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 ANTONIO GRAMSCI
Critical Assessments of Leading
Political Philosophers
ANTONIO GRAMSCI
Critical Assessments of Leading
Political Philosophers

Edited by James Martin

Volume I

Intellectual and Political Context

London and New York

 First published 2002
by Routledge
11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE
Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge
29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group
Editorial matter and selection © 2002 James Martin; individual
owners retain copyright in their own material
Typeset in 10/12pt Times by Graphicraft Limited, Hong Kong
Printed and bound in Great Britain by
TJ International Ltd, Padstow, Cornwall
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or
reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic,
mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter
invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any
information storage or retrieval system, without permission in
writing from the publishers.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Antonio Gramsci / edited by Martin James.
p. cm. — (Critical assessments of leading political philosophers)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Contents: v. |. Intellectual and political context — v. 2. Marxism, philosophy, and
politics — y. 3. Intellectuals, culture, and the party — y. 4. Contemporary applications.
1. Gramsci, Antonio, 1891—1937—Contributions in political science. I. James, Martin,
1968—_ II. Series.
JC265.G68 AS7 2001
320.53'2’092—dc21 2001019937

ISBN 0-415-21747-4
ISBN: 0-415-21748-2 (volume I)

Disclaimers
The publishers have made every effort to contact authors/copyright
holders of works reprinted in Antonio Gramsci: Critical Assessments of
Leading Political Philosophers. This has not been possible in
every case, however, and we would welcome correspondence from those
individuals/companies who we have been unable to trace.

References within each chapter are as they appeared in the original complete work.
In memory of J. K. Dutton
 CONTENTS

Preface XV
Acknowledgements XVIi
Chronological table of reprinted articles and chapters XX111

General Introduction 1

VOLUMEI INTELLECTUAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT

Introduction 10

PART 1
The young Gramsci 13

1 A new look at the young Gramsci 15

CARL LEVY

2 On Gramsci’s theater criticism 33

ROBERT S. DOMBROSKI

3 Gramsci and Gobetti 60

PAOLO SPRIANO

PART 2
Intellectual and political influences 83

4 Gramsci and Italian political culture 85

NORBERTO BOBBIO

Vil
 CONTENTS

From Spaventa to Gramsci 95

PAUL PICCONE
Gramsci, Croce and the Italian political tradition 127
RICHARD BELLAMY
Two views of the Revolution: Gramsci and Sorel, 1916-1920 3
DARROW SCHECTER

Gramsci and Lenin 1917-1922 172

ALISTAIR DAVIDSON

PART 3
The factory council struggles, 1919-1920 197

9 Antonio Gramsci and the soviet experiment in Italy 199

THOMAS R. BATES

10 A history of the Turinese communists written by a liberal 213

PIERO GOBETTI

11 Gramsci, Gentile and the theory of the ethical state in Italy 223
DARROW SCHECTER

ibd Factory councils, Gramsci and the industrialists 245

FRANKLIN ADLER

13 The ideology of labor and capitalist rationality in Gramsci 269

ENZO RUTIGLIANO

PART 4
Communism and Fascism 279

14 Antonio Gramsci and the Bolshevization of the PCI 281

THOMAS R. BATES

15 Towards the Prison Notebooks: the evolution of Gramsci’s

thinking on political organization 1918-1926 296
WALTER L. ADAMSON

16 The Gramsci—Trotsky question (1922-1932) 320

FRANK ROSENGARTEN

17 Gramsci’s interpretation of Fascism 354

WALTER L. ADAMSON

Vill
 CONTENTS

VOLUME IIT MARXISM, PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS

Introduction

PART 5
Marxism as a philosophy of praxis

18 Theory and practice in Gramsci’s Marxism

JOHN MERRINGTON

19 Gramsci’s Hegelian Marxism 36

PAUL PICCONE

20 Interpretive sociology and the philosophy of praxis:

comparing Max Weber and Antonio Gramsci 49
GERSHON SHAFIR

21 The concept of nature in Gramsci 62

BENEDETTO FONTANA

22 Gramsci and the contemporary debate on Marxism 85

D. P. DIMITRAKOS

PART 6
Gramsci’s ‘anti- Croce’ 115

23 Antonio Gramsci’s reformulation of Benedetto Croce’s

speculative idealism 117
BEVERLY L. KAHN

24 Gramsci’s Crocean Marxism 139

MAURICE A. FINOCCHIARO

PART 7
Epistemology and science 157

25 Gramsci, Marxism and philosophy 189

RICHARD D. WOLFF

26 Gramsci’s concept of constitution 172

THOMAS NEMETH
 CONTENTS

27 Science and praxis in Gramsci’s critique of Bukharin 191

MAURICE A. FINOCCHIARO

28 Gramsci’s realism 216

ESTEVE MORERA

PART 8
The concept of hegemony 227

29 The concept of ‘egemonia’ in the thought of Antonio Gramsci:

some notes on interpretation 229
GWYN A. WILLIAMS

30 Gramsci and the theory of hegemony 245

THOMAS R. BATES

31 Hegemony and consciousness in the thought of Antonio Gramsci 263

JOSEPH V. FEMIA

32 Hegemony and ideology in Gramsci 287

CHANTAL MOUFFE

33 The grammar of hegemony 319

PETER IVES

PART 9
State and civil society 337

34 The antinomies of Antonio Gramsci 339

PERRY ANDERSON

35 Gramsci’s subversion of the language of politics 411

ANNE SHOWSTACK SASSOON

36 Gramsci on civil society 422

JOSEPH A. BUTTIGIEG

37 Gramsci, civil society and bureaucracy 450

GEOFFREY HUNT

38 Gramsci’s Marxism and the concept of Homo Oeconomicus 465

GEOFFREY HUNT

oy Gramsci and the politics of civil society 478

WALTER L. ADAMSON
 CONTENTS

VOLUME IIT INTELLECTUALS, CULTURE AND

THE PARTY

Introduction 1

PART 10
The theory of intellectuals s)

40 Revolutionary contradictions: Antonio Gramsci and the problem

of intellectuals i,
JEROME KARABEL

41 Ideological superstructures in Gramsci and Mao Tse-Tung ak

NIGEL TODD

42 Towards a sociology of intellectuals: a structural analysis of

Gramsci’s Marxist theory 63
LEONARDO SALAMINI

43 The people, intellectuals and specialized knowledge 94

ANNE SHOWSTACK SASSOON

44 Between ethics and politics: Gramsci’s theory of intellectuals 124

JAMES MARTIN

45 The social role of intellectuals: Antonio Gramsci and

the Italian Renaissance 145
MARGARET L. KING

PART 11
Culture and language 165

46 Culture and politics in the work of Antonio Gramsci 167

MARCIA LANDY

47 Antonio Gramsci’s sociology of literature 189

WILLIAM Q. BOELHOWER

48 A grammatical introduction to Gramsci’s political theory 212

PETER IVES

49 The official and popular in Gramsci and Bakhtin 231

CRAIG BRANDIST

Xi
 CONTENTS

PART 12
On education 249

50 Antonio Gramsci and the school as hegemonic 251

HAROLD ENTWISTLE

51 The whalebone in the corset: Gramsci on education, culture

and change 267
PHILIP SIMPSON

52 Beyond “reform or revolution”: notes on political education in

Gramsci, Habermas and Arendt 289
WALTER L. ADAMSON

PART 13
The politics of subalternity 319

53 From the periphery of modernity: Antonio Gramsci’s theory

of subordination and hegemony 321
NADIA URBINATI

54 Classes in southern Italy: Salvemini’s, Dorso’s and

Gramsci’s analyses 342
GABRIELLA TURNATURI AND GIOVANNI LODI

55 Gramsci, the peasantry and popular culture 385

ALASTAIR DAVIDSON

PART 14
Gramsci and the Communist Party 401

56 Gramsci’s presence 403

FEDERICO MANCINI AND GIORGIO GALLI

57 Gramsci and the Italian Communist Party 415

STEPHEN WHITE

58 Gramsci’s Marxism: beyond Lenin and Togliatti 432

PAUL PICCONE

59 Gramsci: an alternative communism? 459

MAURICE A. FINOCCHIARO

Xil
 CONTENTS

60 Gramsci, the Via Italiana, and the classical Marxist-Leninist

approach to revolution 482
JOSEPH V. FEMIA
61 Gramsci, Eurocommunism and the Comintern 505
PETER GIBBON

VOLUME IV CONTEMPORARY APPLICATIONS

Introduction

PART 15
Reviews and commentaries

62 The varying seasons of Gramscian studies

ALISTAIR B. DAVIDSON
63 Reading Gramsci in English: observations on the reception of
Antonio Gramsci in the English speaking world 1957-82 28
GEOFF ELEY
64 Gramsci and Marxism in Britain 61
DAVID FORGACS

65 Gramsci in France and Italy: a review of the literature 81

CHANTAL MOUFFE AND ANNE SHOWSTACK SASSOON
66 The Gramsci phenomenon: some reflections 116
JOSEPH V. FEMIA

PART 16
Political theory 133

67 Recasting Marxism: hegemony and new political movements 135

ERNESTO LACLAU AND CHANTAL MOUFFE
68 Who practices hegemony? class division and the subject of politics 154
JOHN ROSENTHAL
69 Gramsci and democracy 177
ESTEVE MORERA
70 Gramsci and Walzer on the intellectual as social critic 191
RICHARD BELLAMY

Xill
 CONTENTS

PART 17
Political analysis 213

71 Using Gramsci for women: feminism and the Quebec State,

1960-1980 215
HEATHER JON MARONEY

72 Gramsci and us 227

STUART HALL

73 Thailand in Gramscian perspective 239

JOHN GIRLING

74 Gramsci and the legitimization of the State: the case of

the Senegalese passive revolution 257
ROBERT FATTON

PART 18
Cultural studies 279

ts Gramsci’s relevance for the study of race and ethnicity 281

STUART HALL
76 After Gramsci 310
COLIN MERCER

vit) The concept of cultural hegemony: problems and possibilities 324

T. J. JACKSON LEARS

PART 19
International relations theory 355

78 Gramsci, hegemony and international relations: an essay

on method 357
ROBERT W. COX

79 Engaging Gramsci: international relations theory and

the new Gramscians 373
RANDALL D. GERMAIN AND MICHAEL KENNY

80 Understanding IR: understanding Gramsci 399

CRAIG N. MURPHY

XIV
 PREFACE

This four-volume collection brings together a selection from the large and
continually expanding number of critical assessments of the influential thinker,
Antonio Gramsci. The intended purpose of the collection is to make avail-
able some of the most important, interesting and informative commentaries
and studies on Gramsci and his ideas, primarily from English-language
journals, over the past thirty years. It is hoped that this will preserve interest
in texts that either are increasingly overlooked or are no longer as readily
accessible as they once were. I have also included in translation a few articles
of Italian origin. However, this is not and could not hope to be an adequate
reflection of the enormous range of commentary on Gramsci from Europe—
especially from Gramsci’s native Italy—and beyond. The collection is also
limited to journal articles rather than book chapters or selections from larger
monographs.
The volumes have been divided according to the following thematic
structure:

Volume I: Intellectual and Political Context

Volume II: Marxism, Philosophy and Politics
Volume III: Intellectuals, Culture and the Party
Volume IV: Contemporary Applications

The rationale for this structure will be discussed in the General Introduc-
tion that follows. Each volume also contains a short introductory commentary
on the selection of articles.

XV
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 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The compilation of this collection began as an idea in Denmark, started as

a project in Belfast and was concluded in London. As a consequence my
thanks go to a number of people who have assisted its formation and even-
tual completion: Bob Jessop, who first gave me the idea; Frances Parkes at
Routledge for her positive response and her help along the way; the Inter-
Library Loans section at Queen’s University, Belfast, and the Library at
Goldsmith’s College, University of London; my colleagues at Goldsmiths:
Carl Levy, who passed on some vital photocopies, and Adrian Little, who did
some last-minute reading; Peter Ives in Canada who looked over the contents
list and my General Introduction and made helpful suggestions on both;
Piera Sarasini for her translation of the piece by Gobetti and for her patience
whilst the TQA destroyed my schedule; my good friend Paola Sannino who
also gave some very useful last-minute advice on the translations I undertook
myself; Richard Bellamy for his advice on translating Prezzolini’s “Societa di
Apoti’; and Susan Lapworth who was invaluable in the closing stages of the
volumes’ preparation. Naturally, none of the above bears any responsibility
for the contents of the collection. Finally, I should like to thank my wife
Melanie and our children Esme and Luis for their remarkable endurance over
the last couple of years.
The publishers would like to thank the following for permission to reprint
their material:
The American Historical Association for permission to reprint T. J. Jackson
Lears, ‘The Concept of Cultural Hegemony: Problems and Possibilities’,
American Historical Review 90(3) (1985): 567-593.

Belfagor for permission to reprint N. Bobbio, ‘Gramsci and Italian Political

Culture’, Belfagor 33(5) (1978): 593-599. Belfagor. A review ofvarious human-
ities directed by Carlo Ferdinando Russo. Florence, Olschki.
Blackwell Publishers for permission to reprint G. Shafir, ‘Interpretive Soci-
ology and the Philosophy of Praxis: Comparing Max Weber and Antonio
Gramsci’, Praxis International | (1985): 63—74; G. Hunt, Gramsci, civil

XVil
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

society and bureaucracy, Praxis International 2 (1986): 206-219; Walter L.

Adamson, ‘Gramsci and the Politics of Civil Society’, Praxis International
3—4 (1987/8): 320-339; A. Davidson, ‘The Varying Seasons of Gramscian
Studies’, Political Studies 20 (1972): 448-461; J. V. Femia, ‘Hegemony and
Consciousness in the Thought of Antonio Gramsci’, Political Studies 23
(1975): 29-48; J. V. Femia, ‘The Gramsci Phenomenon: Some Reflections’,
Political Studies 27 (1979): 472-483; B. Fontana, ‘The Concept of Nature
in Gramsci’, The Philosophical Forum 27(3) (1996): 220-243; R. Bellamy,
‘Gramsci and Walzer on the Intellectual as Social Critic’, The Philosophical
Forum 29(3—4) (1998): 138-159.

Cambridge University Press for permission to reprint R. D. Germain and

M. Kenny, ‘Engaging Gramsci: International Relations theory and the new
Gramscians’, Review of International Studies 24(1) (1998): 3-21. Copyright ©
British International Studies Association, published by Cambridge Univer-
sity Press; C. N. Murphy, ‘Understanding IR: Understanding Gramsci’,
Review of International Studies 24 (1998): 417-425. Copyright © British
International Studies Association, published by Cambridge University Press.

Canadian Political Science Association for permission to reprint R. Fatton

Jr., ‘Gramsci and the Legitimization of the State: The Case of the Senegalese
Passive Revolution’, Canadian Journal of Political Science 19(4) (1986): 729—
750.
Contemporary Literature for permission to reprint W. Q. Boelhower, “Antonio
Gramsci’s Sociology of Literature’, Contemporary Literature 22(4) (1981):
574-599.

Duke University Press for permission to reprint C. Levy, ‘A New Look at

the Young Gramsci’, boundary 2 14(3) (1986): 31-48. Copyright 1986, Duke
University Press. All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission; R. S.
Dombroski, ‘On Gramsci’s Theater Criticism’, boundary 2 14(3) (1986): 91—
117. Copyright 1986, Duke University Press. All rights reserved. Reprinted
with permission; J. A. Buttigieg, “Gramsci on Civil Society’, boundary 2 22(3)
(1995): 1-32. Copyright 1995, Duke University Press. All rights reserved.
Reprinted with permission; A. Showstack Sassoon, “The People, Intellectuals
and Specialized Knowledge’, boundary 2 14(3) (1986): 137-168. Copyright
1995, Duke University Press. All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission;
F. Rosengarten, ‘The Gramsci-Trotsky Question (1922-1932), Social Text
4(3) (1984/5): 65-95. All rights reserved. Reprinted by permission of Duke
University Press; M. Landy, ‘Culture and Politics in the Work of Antonio
Gramsci’, boundary 2 14(3) (1986): 49-70. Copyright 1986, Duke University
Press. All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.

Educational Theory for permission to reprint H. Entwistle, ‘Antonio Gramsci

and the School as Hegemonic’, Educational Theory | (1978); 23-33.

XViil
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Elsevier Science for permission to reprint C. Mouffe, ‘Hegemony and Ideology

in Gramsci’, Research in Political Economy 2 (1979): 1-31; D. Schecter, ‘Two
Views of the Revolution: Gramsci and Sorel, 1916-1920’, History of European
Ideas 12(5) (1990): 637-653. Reprinted with permission from Elsevier Science.

Fondazione Istituto Gramsci for permission to reprint P. Spriano, ‘Gramsci

and Gobetti’, Studi storici 17(2) (1976): 66-99.

Frank Cass and Co. Ltd for permission to reprint A. Davidson, ‘Gramsci, the
Peasantry and Popular Culture’, The Journal of Peasant Studies 4 (1984):
1393-154.

Giulio Einaudi Editore for permission to reprint P. Gobetti, “A History of the

Turin Communists Written by a Liberal’, La Rivoluzione Liberale 7 (1922):
24-26.
Government and Opposition for permission to reprint F. Mancini and
G. Galli, ‘Gramsi’s Presence’, Government and Opposition 3 (1968): 325-338;
S. White, ‘Gramsci and the Italian Communist Party’, Government and Op-
position 7 (1972): 186-205; J. V. Femia, ‘Gramsci, the Via Italiana, and the
Classical Marxist-Leninist Approach to Revolution’, Government and Opposi-
tion 14 (1979): 66-95.
Guilford Publications Inc. for permission to reprint E. Morera, ‘Gramsci’s
Realism’, Science and Society 53(4) (1989): 459-469; A. Showstack Sassoon,
‘Gramsci’s Subversion of the Language of Politics’, Rethinking MARXISM
3(1) (1990): 14-25; R. D. Wolff, ‘Gramsci, Marxism and Philosophy’, Rethink-
ing MARXISM 2(2) (1989): 41—54; Peter Ives, ‘A grammatical introduction
to Gramsci’s political theory’, Rethinking MARXISM 10(1) (1998): 34—S1.

Idealistic Studies for permission to reprint B. L. Kahn, ‘Antonio Gramsci’s

reformulation of Benedetto Croce’s Speculative Idealism’, /dealistic Studies
15 (1985): 18—40.
Imprint Academic for permission to reprint R. Bellamy, “Gramsci, Croce and
the Italian Political Tradition’, History of Political Thought 11(2) (1990):
313-337. Copyright ©, Imprint Academic, Exeter, UK; D. Schecter, ‘Gramsci,
Gentile and the Theory of the Ethical State in Italy, History of Political
Thought 11(3) (1990): 491-508. Copyright ©, Imprint Academic, Exeter, UK.
International Studies in Philosophy for permission to reprint G. Hunt,
‘Gramsci’s Marxism and the Concept of Homo Oeconomicus’, International
Studies in Philosophy 17 (1985): 11-23.
Johns Hopkins University Press for permission to reprint G. A. Williams,
‘The Concept of Egemonia in the Thought of Antonio Gramsci’, Journal of
the History of Ideas 21 (1960): 586-599. Copyright © Journal of the History
of Ideas, Inc. Reprinted by permission of Johns Hopkins University Press;

XIX
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

N. Todd, ‘Ideological Superstructures in Gramsci and Mao Tse-Tung’, Journal

of the History of Ideas 35 (1974): 148-156. Copyright © The Journal of the
History of Ideas. Reprinted by permission of the Johns Hopkins University
Press; W. L. Adamson, ‘Gramsci’s Interpretation of Fascism’, Journal of the
History of Ideas 41(4) (1980): 615—633. Copyright © Journal of the History
of Ideas, Inc. Reprinted by permission of the John Hopkins University Press;
T. R. Bates, ‘Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony’, Journal of the History
of Ideas 2 (1975): 351-366. Copyright © Journal of the History of Ideas, Inc.
Reprinted by permission of the John Hopkins University Press.

The John Logie Baird Centre for permission to reprint C. Mercer, ‘After
Gramsci’, Screen Education 36 (1980): 5-15; P. Simpson, ‘The Whalebone in
the Corset: Gramsci on Education, Culture and Change’, Screen Education
28 (1978): 5-22.
Kluwer Academic Publishers for permission to reprint W. L. Adamson,
‘Beyond “Reform or Revolution”: Notes on Political Education in Gramsci,
Habermas and Arendt’, Theory and Society 6 (1978): 429-460. Copyright ©
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1978; P. Piccone, ‘Gramsci’s Marxism: Beyond
Lenin and Togliatti’, Theory and Society 3 (1976): 485-512. Copyright ©
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1976; M. Finocchiaro, ‘Gramsci: An Alternat-
ive Communism?’, Studies in Soviet Thought 27 (1984): 123-146. Copyright
© Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1984.

Lawrence and Wishart and Stuart Hall for permission to publish S. Hall,
‘Gramsci and Us’, Marxism Today (1987): 16-21.

Left History for permission to reprint P. Ives, “The Grammar of Hegemony’,

Left History 5(1) (1997): 85-103.

M. E. Sharp for permission to reprint G. Turnaturi and G. Lodi, ‘Classes in

Southern Italy: Salvemini’s, Dorso’s and Gramsci’s Analyses’, Jnternational
Journal of Sociology 2-3 (1974): 85-147.

Merlin Press for permission to reprint A. Davidson, ‘Gramsci and Lenin,

1917-1922’, The Socialist Register 1974: 125-150; J. Merrington, ‘Theory
and Practice in Gramsci’s Marxism’, The Socialist Register 1968: 145-176.

Millennium: Journal of International Studies for permission to reprint

R. W. Cox, ‘Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay on
Method’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 12(2) (1983): 162-175.

New Left Review for permission to reprint P. Anderson, ‘The Antinomies

of Antonio Gramsci’, New Left Review 100 (1976-77): 5-78: D. Forgacs,
‘Gramsci and Marxism in Britain’, New Left Review 176 (1989): 69-88.

Pacific Affairs for permission to reprint J. Girling, ‘Thailand in Gramscian

Perspective’, Pacific Affairs 57(3) (1984): 385—403.

XX
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Polity for permission to reprint W. Adamson, ‘Towards the Prison Notebooks:

The Evolution of Gramsci’s Thinking on Political Organization, 1918-1926’,
Polity (1979): 38-64.
Resources for Feminist Research for permission to reprint H. J. Maroney,
‘Using Gramsci for Women: Feminism and the Quebec State, 1960-1980’,
Resources
for Feminism 17(3) (1988): 26-30.

Sage Publications Limited for permission to reprint T. R. Bates, ‘Antonio

Gramsci and the Bolshevization of the PCI’, Journal of Contemporary
History 11 (1976): 115-131. Copyright © Sage Publications Ltd, 1976; P.
Piccone, ‘Gramsci’s Hegelian Marxism’, Political Theory 2(1) (1974): 32-45.
Copyright © Sage Publications Ltd, 1974; D. Dimitrakos, ‘Gramsci and the
Contemporary Debate on Marxism’, Philosophy of the Social Sciences 16
(1986): 459-488. Copyright © Sage Publications Ltd, 1986; T. Nemeth,
‘Gramsci’s Concept of Constitution’, Philosophy and Social Criticism 3—4
(1978): 295-318. Copyright © Sage Publications Ltd, 1978; M. Finnochiaro,
‘Science and Praxis in Gramsci’s Critique of Bukharin’, Philosophy and
Social Criticism | (1979): 26-56. Copyright © Sage Publications Ltd, 1979;
J. Karabel, ‘Revolutionary Contradictions: Antonio Gramsci and the Prob-
lem ofIntellectuals’, Politics and Society 6 (1976): 123-172. Copyright © Sage
Publications Ltd, 1976; N. Urbinati, ‘From the Periphery of Modernity:
Antonio Gramsci’s Theory of Subordination and Hegemony’, Political Theory
26(3) (1998): 370-391; G. Eley, ‘Reading Gramsci in English’, European
History Quarterly 14 (1984): 441-478. Copyright © Sage Publications Ltd,
1979; S. Hall, ‘Gramsci’s Relevance for the Study of Race and Ethnicity’,
Journal of Communication Inquiry 2 (1986): 5—27; C. Brandist, ‘The Official
and the Popular in Gramsci and Bakhtin’, Theory, Culture & Society 13(2)
(1996): 59-74.
Socialist Review for permission to reprint E. Laclau and C. Mouffe, ‘Recast-
ing Marxism: Hegemony and New Political Movements’, Socialist Review 66
(1982): 91-113.
Societas for permission to reprint T. R. Bates, ‘Antonio Gramsci and the
Soviet Experiment in Italy’, Societas | (1974): 39-54.

Sociological Analysis and Theory for permission to reprint L. Salamini,

‘Toward a Sociology of Intellectuals: A Structural Analysis of Gramsci’s
Marxist Theory’, Sociological Analysis and Theory 6(1) (1976): 1-36.

Soundings for permission to reprint M. L. King, ‘The Social Role of Intel-

lectuals: Antonio Gramsci and the Italian Renaissance’, Soundings: An
Interdisciplinary Journal, 61 (1978): 23-46.

Taylor and Francis for permission to reprint J. Martin, “Between Ethics and
Politics: Gramsci’s theory of intellectuals’, Modern Italy 3(1) (1998): 67-85;

XXxl
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

P. Gibbon, ‘Gramsci, Eurocommunism and the Comintern’, Economy and

Society 12 (1983): 328-366; C. Mouffe and A. Showstack Sassoon, ‘Gramsci
in France and Italy: A Review of the Literature’, Economy and Society 6(1)
(1997) 33.1563:
Telos for permission to reprint P. Piccone, ‘From Spaventa to Gramsc1’,
Telos 31 (1977): 35—66; F. Adler, ‘Factory Councils, Gramsci and the Indus-
trialists’, Telos 31 (1977): 67-90; E. Rutgliano, ‘The Ideology of Labor and
Capitalist Rationality in Gramsci’, Te/os 31 (1977): 91-99. M. Finnochiaro,
‘Gramsci’s crocean Marxism’, Telos 33 (1979): 17-32.

The University of Minnesota Press for permission to reprint J. Rosenthal, “Who

Practices Hegemony? Class Division and the Subject of Politics’, Cultural
Critique 9 (1988): 25-52. Copyright © 1988 The University of Minnesota
Press.
Wilfred Laurier University Press for permission to reprint E. Morera, ‘Gramsci
and Democracy’, Canadian Journal of Political Science 23(1) (1990): 23-37.

Disclaimer

The publishers have made every effort to contact authors/copyright holders

of works reprinted in Antonio Gramsci: Critical Assessments of Leading
Political Philosophers. This has not been possible in every case, however, and
we would welcome correspondence from those individuals/companies who
we have been unable to trace.

XXil
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 GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Introduction

In what way is Antonio Gramsci a ‘political philosopher’? How are we to

understand his work? These are not easy questions to answer. Gramsci’s
political ideas are to be found in a series of interventions written throughout
twenty years as a militant socialist, not in a neatly formulated or coherently
elaborated ‘system’. In contrast to other major thinkers, his ideas are ori-
ented towards the comprehension of and engagement in the practical circum-
stances of revolutionary politics, not the distanced speculation of a professional
intellectual. And what we have in terms of his ‘texts’ are not books arguing
a thesis but, on the one hand, a series of articles, essays and letters written
in the heat of dramatic social and political crisis and, on the other, a vast,
fragmented and unfinished collection of notes, hand-written during his incar-
ceration in the 1930s.
That is not to say that Gramsci avoided abstract philosophical questions.
On the contrary, his ideas are informed by an exceptional understanding
of such concerns. However, Gramsci’s great distinction as a political philo-
sopher, if we are to think of him as such, lies in his-ability to interweave
questions of philosophy with those of politics, alerting us to the unavoidable,
indeed necessary, concreteness of thought. For him, abstract questions of
philosophy and culture cannot be separated from practical questions con-
cerning power and domination in society. It is appropriate, then, that he
came to describe his preferred theoretical framework — Marxism — in terms of
the unity of thought and action: that 1s, as a ‘philosophy of praxis’.
Nor should the distinctive form of Gramsci’s ideas divert our attention from
the considerable influence they have had on post-World War II social and polit-
ical theory, especially from the left ofthe political spectrum. Gramsci’s imprison-
ment by Mussolini’s Fascists may have removed him from active politics in
the Italian Communist Party (PCI), of which he was briefly leader, but, ironic-
ally, it did not prevent him from spending the remaining years of his life
reflecting on the conditions of revolutionary defeat both in Italy and Western
Europe generally, on the theoretical resources of the Marxist tradition, and on
the proper form of socialist political struggle in advanced capitalism. These
reflections, collectively known as the Prison Notebooks (or Quaderni del carcere),
published along with his prison letters in the late 1940s and 1950s in Italy and
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which they granted us leave to send from it, proved them more
ignorant than kittens of America’s liveliest idiosyncrasies.
In the United States an impression prevails that the annals of Asia
and of Europe are too long and too complicated for our
consideration. Every now and then some educator, or some politician
who controls educators, makes the “practical” suggestion that no
history prior to the American Revolution shall be taught in the public
schools. Every now and then some able financier affirms that he
would not give a fig for any history, and marshals the figures of his
income to prove its uselessness.
Yet our vast heterogeneous population is forever providing
problems which call for an historical solution; and our foreign
relations would be clarified by a greater accuracy of knowledge. To
the ignorance of the average Congressman and of the average
Senator must be traced their most conspicuous blunders. Back of
every man lies the story of his race. The Negro is more than a voter.
He has a history which may be ascertained without undue effort.
Haiti, San Domingo, Liberia, all have their tales to tell. The Irishman
is more than a voter. He has a long, interesting and instructive
history. It pays us to be well informed about these things. “The
passionate cry of ignorance for power” rises in our ears like the
death-knell of civilization. Down through the ages it has sounded,
now covetous and threatening, now irrepressible and triumphant. We
know what every one of its conquests has cost the human race; yet
we are content to rest our security upon oratorical platitudes and
generalities, upon the dim chance of a man being reborn in the
sacrament of citizenship.
In addition to the things that it is useful to know, there are things
that it is pleasant to know, and pleasure is a very important by-
product of education. It has been too long the fashion to deny, or at
least to decry, this species of enjoyment. “He that increaseth
knowledge increaseth sorrow,” says Ecclesiastes; and Sir Thomas
Browne musically bewails the dark realities with which “the
unhappiness of our knowledge too nearly acquainteth us.” But it was
probably the things he did, rather than the things he knew, which
soured the taste of life in the Hebrew’s mouth; and as for Sir Thomas
Browne, no man ever derived a more lasting satisfaction from
scholarship. His erudition, like his religion, was pure profit. His
temperament saved him from the loudness of controversy. His life
was rich within.
This mental ease is not so much an essential of education as the
reward of education. It makes smooth the reader’s path; it involves
the capacity to think, and to take delight in thinking; it is the keynote
of subtle and animated talk. It presupposes a somewhat varied list of
acquirements; but it has no official catalogue, and no market value. It
emphatically does not consist in knowing inventories of things, useful
or otherwise; still less in imparting this knowledge to the world.
Macaulay, Croker, and Lord Brougham were men who knew things
on a somewhat grand scale, and imparted them with impressive
accuracy; yet they were the blight rather than the spur of
conversation. Even the “more cultivated portion of the ignorant,” to
borrow a phrase of Stevenson’s, is hostile to lectures, unless the
lecturer has the guarantee of a platform, and his audience sits before
him in serried and somnolent rows.
The decline and fall of the classics has not been unattended by
controversy. No other educational system was ever so valiantly and
nobly defended. For no other have so many masterly arguments
been marshalled in vain. There was a pride and a splendour in the
long years’ study of Greek. It indicated in England that the nation
had reached a height which permitted her this costly inutility, this
supreme intellectual indulgence. Greek was an adornment to the
minds of her men, as jewels were an adornment to the bodies of her
women. No practical purpose was involved. Sir Walter Scott put the
case with his usual simplicity and directness in a letter to his second
son, Charles, who had little aptitude for study: “A knowledge of the
classical languages has been fixed upon, not without good reason,
as the mark of a well-educated young man; and though people may
scramble into distinction without it, it is always with difficulty, just like
climbing over a wall instead of giving your ticket at the door.”
In the United States we have never been kindly disposed towards
extravagance of this order. During the years of our comparative
poverty, when few citizens aspired to more than a competence, there
was still money enough for Latin, and now and then for Greek. There
was still a race of men with slender incomes and wide acquirements,
to whom scholarship was a dearly bought but indestructible delight.
Now that we have all the money there is, it is universally understood
that Americans cannot afford to spend any of it on the study of “the
best that has been known and thought in the world.”
Against this practical decision no argument avails. Burke’s plea for
the severity of the foundation upon which rest the principles of taste
carries little weight, because our standard of taste is genial rather
than severe. The influence of Latinity upon English literature
concerns us even less, because prose and verse are emancipated
from the splendid shackles they wore with such composure. But the
mere reader, who is not an educational economist, asks himself now
and then in what fashion Milton and Dryden would have written, if
vocational training had supplanted the classics in their day. And to
come nearer to our time, and closer to our modern and moderate
appreciations, how would the “Elegy Written in a Country
Churchyard,” and the lines “On the Death of a Favourite Cat” have
been composed, had Gray not spent all his life in the serene
company of the Latins?
It was easy to define the requirements of an educated man in the
year 1738, when Gray, a bad mathematician and an admirable
classicist, left Cambridge. It is uncommonly difficult to define them
to-day. Dr. Goodnow, speaking a few years ago to the graduating
class of Johns Hopkins University, summed up collegiate as well as
professional education as the acquisition of the capacity to do work
of a specific character. “Knowledge can come only as the result of
experience. What is learned in any other way seldom has such
reality as to make it an actual part of our lives.”
A doctor cannot afford to depend too freely on experience,
valuable though it may be, because the high prices it asks are paid
by his patients. But so far as professional training goes, Dr.
Goodnow stood on firm ground. All it undertakes to do is to enable
students to work along chosen lines—to turn them into doctors,
lawyers, priests, mining engineers, analytical chemists, expert
accountants. They may or may not be educated men in the liberal
sense of the word. They may or may not understand allusions which
are current in the conversation of educated people. Such
conversation is far from encyclopædic; but it is interwoven with
knowledge, and rich in agreeable disclosures. An adroit participant
can avoid obvious pitfalls; but it is not in dodging issues and
concealing deficits that the pleasures of companionship lie. I once
heard a sparkling and animated lady ask Mr. Henry James (who
abhorred being questioned) if he did not think American women
talked better than English women. “Yes,” said the great novelist
gently, “they are more ready and much more brilliant. They rise to
every suggestion. But”—as if moved by some strain of recollection
—“English women so often know what they are talking about.”
Vocational training and vocational guidance are a little like
intensive farming. They are obvious measures for obvious results;
they economize effort; they keep their goal in view. If they “pander to
cabbages,” they produce as many and as fine cabbages as the soil
they till can yield. Their exponents are most convincing when they
are least imaginative. The Dean of Harvard’s Graduate School of
Business Administration says bluntly that it is hard for a young man
to see any good in a college education, when he finds he has
nothing to offer which business men want.
This is an intelligible point of view. It shows, as I have said, that
the country does not feel itself rich enough for intellectual luxuries.
But when I see it asserted that vocational training is necessary for
the safety of Democracy (the lusty nursling which we persist in
feeding from the bottle), I feel that I am asked to credit an absurdity.
When the reason given for this dependence is the altruism of labour,
—“In a democracy the activity of the people is directed towards the
good of the whole number,”—I know that common sense has been
violated by an assertion which no one is expected to take seriously.
A life-career course may be established in every college in the land,
and students carefully guarded from the inroads of distracting and
unremunerative knowledge; but this praiseworthy thrift will not be
practised in the interests of the public. The mechanical education,
against which Mr. Lowell has protested sharply, is preëminently
selfish. Its impelling motive is not “going over,” but getting on.
 “It takes a much better quality of mind for self-education than for
education in the ordinary sense,” says Mrs. Gerould; and no one will
dispute this truth. Franklin had two years of schooling, and they were
over and done with before he was twelve. His “cultural opportunities”
were richer than those enjoyed by Mr. Gompers, and he had a
consuming passion for knowledge. Vocational training was a simple
thing in his day; but he glimpsed its possibilities, and fitted it into
place. He would have made an admirable “vocational counsellor” in
the college he founded, had his counsels not been needed on
weightier matters, and in wider spheres. As for industrial education,
those vast efficiency courses given by leading manufacturers to their
employees, which embrace an astonishing variety of marketable
attainments, they would have seemed to him like the realization of a
dream—a dream of diffused light and general intelligence.
We stand to-day on an educational no man’s land, exposed to
double fires, and uncertain which way to turn for safety. The
elimination of Greek from the college curriculum blurred the high
light, the supreme distinction, of scholarship. The elimination of Latin
as an essential study leaves us without any educational standard
save a correct knowledge of English, a partial knowledge of modern
languages, and some acquaintance, never clearly defined, with
precise academic studies. The scientist discards many of these
studies as not being germane to his subject. The professional
student deals with them as charily as possible. The future financier
fears to embarrass his mind with things he does not need to know.
Yet back of every field of labour lies the story of the labourer, and
back of every chapter in the history of civilization lie the chapters that
elucidate it. “Wisdom,” says Santayana, “is the funded experience
which mankind has gathered by living.” Education gives to a student
that fraction of knowledge which sometimes leads to understanding
and a clean-cut basis of opinions. The process is engrossing, and, to
certain minds, agreeable and consolatory. Man contemplates his
fellow man with varied emotions, but never with unconcern. “The
world,” observed Bagehot tersely, “has a vested interest in itself.”
 The American Laughs
It was the opinion of Thomas Love Peacock—who knew whereof
he spoke—that “no man should ask another why he laughs, or at
what, seeing that he does not always know, and that, if he does, he
is not a responsible agent.... Reason is in no way essential to mirth.”
This being so, why should human beings, individually and
collectively, be so contemptuous of one another’s humour? To be
puzzled by it is natural enough. There is nothing in the world so
incomprehensible as the joke we do not see. But to be scornful or
angry, to say with Steele that we can judge a man’s temper by the
things he laughs at, is, in a measure, unreasonable. A man laughs
as he loves, moved by secret springs that do not affect his
neighbour. Yet no sooner did America begin to breed humorists of
her own than the first thing these gentlemen did was to cast doubts
upon British humour. Even a cultivated laugher like Mr. Charles
Dudley Warner suffered himself to become acrimonious on this
subject; whereupon an English critic retaliated by saying that if Mr.
Warner considered Knickerbocker’s “New York” to be the equal of
“Gulliver’s Travels,” and that if Mr. Lowell really thought Mr. N. P.
Willis “witty,” then there was no international standard of satire or of
wit. The chances are that Mr. Lowell did not think Mr. Willis witty at
all. He used the word in a friendly and unreflecting moment, not
expecting a derisive echo from the other side of the sea.
And now Mr. Chesterton has protested in the “Illustrated London
News” against the vogue of the American joke in England. He says it
does not convey its point because the conditions which give it birth
are not understood, and the side-light it throws fails to illuminate a
continent. One must be familiar with the intimacies of American life
to enjoy their humorous aspect.
Precisely the same criticism was offered when Artemus Ward
lectured in London more than a half-century ago. The humour of this
once famous joker has become a disputable point. It is safe to say
that anything less amusing than the passage read by Lincoln to his
Cabinet in Mr. Drinkwater’s play could not be found in the literature
of any land. It cast a needless gloom over the scene, and aroused
our sympathy for the officials who had to listen to it. But the
American jest, like the Greek epic, should be spoken, not read; and it
is claimed that when Artemus Ward drawled out his absurdities,
which, like the Greek epic, were always subject to change, these
absurdities were funny. Mr. Leacock has politely assured us that
London was “puzzled and enraptured with the very mystery of the
humour”; but Mr. Leacock, being at that time three years old, was not
there to discern this for himself. Dr. S. Weir Mitchell was there on the
opening night, November 13, 1866, and found the puzzle and the
mystery to be far in advance of the rapture. The description he was
wont to give of this unique entertainment (a “Panorama,” and a
lecture on the Mormons), of the depressing, unventilated Egyptian
Hall in which it was given, of the wild extravagances of the speaker,
which grew wilder and wilder as the audience grew more and more
bewildered, was funny enough, Heaven knows, but the essence of
the fun lay in failure.
Americans, sixty years ago, were brought up on polygamous jests.
The Mormons were our neighbours, and could be always relied upon
to furnish a scandal, a thrill, or a joke. When they mended their
ways, and ceased to be reprehensible or amusing, the comic papers
were compelled to fall back on Solomon, with whose marital
experiences they have regaled us ever since. But to British eyes,
Brigham Young was an unfamiliar figure; and to British minds,
Solomon has always been distinguished for other things than wives.
Therefore Artemus Ward’s casual drolleries presupposed a
humorous background which did not exist. A chance allusion to a
young friend in Salt Lake City who had run away with a boarding
school was received in stupefied silence. Then suddenly a woman’s
smothered giggle showed that light had dawned on one receptive
brain. Then a few belated laughs broke out in various parts of the
hall, as the idea travelled slowly along the thought currents of the
audience, and the speaker went languidly on to the next
unrecognizable pleasantry.
 The criticism passed upon Americans to-day is that they laugh
often and without discrimination. This is what the English say of us,
and this is what some Americans have said of the English. Henry
James complained bitterly that London play-goers laughed
unseasonably at serious plays. I wonder if they received Ervine’s
“John Ferguson” in this fashion, as did American play-goers. That a
tragedy harsh and unrelenting, that human pain, unbearable
because unmerited, should furnish food for mirth may be
comprehensible to the psychologist who claims to have a clue to
every emotion; but to the ordinary mortal it is simply dumbfounding.
People laughed at Molnar’s “Liliom” out of sheer nervousness,
because they could not understand it. And “Liliom” had its comedy
side. But nobody could have helped understanding “John Ferguson,”
and there was no relief from its horror, its pitifulness, its sombre
surrender to the irony of fate. Yet ripples of laughter ran through the
house; and the actress who played Hannah Ferguson confessed that
this laughter had in the beginning completely unnerved her, but that
she had steeled herself to meet and to ignore it.
It was said that British audiences were guilty of laughing at “Hedda
Gabler,” perhaps in sheer desperate impatience at the
unreasonableness of human nature as unfolded in that despairing
drama. They should have been forgiven and congratulated, and so
should the American audiences who were reproached for laughing at
“Mary Rose.” The charm, the delicacy, the tragic sense of an
unknown and arbitrary power with which Barrie invested his play
were lost in the hands of incapable players, while its native dullness
gained force and substance from their presentation. A lengthy
dialogue on a pitch-black stage between an invisible soldier and an
inarticulate ghost was neither enlivening nor terrifying. It would have
been as hard to laugh as to shudder in the face of such tedious
loquacity.
We see it often asserted that Continental play-goers are incapable
of the gross stupidities ascribed to English and Americans, that they
dilate with correct emotions at correct moments, that they laugh,
weep, tremble, and even faint in perfect accord with the situations of
the drama they are witnessing. When Maeterlinck’s “Intruder” was
played in Paris, women fainted; when it was played in Philadelphia,
they tittered. Perhaps the quality of the acting may account for these
varying receptions. A tense situation, imperfectly presented,
degenerates swiftly into farce—into very bad farce, too, as Swift said
of the vulgar malignities of fate.
The Dublin players brought to this country a brand of humour and
pathos with which we were unfamiliar. Irish comedy, as we knew it,
was of the Dion Boucicault type, a pure product of stageland, and
unrelated to any practical experiences of life. Here, on the contrary,
was something indigenous to Ireland, and therefore strange to us.
My first experience was at the opening night of Ervine’s “Mixed
Marriage,” in New York. An audience, exclusively Semitic (so far as I
could judge by looking at it), listened in patient bewilderment to the
theological bickerings of Catholics and Protestants in Belfast. I sat in
a box with Lady Gregory who was visibly disturbed by the slowness
of the house at the uptake, and unaware that what was so familiar
and vital to her was a matter of the purest unconcern to that
particular group of Americans. The only thing that roused them from
their apathy was the sudden rage with which, in the third act, Tom
Rainey shouted at his father: “Ye’re an ould fool, that’s what ye are; a
damned ould fool!” At these reprehensible words a gust of laughter
swept the theatre, destroying the situation on the stage, but shaking
the audience back to life and animation. It was seemingly—though I
should be sorry to think it—the touch of nature which makes the
whole world kin.
When that mad medley of fun and fancy, of grossness and
delicacy, “The Playboy of the Western World,” was put on the
American stage, men laughed—generally at the wrong time—out of
the hopeless confusion of their minds. The “Playboy” was admittedly
an enigma. The night I saw it, the audience, under the impression
that it was anti-Irish, or anti-Catholic, or anti-moral, or anti-
something, they were not sure what, hurled denunciations and one
missile—which looked strangely like a piece of pie—at the actors. It
was a disgraceful scene, but not without its humorous side; for when
the riotous interruptions had subsided, an elderly man arose, and,
with the manner of an invited speaker at a public dinner, began,
“From time immemorial”—But the house had grown tired of
disturbances, and howled him down. He waited for silence, and then
in the same composed and leisurely manner began again, “From
time immemorial”—At this point one of the policemen who had been
restoring order led him gently but forcibly out of the theatre; the play
was resumed; and what it was that had happened from time
immemorial we were destined never to know.
A source of superlative merriment in the United States is the two-
reel comic of our motion-picture halls. Countless thousands of
Americans look at it, and presumably laugh at it, every twenty-four
hours. It is not unlike an amplified and diversified Punch and Judy
show, depending on incessant action and plenty of hard knocks.
Hazlitt says that bangs and blows which we know do not hurt
provoke legitimate laughter; and, until we see a funny film, we have
no conception of the amount of business which can be constructed
out of anything so simple as men hitting one another. Producers of
these comics have taken the public into their confidence, and have
assured us that their work is the hardest in the motion-picture
industry; that the slugging policeman is trained for weary weeks to
slug divertingly, and that every tumble has to be practised with
sickening monotony before it acquires its purely accidental character.
As for accessories—well, it takes more time and trouble to make a
mouse run up a woman’s skirt at the right moment, or a greyhound
carry off a dozen crullers on its tail, than it does to turn out a whole
sentimental scenario, grey-haired mother, high-minded, pure-hearted
convict son, lumber-camp virtue, town vice, and innocent childhood
complete. Whether or not the time and trouble are well spent
depends on the amount of money which that mouse and those
crullers eventually wring from an appreciative and laughter-loving
public.
The dearth of humorous situations—at no time inexhaustible—has
compelled the two-reel comic to depend on such substitutes as
speed, violence, and a succession of well-nigh inconceivable
mishaps. A man acting in one cannot open a door, cross a street, or
sit down to dinner without coming to grief. Even the animals—dogs,
donkeys and pigs—are subject to catastrophes that must wreck their
confidence in life. Fatness, besides being funny, is, under these
circumstances, a great protection. The human body, swathed in rolls
of cotton-wadding, is safe from contusions and broken bones. When
an immensely stout lady sinks into an armchair, only to be
precipitated through a trap-door, and shot down a slide into a pond,
we feel she has earned her pay. But after she has been dropped
from a speeding motor, caught and lifted high in air by a balloon
anchor, let down to earth with a parachute, picked up by an elephant,
and carried through the streets at the head of a circus parade, we
begin to understand the arduousness of art. Only the producers of
comic “movies” know what “One crowded hour of glorious life” can
be made to hold.
Laughter has been over-praised and over-analyzed, as well as
unreasonably denounced. We do not think much about its
determining causes—why should we?—until the contradictory
definitions of philosophers, psychologists and men of letters compel
us to recognize its inscrutable quality. Plato laid down the principle
that our pleasure in the ludicrous originates in the sight of another’s
misfortune. Its motive power is malice. Hobbes stoutly affirmed that
laughter is not primarily malicious, but vainglorious. It is the rough,
spontaneous assertion of our own eminence. “We laugh from
strength, and we laugh at weakness.” Hazlitt saw a lurking cruelty in
the amusement of civilized men who have gaged the folly and
frivolity of their kind. Bergson, who evidently does not frequent
motion-picture halls, says that the comic makes its appeal to “the
intelligence pure and simple.” He raises laughter to the dignity of a
“social gesture” and a corrective. We put our affections out of court,
and impose silence upon our pity before we laugh; but this is only
because the corrective would fail to correct if it bore the stamp of
sympathy and kindness. Leacock, who deals in comics, is sure of but
one thing, that all humour is anti-social; and Stevenson ascribes our
indestructible spirit of mirth to “the unplumbed childishness of man’s
imagination.”
The illustrations given us by these eminent specialists are as
unconvincing as the definitions they vouchsafe, and the rules they
lay down for our guidance. Whenever we are told that a situation or a
jest offers legitimate food for laughter, we cease to have any
disposition to laugh. Just as we are often moved to merriment for no
other reason than that the occasion calls for seriousness, so we are
correspondingly serious when invited too freely to be amused. An
entertainment which promises to be funny is handicapped from the
start. It has to plough deep into men’s risibilities before it can raise its
crop of laughter. I have been told that when Forepaugh first fired a
man out of a cannon, the audience laughed convulsively; not
because it found anything ludicrous in the performance, but because
it had been startled out of its composure, and relieved from a
gasping sense of fear.
Sidney Smith insisted that the overturning of a dinner-table which
had been set for dinner was a laughable incident. Yet he was a
married man, and must have known that such a catastrophe (which
seems to us to belong strictly to the motion-picture field) could not
have been regarded by Mrs. Smith, or by any other hostess, as
amusing. Boswell tells us that Dr. Johnson was so infinitely diverted
by hearing that an English gentleman had left his estate to his three
sisters that he laughed until he was exhausted, and had to hold on to
a post (he was walking home through the London streets) to keep
himself from falling to the ground. Yet no reader of Boswell ever saw
anything ludicrous in such a last will and testament. Sophocles
makes Electra describe Clytemnestra as “laughing triumphantly”
over the murder of Agamemnon; but Electra was a prejudiced
witness. Killing an undesired husband is no laughing matter, though
triumph over its accomplishment—when failure means death—is a
legitimate emotion. Clytemnestra was a singularly august and
composed sinner. Not from her did Orestes and Electra inherit their
nervous systems; and not on their testimony should we credit her
with an excess of humour alike ill-timed and unbecoming.
In our efforts to discover what can never be discovered—the
secret sources of laughter—we have experimented with American
children; testing their appreciation of the ludicrous by giving them
blocks which, when fitted into place, display absurd and incongruous
pictures. Their reactions to this artificial stimulus are of value, only
when they are old enough for perception, and young enough for
candour. The merriment of children, of little girls especially, is often
unreal and affected. They will toss their heads and stimulate one
another to peals of laughter which are a pure make-believe. When
they are really absorbed in their play, and astir with delicious
excitation, they do not laugh; they give vent to piercing shrieks which
sound as if they were being cut into little pieces. These shrieks are
the spontaneous expression of delight; but their sense of absurdity,
which implies a sense of humour, is hard to capture before it has
become tainted with pretence.
There are American newspapers which print every day a sheet or
a half-sheet of comic pictures, and there are American newspapers
which print every Sunday a coloured comic supplement. These
sincere attempts to divert the public are well received. Their vulgarity
does not offend. “What,” asks the wise Santayana, “can we relish if
we recoil at vulgarity?” Their dullness is condoned. Life, for all its
antics, is confessedly dull. Our absurdities may amuse the angels
(Walpole had a cheerful vision of their laughter); but they cannot be
relied on to amuse our fellow men. Nevertheless the coloured
supplement passes from hand to hand—from parents to children,
from children to servants. Even the smudgy black and whites of the
daily press are soberly and conscientiously scrutinized. A man,
reading his paper in the train, seldom skips that page. He examines
every little smudge with attention, not seemingly entertained, or
seeking entertainment, but without visible depression at its
incompetence.
I once had the pleasure of hearing a distinguished etcher lecture
on the art of illustrating. He said some harsh words about these
American comics, and threw on the screen a reproduction of one of
their most familiar series. The audience looked at it sadly. “I am
glad,” commented the lecturer, “that you did not laugh. Those
pictures are, as you perceive, as stupid as they are vulgar. Now I will
show you some clever English work”: and there appeared before us
the once famous Ally Sloper recreating himself and his family at the
seashore. The audience looked at him sadly. A solemn stillness held
the hall. “Why don’t you laugh?” asked the lecturer irritably. “I assure
you that picture is funny.” Whereupon everybody laughed; not
because we saw the fun—which was not there to see—but because
we were jolted into risibility by the unwarranted despotism of the
demand.
The prohibition jest which stands preeminent in the United States,
and has afforded French and English humorists a field which they
have promptly and ably filled, draws its vitality from the inexhaustible
springs of human nature. Readers and play-goers profess
themselves tired of it; moralists deprecate its undermining qualities;
but the conflict between a normal desire and an interdict is too
unadjustable, too rich in circumstance, and too far-reaching in
results, to be accepted in sober silence. The complications incidental
to prohibition, the battle of wits, the turns of the game, the
adventures—often sorry enough—of the players, all present the
essential elements of comedy. Mrs. Gerould has likened the situation
to an obstacle race. It is that, and it is something more. In earlier,
easier days, robbery was made justifiably droll. The master thief was
equally at home in northern Europe and in the far East. England
smiled at Robin Hood. France evolved that amazing epithet,
“chevalier d’industrie.” But arrayed against robbery were a moral law
and a commandment. Arrayed against wine are a legal ordinance
and the modern cult of efficiency. It will be long before these become
so sacrosanct as to disallow a laugh.
The worst that has been said of legitimate American humour is
that it responds to every beck and call. Even Mr. Ewan S. Agnew,
whose business it is to divert the British public, considers that the
American public is too easily diverted. We laugh, either from light-
hearted insensitiveness, or from the superabundant vitality, the half-
conscious sense of power, which bubbles up forever in the callous
gaiety of the world. Certainly Emerson is the only known American
who despised jocularity, and who said early and often that he did not
wish to be amused. The most striking passage in the letters of Mr.
Walter Page is the one which describes his distaste for the “jocular”
Washington luncheons at which he was a guest in the summer of
1916. He had come fresh from the rending anxiety, the heroic stress
and strain of London; and the cloudless atmosphere of our capital
wounded his spirit. England jested too. “Punch” had never been so
brilliant as in the torturing years of war. But England had earned the
right to jest. There was a tonic quality in her laughter. Page feared
from the bottom of his soul lest the great peaceful nation, safe, rich
and debonair, had suffered her “mental neutrality” to blot out from
her vision the agony of Europe, and the outstanding facts which
were responsible for the disaster.
This unconcern, which is the balance wheel of comedy, has
tempered the American mind to an easy acceptance of chance. Its
enthusiasms are modified, its censures are softened by a restraining
humour which is rooted deeply in indifference. We recognize the
sanity of our mental attitude, but not its incompleteness.
Understanding and sympathy are products of civilized life, as
clarifying in their way as tolerance and a quick perception of the
ludicrous. An American newspaper printed recently a photograph
entitled “Smilin’ Through,” which showed two American girls peering
through two holes in a shell-torn wall of Verdun, and laughing
broadly at their sport. The names and addresses of these frolicsome
young women were given, and their enjoyment of their own drollery
was emphasized for the diversion of other young women at home.
Now granted that every nation, like every man, bears the burden
of its own grief. Granted also that every woman, like every man, has
her own conception of the humorous, and that we cannot reasonably
take umbrage because we fail to see the fun. Nevertheless the
memories of Verdun do not make for laughter. There is that in its
story which sobers the world it has ennobled. Four hundred
thousand French soldiers gave their lives for that battered fortress
which saved Paris and France. Mr. Brownell reminds us that there is
such a thing as rectitude outside the sphere of morals, and that it is
precisely this austere element in taste which assures our self-
respect. We cannot analyze, and therefore cannot criticize, that
frothy fun which Bergson has likened to the foam which the receding
waves leave on the ocean sands; but we know, as he knows, that
the substance is scanty, and the after-taste is bitter in our mouths.
We are tethered to our kind, and it is the sureness of our reaction to
the great and appealing facts of history which makes us inheritors of
a hard-won civilization, and qualified citizens of the world.
 The Idolatrous Dog
We shall never know why a feeling of shame attends certain
harmless sensations, certain profoundly innocent tastes and
distastes. Why, for example, are we abashed when we are cold, and
boastful when we are not? There is no merit or distinction in being
insensitive to cold, or in wearing thinner clothing than one’s
neighbour. And what strange impulse is it which induces otherwise
truthful people to say they like music when they do not, and thus
expose themselves to hours of boredom? We are not necessarily
morons or moral lepers because we have no ear for harmony. It is a
significant circumstance that Shakespeare puts his intolerant lines,

“The man that hath no music in himself,

Nor is not moved with concord of sweet sounds,
Is fit for treasons, stratagems and spoils.

Let no such man be trusted”—

in the mouth of Lorenzo who disdained neither stratagems nor

spoils, and who carried off the Jew’s ducats as well as the Jew’s
daughter. And Jessica, who sits by his side in the moonlight, and
responds with delicate grace

“I am never merry when I hear sweet music,”

is the girl who “gilded” herself with stolen gold, and gave her dead
mother’s ring for a monkey.
It is a convenience not to feel cold when the thermometer falls,
and it is a pleasure to listen appreciatively to a symphony concert. It
is also a convenience to relish the proximity of dogs, inasmuch as
we live surrounded by these animals, and it is a pleasure to respond
to their charm. But there is no virtue in liking them, any more than
there is virtue in liking wintry weather or stringed instruments. An
affection for dogs is not, as we have been given to understand, a test
of an open and generous disposition. Still less is their affection for us
to be accepted as a guarantee of our integrity. The assumption that a
dog knows a good from a bad human being when he sees one is
unwarranted. It is part of that engulfing wave of sentiment which
swept the world in the wake of popular fiction. Dickens is its most
unflinching exponent. Henry Gowan’s dog, Lion, springs at the throat
of Blandois, alias Lagnier, alias Rigaud, for no other reason than that
he recognizes him as a villain, without whom the world would be a
safer and better place to live in. Florence Dombey’s dog, Diogenes,
looks out of an upper window, observes Mr. Carker peacefully
walking the London streets, and tries to jump down and bite him then
and there. He sees at once what Mr. Dombey has not found out in
years—that Carker is a base wretch, unworthy of the confidence
reposed in him.
A few animals of this kind might, in real life, close the courts of
justice. The Dickens dog is detective, prosecuting attorney, judge,
jury and executioner, all in one. He stands responsible for a whole
school of fictitious canines who combine the qualities of Vidocq,
Sherlock Holmes, and the Count of Monte Cristo. I read recently a
story in which the villain was introduced as “that anomalous being,
the man who doesn’t like dogs.” After that, no intelligent reader could
have been unprepared to find him murdering his friend and partner.
So much was inevitable. And no experienced reader could have
been unprepared for the behaviour of the friend and partner’s dog,
which recognizes the anomaly as a person likely to commit murder,
and, without wasting time on circumstantial evidence, tracks him
down, and, unaided, brings him to his death. A simple, clean-cut
retribution, contrasting favourably with the cumbersome processes of
law.
A year ago the Governor of Maine had the misfortune to lose his
dog. He signified his sense of loss, and his appreciation of the
animal’s good qualities, by lowering the American flag on the
Augusta State House to half-mast. He was able to do this because
he was Governor, and there was no one to say him nay.
Nevertheless, certain sticklers for formality protested against an
innovation which opened up strange possibilities for the future; and
one logical lady observed that a dog was no more a citizen than was
a strawberry patch, a statement not open to contradiction. The
country at large, however, supported the Governor’s action.
Newspaper men wrote editorials lauding the “homespun” virtues of
an official who set a true value on an honest dog’s affection. Poets
wrote verses about “Old Glory” and “Garry” (the dog’s name); and
described Saint Peter as promptly investing this worthy quadruped
with the citizenship of Heaven. The propriety or impropriety of
lowering the national flag for an animal—which was the question
under dispute—was buried beneath the avalanche of sentiment
which is always ready to fall at the sound of a dog’s name.
A somewhat similar gust of criticism swept Pennsylvania when a
resident of that State spent five hundred dollars on the obsequies of
his dog. The Great War, though drawing to a close, was not yet over,
and perhaps the thought of men unburied on the battle-field, and
refugees starving for bread, intensified public feeling. There was the
usual outcry, as old as Christianity—“this might have been given to
the poor.” There was the usual irrelevant laudation of the
Pennsylvania dog, and of dogs in general. People whose own affairs
failed to occupy their attention (there are many such) wrote
vehement letters to the daily press. At last a caustic reader chilled
the agitation by announcing that he was prepared to give five
hundred dollars any day for the privilege of burying his next-door
neighbour’s dog. Whether or not this offer was accepted, the public
never knew; but what troubled days and sleepless nights must have
prompted its prodigality!
 The honour accorded to the dog is no new thing. It has for
centuries rewarded his valour and fidelity. Responsibilities, duties,
compensations—these have always been his portion. Sirius shines
in the heavens, and Cerberus guards in hell. The dog, Katmir, who
watched over the Seven Sleepers for three hundred and nine years,
gained Paradise for his pains, as well he might. Even the ill-fated
hounds of Actæon, condemned to kill their more ill-fated master, are
in some sort immortal, inasmuch as we may know, if we choose, the
names of every one of them. Through the long pages of legend and
romance the figure of the dog is clearly outlined; and when history
begins with man’s struggle for existence, the dog may be found his
ally and confederate. It was a strange fatality which impelled this
animal to abandon communal life and the companionship of his kind
for the restraints, the safety, the infinite weariness of domesticity. It
was an amazing tractableness which caused him to accept a set of
principles foreign to his nature—the integrity of work, the
honourableness of servitude, the artificial values of civilization.
As a consequence of this extraordinary change of base, we have
grown accustomed to judge the dog by human standards. In fact,
there are no other standards which apply to him. The good dog, like
the good man, is the dog which has duties to perform, and which
performs them faithfully. The bad dog, like the bad man, is the dog
which is idle, ill-tempered and over-indulged by women. Women are
responsible for most of the dog-failures, as well as for many of the
man-failures of the world. So long as they content themselves with
toy beasts, this does not much matter; but a real dog, beloved and
therefore pampered by his mistress, is a lamentable spectacle. He
suffers from fatty degeneration of his moral being.
What if the shepherd dog fares hardly, and if exposure stiffens his
limbs! He has at least lived, and played his part in life. Nothing more
beautiful or more poignant has ever been written about any animal
than James Hogg’s description of his old collie which could no longer
gather in the sheep, and with which he was compelled to part,
because—poor Ettrick shepherd—he could not afford to pay the tax
on two dogs. The decrepit beast refused to be separated from the
flocks which had been his care and pride. Day after day he hobbled
along, watching the new collie bustling about his work, and—too
wise to interfere—looking with reproachful eyes at the master who
had so reluctantly discarded him.
The literature of the dog is limitless. A single shelf would hold all
that has been written about the cat. A library would hardly suffice for
the prose and verse dedicated to the dog. From “Gêlert” to “Rab”
and “Bob, Son of Battle,” he has dominated ballad and fiction. Few
are the poets and few the men of letters who have not paid some
measure of tribute to him. Goethe, indeed, and Alfred de Musset
detested all dogs, and said so composedly. Their detestation was
temperamental, and not the result of an unfortunate encounter, such
as hardened the heart of Dr. Isaac Barrow, mathematician, and
Master of Trinity College. Sidney Smith tells us with something akin
to glee that this eminent scholar, when taking an early stroll in the
grounds of a friend and host, was attacked by a huge and
unwarrantably suspicious mastiff. Barrow, a fighter all his life (a man
who would fight Algerine pirates was not to be easily daunted),
hurled the dog to the ground, and fell on top of him. The mastiff
could not get up, but neither could Barrow, who called loudly for
assistance. It came, and the combatants were separated; but a
distaste for morning strolls and an aversion for dogs lingered in the
Master’s mind. There was one less enthusiast in the world.
We are apt to think that the exuberance of sentiment entertained
by Americans for dogs is a distinctively British trait, that we have
inherited it along with our language, our literature, our manliness, our
love of sport, our admirable outdoor qualities. But it may be found
blooming luxuriously in other and less favoured lands. That
interesting study of Danish childhood by Carl Ewald, called “My Little
Boy,” contains a chapter devoted to the lamentable death of a dog
named Jean, “the biggest dog in Denmark.” This animal, though at
times condescending to kindness, knew how to maintain his just
authority. “He once bit a boy so hard that the boy still walks lame. He
once bit his own master.” The simple pride with which these
incidents are narrated would charm a dog-lover’s soul. And the lame
boy’s point of view is not permitted to intrude.
 Of all writers who have sung the praises of the dog, and who have
justified our love for him, Maeterlinck has given the fullest expression
to the profound and absorbing egotism which underlies this love.
Never for a moment does he consider his dog save as a worshipper.
Never does he think of himself save as a being worshipped. Never
does he feel that this relationship can be otherwise than just,
reasonable, and satisfying to both parties. “The dog,” he says,
“reveres us as though we had drawn him out of nothing. He has a
morality which surpasses all that he is able to discover in himself,
and which he can practise without scruple and without fear. He
possesses truth in its fullness. He has a certain and infinite ideal.”
And what is this ideal? “He” (the dog) “is the only living being that
has found, and recognizes, an indubitable, unexceptionable and
definite god.”
And who is this god? M. Maeterlinck, you, I, anybody who has
bought and reared a puppy. Yet we are told that the dog is intelligent.
What is there about men which can warrant the worship of a wise
beast? What sort of “truth in its fullness” is compatible with such a
blunder? Yet it is for the sake of being idolized that we prize and
cherish the idolater. Our fellow mortals will not love us unless we are
lovable. They will not admire us unless we are admirable. Our cats
will probably neither love nor admire us, being self-engrossed
animals, free from encumbering sensibilities. But our dogs will love
and admire the meanest of us, and feed our colossal vanity with their
uncritical homage. M. Maeterlinck recognizes our dependence on
the dog for the deification we crave, and is unreasonably angry with
the cat for her aloofness. In her eyes, he complains, we are
parasites in our own homes. “She curses us from the depths of her
mysterious heart.”
She does not. She tolerates us with a wise tolerance, recognizing
our usefulness, and indulgent of our foibles. Domesticity has not cost
her the heavy price it has cost the dog. She has merely exchanged
the asylum of cave or tree for the superior accommodation of the
house. Her habits remain unaltered, her freedom unviolated. Cream-
fed and pampered, she still loves the pleasures of the chase; nor will
she pick and choose her prey at the recommendation of prejudiced
humanity. M. Maeterlinck, who has striven to enter into the
consciousness of the dog, describes it as congested with duties and
inhibitions. There are chairs he must not sit on, rooms he must not
enter, food he must not steal, babies he must not upset, cats he
must not chase, visitors he must not bark at, beggars and tramps he
must not permit to enter the gates. He lives under as many, and as
strict, compulsions as though he were a citizen of the United States.
By comparison with this perverted intelligence, this artificial morality,
the mind of the cat appears like a cool and spacious chamber, with
only her own spirit to fill it, and only her own tastes and distastes to
be consulted and obeyed.
Perhaps it is because the dog is so hedged in by rules and
regulations that he has lost his initiative. Descended from animals
that lived in packs, and that enjoyed the advantages of communal
intelligence, he could never have possessed this quality as it was
possessed by an animal that lived alone, and had only his own
acuteness and experience to rely on. But having surrendered his will
to the will of man, and his conscience to the keeping of man, the dog
has by now grown dependent for his simplest pleasures upon man’s
caprice. He loves to roam; but whereas the cat does roam at will,
rightly rejecting all interference with her liberty, the dog craves
permission to accompany his master on a stroll, and, being refused,
slinks sadly back to confinement and inaction. I have great respect
for those exceptional dogs that take their exercise when they need or
desire it in self-sufficing solitude. I once knew an Irish terrier that had
this independent turn of mind. He invited himself to daily
constitutionals, and might have been seen any morning trotting along
the road, miles away from home, with the air of an animal walking to
keep his flesh down. In the end he was run over by a speeding
motor, but what of that? Die we must, and, while he lived, he was
free.
A lordliness of sentiment mars much of the admirable poetry
written about dogs. The poet thrones himself before addressing his
devoted and credulous ally. Even Matthew Arnold’s lines to “Kaiser
Dead”—among the best of their kind—are heavy with patronage:
 “But all those virtues which commend
The humbler sort who serve and tend,
Were thine in store, thou faithful friend.”

To be sure, Kaiser was a mongrel; but why emphasize his low

estate? As a matter of fact, mongrels, like self-made men, are apt to
have a peculiar complacency of demeanour. They do not rank
themselves among “the humbler sort”; but “serve and tend” on the
same conditions as their betters.
Two years ago Mr. Galsworthy, who stands in the foremost rank of
dog-lovers, and who has drawn for us some of the most lifelike and
attractive dogs in fiction, pleaded strongly and emotionally for the
exemption of this animal from any form of experimental research. He
had the popular sentiment of England back of him, because popular
sentiment always is emotional. The question of vivisection is one of
abstract morality. None but the supremely ignorant can deny its
usefulness. There remain certain questions which call for clean-cut
answers. Does our absolute power over beasts carry with it an
absolute right? May we justifiably sacrifice them for the good of
humanity? What degree of pain are we morally justified in inflicting
on them to save men from disease and death? If we faced the issue
squarely, we should feel no more concern for the kind of animal
which is used for experimentation than for the kind of human being
who may possibly benefit by the experiment. Right and wrong admit
of no sentimental distinctions. Yet the vivisectionist pleads, “Is not
the life of a young mother worth more than the life of a beast?” The
anti-vivisectionist asks: “How can man deliberately torture the
creature that loves and trusts him?” And Mr. Galsworthy admitted
that he had nothing to say about vivisection in general. Cats and
rabbits might take their chances. He asked only that the dog should
be spared.
It has been hinted more than once that if we develop the dog’s
intelligence too far, we may end by robbing him of his illusions. He
has absorbed so many human characteristics—vanity, sociability,
snobbishness, a sense of humour and a conscience—that there is
danger of his also acquiring the critical faculty. He will not then
content himself with flying at the throats of villains—the out-and-out
villain is rare in the common walks of life—he will doubt the godlike
qualities of his master. The warmth of his affection will chill, its
steadfastness will be subject to decay.
Of this regrettable possibility there is as yet no sign. The hound,
Argus, beating the ground with his feeble tail in an expiring effort to
welcome the disguised Odysseus, is a prototype of his successor to-
day. Scattered here and there in the pages of history are instances
of unfaithfulness; but their rarity gives point to their picturesqueness.
Froissart tells us that the greyhound, Math, deserted his master, King
Richard the Second, to fawn on the Duke of Lancaster who was to
depose and succeed him; and that a greyhound belonging to
Charles of Blois fled on the eve of battle to the camp of John de
Montfort, seeking protection from the stronger man. These
anecdotes indicate a grasp of political situations which is no part of
the dog’s ordinary make-up. Who can imagine the fortunate, faithful
little spaniel that attended Mary Stuart in her last sad months, and in
her last heroic hours, fawning upon Queen Elizabeth? Who can
imagine Sir Walter Scott’s dogs slinking away from him when the
rabble of Jedburgh heaped insults on his bowed grey head?
The most beautiful words ever written about a dog have no
reference to his affectionate qualities. Simonides, celebrating the
memory of a Thessalian hound, knows only that he was fleet and
brave. “Surely, even as thou liest in this tomb, I deem the wild beasts
yet fear thy white bones, Lycas; and thy valour great Pelion knows,
and the lonely peaks of Cithæron.” This is heroic praise, and so, in a
fashion, is Byron’s epitaph on Boatswain. But Byron, being of the
moderns, can find no better way of honouring dogs than by defaming
men; a stupidity, pardonable in the poet only because he was the
most sincere lover of animals the world has ever known. His tastes
were catholic, his outlook was whimsical. He was not in the least
discomposed when his forgetful wolf-hound bit him, or when his
bulldog bit him without the excuse of forgetfulness. Moore tells us
that the first thing he saw on entering Byron’s palace in Venice was a
notice, “Keep clear of the dog!” and the first thing he heard was the
voice of his host calling out anxiously, “Take care, or that monkey will
fly at you.”
It is a pleasant relief, after floundering through seas of sentiment,
to read about dogs that were every whit as imperfect as their
masters; about Cowper’s “Beau” who has been immortalized for his
disobedience; or Sir Isaac Newton’s “Diamond” who has been
immortalized for the mischief he wrought; or Prince Rupert’s “Boy”
who was shot while loyally pulling down a rebel on Marston Moor; or
the Church of England spaniel, mentioned by Addison, who proved
his allegiance to the Establishment by worrying a dissenter. It is also
a pleasure of a different sort to read about the wise little dog who ran
away from Mrs. Welsh (Carlyle’s mother-in-law) on the streets of
Edinburgh, to follow Sir Walter Scott; and about the London dog of
sound literary tastes who tried for many nights to hear Dickens read.
It is always possible that if men would exact a less unalterable
devotion from their dogs, they might find these animals to be
possessed of individual and companionable traits.
But not of human sagacity. It is their privilege to remain beasts,
bound by admirable limitations, thrice happy in the things they do not
have to know, and feel, and be. “The Spectator” in a hospitable
mood once invited its readers to send it anecdotes of their dogs. The
invitation was, as might be imagined, cordially and widely accepted.
Mr. Strachey subsequently published a collection of these stories in
a volume which had all the vraisemblance of Hans Andersen and
“The Arabian Nights.” Reading it, one could but wonder and regret
that the tribe of man had risen to unmerited supremacy. The
“Spectator” dogs could have run the world, the war and the
Versailles Conference without our lumbering interference.

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