Seizing German Naval Intelligence From T

Seizing German Naval Intelligence
from the Archives of 1870‒1945
DAVID KOHNEN
ABSTRACT
Scholars have learned much about the history of modern Europe and
maritime affairs from the archives of the German Navy. However, few are
aware that Royal Navy and U.S. Navy personnel saved these records from
destruction during the closing weeks of the Second World War. Anglo-
American commando teams operated in advance of Allied forces to "pinch"
intelligence from the Germans. This article will focus on one such unit. The
Royal Navy 30 Advanced Unit (30 AU) joined U.S. Navy counterparts of
the Forward Intelligence Unit (FIU) to procure intelligence from Axis
sources. In the spring of 1945, 30 AU and FIU teams raced their Soviet
allies to locate the Nazi weapons experts Wernher von Braun and Hellmuth
Walther. During the hunt, 30 AU and FIU teams stumbled upon Tambach
Castle in southern Germany – wherein they discovered the German Navy
archives from 1870 to 1945. Anglo-American analysts scoured the archives
for "German intelligence on Russia." This article examines questions in
Anglo-American strategic relations, the operations of units like 30 AU and
FIU, and finally how Axis documents such as those discovered at Tambach
ultimately influenced historians of the war at sea into the Cold War era.
KEYWORDS
30 Advanced Unit; 30 Assault Unit; commando; Forward Intelligence Unit;
German Navy; intelligence; Royal Navy; Tambach Archives; U.S. Navy
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.5893/19498489.120105
____________________________
Introduction
In the age of sail, mariners often received ransom payments for bringing
captured vessels to port. Naval commanders also gathered intelligence by
examining information from captured enemy ships and crew. Keeping with
maritime tradition, the Royal Navy and U.S. Navy developed procedures to
seize intelligence from the enemy during the Second World War. British and
American sailors operated on the ground and in close proximity to the front.
During these operations, they captured key enemy personnel, equipment,
Global War Studies 12 (1) 2015 │ 133

and documents. Such information ultimately proved decisive to the Allied
victory against the Axis Tripartite of Germany, Italy, and Japan. As early as
1944, British and American intelligence also derived information from
captured Axis sources to plan the reconstruction of Europe and Asia. With
the Allied victory in the spring of 1945, Axis records fell under the shared
control of the British Empire and the United States. Historians inevitably
sought access to original documents in examining the events and person-
alities, which defined the Second World War.
Anglo-American intelligence bureaucracies struggled to negotiate
policies, which enabled historians to examine documents while simul-
taneously safeguarding sensitive sources and analytical methods. "A
comparison of German and Japanese official records (archives), which fell
into our hands at the end of the war, with our own archival records," one
analyst noted in 1948, "will show that our Navy, Army, and Air Staffs had in
their possession information of a highly secure nature concerning enemy
movements and operational and technical interest." 1 Given such concerns,
Anglo-American intelligence officials carefully vetted a select number of
historians to examine original records during the postwar era. In turn, these
historians also helped obscure the role of high-grade "Special Intelligence"
in British and American operations during the Second World War. 2 With
declassification, documents relating to these efforts provide historians fresh
opportunities to reexamine the historiography of the Second World War and
retrace the underlying role of Anglo-American intelligence in anticipation of
the Cold War.
This article focuses on a team of Royal Navy and U.S. Navy sailors who
ultimately stumbled upon the German Navy archives at Castle Tambach
while searching for Axis intelligence sources during the closing months of
the Second World War in Europe. The Royal Navy commandos of 30
Assault/Advanced Unit (AU) worked in unison at sea and ashore with the
U.S. Navy Forward Intelligence Unit (FIU). The naval commandos of 30
AU and FIU specialized in taking enemy targets between 1942 and 1946.
They then assisted other teams with more specialized training to identify key
equipment, documents, and interrogate prisoners. 30 AU and FIU then
evacuated such material to centralized exploitation centers, where other
Allied analysts examined the material in detail. 3 After the war, the
1. London (Kew), The National Archives (TNA) [formerly known as the Public Record
Office], Cabinet Office and Predecessors (CAB 103), Historical Section Registered Files
(CAB 103/288), "Official Histories of the War, 1939-45: Use of Special Intelligence by
Historians," Memorandum "General Directive to Chief of Historians," Top Secret Ultra
Annex, Entry of 11 February 1948.
2. Ibid.
3. Nicholas Rankin, Ian Fleming's Commandos: The Story of the Legendary 30 Assault
Unit (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 270-91; Craig Cabell, The History
of 30 Assault Unit: Ian Fleming's Red Indians (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2009); and Sean
Longden, T-Force: The Race for Nazi War Secrets, 1945 (London: Constable, 2009), pp.
1-38, 79, 97, 134, 230, 227-68.
134 │ Global War Studies 12 (1) 2015

documents remained classified. However, some veterans affiliated with the
effort to gather Axis intelligence offered hints about the secret history of the
Second World War.
Seizing History
In general, records relating to 30 AU and FIU remained inaccessible to
researchers working outside the cloistered ranks of Anglo-American naval
insiders. Yet, references to such units appeared in many histories and
popular culture after 1945. For example, Ian Fleming helped orchestrate the
wartime operations of Anglo-American commandos. After the war, Fleming
drew from his knowledge of organizations like 30 AU and FIU to create the
fictional British spy, 007 – James Bond, and his American counterpart, Felix
Leiter.4 In folklore, the "30" reference associated with 30 AU coincided with
a wartime office in which Fleming worked at the Admiralty in London. 5
Fleming clearly drew from his knowledge of Allied intelligence in spinning
his tales of James Bond. However, it is important to set aside the fictions of
007 in order to examine the remaining historical questions associated with
Anglo-American strategic relations, wartime operations, and the unique
exploits of 30 AU and FIU.
While awaiting their release from active service, many veterans of Anglo-
American intelligence wrote the operational narratives and administrative
staff histories of the Admiralty and Navy Department. Between 1945 and
1946, Margarite Priestley of the Women's Royal Naval Service (WRNS)
typed the original draft of an official Admiralty history of 30 AU. Priestley
had served as an assistant to Fleming inside the Admiralty headquarters,
perhaps serving as an inspiration to Fleming's fictional character, Miss
Penny Pettaval, or Miss Moneypenny.6 During the Cold War era, Anglo-
American classification prevented the release of the official history of 30
AU. Such restrictions also prevented Fleming from writing details about his
wartime service. Instead, he used the fictional James Bond to convey his
experiences in British intelligence.
Perhaps inadvertently, the popular mythology surrounding Fleming and
the exploits of James Bond further obscured the secret history of 30 AU and
FIU. However, Fleming also provided useful hints about the character of
Anglo-American collaboration through the fictionalized stories of Bond and
his American counterpart, Leiter. Veterans affiliated with 30 AU adapted
their recollections to conform to the mythology of Anglo-American
intelligence. Many saw themselves in the character of Bond. For example, a
4. John Pearson, "James Bond: Alias Ian Fleming," Life 61:15 (7 October 1966), pp. 102-
20.
5. Longden, T-Force, p. 4.
6. David Nutting, ed., Attain by Surprise: The Story of 30 Assault Unit Royal Navy/Royal
Marine Commando (Chichester: Colver, 1997), pp. 220-23; Craig Cabell, Ian Fleming's
Secret War (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2008), pp. 8-20, 40-53, and 60-83; Cabell, History
of 30 Assault Unit, pp. 143-61; and Longden, T-Force, pp. 380-83.

memoir compiled by David Nutting (in collaboration with Trevor Glanville)
provides unique recollections from thirty-one veterans of 30 AU. One U.S.
Navy liaison, Angus MacLean Thuermer, contributed to this obscure work,
which remained unpublished until 1994. 7 Other memoirs by 30 AU veterans
provide additional color – particularly John A.C. Hugill's, The Hazard Mesh,
and Patrick Dalzel-Job's, From Arctic Snow to the Dusts of Normandy.
Notably, Glanville, Hugill, and Dalzel-Job alluded to their U.S. Navy
counterparts in memoirs. However, they failed to offer details about the
exact role of the Americans.
With the declassification of Anglo-American intelligence files, historical
studies of 30 AU largely failed to examine its close tactical collaboration
with similar American units. For example, Craig Cabell's 2008 biography,
Ian Fleming's Secret War, portrays the British as the driving force behind
American intelligence gathering efforts. His second book on the subject,
The History of 30 Assault Unit: Ian Fleming's Red Indians, also emphasizes
the British perspective, although it fails to provide a fully balanced
examination of American equivalents. In another 2009 history, T-Force: The
Race for Nazi War Secrets, 1945, Sean Longden emphasizes the connections
between 30 AU and other Allied intelligence gathering units, such as the "T-
Force" and "S-Force."8 In 2011, Nicholas Rankin provided more details in
Ian Fleming's Commandos: The Story of the Legendary 30 Assault Unit.
These histories provide useful insight, although the narratives focus mainly
on the British commandos of 30 AU. Perhaps inadvertently, the operations
of 30 AU have overshadowed the key role of U.S. Navy personnel in
combined Anglo-American efforts to seize Axis intelligence sources during
the closing months of the Second World War.
As the exploits of 30 AU progressively entered into the realm of popular
myth, this article will examine the character of Anglo-American collab-
oration by focusing on the relationship between Royal Navy commandos
and their U.S. Navy counterparts in the FIU. For the purposes of this brief
analysis, the narrative will focus primarily upon the collaborative effort by
30 AU and FIU during operations culminating in the capture of the German
Naval Archives. It will then examine how Anglo-American historians cited
their intelligence value to preserve the collection during the immediate
postwar years. "Military history cannot be complete," one Allied observer
noted, "until the enemy's viewpoint and reactions are included in the
documentation."9 Indeed, many historians relied upon captured documents to
7. Nutting, Attain by Surprise, pp. i-x.

8. Francis H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on
Strategy and Operations, Vol. III (London: HMSO, 1990), pp. 459-75.
9. College Park, Maryland, National Archives and Records Administration – Archives II
(NARA II), Record Group 313 (RG 313), Records of the Operating Forces: Commander,
U.S. Naval Forces – Europe" (ComNavEu), Box 10, Folder 53, "Axis Archives," serial
A-12 (9), 4 August 1943 memorandum from Fourth Sea Lord, Vice Admiral Geoffrey
Blake, to DNI, Royal Navy Rear-Admiral Edmund G.N. Rushbrooke, "ComNavEu

reconstruct the history of the Second World War. At the same time, few
examined how such records survived the war in the first place.
By focusing on the collaboration between 30 AU and FIU during
operations culminating in the capture of the German Naval Archives at
Tambach Castle, readers may find fresh insight to the special character of
Anglo-American relations in operations and intelligence. When they arrived
at the scene in April of 1945, the Anglo-American commandos of 30 AU
and FIU discovered a small group of German admirals. Inside the castle,
they discovered a large cache of archival records, chart files, communi-
cations documents, and operational orders. At first glance, it remained
unclear whether the documents contained anything of immediate intelligence
value to the 30 AU commandos. As the team focused on efforts to locate
Nazi scientists and weapons technology, 30 AU reported the find to higher
headquarters and continued southward into the Harz Mountains.
British commandos of 30 AU initially found the German Naval Archives
by acting upon the information provided by their American counterparts
from FIU. Writing in hindsight, the Royal Navy official history of 30 AU
characterized the capture at Tambach as "probably the most successful
operation ever undertaken."10 In his memoir, Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve
(RNVR) Lieutenant Commander Trevor James "Sancho" Glanville
described the capture of Castle Tambach as "the summit of my career in the
unit and my war effort generally."11 At the same time, both accounts
acknowledged the crucial role of U.S. Navy lieutenants John Lambie and
Hubert Potter "H.P." Earle. 30 AU commandos treated Lambie and Earle as
comrades in arms. One 30 AU veteran remembered Earle only by his nick-
name, "Saucy Earle."12 The 30 AU veterans perhaps drew inspiration from
the "HP Sauce" condiment in assigning Earle's informal nom de guerre.
Personalities affiliated with 30 AU provided recollections of British
commando operations, unlike their American counterparts from FIU.
Glanville acknowledged his American counterparts, Lambie and Earle, in
postwar memoirs. At the same time, he also failed to offer biographical
information about these shadowy figures. Lambie originally volunteered for
service with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) before joining the U.S.
Navy Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) as a linguist. He specialized in
interrogating German Navy Prisoners of War (PoW). In the spring of 1943,
Historical Section."
10. TNA, Records of the Admiralty, Naval Forces, Marines, Coast Guard, and Related
Forces (ADM), "Naval Intelligence Division and Operational Intelligence Centre:
Intelligence Reports and Papers" (ADM 223), Subdivision 214 (ADM 223/214),
Appendix I, "History of No. 30 Commando (later known as 30 Assault Unit and 30
Advanced Unit, also known as 'Special Engineering Unit')" ("History of 30 AU"),
Chapter XIII, "Operations in North West Europe – The Final Phase," quote found in
Paragraph 63.
11. Nutting, Attain by Surprise, pp. 17-19 and 211.
12. Author interviews with 30 AU veterans in May 2008, including William Reginald
"Reg" Rush and David Nutting.

Lambie joined the headquarters of the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces
Europe (ComNavEu) under Admiral Harold R. Stark in London. He sub-
sequently joined Earle to receive training with the British commandos in
Scotland in the fall of 1943.13
Earle specialized in examining war crimes attributed to the Nazi regime,
with specific emphasis on the intelligence and security organizations. He
offered specialized expertise from prewar studies in Europe. His father,
George H. Earle, III, held a U.S. Navy Reserve commission and earlier
served as Governor of Pennsylvania before accepting an appointment from
President Franklin D. Roosevelt to serve as the Ambassador to Austria.
Drawing from experiences with his father, Earle studied law at Harvard
University before joining the U.S. Navy Reserve in 1942. From the spring of
1943, the father and son served together in U.S. Navy uniform while
assigned to the ComNavEu headquarters. The elder Earle acted on special
presidential authority to gather evidence relating to the Katyn Forest
massacre.14 The younger Earle gained unique experience, examining
documents relating to the incident.
In efforts to reconstruct the German and Soviet intelligence organizations,
Earle offered specialized expertise from assisting in the Katyn investigation.
In the fall of 1943, his father returned to the United States and subsequently
received another presidential appointment to serve as Governor of American
Samoa in conjunction with a U.S. Navy promotion to captain. Thus, the
younger Earle received an assignment to serve as a Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) liaison at Bletchley Park. He joined
the TICom organization upon completing commando training with 30 AU in
the spring of 1944. During the Normandy campaign, Earle served in the
document exploitation section of ComNavEu in London.15
Lambie and Earle offered similar expertise as reservists serving within the
wartime ranks of the U.S. Navy. Both specialized in reconstructing the
bureaucratic organizations and the identification of key personalities in the
Nazi regime. Lambie and Earle also drew from a cosmopolitan upbringing.
Both nurtured close personal ties with their British counterparts of 30 AU.
Lambie and Earle acted as key intermediaries between 30 AU and FIU
during the preliminary planning in anticipation of the Allied "D-Day"
landings in Nazi-occupied France. Both continued in this capacity,
facilitating Anglo-American efforts to locate and procure raw intelligence
13. NARA, Record Group 226 (RG 226), "Records of the Office of Strategic Services"
(OSS), Central Files, Box 189, Entry 92, Folder 15, "Lambie," 9 July 1942 memo for
Commander William H. Vanderbilt, USNR, OSS Naval Section.
14. George H. Earle, III, "F.D.R.'s Tragic Mistake," Confidential 6:3 (August 1958), pp.
14-19 and 56-58.
15. The younger Earle had also worked as an assistant to Ambassador William Christian
Bullitt, Jr. at the American Embassy in Paris. Similar to Kennedy's memoir, Why
England Slept, Earle wrote about his experiences in prewar Europe in the memoir
Blackout: The Human Side of Europe's March to War (New York: Lippincott, 1939).

sources during the Allied advance to victory in Europe. Lambie and Earle
continued operating in tandem with both 30 AU and FIU during Anglo-
American intelligence gathering operations through 1946.
By focusing on the capture of Castle Tambach, this article will offer a
fresh analysis of relations between 30 AU and FIU. Through this approach,
it will also examine broader questions concerning the Anglo-American
maritime alliance. In general, postwar histories have failed to emphasize the
close collaboration among such units – often creating subtle differences in
historical accounts by British and American authors. This dynamic has
caused problems in the historiography of the Second World War. For
example, many postwar accounts have focused on 30 AU, but historians
have yet to examine the relationship of 30 AU with similar Allied
intelligence gathering units, such as FIU.
In examining histories of the war at sea, many historians have cited
documents found in the German Naval Archives. Yet, historians have
largely ignored how such records actually survived the war in the first place.
Thus, this article will examine three general themes. First, how the capture
of the German Naval Archives at Tambach provides an excellent case study
for understanding the development of Anglo-American naval commando
units after 1942. Secondly, it highlights Anglo-American efforts to gather
intelligence from captured enemy documents. In examining the role of 30
AU and FIU, this article will conclude by acknowledging the role of a few
historians who served as Allied intelligence analysts during the war. These
historians had a key role in preserving captured Axis records, which became
the basis for early postwar histories of the Second World War.
Attain by Surprise
The Allies relied upon the consistent acquisition of enemy intelligence
sources to defeat the Axis. In February of 1942, the British had lost the
ability to solve German Navy communications with the introduction of the
four-rotor (M4) Enigma cipher. Cryptographers at the Government Code and
Cypher School (GC&CS) at Bletchley Park struggled with the M4 problem.
At the same time, they avoided revealing their difficulties with M4 to their
American counterparts. This situation threatened to undermine Admiralty
efforts to control the course of combined naval strategy in the war at sea. 16
Groping for a solution, Lieutenant Commander Ian Fleming, Royal Navy
Volunteer Reserve (RNVR) conceived a variety of novel approaches to the
question. He became widely credited for the idea of organizing specialized
teams of naval personnel to perform the mission of seizing raw intelligence
from the enemy. The successes of German Navy commandos (Marine
Einsatz Kommando or MEK, otherwise known as "MARES" to the Allies)
16. NARA, RG 457, Box 705, 30 May 1944, "Memorandum to the Director of Naval
Communications: History of the Bombe Project," pp. 9-11. Also, see Phyllis L. Soybel, A
Necessary Relationship: The Development of Anglo-American Cooperation in Naval
Intelligence (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2005), pp. 142-49.

first inspired Fleming with the idea of creating a similar unit for the Royal
Navy.
Fleming sought opportunities to take a direct role in Royal Navy
operations, having served in a position of unique influence within the
Admiralty. He served as the personal assistant to the Director of Naval
Intelligence (DNI), Rear Admiral Sir John Godfrey. By April 1942, Godfrey
approved Fleming's concept of an "Offensive Naval Intelligence Group." 17
British efforts to procure intelligence from the enemy reflected a mixture of
creativity and desperation. Facing few alternatives, Godfrey secured funding
from the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) of the War Cabinet and
empowered Fleming to help organize 30 AU. Yet, Godfrey restricted
Fleming from actually becoming a member of the unit. As a result, Fleming
spent most of the war serving in the Operational Section of Naval
Intelligence Division (NID) inside the Old Admiralty Building, across from
the "Citadel" complex by the Horse Guards Parade on the Mall in central
London. In this role, he helped identify German intelligence targets for 30
AU. He also worked in close collaboration with the Combined Operations
Headquarters (COHQ) to orchestrate commando operations associated with
30 AU after 1942.
The Admiralty provided personnel for the Royal Marine and Royal Navy
sections of 30 AU as adjuncts to the British Army commando formations.
Initially, the unit was formed as Number 30 (30 Commando), which was
subdivided into "wings" from all the various branches of the British military
services.18 Commander Robert "Red" Ryder selected personnel with
experience outside the traditional ranks of the Royal Navy and Royal
Marines.19 In forming the Navy Wing of 30 Commando, he sought recruits
who had pursued degrees in the classics, history, and languages before the
war at Eton, Cambridge, and Oxford.20 He also selected polar explorers,
mountaineers, and divers. Among other experts in their field, Ryder also
accepted convicted felons accused of forgery, burglary, and safecracking. 21
Among the new recruits to the Navy Wing of 30 Commando, Trevor J.
"Sancho" Glanville offered a wide variety of experience as a freelance
journalist, a soldier, and a spy.
Glanville earlier served as a British Army officer with the Special
17. TNA, ADM 223/214, "History of 30 AU," Part II, Section 6, "German Intelligence
Assault Units – Marine Einsatz Kommando (MARES)." Also, see Lawrence Paterson,
Weapons of Desperation: German Frogmen and Midget Submarines of World War II
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2006), pp. 1-20; and Nutting, Attain by Surprise, pp.
12-13.
18. TNA, ADM 223/214, "History of 30 AU," Part I, Chapter I, "Early History of the
Unit."
19. Nutting, Attain by Surprise, pp. 13-14.
20. Ibid., pp. 12-16, 169-70, 190-98, 211-19, and 228.
21. TNA, ADM 223/214, "History of 30 AU," Part I, Chapter I, "Early History of the
Unit"; Nutting, Attain by Surprise, pp. 234-35; and I.G. "Jan" Aylen, "Recollections of
30 Assault Unit," The Naval Review 65:4 (October 1977), p. 318.

Intelligence Service (SIS) of the Military Intelligence Division (MI6). Fluent
in Serbo-Croatian, he also had a working knowledge of Spanish, Italian,
French, and German. He completed clandestine missions with MI6 at the
British embassies in Yugoslavia and Portugal. Glanville then transferred into
the Special Operations Executive (SOE) to organize partisan units in the
Balkans. During one mission, Croatian turncoats kidnapped Glanville and
sold him for ransom to the Italians. Released in a prisoner exchange, he
subsequently resigned from the British Army and accepted a provisional
appointment as a sub-lieutenant in the RNVR with the Navy Wing of 30
Commando.22
The British relied heavily upon foreign troops to stage commando
operations against the most formidable Axis targets. British strategists also
depended upon American resources and hoped to bring U.S. Army and U.S.
Navy commanders under the influence of COHQ. Thus, Glanville acted as
an advisor to U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel William O. Darby to organize
National Guard troops into commando units, particularly those from the
168th Infantry Regiment. During the summer of 1942, the "168th
Commandos" evolved in conjunction with the 1st Ranger Battalion. 23 In
these experimental units, British officers often held overall command over
the American troops. British influence within the 168th Commandos was so
evident that one observer remarked that they, "smoked Players [cigarettes],
drank Twinings [tea], and wore British battle dress like lads from Yorkshire
or Chelsea."24
Close collaboration among forces at the front contrasted with the more
tentative relationship which characterized Anglo-American relations at the
higher levels of command. During the raid at Dieppe in August of 1942
(Operation JUBILEE), for example, Anglo-American forces suffered from
confused command organization and did not properly coordinate the assault.
22. Nutting, Attain by Surprise, p. 19; and Jerca Vodušek Starić, "The Concurrence of
Allied and Yugoslav Intelligence Aims and Activities," Journal of Intelligence History
5:1 (Summer 2005), p. 33.
23. Andrew L. Hargreaves, Special Operations in World War II: British and American
Irregular Warfare (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2013), pp. 127-30; Rick
Atkinson, An Army at Dawn: The War in North Africa, 1942-1943 (New York: Henry
Holt, 2002), pp. 54-56, 98-102, 117, 312-16, 323-25, 353-57, 468-73, and 506-10; David
W. Hogan, Jr., Raiders or Elite Infantry: The Changing Role of the U.S. Army Rangers
from Dieppe to Granada (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), pp. 13-56; and John
Hougen, History of the Famous 34th Infantry Division (Nashville: Battery Press, 1986),
pp. 22-30.
24. Nutting, Attain by Surprise, pp. 22-30. Unlike the Rangers, the 168th Commandos
were a totally combined Anglo-American effort. The British fully integrated the
American 168th Commandos as "Troops" 6 through 10 within the regiments of No. 1 and
No. 6 Commando. See Washington, DC, U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH),
Historical Resources Branch, Historical Resources Collection, Reference #461
Publications, U.S. Army Major Jack A. Marshall to the Military District of Washington
Commander, "Tales of a Timid Commando," unpublished manuscript.

As a result, the Allies failed to achieve their actual objectives at Dieppe. 25
The question of allowing the British to assert command over American
forces became a persistent problem among Allied strategic commanders. For
example, Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery and General Dwight D.
Eisenhower frequently disagreed about the focus of operations. Similarly,
Admiral of the Fleet Andrew Cunningham and his American counterpart,
Admiral Ernest J. King, struggled to strike a balance in maneuvering forces
across multiple naval war fronts.26
Although the British generally worked well with their American
counterparts, the Allies still had slightly different war aims in framing their
combined strategy against the Axis. They also had a different approach to
the questions surrounding their wartime allies in the Soviet Union.
Anticipating future conflicts, the British hoped to retain firm control over
high-grade intelligence sources. For example, British cryptographers
provided specialized training for selected members of 30 Commando.
However, the British withheld similar training for American naval liaisons
embedded with 30 Commando. In early 1942, Royal Navy (RN)
Commander N. Allon Bacon traveled from Bletchley Park to the head-
quarters of 30 Commando at Rosneath, Scotland. There, he indoctrinated
officers from 30 Commando into the most secret aspects of the German
Enigma cipher. According to Bacon, "No notes were allowed to be taken in
regard to these requirements" and the members of 30 Commando "were not
allowed to visit B.P. or to have any knowledge of progress made in breaking
enemy cyphers or of the methods and machinery used in British crypto-
analytic procedure."27 In briefing the commandos, Bacon emphasized the
importance of discretion.
The British commandos failed to share details about cryptographic targets
with American counterparts. In North Africa, Glanville and other British
members of 30 Commando accompanied the Americans of the 168th
Commandos. The British elements of 30 Commando focused on securing
the intelligence data and employed the 168th Commandos as a blocking
force. During the raid at Bizerte, Anglo-American commandos suffered
heavy casualties while seizing German codes and cipher equipment. During
the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, U.S. Army and U.S. Navy
commanders questioned the practice of allowing the British to control
25. Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, pp. 31, 47, 70, and 141; Hogan, Raiders or Elite
Infantry, pp. 13-56; and Nutting, Attain by Surprise, pp. 22-30.
26. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (New York: Doubleday, 1948), p. 4. In
naval affairs, it is interesting to examine negotiations between the Admiralty and the
CominCh. For example, U.S. Navy Admiral (four stars) Ernest J. King refused to
relinquish control in stating that "I have very strong (personal) opinion is the avoidance
of mixed forces." See Newport, Rhode Island, Naval War College Library and Archives
(NWC), Ernest J. King Papers (King Papers), Box 7, Folder 5, "ASW Conference of 1
March 1943, Remarks by Admiral King, 2/28/43," p. 2.
27. TNA, ADM 223/214, "History of SIGINT Operations Undertaken by 30 Commando /
30 A.U."

American forces. Shortly thereafter, the Americans dissolved the 168th
Commandos. The survivors thereafter fell under the full control of the U.S.
Army. Given their specialized training and recent combat seasoning,
veterans of the 168th Commandos also joined the ranks of the 1st Rangers
and helped organize the 2nd and 3rd Rangers Battalions.
Combined commando operations resulted in significant successes for
Anglo-American intelligence. From the perspective of GC&CS, "NORTH
AFRICA yielded a new machine relating to a high-grade ABWEHR link
which had hitherto remained unbroken." According to Bacon, "This capture
resulted in the immediate reading of about six weeks of traffic on this link"
and "a notebook containing particulars of a high grade Italian code." During
the Tunisian Campaign, British intelligence leaders told Allied commanders
in North Africa that the "Gamma wheel was to be found at El Hammamet."
Lacking sufficient awareness of its significance, the Anglo-American
commandos initially failed to act upon the information. "Had this wheel
been taken in the first instance," Bacon later postulated, "the effect on the
conduct of operations in the Atlantic would have been most marked."28
The relationship between Anglo-American intelligence services remained
in the early stages of development. As a result, British and American forces
shared information on an informal basis in advance of offensive operations.
They largely lacked procedures for sharing high-grade intelligence sources
throughout the war. For example, their classification procedures remained
unsynchronized – British SECRET equated with the American caveat of
CONFIDENTIAL. This situation hindered full cooperation among Anglo-
American intelligence organizations, as British information of a higher-
grade remained vulnerable to dissemination among American forces at a
lower-grade.29
Allied personnel assigned to the frontline received very limited training in
understanding the sources and analytical methods used in producing
intelligence. Despite their overall success, Anglo-American commandos
largely operated in a vacuum during operations in the Mediterranean.
Among the lessons highlighted from the North African campaign, Bacon
emphasized the failure of GC&CS to provide sufficient training for frontline
personnel. Cryptographic analysts failed to emphasize the significance of a
crucial component of the German Navy four-rotor (M4) Enigma.30
British and American cryptologists relied upon captured enemy
documents and equipment to solve Axis codes and ciphers. Until spring
1942, the Naval Section at GC&CS used captured data to solve German
Navy messages encrypted on the three-rotor (M3) Enigma cipher. The
introduction of the M4 Enigma in the German Navy submarine force in
February 1942 resulted in the "blackout" among GC&CS cryptologists at
28. Ibid.
29. TNA, ADM 116/5418/NID 001669/42, "Categories of Security."
30. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, Vol. 3, Part II, pp. 747-52.

Bletchley Park.31 The failure to solve German Navy codes and ciphers
amplified problems in the relationship between Anglo-American naval
strategists during the summer of 1942, as British leaders failed to share the
full details of the blackout with their American counterparts. Although
British cryptographers briefly restored access to M4 Enigma in November,
the Americans expanded their cryptographic campaign against M4 Enigma.
Allied cryptanalysts struggled against M4 Enigma until the U.S. Navy
perfected a reliable mechanical solution with the "high-speed" Bombe.
Building upon previous British experience, American cryptographers used
the "high-speed" Bombe to solve M4 Enigma messages with limited delay
after June 1943.32
MARTIAN Reports from the Far Shore

When the Germans introduced the M4 Enigma aboard submarines, Allied
strategists temporarily lost access to their best sources of tactical naval
intelligence. As a result, they began to anticipate a number of worst-case
scenarios. British and American intelligence, for example, feared that Axis
scientists had perfected designs for a wide range of new weapons and spent
considerable resources on determining whether Germany was working on
the atomic bomb. Although the Germans never developed atomic weapons
during the war, the Allies did not know this at the time. German scientists
had also begun sharing information with their Japanese allies under the
"Yanagi" arrangement.33 With the invasion of Europe, Anglo-American
commanders hoped to prevent the Germans from passing such technology to
the Japanese.34
British and American analysts worked together to compile information
from various sources to identify potential targets for the invasion. Within
31. Gordon Welchman, The Hut Six Story: Breaking the Enigma Codes (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1982), pp. 125-37; Francis H. Hinsley and Alan Stripp, eds., Code-
breakers: The Inside Story of Bletchley Park (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993),
pp. 113-37; Bradley F. Smith, The Ultra-Magic Deals: And the Most Secret Special
Relationship, 1940-1946 (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1993), pp. 217-29; Alan Harris
Bath, Tracking the Axis Enemy: The Triumph of Anglo-American Naval Intelligence
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998), pp. 227-34; and Jim DeBrosse and Colin
Burke, The Secret in Building 26: The Untold Story of America's Ultra War against the
U-boat Enigma Codes (New York: Random House, 2004), pp. ix-xiv and 197-211.
32. Ralph Erskine and Frode Weierud, "Naval Enigma: M4 and its Rotors," Cryptologia
11:4 (1987), p. 235; Ralph Erskine, "The First Naval Enigma Decrypts of World War II,"
Cryptologia 21:1 (1997), p. 44.
33. Carl Boyd, Hitler's Japanese Confidant: General Ōshima Hiroshi and Magic Intelli-
gence, 1941-1945 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993), pp. 48-49.
34. NARA, RG 457, "Records of the National Security Agency and Central Security
Service," Box 99, "G.C.&C.S. Naval History," Vol. XXIV, "The German Navy and
Japan," Lieutenant Commander Knight W. McMahon, USNR, Comp., Edited by
Lieutenant-Commander Leonard Griffiths, RNVR (Circa 1946), pp. 9 and 49. Note:
McMahon and Griffiths also served on occasion with 30 AU and FIU at the European
front.

SHAEF, Eisenhower created a combined planning center on the grounds of
Bletchley Park, which compiled various sources of intelligence for use in
planning Operation OVERLORD – the Allied amphibious landings to
liberate Nazi-occupied Europe. These combined with clandestine reports
from the SOE and the American equivalent, the Office of Strategic Services
(OSS). Through SOE and OSS channels, the French Forces of the Interior
(FFI) operatives provided crucial information. High-grade intelligence
derived from cryptology was also compared against sources ranging from air
reconnaissance photographs, enemy PoW interrogations, indigenous
resistance forces, and Axis newspapers. 35 For security purposes, Anglo-
American strategists referred to the European coast as the "Far Shore." The
"MARTIAN" Reports, as classified within SHAEF, informed Anglo-
American planning for operations against various potential targets in
anticipation of the invasion of Europe. MARTIAN reports became central to
deception plans, as orchestrated under Operation FORTITUDE. 36
A brief discussion of the Anglo-American naval command is required for
examining commando operations in continental Europe. With the creation of
the SHAEF organization under Eisenhower in the spring of 1944, the Allies
established subsidiary organizations for the planning phases of
OVERLORD. 37 The Allied Naval Commander Expeditionary Force
(ANCXF), for example, became the immediate headquarters to coordinate
naval operations. Serving under Eisenhower, Royal Navy Admiral Sir
Bertram Ramsay (four stars) commanded ANCXF. 38 However, Ramsay
grew deeply frustrated with his American counterparts, particularly his
subordinate commander, U.S. Navy Vice Admiral (three stars) Alan
Goodrich Kirk. Ramsay and Kirk competed for tactical control over
combined Anglo-American naval forces while planning the amphibious
components of OVERLORD – Operation NEPTUNE. 39
35. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, Vol. 3, Part II, pp. 749-55.
36. Michael Howard, Strategic Deception in the Second World War: British Intelligence
Operations against the German High Command (New York: Norton, 1995), 103-34;
Mary Kathryn Barbier, D-Day Deception: Operation Fortitude and the Normandy
Invasion (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007), p. 153; and Christopher D. Yung, Gators of
Neptune: Naval Amphibious Planning for the Normandy Invasion (Annapolis: Naval
Institute Press, 2006), pp. 91-92, 177-78, and 221-23.
37. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 4.
38. Ernest J. King, Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record (New York: Norton, 1952), pp.
543-55; B. Mitchell Simpson, Admiral Harold R. Stark: Architect of Victory, 1939-1945
(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989), pp. 136-54, 199-21, and 223-35;
Morison, History of the United States Navy in World War II, Vol. XI, p. 32; Bath,
Tracking the Axis Enemy, pp. 212-22; and Yung, Gators of Neptune, pp. 91-92, 177-78,
and 221-23.
39. Newport, Rhode Island, Naval War College (NWC), Archives and Special
Collections, "Reminiscences of Alan Goodrich Kirk" (Kirk Reminiscences), Compiled
from a series of 1961 interviews conducted in the New York City home of Kirk at the
Dakota Mansion complex by John T. Mason, Jr. for the Oral History Research Office at
Columbia University, 1962 Transcription, pp. 220-25, and 261-62. Kirk characterized the

Anglo-American strategists drew from their previous experience in
forming commando teams specially trained to seize intelligence from Axis
sources. In planning OVERLORD, Royal Navy and U.S. Navy strategists
incorporated commando missions within NEPTUNE. Anglo-American
strategists retained control over Allied commando operations from head-
quarters in London. For the landings at Normandy, ANCXF headquarters
received responsibility for supporting the naval commando units. Royal
Navy and U.S. Navy commando units received significant latitude in
selecting targets found on the Black List. Thus, they rarely operated under
the centralized control of strategic or operational headquarters at the front.
By identifying the bureaucratic designations associated with the Anglo-
American naval commandos, contemporary historians can reconstruct the
files, which became absorbed into various archival collections of the army,
navy, diplomatic services, and intelligence bureaucracies.40
Anglo-American strategists used the Black List to influence Royal Navy
and U.S. Navy commando operations. However, the officers in charge of
individual commando teams selected targets located within their assigned
sectors. They then set their own priorities in maneuvering to seize the
various targets found on the Black List. According to the procedures
outlined for NEPTUNE, the commandos reported their discoveries to
ANCXF headquarters. Then, ANCXF dispatched Combined Advance Field
Teams (CAFT) to secure the target.41 The CAFT handed-off the objective to
intelligence exploitation teams known as "T-Forces."42 (The "T" stands for
"Technical.") The T-Forces served as "SHAEF's agent to deal with the
intelligence-gathering organization" and "acted as middle-man between
U.S. Navy method of providing "broad directives from the top to the principle
commanders who worked out their plans ... well the British didn't do that." Earlier in the
war, he had a key role in facilitating Anglo-American intelligence collaboration as the
U.S. Naval Attaché in London after 1939. The former DNI at the Admiralty, Godfrey,
entrusted Kirk with the most secret sources of intelligence. After an abbreviated tour as
the DNI at the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), Kirk commanded U.S. Navy convoy
escorts in the North Atlantic. He subsequently organized U.S. Navy amphibious forces in
the Atlantic. In the Mediterranean, Kirk earned the respect of U.S. Army generals Patton
and Omar N. Bradley. See Stanley P. Hirshson, General Patton: A Soldier's Life (New
York: HarperCollins, 2002), pp. 309-10 and 354-63; Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier's Story
(New York: Henry Holt, 1951), pp. 121-29; 250-82, 305, 312, 570; and Harry C.
Butcher, My Three Years with Eisenhower: The Personal Diary of Captain Harry C.
Butcher, USNR, Naval Aide to General Eisenhower, 1942-1945 (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1946), pp. 561-79.
40. TNA, CAB 103/288, "Official Histories of the War, 1939-45: Use of Special Intelli-
gence by Historians," memorandum "General Directive to Chief of Historians," Top
Secret Ultra Annex.
41. NARA, RG 38, Records of the Naval Security Group, Box 15, "Report on British
Procedures for Capturing and Exploiting Enemy Naval Documents." Also see TNA, HW
8 103.
42. Rankin, Ian Fleming's Commandos, pp. 270-91 and 357; Nutting, Attain by
Surprise, pp. 22-30; Cabell, History of 30 Assault Unit; and Longden, T-Force, pp. 1-38,
79, 97, 134, 230, 227-68.

intelligence gathering agencies and local commands." 43 Confusion beset
ANCXF headquarters as the distinctions blurred between the various
intelligence units at the front.44
Focusing on naval targets, Royal Navy and U.S. Navy personnel trained
together in anticipation of NEPTUNE. During the spring of 1943, the
Admiralty reorganized 30 Commando into the 30 "Assault Unit." 45 Within
the Navy Department, Admiral Ernest J. King concurrently authorized the
development of a similar U.S. Navy unit. As the Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO), he held double control over operational forces as the Commander-
in-Chief, U.S. Navy (CominCh). King also designated Admiral Harold R.
Stark, Commander, U.S. Navy Forces in Europe (ComNavEu), with
operational authority as the Commander, U.S. Navy Twelfth Fleet (Com12).
King directed Stark to arrange commando training for U.S. Navy personnel.
In turn, Stark charged Captain Tully Shelley and reserve U.S. Navy
Commander Tracy Barrett Kittredge with the mission of organizing the
"Special Intelligence Commando" (SIC). Another reserve volunteer,
Lieutenant Commander George T. O'Niell, assumed command as the SIC
officer in charge. Earlier in the war, O'Niell served in the Office of Naval
Intelligence (ONI), Special Activities Branch (Op-16-Z). He offered
experience from interrogating German Navy PoWs and in examining
captured enemy documents.
30 AU fostered very special ties with their U.S. Navy counterparts during
commando training in anticipation of NEPTUNE. 30 AU and SIC officers
received specialized training in all forms of Axis intelligence – from
prisoner interrogation techniques to identifying new technical innovations.
They received papers authorizing them to act with the personal authority of
Eisenhower. In the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives at King's
College London, the documents carried by Glanville feature Eisenhower's
signature (in blue ink). In bold print, the card explained: "THE BEARER
OF THIS CARD WILL NOT BE INTERFERED WITH IN THE
PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTY BY MILITARY POLICE OR ANY
OTHER MILITARY ORGANIZATION."46 30 AU and SIC operatives thus
43. NARA, RG 38, U.S. Naval Technical Mission in Europe (NavTechMisEu), Box 2,
"Relations with Other Organizations," p. M18824. Note: these records were originally
accessed at the Navy History and Heritage Command. Since that time, the
NavTechMisEu records were reportedly transferred to NARA and are available in RG 38.
44. TNA, ADM 223/214, "History of 30 AU," Part II, Section 1, "Problems Solved and
Unsolved," Paragraph 14, "30 AU vis-à-vis T-Forces."
45. Ibid., Chapter 10, "Planning and Training for Operation OVERLORD."
46. The draft manuscripts and rough correspondence used by Nutting and Glanville in
writing Attain by Surprise are located in London. Within this collection, Glanville has
included an envelope containing his identification and other papers from service with 30
AU. The collection includes the pass issued by Eisenhower. Of note, Glanville also kept
the business cards given to him by Wernher von Braun and Helmut Walther in the spring
of 1945. See King's College London, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, GB99,
"History of 30 Assault Unit, 1942-46," Box 2, Binders, Tab marked as "Tambach."

received significant latitude somewhat similar to the "License to Kill" issued
to James Bond in Ian Fleming's postwar fiction.
Flexibility remained central in organizing the naval commandos for the
invasion of continental Europe. The various subsections of 30 AU fell into
two basic elements to land within the British assigned sectors on the beaches
of Normandy. For Juno beach, 30 AU received temporary designation as
WOOLFORCE, while those assigned to Gold operated as PIKEFORCE.
The U.S. Navy commandos similarly reorganized in anticipation of the
landings. O'Niell had expanded the ranks of the SIC to accommodate
additional personnel. By the fall of 1943, he rechristened the SIC to become
designated as the "Special Intelligence Unit" (SIU). In accordance with the
U.S. Navy organization for NEPTUNE, elements of the SIU fell within Task
Force (TF) 125.8 (TF-125.8). Following the siege at Cherbourg through the
liberation of Paris, the U.S. Navy unit continuously transformed their
administrative designations within official message traffic. First, they
became TF-122 and then TF-124. During these operations, the Combined
Intelligence Objectives Committee (CIOS) within SHAEF held respon-
sibility for preparing the Black List, which drove the intelligence-gathering
efforts of Allied forces ashore.47
The numerical designations and command identifications frequently
changed after the Allied landings, although the personnel affiliated with 30
AU and FIU generally remained the same. In fact, the best means of
reconstructing the history of these units often hinges upon identifying the
personalities involved – rather than their bureaucratic titles or the tactical
commands with which they served at the front. Bureaucratic references to
these units as articulated in archival documents are also frequently
inconsistent. For example, U.S. Army documents sometimes incorrectly
referred to U.S. Navy Task Forces operating ashore as "Task Groups."
Similarly, U.S. Navy personnel sometimes referred to U.S. Army units using
naval jargon or bureaucratic nomenclature. Such variations also appear in
British records, especially when Royal Navy personnel attempted to describe
relationships between U.S. Navy and U.S. Army units at the front.
Critical bureaucratic differences between Royal Navy and U.S. Navy
forces appeared within the subtext of their official reports, which can be
confusing for contemporary historians. Organizational differences also
overshadow the confusing relationship between higher Anglo-American
headquarters. The confusing dynamics of command and control required
units like 30 AU and FIU to operate with relative independence at the front.
Centralized headquarters in London and Washington served as the strategic
hubs for global operations, although more localized commands such as
SHAEF often functioned as intermediaries between multiple honeycombs of
tactical subdivisions. Very few personnel had comprehensive knowledge of
47. TNA, ADM 223/214, "History of 30 AU," Part II, Section 3, "Intelligence Briefing
and Planning for 30 AU."

the complicated network of command, which characterized Anglo-American
collaboration. Veterans of 30 AU and FIU had unique knowledge of the
broader strategic dynamics, although their information generally remained
limited to the tactical operations in which they participated directly.
Personnel serving closer to the front generally remained aloof to the
infighting among various Allied ground commanders in efforts to control
Royal Navy and U.S. Navy forces ashore. The OSS had also occasionally
employed members of the SIU on clandestine missions in France. For
example, the Germans nearly captured two members of the SIU during an
OSS reconnaissance of the Siegfried Line – well in advance of Allied lines. 48
Fleming and Shelly complained about the practice of using 30 AU and SIU
personnel on missions beyond the scope of naval interest. The primary
function of 30 AU and SIU was to gather intelligence for Anglo-American
navies. Fleming and Shelly wrestled with SOE and OSS counterparts for
control over the 30 AU and SIU teams. Thus, O'Niell reorganized the U.S.
Navy commandos as the "Forward Intelligence Unit" (FIU) after the
liberation of Paris. This subtle change provided O'Niell with the means to
assert his direct connection to the higher ComNavEu headquarters in
London. Thereafter, he could circumvent ANCXF and had greater freedom
to collaborate with the OSS, army commanders, and naval port authorities.
For similar reasons, 30 Assault Unit was transformed into 30 "Advanced"
Unit by the fall of 1944. Terms such as "advanced" and "forward"
emphasized direct ties between 30 AU and FIU with higher authorities at the
Admiralty and ComNavEu in London. Thus, 30 AU and FIU used their
connections with higher headquarters to maneuver with greater freedom at
the front.49
The collaboration between Fleming and Shelly within the COHQ in
London remained unclear to their subordinates at the front. Fleming shared
the Black List with Shelley. However, O'Niell did not know that it was
already available to Shelley in London. Liaisons from 30 AU informed
O'Niell about their Black List. In turn, he asked Shelley to obtain a copy for
the FIU. O'Niell suggested that if "Comdr. Fleming were approached by
proper authority, it might be possible to obtain a copy of the 'Black Book' for
the Group, plus subsequent changes and additions." 50 Shelley responded:
"NID-24 has already provided Black List to ComNavEu. Additional details
will be provided when you arrive in London, as required." 51 To alleviate
48. NARA, RG 313, ComNavEu, Blue Finding Aid, Box 32, Folder A9/8 (16) "Far
Shore," "TG-125.8 Reports," memorandum from O'Niell to Shelley of 5 September 1944.
49. TNA, ADM 223/214, "History of 30 AU," Part II, "Problems Solved and Unsolved;"
NARA, RG 313, ComNavEu, FIU, Box 1, Folder 5, O'Niell to Shelley, "History of
ComNavEu Forward Intelligence Unit – Part I," p. 5; and NARA, RG 331, SHAEF, Box
4, SHAEF G2, T-Subsection, Folder 322-19.2, "30th Advanced Unit – Org."
Shore," "TG-125.8 Reports," memorandum from O'Niell to Shelley of 21 September
1944, p. 2, paragraph 6.

ambiguities of command and communications, 30 AU installed a liaison
within FIU, Lieutenant Commander Ralph Izzard, RNVR. In the fall of
1944, Izzard and O'Nielll flew to Paris for meetings with Fleming and
Shelley in London – to prepare plans for the drive across the Rhine.
Working together, 30 AU and FIU created a combined Black List in
anticipation of the final offensive into Germany. Meanwhile, 30 AU and
FIU field teams secured intelligence from German Navy sources throughout
France. For example, Izzard brought U.S. Navy Reserve Lieutenant Angus
McLean Thuermer to scour PoW encampments for German Navy personnel
who had attempted to evade Allied intelligence by wearing German Army
uniforms.52 Izzard and Thuermer also collaborated to identify and locate
German weapons scientists and their clandestine experimentation facilities.
This work also influenced postwar efforts to intercept Nazi war criminals. 53
Working in collaboration with the French resistance, other 30 AU and
FIU personnel discovered clandestine stockpiles of weapons and German
Navy technical experts. During a search of the abandoned headquarters of
the 9th U-boat Flotilla at Brest, 30 AU and FIU teams uncovered "German
naval codes and cyphers for September for the 'HYDRA' and
'KANALINSELN' circuits [including] specific instructions for tightening the
security of German enigma settings."54 Such captured data hastened the
efforts of Allied cryptanalysts to solve enemy communications during the
closing months of the war.
Anglo-American naval commandos worked in close proximity with U.S.
Army units to secure various port facilities and other targets of naval interest
along the French coast and in Brittany. These teams were comprised of ten
to twenty troops armed with .45-caliber pistols, Thomson machine guns, and
armored jeeps with .50-caliber machine guns. The officers were also
equipped with M-1 carbines. 30 AU personnel wore standard British Army
battle uniforms. Officers customarily wore service dress caps with gray
covers while the enlisted troops wore the dark green berets of the
commandos. They also wore "Royal Navy" or "Royal Marines" flashes,
which appeared above a navy blue square with the number "30" sewn onto
their shoulder sleeves. The Fairbairn-Sykes stilettos further distinguished the
commandos from regular soldiers at the front.
Similar to their counterparts in 30 AU, the FIU personnel usually dressed
in variations of the British or American army combat uniform. They also
carried U.S. Navy issue "KA-BAR" utility knives. Mimicking their Royal
Navy counterparts from 30 AU, the U.S. Navy officers of FIU customarily
Shore," "TG-125.8 Reports," 25 September 1944 memorandum from Shelley to O'Niell.

52. NARA, RG 313, ComNavEu, FIU, Box 1, Folder 5, O'Niell to Shelley, 1 December
1944 memorandum, "German Navy Personnel."
53. Nutting, Attain by Surprise, pp. 17-19 and 211.
54. NARA, RG 313, ComNavEu, FIU, Box 1, Folder 5, O'Niell to Shelley, "History of
ComNavEu Forward Intelligence Unit – Part I," p. 5, "Brittany and Paris," subparagraph
(a).

wore crushed blue-covered dress caps in the field. By naval standards, the 30
AU and FIU commandos had experiences that were uncommon to typical
sailors. One American recalled:
...all of the crew have been under fire at various times, and have taken
it without flinching. They have been operating in strange and peculiar
surroundings, for Naval personnel. They have lived, and are living, a
tough life with the minimum of comfort. They have not had
comfortable wardrooms to relax in, nor bright lights to take care of
their liberty. They have stuck to their jobs, have taken pride in doing
them well, and are proud of and loyal to their assignment. And they
have now been in it the hard way, for exactly five months, with never a
complaint. By comparison with some other Naval assignments in this
Theatre, that of my crew can be considered as being in the rugged
class.55
Army commanders criticized the freewheeling character of the intelligence-
gathering teams of 30 AU and FIU. 56 The presence of British commando
units in sectors assigned to American commanders in Normandy also caused
problems.
The unconventional nature of their mission inspired a close spirit of
collaboration among the members of 30 AU and FIU. This sometimes
caused friction with commanders who preferred a more conventional
philosophy of military operations. General George S. Patton arrived in
Normandy in early August of 1944. During the earlier campaigns in the
Mediterranean, he complained about British commandos for failing to
follow his directives.57 Patton required Allied troops to adhere to his
prescribed combat uniform standards, which the Royal Marines reportedly
"had a problem here – the RM Commandos scorned tin hats, always wearing
the green beret."58 After he arrived in Normandy, Patton met with
representatives of 30 AU and FIU. He challenged Izzard and O'Niell about
their choice of uniforms rather than focus on the purpose of their meeting.
After their meeting, the Third Army intelligence officer, Colonel Oscar W.
Koch, told O'Niell that Patton has directed him to "get rid of that bunch of
limey gangsters."59
30 AU and FIU teams at the front enjoyed some bureaucratic cover from
55. NARA, RG 313, ComNavEu, FIU, Box 32, Folder A9/8-17, "Forward Unit," 6
November 1944 memorandum from O'Niell to Shelley.
Shore," "TG-125.8 Reports," 18 August 1944 cover letter from O'Niell to Shelley with
original memorandum from Lambie enclosed.
57. TNA, ADM 223/214, "History of 30 AU," Part I, Chapter I, "The Campaign in
Sicily," paragraph 36, subsection (a).
58. Nutting, Attain by Surprise, p. 200.
Shore," "TG-125.8 Reports," 16 August 1944 "Daily Report of Activities" Train to
Shelley (NavIntel TUSA to Naval Intelligence Officer, ComNavEu).

the Admiralty and ComNavEu in London. They unified their efforts by
focusing on their common objective of securing intelligence sources for the
Allied high command. The navy wing of 30 AU and the FIU maintained
close lines of communication with their mobile teams through various
liaison officers. For example, 30 AU relied heavily upon U.S. Navy
Lieutenant John E. Lambie. At the age of forty-three, he was the oldest
member of the FIU. Lambie had an adventurous life before the war. Born in
Hong Kong, he traveled with his parents around the world. His American
father was an international entrepreneur who specialized in concrete and his
mother was a naturalized citizen from Spain. Lambie attended the Rugby
School and served in the British Army as a member of the 14th Battalion
London Defense Regiment during the First World War. Having achieved
rank as a lance corporal, he returned to the United States and studied law at
Stanford University. From 1924 to 1926, he worked for Oskar Hammerstein
in New York City and then travelled extensively in Europe and Asia
working for his father's concrete business. After his wife died in May 1942,
Lambie volunteered to serve in the OSS. Given his unique skills and worldly
experience, an OSS reviewer concluded that Lambie "should not be used
unless we have a specific job that might tie in some way with his past
background."60
OSS officials recognized Lambie was an asset with the potential to serve
as a clandestine operative. To ease him into the fold without making a full
commitment, the OSS arranged a reserve commission in the U.S. Navy.
Given his fluency in German, French, Spanish, Russian, and Chinese,
Lambie served with O'Niell interrogating German prisoners for Op-16-Z at
ONI. He accompanied O'Niell for duty on the ComNavEu staff in the fall of
1943. Having worked together through their commando training in Scotland,
O'Niell selected Lambie to serve as a liaison within the 30 AU headquarters
at the front. In this role, he quickly earned the trust of Glanville and others
within 30 AU. Rather than remain in the relative safety of the 30 AU
headquarters during operations in France, Lambie sought action at the front.
At Cherbourg, enemy defenders shot him in the face as he guided a 30 AU
team into the bunker complex where they captured the German garrison
commanders, Lieutenant General Karl von Schlieben and Rear Admiral
Walther Hennecke.61 Lambie subsequently received a Silver Star Medal and
60. NARA, RG 226, "Records of the Office of Strategic Services" (OSS), Central Files,
Box 189, Entry 92, Folder 15, "Lambie," 9 July 1942 memo for Commander William H.
Vanderbilt, USNR, OSS Naval Section.
61. NARA, RG 313, ComNavEu, Box 1, Folder 4, A 12-2 (6)(9), "History and Accom-
plishments of the ComNavEu Special Intelligence Unit," Tully Shelly comp., circa June
1945. Note: 30 AU provided training to the original complement of U.S. Navy volun-
teers, which included fifteen officers and one enlisted yeoman. This number expanded to
roughly forty personnel. "History and Accomplishments of the ComNavEu Special Intel-
ligence Unit," pp. 5-6. Note: Flint was killed in action in Normandy on 26 July 1944.
"For gallantry in action during the period of 6 June 1944 to 14 July 1944," Lambie
received a Silver Star Medal and a Purple Heart. Riggins and Glanville received the

a Purple Heart for his role in capturing the German commanders.
Among members of 30 AU, Glanville was shocked when Lambie refused
to evacuate from the front and accept a guaranteed desk assignment in
London. His easy demeanor and toughness inspired trust within the ranks of
30 AU. Working together, 30 AU and FIU uncovered technical intelligence
of great strategic value by acting without direct involvement from higher
Allied headquarters. Glanville and Lambie supervised the efforts of 30 AU
and FIU to secure a trove of intelligence at the German Navy Headquarters
in the Château de la Muette – near Versailles. They seized details of burst
radio transmitting, radar detection, torpedoes, and U-boat snorkels. Such
information helped the Allies to develop and improve upon countermeasures
to exploit weaknesses in the original German designs. 62
Glanville relied heavily upon Lambie to help mitigate internal disputes
between the Navy Wing and the Marine Wing of 30 AU. Tensions within
the British ranks caused significant problems. To address the situation,
Glanville avoided using his own lines of communication to the Admiralty.
Instead, he relied upon U.S. Navy channels. Lambie reported on the
problems in reports submitted to O'Niell. "I understand from Lt. Lambie,"
O'Niell reported to Shelley, "[that the] Marine wing [of 30 AU] has made
itself highly objectionable through its lack of discipline (drunkenness, dis-
orderliness, flouting of MP's [sic] [machine pistols], etc.) and through
demands for food and transportation." 63 In turn, Shelley advised Fleming of
the problems affecting 30 AU. Within the official history of 30 AU,
Admiralty historians later reasoned that the
youth and inexperience of the majority of the RM Officers led to their
being over shadowed by their Naval colleagues, who were generally
mature, highly trained in a technical sense, gifted in linguistic ability
and enthusiastic and far sighted for the task in hand. This frequently
resulted in the field in a Naval Officer taking command.64
One veteran of 30 AU observed that "Royal Marines were a fine cross
section of British conscript, trained to kill, cheerful, tough, and hugely
Bronze Star Medal.

62. NARA, RG 313, ComNavEu, FIU, Box 1, Folder 5, O'Niell to Shelley, "History of
ComNavEu Forward Intelligence Unit – Part I," pp. 5-16; TNA, ADM 223/214, "History
of 30 AU," Part II, "Problems Solved and Unsolved;" Wyman H. Packard, A Century of
U.S. Naval Intelligence (Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, 1994), pp. 428-30;
Nutting, Attain by Surprise, pp. 174-85; and Patrick Dalzel-Job, Arctic Snow to Dust of
Normandy: The Extraordinary Wartime Exploits of a Naval Special Agent (Barnsley:
Pen & Sword, 2009), pp. 151-86.
Shore," "TG-125.8 Reports," 18 August 1944 cover letter from O'Niell to Shelley with
original memorandum from Lambie enclosed.
64. TNA, ADM 223/214, "History of 30 AU," Part II, section 4, "Observations of the
Royal Marine Unit," paragraph 9, subsection (d), note (1).

disinclined to take no for an answer from friend or fraulein."65
A Bunch of Limey Gangsters

Anglo-American naval commandos experienced extremely difficult relations
with the headquarters of the Third Army. Patton, for example, played
childish pranks on the U.S. Navy officers assigned to the Third Army staff.
In one instance, he found an old raft and had the backboard painted with the
words, "Lucky Forward." Patton then directed the navy personnel to
maintain a constant watch on the raft. He also forced them to haul the old
raft across the French countryside during constant moves of the Third Army
from Normandy to Paris. 66 In one instance, Patton severely admonished
Ensign Edward Taliaferro of FIU. He was enraged to discover that FIU had
abandoned their raft. Patton forced Taliaferro to retrieve the raft and write a
full report on this oversight. This cartoonish incident reveals a broader
problem – Patton severely mishandled the naval liaison officers assigned to
the Third Army. He also abused their access to the special intelligence
collection system, which expedited the transport of goods and personnel
from the forward areas to U.S. Navy logistical hubs in the rear. 67
American troops earned the dubious reputation for plundering private
homes and taking souvenirs from the dead or captured enemy prisoners.
Patton, in particular, was notorious for pillaging Europe, using the FIU
intelligence collection network to build his private art and antiques
collection.68 In September of 1944, he transported a large crate through the
FIU intelligence collection network and included a bottle of bourbon for
O'Niell with a note to "forward this crate to Mrs. B.A. Patton – San Marino,
California."69 In another case, O'Niell complained about receiving "a rug that
is to be sent to Mrs. Patton." 70 In frustration, the FIU officers with the Third
Army staff reasoned, "unless the value of keeping close contact with Third
U.S. Army and 12th Army Group outweighs other considerations, the
65. Aylen, "Recollections of 30 Assault Unit," p. 318.

66. NARA, RG 313, ComNavEu, Blue Finding Aid, Box 67, Folder 504, serial A9/8 (16)
F, O'Niell to Shelley handwritten letter of 24 August 1944.
Shore," "TG-125.8 Reports," Serial I-44, 25 August 1944 Intelligence Report, From III
Army N2 (Lucky Forward) to CTF125.8 (Cherbourg). Note: the request from Patton is
typewritten on the official form used for transmitting intelligence information within the
ComNavEu chain of command. Documents produced by FIU frequently referred to the
Third Army as "III Army," which corresponds with standard U.S. Navy practices in
reference to fleets and task forces.
68. Anthony M. Platt, Bloodlines: Recovering Hitler's Nuremburg Laws (Boulder: Para-
digm Publishers, 2005), pp. 12-16, 99-130, and 172-73.
Shore," "TG-125.8 Reports," Serial I-44, 25 August 1944 Intelligence Report, From III
Army N2 (Lucky Forward) to CTF125.8 (Cherbourg).
70. NARA, RG 313, ComNavEu, Blue Finding Aid, Box 67, Folder 504, serial A9/8 (16)
F, O'Niell to Shelley handwritten letter of 24 August 1944. Note: the word "rug" is
underlined in the original.

physical presence of a Naval Liaison Unit with Third U.S. Army will within
a short time no longer be required." 71 O'Niell sought autonomy from the
Army. He argued that "unless Naval Liaison with 3rd Army Headquarters is
vitally essential on both Army and Navy ends of this liaison [the] mission
should be terminated."72 Thus, in anticipation of the final offensive into
Germany, Anglo-American naval strategists empowered 30 AU and FIU to
operate with nearly complete autonomy from Army ground commanders at
the front.
Pinching the Past

Managing the final collapse of the Third Reich represented a significant
challenge to Allied strategists. To take full advantage of captured enemy
technology, Anglo-American strategists expanded their efforts to take Axis
intelligence sources. They placed top priority on the German scientists,
hoping to prevent them from working for the Soviets. The successes
achieved by 30 AU and FIU through the liberation of Paris inspired Anglo-
American naval strategists to expand their intelligence-gathering efforts
during the drive across the Rhine and into Germany. The CIOS had served
as the clearinghouse for identifying targets through the French campaign.
Among the various subsidiaries of the CIOS, the Target Intelligence
Committee (TICom) focused upon the capture of Axis cryptology and
communications technology.73 The TICom headquarters staff operated in
conjunction with the SHAEF planning group on the grounds of Bletchley
Park. TICom also assembled six combined Anglo-American teams recruited
from various ground, naval, and air services. 74 For more targeted missions,
cryptanalysts affiliated with TICom occasionally fell-in with frontline
intelligence-gathering units, such as 30 AU and FIU. TICom Team 6, for
example, focused on Naval Targets and included members of 30 AU and
FIU – including RNVR Lieutenant Commander Leonard Griffiths and U.S.
Navy Reserve Lieutenant John Nielson.75
Although the Admiralty constantly struggled to marshal sufficient
Shore," "TG-125.8 Reports," memorandum from Train to O'Niell of 19 August 1944,
"3rd Army H.Q. – U.S. Naval Liaison with."
Shore," "TG-125.8 Reports," cover letter from O'Niell to Shelley of 19 August 1944, "3rd
Army H.Q. – U.S. Naval Liaison with."
73. Fort Meade, Maryland, National Security Agency Center for Cryptologic History
(NSA), Unpublished Manuscript dated 1 May 1946, "European Axis Signal Intelligence
in World War II as Revealed by 'TICom' Investigations and by Other Prisoner of War
Interrogations and Captured Material, Principally German" (TICom Investigations), Vol.
1, pp. 1-13.
74. Thomas R. Johnson, American Cryptology during the Cold War, 1945-1989, book
one (Fort Meade: NSA, 1995), p. 3; Thomas Parrish, The Ultra Americans: The U.S.
Role in Breaking the Nazi Codes (New York; Stein and Day, 1986), pp. 174-85.
75. NARA, RG 457, Entry 9037, Box 168, "Narrative and Report of Proceedings of
TICom Team 6, 11 April - 6th July 1945," pp. 1-8.

resources, the Navy Department helped expand operations to seize enemy
intelligence sources. Under the authorities vested in the CNO/CominCh,
King empowered Commodore Henry A. Schade as the Commander, U.S.
Naval Technical Mission in Europe (NavTechMisEu) in December 1944.
King held a chair on the Combined Chiefs, as well as the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, which further amplified the unique authorities he carried as
CNO/CominCh within the U.S. Navy. King sought the expertise of a naval
architect in organizing the multifaceted mission of collecting Axis technical
and scientific intelligence sources, which largely influenced the decision to
designate Schade to the command NavTechMisEu. 76 Earlier, he had super-
vised the naval architecture division within the Bureau of Ships inside the
Navy Department and had a major role in designing the aircraft carriers of
the Yorktown-class and Essex-class. He also assisted in the development of
Iowa-class battleships.77
Schade offered significant experience in managing highly complex
technical projects, coupled with the practical administrative experience from
previous naval service. He also held the trust of the CNO/CominCh, which
amplified the influence of NavTechMisEu in efforts to locate and procure
raw intelligence from Axis sources in Europe. Schade acted "as the personal
representative of the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of
Naval Operations" and had "maximum freedom of action consistent with
operational Naval and Military requirements."78 British strategists grew
annoyed as the NavTechMisEu organization clearly gave the Americans
significant advantages in the race to secure intelligence in Europe. Accord-
ing to the 30 AU official history:
without reference to the Admiralty, this party had been given a brief by
Admiral King to go anywhere in the European theatre of operations
and to be granted unlimited funds and all transport they required. The
result was a swollen organization commanded by one Commodore
Schade (who incidentally was furnished with his own aeroplane). 79
British perceptions of the American decision to create NavTechMisEu
demonstrate the competitive undertones which influenced strategic relations
between the Admiralty and the Navy Department. The British perceived
NavTechMisEu as an American effort to gain control over Axis intelligence
sources. Notwithstanding common British interests, American strategists
indeed placed highest priority on securing intelligence before the Soviets. In
his role as commander of NavTechMisEu, Schade served as the chief U.S.
76. Gary E. Weir, An Ocean in Common: American Naval Officers, Scientists, and the
Ocean Environment (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2001), 293-98.
77. NHHC, Flag Officer Biographies, Rear Admiral Henry A. Schade, USN, circa 1950.
78. NARA, RG 38, NavTechMisEu, "Historical Data on U.S. Naval Technical Mission in
Europe," Section IV, Tab E, Relations with Other Forces, "T-Force," [Microfilm] Frame
13824.
79. TNA, ADM 223/214, "History of 30 AU," Part I, Chapter XIII, "Operations in North
West Europe," paragraph 3.

Navy representative to the OSS coordinating the "ALSOS" missions to
capture Axis scientists and weapons in Europe. 80 Schade also held nearly
unchecked authority as the personal representative of CNO/CominCh –
King.
In practice, the NavTechMisEu organization unified Anglo-American
efforts to gather intelligence sources on the European front. In his
multifaceted role, Schade organized the NavTechMisEu and streamlined the
logistical capacity of forces engaged in Anglo-American intelligence
collection. He controlled his own fleet of U.S. Navy aircraft solely dedicated
for use in evacuating captured personnel, technology, and documents.
Working in tandem with the British SOE and American OSS ashore on the
European continent, Schade organized NavTechMisEu as a combined Allied
headquarters for COHQ, ANCXF, CIOS, T-Forces, 30 AU, and FIU. Cap-
tured Axis intelligence sources flew to Britain aboard American aircraft
chartered by NavTechMisEu.
From London, Fleming and Shelley provided the NavTechMisEu
headquarters with their combined Admiralty and ComNavEu version of the
Black List. In turn, NavTechMisEu compiled a separate Black List. The
NavTechMisEu Black List included targets supplied by various Allied
headquarters – including the SOE and OSS. Given the expanded effort,
NavTechMisEu provided liaison officers to the various intelligence-
gathering units at the front. In March 1945, Lieutenant Hubert P. Earle acted
as a liaison officer for 30 AU and FIU in dealings with the NavTechMisEu
organization. Earle had earlier served in the ComNavEu headquarters,
serving as an analyst of captured German intelligence records. In this role,
he specialized in gleaning information from German sources to examine
Soviet operations.
Through liaison officers like Earle, NavTechMisEu exercised significant
influence over the operations of 30 AU and FIU within sectors assigned to
American forces. For example, Glanville directly credited Lambie and Earle
with leading them to the German Naval Archives at Castle Tambach in April
1945.81 With full access to wartime records, historians may now reconsider
the events surrounding the capture of Castle Tambach. In March 1945,
Glanville of 30 AU assumed command with Team 55, while Lambie of FIU
assumed command with Team 5. They planned to operate in tandem to
secure targets in central and southern Germany. Earle assisted Glanville and
Lambie in preparing their initial plans. He also secured the requisite
clearances through NavTechMisEu for Glanville and Lambie to operate
within the sectors assigned to Patton's Third Army in southern Germany.
Lambie and Glanville planned to sweep the area between Cologne and
80. See Boris T. Pash, The ALSOS Mission (New York: Charter Books, 1980) and
Packard, A Century of U.S. Naval Intelligence, pp. 160-62. Also, see NARA II, RG 38,
NavTechMisEu, "Historical Data on U.S. Naval Technical Mission in Europe,"
[Microfilm] Frame 13824; ComNavEu History, pp. 340-50.
81. Nutting, Attain by Surprise, pp. 17 and 211.

Leipzig. Lambie would focus on the German Navy facilities near Blanken-
burg in the Harz Mountains, while Earle accompanied Glanville's Team 55
into the Soviet sector surrounding Bad Sulza near Nuremburg.
By subdividing battle areas into tactical sectors, Allied strategists avoided
the prospect of friendly fire among various multinational forces. During the
drive across the Rhine River, for example, the French were responsible for
the Alsace-Lorraine and southwestern sectors. The British focused on the
Low Countries and coastal areas north to Denmark, while the Americans
drove into the central and southern sectors of Germany and Austria. The
Soviets, in turn, concentrated on the capture of Berlin and the industrial
regions of eastern Germany, Poland, and the Slavic states. As the Red Army
closed in on Hitler's bunker in central Berlin, the U.S. Army forces of
Patton's Third Army captured Coburg in south-central Germany on 11 April
1945. On the outskirts of Coburg, Patton's troops ignored Castle Tambach
and continued toward the Napoleonic battlefield at Jena. The G.I.s antici-
pated the victory in Europe.82
Anglo-American commanders minimized the prospect of an accidental
battle with Soviet forces by enforcing restrictive rules of engagement among
forces at the front. British and American soldiers were required to confirm
the identity of potential enemy targets before opening fire. Under such
conditions, G.I.s resented orders to continue advancing into areas remaining
under German control.83 Given their mission, the 30 AU and FIU, however,
largely relied upon regular combat troops for support. As they pursued
targets remaining on the Black List, the presence of 30 AU and FIU
sometimes confused the regular combat troops at the front. "We were about
to move out down the road when slipping and sliding down the road came a
U.S. Navy jeep," as U.S. Army Colonel Frederick P. Field of the 12th
Armored Division remembered thinking, "what in the hell is the Navy doing
so far from the sea?" 84 He continued describing how "on board the jeep was
a tar all done up in a pea jacket and a white sailor cap [and the sailor]
explains that he is on a highly classified mission." 85
Such accounts shed light on how regular front soldiers regarded such
units as 30 AU and FIU. The commandos accompanied Patton's Third Army
forces into the Soviet sector, which ultimately culminated in the capture of
the German Naval Archives at Castle Tambach. While imbedded with Team
55, Glanville explained how Earle "joined and told us that radio intelligence
had intercepted a call sign believed to belong to German Naval Intelligence
with a fix at Bad Sulza, near Weimar." Expecting to face Waffen-SS units
during the advance, Glanville and Earle were equally concerned about
82. Peter Schrijvers, The Crash of Ruin: American Combat Soldiers in Europe during
World War II (New York: New York University Press, 1998), pp. 215-67.
83. Ibid.
84. Abilene, Texas, 12th Armored Division Memorial Museum, Frederick P. Field, "The
Capture of Werner [sic] von Braun."
85. Ibid.

beating Soviet forces to capture Bad Sulza. During the trek to Bad Sulza,
Team 55 stopped by the field headquarters of the Third Army near the
Buchenwald concentration camp. "We were shocked," Glanville explained,
"not only at the skeletons and heaps of corpses and the lampshades made of
tattooed human skin, but at the polished brightwork and blackleaded
furnaces in the crematorium, and at the carefully tended gallows and
songbirds in their cages beside them."86
Though hardened by their previous combat experience, the Anglo-
American naval commandos were unprepared to find such evidence of Nazi
savagery. The members of Team 55 became particularly wary of the SS and
other Nazi loyalists, who were closely associated with Buchenwald. Team
55 received sporadic fire from retreating enemy forces during the drive from
Buchenwald eastwards to Bad Sulza. They also encountered German
refugees and deserters searching for American forces (not British, French, or
Soviet) to surrender to. Upon reaching Bad Sulza in the Soviet sector on 17
April 1945, Glanville and Earle interviewed a number of Allied prisoners
repatriated from the nearby German PoW camp (Stammlager, or Stalag IX-
C). The PoWs helped identify a German Navy officer who had attempted to
evade capture by wearing traditional Bavarian costume. Glanville and Earle
also learned about the location of a large cache of German Navy records
inside an abandoned school.
The documents found in Bad Sulza provided clues to the location of
German weapons caches. Earle found a reference on a partially charred
document giving the location of "2 SKL/KA." Though unsure of its exact
functions, he knew 2 SKL/KA was somehow affiliated with the intelligence
branch of the German Admiralty (Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine, or
OKM). He recognized "2 SKL" as being affiliated with the German
Admiralty (2 Seekriegsleitung, or SKL), but lacked further information on
the acronym "KA." According to Glanville memoirs, Earle speculated that
"KA" was a reference to "Kriegsarsenale" (weapons [development]
section).87 He associated 2 SKL/KA with key Nazi scientists, including Dr.
Wernher von Braun and Dr. Helmuth Walther. In a radio transmission to
London, Earle reported that the "documents captured in Bad Sulza contain
information concerning 3 SKL as well as information on Japan and
Russia."88
Allied strategists sought access to German intelligence about Japanese
and Soviet capabilities. They also placed highest priority on determining the
disposition of key Nazi leaders. Earle received orders to return to London
immediately with the documents found in Bad Sulza. In the meantime,
86. Nutting, Attain by Surprise, pp. 17, 211-12.

87. Ibid.
88. NARA, RG 313, ComNavEu, Box 10, Folder 53, "Axis Archives," serial A-12 (9),
"Report on Documents from 3 SKL II Staffel (Secured in Bad Sulza, Thuringia),"
Captain Henry A. Guthrie to Shelley derived from the original report by Earle of 23 June
1945.

Glanville decided to pursue 2 SKL/KA at its last reported location in a place
called Tambach. He remained unsure of the exact location, as maps
indicated a number of places known as Tambach in southern Germany.
Glanville credited Earle with identifying the location of 2 SKL/KA. He also
credited Earle for focusing on a small town to the southeast of Bad Sulza in
the Soviet sector, which referenced Castle Tambach. Glanville departed Bad
Sulza and left Earle to safeguard the captured documents. Within hours,
Earle supervised G.I.s from the Third Army and loaded twenty-five cases of
captured documents aboard a C-47 chartered by the NavTechMisEu staff.
He accompanied the shipment from the German Air Force base at
Herzogenaurach on 23 April 1945. Upon arriving in London, Earle advised
Fleming and Shelley of their findings at Bad Sulza. He explained that
Glanville proceeded with Team 55 to Tambach in pursuit of the weapons
development section of the German Admiralty.89
Anglo-American special intelligence sources corroborated the evidence
discovered by Team 55 in Bad Sulza. From radio intercepts, the submarine
tracking rooms of the Admiralty and CominCh traced the movements of 2
SKL/KA from Berlin to Nazi strongholds rumored to exist somewhere in the
Alps. Allied strategists feared that the Germans planned to stage a guerilla
campaign by employing weapons of unknown destructive power. 90 They also
believed that the impending collapse of the Third Reich had amplified
support for the Nazi cause in Germany. 91 Reports from Allied intelligence
indicated that German weapons scientists traveled in company with an
entourage of armed Waffen-SS escorts.
Glanville expected to face heavy resistance during the advance from Bad
Sulza to Castle Tambach. While they received minor harassing fire, the
throngs of refugees and deserting German solders remained the greater
problem along the road. When they arrived on the outskirts of Castle
Tambach, they observed a peaceful pastoral scene "like a Bavarian post-
card." German Navy admirals Walther Gladisch, Arno Spindler, and Kurt
Assmann greeted Glanville at the grand entrance to the castle. The Germans
immediately surrendered. They then explained that Admiral of the Fleet Karl
Dönitz issued specific orders to transfer the documents inside the castle
"intact to the Allies in the event of capture as proof that the German Navy
had acted throughout in accordance with humanitarian principles and the
traditions of the sea."92 Perhaps inadvertently, Dönitz had also placed the

90. Giles MacDonogh, After the Reich: The Brutal History of the Allied Occupation
(New York: Basic Books, 2007), pp. 78 and 91-92; Perry Biddiscombe, Werwolf!: The
History of the National Socialist Guerrilla Movement, 1944-1946 (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 1998).
91. Daniel Blatman, "The Death Marches and the Final Phase of Nazi Genocide," in Jane
Caplan and Nikolaus Wachsmann, eds., Concentration Camps in Nazi Germany: The
New Histories (New York: Routledge, 2010), pp. 167-85.
92. Nutting, Attain by Surprise, pp. 212-13. Also, see NARA, RG 313, ComNavEu, Box
10, Folder 53, "Axis Archives," serial A-12 (9), 25 August 1945 memorandum from

documents in the path of Patton's advancing Third Army.
Glanville focused on locating records of immediate interest to the Allied
command and largely ignored the older files. He lacked sufficient resources
to assume full control over the documents inside Castle Tambach. Rather,
Glanville and his men quickly scoured records to determine the locations of
weapons caches and Nazi scientists. In the process, Glanville discovered that
Earle had been wrong about the acronym "KA." The reference actually stood
for "Kriegswissenschaft Abteilung" (technical research section). 93 After
reaching Tambach Castle on 25 April 1945, Glanville transmitted a dispatch
reporting: "tatty lot heinie admirals xxx incl archives german adm xxx 1870
to present."94 Upon receiving this dispatch, Earle flew from London to the
field headquarters of the Third Army near Castle Tambach. Arriving on 28
April, he rendezvoused with Glanville and Izzard of 30 AU.
Glanville described the vast scope of the German Naval Archives, but
discounted the importance of Castle Tambach in comparison with other
targets remaining on the Black List. He also reported discovering an under-
ground jet aircraft factory nearby. Following their brief meeting, Glanville
proceeded to Lake Constance where the SS reportedly sank a number of
large metal chests. Having failed to discover the weapons development
section of the German Navy, Glanville left Castle Tambach with a small
detail from 30 AU. He advised Izzard and Earle that the collection
essentially remained under the immediate control of the Germans. Glanville
described the situation inside the castle to Izzard and Earle:
Gladisch and the others declared themselves delighted at our arrival, as
they doubted whether it would otherwise have been possible to obey
their orders. They explained that their subordinate officers and
"Silberlings" had disappeared and that they were left with their
confidential secretary (the widow of a Colonel who had fallen on the
Russian front) and a number of ratings who were still amenable to
Captain William A. Finn to Shelley, "History of German Naval Warfare"; and TNA,
"History of 30 AU," Part I, Chapter I, "Operations in North West Europe – Clearing Up."
93. Nutting, Attain by Surprise, pp. 11-21, 211-19, and 244. Also, see Chris Madsen,
The Royal Navy and German Naval Disarmament, 1942-47 (London: Frank Cass, 1998),
pp. 155-58; Robert Wolfe, Guides to the Microfilmed Records of the German Navy,
1850-1945, no. 3 (Washington, DC: NARA, 1985), pp. viii-xiv; Paul Heinsius, "Der
Verbleib des Aktenmaterials der deutschen Kriegsmarine," Der Archivar 8:2 (1955), pp.
75-86; Charles Burdick, "The Tambach Archive: A Research Note," Military Affairs 36:4
(1972), pp. 124-26; and Robert Wolfe, ed., Captured German and Related Records: A
National Archives Conference (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1974), pp. 157-72.
94. NARA II, RG 313, ComNavEu, Subject File, Box 10, Folder 53, "ComNavEu Axis
Archives," 27 April 1945 message from ANCXF via Third Army G2 for action to
Admiralty with information copies transmitted to ComNavEu SHAEF G2 and
Documents Section SHAEF (FIAT). Note: in the spring of 1945, Anglo-American
commanders reorganized the SHAEF G-2 to focus on Soviet intelligence. Thus, the FIAT
organization was established in May, within which the Naval Technical Section (NTS)
concentrated on targets of naval interest.

naval discipline. The women on the Staff (Kriegsmarine Hilferinen),
corresponding with our Wrens, were the main danger to the archives
as they were bent on their destruction. Led by a formidable character,
Fraulein Andröde, they were being contained with difficulty and had,
in fact, already started a fire, which had been quickly extinguished.
Should they make contact with the Waffen SS, there would be no doubt
that the loyal personnel would be shot and the archives destroyed. A
similar risk related to the post-occupational resistance forces ("Were-
wolves", Hitler Jugend, et al) and above all the marauding bands of
Polish and Russian deserters.95
By the time Izzard and Earle arrived at the scene on 28 April 1945, a group
of American G.I.s had established security outside Castle Tambach. The
G.I.s told Izzard and Earle that the German secretaries had been hiding in
various areas of the castle and starting fires. Spindler attempted to order the
G.I.s to assist them inside the castle.
Unwilling to accept orders from an enemy officer, the G.I.s arrested the
Germans and sent them away for processing. This significantly hindered
Izzard and Earle from being able to make a full assessment of the vast
collection of documents remaining inside Castle Tambach. "Shortly before
our arrival," Earle reported, "Admiral Gladisch, Admiral Assmann, Frau
Hesse (one of the secretaries) and Frau Heyke (alleged to have been
expelled from the U.S.A. shortly before the war as an enemy spy) were
arrested." Moreover, Izzard and Earle suspected Nazi loyalists had pilfered
key documents right under the noses of the American troops. 96
Anglo-American field commanders at the European front initially failed
to grasp the immediate significance of the German Naval Archives or Castle
Tambach. Izzard and Earle lacked sufficient resources for the job at hand.
Glanville later recalled revisiting the castle to find Izzard and Earle
overwhelmed with work.97 In the aftermath of victory in Europe on 8 May
1945, Allied strategists feared the prospect of a Nazi guerilla campaign in
occupied Germany. Reports suggested the presence of resistance elements in
the Alps. Other sources indicated the potential escape of war criminals,
weapons, and scientists aboard German submarines. At this stage, Allied
strategists took a greater interest in securing the German Naval Archives for
systematic exploitation.
Within the submarine tracking rooms of the Admiralty and CominCh,
analysts scrutinized enemy messages to determine the total tally of German
submarines at sea and in port. With the Nazi capitulation, the German Naval
Archives became the focus of a series of messages among various Anglo-

"Germany – Naval Archives at Tambach," Shelley memorandum to Kittredge derived
from the original report by Earle of 3 July 1945, pp. 1-4.

American headquarters after 7 May 1945. 98 Anglo-American submarine
tracking room personnel requested captured enemy records to determine the
exact whereabouts of German submarines. The analysts surmised that the
German Navy archive contained such information. 99 Thus, Patton dispatched
troops and cargo-carrying vehicles to assist in evacuating the documents at
Castle Tambach.
Elements from 30 AU and FIU had earlier rendezvoused at the scene to
prepare the documents for shipment. By 28 May 1945, Earle supervised as
Third Army helped transport selected documents to Herzogenaurach airfield.
From there, NavTechMisEu chartered aircraft that flew an estimated 1,084
cases weighing sixteen tons to the Admiralty in London. However, an
estimated fifteen to twenty tons of material remained largely unguarded
inside Castle Tambach.100 With the initial removal of selected documents in
May of 1945, twelve soldiers from the 14th Tank Battalion of the 9th
Armored Division assumed control for security at Tambach. Yet, these
troops lacked specific orders to safeguard the contents inside the castle.
Nazi loyalists successfully removed key German Navy intelligence files
from Castle Tambach. For nearly two weeks, the American soldiers simply
allowed the Countess von Ortenberg and her staff of local German civilians
to continue their routines inside the castle. American troops were under
orders to refrain from fraternizing with enemy military personnel and
German civilians. Thus, as the Germans moved freely about, the G.I.s
simply sat by their tanks, smoking cigarettes and drinking coffee. This
situation resulted in the loss of additional documents. On 12 June 1945,
Lieutenant Alexander Penn, RNVR, a representative from NID-24, accom-
panied Earle from London to secure the remainder of the Tambach
Collection. As a Russian linguist, Penn earlier worked with Earle during the
Katyn Forest investigation before his assignment to the captured documents
section within NID.
Allied forces failed to provide sufficient security on the documents
remaining inside Castle Tambach. Penn and Earle reported witnessing a
German using "a cart and oxen to take documents into the forest." Upon
additional investigation, Penn and Earle discovered that the Germans had
spirited documents to "various villages and farms in the neighborhood of the
castle." Earle remarked that
officers originally connected to the OKM, who kept in contact with
98. NARA, RG 38, CominCh, Crane Files, Box 37, "F-21 Memoranda Regarding U-boat
Tracking and Operations, June 1943-June 1945," 22 May 1945 assessment of German
Navy messages.
99. NARA, RG 313, "Report of Special Mission Regarding Correlation of Historical
Documentation on Naval Operations in the Atlantic Theater," 23 October 1945
Memorandum from Kenneth Knowles to the Director of Naval History, p. 11.
"Microfilming Facilities, Survey of," memorandum from F.L. Carr, USN, to Shelley of
28 May 1945.

members of the staff inside the castle, and were informed of our
movements and intentions ... in an attempt to create a shadow OKM
organization exercised a form of terror over the German population in
the vicinity. Their ramifications appear to be far-flung.101
Earle admonished the American soldiers for allowing the Germans such
access to the materials inside the castle. The soldiers explained that they
"had no clear instructions as to what they were to guard, since so many
people had free access to the documents and free entry into the castle." They
also reported that "General Patton inspected Tambach earlier in the week
and had left with a crateful of stuff."102
Penn and Earle organized their own effort to recover materials by
enlisting the assistance of 30 AU and FIU. "It is considered essential that all
documents be removed from Tambach as soon as possible," Earle observed.
The files were "so mixed up as to make it difficult to segregate documents
for any given period of time."103 He estimated that the documents remaining
inside the castle weighed "between fifteen and twenty tons." 104 The officers
recommended the removal "be done as soon as possible, as the Army feels it
cannot continue to provide such a large guard indefinitely." 105 Earle also
emphasized that the "documents should not be accommodated in the
Admiralty but could be taken direct to Bletchley Park." "Any documents of
current value," Earle continued, "could be separated at Bletchley Park and
added to the Tambach Library at the Admiralty." 106 The analysts further
emphasized that the Tambach Collection contained a significant amount of
"German Intelligence on Russia."107
Anglo-American commanders feared the prospect of Soviet forces
moving into the area of Tambach Castle. Given their interest in the collec-
tion remaining within, ComNavMisEu organized another push to evacuate
the documents from Germany to London. In May 1945, the Field Infor-
mation Agency – Technical (FIAT) mobilized to conduct a comprehensive
search for Axis intelligence sources. Within the FIAT organization,
ComNavMisEu established the Naval Technical Section (NTS) to concen-
trate upon naval targets. Until its final dissolution in 1946, the FIAT
organization held tactical control over the operations of 30 AU and FIU in
"Germany – Naval Archives at Tambach," Shelley memorandum to Kittredge derived
from the original report by Earle of 3 July 1945, pp. 1-4.
102. Ibid.
103. Ibid.
104. Ibid.
105. Ibid.
106. NARA, RG 313, ComNavEu, "ComNavEu Axis Archives," 3 July 1945 Memo-
randum from Earle to Commodore Tully Shelley, USN, "Germany – Naval Archives at
Tambach," p. 3.
107. NARA, RG 313, ComNavEu, "ComNavEu Axis Archives," 15 November 1945
Admiralty message from NID-24 to ComNavEu Intelligence Officer, prepared by Sub-
Lietuenant Madeleine Rees, 3/0 WRNS, Room 12 – Citadel, London.

Europe. Tabulating all the shipments of German Navy documents associated
with Castle Tambach, analysts estimated the "weight of the total collection
to be forty-eight (48) tons."108
The FIAT organization assumed responsibility for recovering records
referenced in the files recovered from Tambach, but which remained at
large. During the summer of 1945, 30 AU and FIU teams scoured the
countryside for missing files. Former German Navy officers provided addi-
tional assistance to 30 AU and FIU, including Lieutenant Commander Peter
Freiherr Handel-Mazzetti and Sub-Lieutenant Walther Pfeiffer. Holding
doctoral degrees and working as historians, they served on the staff of the
German Admiralty during the war. In September 1945, Handel-Mazzetti and
Pfeiffer helped 30 AU and FIU secure three additional cases of high-grade
documents. In one case, a large cache was located under the doorstep of the
Royal Navy occupational headquarters at Plön in northern Germany. Lambie
of FIU found another cache buried in the woods.109
The scope of raw intelligence found within the German Naval Archives
astounded Anglo-American strategists. In efforts to exploit the documents,
the Royal Navy combined forces with the U.S. Navy to accept equal
responsibility for the German Naval Archives. Anglo-American analysts
cataloged the documents with the acronym "PG" (Pinched from Germans)
with a numerical reference to maintain control over the dissemination of the
captured enemy records within their combined intelligence bureaucracies. 110
Anglo-American strategists also concluded formal negotiations to share
ownership of captured Axis documents, technology, and intelligence. This
arrangement coincided with a long series of negotiations culminating in the
British-American Security Agreement (BrUSA) of 1943, the precursor to the
United Kingdom-United States Security Agreement (UKUSA). 111 Negotia-
tions relating to exchanges of high-grade cryptographic intelligence sources
furthermore influenced the process of recruiting scholarly historians to
analyze captured Axis records.112
As Anglo-American negotiations progressed in the higher levels of
command, veterans of 30 AU and FIU continued working very closely in the
108. NARA, RG 313, ComNavEu, "ComNavEu Axis Archives," 28 May 1945,

"Memorandum for Intelligence Officer, Microfilming Facilities, Survey of," pp. 3-4.
handwritten memorandum from Lambie to FIU.
110. Howard M. Ehrmann, "The German Naval Archives (Tambach)," in Wolfe, ed.,
Captured German and Related Records, p. 158.
111. Jeffrey Grey, "Exploiting Enemy Records: The Enemy Documentation Section and
the Official Histories of the Second World War," in Jeffrey Grey, The Last Word? Essays
on Official History in the United States and British Commonwealth (Westport, CT:
Praeger, 2003), pp. 117-32; Bath, Tracking the Axis Enemy, pp. 103-06; Smith, The
Ultra-Magic Deals, pp. 131-230.
112. TNA, CAB 103/288, "Official Histories of the War, 1939-45: Use of Special
Intelligence by Historians," memorandum "General Directive to Chief of Historians,"
Top Secret Ultra Annex.

race against the Soviets to secure Axis intelligence sources. By the end of
July 1945, Glanville and Lambie transferred to East Asia to organize the
Inter-service Intelligence Assault Unit (IAU) within the combined Anglo-
American headquarters of the South East Asia Command (SEAC) located at
Kandy in Ceylon. The British held supreme command within SEAC unlike
the American SHAEF of Eisenhower in Europe. Within SEAC, Admiral
Lord Louis Mountbatten of the Royal Navy acted as the Supreme Allied
Commander. Within the IAU of SEAC, members of 30 AU and FIU
continued the practice of intermixing Anglo-American personnel in the field.
Collaboration among personnel at the front remained intact, although
Anglo-American policymakers competed for control at the strategic levels.
Glanville collaborated with Lambie to exploit Japanese intelligence sources
in Asia. However, Glanville found conditions in Asia "very different from
those in Europe, mainly on account of the great distances involved and the
difficulty experienced in obtaining precise topographical references in
regard to the location of targets." 113 Following the surrender of Japan in
September 1945, Glanville served as a British representative to the head-
quarters of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) in Tokyo
under U.S. Army General of the Army (five stars) Douglas MacArthur.
As a British intelligence representative to the SCAP headquarters in
Tokyo, Glanville grew frustrated with the close supervision of the
Americans. He served under the immediate supervision of William J. Sebald
– MacArthur's deputy within the SCAP headquarters. During the war,
Sebald had served as chief of the "Pacific Section" with Commander
Kenneth A. Knowles heading the "Atlantic Section" within the Combat
Intelligence Division of CominCh. Although Sebald had officially retired
from active duty, he remained an American intelligence operative. He
restricted the British personnel assigned within the SCAP headquarters.
Later, Glanville complained about Sebald and other Americans when he
recounted that "no premises were to be visited or Japanese technicians
interrogated unless four clear days notice had been given to G2 SCAP who
would arrange the meeting and provide transport." He also stated that "no
visits were to be paid to any Japanese premises unless a U.S. Officer was
present."114
Glanville regarded such constraints as counterproductive considering the
close relations he had with his American counterparts in Europe. "The
exaggerated organization of the Americans and of their general disregard for
the practical aspect of intelligence investigations," he concluded, is "a
sample of what is to be expected for the future from operations carried out in
a theatre where the Americans are in absolute control." 115 The relationship
113. TNA, ADM 223/214, "History of 30 AU," Part I, Chapter XIII, "Operations in the
Far Eastern Theater," paragraph 31, subparagraph (e).
Far Eastern Theater," paragraphs 31 and 33, subparagraphs (a, b, c, and e).

between British and American intelligence had radically changed since
1941. In February 1946, Glanville disbanded the remaining elements of the
30 AU organization in Hong Kong and subsequently returned to Britain.
Looking back, he lamented the erosion of British influence as the Americans
assumed control in anticipation of the Cold War against the Soviets.
Bond ... James Bond

Working together, Anglo-American historians serving within the Admiralty
and Navy Department helped preserve the German Naval Archives. They
agreed to share ownership of the collection, along with other Axis intelli-
gence sources. Anglo-American forces maintained storage facilities for
captured intelligence sources across various locations in occupied areas of
Europe. These facilities often fell under either British or American control
and, thus, hindered full collaboration among Anglo-American analysts, as
one partner sometimes had no immediate knowledge of the other's holdings.
The amount of raw data overwhelmed Anglo-American intelligence
analysts.116
To expedite the exploitation process, historians helped examine raw
sources of captured enemy intelligence to help Allied strategists defeat the
Axis. For example, Royal Navy Captain Alfred C. Dewar supervised the
Historical Section within the Training and Staff Division of the Admiralty.
Retired U.S. Navy Commodore Dudley W. Knox, by comparison, controlled
a large pool of historians as the Director of Naval Records and Library
(NRL) at the Navy Department. As staff officers, Dewar and Knox had
served together with the historians Frank Birch and Tracy Barrett Kittredge
during the First World War. 117 Twenty years later, Dewar, Knox, Birch, and
Kittredge took a direct role in the operations of units like 30 AU and FIU.
Personnel originally assigned to the Historical Section of the Admiralty
transferred into various subsections of NID. This resulted in severe shortfalls
during the war, causing Dewar to complain that he was "obliged to carry on
the functions of the Historical Section with an inadequate number of
assistants for the work expected."118 Dewar's organization inspired Knox to
build an equivalent to the Historical Section within the Navy Department.
By June 1944, Knox convinced Admiral Ernest J. King, and the Secretary of
the Navy, James V. Forrestal, to establish the NRL and the Office of Naval
Far Eastern Theater," paragraph 35.

Secret Ultra Annex.
117. Stanford, California, Hoover Institution Archives, Tracy Barrett Kittredge Papers,
Box 8, "Oxford and Early Essays," Folder 2, Rough notes and reminiscences of Oxford;
Tracy Barrett Kittredge, Naval Lessons of the Great War (Garden City, NY: Doubleday,
1921), pp. 143-44, 284-92, 334-45, and 410-11; and Patrick Beesly, Room 40: British
Naval Intelligence, 1914-18 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1982), pp. 1-45.
118. NARA, RG 313, ComNavEu, Box 10, Folder 53, "Axis Archives," serial A-12 (9), 4
August 1943, "Microfilming Archives in Enemy Countries."

History (ONH). King then appointed Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, the
President of the Naval War College, to supervise the NRL and ONH with
the understanding that the
authority to coordinate histories and narratives shall include the history
of operations being prepared by Commander S.E. Morison, USNR, the
administrative history under Dr. R.G. Albion, the Battle reports of the
Office of Public Relations, the record of aviation accomplishment, and
the Combat Narratives of the Office of Naval Intelligence. 119
In turn, Kalbfus empowered Knox to supervise the daily operations of the
ONH. The connections between intelligence gathering and historical
analysis reflected in the physical location of the ONH inside Room 2742,
which connected with the spaces occupied by ONI on the second deck inside
the Main Navy building. The speed of the Navy Department in creating the
ONH impressed Dewar. He remarked in correspondence that Knox
"possessed authority comparable to that of the First Lord."120
Knox convinced U.S. Navy strategists to combine intelligence gathering
with the pursuit of historical scholarship. Concurrently, Princeton University
professor Robert Greenhalgh Albion helped Knox in the campaign to merge
intelligence gathering with historical analysis in the Navy Department. Knox
secured resources from the ONH and ONI. Following the directive of the
Navy Department, Kittredge established the Historical Section as a sub-
sidiary of the intelligence division under Shelley of the ComNavEu head-
quarters in London. Given their longstanding friendship, Kittredge also
collaborated with Birch in the Naval Section of GC&CS at Bletchley Park.
Birch and Kittredge merged the intelligence collection functions of 30 AU
and FIU with their personal interests in history.121
In anticipation of the Allied advance across the Rhine into Germany,
Birch and Kittredge convinced Fleming and Shelley to include targets of
historical interest with those of higher intelligence value on the Black List.
Upon learning of the Tambach archives, Birch and Kittredge cited their
intelligence value as one justification to preserve the original organization
and integrity of the collection. While the majority of the records remained
classified in order to preclude the Soviets from gaining full access, the
German Naval Archives ultimately provided historians the means to study
events from the nineteenth century through the world wars. 122
119. NARA, RG 38, CominCh, "Naval History of the Current War," 31 July 1944.
120. NARA, RG 313, ComNavEu, Box 10, Folder 53, "Axis Archives," serial A-12 (9), 4
August 1943 memorandum from Lieutenant Commander Peter van der Poel to Kittredge,
"Microfilming Archives in Enemy Countries."
121. TNA, HW 8/37, "Naval Miscellaneous Papers July-Dec 1945 papers, collected by
Frank Birch, Head of Naval Section," 17 August 1945 report on "N.I.D. Captured
Document Library (Short Title C.D.L.)."
Secret Ultra Annex.

Birch and Kittredge secured American financing under the Navy Depart-
ment to microfilm and translate the German Naval Archives. In turn, they
pursued this massive undertaking through contracts with the British
Association of Special Libraries and University Microfilm Incorporated of
Ann Arbor, Michigan. U.S. Navy Captain Roland Krause then supervised
the combined Anglo-American and German effort to duplicate (with English
translations) the Tambach Collection between 1945 and 1949. Krause's
organization translated in excess of 30,000 pages, which remained in-
accessible to researchers outside the Navy Department until the 1960s. Over
time, researchers generally referred to the German Naval Archives as the
"Tambach Collection."123 The collection includes an estimated 4,391 reels of
microfilm and remains available to researchers at the National Archives and
Records Administration facilities in College Park, Maryland. 124
Anglo-American policymakers maintained wartime classification pro-
tocols on captured Axis intelligence sources. To preclude the Soviets from
gaining access, the German Naval Archives remained restricted to a highly
select circle of historians. The British held custody of the original German
Navy documents, though shared ownership with the Americans. Thus,
Admiralty and Navy Department policymakers sequestered the German
Naval Archives for the purposes of compiling official histories. For the
Admiralty official history, Roskill supervised a team of historians to produce
The War at Sea, which appeared in four volumes between 1954 and 1961.
He also completed a classified version of The War at Sea for internal
military use. Roskill argued that the "study of contemporary German
documents [revealed] the uneasiness which always seems to be produced
among our enemies when it becomes apparent that an invasion is to be
launched across seas which they do not adequately control."125
Roskill cited Axis aggression to justify arguments for an ongoing global
collaboration between the Royal Navy and the U.S. Navy. Roskill's
government-sponsored history of the Royal Navy complemented the
commercially published semi-official history of U.S. Navy operations by
Morison.126 Between 1942 and 1963, Morison compiled the History of
United States Naval Operations in World War II. From 1948 to 1954, he
also helped write scripts for the television documentary Victory at Sea. Like
Roskill, Morison emphasized that until "German Admiralty records were
examined … almost everyone in the United States and Great Britain thought
123. NARA, RG 313, ComNavEu, "ComNavEu Axis Archives," 28 May 1945,

"Memorandum for Intelligence Officer, Microfilming Facilities, Survey of," pp. 3-4.
124. See NARA, RG 242.8, "Microfilm Copies of Records of the German Navy, 1850-
1945."
125. Roskill, War at Sea, Vol. I, p. 10.
Secret Ultra Annex.

that the submarine campaign had been prepared long in advance." 127 From
reviewing German records, Morison discovered that "[n]othing could be
further from the truth."128 Morison also used the Second World War to
emphasize the historical and cultural connections between the United
Kingdom and the United States.129
Conclusion
Examining the events culminating in the capture of Castle Tambach,
contemporary historians should understand efforts to secure the German
Naval Archives as an effort involving both British and American personnel.
Until recently, historians working outside the Anglo-American governments
lacked comprehensive access to archival documents relating to 30 AU and
FIU. The one exception was a heavily redacted official history of 30 AU,
which primarily traces the development of intelligence-gathering commando
units by examining the bureaucratic changes within the Anglo-American
command. The unedited 30 AU history remained inaccessible until 1972.
The British government released it as "ADM 233/214" at the Public Record
Office (now The National Archives, or TNA). Much later, the classified
appendices from the official history became available as "HW 8/104" in
June 2002. Although the official history acknowledges that the U.S. Navy
officers "did yeoman service in liaison duties while the Unit was operating
in the U.S. theatre [and were] treated as officers of 30 AU," it does not fully
assess the role of FIU.130
The documents required for examining the combined histories of 30 AU
and FIU presently appear in various collections in the United Kingdom and
United States. From recently released U.S. Navy records, historians may
now examine the close collaboration between 30 AU and the FIU in detail.
From 1943 to 1946, FIU appeared in many different bureaucratic forms. The
key to clarifying historical ambiguities associated with such organizations
centers upon the personalities who directly participated in the operations of
30 AU and FIU. By tracking the individual names of personalities involved,
historians may reconstruct the organizational framework of relations
between units like 30 AU and FIU. 131 This approach also provides the means
to understand how Anglo-American strategists collaborated in planning
combined operations against enemy forces at the front.132
127. Morison, History of United States Naval Operations, Vol. I, p. 4.

128. Ibid.
129. Roskill, War at Sea, Vol. III, Part II, p. 409; and Samuel Eliot Morison, Strategy
and Compromise (Boston: Little, Brown, 1958), p. 120.
130. TNA, ADM 223/214, "History of 30 AU," Part I, Chapter I, "Operations in North
West Europe," paragraph 82, subsection (a).
Secret Ultra Annex.
132. NARA, RG 38, Records of the Naval Security Group, Box 15, "Report on British
Procedures for Capturing and Exploiting Enemy Naval Documents." Also, see TNA, HW

U.S. Navy records relating to the FIU organization remain scattered in
various collections relating to Allied operations and intelligence. Tracking
the activities of FIU, researchers may find documents at the Operational
Archives (OA) of the Navy History and Heritage Command (NHHC); the
Naval War College; and the NARA facilities in College Park, Maryland.
The records of SHAEF, subordinate staffs, and individual U.S. Army units
contain information about the operations of 30 AU and FIU. The records of
the Commander, U.S. Navy Forces Germany (NavForGer) and the
NavTechMisEu highlight the internal debates which influenced the efforts to
gather intelligence from the German Naval Archives. 133 Concurrent with the
effort to gather intelligence, historians affiliated with Anglo-American
intelligence helped preserve the German Naval Archives.
Future historians will continue to discover new perspectives from
examining the original files of 30 AU and FIU. Among other aspects, the
German Naval Archives remains a unique resource for historians to examine
a wide range of subjects from the nineteenth century through the world wars.
After 1962, the British progressively repatriated selected records from the
Tambach Collection to German custody. 134 Historians, in turn, continued
using the duplicated copies and translations of the Tambach Collection.
Anglo-American commanders financed the effort to duplicate and translate
the Tambach Collection for use by their intelligence services in anticipation
of the Cold War. Over time, the duplicates became the means by which
historians have written about the war at sea. In this respect, the capture of
the Tambach Collection represented one of the greatest triumphs of Anglo-
American collaboration during the Second World War. Given its signifi-
cance for the development of postwar reconstruction policy and the Anglo-
American intelligence services, the Tambach Collection also influenced
historical scholarship during the Cold War era. With nearly unrestricted
access to Allied naval intelligence records, historians are now able to
examine how the Tambach Collection survived the war in the first place.
David Kohnen is an Instructor in the College of Operations and Strategic

Leadership at the U.S. Naval War College. He also serves with the naval
reserve faculty at the National Intelligence University. He is the author of
Commanders Winn and Knowles: Winning the U-Boat War with Intelli-
gence, 1939-1943 (New York: Enigma, 1999).
8 103.
133. Madsen, Royal Navy and German Naval Disarmament, pp. 155-58; Pash, ALSOS
Mission and Packard, A Century of U.S. Naval Intelligence, pp. 160-62, 212-13, and 430-
32.
134. Astrid M. Eckert, The Struggle for the Files: The Western Allies and the Return of
German Archives after the Second World War (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2012), pp. 13-35 and 293-374.

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from the Archives of 1870‒1945

Global War Studies 12 (1) 2015 │ 133

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7. Nutting, Attain by Surprise, pp. i-x.

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MARTIAN Reports from the Far Shore

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Shore," "TG-125.8 Reports," 25 September 1944 memorandum from Shelley to O'Niell.

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Bronze Star Medal.

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A Bunch of Limey Gangsters

65. Aylen, "Recollections of 30 Assault Unit," p. 318.

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Pinching the Past

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86. Nutting, Attain by Surprise, pp. 17, 211-12.

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89. Nutting, Attain by Surprise, p. 17.

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95. Nutting, Attain by Surprise, p. 213.

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108. NARA, RG 313, ComNavEu, "ComNavEu Axis Archives," 28 May 1945,

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Bond ... James Bond

Far Eastern Theater," paragraph 35.

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123. NARA, RG 313, ComNavEu, "ComNavEu Axis Archives," 28 May 1945,

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127. Morison, History of United States Naval Operations, Vol. I, p. 4.

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David Kohnen is an Instructor in the College of Operations and Strategic

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