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Approaching Infinity
Also by Michael Huemer

ETHICAL INTUITIONISM

THE PROBLEM OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY

SKEPTICISM AND THE VEIL OF PERCEPTION

Approaching Infinity
Michael Huemer
Professor of Philosophy, University of Colorado at Boulder, USA
© Michael Huemer 2016
All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this
publication may be made without written permission.
No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted
save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence
permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency,
Saffron House, 6–10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS.
Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication
may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.
The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work
in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
First published 2016 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN
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registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke,
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Huemer, Michael, 1969– author.
Title: Approaching infinity / Michael Huemer.
Description: New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. | Includes index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2015040546| ISBN 9781137560865 (pbk.)
Subjects: LCSH: Infinite.
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LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2015040546
For Iskra
This page intentionally left blank
Contents

List of Figures xi

Preface xii

Part I The Need for a Theory of Infinity

1 The Prevalence of the Infinite 3

1.1 The concept of infinity and the infinite 3
1.2 The infinite in mathematics 4
1.3 The infinite in philosophy 5
1.4 The infinite in the physical world 6
1.5 The infinite in modern physics 7
1.6 Controversies 7

2 Six Infinite Regresses 9

2.1 The regress of causes 9
2.2 The regress of reasons 10
2.3 The regress of forms 11
2.4 The regress of resemblances 12
2.5 The regress of temporal series 14
2.6 The regress of truths 15
2.7 Conclusion 16

3 Seventeen Paradoxes of the Infinite 17

3.1 A word about paradoxes 17
3.2 The arithmetic of infinity 17
3.3 The paradox of geometric points 18
3.4 Infinite sums 20
3.5 Galileo’s paradox 21
3.6 Hilbert’s hotel 22
3.7 Gabriel’s horn 23
3.8 Smullyan’s infinite rod 24
3.9 Zeno’s paradox 25
3.10 The divided stick 27
3.11 Thomson’s lamp 28
3.12 The Littlewood-Ross Banker 29
3.13 Benardete’s paradox 31

vii
viii Contents

3.14 Laraudogoitia’s marbles 32

3.15 The spaceship 33
3.16 The Saint Petersburg paradox 34
3.17 The Martingale betting system 35
3.18 The delayed heaven paradox 36
3.19 Conclusion 38

Part II Old Theories of Infinity

4 Impossible Infinite Series: Two False Accounts 41

4.1 ‘An infinite series cannot be completed by
successive synthesis’ 41
4.2 ‘An infinite series of preconditions cannot be satisfied’ 44
4.3 Conclusion 47

5 Actual and Potential Infinities 49

5.1 The theory of potential infinity 49
5.2 Why not actual infinities? 51
5.3 Infinite divisibility 52
5.4 Infinite time 57
5.5 Infinite space 57
5.6 Infinitely numerous numbers 65
5.7 Infinitely numerous abstract objects 67
5.8 Infinitely numerous physical objects 68
5.9 Conclusion 69

6 The Cantorian Orthodoxy 71

6.1 The importance of Georg Cantor 71
6.2 Sets 71
6.3 Cardinal numbers 73
6.4 ‘Greater’, ‘less’, and ‘equal’ 74
6.5 Many sets are equally numerous 75
6.6 The diagonalization argument 78
6.7 Cantor’s theorem 80
6.8 The paradoxes of set theory 82
6.9 Other paradoxes of infinity 85
6.10 Conclusion 89

Part III A New Theory of Infinity and Related Matters

7 Philosophical Preliminaries 93
7.1 Metapreliminaries 93
7.2 Phenomenal conservatism 95
 Contents ix

7.3 Synthetic a priori knowledge 97

7.4 Metaphysical possibility 100
7.5 Possibility and paradox 105
7.6 A realist view of mathematics 106

8 Sets 108
8.1 Sets are not collections 108
8.2 Sets are not defined by the axioms 110
8.3 Many regarded as one: the foundational sin? 111
8.4 The significance of the paradoxes 113
8.5 Are numbers sets? 114
8.6 Set theory and the laws of arithmetic 116

9 Numbers 119
9.1 Cardinal numbers as properties 119
9.2 Frege’s objection 120
9.3 Arithmetical operations 122
9.4 The laws of arithmetic 123
9.5 Zero 124
9.6 A digression on large numbers 127
9.7 Magnitudes and real numbers 129
9.8 Indexing uses of numbers 137
9.9 Other numbers 138

10 Infinity 143
10.1 Infinity is not a number 143
10.2 Infinite cardinalities 148
10.3 Infinite extensive magnitudes 150
10.4 Infinite intensive magnitudes 151
10.5 Some a priori physics 158

11 Space 162
11.1 Pointy space versus gunky space 162
11.2 The unimaginability of points 163
11.3 The zero argument 164
11.4 When zero is not mere absence 165
11.5 The paradox of contact 168
11.6 The problem of division 170
11.7 The dimensionality of space is necessary 171
11.8 The measure-theoretic objection 173
12 Some Paradoxes Mostly Resolved 176
12.1 The arithmetic of infinity 176
x Contents

12.2 The paradox of geometric points 176

12.3 Infinite sums 178
12.4 Galileo’s paradox 180
12.5 Hilbert’s hotel 182
12.6 Gabriel’s horn 183
12.7 Smullyan’s infinite rod 184
12.8 Zeno’s paradox 185
12.9 The divided stick 188
12.10 Thomson’s lamp 194
12.11 The Littlewood-Ross Banker 201
12.12 Benardete’s paradox 207
12.13 Laraudogoitia’s marbles 211
12.14 The spaceship 211
12.15 The Saint Petersburg paradox 213
12.16 The Martingale betting system 218
12.17 The delayed heaven paradox 220
12.18 Comment: shallow and deep impossibilities 223

13 Assessing Infinite Regress Arguments 229

13.1 The problem of identifying vicious regresses 229
13.2 Viciousness through metaphysical impossibility 230
13.3 Viciousness through implausibility 232
13.4 Viciousness through explanatory failure 236
13.5 Conclusion 245

14 Conclusion 247
14.1 Why study infinity? 247
14.2 Troubles with traditional approaches 248
14.3 A new approach to infinity 248
14.4 Some controversial views about sets, numbers,
and points 249
14.5 Solving the paradoxes 250
14.6 For further reflection, or: what is wrong
with this book? 251

References 261

Index 269
List of Figures

3.1 A magically expanding rod 20

3.2 Hilbert’s hotel 23
3.3 Gabriel’s horn 24
3.4 Smullyan’s rod 25
3.5 The divided stick 28
5.1 Relationship between the side and the diagonal of a square 56
5.2 Three lines connecting two points 59
5.3 Newton’s bucket 63
6.1 Cantor’s theorem 81
9.1 Three instances of twoness 119
10.1 Infinite temperature and negative temperature 156
10.2 An impossible Newtonian scenario 159
11.1 A line and a triangle 165
11.2 Two ways of dividing a stick in half 171
11.3 The Cantor lines 174
12.1 A magically expanding rod 177
12.2 Dividing a stick with infinitely many knives 190
12.3 Cutting a material 193
12.4 A rotary switch for Thomson’s lamp 199
12.5 The Banker paradox with diminishing bills 203
12.6 Benardete’s walls 208
14.1 An impossible Newtonian scenario 252

xi
Preface

For many years, I have made a point of confounding my philosophy

students with a variety of paradoxes, including several paradoxes of the
infinite. And for many years, I tried myself to think through these para-
doxes, without success. I list seventeen of these paradoxes in Chapter 3.
But over and above the seventeen paradoxes, there were three philo-
sophical questions about the infinite that exercised me.
Here is the first issue. It seems that there are some infinite series that
can be completed. For instance, for an object to move from point A to
point B, it must first travel half the distance, then half the remaining
distance, then half the remaining distance, and so on. According to one
famous argument, because this is an infinite series, the object can never
reach point B. The proper response seems to be to insist that one can in
fact complete an infinite series.
On the other hand, it seems that there are other infinite series that
cannot be completed. For instance, imagine a lamp that starts out on,
then is switched off after half a minute, then back on after another
quarter minute, then off after another eighth of a minute, and so on.
At the end of one minute, is it on or off? The proper response seems
to be that one could not complete such an infinite series of switch-
ings. We might think this is because an infinite series, by definition,
is endless, and one cannot come to the end of something that is
endless.
In other words, the solution to the first puzzle (‘one can complete an
infinite series’) seems to be the opposite of the solution to the second
puzzle (‘one cannot complete an infinite series’). That’s puzzling. What
we would like to say is that some infinite series are possible, and others
are impossible. But why? What is the difference between the infinite
series of halfway-motions, and the infinite series of lamp-switchings?
That’s the first philosophical question I wanted to answer.
This puzzle is tied up with a popular genre of arguments in philosophy:
it is common to argue that some philosophical theory must be rejected
because it leads to an infinite regress. For instance, if every event has a
cause, and the cause of an event is also an event, then there must be an
infinite regress of causes. To avoid this, some say, we should reject the
idea that everything has a cause; instead, we should posit a ‘first cause’,
something that caused everything else and was itself uncaused.

xii
 Preface xiii

But almost as common as infinite regress arguments is a certain type of

response, which claims that there is nothing wrong with the infinite regress.
For instance, some say that we should simply accept that there is an infinite
series of causes stretching into the past forever. Now, there seems to be wide
agreement among philosophers that some but not all infinite regresses are
bad; but there has been no consensus on which regresses are bad (‘vicious’)
and which benign. Hence, the second philosophical question I wanted to
answer: What makes an infinite regress vicious or benign?
Finally, I started reflecting on infinities in science, where there seems
to be an analogous issue. Some infinities are considered ‘bad’ – for
instance, the infinite energy density and infinite spacetime curvature of
a black hole are considered problems in astrophysics. They are thought
to indicate a breakdown of accepted theories (notably, general relativity),
and astrophysicists have been trying to devise new theories that elim-
inate these infinities. But there are other infinities that no one seems
worried about: no one seems to consider the notion of an infinitely large
universe, or the notion of an infinite future, to be problematic. Why is
this? What makes some infinite quantities in a theory problematic while
others are perfectly acceptable?
One can see that these three questions – ‘Why are some infinite series
completeable and others not?’, ‘Why are some infinite regresses vicious
and others not?’, and ‘Why are some infinite quantities problematic and
others not?’ – are quite similar, and so perhaps they have a common
answer. After several years of puzzlement concerning the first two ques-
tions, I finally tried to connect them with the third question. It was then
that I thought of a theory that seems to me to account for which sorts
of infinities are possible and which impossible. After publishing one
paper on the subject (‘Virtue and Vice among the Infinite’), I decided to
expand my ideas into this book.
I would like to thank Stuart Rachels for the conversations about
the infinite that led to this expansion. In addition, I am grateful
for the comments of Adrian Moore and Matt Skene on earlier drafts of
the manuscript, and the questions and comments of Peter Klein, Ted
Poston, Jeanne Peijnenberg, David Atkinson, and the other participants
of the Infinite Regress Workshop organized by Scott Aiken at Vanderbilt
University in October, 2013, where I presented my earlier paper on the
subject. If there are any errors in this book, as surely there must be, they
are the fault of one of these other philosophers – most likely Peter Klein,
because he supervised my PhD and should have trained me better.
Part I
The Need for a Theory of Infinity
1
The Prevalence of the Infinite

Two things are infinite: the universe and human stupidity.

– Albert Einstein/Frederick S. Perls1

1.1 The concept of infinity and the infinite

What is the infinite? The infinite is sometimes described as that which

is unlimited, boundless, or so great that it is impossible for anything
to be greater. For instance, an infinitely heavy stone would be a stone
so heavy that it would be conceptually impossible for anything to be
heavier. (Whether there could be such a stone is another matter.) An
infinite area would be an area such that no area could be larger.
What about the noun ‘infinity’ – what does this refer to? Infinity is
commonly thought of as a very large number – a number larger than all
the other numbers; or, a number so large that if you add one to it, the
result is no larger than you started with. Another way to get at the idea
is to define infinity by reference to some particular thing that is infi-
nite. For instance, we might say: infinity is the number that describes
how many natural numbers there are. Or: infinity is the number that
describes how big all of space is.

1
This quotation comes from the Gestalt psychotherapist Frederick Perls (1947,
111), who attributes it to ‘a great astronomer’ then goes on to say that Einstein has
shown that the universe is not infinite. Later, Perls (1969, 33) modified the quota-
tion and ascribed it to Einstein, who is supposed to have said it in conversation
with Perls (the original version contained ‘as far as we know’ after ‘infinite’).

3
4 Approaching Infinity

Much later in this book, we see why the above characterizations are
inadequate and what a more adequate characterization looks like. But
that requires much more work, so for now, I leave the reader with the
above characterizations, which at least point at the intuitive conception
of infinity and the infinite.
Why is infinity interesting? Three reasons: first, the infinite is an
important part of reality. Second, many important philosophical
arguments invoke the concept of infinity, infinite regresses in partic-
ular. Third, infinity is extremely puzzling, and we have yet to attain a
clear grasp of it. We begin in this chapter with the first of these three
points; the second and third points are elaborated in Chapters 2 and 3,
respectively.

1.2 The infinite in mathematics

Pace Einstein, more than two things are infinite. In mathematics, there
are a variety of infinite classes of abstract objects. The most familiar of
these is the set of counting numbers (the numbers 1, 2, 3, and so on).
There is no last member of this set; no matter how high you count,
there are always more counting numbers. And the point is of course not
one about human counting capacities; the main point of interest is one
that would hold even if there were no conscious beings: for any natural
number n, there is another greater than it.
Similarly, the real numbers (which include whole numbers in addition
to fractions and irrational numbers) are infinitely numerous, since again,
for any real number r, there are real numbers larger than r. Indeed, if you
pick any two real numbers, there are infinitely many others sandwiched
between them. For example, between the numbers 2 and 2.1, there are
the numbers 2.01, 2.011, 2.0111, and so on.
These numbers are the least controversial; anyone who believes in
numbers at all believes in the reals. Negative numbers used to be contro-
versial since it seemed odd that there should be a quantity less than
nothing. Potentially controversial classes of numbers include imaginary
numbers, infinitesimals, hyperreals, and transfinite cardinals. Each of
these kinds of number, if they exist at all, are also infinitely numerous.
If there are imaginary numbers, then there are infinitely many of them
(i, −i, 2i, −2i, ... ); if there are infinitesimals, then there are infinitely
many of them; and so on.
That is just to speak of numbers. Other mathematical objects, if they
exist at all, are also infinitely numerous. For instance, if sets exist, then
there are the sets {1}, {2}, {1,2}, {3}, {1,3}, {2,3}, {1,2,3}, and so on. Or, if
 The Prevalence of the Infinite 5

you prefer sets built from concrete elements, there are {the moon}, {{the
moon}}, {{the moon}, the moon}, {{{the moon}}}, and so on. Almost any
other type of mathematical object will also be infinitely numerous, if
that type of object exists at all (for example, vectors, groups, functions,
points, spaces).

1.3 The infinite in philosophy

Philosophers often discuss propositions, which are usually thought of as

a special kind of abstract object. A proposition is the sort of thing that
can be either true or false; however, propositions are to be distinguished
both from statements and from beliefs. When you have a belief, the thing
that you believe to be the case is a proposition. Multiple people can
believe the same thing (the same proposition). A person can also have
multiple attitudes toward the same proposition; for instance, you may
both believe and regret that you have eaten all the coffee ice cream.
The phrase ‘that you have eaten all the coffee ice cream’ denotes a
proposition. There can also be multiple sentences that express the same
proposition; for instance, ‘It is raining’ and ‘Il pleut’ (the French transla-
tion of ‘It is raining’) both express the proposition that it is raining.2 If
propositions exist, then there are infinitely many of them. There are,
for instance, the propositions that 2 is greater than 1, that 3 is greater
than 1, that 4 is greater than 1, and so on.
Then there are universals. A ‘universal’ is something that multiple
things could have in common, in the sense of something that could be
predicated of them. For instance, in my refrigerator I have a tomato and
a chili pepper. Both are red; in other words, redness is one of the things
they have in common. So redness is a universal. Note, incidentally, that
redness would be a universal even if there were fewer than two red things
in the universe: redness is a universal because it is the sort of thing that
multiple things could have in common, even if in fact multiple things
don’t have this in common. (I don’t know why philosophers call these
things ‘universals’. The name ‘universal’ makes it sound as though they
are shared by everything, but in fact all that is required is that they are
capable of being shared by more than one thing.)

2
This may need to be relativized to a conversational context – that is, ‘it is
raining’ expresses the proposition that it is raining at the time and place made
salient by the context of the utterance. That it rains at some other place or time
would be a distinct proposition.
6 Approaching Infinity

How many universals are there? Infinitely many. Every color is a

universal – not just the familiar colors such as red, green, and blue, but
every shade of color, however specific, including the shades for which
English lacks a name. Each of these colors is something that multiple
things could have in common. Similarly, every shape is a universal – not
just the familiar shapes such as round, square, and triangular, but every
irregular shape, including the ones that have no names in English, and
including those shapes such that no physical object is actually shaped
that way. Each of these shapes is something that multiple objects could
have in common. Similarly, every possible size is a universal; every type
of emotional state is a universal (for example, being happy, being afraid,
being angry); and so on.
Finally, many philosophers have held that there is one particularly
interesting entity that is infinite, namely, God. God has been thought to
be infinite in a variety of respects – to have unlimited power, unlimited
knowledge, to be present everywhere at all times, and so on. According
to Descartes, the word ‘infinite’ strictly applies ‘only to that in which
no limits of any kind can be found; and in this sense God alone is
infinite.’3

1.4 The infinite in the physical world

Physical space – the space that we occupy and move around in – is infi-
nite in two ways. First, space is infinitely extended (it extends infinitely far
in all directions). Imagine traveling away from the Earth. No matter how
far away you went, it would always be possible to go farther. You would
never, so to speak, come to the edge of space, like some giant wall. And
the real point here is not about our traveling capabilities; the point of
interest is that there are places arbitrarily far from here. That is, for any
distance, d, there are places farther from here than d (even if there are no
physical objects in those places).
Second, space is infinitely divisible. If you have a line segment, for
example, you can divide the segment into a left half and a right half.
Then the left half can itself be divided into a left half (the leftmost
quarter of the original segment) and a right half. Then that left half
(the leftmost eighth of the original segment) can be divided into a left
half and a right half. And so on. Again, the point here is not one about
human dividing capabilities; the real point is that for any two points,
there are other points in between them, which entails that there are

3
Descartes 1984, 81. Compare Aquinas 1981, I.Q7.
 The Prevalence of the Infinite 7

infinitely many points, and infinitely many line segments, within any
given line segment.
The same observations apply to time. Time appears to extend infi-
nitely in both directions. No matter how far into the past one looks,
there were moments earlier than that. No matter how far into the future
one looks, there will be moments after that. There may one day come an
end of humanity, or an end of the Earth, or even an end of our material
universe, but there is not going to come an end of time.
Like space, time is infinitely divisible. Take a one-minute interval of
time. It can be divided into the first half and the last half. Then the first
half can itself be divided into a first half (the first 15 seconds of the orig-
inal interval) and a second half. Then that first half can be divided into
a first half (the first 7.5 seconds of the original interval) and a second
half. And so on. Every time interval contains infinitely many smaller
intervals, and infinitely many instants.

1.5 The infinite in modern physics

In modern physics, some infinite quantities have been theorized but

remain controversial. A black hole, as described by the general theory of
relativity, is a region of infinite density (a positive amount of mass-en-
ergy is concentrated in zero volume) and infinite spacetime curvature.
The same is true of the Big Bang singularity in which the universe is
thought to have originated. However, the appearance of these infinities
is generally regarded as signaling a breakdown of the theory (general
relativity) under these conditions. To accurately describe a black hole
or the conditions at the beginning of the universe, one would have to
take account of quantum mechanics, and there is as yet no accepted
quantum mechanical account of gravitation.4 Scientists working on
quantum gravity are seeking ways to eliminate the infinities from the
theory.

1.6 Controversies

Some (perhaps all) of the above examples are controversial. Some people
would deny that all of these are genuine examples of existing infinities,
either because they deny that the things I am discussing really exist, or
because they think the things I am discussing are finite. For instance,
some would deny that there are infinitely many sets, because they deny

4
Wald 1984, 211–12; Hamade 1996.
8 Approaching Infinity

that sets exist at all. Some would deny that the past is infinite, because
they think there was a beginning of time. I address some of these contro-
versies later, when I consider certain philosophical theories that have
led people to deny the existence of actual infinities. For now, I hope
simply to have made a prima facie case that infinity is an important
aspect of reality, worthy of investigation. If you accept at least some of
my examples, this should suffice.
2
Six Infinite Regresses

It is commonly thought that there are some kinds of infinite series that
one should avoid in one’s philosophical theories – infinite series such
that, if a theory requires one of them, then the theory should therefore
be rejected. These are referred to as ‘vicious infinite regresses’. On the
other hand, it is also commonly thought that not all infinite series need
be avoided; sometimes a theory entails the existence of an infinite series,
but the theory should not therefore be rejected. These are referred to as
‘virtuous’ or (less misleadingly) ‘benign infinite regresses’.
Infinite regress arguments are common in philosophy. These are
arguments that claim that a certain philosophical doctrine should be
rejected because the doctrine leads to a vicious infinite regress, or that
a certain philosophical doctrine should be accepted in order to avoid a
vicious regress.
What makes an infinite regress virtuous or vicious? This remains a
matter of controversy, and one purpose of this book is to work toward a
satisfying answer to this question. But we will be in a better position to
address the question after we have looked at some examples of infinite
regresses, as well as a variety of problems involving the infinite. In the
present chapter, I confine myself to listing several infinite regresses that
appear in philosophy, with the aim of evincing the need for an account
of virtue and vice among the infinite.

2.1 The regress of causes

Perhaps the most famous infinite regress argument is the First Cause
Argument for the existence of God (also known as the Cosmological
Argument). We find in the world many events that are linked by

9
10 Approaching Infinity

relations of cause and effect. Suppose some present event, A, was caused
by B. Then we can ask what caused B. If B was caused by C, then we can
ask what caused C. If C was caused by D, then we can ask what caused
D. And so on.
But, the argument goes, there cannot be an infinite regress of causes. If
there were, this would mean that an infinite series had to be completed
in order for event A to occur; but an infinite series cannot be completed
(compare the absurd idea of counting to infinity); therefore, event A
would not have been possible. To avoid the infinite regress, we must
postulate a ‘first cause’, something that started the chain of causation
and was not itself caused by anything.1
How one gets from the idea of a first cause to the idea of God is less
clear. As far as the above reasoning goes, the first cause need not be
unique, that is, there might be more than one uncaused cause; it need
not be a conscious being, let alone an all-knowing, all-powerful, morally
good being; and it need not even exist in the present (the first cause or
causes might have existed only in the distant past). Nevertheless, the
theist would wish to argue that God is the most plausible candidate for
a first cause.
Our concern here, however, is whether the argument for a first cause
succeeds, not whether the first cause is God or something else. Even
before God is introduced, the first cause argument is controversial.
While some philosophers find the idea of an infinite series of causes
stretching back infinitely into the past paradoxical, others find the idea
unproblematic.2 This is to say that there is no general agreement on
whether the infinite regress of causes is vicious or benign.

2.2 The regress of reasons

Suppose you believe some proposition, A, and assume that this is a

rationally justified belief. We can then ask what reason you have to
believe A. Now suppose that your reason for believing A is B. It seems
that, for B to justify A, you must also be justified in believing B. So
we can ask why you believe B. Now suppose your reason for believing
B is C. Again, it seems that C must also be justifiably believed, so we
can ask for your reason for believing C. But this process cannot go on
forever; you cannot actually have an infinite series of reasons for belief.
Therefore, there must be a point at which you have a justified belief, but

1
Aquinas 1981, I.Q2.A3; Kant 1965, B454; Craig 1991.
2
Russell 1961, 587.
 Six Infinite Regresses 11

that belief is not based on any reasons. This is referred to as a ‘founda-

tional’ belief, and the people who believe that there are foundational
beliefs are referred to as ‘foundationalists’.
The preceding paragraph summarizes the leading argument for foun-
dationalism. It is due in part to that argument that foundationalism has
been the dominant position in the history of philosophy. Another way
of stating the basic idea is this: we must posit foundational beliefs in
order to avoid a vicious regress of reasons.3
Recently, however, some philosophers have questioned whether the
regress of reasons is really vicious. This position is known as ‘infinitism’.4
Infinitists agree that there are justified beliefs, they agree that circular
reasoning must be avoided, but they disagree that any beliefs are founda-
tional; instead, they hold that the infinite regress of reasons is a virtuous
regress. Traditionally, foundationalists argue that the regress of reasons
is vicious because no human being could complete an infinitely long
chain of reasoning. In response, infinitists maintain that justified belief
only requires that the believer be capable of providing a reason for a
given belief, if and when the belief is challenged; it does not require that
the believer have actually provided a reason for every belief. Thus, there
is no requirement of completing an infinitely long chain of reasoning.
In addition, infinitists maintain that, while it may be impossible for an
individual to have infinitely many beliefs occurring in their conscious-
ness at one time, it is possible for a person to have infinitely many dispo-
sitional beliefs; these are beliefs that one counts as holding by virtue of
one’s dispositions, rather than what one is thinking at the moment.

2.3 The regress of forms

Plato’s best known idea was his theory of universals, the Theory of the
Forms.5 This theory held that there is a realm of non-physical, abstract
objects, the ‘Forms’. There are Forms for every property – or at least every
important property6 – that objects might have in common. Thus, there
are Forms of Roundness, Largeness, Humanness, Beauty, Goodness, and
so on. Furthermore, Plato appears to have held that the Form of F (where

3
Aristotle 1941, Posterior Analytics I.2; Huemer 2010.
4
Infinitism was pioneered by my old grad school advisor, Peter Klein (1999;
2003). See also Turri and Klein 2014.
5
See the Meno (Plato 2012) and The Republic (Plato 1974), 514a–518d. For
Plato’s trenchant criticisms of his own theory, see the Parmenides in Plato 1931.
6
See the Parmenides (Plato 1931) at 130c–d, where Socrates denies the existence
of Forms for such things as hair, mud, and filth.
12 Approaching Infinity

F is some property) is a perfect example of F. For instance, the Form of

Roundness is a perfect circle, existing in some non-physical realm. All
circles in the physical, observable world are but imperfect approxima-
tions to the Form of Roundness.
There is a famous argument (at least it is famous among philoso-
phers – which really doesn’t make it famous at all) against the Theory
of Forms, known as the Third Man Argument.7 Suppose there are two
men, say Homer and Carl. According to Plato, to explain what Homer
and Carl have in common, we have to posit the Form of Man. This
Form of Man is a perfect man, just as the Form of Roundness is a perfect
circle. (This is already quite bizarre.) The Form of Man will therefore
have something in common with Homer and Carl – it, too, is a man.
Therefore, to explain what the Form of Man has in common with the
ordinary, physical men, we will have to posit another Form. This second
Form will also presumably be a perfect example of manhood, so it will
have something in common with Homer, Carl, and the first Form of
Man. Thus begins an infinite regress.
Unlike the previous two cases, the viciousness of this regress is not
very controversial – no one has tried to defend the idea that there really
is this infinite series of Forms of Man. Contemporary thinkers avoid the
regress by denying that the property of being F is itself an instance of
F. For example, even if there is a universal of Manhood, that universal
is not itself a man; hence, there is no occasion to introduce a second
universal of Manhood.8

2.4 The regress of resemblances

In contrast to Plato, many philosophers have held that universals do

not exist, or that there are no abstract objects; there are only concrete,
particular things.9 This sort of view is called ‘nominalism’.
Nominalists then owe us an explanation for why it seems as though
there are universals. For example, there might be three blue things – say,
the sky, a blueberry, and a blue parrot. It seems as though there is some-
thing they have in common – or as we might say, there is a respect in
which the three objects are the same – namely, their blueness. Blueness

7
See Plato 1931, Parmenides 132a–b, where the argument is given using the
Form of the Large. Aristotle (1941) appears to have changed the example to the
Form of Man (Metaphysics 990b17, 1039a2; Sophistical Refutations 178b36ff.).
8
Armstrong 1978, 71.
9
Hume 1992, 17–25; Ockham 1994.
 Six Infinite Regresses 13

is not a particular, concrete thing; it is a universal. So it seems that there

is at least one universal.
Here is one way in which nominalists have responded; the following
view is known as ‘resemblance nominalism’: there are three distinct
bluenesses, (A) the blueness of the sky, (B) the blueness of the berry,
and (C) the blueness of the parrot. Each of these is a property confined
to a specific object at a certain place and time; none of them is repeat-
able. Furthermore, the three bluenesses do not themselves literally have
anything in common; they are not the same in any respect. Rather, they
are merely similar, that is they resemble each other to some degree, and
this is why we apply the word ‘blue’ to all of them.10 Resemblance itself
is taken as a basic, unanalyzed notion. (Obviously, the nominalist could
not explain the ‘resemblance’ between two objects in terms of their
sharing some number of properties; this would undermine their aim of
avoiding the need to posit universals.)
David Armstrong has presented a variety of infinite regress argu-
ments against a variety of nominalist theories. One of these arguments,
directed against resemblance nominalism, begins by pointing out that
resemblance itself seems to be a universal. The blueness of the sky resem-
bles that of the berry, which resembles that of the parrot, which resem-
bles that of the sky. So there are at least three examples of resemblance.
Since resemblance can thus be ascribed to more than one pair, resem-
blance is a universal. So it would seem that, just as the nominalist owed
us an explanation for the fact that three objects may all be blue, the
nominalist will also owe us an explanation for the fact that three pairs
may all resemble.
Now, if the nominalist tries to explain resemblance in the same way
that she explained blueness, she will have to say: it’s not that the three
cases of resemblance have something in common; there isn’t anything
that is the same in the three cases. Rather, the three instances of resem-
blance merely resemble each other. So now we have a new level of resem-
blance, with three more resemblances: the resemblance between (the
resemblance between A and B) and (the resemblance between B and
C), the resemblance between (the resemblance between B and C) and
(the resemblance between A and C), and the resemblance between (the
resemblance between A and B) and (the resemblance between A and C).
But these three resemblances, so the nominalist must maintain, do not
literally have anything in common either. Rather, they merely resemble
each other. And so we are off on an infinite regress. Letting ‘A’ stand for

10
Price 1953; Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002.
14 Approaching Infinity

the blueness of the sky, ‘B’ for the blueness of the blueberry, and ‘C’ for
the blueness of the parrot, and letting ‘R(x,y)’ stand for the resemblance
between x and y, we have the following series (I list just the first four of
the infinitely many stages):

Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3

A R(A,B) R[R(A,B), R(B,C)]
B R(B,C) R[R(B,C), R(A,C)]
C R(A,C) R[R(A,B), R(A,C)]
Stage 4 ...
R{R[R(A,B), R(B,C)], R[R(B,C), R(A,C)]}
R{R[R(B,C), R(A,C)], R[R(A,B), R(A,C)]} ...
R{R[R(A,B), R(B,C)], R[R(A,B), R(A,C)]}

All of these increasingly complex resemblances must exist. Armstrong

initially said that this regress was vicious, so that we must reject resem-
blance nominalism.11 Later, however, he decided, along with the
defenders of resemblance nominalism, that the regress is benign.12

2.5 The regress of temporal series

J. M. E. McTaggart presented a famous argument for ‘the unreality of

time’.13 Events in time may have the properties of being past, present,
or future, where these properties are understood to be mutually exclu-
sive. Now consider some particular event, e. Before e occurs, a person
can truthfully say, ‘e is in the future.’ While it is occurring, a person
can truthfully say, ‘e is in the present.’ And after it occurs, a person can
truthfully say, ‘e is in the past.’ Therefore, e must possess all three proper-
ties, past, present, and future. But this is contradictory, since as we have
said, the attributes of pastness, presentness, and futurity are mutually
exclusive. To resolve the paradox, McTaggart urges, we must deny that
anything exists in time.
Instead of rejecting the reality of time, we might try to resolve the
paradox by saying that there is no contradiction since e does not
have the properties of pastness, presentness, and futurity at the same
time. For example, suppose e is the event of my writing this chapter.

11
Armstrong 1978, 54–6.
12
Armstrong 1989, 54–7; Price 1953, 23–6.
13
McTaggart 1908.
 Six Infinite Regresses 15

e is in the present at the present; however, in the past, e was in the

future; and in the future, e will be in the past. Of course, nothing can
have incompatible properties simultaneously; however, there is no
contradiction in a thing’s having incompatible properties at different
times.
McTaggart says that this response involves introducing a second
temporal series. The original temporal series involved ordinary events,
which are ordered as past, present, and future. The second temporal
series involves the pastness, presentness, and futurity of events, which
themselves may be past, present, or future. But then McTaggart’s objec-
tion can be raised anew for this second time series: the presentness of e
itself has the properties of being past, present, and future. Again, these
are incompatible properties, so this is a contradiction.
We might try to resolve this second contradiction by claiming that –
just as e itself has the properties of being past, present, and future at
different times – so the presentness of e has the properties of being past,
present, and future at different times. (For example, the presentness of
e is present in the present, it was future in the past, and it will be past
in the future.) But now we are embarked on an infinite regress. To avoid
the regress, says McTaggart, we must deny the reality of time. Other
philosophers, however, embrace the infinite regress as benign – there
just are all of these temporal facts. For example, e is present, and the
presentness of e is present, and the presentness of the presentness of e is
present, and so on.14

2.6 The regress of truths

Our final infinite regress is the truth regress. The truth regress results
from the observation that, for any proposition, P, P entails that it is true
that P. The proposition that it is true that P then entails that it is true
that it is true that P. And so on. Thus, if there is any true proposition, P,
then there will be the following infinite series of truths:

P
It is true that P.
It is true that it is true that P.
⁝

14
Smith 1986.
16 Approaching Infinity

This is the least controversial of the infinite regresses – it is generally

agreed to be benign.15 No one thinks that we need to avoid this infinite
series by denying that P entails that it is true that P; instead, the standard
response is simply to accept that all these truths exist.

2.7 Conclusion

What can we conclude from the preceding six examples of infinite

regresses? Perhaps just this: philosophers are in need of an account
of when an infinite regress is vicious. There is at present no generally
accepted account of this, though we shall see some candidate accounts
later. In fact, it seems likely that most philosophers, even those who
employ infinite regress arguments, do not have any account – not even
a controversial one – of what makes a regress vicious. This may help
to explain why infinite regress arguments in philosophy often produce
stalemates in which one side claims that the regress is vicious while
the other insists that it is virtuous. These regress arguments concern
some of the most fundamental and important issues in all of human
inquiry, including the beginning (if any) of the universe and the struc-
ture of knowledge. A successful account of virtue and vice among the
infinite would therefore be of great interest. In developing such an
account (much later in this book), we should bear in mind the few rela-
tively uncontroversial data points encountered in this chapter: the truth
regress is benign; the regress of Forms is probably vicious; and in the
regress of reasons for belief, an infinite regress of actual, consciously occur-
ring reasons would be vicious.

15
See, for example, Armstrong 1989, 54; Hochberg 1999, 196; Nolan 2001,
523–4.
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News, Inc. 1 reel. © 31Jan47; M1710. Hearst Metrotone News, a
division of The Hearst Corporation (PWH); 11Feb74; R570438.

R570569.
Night in paradise. By Universal Pictures Company, Inc. 10 reels. ©
11Apr46; L288. Leo A. Gutman, Inc. (PWH); 15Feb74; R570569.

R570570.
Paramount news. No. 47. By Paramount Pictures, Inc. 1 reel. ©
8Feb47; M1734. Major News Library (PWH); 15Feb74; R570570.

R570571.
Paramount news. No. 48. By Paramount Pictures, Inc. 1 reel. ©
12Feb47; M1735. Major News Library (PWH); 15Feb74; R570571.

R570573.
Paramount news. No. 46. By Paramount Pictures, Inc. 1 reel. ©
5Feb47; M1727. Major News Library (PWH); 11Feb74; R570573.

R570574.
Bedelia. By Eagle Lion Films, Inc. 85 min. © 15Feb47; L829.
Raymond Rohauer (PWH); 20Feb74; R570574.

R570576.
 Paramount news. No. 49. By Paramount Pictures. Inc. 1 reel. ©
15Feb47; M1784. Major News Library (PWH); 20Feb74; R570576.

R570577.
Paramount news. No. 50. By Paramount Pictures. Inc. 1 reel. ©
19Feb47; M1785. Major News Library (PWH); 20Feb74; R570577.

R570603.
Cat fishin’. By Loew’s, Inc. 1 reel. © 12Feb47; L831. Metro
Goldwyn Mayer, Inc. (PWH); 15Feb74; R570603.

R570604.
It happened in Brooklyn. By Loew’s, Inc. 11 reels. © 12Feb47;
L848. Metro Goldwyn Mayer, Inc. (PWH); 15Feb74; R570604.

R570608.
Mighty Mouse in My old Kentucky home. By Terrytoons, Inc. 1
reel. © 29Mar46; L439. Viacom International, Inc. (PWH); 15Feb74;
R570608.

R570609.
Mighty Mouse in The Wicked wolf. By Terrytoons, Inc. 1 reel. ©
8Mar46; L532. Viacom International, Inc. (PWH); 15Feb74;
R570609.

R570610.
Gandy Goose in It’s all in the stars. By Terrytoons, Inc. 1 reel. ©
12Apr46; L634. Viacom International, Inc. (PWH); 15Feb74;
R570610.

R570686.
 Clown of the jungle. 1 reel. © 31Dec46; L1131. Walt Disney
Productions (PWH); 4Feb74; R570686.

R571260.
Wanted for murder. 10 reels. © 1Nov46; L727. Twentieth Century
Fox Film Corporation (PWH); 10Jan74; R571260.

R571439.
Undercover Maisie. By Loew’s, Inc. 9 reels. © 20Feb47; L863.
Metro Goldwyn Mayer, Inc. (PWH); 25Feb74; R571439.

R571689.
The Man I love. By Warner Brothers Pictures, Inc. 10 reels. ©
11Jan47; L776. United Artists Television, Inc. (PWH); 27Feb74;
R571689.

R571690.
Humoresque. By Warner Brothers Pictures, Inc. 10 reels. ©
25Jan47; L793. United Artists Television, Inc. (PWH); 27Feb74;
R571690.

R571691.
The Beast with five fingers. By Warner Brothers Pictures, Inc. 10
reels. © 8Feb47; L819. United Artists Television, Inc. (PWH);
27Feb74; R571691.

R571692.
Nora Prentiss. By Warner Brothers Pictures, Inc. 11 reels. ©
22Feb47; L845. United Artists Television, Inc. (PWH); 27Feb74;
R571692.

R571693.
 One meat brawl. By The Vitaphone Corporation. 1 reel. © 9Jan47;
M1548. United Artists Television, Inc. (PWH); 27Feb74; R571693.

R571694.
Let’s go swimming. By Vitaphone Corporation. 1 reel. © 25Jan47;
M1617. United Artists Television, Inc. (PWH); 27Feb74; R571694.

R571695.
Melody of youth. By Vitaphone Corporation. 1 reel. © 27Jan47;
M1732. United Artists Television, Inc. (PWH); 27Feb74; R571695.

R571696.
Circus horse. By Vitaphone Corporation. 1 reel. © 21Jan47;
M2201. United Artists Television, Inc. (PWH); 27Feb74; R571696.

R572004.
13 Rue Madeleine. 10 reels. © 15Jan47; L942. Twentieth Century
Fox Film Corporation (PWH); 1Mar74; R572004.

R572005.
Monkey tone news. 1 reel. © 17Jan47; L944. Twentieth Century
Fox Film Corporation (PWH); 1Mar74; R572005.

R572006.
Fantasy of Siam. 1 reel. © 3Jan47; M1642. Twentieth Century Fox
Film Corporation (PWH); 1Mar74; R572006.

R572007.
Michigan Kid. By Universal Pictures Company, Inc. 8 reels. ©
18Feb47; L877. Universal Pictures (PWH); 1Mar74; R572007.
R572008.
Song of Scheherazade. By Universal Pictures Company, Inc. 12
reels. © 18Feb47; L878. Universal Pictures (PWH); 1Mar74;
R572008.

R572009.
I’ll be yours. By Universal Pictures Company, Inc. 93 min. ©
18Feb47; L879. Universal Pictures (PWH); 1Mar74; R572009.

R572010.
Universal newsreel. Vol. 20, no. 9. By Universal Pictures Company,
Inc. 1 reel. © 4Feb47; M1800. Universal Pictures (PWH); 1Mar74;
R572010.

R572011.
Universal newsreel. Vol. 20, no. 10. By Universal Pictures
Company, Inc. 1 reel. © 6Feb47; M1801. Universal Pictures (PWH);
1Mar74; R572011.

R572012.
Universal newsreel. Vol. 20, no. 11. By Universal Pictures
Company, Inc. 1 reel. © 11Feb47; M1804. Universal Pictures (PWH);
1Mar74; R572012.

R572013.
Universal newsreel. Vol. 20, no. 12. By Universal Pictures
Company, Inc. 1 reel. © 13Feb47; M1805. Universal Pictures (PWH);
1Mar74; R572013.

R572014.
Universal newsreel. Vol. 20, no. 13. By Universal Pictures
Company, Inc. 1 reel. © 18Feb47; M1806. Universal Pictures (PWH);
1Mar74; R572014.

R572015.
Universal newsreel. Vol. 20, no. 14. By Universal Pictures
Company, Inc. 1 reel. © 20Feb47; M1807. Universal Pictures (PWH);
1Mar74; R572015.

R572016.
Pelican pranks. By Universal Pictures Company, Inc. 1 reel. ©
18Feb47; M1884. Universal Pictures (PWH); 1Mar74; R572016.

R572017.
Rhumba holiday. By Universal Pictures Company, Inc. 1 reel. ©
18Feb47; M1885. Universal Pictures (PWH); 1Mar74; R572017.

R572018.
Wild West chimp. By Universal Pictures Company, Inc. 1 reel. ©
18Feb47; M1886. Universal Pictures (PWH); 1Mar74; R572018.

R572019.
Universal newsreel. Vol. 20, no. 15. By Universal Pictures
Company, Inc. 1 reel. © 25Feb47; M1904. Universal Pictures (PWH);
1Mar74; R572019.

R572020.
Universal newsreel. Vol. 20, no. 16. By Universal Pictures
Company, Inc. 1 reel. © 27Feb47; M1905. Universal Pictures (PWH);
1Mar74; R572020.

R572096.
 Neighbor pests. By Loew’s, Inc. 1 reel. © 26Feb47; L931. Metro
Goldwyn Mayer, Inc. (PWH); 1Mar74; R572096.

R572097.
Calling on Costa Rica. By Loew’s, Inc. 1 reel. © 26Feb47; M1795.
Metro Goldwyn Mayer, Inc. (PWH); 1Mar74; R572097.

B572099.
Gandy Goose in Peace time football. By Terrytoons, Inc. 1 reel. ©
19Jul46; L612. Viacom International, Inc. (PWH); 14Mar74;
R572099.

R572100.
Mighty Mouse in The Jail break. By Terrytoons, Inc. 1 reel. ©
20Sep46: L613. Viacom International, Inc. (PWH); 14Mar74;
R572100.

R572101.
Gandy Goose in The Golden hen. By Terrytoons, Inc. 1 reel. ©
24May46; L614. Viacom International, Inc. (PWH); 14Mar74;
R572101.

R572102.
Mighty Mouse in The Johnstown Flood. By Terrytoons, Inc. 1 reel.
© 28Jun46; L615. Viacom International, Inc. (PWH); 14Mar74;
R572102.

R572103.
Mighty Mouse in The Trojan horse. By Terrytoons, Inc. 1 reel. ©
26Jul46; L616. Viacom International, Inc. (PWH); 14Mar74;
R572103.
R572104.
The Tortoise wins again. By Terrytoons, Inc. 1 reel. © 30Aug46:
L617. Viacom International, Inc. (PWH); 14Mar74; R572104.

R572105.
Mighty Mouse in The Electronic mouse trap. By Terrytoons, Inc. 1
reel. © 6Sep46; L618. Viacom International, Inc. (PWH); 14Mar74;
R572105.

R572106.
Mighty Mouse in Winning the West. By Terrytoons, Inc. 1 reel. ©
16Aug46; L635. Viacom International, Inc. (PWH); 14Mar74;
R572106.

R572107.
Dinky finds a home. By Terrytoons, Inc. 1 reel. © 7Jun46; L637.
Viacom International, Inc. (PWH); 14Mar74; R572107.

R572108.
Mighty Mouse in Throwing the bull. By Terrytoons, Inc. 1 reel. ©
3May46: L752. Viacom International, Inc. (PWH); 14Mar74;
R572108.

R572109.
The Housing problem. By Terrytoons, Inc. 1 reel. © 25Oct46;
L772. Viacom International, Inc. (PWH); 14Mar74; R572109.

R572110.
The Snow man. By Terrytoons, Inc. 1 reel. © 11Oct46; L773.
Viacom International, Inc. (PWH); 14Mar74; R572110.
R572111.
Mighty Mouse in The Crackpot king. By Terrytoons, Inc. 1 reel. ©
15Nov46; L814. Viacom International, Inc. (PWH); 14Mar74;
R572111.

R572112.
Heckle and Jeckle the Talking Magpies in The Uninvited pests. By
Terrytoons, Inc. 1 reel. © 29Nov46; L815. Viacom International, Inc.
(PWH); 14Mar74; R572112.

R572113.
Mighty Mouse and the hep cat. By Terrytoons, Inc. 1 reel. ©
6Dec46; L884. Viacom International, Inc. (PWH); 14Mar74;
R572113.

R572114.
Beanstalk Jack. By Terrytoons, Inc. 1 reel. © 20Dec46; L885.
Viacom International, Inc. (PWH); 14Mar74; R572114.

R572115.
Mighty Mouse in Crying “wolf.” By Terrytoons, Inc. 1 reel. ©
10Jan47; L941. Viacom International, Inc. (PWH); 14Mar74;
R572115.

R572286.
Paramount news. No. 52. By Paramount Pictures, Inc. 1 reel. ©
26Feb47; M1812. Major News Library (PWH); 5Mar74; R572286.

R572287.
Paramount news. No. 53. By Paramount Pictures, Inc. 1 reel. ©
1Mar47; M1823. Major News Library (PWH); 5Mar74; R572287.
R572325.
Mister District Attorney. By Columbia Pictures Corporation. 9
reels. © 19Feb47; L835. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. (PWH);
15Mar74; R572325.

R572326.
Johnny O’Clock. By Columbia Pictures Corporation. 10 reels. ©
20Feb47; L836. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. (PWH); 15Mar74;
R572326.

R572327.
Cigarette girl. By Columbia Pictures Corporation. 7 reels. ©
13Feb47; L852. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. (PWH); 15Mar74;
R572327.

R572328.
Dead reckoning. By Columbia Pictures Corporation. 11 reels. ©
15Feb47; L853. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. (PWH); 15Mar74;
R572328.

R572329.
Mystery of the cosmic ray. By Columbia Pictures Corporation. 3
reels. (Jack Armstrong, chap. 1) © 6Feb47; L854. Columbia Pictures
Industries, Inc. (PWH); 15Mar74; R572329.

R572330.
Blind spot. By Columbia Pictures Corporation. 7 reels. © 6Feb47;
L855. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. (PWH); 15Mar74; R572330.

R572331.
The Far world. By Columbia Pictures Corporation. 2 reels. (Jack
Armstrong, chap. no. 2) © 13Feb47; L861. Columbia Pictures