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ANTHONY AMATRUDO
Criminal Actions
and Social Situations
and Intentionality
Criminal Actions and Social Situations
Anthony Amatrudo
Criminal Actions and

Social Situations
and Intentionality
Anthony Amatrudo
Law School
Middlesex University
London, UK
ISBN 978-1-137-45730-1 ISBN 978-1-137-45731-8 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-45731-8
Library of Congress Control Number: 2017961835
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018

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with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
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The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication
does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant
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The registered company is Macmillan Publishers Ltd.
The registered company address is: The Campus, 4 Crinan Street, London, N1 9XW, United Kingdom
“Innocence is like a dumb leper who has lost his bell, wandering the
world, meaning no harm.”
Greene, G. (1973) The Quiet American.
Heinemann & Bodley Head: London.
Acknowledgements
My thanks are due to St Edmund’s College, Cambridge and the Institute

of Criminology in Cambridge who have both supported my work for
many years. Sir Anthony Bottoms FBA, I must thank, for the usefully
open-ended questions he proffered at a paper I gave at the Institute of
Criminology in late 2016 and which have certainly informed the text in
this book. I am grateful to the Max-Planck Institute for Foreign and
International Criminal Law in Freiburg and the Max-Planck Institute for
European Legal History in Frankfurt am Main who have for several years
supported my research with various visiting fellowships and opened their
amazing resources to me. The friendly scholarly community at both the
Frankfurt Planck and the Freiburg Planck have been great supports. I am
also grateful for the assistance extended to me by the University of Basel
where I spent many useful hours in its state of the art library. My pub-
lisher, Palgrave Macmillan, has been very professional and supportive
throughout this project. My personal thanks for friendship and inspira-
tion go to: Hans-Jorg Albrecht; Blackheath Rugby Club; Leslie Blake;
Jake and Dinos Chapman; John Charvet; Antje du Bois Pedain; Robert
Fine; the denizens of the Groucho Club; Volker Grundies; Felicia
Herrschaft; Andreas von Hirsch; Jennifer Kessler; Ronnie Lippens; Sarah
Lucas; Steven Lukes FBA; David Polizzi; Marc Quinn; Robert Reiner;
Magnus Ryan; George Steiner FBA and Colin Sumner. The words of the
vii
viii Acknowledgements
late Brian Barry FBA, who I had the enormous privilege of working with
as a research student at the LSE I recall daily; only now realising their true
wisdom.
Thanks also to the Onati Socio-Legal Series for permission to make use
of an earlier version of an article for this book: Amatrudo, A. (2016)
“Applying Analytical Reasoning to Clarify Intention and Responsibility
in Joint Enterprise Cases.” The Politics and Jurisprudence of Group
Offending: Onati Socio-Legal Series (2016) 6 (4) pp. 920–936.
Max-Planck Institute for European Legal History Anthony Amatrudo

Hansaallee, Frankfurt, Germany
8th August 2017
Contents
Section 1 Technical and Analytical Considerations 1
1 The Central Problem of Collective Action 3
2 Collective Actions and Goals 33
Section 2 Legal Considerations 61
3 Mobs, Masses and Treating People as Groups 63
4 Organisations and Their Enterprise in UK Criminal Law

and in International Law 89
Section 3 Reality and Sociology 117
5 Real-Life Cases: War Criminal Prosecutions and the

Treatment of Membership of Illegal Organisations 119
ix
x Contents
6 The Gang in Criminological Literature 145
7 Drawing the Strands Together 171
Bibliography 181
Index 193
Section 1
Technical and Analytical
Considerations
1
The Central Problem of Collective Action
The basic issue this book seeks to address is the knotty problem of what
exactly collective action is. In this regard it is more ambitious and more
broadly focused than is typical for a work focused upon Criminology.
The job of this chapter is to move the existing criminological settlement
around gangs, and joint enterprise, towards a more technical concentra-
tion upon the nature of individual action and its relationship with joint
action. In doing this I largely follow the line I originally set out in my
earlier article (Amatrudo 2016). My view is that it is a more straightfor-
ward task to seek to apportion criminal responsibility technically than to
use the current, overly simplified and culturally reductive, accounts. This
more technical approach makes the allocation of culpability surer. The
argument will be that the law ought to be focused upon the wilful actions
of individuals acting either alone or in a group. Individuals commit
crimes, though they often do so with others. Culpability can only reside
with individuals and their individual actions and with groups that are
comprised of individuals. Culpability is only incidentally a structural
matter. Whilst robbers, street gang members, war criminals, drug dealers
and the like may form a group, what really matters are the individual
actions of actors even where there is agreement about the intentional
© The Author(s) 2018 3

A. Amatrudo, Criminal Actions and Social Situations,
https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-45731-8_1
4 A. Amatrudo
status of the group. The individual who stabs with a knife is always more
culpable than the person who looked on. Furthermore, serious consider-
ation needs to be afforded to goal setting, intentionality and deliberation
when considering the criminal action of criminal actors; more so than the
role of culture. When such technical matters are marginalised, the legiti-
macy of the outcome becomes inadequate, as is seen in the rise of joint
enterprise prosecutions since the 1980s in the UK (Williams and Clarke
2016). Our aim will be to better understand the actions, deliberations
and goals of individuals, and of groups, simply because these individuals
are held responsible for their actions. Accordingly, we must deconstruct
the blasé arguments often advanced concerning joint criminal activity in
order to weigh more carefully the elements that make it up. We can all
agree that it is certainly possible for individuals to act with a common
purpose: whilst also understanding that such a claim is a very compli-
cated, and multi-faceted, determination to make.
On the matter of culpability we must allow that one of most impor-
tant elements in collective action is the understanding that individuals,
themselves, may self-impose certain constraints upon their deliberation
in the form of goals and intentions. Collective action is simply what we
call the outcome of what happens when all the members of a given group
accept the same constraints put on their personal deliberations in order
that they might bring about collectively acceptable outcomes or an array
of collectively acceptable outcomes. We note that such an understanding
is effectively individualistic since it holds that each member of the group
makes their own personal deliberation. The only real difference between
the deliberation of personal goals and collective ones is in terms of the
sorts of goals that are set. The point here is that collective goals always rest
upon the role of individual moral agency. Consequently, we should stress
the role of individuals: rather than marginalise them in stressing collec-
tive agency. The personal responsibility of actors cannot be subsumed
into merely an aspect of a broader ontological affiliation.
Any account of collective action has to do several things. It first has to
explain how collective actions are themselves related to collective goals
whilst noting that the collective is always comprised of individual actors
and that is a tricky determination. Laws need to understand that the
criminal responsibility of groups always comprises a degree of individual
The Central Problem of Collective Action 5
responsibility. It has been argued that: “There is no need to speak of

degrees of responsibility. All that is required is the minimum voluntari-
ness: that the person could have done otherwise” (Amatrudo 2010).
Moreover, the responsibility of individuals, for their actions, cannot be
waived or reduced to some minor aspect of some prior association with a
group of other individuals. A useful way of understanding group mem-
bership is in terms of its connection to collective action. What is more we
should note that groups can, and do, participate in collective actions that
are wholly irrational and undertake activities that are immoral for the
group and the individuals who make it up. We see this clearly in a lot of
criminal activity, such as drug usage. It is an aspect of our world and of
our nature. The drug gang deals drugs and though that is socially undesir-
able it is just another case of collective action. It is useful for criminolo-
gists to understand criminal activity as just a different sort of behaviour,
or if you like action. There is no need to be censorious or to claim a form
of exceptionalism for criminal action. Criminals are persons and can be
simply understood as such. They act at times rationally and at other times
irrationally and their actions are differentiated only by the fact that they
breach a criminal threshold. When we determine their actions it is better
done as a calm, moral and rational activity of reasoning and not as one
that prioritises a disputed notion of culture. We need not ask if collective
actions, whether criminal or not, are positive or not, in order to account
for them. All the same it is useful here to look briefly at rational choice
making in terms of the, so-called, prisoner’s dilemma. List and Petit have
looked at the prisoner’s dilemma in relation to group agency. The pris-
oner’s dilemma sets out to explain cooperative behaviour and how to
assuage the costs of it, notably in terms of defecting. Essentially the pris-
oner’s dilemma demonstrates that defection is often less costly than a
strategy of straightforward cooperation for individuals. The prisoner’s
dilemma illustrates two important issues: (1) that there are cases of genu-
inely cooperative collective behaviour that seem not to correspond with
the wellbeing of the cooperating parties and (2) that it is the case that
individuals often justify their part in collective actions in terms of advanc-
ing a collective goal and can understand collective action as rational.
Prisoner’s dilemma games illustrate how individuals can undertake coop-
erative behaviour, as a rational activity, though they themselves may have
6 A. Amatrudo
good reasons not to engage in collective action. This may seem perplexing
but the thing to note here is that there can be a range of reasons for indi-
viduals to undertake cooperative actions. Simply put collective actions in
the prisoner’s dilemma game illustrate that these may be justified in terms
of the meta-reasoning of the collective action itself or as a justification for
the individual in terms of their part in the collective action by way of
executing an action that contributes to the greater collective action. In
other words, collective action is commonplace and there is rational justi-
fication for those undertaking it. One may imagine collective actions
which have no deliberative aspect to them, and possibly dancing might be
such a case, whilst conceding that deliberation is usually an aspect of col-
lective action. Those individuals who undertake collective action surely
need to reason concerning their role in achieving the goal of the group. As
we saw earlier, this may be either through collective or individual delib-
eration. For it is through deliberative collective action that individuals
settle issues and undertake actions. Surely it is better to look at criminal
groups as undertaking collective criminal actions in this fashion; as
opposed to using external attributes to explain the actions of criminal
groups or the demarcations allowed by academic gang typologies (Gordon
2000). It is also a good idea to distinguish between collective action and
collective behaviour: the former being deliberative, in other words purpo-
sive, and rationalised in terms of a definite reason and the latter being
mere undirected activity. This is helpful since it illustrates how the reason-
ing of individuals involved in deliberative collective action is an active and
dynamic aspect of it. Through a process of deliberation individuals come
to perform actions of the sort X performs actions x in accord with their
reasons and so are performing an action not a behaviour. When individu-
als perform collective actions they are doing so in the light of collective
goals. I accept that it is possible that collective goals could be undertaken
either deliberatively or non-deliberatively but because our focus is upon
culpable criminal activity we focus on deliberative instances.
The question is how to explain deliberative collective action? There is
distinction being made that holds there is a real difference between col-
lective and individual actions. Moreover, surely some actions are part of
sets of actions, individual and/or collective. Furthermore, deliberative
collective action has to be set out in terms that always relate to a pre-
existing, or underlying, collective goal or goals. It is a tricky idea: for

instance, if a rational actor when presented with an issue then decides to
participate in collective action with others to overcome it, what should
their action be in this collective endeavour? I note these things for later.
One thing that is abundantly clear within Criminology is that it cries
out for a better explanation of action, especially in relation to group
offending cases. At present this is lacking, as is the lack of a thoroughgo-
ing consideration of intentionality and responsibility. This book aims to
address this deficit by taking a more philosophical approach. This is not
some academic indulgence for criminal justice regularly presents us with
group offending cases, including serious offending and joint criminal
enterprise cases where there is common agreement that the UK criminal
justice systems seems to over-criminalise secondary parties in joint crimi-
nal enterprise prosecutions. The effective use of joint criminal enterprise
prosecution, moreover, gets more and more shaky where the number of
defendants rises (Williams and Clarke 2016, 20). If one thing is certain
it is that coming up with a better explanation of the gang, its culture and
its ethnography is of no use in accounting for the ascription of culpability
in group offending cases or detailing responsibility in specific actions.
When put like this it may seem obvious, but you would hardly know it
given the lack of attention such issues has had within Criminology. If we
try and account for the actions of individuals in group offending cases
then better defining gang membership, or the like, fails to account for the
culpability of individuals in criminal cases where accounting for multi-
party agency, and the constituent elements of the individual within it, is
an important consideration.
There are several models available to those who wish to tackle, more
rigorously, the issue of group offending. In legal theory Kutz has addressed
the issue by examining collective intentions. However, he holds to ele-
phantine explanations of instrumentality and participation that load
complexity upon complexity and which are neither elegant nor stable
(Sanchez Brigado 2010). So we will reject Kutz. Nonetheless we can fol-
low Kutz to the extent that we look at Bratman’s work as he did (Kutz
2000). The way forward is to look at two versions of reductive theory,
Bratman’s and Gilbert’s. “(E)very individual acts on the basis of their own
will, or mental state, and that we can accordingly, say that all collective
8 A. Amatrudo
actions, may, in turn, be reduced to a sub-set of individual actions, each

enacted by persons in terms of their own will, or mental state … The
point to hold onto is that those who hold a reductive theory of collective
action view it as the sum of a set of individual actions enacted by a sub-set
of wills, or mental states” (Amatrudo 2015a, b, 111). Reductive theory
has the obvious benefit that it allows for personal responsibility to be
handled in a straightforward fashion. There are non-reductive models
available like that of Roth. However, they tend to place considerable limi-
tations upon the agency of individuals by placing too much stress on the
collective (Roth 2004). For this reason we shall reject non-reductive
models.
Bratman supplies an explanation which is often known as we-action
theory. We-action theory sees shared intentions as the outcome of a set of
individual attitudes and relationships. It prioritises the individual over
and against the group. Gilbert, on the other hand, maintains that things
are better explained in terms of sets of normative transactions that gener-
ate interpersonal obligations. Gilbert places more emphasis upon the col-
lective quality of action than Bratman. List and Petit have gone so far as
to call Gilbert a non-reductivist (List and Petit 2011). This is far too
strong and though she writes of plural subjects she is also clear that these
are made up of a prior set of individuals which are, in turn, characterised
by their individual, separate and unique wills. Gilbert resists the collectiv-
ism of Roth (Gilbert 1999). The task of this chapter is to argue for a more
technical, and philosophically savvy, account of group behaviour as
opposed to the hackneyed cultural one now dominating within
Criminology. In doing this it will hold that criminal activity is merely a
sub-category of group behaviour, more generally. Accordingly, both
Bratman and Gilbert supply us with robust accounts of collective action
applicable to the sorts of issues faced in the criminal justice system around
group offending. In using models drawn from accounts of joint commit-
ment and shared intention, that ask important questions about subjects,
it is likely that we will get better answers to our queries concerning the
nature of multi-agent criminal activity and a more realistic legal frame-
work with which to judge that activity. The work of Bratman and Gilbert
can, moreover, give us a sharper lens to better view group offending in
socio-legal terms. By insisting upon a technical determination of group

offending we will arrive at a safer basis for sentencing in such cases.
However, one should not imagine that reflecting on the work of
Bratman and Gilbert is simply of academic interest because there is much
in such reflection that could aid the cause of justice and aid the courts,
notably in group offending cases. After all, as Pitts has argued, the pros-
ecution of joint enterprise cases in the English courts has not been so
much interested in the culpability of parties so much as determining
individual bad character (Pitts 2014). This sort of non-technical and
associational approach is, moreover, closely correlated with gross instances
of racial bias by the police, Criminla Prosecution Service (CPS) and
courts (Williams and Clarke 2016). The focus away from the central
issues of culpability and justice, as they inform determining specific
responsibility for specific acts, in the prosecution of group offending
cases, and towards a vaguer sense of association in terms of certain cul-
tural markers is worrying. Indeed Criminology itself gives support to this
unhelpful view of group offending with its multiplicity of typologies of
persons in groups, gangs. Of course, such typologies have certainly fed
into the over-criminalisation of youth, especially black urban youth. The
assumptions and the tight, and at best sub-regional, and at worst incred-
ibly localised, snapshot focus of most of the fieldwork that supports such
an approach has extrapolated generalised notions of “gangs” which have
fed into the mania for joint enterprise prosecutions in the UK. Indeed
such an approach has engendered real, though largely unwarranted, fears
about such “gangs” being the “enemies of society” (Green and McGourlay
2015). For these reasons the argument shall be set in terms of the prin-
ciples required to determine joint action, as set out by Bratman and
Gilbert. This approach both avoids the obvious moral panic we note in so
much academic literature and policing strategies around joint enterprise
prosecutions. Surer to think through the technicalities of specific actions
than to consider the extraneous, such as clothing, associations around
family and friendship, the use of social media, as so forth; all of which are
regularly taken into account as evidence of foresight in the prosecution of
joint enterprise cases. The task will be to stick tightly to notions of culpa-
bility and joint action and away from the mendacious assemblage of:
“(G)ang discourse and joint enterprise” (Williams and Clarke 2016).
10 A. Amatrudo
We-action Theory in Bratman

We-action theory addresses the matter of the goals of individuals by
examining the relationship between their intentions in relation to the
larger group. The doyen of this approach is Michael Bratman and it is
his contention that in order to understand collective action we ought to
concentrate upon shared intentions as the starting point for discovering
we-actions. His work on we-actions, and team preferences, appeals to
the mechanics involved in the deeper processes of reasoning that under-
lie collective action, in terms of shared intentions. This approach is
appealing because it notes that collective actions are nevertheless “reduc-
ible to a sub-set of individual, though inter-related, actions” (Amatrudo
2015a, b). The notion is that the actor, the individual unit of person-
hood and action, is unavoidably the basis of any collective action. This
is an important point to note in terms of thinking about the criminal
law for it ensures the individual subject may be held personally culpable
in group offences. For Bratman the main thrust in understanding shared
intentions is to determine whether they are also able to account for
team goals. The language of sharing implies a level of intimacy between
the parties which is not the case in all conceivable cases of collective
action. In simple terms, this is to address the issue of whether it is the
case that when a person has an intention to act they simultaneously
share a team goal. Moreover, it follows from this that the question arises
as to whether the person who shares a team goal shares precisely the
same intention as the rest of the group. In a formal and technical sense,
holding to a goal and sharing an intention are separate activities; a point
typically missed in academic Criminology. When we look at an example
that Bratman employs then a helpful contrast becomes apparent. Let us
think through two scenarios (1) A and B go on a journey together and
(2) A and B share a journey together. The notion is that the second
example is suggestive of a much more interpersonally rich experience
than is present in the first example. We take from this that sharing a
journey, or some other experience, is much stronger than merely col-
lectively participating in it. However, exactly how it is stronger is a more
tricky determination. Bratman is not so much concerned with delineat-
ing strong and weak notions of goal sharing and accounting for their
differential treatment of personal intimacy. Nonetheless, Bratman goes
on to set out three sorts of sharing which illustrate this issue. The forms
of shared activity he sets out are: (1) a basic commitment to mutual sup-
port, (2) a commitment to joint action and (3) a more elaborated notion
of “mutual responsiveness” (Bratman 1993). All of these three activities,
in their varying ways, centre upon achieving a goal. Bratman is shy of
distinguishing in terms of the level of intimacy but instead he uses a
technical distinction between JIA (jointly intentional activity) and SCA
(shared cooperative activity). He develops this in his article in the The
Philosophical Review, “Shared cooperative activity.” In this piece he sets
out the example of two singers who are involved in a duet. The issue he
points to is that though their separate actions would bring about a suc-
cessful duet they fail to support one another in their singing. Bratman
shows how if either singer messes up their singing then the other singer
does not have the ability to help out. He determines this to be an exam-
ple of JIA since SCA would entail an additional element, a commitment
to mutual support of the other singer. Bratman claims that: “(Any) joint
action-type can be loaded with respect to joint intentionality but still
not strictly speaking (be), cooperatively loaded …” (Bratman 1992).
We should note here that the question arises whether team goals, on this
reasoning, are cooperatively structured or structured in terms of the
parties’ joint intentionality. Bratman holds that team goals are coopera-
tively structured. This amounts to saying that those persons who hold
to a team goal are more committed than those who simply engage in
JIA. Bratman sets out three different sorts of outcomes that can be pro-
duced collectively. These are (1) collectively successful outcomes in which
every actor involved as a party to a joint activity performs a role in order
that the joint outcome is realised, (2) individually successful outcomes in
which an individual actor successfully performs their own contribution
to the joint action but other actors do not achieve this and (3) jointly
unsuccessful outcomes in which the actors neither fulfil to undertake
their role and where, consequently, there is no joint outcome success-
fully achieved. Do note we are using the term “joint” in a neutral fash-
ion because we have no grounds for assuming that joint outcomes
unavoidably require the contribution of more than one party. The
12 A. Amatrudo
importance of distinguishing SCA from JIA, for Bratman, is to under-

score that those who undertake JIA will value their own individual suc-
cess ahead of a collectively successful outcome (Bratman 1992). Rather
than contest Bratman’s claim let us instead take from this that it is pos-
sible to delineate actors undertaking JIA from those undertaking SCA:
and hold that when we do this we then note that a differential emerges
between the values this imposes upon a range of possible intended out-
comes. This means that we can hold that possessing team preferences is
dependent upon the actors who are party to it being prompted by SCA,
rather than JIA.
Collective Action and Intentions in Bratman

The novel contribution Bratman made to the way we think about collec-
tive action is in terms of the way he conceived of our sharing intentions.
He maintained that persons are involved in the collective action, of J-ing,
only when they share the identical intention to J in cases of voluntary J.
Since it is so important we ought to restate Bratman’s formulation in full,
before moving on:
We intend to J if and only if:
1. (a) I intend that we J and (b) you intend that we J;

2. I intend that we J in accordance with and because of 1a, 1b, and mesh-
ing sub-plans of 1a and 1b; you intend that we J in accordance with and
because of 1a, 1b and meshing sub-plans of 1a and 1b;
3. 1 and 2 are common knowledge between us. (Bratman 1993, 106)
It is important to note the technical term that is doing all the work
here. The first condition is what philosophers call a we-intention and it is
central to understanding Bratman’s contribution. The second condition
he calls the meshing sub-plans condition. The main thing to note is that
shared intentions may not be reduced to the set of attitudes held by indi-
viduals, instead they should be viewed as the appropriate mental attitudes
of appropriate individuals
Bratman on Shared Intentions

Let us look a little deeper at Bratman’s notion of J-ing. Bratman’s we-
intention notes that A and B share the same intention, J being a joint
action. However, the issue of just how any individual comes to intend an
action that is joint becomes a knotty technical matter as does the issue of
control over it (Bratman 1999). Bratman brings in his own form of con-
trol, which he terms Condition C. It holds that an individual cannot be
said to intend any actions that they personally cannot control and also
settle. On the matter of settling, Condition S, Bratman posits that an
individual can only intend an action that they personally can resolve or
settle. This is an important element in Bratman’s account and vital to his
reductivism. It is nonetheless possible to conceive of we-intention condi-
tions that are not bound by the limitations of the C and S constraints that
Bratman sets out. In the account Bratman provides, the role of C and S
constraints is partly to enable “other-actor conditional mediation” of
intentions (Bratman 1999). What he has in mind here is, for example,
holding that an individual X may intend to facilitate an outcome o by
performing an action x even in a case where o requires that some other
individual Y executes an action y; then it is the case that if X considers if
o is produced this rests on the actor who performs x. It is the case that
when an individual carries out y it is conditional upon X’s completion of
x, if X knows the individual carrying out y is conditional upon X’s inten-
tion to undertake x. In this fashion X is able to control and settle the
production of o simply by having the intention to x. Moreover, he argues
that it is reasonable to hold that an individual X may intend a joint action
J, when it is believed that the joint action J rests, to some degree, on
whether X holds an intention to do his or her bit, x, in the J. Bratman is
clear on this matter and states:
When I decide that we paint together, I suppose that my intention that we

paint will lead you so to intend as well. Does this mean that, strictly speak-
ing, you don’t get to settle the matter of our painting or, at least, I don’t see
you as settling the matter? Well you remain a free actor; it really is a deci-
sion that is up to you without which we really will not paint. I predict that,
in part as a result of my intention, you will so decide; but that does not
14 A. Amatrudo
mean that you do not decide. I can predict what I know to be your free
decision. I can predict that you will freely, in response to my intention,
intend that we paint, and so settle the matter of our painting together. That
is why I can now intend that we paint. (Bratman 1999, 1956–7)
Bearing this in mind, let us restate that an outcome o is produced by

an individual X performing an action x and an individual Y performing
an action y. We could further hold that an individual Y will only perform
y if they note X about to undertake x, or where they note X has formed an
intention to perform x. Bratman maintains it is correct for X to intend to
bring about o by performing an action x, and this controls and settles the
matter of the production of o. However, the bigger claim as to whether
we can hold that X intends that together X and Y collectively produce o
we can only hold, in my view, if X intends that she produces o in terms of
her performing x but this is well short of the claim she, X, intends: that
they, X and Y collectively, produce o. The major problem here is whether
it is right for Bratman to move from his other-agent, yet conditionally
mediated version of intentionality to a full-on we-intentionality model. I
am sceptical simply because we-intentions are completely different in
their form from other-agent conditionally mediated intentions. We-
intentions are characterised in terms of their form by being exemplified
by the action not of a single individual but by the action of another indi-
vidual, or individuals, as well. In order to show this we need to revisit
Bratman’s “I intend that we J” procedure. To begin with joint actions are
necessarily, and obviously, composed of more than one person. Therefore,
if an individual X has a behaviour, or set of behaviours, x which she can
perform and which, in turn, bring about an action type and another
individual Y has a behaviour, or set of behaviours, y that she can perform
and which bring about an action type then we can say that the joint
action J is composed of an aggregate which may be expressed as {Xx, Yy}.
Moreover, we may make another claim about the composition of joint
action that maintains that any joint action J which may be undertaken by
X and Y is always on a set of further behaviours x and y; so we note that J
is always the expression of an aggregate set, {Xx, Yy}. This is important
since it shows how joint action types, that satisfy the compositionality
criteria, may always be further broken down to the individual sets of
behaviour performed by the participating individuals. This ability to

reduce collective behaviour to the actions of its individual members is an
important point that has real-world appeal in accounting for culpability
when considering joint action in multi-agent criminal cases.
Getting More Technical

It is difficult to sustain the proposition that all joint action types satisfy
the compositionality criteria. This is simply because although all joint
action types, including cooperatively neutral ones, must fulfil the compo-
sitionality criteria in the Bratman plan we note here that because Jo is
cooperatively neutral from the outside those joint actions that are coop-
eratively positive, J+, appear the same as those joint actions that are not
cooperatively positive, J–. To the outsider both J+ and J– appear the
same, with respect to their external behaviour. This is a big issue for it is
not possible for us to allow that J–, which is non-cooperative, can appeal
to collective goals. J–, being non-cooperative, may only ever be sustained
by reference to the goals of individuals, X and Y. If we do this then the
component activities, x and y, of the parties X and Y, are what establishes
J– and all that entails is a simple combination of individual action types;
and this we establish as {Xx, Yy}. Since Jo is cooperatively neutral it is
externally, at least, identical to Jo: and the same applies to J+, and both
are constituted by actions, x and y. We may hold that all joint action
types, of the sort we J, look precisely the same as joint actions of the sort
you do y and I do x. Although Bratman argues that his notion of meshing
sub-plans can allow for a common knowledge condition to explain joint
actions it appears that his compositionality condition means that ulti-
mately his we-condition collapses into circularity (Bratman 1993).
Let us look again at Bratman’s we-condition formulation that holds:
“1. (a) I intend that we J and (b) you intend that we J.” In this case J is a
cooperatively neutral joint action type which exhibits a compositionality
criterion which is identical with the action types of the sort x and y. His
second condition holds: “2. I intend that we J in accordance with and
because of 1a, 1b, and meshing sub-plans of 1a and 1b; you intend that
we J in accordance with and because of 1a, 1b and meshing sub-plans of
16 A. Amatrudo
1a and 1b.” We could alter this to: 1# (a) X must intend that X do x and
that Y do y and that 1# (b) Y must intend that X do x and that Y do y.
This too seems not to be quite up to the job, for how can X intend that Y
undertakes an action or that Y intend that X undertakes an action? Surely
the conditions C and S ensure constraints on the intentions of individu-
als and, accordingly, entail rejecting the idea that X intends that Y under-
takes y because X cannot control (C) or settle (S) the matter of Y
undertaking y. It could be argued that X does in fact control (C) or settle
(S) to the degree that it could be predicted that Y will undertake y so long
as X does x. This is what amounts to the foresight condition in UK joint
enterprise law (Krebs 2015). Bratman’s own view of the settle condition
(S) holds that: “Suppose that Diane does not intend to raise the pressure
once Abe intends to pump. But Diane is a kind soul and has access to the
pressure valve. Recognizing this, Abe might be justifiably confident that
if Diane knew that Abe intended to pump water Diane would decide to
turn the pressure valve. And he might be confident that if he intended to
pump Diane would know it. Given this confidence can Abe decide to
pump water? Can he in the relevant sense ‘settle’ the matter of whether
the water is pumped? I think he can, given that he is in a position to pre-
dict that Diane will respond appropriately” (Bratman 1999, 1954–5).
This is unsatisfactory to my mind, since rather disappointingly, Bratman
falls short of showing us Abe settling the issue of whether Diane turns the
pressure valve and so all that Abe settles is that the water is pumped.
Therefore, all that Abe is able to intend is the outcome of the water
pumping. Moreover, it would be wrong to think of the situation in the
terms Abe intends, in other words that they pump the water together (col-
lectively) through Diane’s turning and Abe’s pumping. Whilst Abe can
surely settle his own pumping of the water he is unable to do the same as
regards to their, collective, pumping of water. Abe is unable to settle
Diane’s turning of the valve even though this is a very important consid-
eration. From the outside all we can allow is that Abe intends to pump
the water and that it is pumped. The matter that this is all causally related
to Diane’s intentions too is not so important, although Abe knows that
her actions are necessary to the outcome. We can hold that Diane’s con-
tribution is just one of the many things that unite Abe’s actions with his
favoured outcome. It would be misleading to hold that Abe’s intention is
their (his and Diane’s) pumping of water as this implies that he can settle
both his pumping and, crucially, Diane’s turning. If we held that Abe
could settle Diane’s turning that would be tantamount to holding that
she is not a sovereign person; indeed it is not possible.
We might contend that an individual, X, could bring about an out-
come o that rests both on their undertaking x and another individual, Y,
undertaking an action y. This is obviously not the same as contending
that X intends that collectively, they, generate o by means of the one doing
y and the other undertaking x. It is safer to argue that X has in mind to
produce o by means of their doing x, but in the knowledge that their
undertaking of x will facilitate Y doing x; and thereby the outcome o will
be achieved. It is not possible, however, to maintain that X can ever intend
that they bring about o as that would entail X to intend y and conversely
that Y intends x. This is unsatisfactory as we have seen already that X can
neither control (C) nor settle (S) Y’s carrying out of x. So, in the end, we
have to hold that Bratman’s notion of the we-intention is flawed simply
because he never furnishes us with reasons for accepting we-intention
grounds without simultaneously asserting that individuals involved in
joint action possess we-intentions. We cannot allow such an assertion to
be sustained as it seems to breach the sort of reasonable conditions neces-
sary to maintain a rational basis to individual intentionality.
The account Bratman provides us is one that tends to account for col-
lective action in reductive terms; that is to say in terms of individual
actors. These individual actors deliberate and act in terms of their own
individual states, though these might also be interdependent. This is clear
but it only really allows a full account of the individual actor and his, or
her, individual actions. In the Bratman account the only serious differ-
ence between examples of individual and collective action is that in the
case of collective action there would appear to be a dependence upon the
individual and upon others to enact a given action rather than their
enacting it alone. It is though, a reliance, not a straightforward matter
that can be both controlled and settled, which we would require for a
robust account of collective action. In Bratman’s account it is the case
that X’s intention that both X and Y undertake J is only something that X
can control if he is certain that Y too will share, and act on, the same
intention to J. The problem, as we have already noted, is that X’s intention
18 A. Amatrudo
remains what we technically call other-actor enabled, in other words it

only ever refers to their personal action. This means that the content of
such an explanation cannot truly be said to be referring to collective action
at all. Likewise, if Bratman holds that the intention refers to Y’s actions
too then this clearly breaches the important own action condition that
holds that individuals may not intend the action of other individuals. It
may though, we can concede, be possible to intend some outcome o that
is collectively enacted.
Plural Subjects in Gilbert’s Account

Margaret Gilbert follows in the footsteps of Searle in that, like him, she
understands that the defining feature of a joint action is invariably cor-
related to its elemental internal composition (Searle 1997). Her elabora-
tion of joint action states that the important feature of any internal
composition lies in it having a shared aspect to it. Her notion of shared
intention is not given as an aspect of the particular form of intention an
individual may possess: instead Gilbert conceives of it in terms of rela-
tionships, in other words in regards to the obligations and interpersonal
obligations that spring from any shared intention. In this regard she elab-
orates a very sociological understanding of joint intention. What is more
her work exhibits a much richer sense of the collective nature of collective
action than does Bratman. This has led Sheehy to argue that her writings
show the requirement for an ontological commitment by actors to any
joint commitment (Sheehy 2006).
Ethics of Joint Commitment

In Gilbert’s account we note that we can only fully understand social
phenomenon by first understanding the underlying composition of the
beliefs, groups and intentions that give rise to it (Gilbert 1992). The
notion that Gilbert works is straightforward; it merely asserts that it is
possible for individuals to think, and act, as a collective and that they do
this much of the time. This is what Sheehy had in mind when he noted
Gilbert’s ontological commitment. She holds that there are “plural sub-
jects of intention” and that, advancing a version of holism, we simply
cannot explain joint action by restricting actions and beliefs and inten-
tions to those of individual actors (Gilbert 1992). This is a very impor-
tant element in her work though holism has been roundly criticised by
scholars who note that it often tends to underplay the role of individual
agency in group action (Harding 2007). Gilbert, I think, avoids this trap.
She sets out a technical formula for interpreting plural subjects: “Schema
S. For the relevant psychological predicate ‘X’ and persons P1 and P2, P1
and P2 may truly say: ‘We X with respect to PI and P2 if and only if PI
and P2 are jointly committed to X-ing as a body’” (Gilbert 2000, 19). In
outlining Schema S she sets out not just the form of joint commitment
but the form for all of her views on plural subjects. The idea is that all
forms of commitment have two basic categories, joint commitments and
personal commitments, and, furthermore, that all commitments are
reducible to these two categories. Gilbert notes how any individual can
generate personal commitments as they like with no constraint upon that
endeavour. This means that individuals may also rescind those commit-
ments at any time. Gilbert writes how “… if and only if he is the sole
author of a commitment and has the authority unilaterally to rescind it”
(Gilbert 2000, 21). This is in contradistinction to the altogether more
problematic incidents of joint commitment where more than one person
is involved and where the commitment is jointly undertaken. We note
that such joint commitments are an aggregation of the concomitant com-
mitments of those parties to it. There is a technical point to note also and
it is that Gilbert rejects the idea of joint commitments being composite in
nature (Gilbert 2000, 53). In Gilbert’s scheme joint commitment is
defined in terms of it being created by the parties together and so the only
way to annul such a commitment would be for parties, similarly, together
to determine their wills to annul it (Gilbert 2000, 21). What this means
in a practical sense is that if any one party to a commitment breaches their
commitment the commitment is not breached, in terms of the original
joint commitment; instead Gilbert asks us to view it as a violation. This
is because she determines that the original commitment has real status in
its own terms. In Living Together she explains that “the parties to a joint
commitment are tied to one another” (Gilbert 1996, 295). This illustrates
20 A. Amatrudo
how Gilbert understands the situation in terms of all of the parties need-
ing to mutually annul joint commitments as no single party has the
power to do this. The important point she is expressing here is that the
entire enterprise of individuals coming to mutual agreements necessarily
generates coterminous interpersonal entitlements and obligations; which
is also interesting sociologically. Her notion that mutual agreements are
necessarily implied in any joint commitment is her major contribution in
this area (Gilbert 2000, 26).
Gilbert on Plural Subjects

By going back to her Schema S it is possible for us to set out, more fully,
Gilbert’s concept of the plural subject and to say something meaningful
about its relationship with the notion of intentionality. She sets out three
key features that relate to shared intentions, which she relates back to the
notion of a plural subject, in order to explain it. She does this using the
example of two persons who decide to go on a walk (i.e. a walk together).
So initially she states that two persons decide (i.e. have the intention) to
go on a walk together. The question then arises as to what happens should
one walker decide to end the walk. For Gilbert it is clear that the person
who decides to give up on the walk is deviating from the original shared
intention to go on a walk together. If this happens, and one party unilater-
ally ends the walk, Gilbert holds that they deserve a rebuke since the
other party has what she terms “(a) special standing …by virtue of the
(original) shared intention” (Gilbert 2000, 16). When situations like this
arise in the context of shared intention several things follow, for Gilbert:
(1) In the Gilbert formulation it is clear that the parties involved are
obliged to always act in terms of the shared intention and that such
obligations are necessarily directed at the realisation of the shared
intention.
(2) All shared intentions produce concomitant entitlements, and rights,
upon all the actors involved in relation to the achievement of the pre-
ferred outcome.
(3) Should any party to a shared intention act counter to it then it follows
that all the other parties to it may rebuke them. (Gilbert 2000, 17)
If we consider these three elements together we note that they form

Gilbert’s obligation criteria. Furthermore, that this obligation criteria
binds parties to the shared intention that they make (Gilbert 1999).
However, what of the case, for example, when one of the walkers gives
up due to tiredness? Gilbert still holds here that there can be no unilat-
eral termination of the walk and argues that the person giving up would
have to gain permission from the other party, or parties, since in her
scheme all the parties must agree (Gilbert 2000, 170). This is not to
state that it is not possible, only that it needs all parties to agree any
annulment. Gilbert’s account of shared intentions rests upon this per-
mission criterion and it underpins her criterion for deciding the suffi-
ciency of the agreement. She also advances a compatibility criterion to
determine the sufficiency of the situation which maintains that the
intentions of all parties must correspond and not merely coincide with
each other (Gilbert 2000, 17). We note how her idea of shared inten-
tion is rigorous, and conceptual, and holds that shared intentions nec-
essarily entail recognition of the obligations and rights associated with
any given joint commitment.
he Role of Joint Commitment and Obligation

T
in Gilbert
It is a defining feature of Gilbert’s work that shared intentions and joint
commitments are intrinsically tied to one another. Moreover, that the
existence of joint commitment implies a supporting set of relationships
in terms of interpersonal entitlements and obligations between all the
individuals involved. Gilbert’s particular version of joint commitment
has a set of characteristics associated with it. Joint commitments are
always given, or rather directed, in terms of obligations to particular par-
ties. In this fashion, parties are obligated to one another in terms of a
matrix of corresponding entitlements and rights (Gilbert 2000, 104).
Moreover, these obligations that are expressed through joint commit-
ment are not set out in either moral or prudential terms (Gilbert 1992,
163). This is because, she argues, that morality and prudence are insuffi-
cient in terms of animating parties in joint commitments. This I do not
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greatly reduced through the operation of natural causes. But
morbidity would not be diminished, possibly greatly increased by the
wider and wider diffusion of these parasites, or potential disease
producers. The few still highly mortal plagues would eventually settle
down to sporadic infections or else disappear wholly because of
adverse conditions to which they cannot adapt themselves.
“In this mutual adaptation of microorganism to host, there is,
however, nothing to hinder a rise in virulence in place of the gradual
decline if proper conditions exist. In fact, it is not very difficult to
furnish adequate explanations for the recrudescence and activities of
many diseases today, though the natural tendencies are toward a
decline in virulence. In the more or less rapid changes in our
environment due to industrial and social movements the natural
equilibrium between host and parasite established for a given
climate, locality, and race or nationality is often seriously disturbed
and epidemics of hitherto sporadic diseases result.
“These illustrations indicate that so-called natural law does not
stand in the way of our having highly virulent types of disease, if we
are ignorant enough to cultivate them. The microorganism is
sufficiently plastic to shape itself for an upward as well as a
downward movement. Among the most formidable of the obstacles
toward a steady decline of mortality is the continual movement of
individuals and masses from one part of the world to another,
whereby the partly adapted parasites become planted as it were into
new soil and the original equilibrium destroyed. These various races
of disease germs become widely disseminated by so-called germ
carriers, and epidemics here and there light up their unseen paths.”
An example of increasing virulence from changing environmental
conditions, is the experience in the United States Army camps in
1917 and 1918 with the streptococcus. This microorganism, which at
first was but a secondary invader, particularly to measles, became so
exalted in virulence that it soon became the cause of primary disease.
This is likewise true of the various secondary invaders of the
influenza epidemics. They become so highly virulent that they
dominate the picture in the later stages. The organisms included in
this group are particularly the streptococcus, the various
pneumococci, and the meningococcus. Probably the tubercle bacillus
should be added to this list.
It requires a certain amount of time for such organisms to attain
increased virulence. The earliest cases in any epidemic are
comparatively very mild. Thus Major Billings, epidemiologist at
Camp Custer, says that for the first five days of the autumn influenza
epidemic in that camp the cases admitted to the hospital were very
mild in character and were recorded as simple bronchitis and
pharyngitis, of no great severity, the majority soon recovering. Five
days after the first case was admitted, however, the entire symptom
complex seemed to change, and the cases admitted to the hospital
from then on were a very different and much more severe type.
Major Billings, after going over the records, feels that both types of
cases were the same disease, the second being a more severe form.
Woolley reports essentially the same condition from Camp Devens.
The same phenomena were found in 1889. During the 1889
epidemic Prudden examined by current bacteriologic methods seven
cases of influenza and six cases of influenza-pneumonia. In them he
found staphylococcus pyogenes aureus, streptococcus pyogenes,
diplococcus pneumoniae, and in other cases he found a
streptococcus. He concludes that the use of culture methods and
media commonly employed has brought to light no living germ
which there is reason to believe has anything to do with causing the
disease. He emphasizes the probable importance of streptococcus
pyogenes in particular in inducing the various complications.
At this point we should include for the sake of completeness
reference to a recent theory propounded by Sahli explaining
influenza epidemics, a theory to which we do not subscribe. He
believes that the pneumococcus, the streptococcus, the influenza
bacillus, and possibly other organisms, form a complex group, an
obligate complex, a symbiosis, a higher unit, which infects the
organism as a unit. It is all of these organisms acting together which
produce the influenza. After infection has occurred one or the other
member of the group may develop preferentially. In favor of this he
says that in one of his cases the sputum was swarming with influenza
bacilli on one day, and that the next day the sputum was a thick pure
culture of the pneumococcus. He says that if an ultramicroscopic
germ should yet be discovered this would not invalidate the theory,
but would merely add another member to the group forming the
obligate complex virus unit.
Meteorologic conditions.—Formerly attempts were made to
demonstrate etiologic relationships between the occurrence of
influenza and unusual conditions of the atmosphere. In most cases
no relationship has been discovered. Nevertheless it is conceivable
that the changes in the atmosphere, particularly seasonal variations,
might influence the virulence of the organism. It has been found that
nearly all of the many epidemics apparently originating in Russia
took their origin there either in the late autumn or in the winter
months. The spread of influenza appears to be uninfluenced by
atmospheric conditions, but the severity of the disease is definitely
increased in the winter months, and Leichtenstern believes that the
development of a primary spread from its point of origin is also
influenced by the season. Hirsch found that out of 175 correlated
pandemics or epidemics, 50 occurred in the winter between
December and February, 85 in the spring from March to May, 16 in
the summer from June to August and 24 in the autumn.
The soil plays no part in the spread of the disease. It prevails on
every soil or geologic formation; on the mountain top, in the low
malarial swamps, in the tropics and within the arctic circle. Volcanic
eruptions, fogs, electrical conditions, ozone, direction of the wind,
have all been considered in previous epidemics and successively
eliminated as etiologic factors.
It must be stated, however, that Teissier, who investigated the
influenza in Russia in 1890 and has compared his conclusions at that
time with the results of investigation of the recent visitation, believes
that some particular cosmic conditions suddenly enhanced the
virulence of an endemic etiologic microorganism—probably some
ordinary germ—and that this opened the portals to secondary
infections.
Secondary invaders.—We have considered a possible manner in
which the virulence of the organism causing influenza may become
enhanced. Whatever this organism may be, another and equally
important virulence enhancement occurs in the opportunist group of
the germs, so-called secondary invaders of influenza. As we have
previously remarked, it is a characteristic of influenza outbreaks in
all communities that the earliest cases are very mild. Secondary
infection has not as yet obtained a foothold. After about a week the
character of the illness changes, becoming distinctly more severe.
Billings reported that at Camp Custer in the autumn of 1918 cases
admitted to the hospital during the first five days were very mild in
character and were reported as simply bronchitis or pharyngitis of no
great severity, the majority soon recovering. After this time the entire
symptom complex seemed to change and the cases admitted to the
hospital were of a very different and more severe type.
Benjafield reports that in the Egyptian Expeditionary Force the
epidemic commenced in May, 1918, and that the cases occurring
during the earlier portion of the epidemic were mild in type and of
short duration, only a very small proportion being complicated by
bronchopneumonia. Wooley found at Camp Devens that the first
cases were of a mild form and were usually diagnosed “naso-
pharyngitis, acute catarrhal.” After a few days the disease became
more severe and pneumonia cases developed.
Bezançon found that among the repatriated French soldiers from
Switzerland those cases occurring in May and June had a much
lower severity than in the later epidemic. Zinsser’s description of the
mild, earlier epidemic in Chaumont has already been quoted.
The secondary invaders of pathogenic importance are the various
forms of the streptococcus and pneumococcus, the meningococcus,
the staphylococcus, and probably the tubercle bacillus and the
influenza bacillus. In the last epidemic as in that of thirty years
previously, the chief complications were bronchitis and pneumonia.
Capps and Moody found these to be the chief complications in
December, 1915. Also they found a high incidence of sinusitis. This
has been a feature of the last epidemic. Wooley cites a good example
of the damage done by these opportunist organisms when they are
present. Among the troops stationed at Camp Devens in the fall of
1918 pneumonia following influenza was particularly prevalent in a
battalion of negroes from the South. This battalion had, a short time
previously, passed through an epidemic of pneumonia and Wooley
believes that many of the blacks were harboring the pneumococci
which were only awaiting a favorable opportunity to invade their
hosts. The influenza furnished the required opportunity.
That the meningococcus should be classed in this group is certain.
The author observed at Camp Sevier cases of epidemic meningitis
occurring in various influenza wards scattered throughout the
hospital, with no demonstrable relationship. Usually there was but
one case in a ward and almost invariably meningitis occurred when
convalescence was beginning. No epidemic occurred in any ward.
Others have reported actual epidemics of meningitis following
influenza. Moss found that a large proportion of his influenza cases
had the meningococcus in the circulating blood, as demonstrated by
culture. Fletcher cultivated meningococci from the lungs in all of
eleven autopsies, and in all eleven cases the influenza bacillus was
also present.
In considering the effect of influenza on the death rate in general,
and in considering the relationship of influenza to other diseases in
general, it is important to distinguish those diseases which are
apparently unrelated and those diseases which occur as direct
complications or sequelae. Bronchopneumonia, bronchitis,
empyema, otitis media, frequently tonsillitis and sometimes
erysipelas, occur as sequelae. Meningitis should frequently be
included in this group.
Not only is there an increase in certain other diseases following
influenza outbreaks, genetically related, as we have seen, but also
some observers, particularly Crookshank, believe that previous to
epidemic influenza prevalences there occurs an increase in the
incidence of other entirely unrelated infectious diseases, such as
poliomyelitis. This theory of simultaneous increase in invasiveness of
many apparently unrelated germs is comparatively new and will
probably receive deep consideration in the future. For the present
the information on the subject is so limited that attempted
conclusions would have no value.
Origin of the 1918 Pandemic.
In discussing the spread of the 1918 pandemic over the earth, the
author has traced it from an apparent origin in the United States.
Localized early epidemics are reported simultaneously in the United
States, France, and China. From the literature at his disposal he has
been unable to find convincing proof of an earlier origin in Asia, but
he did emphasize at the time the necessity of a much more thorough
study of influenza in all countries to be made by more competent
statisticians. Nevertheless it is highly interesting to formulate an
hypothesis which appears to meet all demands, on the assumption
that the disease originated in America. In order to hold a theory with
this basis we must assume that the third of our previously mentioned
hypotheses of the origin of the disease is the more nearly correct.
Let us assume that in the interpandemic periods the influenza
virus is widely distributed over the earth, existing in an avirulent
form. The basis for this assumption is the previously described
occurrence of localized epidemics in interpandemic periods. The
occurrence of solitary cases, although of interest, could scarcely be
considered as evidence of the widespread distribution of the virus,
but in the case of the small outbreaks as in 1900, 1907 and 1915, and
as in the numerous small outbreaks described by Hirsch, the
character of the epidemic curve is characteristic. Let us, then, assume
that the disease has been endemic in the United States, together with
other localities. It requires no keen observation to discover in the
years 1917 and 1918, Theobald Smith’s “movement of individuals and
masses from one part of the world to another, whereby the partly
adapted parasites become planted, as it were, into new soil, and the
original equilibrium is disturbed.” Not only was there a tremendous
redistribution and concentration of individuals in our camps in this
country, but also there was a further disturbance of the equilibrium
in the outbreak of other infectious diseases, particularly measles. The
effect of the measles epidemic on the virulence of the streptococcus
and allied organisms has been discussed; presumably the same
occurred with respect to the influenza virus. Howard and Love report
that approximately 40,512 cases of influenza were reported in the
United States Army during 1917. They write:
“In 1917, the death rate for the acute respiratory diseases
(influenza, pneumonias and the common types) increased to 1.71.
During the fall of 1917, after the camps were filled with drafted men,
acute epidemic diseases swept through a number of them. Measles
was one of the most prevalent and one of the most fatal of the
infectious diseases that occurred. It was noted during the fall and
early winter that there were a number of cases of pneumonia which
were unlike the pneumonia that ordinarily occurred. This was
apparent both to the physicians in civil life and in the army camps. It
was reported by all classes of practitioners that numerous cases of
pneumonia were occurring which resembled the pneumonia
following measles, but occurring among men who had not had
measles recently. In a number of the camps, both in the north and in
the south, rather extensive epidemics of pneumonia occurred and a
number of deaths resulted. The same variety of pneumonia occurred
in the late winter and spring of 1918. In many of the camps
pneumonia was practically epidemic during March and April. In
many camps a number of cases occurred later in the spring and
summer. It was again reported by a number of medical men that
these cases of pneumonia that were occurring were different from
the types of pneumonia ordinarily encountered and very similar to
pneumonia following measles, but, again, that the cases occurred
among men who had not had measles recently.”
MacNeal has observed similar conditions in the American
Expeditionary Forces in France in 1917:
“The American troops in France in 1917 began to show, as early as
October, 1917, a very considerable rise in the influenza morbidity.
The data available in the office of the Chief Surgeon, A. E. F., show
an influenza morbidity per 100,000 of 321 in July, 438 in August,
and 404 in September, rising to 1,050 in October, 1,980 in
November, and 2,480 in December, 1917, in which month the total
number of new cases of influenza reported was 3,520. That a
considerable proportion of these cases were actual infections with
the bacillus of Pfeiffer is proven by the necropsy findings in fatal
cases of bronchitis and bronchopneumonia, especially those
performed by Major H. E. Robertson at Army Laboratory No. 1,
Neufchateau, in November and December, 1917, and January, 1918.
In these cases the bacillus of Pfeiffer was found in the scattered
patches of lung involved in the bronchopneumonia and also with
great frequency in the cranial sinuses. These necropsy findings were,
at the time, recognized as essentially new for young adult Americans,
and, in a discussion at Army Laboratory No. 1, during December,
1917, they were considered as being of possible important
significance for the future morbidity of American soldiers in France.
In the British Army in France there is definite evidence of epidemics
showing the same pathologic condition, during the winter of 1916–
17, and at Aldershot in September, 1917. There can be little, if any
doubt that this disease was essentially the same which attacked the
American soldiers late in 1917.”
Schittenhelm and Schlecht have reported that a disease was
studied among the German troops on the Eastern front which
resembled greatly the influenza. It occurred from the beginning of
August to the middle of October, 1917. It attacked simultaneously
and in epidemic form units and divisions very widely separated over
a large territory. It was characterized clinically by a very sudden
onset, in the greater number of cases with chill, headache, pain in the
extremities, sometimes thoracic pain and cough. The fever lasted
seven to nine days. The spleen was enlarged in 11 per cent. of the
individuals. There was diarrhea in 12 per cent., frequently
conjunctivitis, and quite often a scarlatiniform rash. Bacteriologic
examination of the blood was negative. There was usually
leucopenia. No treatment seemed especially efficacious. Aspirin gave
the best results. The authors call attention to the close similarity to
influenza and also suggest that it might have been due to
transmission by insects as in pappataci fever or in dengue.
Carnwath concluded that the finding of influenza bacilli in
necropsies in British soldiers in 1917 was without epidemiologic
significance in considering the origin of the 1918 pandemic. He had
studied the disease among the British in detail and appeared to be of
the opinion that the first influenza morbidity of significance among
the British troops did not appear previous to April, 1918.
MacNeal further says: “The influenza rates per 100,000 of 1,050 in
November and 2,480 in December, 1917, really indicate a greater
relative prevalence of influenza at that time in the A. E. F. than
occurred in the fall of 1918, when the respective morbidity rates were
826 in September, 2,176 in October, and 1,356 in November. The
total number of American troops in France was relatively small
during that winter—141,995 effective mean strength in December—
so that the prevalence of influenza did not lead to the recognition of
an actual epidemic. Furthermore, the overcrowding in quarters,
which seems to have had a definite relation to many of the later
explosive outbreaks, had not become such a distinct feature at that
time. In addition, the cold, wet weather, exposure and unusual living
conditions furnished explanations for the morbidity which were no
longer adequate during the hot weather of May and June, 1918. Until
May, 1918, therefore, the prevalence was that of an endemic disease,
with perhaps an occasional outbreak suggesting epidemic character.”
We admit that MacNeal’s report furnishes excellent evidence of an
independent origin in France. Two points should be borne in mind.
First, that MacNeal’s figures are not for the French, but for the
Americans who were transported to that country, and that we may
consequently consider influenza among the American Expeditionary
Forces as being possibly from the same source as influenza among
the troops in our own country,—that the American Expeditionary
Forces may be considered a subdivision of the American Army in the
United States, equally well as a subdivision of the French population;
second, that we have been unable to find detailed evidence of similar
conditions occurring among the French troops or French population,
where the conditions have been ripe in a way since 1914. MacNeal
records that in March and April, 1918, there was a great increase in
the number of troops brought over from the United States to France.
Previous to that time there had been 287,000 in that country and
during the two months 150,000 were added, with a consequent
increase of more than fifty per cent.
We should insert a word of caution regarding the diagnosis of
influenza among troops in the absence of any sign of an epidemic.
Internists who served in base hospitals during the war will agree that
a diagnosis of influenza is very frequently made on the admission
card when the disease turns out to be some other malady. This was
not equally true in all camps, but regimental surgeons could often be
found who would transfer a patient to the hospital with the diagnosis
of influenza used almost interchangeably with the diagnosis “Fever
of unknown origin.” It would be interesting to see statistics from one
or two of those base hospitals which were manned with especially
competent internists, as to the frequency with which the admission
diagnosis of influenza remained unchallenged in the hospital, during
the year 1917.
There would be such cases in greater or smaller numbers. The
magnitude of this number would not influence our hypothesis.
Aside from this discussion of the disease among our troops in
France it is most important that we establish, if possible, the identity
of the disease reported among British troops in Northern France
during the winter of 1916–1917 and designated by the name
“Purulent Bronchitis.” The disease first appeared in December, 1916.
It reached its height during February and early March of 1917, and
appears to have disappeared early in the spring. Hammond, Rolland
and Shore report that during February and early March 45 per cent.
of the necropsies under observation showed the presence of purulent
bronchitis, and they remarked that the disease assumed such
proportions as to constitute almost a small epidemic. They described
the clinical aspects as follows:
“The cases which came under our notice can be divided broadly
into two types: The first and more acute presents a clinical picture
which closely simulates ordinary lobar pneumonia with a sustained
temperature of about 103°, and expectoration at first blood-streaked
—rather than rusty—which, however, rapidly becomes quite
purulent. The pulse-rate in these cases is out of all proportion to the
temperature in its rapidity. Dyspnoea and cyanosis are prominent
features. The patient usually dies from ‘lung block,’ resulting in
embarrassment of the right side of the heart on the fifth or sixth day.
For the last day or two there is often incontinence of the feces, due,
no doubt, to the condition of partial asphyxia. The mental state is
one of torpor; delirium is the exception.
“The second and less acute type is marked by a more swinging
temperature with a range of two or three degrees. The expectoration
at first may be frothy and mucopurulent, but it very soon assumes
the typically purulent character. This form may run a long course of
from three to six weeks, during which time the patient wastes a great
deal and has frequent and profuse sweats; indeed, at a certain stage
the illness is most suggestive of acute tubercular infection, and it is
only by repeated examination of the expectoration that the clinician
can satisfy himself he is not really over-looking a case of acute
pulmonary tuberculosis. The majority of our cases conforming to this
type have ultimately recovered, but the convalescence is slow and
tedious.
“Onset.—Whilst a history of a previous catarrhal condition lasting
for a few days is often obtained, the disease quickly assumes an acute
character; we have been able to observe this in patients admitted into
this hospital with purulent bronchitis; we find the temperature is
between 102° and 103°, the pulse 120 or over, and the respiration
about 35. The patient frequently complains of shivering and looks
pathetically miserable, but we have not seen an actual rigor. Despite
his obvious shortness of breath, the sisters have noticed that, at any
rate at first, he prefers a lateral position low down in the bed, and
resents any attempt to prop him up.
“Cough.—This for the first day or two may be irritable and
distressing, with a little frothy expectoration, but as the latter
becomes more purulent the cough is less troublesome, and soon the
patient is expectorating easily and frequently, until the later stages
are reached; when owing to increasing asphyxia the patient becomes
more and more torpid, the cough subsides, and hardly any secretion
is brought up. This failure becomes an added factor in bringing about
a rapidly fatal termination.
“Expectoration.—The sputum, with its yellowish-green purulent
masses, is very characteristic, and may be one of the first indications
of the serious nature of the illness the patient is suffering from.
“Temperature.—The fever of this complaint does not follow any
very constant type. In nearly all our cases the pyrexia was of sudden
onset, and for the first few days was more or less sustained at about
103°. Later it conformed more to the swinging type with a range of
several degrees. In a few cases a curious gradual ante mortem drop
has been observed.
“Pulse.—Tachycardia is a very constant feature throughout the
illness. The rate is frequently well over 120, though the volume may
remain surprisingly good until immediately before death.
“Some degree of dyspnoea is always present, and is usually
progressive, though towards the end in the fatal cases when the
mental acuteness is dulled by the increasing asphyxia the patient is
not distressed by its presence. In some cases there have been
paroxysmal exacerbations of the breathlessness, accompanied by a
state of panic, in which the patient struggles wildly and tries to get
out of bed in order to gain relief. Cyanosis is another prominent
feature throughout the illness. At first it may not be more than
duskiness, but in the later stages it becomes very evident. It is only
slightly relieved by oxygen; this, no doubt, is partly explained by the
difficulty in giving the oxygen efficiently, owing to the patient’s
objection to any mouthpiece that fits at all tightly, and partly by the
blocked condition of the bronchioles interfering with the absorption
of the oxygen.
“The condition usually begins with the presence of a moderate
number of sharp crepitant râles, often first heard in the region of the
root of the lung; these quickly become generalized. In the majority of
the cases signs of bronchopneumonia patches can be made out; these
are generally situated near the root of the lungs. In a certain number
of cases these patches spread and become confluent, giving
practically all of the physical signs of a lobar pneumonia. As the
disease progresses the air entry is diminished; on listening one is
often struck by the small volume of sound heard. The resonance of
the lungs may also be lessened. A slight pleuritic rub was heard in a
few of our cases, but this was soon masked by the bronchitis signs.”
Detailed sputum examination in twenty cases showed the presence
of the influenza bacillus in eighteen, and in ten out of these eighteen
the organism was isolated by culture. The next most frequent
organism found was the pneumococcus, which was present in
thirteen cases. The streptococcus was found in five.
Abrahams, Hallows, Eyre and French report the same epidemic:
“A typical case is as follows. The onset is usually acute; the early
symptoms are those of a ‘cold in the head.’ The temperature may be
101 or 102°, but there are no features to distinguish the condition
from acute ‘coryza’ or febricula, so that in the majority of cases the
patient does not report sick for two or three days, by which time he is
sent to the hospital. At this state two features attract particular
attention. First, the character of the expectoration: this consists of
thick pale yellow, almost pure pus, not the frothy expectoration
familiar in ordinary bronchitis; it has no particular odor and it
becomes increasingly abundant until in a day or two it may amount
to several ounces in the twenty-four hours. Secondly, the rapidity of
the patient’s breathing: this may be so evident that pneumonia
suggests itself, yet on examining the chest the only physical signs
consist of few or many rhonchi scattered widely, but most marked at
the bases of the lungs behind, associated with a wheezy vesicular
murmur; resonance everywhere is unimpaired and bronchial
breathing is absent. A little later a third point attracts notice; a
peculiar dusky heliotrope type of cyanosis of the face, lips, and ears,
so characteristic as to hall-mark the nature of the patient’s malady
even on superficial inspection. By this time dyspnoea is very
pronounced; respiration consists of short, shallow movements,
which in bad cases amount almost to gasps, reminiscent of the effects
of gas poisoning. Recovery at this stage may occur, but by the time
the cyanosis has become at all pronounced the prognosis is
extremely bad, though the number of days the patient may still live,
in spite of the severity of his distress, is often surprising. The
character of the sputum remains the same throughout, though
sometimes it is blood-tinged or actual blood may be expectorated
instead of, or in addition to, the more typical pale yellow pus. In the
later stages of the illness areas of impaired note or of actual dullness
may be found, particularly over the posterior aspects of the lungs,
associated with bronchial breathing and crepitant râles. These may
be due to the progression of the purulent bronchitis into hypostatic
pneumonia, or into actual bronchopneumonia at the bases; or, on
the other hand, they may be due to massive collapse of the lungs
secondary to the bronchitis and obstruction of the bronchioles by
pus. In a few cases, not necessarily the most serious, a frank lobar
pneumonia has developed later, and has been followed by an
empyema from which 15–30 ounces of thin pneumococcal pus has
been aspirated—in one case alone was resection of a rib unavoidable.
The condition, however, is not primarily a lobar or a
bronchopneumonia, but a bronchitis, and although a small amount
of basal bronchopneumonia has been present in one or two of our
post-mortem examinations, in other fatal cases there has been no
bronchopneumonia at all, not even the smallest portions of either
lung being found to sink in water.
“We have no doubt that the condition is primarily an affection of
the bronchi and bronchioles, and not of the alveoli, though the
alveoli may be affected later if the patient survives long enough. In a
typical post-mortem examination it would be difficult, or almost
impossible, to define the actual cause of death unless one knew the
clinical history.”
Abrahams and his collaborators describe in detail eight
consecutive cases. A study of the type of onset may be of help in
determining the character of the disease. The first patient had been
subject to bronchitis for years. He had been ill with cough and some
pyrexia for five days previous to his admission. There is no further
description of his admission symptoms. Case two was admitted on
March 17th, having taken ill the previous day with shivering, cold
and pain in the chest. The temperature was 104°, the pulse-rate 118,
and the respirations were 44. The patient was very restless and had
much dyspnoea but was not cyanosed. The third patient had taken ill
three days previous to admission with symptoms of cold in the head
and a sore throat. He complained of headache and dry cough without
expectoration, shortness of breath, and a pain behind the sternum.
Case four was admitted with a history of having been out of sorts
with a cold and bronchial cough for ten days previously. On
admission his temperature was 103°, pulse-rate 112 and respiration-
rate 36. He had abundant blood-stained purulent sputum.
Case five is the first case that shows a type of onset distinctly
resembling that of influenza. The patient had been ill three days with
headache, cough and generalized pain previous to his admission. The
temperature on admission to the hospital was 103°, pulse-rate 112,
respiration-rate 20. There were no abnormal physical signs in the
chest on admission. They did appear two days later. Case six related
that he had been sleeping under canvas for three nights before
coming to the hospital, and that during the first of these nights he
was taken ill with a cold which became associated with a cough and
increasing shortness of breath. On admission there was slight
cyanosis, and dyspnoea was very pronounced. Shortly afterwards he
became orthopnoeic, with heliotrope cyanosis. On the slightest
exertion, such as turning over in bed, the cyanosis increased
markedly, and although the respiration-rate remained under forty
when he was at rest, on the least exertion it increased to nearly sixty.
The sputum was purulent and abundant, pale yellow, not frothy and
not blood-stained, and the day after admission contained Bacillus
influenzae, pneumococcus and Micrococcus catarrhalis.
Case seven had been ill seven days before admission with cough
and fever. On admission his temperature was 105°, pulse 116,
respiration 24. Case eight gave a history of having had a cough for
eight days previous to admission. This cough had not incapacitated
him much at first, but he became progressively worse during the four
days before admission, with increasing shortness of breath and
abundant yellow sputum which he found it difficult to raise. On
admission dyspnoea with cyanosis was very evident.
Even from these detailed clinical descriptions it is impossible to
say definitely whether the disease was or was not influenza. There is
no doubt, however, but that clinically the disease resembled more the
so-called streptococcus pneumonias that were observed in the
United States camps in the winter of 1917–18. The descriptions of the
mode of onset are particularly at variance with the onset as we know
it in influenza.
Those who believe that the influenza bacillus is the cause of
influenza maintain that the finding of this organism in a large per
cent. of cases by both groups of observers is valuable evidence. For
reasons previously stated we cannot agree.
Description of the epidemic features is not detailed enough to be of
assistance. The first group of authors remark that the disease
constituted “almost a small epidemic.” The second group say that six
out of eight cases in their series of candidly reported patients came
from one command. The former report on twenty cases, the latter on
eight. The latter remark that although they have dealt with only eight
cases in detail, they had a much larger number altogether.
Presumably there were a decidedly larger number of patients in both
hospitals, but the actual number is not stated. In short, we do not
know whether the disease appeared to be more or less epidemic than
the apparently similar disease among our troops in the winter of
1917–18.
Both groups of observers have described in some detail the
pathology of the cases which were necropsied. The author in
attempting to obtain further comparative information has submitted
the pathologic descriptions given by the British authors to Dr. E. W.
Goodpasture, who has very kindly pointed out the points of
similarity and difference between the gross and microscopic findings
in these cases of purulent bronchitis, and the same findings in typical
influenza. He says that the lung picture, as described, is not the same
as that which was typical of the acute influenza observed in the
autumn of 1918 and again in the winter of 1920. The characteristic
picture in the latter is primarily an extensive involvement of the
alveolar structure, while as Abrahams and his associates remarked,
the condition in their case is primarily “an affection of the bronchi
and bronchioles, and not of the alveoli, though the alveoli may be
affected later, if the patient survives long enough.” Goodpasture
states that the pathology as described by the British authors is very
similar to the lung picture in interstitial bronchopneumonia
described by MacCallum for the post-measles and primary
bronchopneumonia among our troops in the winter of 1917–18. The
streptococcus and the influenza bacillus were dominant organisms in
MacCallum’s series. It also resembles the pathologic picture
described by Pfeiffer in his original article on one of the late
recurrences of the 1889–93 epidemics of influenza.
In summing up, we must admit that it is impossible to reach a
definite conclusion, but that both clinically and pathologically the
disease described among the British troops in 1916 and 1917 was not
typical of influenza as we have known it more recently. The similar
conclusion reached by Carnwath, presumably chiefly from
epidemiologic considerations, has already been described. We do not
deny that this “purulent bronchitis” may have been influenza. On the
contrary, it is a part of our hypothesis that influenza under the
proper conditions may become epidemic in practically any land. But
we do believe that the evidence has not shown that the disease
among the British troops in 1916 and 1917 was an etiologic precursor
of the great pandemic.
To return to a discussion of influenza in China, we quote from an
article by Cadbury in the China Medical Journal: “Unfortunately no
health reports are available for the greater part of the Chinese
Republic. We have consulted, however, the Health Reports of the
Shanghai Municipal Council from 1898 to 1917, and among the total
foreign deaths we find that only the following were attributed to
influenza: 1899, one death; 1900, one death; 1907, four deaths; 1910,
one death. After this no deaths are recorded from this cause up to
and including the year 1917.
“In the Hongkong Medical and Sanitary Reports, which give the
total deaths registered in the Colony, we have examined the records
from 1909 to 1917. During these nine years only two deaths were
attributed to influenza, and both occurred in 1909.
“From a personal letter from Dr. Arthur Stanley, Health Officer in
Shanghai, dated February 11, 1919, I quote the following:
“‘As to influenza we had an attack beginning at the end of May and
lasting through June and again in the latter part of October and
lasting through November. The latter was somewhat more severe.
The noteworthy features were general absence of catarrhal
symptoms, congestive pharynx frequent, as also was a slight
erythematous blush on the neck and chest, which made one think at
first of scarlet fever. Fatal pneumonia common among the Chinese
and Japanese, but among Europeans very little pneumonia.’
“In his report for May, 1918, Dr. Stanley says that the disease was
reported to have reached Peking before it came to Shanghai, but
subsequent reports showed that most of the river ports were almost
simultaneously infected, the rate of spread conforming to the rate of
conveyance by railways and boats of infected persons. The mortality
was very low.
“Newspaper reports indicate that a third appearance of the disease
in Shanghai occurred from the middle of February, 1919, which was
still prevalent in April. The symptoms were much more severe.
“For Hongkong I quote from a personal letter from Dr. Hickling,
the Principal Medical Officer of Health, dated January 29, 1919:
“‘The epidemic of influenza in the spring was a very mild one, so
far as we can judge. The disease did not last more than a few days in
most cases. The recent epidemic (October, November, December and
January) has been much more severe, often lasting two or three
weeks.’
“Only one death, which occurred on May 14th, was reported from
Hongkong in the spring. In the later epidemic the deaths reported
were as follows: October, 70; November, 95; December, 67. The first
of these deaths occurred on October 5th. The figures for January had
not been compiled, but the disease was diminishing.
“Dr. C. W. McKenny of Hongkong has kindly furnished me with
the following facts: ‘During the first five months of 1918 there were
twenty-two admissions for influenza to the Civil and Tung Wa
hospitals (3 in May). In June there were 269 cases with three deaths.
In July, August and September, 43 cases; and during October-
November, 130 cases with four deaths....
“‘The June epidemic in Canton appeared first at the Pui Ying
School, then among the employees of the Post Office, the staff of the
Canton Hospital, the Canton Christian College, and the Kung Yee
Hospital. The other schools entirely escaped. Eleven days were taken
by the disease to spread from one part of the city to the various other
parts.’”
Plague appeared in the north of China in 1917, originating
apparently in inner Mongolia. The spread extended over quite an
area, and it is reported that this epidemic of pneumonic plague has
been more extensive than any since that of 1910–11. The disease was
first reported prevalent in Patsebolong December 6, 1917. The
diagnosis was confirmed bacteriologically, and there can be little
doubt but that the cases of plague reported in various parts of China
even up to March 18th were true plague, and not unrecognized
influenza.
SECTION III.
In the following section of our report we shall have frequent

occasion to refer to a series of investigations conducted by the author
in the City of Boston during the 1920 influenza epidemic. We will
explain in some detail at this point the nature of the work done and
the methods used, in order that the subsequent references will be
readily intelligible.
An Investigation of Influenza in Boston
During the Winter of 1920.
Following every widespread epidemic interest centers in the
question as to how much havoc the disease has wrought, what
proportion of the population fell victim, and how many of these died.
With regard to influenza the vital statistics of all countries are
decidedly insufficient in furnishing this information.
In nearly all countries influenza is not a reportable disease.
Usually, as was the case in the United States in 1918, the disease was
made reportable during the epidemic, but this took effect usually at
least two weeks after the epidemic had started in a community.
Further, there is probably not a single community in which the
reported cases of influenza reach to anywhere near the total of actual
cases. The question of diagnosis, which is not always easy even in the
presence of a pandemic, causes some physicians to hesitate to report
cases. Other physicians “play safe” and report nearly everything as
influenza. Finally, in the period of an epidemic, the physicians are so
pressed with caring for the sick that they very naturally neglect to
report cases as they occur.
It becomes necessary, therefore, in collecting evidence in civil
populations, of the morbidity and fatality from influenza, to obtain
additional information to that available to the Health Officer.
The method which may be relied upon to give the most accurate
data consists in house-to-house surveys made soon after an
epidemic, in which competent inspectors obtain detailed information
concerning the illness or freedom from illness of every individual in
the areas canvassed. The majority of individuals interviewed will not
have had the disease, and it is therefore essential that in such a
census a large enough population be covered that the resulting
figures will be truly representative of the population at large.
Toward the end of January, 1920, when the recurrent epidemic
was at its height in Boston, the author undertook with the aid of
thirteen trained social service workers, and one physician, who was a
graduate of the Harvard School of Public Health, to make a sickness

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Criminal Actions and Social Situations:

Understanding the Role of Structure

Criminal Astrology Understanding the Crime Charts 1st

Social Ontology and Collective Intentionality Critical

Understanding the Role of Business Analytics: Some

Successful Educational Actions for Inclusion and Social

The Social Structure Of Online Communities William Sims

Social Movements The Structure of Collective

Overcoming Information Poverty Investigating the Role

Queering Pregnancy Understanding the Role of Queer

Criminal Actions and

ISBN 978-1-137-45730-1 ISBN 978-1-137-45731-8 (eBook)

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017961835

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018

Cover illustration: Baranovskaya

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature

My thanks are due to St Edmund’s College, Cambridge and the Institute

Max-Planck Institute for European Legal History Anthony Amatrudo

Section 1 Technical and Analytical Considerations 1

1 The Central Problem of Collective Action 3

2 Collective Actions and Goals 33

Section 2 Legal Considerations 61

3 Mobs, Masses and Treating People as Groups 63

4 Organisations and Their Enterprise in UK Criminal Law

Section 3 Reality and Sociology 117

5 Real-Life Cases: War Criminal Prosecutions and the

6 The Gang in Criminological Literature 145

7 Drawing the Strands Together 171

© The Author(s) 2018 3

responsibility. It has been argued that: “There is no need to speak of

existing, or underlying, collective goal or goals. It is a tricky idea: for

actions, may, in turn, be reduced to a sub-set of individual actions, each

socio-legal terms. By insisting upon a technical determination of group

We-action Theory in Bratman

importance of distinguishing SCA from JIA, for Bratman, is to under-

Collective Action and Intentions in Bratman

We intend to J if and only if:

1. (a) I intend that we J and (b) you intend that we J;

Bratman on Shared Intentions

When I decide that we paint together, I suppose that my intention that we

Bearing this in mind, let us restate that an outcome o is produced by

behaviour performed by the participating individuals. This ability to

Getting More Technical

remains what we technically call other-actor enabled, in other words it

Plural Subjects in Gilbert’s Account

Ethics of Joint Commitment

Gilbert on Plural Subjects

If we consider these three elements together we note that they form

 he Role of Joint Commitment and Obligation

In the following section of our report we shall have frequent

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Max-Planck Institute for European Legal History Anthony Amatrudo

Section 1 Technical and Analytical Considerations 1

1 The Central Problem of Collective Action 3

2 Collective Actions and Goals 33

Section 2 Legal Considerations 61

3 Mobs, Masses and Treating People as Groups 63

4 Organisations and Their Enterprise in UK Criminal Law

Section 3 Reality and Sociology 117

5 Real-Life Cases: War Criminal Prosecutions and the

6 The Gang in Criminological Literature 145

7 Drawing the Strands Together 171

We-action Theory in Bratman

Collective Action and Intentions in Bratman

Bratman on Shared Intentions

Getting More Technical

Plural Subjects in Gilbert’s Account

Ethics of Joint Commitment

Gilbert on Plural Subjects

he Role of Joint Commitment and Obligation