Ja'farUmar Thalib remindedall
in
thepeoplepresentin thecourt,"Whatwe do willbe regardedby Allah as sincerity
8Interview withLaskarJihadfighters, December2000.

CempakaPutihTengah,Jakarta,
9 See http:/
/www.laskarjihad.or.id.

168 NoorhaidiHasan
upholdingthereligion of Allah,becauseof whichAllah willendowus withvictoryin

ourjihadd.""8
A monthaftertheexecutionof thissentence, Ja'farUmarThalibwas arrestedby
the police. He was accused of the tortureto death of one of his followersand of
incitement to criminalviolence.In reactionto this arrest,a numberof Islamic
organizationslike the KomiteIndonesiauntukSolidaritasDunia Islam, the Dewan
Dakwah IslamiyahIndonesia,the Badan Kerjasama Pondok PesantrenSeluruh
Indonesia,and thePerguruanIslamal-Syafi'iyyah (Al-Syafi'iyyah IslamicInstitutionof
Learning), held a mass religiousmeeting in front of the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah
Indonesiaofficein Jakartato demandthereleaseof Ja'farUmar Thalib.The meeting
was also attendedby the leadersof theseorganizations, including HartonoMardjono,
HusseinUmar,KholilRidwan,and Daud Rasyid,who stated theirdetermination to
defendJa'farUmarThalib."sIn conjunction withthedemandforJa'farUmar Thalib's
release,theso-calledGerakanAntiKomunis(Anti-Communist Movement)conducted
sweeps forleftistand communist-leaning books and burnedthempublicly.A few
weekslater,Ja'farUmarThalibwas releasedby thepolice.
In July2001, duringan extraordinary sessionof theMPR,MegawatiSukarnoputri
was installedas president,replacingAbdurrahman Wahid,and Hamzah Haz was
electedas vice-president. The LaskarJihadpromptlyreactedby organizing a tabligh
akbarin Yogyakarta. Once again,theyproclaimedtheirdetermination to continuejihdd
actions and send militia troops to troubledregions,particularlyPoso, Central
Sulawesi.82 A fewdays later,a delegationof theLaskarJihadvisitedHamzah Haz's
officetovoicetheirrejection ofa womanpresident, claimingthatherappointment was
a greatsincommitted by Indonesian Muslims. In addition,they stated the necessityof
implementing thesharfa,as iftheyweredemanding thefulfillment of a promisegiven
by this PPP partyleader. Reacting to thisdemand, Hamzah Haz asked themto behave
in a mannerthatwould displayIslamas rahmatan (a blessingforthewhole
ii al-'aflamin
universe),and not to to and
appeal continually militancy violence.83
Followingtheattackson Afghanistan by theUS and its allies-a responseto the
terrorist on
attacks theWorld Trade Centerin New Yorkin September 2001-a number
of IndonesianMuslimhard-linegroupsheld demonstrations in frontof the US
Embassyin Jakarta.Y' Theycondemnedtheattackon Afghanistan and demandedthat
theIndonesiangovernment severdiplomatictieswiththeUS. Interestingly, theLaskar
in
Jihaddid notinvolvethemselves thedemonstrations. Thisabsence was confirmed by
a representative oftheLaskarJihad,who pointedoutthatdemonstrations constitutea
formof democraticexpressiontotallyforbidden by Salafi teaching. For the Laskar
80
"LaskarJihadTegakkanHukumAllah:RajamAnggotanya YangMelakukanZina,"
http:/www.laskarjihad.or.id/berita/March2001.
81
"BeberapaPengacaraSiap Bela PanglimaLaskarJihad,"
May5, 2001,http://www.berpolitik.com.
82 "RibuanLaskarJihad Siap ke Poso,"August7,2001,http://www.laskarjihad.or.id/berita.
83 See "Laskar
JihadBerharapPemerintahSeriusTanganiKasusKerusuhan," August8,2001;see
Kompas,
also "PanglimaLaskarJihadBertemu WakilPresiden," August9,
http://www.laskarjihad.or.id/berita,
2001.
"8Fordetailedinformationon theanti-America see http:/
demonstrations, /www.detik.com
(accessed
October18,2001).

Jihad,any person who participatedin those demonstrations committeda sin.m

Nevertheless,in a television
interview
the day before,Ja'farUmar Thalib stated that
tenthousandfighters werepreparedto wagejihadin Afghanistan. This threatseemed
morerealwhenhe visitedmanyFKAWJ branchestowarntroopsto be in readinessfor
such an action."Ja'farUmarThalibevensentthe following sarcasticmessageto the
US: "We would liketo sorrowovertheUnitedStates,you shouldlearnfromyourown
arrogance.ForMuslims,we wouldliketocongratulate you fortherevengeupon terrors
committed by the biggestterrorist
nationin the world,the UnitedStates,on Muslim
nations."87
It seemsto me thatjihddhas becomea commonword,characterizing a varietyof
discoursesin Indonesia.Thiswordis usuallycombinedwiththelanguageof otherness
and anti-Westernism and communism, identifiedby Bruce B. Lawrence as the
hallmarksof Islamic fundamentalism.Y Even thoughthereare some signs of the
proliferation ofIslamicfundamentalism in Indonesia,nobodyknowsto what extentit
willinfluence thefuture courseofthecountry. One thingis clear:theviolence,to quote
Roy, "is morea sign of weaknessthan the harbingerof a new wave of Islamic
militancy.""9 PoliticalIslamremainson thepoliticalperiphery, and mayneversucceed
in changing thestrategiclandscape of the Muslimworld.It is worthnotingthat the
militant Islamicgroupswe have discussedareessentially notsupportedby mainstream
IndonesianMuslims.Generally, I am in accordwithAzyumardiAzra,who assertsthat
"once Indonesiaattains a new equilibrium most-if not
in this painfultransition,
all-of these Muslim hard-line groups willlose momentum."'9
withHardiIbnuHarun,CempakaPutihTengah,October20,2001.
85Interview
86
"BersiagaMelawanAmerika,"Bulletin LaskarJihad AhlusSunnahwalJama'ah 10 (October2001):8-9.
Umar
87 Ja'far Thalib,"MampuslahAmerika," BulletinLaskar Ahlus
Jihad Sunnah walJama'ah, 10 (October
2001): 9.
88
Lawrence,DefendersofGod(Columbia:University ofSouthCarolina,1989).
9 OlivierRoy,"ChangingPatternsamong RadicalIslamic
Movements," Brown JournalofWorld VI,1
Affairs
(Winter/Spring 1999):119.
90Azyumardi Azra,"GlobalizationofIndonesianMuslimDiscourse:Contemporary Religio-Intellectual
Connections BetweenIndonesiaand theMiddleEast,"in Islamin theEraofGlobalization: MuslimAttitudes
towards Modernity ed. JohanMeuleman(Jakarta:
andIdentity, INIS,2001),p. 50.


Hasan, Noorhaidi - Faith and Politics The Rise of The Laskar Jihad in The Era of Transition in Indonesia

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Faith and Politics: The Rise of the Laskar Jihad in the Era of Transition in Indonesia

Author(s): Noorhaidi Hasan

This content downloaded from 193.157.118.233 on Mon, 27 Jan 2014 09:38:31 AM

The turnof the twenty-first centurywitnessedthe eruptionof Islam into the

This content downloaded from 193.157.118.233 on Mon, 27 Jan 2014 09:38:31 AM

and theLaskarMujahidinIndonesia(theIndonesianHoly WarriorParamilitary Force).

The LaskarJihadand SimilarGroups

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by mainstream IndonesianIslam.The FKAWJwas establishedby Ja'farUmar Thalib,

thissociety tomention buta few,theIhyaal-Turath the

This content downloaded from 193.157.118.233 on Mon, 27 Jan 2014 09:38:31 AM

Afterthistablighakbar,theLaskarJihadmarchedto thepresidential palace. They

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Huseinal-Habsyi(b. 1955), the leader of the IndonesianMuslimBrotherhood,9 who

9 Theestablishment allegedlyan Indonesianbranchoftheoriginally

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Organizationally, the Laskar MujahidinIndonesiais underthe umbrellaof the

"2IrfanS. Awwas,ed.,RisalahKongres Mujahidin I danPenegakan Syari'ahIslam(Yogyakarta: Wihdah

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The emergenceof these Muslim paramilitarycivilian groups leads to some

BiographicalSketchof theLeader of theLaskarJihad

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the Dewan Dakwah IslamiyahIndonesiahas becomeassociated withthe Rabitatal-

20 On thelinkbetweentheDewanDakwahIslamiyah IndonesiaandtheRabita,see Reinhard Schulze,

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violence,shoulditbe necessary.28 This factionhad special relationswiththePakistani

28 Roy, The FailureofPoliticalIslam,p. 36.

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had mastereda wide rangeof religiousknowledge,Ja'farUmar Thalib quickly

The Manhaj Salafi: Doctrineand Ideologyof theIhya al-Sunnah

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above the ankle,and headgear-and allowed theirbeards to growlong.33 Theyalso

The Halaqahs: Site of Recruitmentof theIhya al-SunnahCadres

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many campuses of "secular" universitiesin Indonesia,includingGadjah Mada,

40 See M. M. Billah,"GerakanKelompokIslamdi Yogyakarta," in GerakanIslamKontemporer di Indonesia,

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jobs, since the numberof university graduatesenteringthe job marketincreased

The FKAWJ:Organizationand Membership

43 "TargetKamiMenyingkirkan Gus Dur,"Interview withJa'farUmarThalib,PanjiMasyarakat 01,IV

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This content downloaded from 193.157.118.233 on Mon, 27 Jan 2014 09:38:31 AM

conflictin daily reports.Theyhave insistedthat theyare ready to do anythingto

The MultidimensionalCrisis:TurningPointoftheIhya al-Sunnah

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recentdevelopments in thepoliticalrealm.Theycondemnedthe practiceof Western

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IslamizationPolicyand theResurfacing ofPoliticalIslam

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This Islamizationstrategy was believedby a numberof scholarsto be a way to

66 See,e.g.,DouglasRamage,Politics inIndonesia:Democracy, ofTolerance

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strategy.However,the embattledHabibie could not do so. Pressuredby various

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Arabia,arguedthattheengagement of Muslimsin theMoluccanwar was a fard ain,

7 See "FatwaPara Ulama tentang

77 Interview withmembers oftheFKAWJ, December

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jihddis believedto be theonlyway to rescuetheumma,as practicedby the Prophet

8Interview withLaskarJihadfighters, December2000.

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