Sapienza - Universita di Roma

INTRODUCTION, PART I. NATURE IN CLASSICAL INDIA

Author(s): Raffaele Torella
Source: Rivista degli studi orientali, Nuova Serie, Vol. 88, SUPPLEMENTO No 2: THE
HUMAN PERSON AND NATURE IN CLASSICAL AND MODERN INDIA (2015), pp. 9-13
Published by: Sapienza - Universita di Roma
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/24754127
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 INTRODUCTION, PART I.
NATURE IN CLASSICAL INDIA

Raffaele Torella

India, first of all

ally considered by in
theits philosophical
West and
as a civilisation religious
ignoring dimensions,
nature has been usu
and only inter
ested in the absolute and in liberation from the phenomenal world; such a be
lief may influence also our judgments about contemporary India. In order to
question this prejudice and reconsider the concept of 'nature' in India, thus
enriching also contemporary discourses about it in the West, a research proj
ect under my direction has been funded by Rome Sapienza, whose results
were offered at the Conference "The Human Person and Nature in Classical
and Modern India", Rome Sapienza, 14^-15* March 2013. The main lines of
the project have been: level A) exploring in various directions the philosoph
ical, aesthetic and religious thought of traditional India, also in its sociologi
cal and anthropological aspects; level B) focusing the theme of nature in the
historical and political-sociological dimensions of modern and contempo
rary India. Within this exploration, the research areas necessarily include
even very distant aspects, temporally and culturally distinct, but also full of
cross references. The presence of level B besides level A testifies to the ideal
continuity of classical and contemporary India. Level B treats the historical
repercussions of the themes dealt with in level A, the complex relationship
among nature, dominant cultures and values expressed by tribal and ethnic
communities, in medieval and modern texts, in contemporary jurisprudence,
and their impact on the alterations in social, economic and political structures
since the pre-colonial period.
The present publication includes the final versions of some of the papers
read at the Conference with the addition of new materials.
We should start with the awareness that one could hardly meet with a
more elusive and multifaceted concept than 'nature' both in India and the
West. Moreover, we can see that the two very terms of the human per
son/ nature relationship are like Chinese boxes: the first term, particularly, is
already in itself a very problematic mixture of 'human' and 'nature'. An at
tempt to define it may be helped by taking into account its antithesis, or, bet
ter, its various possible antitheses.1 A syntetic, but also well gauged, approach
to the whole question can be found in the words of Kate Soper:

1 The western antithesis between nature and culture has been aptly challenged in Ph. Descola, Be
yond nature and culture, Chicago: The University of Chicago 2013 (Engl, transi, of Par-delà nature et culture,
Paris: Gallimard 2005); see particularly pp. 57-90.

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10 RAFFAELE TORELLA [2]

The nature-convention antithesis is one of a number of cognate dualisms (nature-cul

ture; natural-artificial; animal-human) through which Western thought conceptual
izes what is distinctive to the 'being' of humanity, and demarcates between that which
is independent of, and pre-given to, human activity and that which is humanly
achieved or contrived. Though many would dispute whether any clear-cut division can
be drawn between the 'human' and the 'animal', the very posing of the question of
our affinity with, or distinction from, other creatures is reliant on a prior appreciation
of those features which are specific to humans. One of the most notable of these is
that human beings establish 'conventions': customs, rules, or norms of behaviour
which are socially instituted as opposed to naturally dictated. [...] The nature-con
vention opposition has its origins in Greek antiquity, in the fifth century BC, where
the distinction between physis and nomos becomes the site of a dispute about the cul
tural relativity of political and moral values which has remained a central concern of
philosophy ever since. Thus it is by reference to the multiplicity of human conven
tions, that relativists have often challenged claims about the existence of a common
'human nature' or universally applicable morality. [...] The philosophic interest of the
nature-convention distinction lies therefore in the normative disputes that are con
ducted in its terms: that which is socially instituted is at once both defended by its ad
herents as part of the order of nature, and thus untransformable, and exposed by its
critics as conventional and hence mutable. Relations of class, and discriminations on
grounds of gender, race and sexuality, for example, have all been said to be natural by
those seeking to sustain their social hierarchies, and denounced as illegitimate and op
pressive norms by those seeking to overthrow them. Within this challenge, however,
to the naturalization of what is socially instituted, we may distinguish between those
who would contest what is said to be natural in the name of the more authentic nat
urality of what they seek to institute; and those (like Michel Foucault) who would in
sist upon the always normative and constantly revisable quality of what is said to be
natural to human societies at any point in time.2

The presuppositions implicit in many occidental ideas of 'nature' show how

these conceptions are historically and culturally determined. In fact, the man
ners of conceptualizing 'nature' in other parts of the world have not necessar
ily assumed the same forms as in the West:3 in this respect, the case of India is
particularly representative. Common formulations regarding the relationship
between India and nature must be radically reconsidered. Such formulations
largely depend on the first generation of indologists and, even more, on the
popular imagery they determined. According to such imagery, India substan
tially neglects the outer world (Spinoza's natura naturata) to focus on self-cen
tred meditation as an instrument to attain liberation. Equipped with such read

2 K. Soper, "Nature and convention", s.v. in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Version 1.0, London
and New York: Routledge 1998, pp. 5902-5903.
3 Until some decades ago, and sometimes even now, it happened that in the surveys of the concept
of nature through the ages non-western civilisations were tacitly excluded; see for instance R. Lenoble,
Esquisse d'une histoire de l'idée de Nature, Paris: Albin Michel 1969.

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[3] INTRODUCTION, PART I 11

ings, the first to filter through systematically in the West and to be firml
in communis opinio, how often must the western traveller, landing in India
expectancy of an ascetic and disincarnate world, have been stunned by
tiring proliferation of colours, odours and sounds - of life in all its mos
did and ephemeral forms! This also concerns the 'natural' aspects of man
as the body, passions, emotions, in a word his 'desiring' dimension.4
An apt starting point for an assessment of the concept of nature in
modern India can be a close look at the Sanskrit word deemed to be the
candidate for translating the western 'nature': the well-known term pr
An useful overall view on the subject is provided by Tracy Pintchman.

It is notable that the term prakrti, so important in later Brahmanical thought, d

occur at all in any of the Vedic Samhitâs and appears to occur only once in th
manas. It is found, however, in the Vedârigas, the "limbs" or subsidiary texts
Vedas, in both grammatical and ritual contexts. In these environments, the ter
technical meaning denoting the basic, uninflected, or unelaborated structure th
then be modified or embellished in different ways in other contexts. In the form
prakrti means the primary, radical form of a word, whereas in the latter it signi
paradigmatic sacrifice on which other sacrifices are modeled. The similarity b
these two senses of the term prakrti is more than coincidental. The Sanskri
matical tradition draws upon notions prevalent in the Vedic ritual tradition an
plies them with slightly different inflection. Louis Renou has suggested that
find many parallels between ancient grammatical formulations and those of ri
further suggests that the Sanskrit grammatical tradition draws upon notions p
in the Vedic ritual tradition and reapplies them with slightly different inflection
respect to the term prakrti, he notes: "Prakrti means 'base': the word is glosse
yoni and designates those rites that, once described, will not be repeated anymore
one will treat other ceremonies. It is with regard to prakrti that vikrti, or variety
ly the 'ectype', with respect to the 'archetype', is posited.. .The same meaning
exists in the grammarians and the phoneticians: thus 'radical' as opposed to pr
or rather 'original, primitive state' of a word as opposed to its 'modified state
is denoted by the term vikrti and more often vikâra... The usage of the term
mar can be thus understood as a borrowing from ritual language."5 [...] There a
points that should be noted about the use of the term prakrti in these contexts
the term seems to have ritual and linguistic significance but no explicitly stat

4 Cf. G. Boccali, R. Torcila (eds.), Passioni d'oriente: Eros ed emozioni in India e in Tibet, Torino
di 2007; R. Torcila, "Passions and emotions in the Indian Philosophical-Religious Traditions",
imoria, A. Wenta (eds.), Emotions in Indian Thought-Systems, London: Routledge (2014, pp. 57-96
5 "Prakrti signifie "base": le mot est glosé mula, yoni (le comm. de HirSs. xxv 110 le donne
équivalent de nimitta ou de kârana) et désigne les rites qui une fois décrits ne seront plus répétés
on traitera d'autres cérémonies. C'est par rapport à la prakrti qu'est instruite la vikrti ou "var
type" si l'on préfère par rapport à l'archétype. [...] La même valeur de "base" existe chez
mairiens et le phonéticiens: donc "radical" opposé à pratyaya, ou bien "état primitif, originel"
opposé à son "état modifié"que note le terme vikrti et plus souvent vikâra [...]. [L']usage du
grammaire se décèle donc comme un emprunt à la langue rituelle." (L. Renou, "Les connexions
rituel et la grammaire en sanskrit", Journal Asiatique 1941-1942, repr. E Staal, A Reader on the Sanskri
marians, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1972, p. 457).

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12 RAFFAELE TORELLA [4]

mological implications. Second, the term prakrti as it is used in these texts does not
have any clear association with materiality. A form that is prakrti is described as foun
dational in a structural, but not material, sense.6

In classical Sàmkhya prakrti 'nature, primordial matter' is opposed, but in a

sense also complementary, to the antagonist principle purusa 'the conscious
spiritual principle'.7 An apparently unbridgeable abyss separates the world of
nature - comprising the body, senses, passions and mental functions forming
an integrated whole - from the world of the spirit, alone responsible for
striking the spark of consciousness, without which the continual gross activi
ty of the sensorial faculties, of the inner sense, of the I-notion and the intellect
could never finally shine as 'knowledge'. An integrated monism of body, sens
es, emotions and intellectual faculties consequently exists, but leaves out that
very principle that alone can give meaning to the whole. The goal is not the
final achieving of greater unity, but the recognition of an irremediable other
ness, having reached which, the psyche-body-nature complex progressively
withdraws from the scene, . .like a dancer", recounts a famous stanza of the
Sâmkhya-kârikâ (v. 59), "having presented her performance to her audience",
leaving the spirit to shine in undisturbed solitude. The material, emotional and
psychic universe thus comes into existence solely so that the soul can recognise
itself as being foreign to it and isolate itself in its own self-identity. Even this
recognition is made possible by the action of prakrti itself, which thus finds in
its own negation its ultimate reason for existence. Another opposition stems
from this, more or less directly: prakrti seen as something fundamental, basic,
but also rough, even vulgar, which needs to be culturally refined to find its
proper place in the human world. See for example how the Indian 'natural'
languages (prakrta) stand with respect to the supremely refined and prestigious
Sanskrit, the language of the gods. But India knows also the opposite: the
praise of the supremely natural and innate (sahaja) with respect to the human
made, like in some currents of Hindu and Buddhist Tantrism.
Borrowing from the title of an insightful book by Charles Malamoud,8 we
could inquire about a possible feminineness of prakrti, itself a feminine word
in Sanskrit. The Sâmkhya-kàrikâ does not go beyond equating prakrti to a fe
male dancer (nartaki), or implicitly alluding to its generative function in re
spect to the manifested world. However, in later Sàmkhya, but first of all in
medieval Tantrism, both Saiva and Vaisnava, the prbcess of feminization of
the nature, or prakrti, is fully achieved. One of the key characteristics of
Tantrism is the understanding of the divine and the world as being sexually
polarized into male and female aspects. The female pole of Hindu Tantrism

6 T. Pintchman, The Rise of the Goddess in the Hindu Tradition, Albany: SUNY Press 1994, pp. 61-63.
7 On prakrti in Sàmkhya see A. Malinar, "Prakrti as sâmânya", Asiatische Studien/Études Asiatiques 53.3,
1999, pp. 619-643
8 Ch. Malamoud, Féminité de la Parole: Études sur l'Inde ancienne, Paris: Albin Michel 2005.

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[5] INTRODUCTION, PART I 13

is understood as an active principle and the source of the world, and in the
ology it is personified as a goddess. Thus, we have two series of attributes op
posing each other, a paradigm that largely still holds in contemporary India:
nature, matter, unconsciousness, feminine, movement, energy, on the one
side, and spirit, consciousness, masculinity, motionlessness, on the other. The
prakrti of later Sâmkhya and Tantrism, now fully feminized, becomes one of
the names of the partner of the male god, his sakti, which makes him active.
The germ of this evolution can be detected in the early history of the term.
The Svetâsvatara-upanisad equates prakrti with the principle of maya and de
scribes God as the possessor of this mâyâ:

The Vedas, the sacrifices, the rituals, the observances, the past, the future, and what the
Vedas say, all this the master of mâyâ (mâyin) emits from this and in it the other is ob
structed by mâyâ. Know that prakrti is mâyâ, and the master of mâyâ is the Great Lord.
All this universe is pervaded by beings which are parts of Him.9

I am going to conclude these sketchy remarks by highlighting a theme that,

at least partly, is common to the Indian prakrti and the western 'nature', lat.
natura, gr. <pvoiç. In both, nature has a double aspect: it exposes itself to our
senses in the rich variety of the living world and the universe (Spinoza's natu
ra naturata), but at the same time conceals its most essential and profound re
ality (natura naturans) behind the external appearances. Sâmkhya prakrti (as
natura naturans) is not accessible to perception due to its 'subtlety';10 likewise,
Heraclitus's cpvaiç loves hiding itself {cpvaiç xQvnreadai cpiMei).11 Hence the
theme of the mystery, or mysteries, of nature. While for the Stoiciens nature
is identified with the totality of apparent reality, both rational and corporal,
for the Neoplatonicians, like Porphyrius, cpvaiç detests exposing itself to all
in its nudity. The phenomena are just a veil it makes use of to conceal itself:
only the spiritual eye can lift this veil and grasp its elusive essence.12

9 IV.9-io chandàmsi yajiîâh kratavo vratâni bhûtam yac ca veda vacanti | asmàn màyi srjate visvam etat tas
mims cânyo mâyayà samniruddhah \ \ màyàm tu prakrtim riddhi màyinam tu mahesvaram | tasyâvayavabhûtais
tu vyàptam sarvam idamjagat 11.
10 Sâmkhya-kârikâ 8a sauksmyàt tadanupalabdhih. 11 Diels-Kranz K22B123.
12 Cf. P. Hadot, Le voile d'Isis, Paris: Gallimard 2004, pp. 80-88. It is to be noted that, notwithstanding
the fact that Heraclitus's sentence has always been taken in this meaning in the numberless cases of its
assumption by the most diverse schools of thought, from the Neoplatonicians down to our times, its
original meaning was probably quite different. In fact, parallel occurrences of the infinite xovTireofiai in
coeval literature point to an active (not passive!) meaning: ipvoiç loves 'concealing', that is, destroying
the forms after creating/manifesting them... (cf. P. Hadot, cit., pp. 29-33). On this fragment, see also G.
Colli, La sapienza greca, m. Eraclito, Milano: Adelphi 1993 [1980], p. 188.

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