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JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SMALL BUSINESS
https://doi.org/10.1080/26437015.2020.1850156

Humane Entrepreneurship Model: Does morality of


entrepreneurs matter?
Alina Maria Landowskaa, Bice Della Piana b
, and Rosangela Feolab
a
Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities,
Poland; bDepartment of Management & Innovation Systems, University of Salerno, Italy

ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
What is the relationship between morality and entrepreneurship? Morality-as-cooperation;
Previous research suggests that (a) morality is a set of tools for humane entrepreneurship;
promoting cooperation (morality-as-cooperation [MAC]), and (b) culture
entrepreneurs succeed in part by fostering cooperation in their busi-
ness. We argue that MAC is able to explain why moral entrepreneurs
are more successful than immoral entrepreneurs—because they are
better able to solve problems of cooperation. We provide evidence of
the seven MAC principles at work in business. Further, we propose
a future research using the Humane Entrepreneurship Model should
have to incorporate Cooperative Orientation and the MAC
Questionnaire should be used to assess morality in entrepreneurship.

Introduction
Entrepreneurs are spiritus movens of economic change and competitiveness
through innovating and taking advantage of business opportunities (Acs et al.,
2009b). Growth and innovations are driven by entrepreneurships—in fact, by
phenomenal individuals (Bosma et al., 2009). Entrepreneurs create the wealth of
nations “by bringing together unique packages of resources to exploit market-
place opportunities” (Ireland et al., 2001, p. 51) and they facilitate inclusive and
long-term economic growth (Terjesen et al., 2016; van Oort & Bosma, 2013). As
showed by the literature on the topic, entrepreneurs’ success—among others—
depends on ability to cooperate (Acs et al., 2009a; Baron & Markman, 2000;
Tesar & Vincze, 2017; Ulijn et al., 2007; von Ravensburg, 2009).
“Cooperation is hybrid by nature” (Verhoeven et al., 2007, p. 91). Shared
intentionality—when two or more people experience the same thing at the same
time and know that they are doing this—enabled humans to share emotions,
experience, and cooperation (Tomasello, 1995; Tomasello et al., 2012; Tomasello
& Moll, 2010). Uniquely human cooperative skills emerged to coordinate
mutualistic activities (Tomasello, 2008).
According to the Morality-as-Cooperation (MAC) theory proposed by Curry
et al. (2019a), human cooperation— as an evolutionary adaptation—manifests

CONTACT Alina Maria Landowska, PhD. alandowska@swps.edu.pl Department of Humanities and Social
Sciences, SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities, 19/31 Chodakowska Street, Warsaw 03-815, Poland.
© 2020 International Council for Small Business
2 A. M. LANDOWSKA ET AL.

itself in several dimensions, causing different problems as well as opportunities,


which are “allocating resources to kin, coordinating to mutual advantage, enga-
ging in social exchange, and minimizing the costs of conflict” (Curry et al.,
2019b, pp. 1–2). As a consequence, humans dispose of cooperative abilities that
enable them to “(1) care for our families, (2) maintain coalitions, (3) reciprocate
favors (and punish cheats)—and resolve conflicts through contests involving
displays of (4) heroism and (5) deference, (6) fairness, and (7) respect for prior
possession” (Curry et al., 2019b, p. 2) (see Table 1).
The Moral Foundations theory (MFT), introduced prior to MAC by Haidt
and Graham (2007), which used the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ;
Graham et al., 2011), is the first morality map that incorporates five moral
domains, related to fairness, ingroup, authority, care, and purity. However, it
does not relate to theory of cooperation (Haidt & Joseph, 2011). MAC enlarges
the map by adding domains related to family, reciprocity, heroism, or property,
but does not include care and purity, which do not correspond to cooperation
types (Curry et al., 2019a). Another model, based on Relational theory (RMT),
includes only four moral domains, such as unity, hierarchy, equality, and
proportionality (Fiske & Rai, 2014; Rai & Fiske, 2011). The RMT does not
differentiate between family and group, reciprocity and fairness; neither does
it recognize the differences between “hawkishness” and “doveishness” (Curry
et al., 2019a). But, in like manner to MAC, it confirms that “harm” or “purity”
should not be considered as distinct domains. MFT and RMT, as well as the
theory of Dyadic Morality (TDM) (Schein & Gray, 2017), did not evolve from
a cooperative approach. However, TDM argues that morality’s foundation is
minimizing harm and suggests different forms of them—similar to MFT’s
domains. At the same time, it recognizes moral violations as an effect of activity
of psychological mechanisms oriented on general-purpose not a distinct one.

Table 1. Relations between morality and cooperation types.


Moral Problem/ Cooperative Moral Immoral
domain opportunity solution behavior behavior
Family Kin selection Kin altruism Duty of care, special Incest, neglect
obligations to kin
Group Coordination Mutualism Loyalty, unity, solidarity, Betrayal, treason
conformity
Reciprocity Social dilemma Reciprocal Reciprocity, trustworthiness, Cheating,
altruism forgiveness ingratitude
Heroism Conflict resolution Hawkish Bravery, fortitude, largesse Cowardice,
(contest) displays miserliness
Deference Conflict resolution Doveish Respect, obedience, humility Disrespect,
(contest) displays hubris
Fairness Conflict resolution Division Fairness, impartiality, equality Unfairness,
(bargaining) favoritism
Property Conflict resolution Ownership Respect for property, property Theft, trespass
(possession) rights
Source: Adapted from Mapping morality with a compass: Testing the theory of “morality-as-cooperation” with a
new questionnaire, Curry et al. (2019a, p. 108).
JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SMALL BUSINESS 3

Contrary to MFT, TDM (like RMT and MAC), excludes “purity” as a separate
moral domain. But TDM proves rather that it is a form of “harm” (Gray et al.,
2014). Similarly, to MAC, a “Side-Taking” Theory of Morality (STTM)—pro-
posed by DeScioli and Kurzban (2009)—explains morality via a cooperation
approach. In this case, the moral judgment is necessary in the process of
choosing a side in conflicts, which helps in avoiding costs and does not exclude
supporting others in different fights even if condemnation is harmful to others
(DeScioli, 2016; DeScioli & Kurzban, 2009). MAC, however—by use of coop-
erative theories—allows for justifying moral behaviors like those of enhancing or
sabotaging one’s reputation among family and friends (Barclay, 2016), choosing
partners to cooperate (Krasnow et al., 2016), or building social alliances for
protection of resources (Petersen, 2013).
While considerable progress has been made in developing moral theories in
the field of business morality, supporters of the Moral Management model
(Carroll, 2001; Hendry, 2001) argued with Boatright’s Moral Market model
(Boatright, 1999). Most research focuses on organizational and behavioral
theories. Recent years showed an increasing interest in researching organiza-
tional morality as a social construct, which is not accepted by a community’s
morality (Shadnam et al., 2020), as well as investigating the responsibility and
morality of leaders as influential individuals (Day & Harrison, 2007; Zhu et al.,
2016). Researchers also suggest that moral leaders should be moral people
(Aquino & Reed, 2003; Hardy & Carlo, 2011) and organizations cannot achieve
their goals without moral consideration (Nielsen, 2006). Universal moral values
of cross-cultural leaders persist elusive despite considerable research. We notice
that Morality-as-Cooperation may help explain managers’ and entrepreneurs’
morality in a globalized business infrastructure.
Successful entrepreneurs operate on sound business ethics, those codes of
conduct that impact society positively, which are approved and accepted in any
society, and they use moral imagination that integrates morality into the deci-
sion-making process (Dunham et al., 2008; Werhane, 1999). Much evidence
suggests that entrepreneurs share some universal attitudes toward business
ethics (Clarke & Aram, 1997; Dees & Starr, 1990; Izraeli, 1988; Lysonski &
Gaidis, 1991; Whipple & Swords, 1992). They also show sensitivity to the norms
and values of particular societies (Becker & Fritzsche, 1987; Clarke & Aram,
1997; Deal & Kennedy, 1988; Peters & Waterman, 1982; White & Rhodeback,
1992). As culture affects entrepreneurial posture, entrepreneurs shape its orga-
nizational culture (Covin & Slevin, 1991). The company’s culture reflects—
among other things—shared values, beliefs, and ideologies (Covin & Slevin,
1991; Gordon & DiTomaso, 1992; Pettigrew, 1979). Some research focuses on
virtues that might be responsible for success in business, for example, Cornwall
et al. (2008) maintained that being a good entrepreneur requires prudence,
justice, courage, and temperance.
4 A. M. LANDOWSKA ET AL.

Studies of entrepreneurial cognition demonstrate that entrepreneurs across 11


countries share a universal culture of entrepreneurship that differs from the beliefs
of others who are not entrepreneurs (Mitchell et al., 2002). Gartner (1989, 1985)
and later Sarasvathy (2004) underlined that differences among entrepreneurs tend
to be greater than differences between those who are not entrepreneurs. Cognitive
scholars (see, for example, Reynolds, 2006) investigated such heterogeneity among
entrepreneurs, which is expressed in diversified responsiveness (specified as sensi-
tivity or awareness) to moral issues. They also suggested (see, for example, Sommer
et al., 2000) that some differences may result from sociocultural influences.
As shown in Figure 1, entrepreneurship research mainly focuses on four
types of problems related to cooperation: coordination, kin selection, posses-
sion, and deference. Social dilemma and conflict resolution issues (associated
with contest and bargaining) showed much less response.
Entrepreneurs seem to fully exploit their power of cooperation as humans,
which helps them to achieve their business goals (Brown & Uljin, 2004; Fligstein,
1997). Following Melé’s (2003) concept of Humanistic Management, we under-
stand entrepreneurship as a construct that “build[s] up a community of persons
and foster[s] the development of human virtues” (p. 85). The recent model of
Humane Entrepreneurship (HumEnt) enlarges the traditional view of the firm
based on the concept of entrepreneurial orientation (Covin & Slevin, 1989),
adding two further elements: attention toward human resource involved in
firms (Kim et al., 2018) and attention to the environment and society at large

8000

7000
Web of Science Cita!ons

6000

5000

4000

3000

2000

1000

Figure 1. Web of Science Citation search.*


*A Web of Science Citation search for articles mentioning entrepreneurship and different key-
words related to kin altruism, mutualism, reciprocity, heroism, deference, fairness, and property
rights indicates much less interest to reciprocity and fairness issues, as well as an extreme bias
toward heroism in entrepreneurship research.
JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SMALL BUSINESS 5

(Parente et al., 2018, 2020). HumEnt is a relatively new theory developed by the
Italian school (Parente et al., 2018, 2020) from the following theories:
Entrepreneurial Orientation theory (EO), Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)
theory, and Servant Leadership Theory (SLT) (Parente et al., 2018, 2020). In
explaining the HumEnt, Parente et al. (2018) maintained that entrepreneurs/top
management Core Values as individual factors have a significant impact on
business ventures (Parente et al., 2018, 2020).
In analyzing factors, such as core values that could influence HumEnt, we focus
on entrepreneurs’ and managers’ morality, which shapes the moral quality of the
firm. The entrepreneurs’ and managers’ moral values might be expressed in “(a)
a strategic posture that shows both attitudinal and behavioral dimensions and as
(b) a firm-level construct” (Parente et al., 2020, p. 14). Starting from these premises,
we discuss the role of morality and cooperation in the HumEnt model. More
specifically we sustain that the Morality-as-Cooperation theory should be consid-
ered as a fourth theory contributing to the HumEnt and MAC Questionnaire
(MAC-Q) might be a measurement tool to better recognize entrepreneurs’ and
managers’ moral values reflected in seven types of cooperation that differ among
cultures. The results of the article might be used to indicate what “being humane
entrepreneurial” (Parente et al., 2020, p. 5) means for entrepreneurs and managers
by manifestation of their moral values in cooperation types.

An integrated approach to morality, cooperation, and HumEnt


HumEnt theory and its theoretical pillars
HumEnt is an emerging model of entrepreneurship that has been recently
proposed and developed (Kim et al., 2018; Parente et al., 2018, 2020). The
model enlarges the traditional orientation of firms toward business and profit
and is well expressed in the concept of Entrepreneurial Orientation (EO;
Covin & Slevin, 1989) with attention to human resources involved in the firm
(Kim, 2015; Kim et al., 2016, 2018), and for the environment and society at
large (Parente et al., 2018, 2020). The concept of HumEnt, in fact, has been
proposed following two specific models.
The model proposed by Kim et al. (2018), based on the study of human
resources (Pfeffer, 1998) and according to humanistic management’s principles
(Melé, 2003), maintained the idea of a human-centered approach resulting from
the integration of entrepreneurship, leadership, and human resources manage-
ment. In this model, EO and Humane Entrepreneurial Orientation (H-EO),
characterized by empathy, equity, empowerment and enablement in human
resource management, are the two basic elements of HumEnt aimed at genera-
tion of high-quality jobs and wealth (Kim et al., 2018).
The model proposed by Parente et al. (2018) enlarged this idea and
defined a HumEnt model as a combination of three components: EO,
6 A. M. LANDOWSKA ET AL.

Humane Resource Orientation (HRO), and Sustainability Orientation (SO),


in which SO includes not only attention to the environment, but also
consideration and care for the community and society at large (Parente
et al., 2020).
In this model, HEO is defined as an enlarged strategic posture (Parente
et al., 2018, 2020) and in this sense it can be broadly defined as a “firm’s
overall competitive orientation” (Covin & Slevin, 1989, p. 77) that is attitu-
dinal and behavioral at the same time (Parente et al., 2020).
HumEnt draws on three theoretical pillars (Parente et al., 2018):
Entrepreneurial Orientation theory (Covin & Slevin, 1989; Miller, 1983), SLT
(Barbuto & Wheeler, 2006; Van Dierendonck, 2011), and CSR (McWilliams &
Siegel, 2001).
In explaining their enlarged model, authors identify different factors and
elements that influence the strategic posture of firm, classifying them in
external, internal, and individual factors (Parente et al., 2018).
More specifically, the role of individual factors found its origins in the
Upper Echelon theory, which suggests that the strategic decisions of firms
are the result of values, beliefs, and orientations of their top decision makers
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984). As shown in the literature, entrepreneurs’, man-
agers’, and employees’ core values structure the motivational foundations of
a firm (Schwartz, 2007) and reflected in norms—via rules and expectations—
regulate behaviors (Rokeach, 1973). Accordingly, research on the topic shows
that the core values of entrepreneurs influence strategic actions of firms (Guth
& Tagiuri, 1965; Judge & Bretz, 1992) and differences in values, beliefs, and
orientations of entrepreneurs may affect strategic choices at the firm level.

Morality and cooperation theory


By applying the Morality-as-Cooperation theory, we aim at explaining why
“moral” entrepreneurs, who are better able to solve problems of cooperation,
are more successful than “immoral” or “amoral” entrepreneurs. There are
many different problems of cooperation resulting from human social interac-
tions, and many different solutions for them. MAC, which originates in game
theory and evolutionary biology, shows the mathematics of cooperation. It
explains that morality delivers solutions, unfolded in biological and cultural
coevolution, to the cooperative problems incessantly repeated by humans in
social interactions (Curry, 2016). MAC examines the essence of morality by
covering its matter and structure. Regarding the content, it identifies seven
types of cooperative behaviors as morally relevant. These include helping
family and group members, costs and benefits of reciprocation, demonstrating
“hawkish” or “doveish” traits, splitting disputed resources, as well as respecting
prior possession (Curry, 2016). And regarding the structure, it recognizes
specific moral constructs related to family, group, reciprocity, heroism,
JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SMALL BUSINESS 7

deference, fairness, and property (Curry, 2016). Thus, it allows for a deeper
and wider understanding of morality than previous cooperative studies (see,
for example, MFT) (Curry et al., 2019a). It introduces new moral accounts
referring to family, reciprocity (in contrast to fairness), heroism, and property,
as well as distinguishing moral explanations relating to group, deference, and
fairness.1 MAC precisely indicates specific solutions to cooperative problems
that are a substance of human morality (Curry, 2005, 2016).
As a result, a new scale for measuring morality—the MAC-Q—was proposed
by Curry and his colleagues (Curry, 2016; Curry et al., 2019a, 2019b). The scale
covers more extensive and detailed description, as well as having more precise
psychometric properties than previous ones (Curry et al., 2019a). Moreover –
according to MAC—cooperation as a form of social interaction generates different
types of benefits (in other words, care or altruism) and costs (in other words,
harms) that refer to diverse causes and consequences (Curry et al., 2019b). For
example, fraud might illustrate a sort of “harm,” which is considered morally bad
because of transgressing more than one cooperative principle. “Harms” break
social contracts and escalate conflict instead of finding peaceful solutions. While
punishment or self-defense exemplify other types of “harms” promoting coopera-
tion and considered by humans as a morally good behavior.
Curry (2005, 2016) comprehensive cooperative theory could establish a new
approach for HEO research. Previous research shows that the cooperative dis-
positions act twofold: motivating moral behavior and providing criteria used to
judge (Curry, 2016). MAC theory may help at decoding the moral duties that
entrepreneurs experience to family, friends, neighbors (broadly society), as well as
to strangers—with whom they work (employees, suppliers), sell (customers), or
compete (competitors), as well as to the environment.2
Repeating Sarasvathy’s (2002) provocative view, a theory of entrepreneurship is
still looking for a new framework that will incorporate the ethical demands of
entrepreneurship within society. Similar views are shared by other researchers (for
example, Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). The authors of HumEnt (Kim et al.,
2018; Parente et al., 2018, 2020) addressed that problem and introduced a missing
link. More research of all these cooperative problems and solutions should in part
help to complete the HumEnt model with a moral component. MAC theory
might be an answer to discovering a more comprehensive approach to under-
standing entrepreneurs’ and managers’ morality in HumEnt—to some extent
dependent on culture logic. In the following sections we provide evidence of
seven ways MAC principles manifest themselves in entrepreneurship research.

1
While, for example, MFT names three domains, focused on group, deference, and fairness.
2
As Curry et al. (2019b) suggested, people’s (especially entrepreneurs’) obligations to the environment and other
species may be treated as by-products of our moral intuitions.
8 A. M. LANDOWSKA ET AL.

Family values
Entrepreneurs are kin altruists, who—like other humans—are shaped by natural
selection that can favor cooperation between genetic relatives (Hamilton, 1964;
Nowak, 2006). They are equipped in a system that allows for detecting and
delivering benefits to families, as well as for avoiding harm to them (Curry et al.,
2019b; Salmon & Shackelford, 2008).
In the early stages of enterprise creation, some entrepreneurs might face
a problem of management of social interacting with family and friends being co-
investors and/or employees at the same time (Starr & MacMillan, 1990).
“Familiness,” understood “as the unique bundle of resources a particular firm
has because of the systems interactions between the family, its individual mem-
bers, and the business” (Habbershon & Williams, 1999, p. 11), assumes that family
and enterprise—acting as two systems that are operationally closed—create their
own communication and use it to reproduce themselves. Furthermore, from one
generation to the next, family leaders take the responsibility to preserve and
promote family values across generations. Family values influence the operation
of the business (Davis, 1983). De Massis et al. (2018) underlined that family owned
businesses (FOBs) constitute two thirds of all business around the world and
contribute in a major way as the backbone of the economy. Additionally, from 70
to 90 percent of the world’s Gross Domestic Product is created by FOBs, which
provide 50 to 80 percent of jobs worldwide.
A special case is the social entrepreneur (which might be individuals, groups,
or start-up companies) who takes up a pressing social, environmental, or com-
munity problem and meets it with an innovative solution (Lepoutre et al., 2013),
which is another example of kin altruism in business. Appealing to obligations to
all humans (kin), the social entrepreneur resigns from margins and profits, which
are typically used to measure the success of for-profit enterprises. The social
entrepreneur widens the circle of concern and looks for solutions to problems so
everyone can benefit, and they treat all other humans as a family.
A global phenomenon of family and social entrepreneurs indicates how
important their obligations to relatives are for people, especially being obliged
to take care of them.

Group orientation
Entrepreneurs—like all humans—are “ultra-social animals” (Tomasello, 2014, p.
187) with a mutual orientation that enables coordination of behaviors
(Tomasello & Vaish, 2013) and forms coalitions necessary for collaborating in
order to achieve a collective goal (Curry et al., 2019b). It requires overcoming
coordination problems related to the goal, synchronization in time, and selec-
tion of partners (Lewis, 1969). Like no one else, the entrepreneur needs to
manage coordination problems with the best possible outcomes. Group-
mindedness (Tomasello, 2014) as an evolutionary capacity enables entrepre-
neurs to build teams and manage their work with success.
JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SMALL BUSINESS 9

Because of fear that one’s effort will be wasted, people do not want to act alone—
usually, first movers pay higher costs (Shen et al., 2010), except the entrepreneur.
An enterprise may gain first-mover advantage (sometimes a second-mover takes
an advantage because of first-mover failure) when its position as a sole seller on the
market and profits on its cutting-edge discovery recompensate its efforts made in
research and development (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988).
As a strategist, the entrepreneur needs to think creatively and tactically. They
constantly develop effectiveness and efficiency business models that benefit and
grow the company. On a daily basis, entrepreneurs need to solve coordination
problems, for example, relating to communication between teams to improve
exchange of common knowledge. If people know that others will join coordinated
projects (for example, shared group norm) and if they also know that these others
know that others will do so, they will also tend to do so (Thomas et al., 2014).
On the market, for example, entrepreneurs can witness that competing
firms (groups) indicate parallel behavior, that does not infringe on the
competition rules, by underlining joint interests and efforts to receive returns
(Elhauge & Geradin, 2011) and/or establishing one-side commitments to find
a solution (McAdams, 2000).
The entrepreneur as coordinator must balance loyalty, unity, solidarity,
and conformity, which are strictly associated with mutualism (Curry, 2007).

Reciprocity
Entrepreneurs—like all humans—are reciprocators who know how to find
a balance between cooperation (or conditional cooperation) and competition
(Axelrod, 1984; Trivers, 1971). Reciprocity is considered to be only one of many
ways to obtain benefits through cooperation (Gardner et al., 2009; West et al.,
2007). The cooperative reciprocal tendencies, neither positive nor negative, will
result in certain consequences (Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Gintis et al., 2008). Social
selection based on a “cheater-detection mechanism” (Tomasello et al., 2012,
p. 679) leads humans not only to avoid free-riders but—if necessary—even to
punish them (Cosmides, 1989). A mechanism that enforces cooperation—that is,
rewards cooperators and/or punishes cheaters—comes into action to achieve
a disciplining effect (Frank, 2003; Ostrom, 1990; Trivers, 1971).
The prisoner’s dilemma, with repeated play and reciprocity to maintain
a cooperative equilibrium, is an instrument that effectively supports the deci-
sion-making process. Considering some decisions from the prisoner’s dilemma
perspective, entrepreneurs may come to more advantageous results. It allows
them to predict the optimal decisions that rational individual will choose (D.
Friedman, 1990, 1996). In business, a typical example of the prisoner’s dilemma
occurs when two competitors are fighting for market share. For example, by
price reduction, one of them may win by selling more products/services and
earn gradual profits, while the other continues to keep prices high.
JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SMALL BUSINESS 11

to the wishes of others by taking a deference position (also called submission


or passivity), which is expressed in exaggerated mildness, humility, and
esteem (Curry, 2007; Mazur, 2005). Hawks always win with doves. But if
hawks meet other hawks, they can be badly injured, so both players benefit if
they avoid the cost of an exchange of hits (Curry et al., 2019b). When two
doves meet, then positive results are expected. If dove meets hawk repeatedly,
then the dove has a chance to improve its qualities. Finally, such a dove,
becomes a “retaliator” or a “shape shifter,” which learned to change its
displays from doveish to hawkish ones, if needed (Smith, 1982). In the
prisoner’s dilemma, hawkish displays are assigned to the defector’s behavior,
while the doveish ones are assigned to the cooperators.
Entrepreneurs regularly solve conflicts (for example, among team mem-
bers, with suppliers, with clients, and with competitors). Some of them will
indicate the hawkish attitudes and others the doveish ones. If dove meets
hawk, the winner is obvious. But if two hawks meet, both of them can be
severely injured. Thus, entrepreneurs carefully consider how to behave in
business situations.
Entrepreneurs activate appropriate strategies—which increase their
chances of winning—to pursue in competition for resources, for example,
contracts, clients, technologies, and market share. Showing bravery, fortitude,
or largesse may make sense if in turn it leads them to gain more market
share, but not at all costs.

Fair division
Entrepreneurs—like all other humans—are fair-minded about what helps
them to solve problems of equitable sharing of resources (Messick, 1993).
They forage together and divide the spoils together as equally deserving
partners (Messick, 1993; Skyrms, 1996). They do not operate in a vacuum,
but in a certain business context, which requires building and sustaining
relations with business partners as well as with clients.
Casual evidence and daily experience suggest that the whole of entrepre-
neurs’ activity is assessed in the sense of fairness. It refers to the fairness of
outcome distribution, the fairness of the processes used to determine firm
outcomes, and a focus on the treatment of individuals (for example, employ-
ees), called social determinants of justice (Greenberg, 1993). As well as being
fair, it is also important from consumer and other business perspectives, who
get an opportunity to identify relevant information, compare offers from
competitors, and make decisions.
Shareholders, clients, customers, or business partners all expect to get
good value for their money from entrepreneurs. The customer’s satisfaction,
including a(n) (un)fair producer’s behavior, influences the buyer decision on
future transactions with the entrepreneur.
12 A. M. LANDOWSKA ET AL.

Fair division matters in entrepreneurs’ and investors’ relations. An entrepre-


neur looks for the best model of cooperation with the investor in order to make
best possible use of their profits (Cable & Shane, 1997). Investors participate in
an entrepreneur’s entity because of the entrepreneur’s reputation (Casson,
2003), which is a social phenomenon carefully sustained by social norms
(Ostrom, 2000; Tomasello, 1999). An entrepreneur’s reputation guarantees
that the investor’s efforts will be granted by fair division of the net value arising
from common investment (Mesquita & Lazzarini, 2009; Sapienza & Korsgaard,
1996).
Fair division and equality, in the case of entrepreneurs, may play a key role
in their business survival. Widely shared opinion—closed in the phrase that
“people should get what they deserve and deserve what they get” (Alesina &
Angeletos, 2005, p. 974) respectively to their efforts and hard work—seems to
be especially related to entrepreneurs.

Respect for ownership


Entrepreneurs—like other humans—resolve conflicts that require respecting
ownership and rewarding rights to property (Hardin, 1968; Hare et al., 2016;
Ostrom, 1990; Russ et al., 2010; Sherratt & Mesterton-Gibbons, 2015; Stake, 2004).
Entrepreneurs, who might be inventors as well as innovators (Acs et al.,
2009a), need to protect their property rights (for example, brand, product,
service, knowledge) as well as they respect others’ rights. This fundamental
rule of market economy—enshrined by law—ensures freedom, which
encourages entrepreneurs to start their businesses. For example, stronger
patent protection stimulates research and development and generates new
knowledge, which, in turn—among other things—vivifies entrepreneurship
(Acs & Sanders, 2012). As long as ownership of the expected profits is
guaranteed, entrepreneurs bear the costs and enjoy the benefits. They also
invest in new developments because of future demand and future rights to
profits (Facchini & Subandono, 2017). Entrepreneurs also stimulate compe-
titors’ innovativeness, which results in introducing new products and services
that aim at retaking market share.
Freedom related to property rights is globally diverging. Adequate rule of
law that protects entrepreneurs’ property rights may ensure investing or
reinvesting their earnings as well as entrepreneurial inventiveness (Johnson
et al., 2002). If an entrepreneur has ownership of something—which means
that they are the owner— they can sell or lease an item of property and can
benefit from it. Property rights protect business from theft, so it is important
for entrepreneurs how their rights are respected.
14 A. M. LANDOWSKA ET AL.

directed toward selected problems of cooperation, precludes understanding


holistically the issue of moral entrepreneurship.
Finally, by investigating all types of cooperation and incorporating all
moral values related to them, MAC is a useful tool to define and measure
Cooperative Orientation in the HumEnt model. So far, research has been
conducted in the framework of the House et al. (2004) approach, where the
humane orientation represents “the degree to which an organization or
society encourages and rewards individuals for being fair, altruistic, friendly,
generous, caring, and kind to others” (p. 569). This approach was operatio-
nalized mostly by the GLOBE project (Gelfand et al., 2004; Hanges et al.,
2004). MAC covers a broader spectrum of moral values indicated as universal
ones in all cultures. It demonstrates how distinct types of cooperation
expound related to them types of morality. It may illustrate different entre-
preneurs’ and managers’ sensitivity to moral issues and can be used to assess
cultural differences in the morality of entrepreneurship. Therefore, it con-
tributes well to the HumEnt model as an orientation of a “moral” entrepre-
neur or manager who respects universal human values and succeeds in
business. Further entrepreneurship investigations into cooperative problems
and solutions within HumEnt will be able to reorganize morality issues
across the discipline.

ORCID
Bice Della Piana http://orcid.org/0000-0003-2663-2762

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