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Five Modes of Scepticism

OXFORD PHILOSOPHICAL MONOGRAPHS

Editorial Committee
William Child, R. S. Crisp, A. W. Moore, Stephen Mulhall,
Christopher G. Timpson
Other titles in this series include
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J. P. Studd
Vagueness and Thought
Andrew Bacon
Visual Experience: A Semantic Approach
Wylie Breckenridge
Discrimination and Disrespect
Benjamin Eidelson
Knowing Better: Virtue, Deliberation, and Normative Ethics
Daniel Star
Potentiality and Possibility: A Dispositional Account of
Metaphysical Modality
Barbara Vetter
Moral Reason
Julia Markovits
Category Mistakes
Ofra Magidor
The Critical Imagination
James Grant
From Morality to Metaphysics: The Theistic Implications
of our Ethical Commitments
Angus Ritchie
Aquinas on Friendship
Daniel Schwartz
The Brute Within: Appetitive Desire in Plato and Aristotle
Hendrik Lorenz
Five Modes
of Scepticism
Sextus Empiricus
and the Agrippan Modes
Stefan Sienkiewicz
1
3
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For my parents, Richard and Naz—for everything.

Contents
Acknowledgements ix
Introduction 1
1. The Mode of Disagreement 12
Some Features of Disagreement 12
Kinds of Disagreement 15
Is the Sceptic Part of the Disagreement? 19
Disagreement and Undecided Disagreement 22
Principles of Disagreement 25
Two Accounts of the Sorts of Beliefs a Sceptic Can Hold 29
A Dogmatic Mode of Disagreement 31
The Method of Equipollence 34
A Sceptical Mode of Disagreement 41
Chronicling Disagreement and Creating Disagreement 47
Concluding Remarks 51
2. The Mode of Hypothesis 53
When the Mode of Hypothesis Occurs 53
What Hypothesizing Is Not 55
What Hypothesizing Is 59
The Function of Hypothesizing 64
Three Modes of Hypothesis 68
A Sceptical Mode of Hypothesis 72
The Mode of Hypothesis as a Limiting Case of the
Method of Equipollence 74
3. The Mode of Infinite Regression 77
Infinity Introduced 77
The Unacceptability of Infinitely Regressive Arguments 80
The Unsurveyability of Infinitely Regressive Arguments 87
Infinite Regression and the Suspension of Judgement 93
A Dogmatic Mode of Infinite Regression 97
A Sceptical Mode of Infinite Regression 99
4. The Mode of Reciprocity 104
Reciprocity Parallel to Infinite Regression 104
Formal Reciprocity 105
viii CONTENTS
Regressive Reciprocity 108

Conceptual Reciprocity 110
The Unacceptability of Reciprocal Arguments 111
Two Kinds of Priority 114
Asymmetry and Transitivity 116
From Reciprocity to the Suspension of Judgement 118
A Dogmatic Mode of Reciprocity 119
A Sceptical Mode of Reciprocity 121
5. The Mode of Relativity 125
Modes of Relativity 125
The Logical Form of Sextus’ Argument 129
Sub-Argument 1 132
Sub-Argument 2 134
Sub-Argument 3 136
The Nature of Sextan Relativity 137
The Mode of Relativity and the Other Agrippan Modes 143
Relativity and Disagreement 147
6. The Modes Combined 154
Preliminary Remarks 154
Net 1 157
Net 2 166
The Modes Recombined 177
Actual Disagreement, Possible Disagreement, and the Giving
of Reasons 181
Dogmatic Nets 186
References 193
Index Locorum 199
General Index 202
Acknowledgements
This book owes much to many. My interest in Sextus Empiricus was

sparked back when I was an undergraduate when I stumbled across
Jonathan Barnes’s The Toils of Scepticism, without which—simply
put—this book would not exist. That spark was fanned by attending a
splendid series of lectures on Sextus by Benjamin Morison, who first
prompted me to think more about the theoretical underpinnings of the
Agrippan modes and under whose expert guidance I began to articulate,
in an MSt thesis, some of the ideas that still find expression in the
following pages. So many of the insights of this book—if insights they
be—I owe to my conversations with him. To my DPhil supervisor, David
Charles, whose acuity, diligence, kindness, and generosity—both philo-
sophical and otherwise—remain for me exemplary, I owe a debt that
cannot be repaid. To my two doctoral examiners—Jonathan Barnes and
Thomas Johansen—without whose encouragement and advice this book
would not have seen the light of day, I offer my heartfelt thanks. Finally,
to Peter Momtchiloff for his patience and good humour and to the
anonymous readers for Oxford University Press, whose extensive and
thoughtful comments have improved the contents of this book no end,
I am deeply grateful.
In terms of scholarship, the writings of two individuals, in particular,
demand singling out: first, Benjamin Morison, whose work on the
Aenesideman modes has much influenced my thinking about the Agrip-
pan modes, and, second, Jonathan Barnes, whose pioneering Sextan
studies have provided the foil for much of the contents of this book.
A hasty reader might be forgiven for inferring that I only cite the work of
Barnes when I wish to disagree with it or when I wish to contrast a path
taken by Barnes with an alternative path down which I subsequently
tread. Nothing could be further from the truth. Though it will be plain
from the following pages just how much I owe to the writings of Julia
Annas, Richard Bett, Myles Burnyeat, Michael Frede, R. J. Hankinson,
Benjamin Morison, Casey Perin, and Gisela Striker, Jonathan Barnes’s
influence will be apparent on virtually every page.
x ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Moving from individuals to collectives, I would like to express my

gratitude to the ancient philosophy community in Oxford of which—in
one way or another—I have been a member for the past fourteen years. It
has been at the centre of my intellectual life and has given me so much.
Long may it flourish. It is impossible to record here the names of all of
the philosophers who have helped me in the writing of this book—let
alone all of those philosophers from whom I have learned—but for their
conversation, correspondence, advice, and encouragement along the way
I would like to thank: Tom Ainsworth, Jason Carter, Ursula Coope,
Matthew Duncombe, Gail Fine, Mark Gatten, Edward Hussey, Terry
Irwin, Dhananjay Jagannathan, Lindsay Judson, Nakul Krishna, Harvey
Lederman, Tamer Nawar, Michael Peramatzis, Martin Pickup, Gonzalo
Rodriguez-Pereyra, Christopher Shields, Gisela Striker, James Studd and
Rob Watt.
I would also like to give hearty thanks to the following institutions: to
the Oxford colleges of Christ Church and Oriel for supporting me so well
as a student and to Balliol for supporting me so well as a fellow; to the
AHRC for awarding me the funding required to complete my postgradu-
ate studies; to the Bodleian Library where virtually every word of this
book was written and to the London Library and the Institute of Classical
Studies Library where a good deal of them were rewritten. In particular,
I would like to thank my wonderful Balliol colleagues both in philosophy
and in classics for making the last five years such a pleasure. I raise a glass
to Adam Caulton, Alex Kaiserman, Adrian Kelly, Ofra Magidor, Jonny
McIntosh, Matthew Robinson, Rowland Stout, Rosalind Thomas and
David Wallace.
Last—but by no means least—I want to record a debt that cannot at all
easily be put into words. To my family (in particular my parents, Richard
and Naz, to whom I dedicate this book), to Emma, and to every one of
my friends—for all those nameless, unremembered (and remembered)
acts of kindness and of love, thank you. This book would not have been
written without you. Of that I am not in the least bit sceptical.
STEFAN SIENKIEWICZ
Balliol College, Oxford
April 2018
Introduction
This book has as its focus a particular type of philosophical scepticism

and a particular aspect of that particular type of scepticism. The type of
scepticism in question is Pyrrhonian scepticism and the particular aspect
of that type of scepticism is its Agrippan aspect.¹ Pyrrho and Agrippa are
shadowy characters—Agrippa the shadowier—and in the following
pages not one citation of either Pyrrho or Agrippa is to be found. This
is for the simple reason that none of their writings (if, indeed, Pyrrho
wrote anything at all²) survive.³ Instead, the main textual source for this
study, which is also our main textual source for ancient Pyrrhonism in
general, is The Outlines of Pyrrhonism by the third-century AD doctor and
philosopher Sextus Empiricus.⁴ It is the version of Pyrrhonian scepticism
presented to us in the pages of Sextus’ Outlines with which I shall be
concerned.⁵
¹ Other varieties of scepticism—for example the Academic and the Cartesian—do not
feature.
² According to Sextus, Pyrrho wrote a poem for Alexander the Great (M 1.282).
Diogenes Laertius in his Lives of the Philosophers claims, at one point, that Pyrrho wrote
nothing at all (I 16) and, at another, that he left nothing in writing (IX 102). Whatever the
truth of the matter, it is reasonable to infer that none of Pyrrho’s writings was philosophical.
³ Agrippa is mentioned once in Diogenes Laertius IX 88. There are no other mentions of
him in the ancient texts and none of his works survive. The situation regarding Pyrrho is
marginally better. His name crops up in Diogenes Laertius, Sextus, and Plutarch; and in
Eusebius’ Preparation for the Gospel (Praep. evang. XIV xviii 1–4) a summary is offered of
some aspects of his thought by his student Timon. I discuss this passage in greater detail in
Chapter 1 n. 17. For further information on Pyrrho see Sedley (1983), pp. 14–16 and Bett
(2000).
⁴ ‘PH’ is the standard abbreviation.
⁵ I shall also, occasionally, make reference to Sextus’ other works, namely Against the
Mathematicians 1–6 and Against the Mathematicians 7–11 (the standard abbreviation is M).
However, my main focus will be on the Outlines. For the Greek texts I have used the
standard Teubner editions: PH (ed.) Mutschmann and Mau (1958); M 7–11 (ed.)
    
Unless I say otherwise, by ‘sceptic’ I should be taken to mean Pyrrhonian

sceptic, by ‘Pyrrhonian sceptic’ I should be taken to mean Pyrrhonian
sceptic as presented by Sextus in the Outlines and by ‘Agrippan aspect of
Pyrrhonian scepticism’ I should be taken to mean those five argument
forms (or ‘modes’) which Sextus outlines for us at PH 1.164–79 and which
Diogenes Laertius (IX 88) attributes to Agrippa.⁶ They are the modes of
disagreement, hypothesis, infinite regression, reciprocity, and relativity.
These are by no means the only argument forms Sextus discusses in the
Outlines—PH 1.35–63, for instance, is taken up with an exposition of ten
Aenesideman modes and PH 1.180–6 adverts to eight modes which target
causal explanations. However, I shall not comment upon either of these
other sets of modes, unless, in so doing, light is shed on one or more of the
Agrippan modes.⁷
Why this Agrippan focus? There are at least three reasons. First, these
modes lie at the heart of the sceptic’s argumentative practice. Sextus
adduces them time and again in the Outlines—indeed they can be seen to
underpin both the ten Aenesideman modes and the eight modes against
casual explanation, though to fully elaborate on this claim would require
writing a different book from the one I have written.
Secondly, these argument forms have intrinsic and abiding philosoph-
ical interest. I hope a sense of their intrinsic philosophical interest
emerges from the subsequent pages. As for evidence of their abiding
interest, one might point to the fact that there has, in recent years, been a
surge of interest in the epistemology of disagreement.⁸ Indeed, taking the
longer view, one can point to the fact that the sceptical problem posed by
the combined modes of infinite regression, reciprocity, and hypothesis
Mutschmann (1914); M 1–6 (ed.) Mau (1961). Translations of PH are based on Annas and
Barnes (2000). Translations of other ancient texts are my own.
⁶ Sextus attributes the modes to ‘the more recent sceptics’ (οἱ νεώτεροι) at PH 1.164.
These sceptics are presumably more recent than the ‘older sceptics’ (οἱ ἀρχαιότεροι) of
whom Sextus speaks at PH 1.36 and to whom he ascribes the ten modes. Elsewhere, at
M 7.345, Sextus attributes the ten modes to Aenesidemus, so we might date the more recent
sceptics of PH 1.165 to somewhere between Aenesidemus and Sextus, that is between 100 BC
and AD 200. For further detail on Aenesidemus’ dates see Glucker (1978), pp. 116–18 and on
Sextus’ see House (1980).
⁷ For reflections on the Aenesideman modes see Annas and Barnes (1985), Striker
(1996a), and Morison (2011) and on the eight modes against causal explanation see Barnes
(1983).
⁸ See, by way of example, the anthologies by Feldman and Warfield (2010) and Chris-
tensen and Lackey (2013).
 
has been a perennial source of reflection for epistemologists. In the words

of Laurence Bonjour it is ‘perhaps the most crucial in the entire theory of
knowledge’.⁹
Thirdly, and for my purposes most significantly, those commentators
who have discussed the Agrippan modes, have—for the most part—
failed to distinguish, or to distinguish sufficiently carefully, between
two importantly different perspectives on these modes. It is the articu-
lation of these two different perspectives which is the central theme of
this book.
The Agrippan modes are introduced to us by Sextus at PH 1.164 as
modes of epochē—a sceptical term of art which Sextus glosses for us at
PH 1.10 as a standstill of the intellect (στάσις διανοίας), owing to which
we neither reject nor posit anything (δι’ἥν οὔτε αἴρομέν τι οὔτε τίθεμεν).
The term is often translated by the phrase ‘suspension of judgement’ and
this is the translation adopted in these pages. In subsequent chapters
I adopt the following characterization of the phenomenon: some epi-
stemic subject, S, suspends judgement with regard to some proposition,
P, just in case, having considered the matter, S neither believes P nor
believes not-P.¹⁰ This book, then, asks of the five Agrippan modes, both
individually and collectively, how they bring about suspension of judge-
ment, so understood. In particular, to reiterate its central theme, it
identifies two different perspectives on this question: one might ask
how some dogmatic philosopher comes to suspend judgement on the
basis of one or more of these modes, or one might ask how a sceptic
comes to suspend judgement on the basis of one or more of these modes.
⁹ Bonjour (1985), p. 18.

¹⁰ The ‘having considered the matter’ clause is important because it prevents suspension
of judgement arising too easily. Without it, I would stand in a relation of suspended
judgement to a whole range of propositions just by virtue of never having entertained
any of the propositions in question. For example, until writing this sentence, I have never
given a moment’s thought as to whether or not Parmenides was left-handed. I therefore
neither believed nor disbelieved the claim, but that is not to say that I suspended judgement
on the matter. Sextus himself emphasizes that suspension of judgement over some question
only arises once the arguments on both sides of the question have been considered (PH 1.8).
For a recent analysis of the concept of suspended judgement, which departs from this
Sextan way of construing suspension of judgement and instead argues that having con-
sidered whether P is neither necessary nor sufficient for suspending judgement over P see
Friedman (2013), pp. 165–81. On Friedman’s view ‘one suspends judgment about p only if
one has an attitude that expresses or represents or just is one’s neutrality or indecision about
which of p, ¬ p is true’ (Friedman (2013), p. 179).
    
These are different questions because the sceptic and the dogmatist are
very different sorts of epistemic agent. One basic difference is that the
sceptic, unlike the dogmatist, is restricted with regard to the sorts of
belief he can hold. As Sextus informs us in a celebrated passage of the
Outlines—PH 1.13—the sceptic does not hold any beliefs, the holding of
which involves assenting to some unclear object of investigation of the
sciences (τήν τινι πράγματι τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας ζητουμένων ἀδήλων
συγκατάθεσιν). Two main interpretative traditions detailing the sorts of
beliefs a sceptic is prohibited from holding have sprung up from the well-
tilled soil of the PH 1.13 passage, the details of which do not need to
concern us here in this Introduction—they will concern us later. It will
suffice to say that, according to one of these traditions, the sceptic is
prohibited from holding beliefs which have theoretical content (which
I term the Content Interpretation) and, according to the other, the
sceptic is prohibited from holding beliefs which are arrived at by a
process of reasoning (which I term the Grounds Interpretation).¹¹ For
the moment, let us refer to these prohibited beliefs as ‘theoretical beliefs’.
The PH 1.13 passage, therefore, tells us at least one thing about the
respective ways in which a sceptic and a dogmatist come to suspend
judgement on the basis of the Agrippan modes: the dogmatist can reach
suspended judgement by relying on various theoretical beliefs, but a
sceptic cannot.
Of those commentators who have probed the working of the Agrippan
modes, the most significant treatment to date is that of Jonathan
Barnes.¹² Though there have been (albeit briefer) treatments of the
modes by R. J. Hankinson, Harald Thorsrud, and Paul Woodruff, it is
Barnes’s work which will provide the main focus for this study.¹³ It has
two main aims. The first is to show that the reconstruction offered by
commentators, like Barnes, of some of the modes—in particular the
modes of infinite regression and reciprocity—is a dogmatic one. By
this I mean that it is a reconstruction which captures perfectly well
how a dogmatic philosopher might come to suspend judgement on the
¹¹ Barnes (1982) and Burnyeat (1984) can be seen as representative of the Content
Interpretation, Frede (1987) and Morison (2011) of the Grounds Interpretation. I elaborate
on these two traditions of interpretation in greater detail in Chapter 1.
¹² See Barnes (1990a) and Barnes (1990b).
¹³ See Hankinson (1995), Thorsrud (2009), and Woodruff (2010).
 
basis of these modes, but which cannot capture how a sceptic might
come to do so.¹⁴ The reason for this is that on the proposed reconstruc-
tion, the sceptic would have to hold a variety of theoretical beliefs to
which he is not entitled.
The second aim is to effect a change of perspective by approaching the
question of how the modes in general are meant to bring about suspen-
sion of judgement not from the point of view of the dogmatist, but from
the point of view of the sceptic. In this respect, the book can be seen as
opening up an alternative to a line of thinking advanced by Michael
Frede. On Frede’s view, the various first-person locutions that pepper the
Outlines—locutions such as ‘we come to suspend judgement’—are to be
understood as claims made by a sceptic who adopts, temporarily and
purely for dialectical purposes, a set of dogmatic assumptions and
patterns of reasoning.¹⁵ The present work can be seen as an attempt at
seeing how far one can take these locutions at face value—that is, taking
them as claims which a sceptic makes on his own behalf and not for
purely dialectical reasons.
Lest this point be misunderstood, let me stress that, in what follows,
I take no view as to whether Sextus himself was a sceptic who lacked all
theoretical beliefs.¹⁶ In the following pages I often speak of Sextus
‘formulating an argument’ or ‘drawing a conclusion’ or ‘objecting to a
line of reasoning’, activities which, one might reasonably think, would
require the holding of at least some minimally theoretical beliefs. The
point is simply to see how one might characterize the sceptic’s behaviour
if, pace Frede, one interprets those first-person utterances in the context
of the Agrippan modes as utterances made by a sceptic who makes them
sincerely and not for purely dialectical reasons.
In reconstructing the Agrippan modes from a sceptical and not a
dogmatic perspective two questions in particular will be distinguished
from one another and addressed: the question as to how the sceptic puts
the modes to use in his tussles with his dogmatic opponents, and the
question as to how a sceptic might come to suspend judgement on the
¹⁴ Note that the dogmatist could either be the historical figure with whom the sceptic
tussled or the contemporary historian of philosophy who anatomizes, analyses, recon-
structs, and passes judgement on the effectiveness of the sceptic’s arguments.
¹⁵ See Frede (1987c), pp. 204–5.
¹⁶ Lorenzo Corti has emphasized to me in conversation the importance of distinguishing
Sextus from the sceptic referred to in his pages.
    
basis of those modes. The starting point for my response to these

questions is grounded in an insight I share with Benjamin Morison,
who has recently raised the possibility of interpreting the Agrippan
modes in light of the sceptic’s method of equipollence.¹⁷ This is a method
that involves opposing to every argument one encounters, an argument
of equal force but with a conclusion incompatible with the conclusion of
the original argument.
It will emerge that the Agrippan modes end up having very different
argumentative structures depending on whether we think of them from
the perspective of the sceptic or from that of the dogmatist. What
inferences can be drawn regarding Sextus’ literary intentions from this
fact is not a question I pursue. It may be the case that in texts where he
discusses the Agrippan modes, Sextus is self-consciously simultaneously
addressing both a sceptical and a dogmatic reader, aware that the
Agrippan modes could equally bring a sceptic and a dogmatist to sus-
pend judgement. But my concern in this book is not to divine Sextus’
literary intentions. It is simply to stress that the modes will have to
display these different argumentative structures—depending on whether
we think of them as working on a sceptic or on a dogmatist—irrespective
of whether Sextus himself recognized that fact.¹⁸
The details of my attempt to give an account of the sceptic’s deploy-
ment of the Agrippan modes—both against his dogmatic opponent and
against himself—in terms of his equipollent ability will emerge in the
following pages and chapters. For the remainder of this Introduction
I shall outline the overall structure of this book and the main conclusions
that are drawn in each of its chapters.
Unlike Gaul, it is divided into six parts. The first five deal with the
modes individually. The final sixth considers them in combination with
one another. The order in which I treat the modes does not reflect Sextus’
ordering. Though we both begin with disagreement, we then diverge.¹⁹
My reason for altering the order in which Sextus presents them is purely
for ease of exposition, as the following sketch of each chapter should
make clear.
¹⁷ Morison (2014), §3.5.2.

¹⁸ My thanks to the anonymous reader for drawing my attention to this point.
¹⁹ My running order: disagreement, hypothesis, infinite regression, reciprocity, and
relativity. Sextus’: disagreement, infinite regression, relativity, hypothesis, and reciprocity.
 
I begin, in Chapter 1, with the mode of disagreement. After some

preliminary remarks about how the phenomenon of disagreement
should be understood, I distinguish two different principles (consistent
with Sextus’ remarks in the Outlines) which connect the phenomenon of
disagreement with suspension of judgement and two corresponding
versions of the mode of disagreement. One version, which turns on the
phenomenon of disagreement between epistemic peers, is, I argue, a
dogmatic version of the mode—dogmatic in the sense that the sceptic
cannot come to suspend judgement on the basis of it. This is because the
dogmatic version of the mode turns on a number of theoretical claims
which a sceptic is not in a position to believe. A second version, which
turns on the notion of undecided disagreement forms the basis of a
sceptical version of the mode—that is, a mode on the basis of which
a sceptic might come to suspend judgement. This is because, it is argued,
it is one and the same thing to suspend judgement on the basis of
undecided disagreement and to suspend judgement on the basis of a
pair of equipollent arguments.
To make sense of how the sceptic comes to suspend judgement on the
basis of the mode of disagreement is, therefore, one and the same project as
making sense of how the sceptic comes to suspend judgement on the basis
of his own equipollent ability. In the latter part of the chapter I argue that,
whether one adopts the Content Interpretation or the Grounds Interpret-
ation, it is possible to make sense of how the sceptic comes to suspend
judgement on the basis of his equipollent ability—and therefore on the
basis of the mode of disagreement. However, I also point out that the
explanation of the sceptic’s coming to suspend judgement is more
involved if one adopts the Grounds Interpretation. This is because, on
the Grounds Interpretation, the sceptic cannot believe that he is rationally
required to suspend judgement. Following a distinction drawn by Casey
Perin, I suggest how someone who adopts the Grounds Interpretation
might make sense of how the sceptic comes to suspend judgement by
distinguishing two phases in the sceptic’s career: a proto-sceptical phase
during which the sceptic suspends judgement because he believes it is the
rational thing to do and a mature sceptical phase during which the sceptic
suspends judgement not because he believes it is the rational thing to do,
but because he has developed a psychological disposition to do so.
The chapter closes by moving away from the question as to how the
sceptic comes to suspend judgement on the basis of the mode of
    
disagreement and reflects on the fact that undecided disagreement is

utilized by the sceptic in two ways: the sceptic is both a chronicler of
undecided disagreements that rage between various dogmatists and
himself a creator of undecided disagreement by virtue of exercising his
equipollent ability. An appreciation of these two ways in which the mode
might be deployed is shown to offer the beginnings of a response to an
objection that has sometimes been made regarding the power of the
mode of disagreement—namely that instances where the mode will be
effective are few and far between.
Chapter 2 centres on the mode of hypothesis. The opening sections
clarify what is involved in the act of hypothesizing, and a distinction is
drawn between dogmatic and sceptical hypotheses—where the former
are those hypotheses which the sceptic’s dogmatic opponent puts for-
ward to avoid falling victim to either the mode of infinite regression or
the mode of reciprocity, and the latter are those hypotheses which the
sceptic puts forward and which he casts in opposition to the dogmatist’s.
Three different versions of the mode are then extracted from the Outlines
and it is argued that the third of these is the most significant (and indeed
underpins the other versions). It is noted that the mode of hypothesis,
when utilized by a sceptic, is a limiting case of the sceptic’s method of
equipollence: to the dogmatist’s hypothesis the sceptic opposes his own
incompatible hypothesis and these hypotheses are equipollent because
they are supported by precisely the same kind of argument, namely no
argument at all.
Being a limiting case of the method of equipollence, the mode of
hypothesis therefore emerges as a unique Agrippan mode. Unlike the
mode of disagreement (which Chapter 1 showed could have both a
sceptical and a dogmatic face) and unlike the modes of infinite regression
and reciprocity (which Chapters 3 and 4 go on to show also have
sceptical and dogmatic incarnations), the mode of hypothesis is just an
instance of the sceptic’s method of equipollence. Chapter 2 concludes by
giving an account—parallel to that given regarding the sceptical version
of the mode of disagreement in Chapter 1—of how, on both the Content
Interpretation and the Grounds Interpretation, the sceptic can come to
suspend judgement on the basis of the mode of hypothesis.
Chapter 3 is concerned with the mode of infinite regression. Barnes’s
reconstruction of the mode is analysed and a modified version of it is
offered so that it yields a suspensive conclusion. It is then argued that this
 
modified version is a dogmatic version of the mode, for, on Barnes’s

view, some epistemic subject suspends judgement on the basis of the
mode of infinite regression by framing to himself an argument with a
number of theoretical premises, for example the premise that infinitely
regressive arguments are bad kinds of argument. It is noted that when
the sceptic exercises the mode of infinite regression that is merely a
particular instance of his method of equipollence: opposing to one
infinitely regressive argument another infinitely regressive argument
with a conclusion incompatible with the conclusion of the original
argument. A sceptical version of the mode is then constructed, and an
account given of how, on both the Content and the Grounds Interpret-
ation, the sceptic is able to come to suspend judgement on the basis of
the mode.
Chapter 4 has a similar structure to Chapter 3, though here the mode
under scrutiny is the mode of reciprocity. Following Barnes, three dif-
ferent kinds of reciprocity are identified in the Outlines, and it is argued
that only one of these kinds of reciprocity—formal reciprocity—is rele-
vant to an understanding of the mode. Barnes’s reconstruction of the
mode is then analysed and for analogous reasons to those mentioned in
Chapter 3, it is argued that the version of the mode offered by Barnes is a
version by which a dogmatist might come to suspend judgement, but not
a sceptic. Chapter 4 closes as Chapter 3 closed. It is noted that the
sceptic’s use of the mode of reciprocity is a particular instance of his
equipollent ability, and a sceptical version of the mode is presented.
According to this version of the mode, the sceptic suspends judgement
when confronted by a pair of equipollent reciprocal arguments just as he
did when confronted by a pair of equipollent hypotheses in Chapter 2
and by a pair of equipollent infinitely regressive arguments in Chapter 3.
Chapters 1–4, then, form—or should form—a coherent whole. In
Chapter 1, the sceptical version of the mode of disagreement was
shown to be equivalent to the phenomenon of equipollent argumenta-
tion but where the type of equipollent argumentation in question is left
unspecified. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 can be thought of as providing examples
of particular kinds of equipollent argumentation—hypothetical argu-
mentation in the case of Chapter 2, infinitely regressive argumentation
in Chapter 3, and reciprocal argumentation in Chapter 4.
Chapter 5, by contrast, is an anomalous chapter, partly because the
mode with which it is concerned—relativity—is an anomalous mode.
    
One respect in which it is anomalous is the fact that it occurs twice in the
Outlines, once as an Aenesideman mode, and once as an Agrippan one.
Chapter 5 opens by remarking on this fact, and argues that the Agrippan
mode of relativity must be understood in terms of the Aenesideman
mode. The rest of the chapter can be viewed as presenting any Sextan
interpreter with two dilemmas. The first dilemma is to decide with which
type of relativity Sextus is concerned—for three different kinds of rela-
tivity are to be found in Sextus’ discussion of the mode. It is argued that
only one of these kinds of relativity is non-trivial, but if this is the kind of
relativity one opts for, then one faces a second interpretative dilemma
when it comes to integrating the non-trivial version of the mode of
relativity into a system which includes the other four Agrippan modes.
For it is argued that the non-trivial mode of relativity is incompatible
with the mode of disagreement. Given the importance of the phenom-
enon of disagreement, and given the fact that a relativistic thesis is very
much the sort of thesis over which a sceptic would suspend judgement,
Chapter 5 closes by suggesting that, if the choice a Sextan interpreter
faces is a choice between rejecting the mode of disagreement or rejecting
the mode of relativity, opting for the latter course of action is preferable.
The sixth and final chapter analyses how the Agrippan modes (exclud-
ing relativity for the reasons given in Chapter 5) are meant to work in
combination with one another. In the Outlines Sextus presents us with
two such combinations, which, following Barnes’s terminology, I refer to
as ‘nets’. The first half of Chapter 6 offers reconstructions of each of these
nets in turn. In particular, I present a new version of Sextus’ first net
which interprets it in terms of three possible dialectic scenarios that
obtain between a sceptic and three kinds of dogmatic opponent, and
suggest, pace Barnes, that, though complex, it does not lack philosophical
cohesion. Regarding the second net, which is often seen as superior to the
first, it is noted that it is not free from fault—in particular regarding its
omission of the mode of hypothesis.
The final part of the chapter compares both nets with a third net not to
be found in the pages of Sextus but devised by Barnes. It is observed that
Barnes’s net is easier to comprehend and free from many of the defects
which afflict both Sextus’ first and second nets. However, after noting
that Barnes’s net omits the mode of disagreement, a fourth, modified
version of Barnes’s net with disagreement incorporated, is presented.
The chapter closes by reflecting on the fact that all the various nets thus
 
far considered rely on a number of theoretical assumptions which a

sceptic himself cannot make.
The chapter (and the book) therefore ends on an ironical note: though
the sceptic is perfectly able to deploy any of the modes individually
(indeed, one of the morals of Chapters 1–4 was that in deploying the
modes the sceptic is merely exercising his equipollent ability), when it
comes to organizing them into a sceptical system, this is a task which, as
it turns out, only a dogmatist can perform.
1
The Mode of Disagreement
How does the mode of disagreement give rise to the suspension of

judgement? That is the question with which this opening chapter is
concerned. The first half of the chapter is devoted to unpacking what is
meant by ‘disagreement’ and, in particular, what is meant by ‘undecided
disagreement’. The second half is concerned with articulating the con-
nection between undecided disagreement and the suspension of judge-
ment. As outlined in the introduction, two versions of the mode will be
presented: one version which captures how a dogmatist might come to
suspend judgement on the basis of the mode and another version by
means of which a sceptic might come to do so.
Some Features of Disagreement

The Greek for ‘disagreement’ is diaphōnia. Barnes, with a helping hand
from Janacek, has counted about 120 instances of the word and its
cognates in Sextus’ works.¹ And when terms which overlap in meaning
with diaphōnia are taken into account—like stasis, diastasis, amphisbēt-
ēsis, anōmalia, machē, and polemos—as well as terms which point to the
absence of diaphōnia—like sumphōnia, homophōnia, and homologia—
the number of references, both direct and indirect, to disagreement in the
Sextan corpus swells to over 200.
A notion then that Sextus thought important. But how best to char-
acterize it? Two features in particular require elucidation. First, what
kinds of item are the relata that are yoked together by the relation of
diaphōnia? And second, what does the relation of diaphōnia itself consist
in? Barnes provides helpful answers to both of these questions.²
¹ Cf. Barnes (1990a), p. 8 n. 8; Janacek (1962), pp. 70–1.

² Barnes (1990a), pp. 11–13.
    
Regarding the first question he claims that diaphōnia is a relation which

holds between opinions rather than between propositions. Regarding the
second he suggests that when two (or more) opinions stand in a relation
of diaphōnia to one another, this amounts to there being a certain kind of
conflict between those opinions. Both of these claims require further
unpacking and I take them in turn—for while the second is true (subject
to further qualification) the first is false.
This first remark should not be misunderstood. Of course, to say that
I have the opinion that P is just to say that there is some proposition,
P, which I opine. I take Barnes’s point to be not that the opining relation
holds between an epistemic subject and something other than a
proposition—for it does not. The point, rather, is that diaphōnia is a
relation that holds between opined propositions rather than between
propositions simpliciter. So, on Barnes’s view, the proposition that
Vega is conspicuous overhead is not in a relation of diaphōnia with the
proposition that Vega is not conspicuous overhead. Rather, my opinion
that Vega is conspicuous overhead is in a relation of diaphōnia with your
opinion that Vega is not conspicuous overhead. And my opinion stands
in a relation of diaphōnia with yours even if neither of us is aware of the
other’s astronomical views.
Now it is one thing—and perfectly true—to say that diaphōnia can
hold between opined propositions. It is another—and false—to say that
diaphōnia can hold only between opined propositions. Suppose that you
believe that P, and that you believe that P on the basis of some argument
that P. Further suppose that I oppose to your claim that P, a rival and
incompatible claim, Q, which I also support with some argument. From
this description, it does not follow that I believe that Q or, indeed, that
anyone else believes that Q. I might have no opinion whatsoever on the
matter and am simply arguing in favour of Q because I am eristic or
because I am perverse or because I have cultivated a certain disposition
to so argue. As we shall see, the sceptic is a member of this third class of
person: he has cultivated a certain disposition to oppose to any argument
he encounters a rival argument with a conclusion incompatible with the
conclusion of the original argument. I go on to devote several subsections
of this chapter to spelling out what this particular disposition of the
sceptic consists in, so I do not here enter into any detailed exposition of
the phenomenon. What is important, for present purposes, is to empha-
size that there is no requirement, given what Sextus says, to suppose that
    
he was operating with a conception of diaphōnia that restricted the relata

of that relation to being opined propositions.³
As for the second question—what the relation of diaphōnia itself
consists in—clearly two claims merely being different from one another
is not sufficient for them to stand in a relation of diaphōnia to one
another. I might believe that Pyrrho was a sceptical philosopher, while
you believe that Pyrrho travelled to India with Alexander the Great. Our
claims about Pyrrho are different (after all they are not the same) but
they do not conflict. Pyrrho could both have been a sceptical philosopher
and have travelled to India with Alexander the Great. diaphōnia there-
fore involves not merely a difference between claims but a conflict
between claims.
But how to spell out what it means for a pair of claims to conflict?
One natural thought to have is that a pair of claims conflict when they
cannot both be true together. It does not take much reflection, however,
to see that this is inadequate. Not being able to be jointly true, even if it
is necessary, is not sufficient for a pair of claims to conflict.⁴ From the
fact that P and Q cannot both be true together, it does not follow
that P conflicts with Q. The claim that motion exists and the claim
that motion does not exist cannot both be true together. The claim that
motion exists and the claim that Hesperus is non-identical with Hes-
perus also cannot both be true together.⁵ But it is not clear that the
claim that motion exists conflicts with the claim that Hesperus is non-
identical with Hesperus in the same way in which the claim that motion
exists conflicts with the claim that motion does not exist. No doubt the
claim that motion exists and the claim that Hesperus is non-identical
with Hesperus cannot both be true together but this is simply in virtue
of the fact that one of these claims (namely the claim that Hesperus
is non-identical with Hesperus) cannot be true. But there is no point
of contact between them, no issue over which they are divided. By
contrast the claim that motion exists and the claim that motion does
not exist are in conflict with one another: what one claim asserts the
other denies.
³ My thanks to the anonymous reader for prompting me to clarify this point.

⁴ See Barnes (1990a), p. 11 n. 12 who emphasizes this point.
⁵ Equally, the claim that motion does not exist and the claim that Hesperus is non-
identical with Hesperus also cannot both be true.
   
To spell out in greater detail what it is for two claims to conflict

over and above not being able to be jointly true is an issue I do not
enter into here.⁶ In any case, our conception of diaphōnia has been
somewhat sharpened. It is relation that holds between two (or more)
conflicting claims where ‘conflict’ is to be understood merely in terms of
not being able to be jointly true (except in cases where at least one of the
conflicting propositions is a logical contradiction or necessarily false).
Kinds of Disagreement
With all that being said, there are still different ways of understanding
what it is for two claims to stand in a relation of diaphōnia to one another.
Suppose we have two disputants—Quintus and Septimus.⁷ Barnes dis-
tinguishes between three ways in which Quintus and Septimus could
disagree with one another. To appropriate his terminology, they might
have a ‘positive disagreement’ or a ‘disagreement in opinion’ or a ‘dis-
agreement in attitude’.⁸ According to Barnes, a positive disagreement
occurs whenever Quintus and Septimus offer incompatible answers to the
same question. A disagreement in opinion occurs either whenever Quin-
tus and Septimus offer incompatible answers to the same question (i.e.
positively disagree) or whenever Quintus offers an answer which Septi-
mus rejects (or Septimus offers an answer which Quintus rejects). Finally,
a disagreement in attitude occurs whenever Quintus and Septimus hold
conflicting attitudes towards the same question, where to ‘take an atti-
tude’ towards a question is, having considered the matter, either to accept
some proposition as the answer to the question or to reject some prop-
osition as an answer to the question or to suspend judgement over the
question.⁹ Furthermore, these attitudes can conflict in a variety of ways.
Accepting some proposition, P₁, conflicts with accepting some other
proposition, P₂, where P₁ and P₂ are incompatible with one another;
⁶ For further discussion see Stopper (1983), pp. 285–6. There the suggestion is made (in
the context of a discussion of the Stoic notion of conflict) that two claims P and Q conflict iff
neither P is possible given Q and neither Q is possible given P.
⁷ I restrict myself to bilateral disagreements for the sake of simplicity.
⁸ See Barnes (1990a), pp. 13–15.
⁹ In Barnes’s own words: ‘Let us say that someone “takes an attitude” to a question ?Q if,
having considered the matter, he either accepts some proposition as the answer to ?Q or
rejects some proposition as an answer to ?Q or suspends judgement over ?Q.’ See Barnes
(1990a), p. 15.
    
accepting P₁ conflicts with rejecting P₁; and suspending judgement as to

whether P₁ conflicts with accepting P₁ and with rejecting P₁.
For Barnes, the interrelations of these three kinds of disagreement are
clear.¹⁰ Anything which counts as a positive disagreement counts as a
disagreement in opinion, and anything which counts as a disagreement
in opinion counts as a disagreement in attitude. But the converse rela-
tions do not hold. Anything which counts as a disagreement in attitude
may, but need not, count as a disagreement in opinion and anything
which counts as a disagreement in opinion may, but need not, count as a
positive disagreement.
Now given how Barnes has defined disagreements in opinion, it
follows (trivially) that anything which counts as a positive disagreement
counts as a disagreement in opinion. For a disagreement in opinion has
been defined disjunctively as either a positive disagreement or a disagree-
ment which involves one of the disagreeing parties offering an answer to
a question which the other party rejects (or vice versa). However, it is less
clear whether it is true that every disagreement in opinion counts as a
disagreement in attitude.
Suppose Quintus and Septimus disagree over the answer to some
question, Q. For there to be a disagreement in opinion between them is
either for Quintus to offer P₁ as the answer to Q and for Septimus to offer
P₂ as the answer to Q, where P₁ and P₂ are incompatible with one
another, or for Quintus to offer P₁ as the answer to Q and for Septimus
to reject P₁ as the answer to Q. Does it follow from the fact that Quintus
and Septimus have a disagreement in opinion that they also have a
disagreement in attitude?
The issue turns on whether the following principle is true. For some
epistemic subject, S, and for some question, Q,
(*) S offers A as an answer to Q, if, and only if, S accepts A as the
answer to Q.
If (*) is true, then any disagreement in opinion will count as a disagree-
ment in attitude. For, if (*) is true and Quintus offers P₁ as the answer to
Q and Septimus offers P₂ as the answer to Q, then Quintus accepts P₁ as
the answer to Q and Septimus accepts P₂ as the answer to Q. We
¹⁰ See Barnes (1990a), p. 15.

   
therefore have a disagreement in attitude. Similarly, if (*) is true and

Quintus offers P₁ as the answer to Q and Septimus rejects (i.e. does not
accept) P₁ as the answer to Q, then Quintus accepts P₁ as the answer to
Q and Septimus rejects (i.e. does not accept) P₁ as the answer to Q. Once
again, we have a disagreement in attitude.
But is the principle expressed in (*) true? It seems possible to conceive
of circumstances in which (*) is false. For instance, suppose Quintus is
open minded as to whether P₁ is the answer to Q. He offers P₁ as an
answer to Q, but he is not committed to P₁ being the answer to Q, that is
to say he does not accept that P₁ is the answer to Q. He is perfectly open
to considering evidence and arguments to the contrary. Similarly, sup-
pose Septimus is open minded as to whether P₂ is the answer to Q. He
offers P₂ as an answer to Q, but he is not committed to P₂ being the
answer to Q, that is to say he does not accept that P₂ is the answer to
Q. He, too, is perfectly open to considering evidence and arguments to
the contrary. In such a case, it seems that Quintus and Septimus have a
disagreement in opinion (they offer incompatible answers to Q) but do
not have a disagreement in attitude (they are both open minded as to
whether P₁ or P₂ is the correct answer to Q).¹¹
To this putative counterexample to (*) it might be objected that, in the
situation just described, Quintus is not really offering P₁ as an answer to
Q, and Septimus is not really offering P₂ as an answer to Q. Rather,
Quintus is entertaining the possibility that P₁ is the answer to Q and
likewise Septimus is entertaining the possibility that P₂ is the answer to
Q. And, the objection would continue, to entertain the possibility that P₁
is the answer to Q is not to offer P₁ as an answer to Q. However, this
counterargument does not so much argue for the truth of (*) as presup-
pose it. It may be that a condition of offering P₁ as an answer to Q is
accepting P₁ as the answer to Q, but, if so, this is merely a restatement of
(*) and not an independent argument for it.
Perhaps, then, we should be content with the following summary of
the interrelations of our three kinds of disagreement. Anything which
counts as a positive disagreement counts as a disagreement in opinion
(but not vice versa), and in many (but not all) cases something which
counts as a disagreement in opinion will also count as a disagreement in
¹¹ Bueno (2013), p. 29 makes a similar point.

    
attitude. At any rate, however these three kinds of disagreement relate to

one another, Barnes’s distinction between them is both salutary and
important. The question which must now be confronted is whether or
not the distinction is borne out in Sextus’ text.
Instances of positive disagreement are certainly to be found in the
Outlines. PH 3.30 offers one such example. There Sextus sets out a
dispute between various philosophers regarding the fundamental mater-
ial principle of the universe. He writes:
Φερεκύδης μὲν γὰρ ὁ Σύριος γῆν εἶπε τὴν πάντων εἶναι ἀρχήν, Θαλῆς δὲ ὁ Μιλήσιος
ὕδωρ, Ἀναξίμανδρος δὲ ὁ ἀκουστὴς τούτου τὸ ἄπειρον, Ἀναξιμένης δὲ καὶ Διογένης
ὁ Ἀπολλωνιάτης ἀέρα, Ἵππασος δὲ ὁ Μεταποντῖνος πῦρ . . .
Pherecydes of Syros said that the principle of everything was earth, Thales of
Miletus said water, Anaximander (his pupil) the infinite, Anaximenes and
Diogenes of Apollonia air, Hippasus of Metapontum fire . . . (PH 3.30)
The list goes on, but the point should be clear. Pherecydes endorses a
certain material principle of everything, Thales another, Anaximander
another, and so forth. And each principle is incompatible with the
others. So we have a positive disagreement.
As for disagreements of opinion and disagreements of attitude, Barnes
draws our attention to PH 2.18 where Sextus is discussing the criterion of
truth:
Τῶν διαλαβόντων τοίνυν περὶ κριτηρίου οἱ μὲν εἶναι τοῦτο ἀπεφήναντο, ὡς οἱ
Στωικοὶ καὶ ἄλλοι τινές, οἱ δὲ μὴ εἶναι, ὡς ἄλλοι τε καὶ ὁ Κορίνθιος Ξενιάδης καὶ
Ξενοφάνης ὁ Κολοφώνιος, λέγων δόκος δ’ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται· ἡμεῖς δ’ ἐπέσχομεν,
πότερον ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν.
Of those who have discussed standards, some have asserted that there is one (e.g.
the Stoics and certain others), some that there is not (among them Xeniades of
Corinth and Xenophanes of Colophon who says: ‘but belief is found over all’);
and we suspend judgement as to whether there is one or not. (PH 2.18)
Here Barnes suggests that we have a trilateral disagreement between

the Stoics, Xenophanes, and the sceptics.¹² The disagreement between the
Stoics and Xenophanes counts as a disagreement in opinion, whereas the
disagreement between the Stoics and the sceptics and between Xenophanes
and the sceptics counts as a disagreement in attitude.
¹² For convenience I leave out Xeniades.

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PDF Five Modes of Scepticism Sextus Empiricus and The Agrippan Modes Stefan Sienkiewicz Ebook Full Chapter

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Five Modes of Scepticism: Sextus

Empiricus and the Agrippan Modes

Sextus Empiricus: against those in the disciplines

Modelling of the Interaction of the Different Vehicles

Spatial Practices Modes of Action and Engagement with

Control of Operation Modes of Gas Consumers in the

Reading Philosophy Writing Poetry Intertextual Modes of

Optical Whispering Gallery Modes for Biosensing From

Control Modes on Mobile Software Platforms Empirical

Of Odysseys and Oddities Scales and Modes of

Five Modes of Scepticism

OXFORD PHILOSOPHICAL MONOGRAPHS

For my parents, Richard and Naz—for everything.

Regressive Reciprocity 108

This book owes much to many. My interest in Sextus Empiricus was

Moving from individuals to collectives, I would like to express my

This book has as its focus a particular type of philosophical scepticism

    

Unless I say otherwise, by ‘sceptic’ I should be taken to mean Pyrrhonian

has been a perennial source of reﬂection for epistemologists. In the words

⁹ Bonjour (1985), p. 18.

    

    

basis of those modes. The starting point for my response to these

¹⁷ Morison (2014), §3.5.2.

I begin, in Chapter 1, with the mode of disagreement. After some

    

disagreement and reﬂects on the fact that undecided disagreement is

modiﬁed version is a dogmatic version of the mode, for, on Barnes’s

    

far considered rely on a number of theoretical assumptions which a

How does the mode of disagreement give rise to the suspension of

Some Features of Disagreement

¹ Cf. Barnes (1990a), p. 8 n. 8; Janacek (1962), pp. 70–1.

    

Regarding the ﬁrst question he claims that diaphōnia is a relation which

    

he was operating with a conception of diaphōnia that restricted the relata

³ My thanks to the anonymous reader for prompting me to clarify this point.

To spell out in greater detail what it is for two claims to conﬂict

    

accepting P₁ conﬂicts with rejecting P₁; and suspending judgement as to

¹⁰ See Barnes (1990a), p. 15.

therefore have a disagreement in attitude. Similarly, if (*) is true and

¹¹ Bueno (2013), p. 29 makes a similar point.

    

attitude. At any rate, however these three kinds of disagreement relate to

Here Barnes suggests that we have a trilateral disagreement between

¹² For convenience I leave out Xeniades.

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