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On Folk Epistemology
On Folk Epistemology
How we think and talk
about knowledge

Mikkel Gerken

1
3
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For Julie
Contents

Preface and Acknowledgments xi

Introduction 1

Part I. Puzzles
1. Thought and Talk about Knowledge 9
1. Knowledge Ascriptions and Their Communicative Roles 9
1.1. Knowledge ascriptions: first approximations 9
1.2. The roles of knowledge ascriptions 15
1.3. Concluding remarks 18
2. Puzzling Patterns of Knowledge Ascriptions 20
2. The Sources of the Challenges to Traditional Epistemology 20
2.1. Intuitive judgments: some distinctions 20
2.2. The BANK case pair 22
2.3. Salient alternative effects 24
2.4. Contrast effects 30
2.5. Practical factor effects 34
2.6. Concluding remarks 43
3. Theoretical Responses and Methodology 44
3. Theory and Data 44
3.1. Theoretical responses to the three effects 44
3.2. Challenges from intuitive judgments, principles, and functions 51
3.3. Intuitive judgments and philosophical methodology 56
3.4. Concluding methodological remarks on the challenges 65
4. Arguments for Strict Purist Invariantism 66
4. Epistemology First 66
4.1. Salient alternative effects and false negatives 66
4.2. Contrast effects and false positives 74
4.3. Practical factor effects and their problems 80
4.4. The force of philosophy 91

Part II. Resources

5. The Psychology of Knowledge Ascriptions 95
5. The Cognitive Basis of Knowledge Ascriptions 95
5.1. The psychology of intuitive judgment 95
5.2. Heuristics, biases, and bounded rationality 97
viii contents

5.3. Knowledge ascriptions and cognitive heuristics 100

5.4. Dual process theory and levels of processing 107
5.5. Knowledge ascriptions and mental state ascriptions 113
5.6. Epistemic focal bias: the basic account 116
5.7. Epistemic focal bias, levels of processing, and stereotypes 121
5.8. The psychology of folk epistemology 123
6. The Epistemic Norms of Action 125
6. The Epistemic Norms of Action and Practical Deliberation 125
6.1. Epistemic standards, norms, and guidelines 125
6.2. Epistemic norms of action 130
6.3. Objections to the knowledge norm of action 137
6.4. Responses and further objections 149
6.5. Folk epistemology and the epistemic norms of action 154
7. The Epistemic Norms of Assertion 156
7. The Epistemic Norms of Assertion 156
7.1. Assertion and epistemic normativity 156
7.2. Objections to the knowledge norm of assertion 162
7.3. Epistemic norms, pragmatics, and knowledge ascriptions 170
7.4. Folk epistemology and the norms of assertion 177
8. Cognition and Communication: Toward a Unified Account 178
8. Knowledge Ascriptions and Pragmatics 178
8.1. Things we do with the word ‘knowledge’ 178
8.2. Conversational pragmatics 180
8.3. Cognitive pragmatics and knowledge ascriptions 186
8.4. Folk epistemology and cognitive pragmatics 194

Part III. Diagnoses

9. Staging a Strict Purist Invariantist Comeback 197
9. Defending Strict Purist Invariantism 197
9.1. Methodological doubts about genealogies and functional roles 197
9.2. Against functional role accounts 199
9.3. Pandora’s Dilemma 208
9.4. Concluding considerations 214
10. Diagnosing Salient Alternative Effects 215
10. Salient Alternative Effects 215
10.1. Psychological bias accounts 215
10.2. The epistemic focal bias account 218
10.3. Related psychological biases 224
10.4. The power and limits of cognitive bias accounts 231
10.5. Linguistic considerations 236
10.6. Concluding remarks on salient alternative effects 240
 contents ix

11. Diagnosing Contrast Effects 241

11. Contrast Effects 241
11.1. Psychological bias accounts 241
11.2. The epistemic focal bias account 243
11.3. Experimental support 246
11.4. Further psychological considerations 251
11.5. Linguistic considerations 253
11.6. Concluding remarks on contrast effects 258
12. Diagnosing Practical Factor Effects 260
12. Practical Factor Effects 260
12.1. Explananda and desiderata 260
12.2. Psychological considerations 263
12.3. A psychological account of mental practical factor effects 268
12.4. Linguistic considerations 273
12.5. The directive force account 278
12.6. Objections and responses 282
12.7. Extensions and integrations 286
12.8. Concluding remarks on practical factor effects 290
Coda: Folk Epistemology and Epistemic Injustice 292
C.1. Folk epistemology and beyond 292
C.2. Consequences for epistemology 292
C.3. Consequences for epistemic injustice 294
C.4. Final remark 296

Appendix: List of Principles 297

Literature 303
Author Index 325
Subject Index 329
Preface and Acknowledgments

THE CONTEXT OF DISCOVERY:1 I came upon the central idea of this book on a
boat sailing across the Celebes Sea off Kalimantan, Indonesian Borneo, in early January
2009. It was late in the afternoon and a translucent vapor had risen from the damp
ocean and concealed the horizon in a milky blur that left little sense of perspective.
Despite the engine noise, or perhaps because it precluded conversation, I found myself
thinking about some philosophical puzzles that I had worked on for several years—
puzzles about knowledge ascriptions.
Knowledge ascriptions are utterances such as ‘Sally knows that water is wet.’ A puz-
zling thing about them is that merely practical and conversational factors appear to
influence whether they are, in some sense, intuitively correct. This is puzzling because
such factors have not traditionally been taken to even partly determine whether a
knowledge ascription is true or not.
I had studied this class of puzzles about knowledge ascriptions almost since I began
studying philosophy, and I had always looked upon the cases that generate these
intuitions with some suspicion. Yet I recognized that the knowledge ascriptions
constituting the puzzling patterns were in some sense intuitively correct, at least when
considered individually. My puzzlement consisted in the inability to pinpoint the exact
nature of this tension within my own judgments. Was it an internal conflict of intuitions?
Was it a reasonable response to conflicting evidence? Was it a conflict between intuitive
judgments and background theory?
My lack of grasp of my own response to the knowledge ascriptions in question
had hampered my attempts to make progress on the issue. Draft after draft had been
abolished. Idea after idea had proven to be too problematic. So, part of the agenda for
my Borneo trip (the part that did not have to do with exploring Borneo) was to rethink
the issue from scratch. I now found myself pondering over these issues in an unmethodical
and associative manner in the unusual scene of the misty seascape.
When our destination, a small island lush with coconut palms, came into sight in the
light mist, it made me recall Kahneman and Tversky’s famous analogy between visual
illusions and cognitive illusions. Our visual faculty operates by taking the blurriness or
clarity of an object as a distance cue. Doing so helps us form reasonably accurate visual
representations of distance. But it can also lead to systematically mistaken, indeed illu-
sory, judgments in certain conditions. On a very clear day things will appear closer
than they are. Conversely, things will appears farther away than they are on a hazy day.

1
I allow myself this uncustomary remark on the context of discovery to point out something that I have
noted on several occasions: it can be productive to rethink some of one’s basic philosophical commitments
outside the usual philosophical environment of conferences, classrooms, and coffee breaks.
xii Preface and acknowledgments

Remarkably, a large number of non-perceptual cognitive processes, including those

involved in higher cognition, such as reasoning, exhibit similar illusions.
On this occasion, the total lack of distance cues other than blur made my tropical
island in the mist appear much farther away than it in fact was. I was just about to
remark upon the phenomenon to a travel companion when a connection to the puz-
zling intuitions about knowledge ascriptions struck me: Might the intuitive judgments
about knowledge ascriptions be akin to the sort of mistaken intuitive judgment that both
perception and more advanced cognition are replete with?
That didn’t seem like too crazy an idea. In fact, it didn’t seem crazy at all. So, I began
to think through where it would lead. Could it be that our intuitive judgments about
knowledge ascriptions are produced by processes that may be prone to cognitive illusions
in certain circumstances?
This too didn’t seem too implausible. In fact, it seemed to me rather reasonable. But
is it plausible, then, that the relevant cases are abnormal in ways that may lead to such
systematically mistaken judgments?
Again, reflecting back on the relevant cases, an affirmative answer seemed right to
me. But an affirmative answer suggested yet an idea: Wouldn’t this explain why the
intuitive judgments about knowledge ascriptions in some sense persist even though one,
on reflection, regards them as false or misleading?
This last idea engaged me, at the time, more than any of the others. For it seemed to
hold promise of a solution to my above-mentioned inner tension. An interesting thing
about both visual and cognitive illusions is that they—or some of their phenomenal
aspects—persist even when we know that we are subject to an illusion. Although I was
actively contemplating the way in which the blurry contours of the island misled my
visual judgment, the island in the mist continued to seem farther away than it really
was. If the puzzling knowledge ascriptions were anything like that, it would be no wonder
that they could continue to seem intuitively correct despite a more reflective judgment
to the contrary.
That evening, sitting on a pier in the village of houses on stilts, I scribbled down an
outline of this complex of ideas. As I scribbled, the clouds gathered over the inland
mountains, preparing the nightly spectacle of thunderstorms that would later destroy
the notes on an unfortunate jungle adventure. But, for better or worse, the ideas stuck.

THE CONTEXT OF JUSTIFICATION: As most philosophers know, coming up with

an idea is not enough. The bulk of philosophical work consists in developing, specify-
ing, and sometimes abandoning one’s ideas by subjecting them to critical and method-
ical scrutiny. Since 2009, I have developed, specified, and abandoned ideas to my
heart’s desire.
Immediately upon my return from Borneo in early 2009, I began reading up on the
relevant psychological literature. Overly excited, I voiced my still too general ideas in a
couple of groping responses to a blog post by Jonathan Schaffer (on February 3, 2009,
on Jon Kvanvig’s blog Certain Doubts). I had more constructive things to say when
 Preface and acknowledgments xiii

Schaffer posted a follow-up, containing a draft of his and Joshua Knobe’s Contrastive
Knowledge Surveyed on September 4, 2009. This led to very helpful correspondences
with both Knobe and Schaffer that helped shape a series of papers. Meanwhile, I had
looked for other philosophers who had considered knowledge ascriptions in relation
to the psychology of intuitive judgment. At first I was disappointed by how little I found,
but I was fortunate enough to come across very stimulating papers by Jennifer Nagel
and Finn Spicer.
In Copenhagen, I benefitted from the philosophy and psychology reading group
that Thor Grünbaum and I ran. During 2009–11, I also benefitted from discussion
with a small research group consisting of Kristoffer Ahlström, Klemens Kappel and
Nikolaj Jang Pedersen. Along with Jessica Brown, I organized a conference on knowledge
ascriptions that was held at St. Andrews University, Arché, in 2010. We coedited an
anthology, Knowledge Ascriptions, and corresponding with the contributors (Michael
Blome-Tillmann, James Beebe, Jessica Brown, and Jennifer Nagel in particular) was
a stimulating way to continue to work on the topic. In 2013, Michael Hannon and
I co-organized a conference on the roles of knowledge at Cambridge University,
and Natalie Ashton provided helpful comments on my talk.
Over the next couple of years, I wrote a number of articles, but I quickly realized that
crucial connections between seemingly disparate areas could not be adequately pre-
sented in article form. Likewise, I realized that a general methodological framework
for the study of folk epistemology was required. So, in 2011, I submitted a book proposal to
Oxford University Press and Peter Momtchiloff encouraged me to submit a manuscript.
Since I knew that the book project would be a major haul and since I lacked tenure,
I did not dare initiate writing it until I had the good fortune of being hired by the
University of Edinburgh in 2013. But I kept writing articles, including an experimental
paper in collaboration with James Beebe.
After much warm-up, I finally began writing in earnest in April 2014. I cannot thank
everyone who deserves my thanks but I tried to keep track of those who have read part
of the book since April 2014. First of all, the University of Edinburgh proved to be an
ideal environment, hosting an outstanding group of epistemologists including Adam
Carter, Allan Hazlett, Aidan McGlynn, Jesper Kallestrup, Duncan Pritchard, Martin
Smith, and Nick Treanor. Having these guys just a few doors away was helpful in the
extreme. I was also fortunate to get to supervise a fine group of PhD students—Adam
Bricker, Jie Gao, Vivek Pachpande, and Stephen Ryan—who were all valuable inter-
locutors. Jie Gao was of particular help since she simultaneously wrote her PhD thesis
on related topics. I also benefitted from working with Tamarinde Haven on her
MA thesis on biases in knowledge ascriptions. Furthermore, the entire manuscript
benefitted tremendously from being worked through in an Edinburgh epistemology
reading group where regular participants included Jie Gao, Cordula Gunst, Miriam
McCormick, Lukas Lewerentz, Stephen Ryan, Lukas Schwengerer, Kegan Shaw, and
Kevin Wallbridge. I am very grateful for their helpful feedback on both substance
and presentation.
xiv Preface and acknowledgments

Several people commented on all or most of the manuscript. These generous souls
include Jie Gao, Michael Hannon, David Henderson, Chris Kelp, Robin McKenna,
and Emil Møller. Others read individual chapters or selected sections. In the order
of chapters they include: Chapter 2: Wesley Buckwalter, Nathaniel Hansen;
Chapter 3: Michael Blome-Tillmann, Matthew McGrath; Chapter 4: Adam Carter,
Matthew McGrath; Chapter 5: Bjørn Hallsson, John Michael, Katherine Puddifoot;
Chapter 6: Conor McHugh, Andy Mueller, Jacques Vollet; Chapter 7: Esben
Nedenskov Petersen; Chapter 8: Kent Bach, Eliot Michaelson, Anders Schoubye;
Chapter 9: Adam Carter; Chapter 10: Joshua Alexander, Adam Carter, Alexander
Dinges, Jennifer Nagel; Chapter 11: Joshua Knobe, Jonathan Schaffer, Asbjørn Steglich-
Petersen; Chapter 12: Kent Bach, Jessica Brown, Davide Fassio, Leo Iacono; Coda:
Rachel Fraser, Amia Srinivasan.
Furthermore, the following helped in correspondence or conversation. Again, space
demands that I only mention interlocutors since 2014 and exclude those already men-
tioned, although many of them provided more general help. But, in addition, I should
at least mention Charity Anderson, Ian Apperly, James Beebe, Matthew Benton,
J. C. Bjerring, Cameron Boult, Kenneth Boyd, Anthony Brueckner, Jacob Busch,
Matthew Chrisman, Andy Clark, Annalisa Coliva, Trent Dougherty, Pascal Engel,
Abrol Fairweather, Elizabeth Fricker, Daniel Fogal, John Greco, Sanford Goldberg,
Emma Gordon, Patrick Greenough, Peter Graham, Thor Grünbaum, John Hawthorne,
Nick Hughes, Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa, Dirk Kindermann, Martin Kusch, Jon
Kvanvig, Igal Kvart, Krista Lawlor, Clayton Littlejohn, Arturs Logins, Edouard
Machery, Brent Madison, Anna-Sara Malmgren, Rachel McKinnon, Veli Mitova,
Martin Montminy, Nikolaj Nottelmann, Erik Olsson, Sara Kier Praëm, John Turri,
Joshua Schechter, Mona Simion, Shannon Spaulding, Jason Stanley, Andreas Stokke,
Greg Stoutenburg, Margot Strohminger, Patrick Sturt, Anand Vaidya, Jonathan
Weinberg, Timothy Williamson, and Crispin Wright. I apologize to those whom I have
forgotten here and to those who helped prior to 2014.
Two readers from Oxford University Press provided extremely helpful criticism.
Apart from noting problems in a constructive manner, both included positive
reinforcement that the project was worthwhile. I owe them many thanks and hope that
they will find that their comments have led to considerable improvements with regard
to structure, style, and substance. I am also grateful to Peter Momtchiloff, who provided
first-rate editorial advice throughout.
I also learned much from trying out material in workshops and conferences. Since
my first talk that is a direct ancestor took place in 2004, I will only mention the relevant
talks since 2014. In 2014: roundtable on my work on epistemic norms, Université
de Genève; ‘Against Knowledge-First Epistemology,’ Université de Genève; ‘Against
Knowledge-First Epistemology,’ Yonsei University, Seoul; ‘Against Knowledge-First
Epistemology,’ University of Oxford; ‘How to Do Things with Knowledge Ascriptions,’
European Epistemology Network conference, Madrid. In 2015: ‘Folk Epistemology and
Salient Alternatives,’ Philosophical Society, University of Oxford; ‘Folk Epistemology
 Preface and acknowledgments xv

and Salient Alternatives,’ Karl-Franzens-Universität, Graz; ‘The New Evil Demon and
the Devil in the Details,’ Factive Turn, Universität Wien; ‘Folk Epistemology and Salient
Alternatives,’ Bled Conference; ‘Folk Epistemology and Epistemic Norms,’ Reasons
Workshop, University of Copenhagen; ‘Recommendations: Where Epistemic Norms
of Action and Assertion Meet,’ Normativity Conference, University of Southampton;
‘Folk Epistemology and Pragmatic Encroachment,’ University of Stirling. In 2016: ‘Folk
Epistemology and Pragmatic Encroachment,’ Aarhus University; ‘Is Epistemology a
Normative Guide to the Study of Folk Epistemology?’, European Epistemology Network
conference, EHESS, Paris; ‘Is Epistemology a Normative Guide to the Study of Folk
Epistemology?’, International Conference on Thinking 2016, Brown University.
Finally, I want to thank my parents, my sisters and my in-laws for sustained moral
and logistic support as well as my friends for keeping me in check. Nothing compares,
however, to my gratitude to my wife, Julie. I can’t even begin to describe all the ways in
which she has helped me in writing the book and the sacrifices she has made to allow
me such an extended period of intense work. That she proofread the entire manuscript
and provided much stylistic and structural guidance are minor in comparison. When our
son, Teo, arrived in December 2015 (having inherited his father’s nocturnal tendencies),
Julie held it all together with the patience, calm and grace that I lacked. I dedicate the
book to her with love and gratitude.
 Introduction

This book is about our talk and thoughts about knowledge. Our ways of thinking
and talking about knowledge are important input to a theory of knowledge—that is, a
theory of what we talk about when we talk about knowledge. A certain kind of talk
about knowledge has been central to epistemology: knowledge ascriptions—assertive
utterances of sentences of the form ‘S knows that p.’ Knowledge ascriptions are on the
tips of our tongues from early in life. In fact, ‘knows’ is among the first mental verbs that
we acquire, and it remains one of our favorites throughout life. Likewise, knowledge is
at the forefront of our minds. We early and often form judgments that S knows that p,
and we rely heavily on those judgments in navigating our social environment.
In consequence, knowledge ascriptions play important roles in our lives. Arguably,
they are among the most important speech acts that we engage in. For example, the
locution ‘we know that p’ carries tremendous rhetorical power. To see this, just replace
the proposition ‘p’ with, for example, ‘they have weapons of mass destruction,’ ‘global
warming is caused by CO2 emissions,’ ‘humans evolved from more primitive species,’ or
‘capital punishment has a deterrent effect.’
To assert that these propositions are known by oneself or someone else is to do
something significant and distinctive with one’s words. The proposition is now given a
special status. Moreover, we can give someone a stamp of social approval by ascribing
knowledge to her. Indeed, phrases such as ‘she is in the know’ and ‘she knows what she is
talking about’ indicate that knowledge ascriptions are central to many of the social
scripts that govern our interactions.
Like many of my fellow epistemologists, I think that reflection on knowledge ascrip-
tions can contribute to our understanding of the nature of knowledge as well as to the
semantics of ‘knowledge.’ However, knowledge ascriptions serve a large and varied
number of communicative roles. When we talk about knowledge, we often talk about a
lot more than knowledge. As noted, verbal ascriptions of knowledge guide and regulate
our social interactions. So, if we are to learn anything of substance from our folk
epistemological talk, we must reflect upon it in a critical manner.
Moreover, in contemporary epistemology, reflection on the ways we think about
knowledge plays a less significant role than reflection on the ways we talk about
knowledge. I think this focus on talk over thought is misguided. Our linguistic knowledge
ascriptions are typically the expression of our judgments that someone knows. In
consequence, the cognitive basis for these judgments deserves to be examined. We
2 introduction

should think more about how we think about knowledge. A lot of the secrets of our
folk epistemological practices can be revealed only by understanding the nature of
the cognitive basis of our intuitive judgments about knowledge.
Here broad analogies between folk psychology and folk epistemology are inspiring.
Just as folk psychological ascriptions of belief and desire help us predict behavior,
folk epistemological ascriptions of knowledge help us assess such behavior. This is
why judgments that someone knows or that she does not know are so influential for
our social interactions. However, just as our folk psychology is biased, so is our folk
epistemology. Given the central roles that knowledge ascriptions play in our social
lives, it is important to understand how they are biased. Moreover, a better under-
standing of folk epistemology is important for epistemological methodology.
Indeed, judgments about linguistic knowledge ascriptions in imagined cases have
played a pivotal role in the theory of knowledge. Philosophers’ own judgments as
well as measures of laypersons’ judgments about such cases are standardly appealed
to in epistemological theorizing. However, if such judgments are systematically
misguided, they cannot straightforwardly play a role as data that a theory must
be made to fit. Our folk epistemology can diverge from both common sense and
epistemological theory.
At this point, the reader might expect (with either joy or dread) the book to represent
a philosophy-hating stance, which seeks to undermine the legitimacy of philosophical
theorizing. But few methodological stances could be further from mine. In fact, one of
the key methodological theses that I will argue for is that empirical research on folk
epistemology depends on epistemological theorizing. Without a considerable theoretical
grasp of what knowledge is, we would be unable to properly assess empirical findings.
So, while we should not uncritically rely on judgments about cases, we should—indeed
must—critically rely on judgments about cases. Doing so requires plenty of empirically
informed reflection, which is best conducted from the armchair. Thus, I do not use
empirical results in an ideological attempt to naturalize epistemology beyond recogni-
tion. Rather, I seek to contribute to the philosophical foundation required for a fruitful
empirical study of folk epistemology. I take this ambition to be a fairly traditional one.
Even philosophers in the rationalist tradition can and should be empirically informed.
Throughout the history of philosophy they often have been.
The book defends and develops a fairly orthodox view about knowledge that I label
‘strict purist invariantism.’ Roughly, invariantism is the semantic view that conver-
sational factors do not bear on the content of the word ‘knowledge.’ The brand of
invariantism I advocate is a strict purist one. Roughly, this is because it rejects that
whether someone knows that p depends on practical factors associated with p or on
conversationally salient alternatives to p. I will develop the view and specify the ter-
minology as we go along. For now, the key thing to note is that a number of puzzling
patterns of knowledge ascriptions challenge strict purist invariantism. I grant, with
some qualifications, that these puzzling patterns reflect central aspects of our folk
 introduction 3

epistemology. However, I reject straightforward leaps from folk epistemology to

substantive epistemological conclusions. Our folk epistemological practices should
inform epistemology but folk epistemology should not rule epistemology.
On the contrary, critical epistemological theorizing may on occasion enable us to
better understand the limitations of the tacit folk epistemological principles and pre-
suppositions that we rely on in our ordinary life. When things go well, epistemological
theorizing may even help us address some of the unfortunate consequences of our folk
epistemological practices. These include epistemic injustices that sometimes manifest
in our folk epistemological practices.

A Brief Overview
The book is divided into three parts, each of which consists of four chapters. It concludes
with a brief Coda in which I indicate some ramifications for epistemic injustice.

Part I: Puzzles
In Chapter 1, I outline the epistemology that I will defend: strict purist invariantism.
Very roughly, this is the view that the truth of knowledge ascriptions does not depend
on contextually salient practical factors or error-possibilities. Furthermore, I adopt a
variety of a relevant alternatives framework that appeals to normal circumstances
and a competence epistemology according to which S may obtain knowledge only by
exercising a cognitive competence. Moving from the epistemological framework
to our folk epistemology, I consider ways in which the term ‘knowledge’ is central
in ordinary talk. Specifically, I highlight some of knowledge ascriptions’ social and
communicative functions.
Chapter 2 consists of a survey of the reflective and empirical evidence for assuming
that there are a number of puzzling patterns of knowledge ascriptions. I consider,
in turn, three such effects on folk knowledge ascriptions: the first one is a salient
alternative effect—roughly, the inclination to deny S knowledge that p in the face of a
salient alternative, q. The second effect is a contrast effect—roughly, the idea that
whether an alternative, q, to S’s knowledge that p is “in contrast” partly determines our
inclination to ascribe knowledge. The third effect is a practical factor effect—roughly,
the effect of salient practical factors, such as the stakes of the speaker or subject, on our
inclination to ascribe knowledge.
I begin Chapter 3 by taxonomizing the theoretical responses to the puzzling patterns of
knowledge ascriptions surveyed in Chapter 2. For example, I provide a characterization
of pragmatic encroachment that captures a wide variety of views. Moreover, I consider
the main lines of argument against strict purist invariantism from the various effects on
knowledge ascriptions. The chapter concludes with a discussion of methodology. I argue
against DeRose’s ‘methodology of the straightforward’ in favor of an ‘equilibristic
4 introduction

methodology’ according to which it is sometimes reasonable to revise our intuitive judg-

ments in the light of theoretical considerations.
In Chapter 4, I go on the offensive and provide arguments against the epistemological
views that are motivated by the salient alternative, contrast and practical factor effects.
My negative arguments suggest that these effects reflect folk epistemological practices
that are useful but systematically inaccurate. So, I argue that taking these effects as
straightforward evidence for substantive epistemology views has such problematic
consequences that we should consider whether strict purist invariantism may account
for them by invoking epistemological, psychological, and linguistic resources.

Part II: Resources

Chapter 5 surveys some empirical psychology and outlines some important folk epis-
temological principles. I begin by considering the heuristic and biases tradition. On this
basis, I argue that ordinary knowledge ascriptions are standardly driven by heuristic
processes and, therefore, associated with biases. I integrate this idea in a general dual
process framework for mental state ascriptions. Finally, I seek to articulate some of the
heuristics and principles that govern intuitive judgments about knowledge ascriptions
and the biases associated with them. In particular, I characterize an epistemic focal bias.
In Chapter 6, I turn to the normative relationship between knowledge ascriptions
and action. I argue against a knowledge norm of action (henceforth KNAC) and in
favor of an alternative warrant-action norm (henceforth WA). According to WA, an
individual must be adequately warranted in believing that p relative to her deliberative
context in order to meet the epistemic requirements for acting on p. Thus, I argue that
the knowledge norm is an important example of a folk epistemological principle that
does not pass muster as an epistemological principle.
Chapter 7 extends the discussion of epistemic norms to the linguistic realm. Again, I
argue against a knowledge norm of assertion (henceforth KNAS). While KNAS repre-
sents important aspects of our folk epistemology, I argue that within epistemology it
should be replaced with a warrant-assertive speech act norm (henceforth WASA).
According to WASA, an individual must be adequately warranted in believing that p
relative to her conversational context in order to meet the epistemic requirements for
asserting that p. I consider how this epistemic norm may be extended to assertive
speech acts that carry implicatures or illocutionary forces. In particular, I develop a
species of WASA that accounts for assertive speech acts with a directive force and I do
so by focusing on recommendations.
In Chapter 8, I connect the discussion of epistemic norms of assertion to pragmatics
more generally and to the pragmatics of knowledge ascriptions in particular. I survey
some pragmatic theories and focus on recent work in cognitive pragmatics and psy-
cholinguistics. On this basis, I argue that knowledge ascriptions are often used as
communicative heuristics, which are effective, albeit inaccurate, ways of getting complex
epistemic points across. Thus, Chapter 8 concludes Part II of the book by unifying
some of its central discussions.
 introduction 5

Part III: Diagnoses

In Chapter 9, I respond to arguments for pragmatic encroachment that appeal to
the communicative functions of knowledge ascriptions or genealogical assumptions.
I criticize the methodology of such arguments and raise a dilemma: either the emphasized
communicative role is semantically constitutive or it is merely pragmatic. I then argue
against the former option and continue to argue that merely pragmatic functions may
be accounted for by strict purist invariantism. I then raise another dilemma—Pandora’s
Dilemma—for pragmatic encroachment. Many factors other than stakes can have an
effect on knowledge ascriptions. So, pragmatic encroachers must either accept that
these factors are partial determiners of knowledge or reject this. However, both options
lead to trouble.
In Chapter 10, I attempt to diagnose the salient alternative effect on knowledge
ascriptions. The core of my diagnosis of this effect consists in a development of the
epistemic focal bias account according to which denials of knowledge in the face of a
salient alternative amount to false negatives. However, I recognize that other psychological
factors may also influence this class of judgments and I argue that a psychological account
requires supplementation. In consequence, I integrate the psychological diagnosis
with a number of assumptions drawn from cognitive pragmatics.
In Chapter 11, I pursue a diagnosis of the contrast effect on knowledge ascriptions.
Again, I begin by articulating the epistemic focal bias account according to which the
contrast effects amount to false positives. I then argue that the epistemic focal bias
account fulfills an important desideratum of providing a unified account of the con-
trast effects and salient alternative effects. I augment the case for the focal bias account
with a number of experimental results, and, finally, I connect it to some linguistic con-
siderations as well as to the anti-contrastivist arguments from Chapter 4.
In Chapter 12, I diagnose the practical factor effects on knowledge ascriptions by argu-
ing that they are the result of a combination of pragmatic and psychological factors.
I begin by arguing that in the cases which generate practical factor effects, the focus is on
an action or decision to act. In the cases where the knowledge ascription is mental, I argue
that it serves as a heuristic proxy for a more complex judgment about epistemic actionabil-
ity. Similarly, I argue that linguistic knowledge ascriptions serve a directive communicative
function in the cases under consideration. Therefore, the “shifty” judgments about the
knowledge ascriptions in question reflect whether they meet or violate the epistemic
norm governing directive speech acts—specifically, the speech act of recommending. The
result is a psycholinguistic account of the practical factor effects.
A brief Coda considers the key conclusions and methodology as a research program
for the study of folk epistemology. Moreover, I tentatively consider how our folk epis-
temological practices may yield distinctive forms of epistemic injustice. For example,
I hypothesize that our ordinary knowledge ascriptions may be biased in terms of
gender, race, or social power structure. So, I conclude the book by emphasizing a key
rationale for engaging in this theoretical endeavor: the study of folk epistemology may
serve as the basis for an important area of applied epistemology.
6 introduction

Reading Notes
The book promotes a rather grand epistemological framework that touches on many
areas which deserve a full monograph in their own right. It is about the nature of cogni-
tive biases. It is about epistemic norms. It is about the pragmatics–semantics interface in
the philosophy of language. It is about epistemology. It is about folk epistemology.
But, first and foremost, it is about the relationship between epistemology and folk
epistemology. In selecting what material to include, I have had to kill many a darling.
However, I have tried to write the book in a manner that makes each topic accessible to
novices. For example, Chapter 2 surveys the existing empirical work on knowledge
ascriptions. Chapter 5 introduces the psychological aspects of folk epistemology via
some textbook material. Chapter 6 introduces the debates over epistemic norms by some
general considerations, etc. These chapters contain fairly broad overviews of substan-
tially important material. So, although the book pursues an ambitious research contribu-
tion, I hope that its format will also make it apt for teaching. Often, philosophy is taught
best by work that pursues novel contributions. That said, I have often taken a couple of
steps back to start out with presentations of background materials in order to make the
discussion comprehensible for readers who are not already familiar with the debates.
I have structured the book such that readers with special interests or limited time
can plot a course through the parts most relevant for them. For example, someone
interested in cognitive bias accounts of salient alternative effects can read Chapters 1,
2.3, 3, 4.1, 5, and 10. But someone teaching a course on epistemic norms and pragmatic
encroachment could assign Chapters 1, 2.5, 3, 4.3, 6, 7, 9.3, and 12. To facilitate tar-
geted reading, I’ve included a fairly large number of intertextual references. For easy
reference, I have included an Appendix with the principles discussed in the book.

Stylistic Notes
I label cases by italicized capitalization: ‘As the case RED TABLE B exemplifies . . . ’ I have,
for the sake of consistency, taken the liberty of altering the format of other authors’
labels.
I label principles as follows: ‘According to the Principle of Epistemic Satisficing . . . ’
I use single quotes to mention words and sentences: ‘When the word ‘knows’ is in
­sentences such as ‘S knows that p’ it serves important communicative functions.’
I use underlining to mention concepts and thoughts: ‘The concept knowledge is
acquired early. Thus, a three-year-old may think S knows that p.’
I use double quotes for citation and occasionally to indicate metaphor or semi-technical
phrases.
I use italics for emphasis and occasionally to introduce terminology.
 PA RT I
Puzzles

Part I presents a fairly orthodox theory of knowledge and some puzzling patterns of
knowledge ascriptions that challenge it. It also contains a critical discussion of various
responses and the relevant methodology.
First, the central background epistemological theory is presented (Chapter 1). The next
chapter surveys some empirical findings of puzzling patterns of knowledge ascriptions
(Chapter 2). On this basis, a partial taxonomy of the various theoretical responses is
provided along with methodological considerations (Chapter 3). Finally, the advertised
equilibristic methodology is put to use in substantive epistemological arguments (Chapter 4).
 1
Thought and Talk about
Knowledge

1. Knowledge Ascriptions and Their

Communicative Roles
In the first part of this chapter, I will outline some of the basic assumptions about
knowledge and knowledge ascriptions that I will rely on in some cases and defend in
others. The fact that these assumptions are basic and fairly orthodox does not, as will
soon transpire, mean that they are uncontroversial. But my aim in this introductory
chapter is only to sketch the view that I will defend and to delimit the scope of the
investigation.
In the second part of the chapter, I will provide more constructive arguments con-
cerning the communicative functions of knowledge ascriptions. I will give some
preliminary reasons for being cautious about drawing substantive conclusions about
knowledge from facts about the communicative roles of vernacular knowledge ascrip-
tions. But I will also argue that reflection on such communicative roles provides
important resources for explaining otherwise puzzling patterns of knowledge
ascriptions.

1.1. Knowledge ascriptions: first approximations

Before considering any challenges to the traditional view of knowledge and knowledge
ascriptions, we must first get a basic grasp of the orthodox view that has come under
fire. I will defend this view against specific challenges and cases. Hence, the remarks in
this chapter are preliminary. These issues are best understood by working with them in
more concrete contexts. So, readers who are new to epistemology may find the subse-
quent material abstract and hard to grasp. Don’t despair! Things will be developed in
more concrete ways as we go along.
1.1.a. Knowledge ascriptions and the orthodox view. We ascribe knowledge to others
in a wide variety of ways. I might say that Alberte knows how to dance, that Ludvig
knows whether Tivoli is open and that Tilde knows that there is milk in the cup.
Epistemologists are busy debating the relationships between these forms of knowledge
ascriptions. On this occasion, I will not contribute to these debates but focus exclusively
10 thought and talk about knowledge

on the latter: knowledge-that ascriptions—assertive utterances of sentences of the form

‘S knows that p’ and their mental counterparts.
One philosophical interest in our ordinary knowledge ascriptions is due to the fact
that careful and critical reflection upon them can improve our understanding of what
they refer to—i.e., knowledge itself. Unsurprisingly, epistemologists disagree about
the nature of knowledge itself. Some think that it is a mental state (Williamson 2000). I
prefer to think of it as a relation between an agent, who has certain mental states, and
the proposition known. So, if the knowledge ascription ‘Tilde knows that there is milk
in the cup’ is true, a certain relation holds between some of Tilde’s mental states and the
proposition that there is milk in the cup.1 In virtue of what does the relation hold?
Among the orthodox epistemological answers to this question is the requirement
that the proposition known must be true. In standard terminology, the component of a
knowledge ascription that refers to the proposition known is called ‘the complement
clause’ and is abbreviated ‘p.’ That is, ‘Tilde knows that there is milk in the cup’ is abbre-
viated ‘Tilde knows that p.’ In some further standard terminology, the assumption that
the truth of a knowledge ascription entails the truth of the complement clause is the
idea that knowledge is factive: S knows that p only if p.
Furthermore, the orthodox view has it that a subject knows that p only if she is in a
representational mental state that constitutes some commitment toward p. Paradigmat­
ically, the mental state is belief. But it is debated whether other mental states than belief
may constitute the required mental state condition for knowledge (Radford 1966;
Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel 2013; Rose and Schaffer 2013). For now, I will simply
refer to this condition on knowledge as ‘the belief condition.’
The final orthodox condition on knowledge is the idea that the subject’s belief that
p must be epistemically rational. I will use the term ‘warrant’ as a broad label for epi-
stemic rationality. I am a pluralist about epistemic warrant. I regard warrant as a
genus that harbors two main species. These species are labeled ‘justification’ and
‘entitlement’ (Burge 2003, 2013; Gerken 2013c). Justification is an internalist species
of warrant in the sense that it is constituted by the exercise of the subject’s reason—
roughly, a person-level propositional cognitive competence (Gerken forthcoming b).
Moreover, justification is typically accessible to the subject by first-person methods.
I call the latter form of justification ‘access justification’ (Gerken 2012c, forthcoming b).
In contrast, entitlement is an externalist species of warrant which need not derive its
warranting force from the agent’s exercise of reason. Likewise, the grounds of entitle-
ment need not be accessible by first-person methods. The internalist–externalist dis-
pute is a hard-fought debate in contemporary epistemology and it will surface
throughout. For now, I am just settling on the terminology that allows us to discuss
the issue. However, I should flag one of my substantive commitments that is not part
of orthodoxy: knowledge does not require (internalist) justification—often entitle-
ment will do.

1
This does not entail that knowledge may be reduced to more basic phenomena. In fact, I doubt that
knowledge may be reductively analyzed (Gerken forthcoming a).
 thought and talk about knowledge 11

Noting some further general properties of warrant (epistemic rationality) will serve
the purpose of sketching some of the ideas and terminology which I will make use of.
1.1.b. Truth-conduciveness and epistemic luck. Epistemic warrant is constitutively
characterized by its truth-conducive nature. It is subject to a principled truth-connec-
tion (Cohen and Lehrer 1983; Cohen 1984). However, the relationship between warrant
and truth is weaker than the relationship between knowledge and truth. Whereas
knowledge is factive, warrant is not. There are epistemologists who question the factivity
of knowledge (Hazlett 2010) and also some who dispute the non-factivity of warrant
(Sutton 2007; Littlejohn 2012). Such disagreements follow from the general principle
that there are no epistemological principles that every epistemologist agrees to.
Throughout, I simply assume the factivity of knowledge and the non-factivity of
warrant. Likewise, I will simply beg the question against skeptical views according to
which we do not have any warranted beliefs and, therefore, know nothing.2
The truth-conducive character of warrant explains its constitutive relationship to
knowledge. Both knowledge and warranted belief are cognitive achievements that do
not simply rest on good epistemic luck (Pritchard 2005). Assume, for example, that I,
during one of my spells of wishful thinking, form the belief that Stevie Wonder has
invited me to jam with him. I have no rational basis for this belief whatsoever. But as
freak chance would have it, Stevie has just called to say that he would like me to jam
with him. Unfortunately, I missed the call. So, although my belief is true, it is not
­epistemically warranted in any sense of ‘warrant.’ Since knowledge requires warrant,
the belief does not amount to knowledge either.
Moreover, I accept that both knowledge and warranted belief require that the sub-
ject exercises a cognitive competence. This assumption is partly motivated by reflection
on “guardian angel” cases in which the environment is set up in a way that ensures that
the subject’s beliefs are true (Pritchard 2010a, 2012; Greco 2012). In such cases, the
worldly facts track S’s belief rather than vice versa. When the direction of fit is wrong in
this manner, S’s beliefs are not normally warranted. Many theorists take such cases to
motivate a virtue epistemology, but I only uphold a modest competence epistemology
that requires that the non-lucky truth-connection holds in virtue of the exercise of a
cognitive competence.3
Importantly, some kinds of epistemic luck are compatible with warrant but incom-
patible with knowledge. Such knowledge defeating luck figures in Gettier-style cases
which form counterexamples to the tripartite analysis of knowledge (Gettier 1963).
Tripartite
S knows that p if and only if S has a warranted true belief that p.

2
My stance here is asymmetric. I regard skeptical arguments as an intriguing brand of paradoxes: com-
pelling arguments from initially compelling premises to unacceptable conclusions (Gerken 2012c). I per-
sonally find skeptical arguments to be more intellectually stimulating than arguments for factivity of
warrant or non-factivity of knowledge.
3
The preference for competence epistemology over virtue epistemology is not merely terminological
but since the substantive difference will not play a role, I set this issue aside.
12 thought and talk about knowledge

Gettier-style cases show that the individually necessary conditions of truth, belief and
warrant are not jointly sufficient for knowledge. Assume, for example, that Mr. Doe is
on a walk in the Scottish Highlands and comes to believe that there is a sheep in the
field on the basis of seeing a rock that looks exactly like a sheep (Chisholm 1977: 105).
However, there is in fact a sheep in the field hidden out of Mr. Doe’s sight. It is helpful to
juxtapose the Gettier case with a case of knowledge. So, assume that Mrs. Doe passes by
the field ten minutes later and sees the sheep which has now emerged.
Mr. Doe is warranted in believing that there is a sheep in the field although he does
not know it. In contrast, Mrs. Doe knows that there is a sheep in the field. Since Gettier-
style cases are not a theme in this book, I only note them to make a few general points.4
The first point is that the case pair exemplifies that two individuals, Mr. and Mrs.
Doe, can be equally well warranted although only one of them knows. This compara-
tive judgment is not merely an intuitive judgment. Rather, it is backed by reflection on
the nature of warrant as well as by reflection about the structure of the case. The latter
point is worth elaborating upon since it exemplifies the methodology that I will adver-
tise in Chapter 3: it is because Mr. Doe possesses the same degree of warrant as Mrs.
Doe that the case is plausibly regarded as a counterexample to the idea that justified
true belief is sufficient for knowledge. For if Mr. Doe had a lesser degree of warrant, the
right verdict might simply be that Mr. Doe had an insufficient degree of warrant for
knowledge. But that is hardly what Gettier-style cases show. So, we should assume that
Mr. Doe possesses the same degree of warrant as Mrs. Doe even though she knows and
he does not. Indeed, we can easily construct a version of the Gettier case in which Mr.
Doe has better warrant than Mrs. Doe although she knows and he does not. These
points motivate the following thesis (from Gerken 2013b: 30):
Equi-warrant
Two individuals, S and S*, may be equally well warranted in believing that p although
S knows that p whereas S* does not know that p.
Relatedly, a hallmark of Gettier-style cases is that they defeat knowledge without
defeating (or affecting) warrant (Gerken 2013b: 32). A further hallmark of Gettier-
style cases is that they involve circumstances which are epistemically abnormal at least
with regard to the belief in question (Gerken 2013b: 32). Entities that look exactly like
sheep in the Scottish Highlands normally are sheep. Indeed, this environmental fact
explains why Mr. Doe is warranted in the case in question (Burge 2003). In Gettier-
style cases, then, the orthodox view has it that knowledge is defeated by inhospitable or
abnormal circumstances but that warrant persists.
1.1.c. Normal circumstances and relevant alternatives. In the Gettier-style cases, we
can recognize that the subject is in some sort of epistemically abnormal circumstance.

4
For fascinating empirical work on Gettier cases, see, e.g., Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich 2001; Starmans
and Friedman 2012; Nagel, San Juan, and Mar 2013; Buckwalter 2013; Turri 2013a; Colaco et al. 2014;
Machery et al. forthcoming.
Another random document with
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rough building. Frank instantly knew what it meant. As the shed had
only been intended as a cover from the elements, in the building no
great pains had been taken, so that there were many cracks, each
fully an inch in diameter.
Some one had taken pains to insert an iron rod, possibly, through
one of those apertures, and was now engaged in prying off a board.
Once that was accomplished it would be easy to gain an entrance.
Frank wondered what the intruders might think when they found
evidences to the effect that some one had been sleeping there? And
the bar across the wide double doors must also tell them the same
fact. Would they look around to find the hidden lads, and injure them
in some way; or might their desire for a hurried departure cause
them to ignore the facts?
Again came that crackling noise.
“What are they doing?” whispered Andy.
“Breaking in by ripping off a board,” came the answer, accompanied
by a warning pressure on the arm.
“Then I don’t believe it’s Puss and Sandy!” said the other, positively.
Frank did not attempt to convince him otherwise, for truth to tell his
mind had been made up on that same score several minutes before.
Those who were going to all this trouble to effect an entrance to the
hangar, must have some more important reason urging them on than
a mere desire to do mischief.
What had they better do? Frank could not decide on the spur of the
moment. Afterwards he realized that their best course would have
been to set up a great shouting, and make all the noise they could,
which would have undoubtedly frightened off the marauders, who
shunned publicity above all things.
And before Frank could collect his thoughts enough to decide upon
any course, he knew that the board had yielded to the efforts of
those who wielded the object that was being used as a crowbar.
Then he could hear some party crawling in through the opening.
Andy too understood. He was quivering at a tremendous rate, so that
Frank actually feared lest he might set the bench to rattling, and
betray their hiding-place. So he kept nudging him, in the hope of
bolstering up his courage.
Whoever it was creeping along over the littered floor of the shed, he
kept advancing. Presently they heard him mutter to himself. Then
there came a scratching sound that told of a match being struck.
A faint light sprang up. The two lads, crouching there under the work
bench, and clad only in their pajamas, saw the figure of a man
kneeling not twelve feet away from them.
He happened to be in a position where the side of his face only could
be seen; but Frank knew instantly that the intruder was an utter
stranger to him.
Apparently the man had eyes only for the precious monoplane; for
bending forward he stared at it eagerly, the while saying low words to
himself that seemed to be expressions of exceeding rapture.
Evidently the sight of the air craft quite tickled him. Perhaps it
reminded him of old times. Frank might have felt complimented that
his work was appreciated so highly; but the only sensation he really
experienced was alarm lest the result of all their labor be stolen.
The match went out. About the same time there came a low call from
beyond the doors. The man outside was getting impatient, and
wanted his comrade to open up. Undoubtedly he had seen the light
through the cracks, and knew his pal was safely inside. And he may
also have had a glimpse of the aeroplane that was, of course, the
main object of their regard.
Frank felt a new thrill. He had caught some of the low words, and
while they were as so much Greek to him, he knew that the speaker
must be a Frenchman! Like a flash he remembered what Larry had
said about the aviator license which was found on the floor of the
looted jewelry establishment being granted by a French society.
Then, this was Jules Garrone and his fellow desperado. All doubt
was settled by that voice speaking in a foreign tongue.
Now the man inside was creeping over to where he knew the doors
lay. Frank heard him fumbling with the bar. Surely he must guess
from this that the shed was not untenanted. The boy’s wandering
hand had come in contact with a piece of wood, and almost
unconsciously he gripped it. If the worst came, they might put up
some sort of fight, meanwhile trying to hold on to the precious
aeroplane, and balk the wicked designs of these law-breakers.
Then the doors opened, and were shoved far back. This alone must
have told what the designs of the two intruders were. They needed
room to wheel the monoplane out of the hangar; and the wide doors
had been fashioned to admit of its passage when necessary.
More whispering followed. Then a second match was struck, and
discovering a lantern hanging from a hook, it was eagerly seized
upon by the smaller of the two.
They seemed to be deeply interested in the machine, and walked
around, closely examining its construction, and exchanging eager
sentences, as though becoming more and more pleased the further
they looked.
Twice they were so close to the hidden lads that Frank could have
stretched out a hand, and gripped one of their legs. It need hardly be
said, however, that he did nothing of the kind. Larry had declared
that according to the police chief the two jewelry robbers were
desperate criminals; and if this were so it would be folly for two
unarmed boys to think of grappling with them in the hope of
detaining them until help came.
The two intruders seemed to have arrived at a satisfactory
conclusion with regard to the monoplane. Frank had heard them
talking now in English, and could understand what was being said.
“It ees very good indeed,” said the smaller man, with a laugh. “Zese
boys, zey haf made one clever job. I believe it will go, and carry us
both.”
“Then the sooner we make a start the better I am pleased, Jules. At
any minute right now we might be detected and stopped. Shall I get
the things, and strap them on the machine?” asked the other,
anxiously—he had been moving over and looking out of the doors
several times, as though afraid of an interruption.
“Oui! It ees just as well,” replied his companion. “Once we get up in
ze air we can give zem all ze laugh. It haf please me exceedingly. I
am much oblige to zese boys. I shall pleasure take in renewing my
acquaintance with a Bleriot monoplane. It is like old times quite.”
Jules, then, was the aviator who had won his spurs across the water.
Why he had deserted such a profitable calling to become a common
thief doubtless had a story back of it.
Presently the second man came back after going outside. He carried
some object with either hand. Frank held his very breath when he
saw what these were. Nothing more nor less than a couple of suit-
cases, just as the Chief had declared had been used in the jewelry
robbery.
It afterwards developed that these were the property of the cashier,
and one of the salesmen in the establishment. They were in the habit
of carrying their laundry to town in this fashion; and at the time of the
robbery the two bags had been in the store. As they were missing in
the morning, it was plain that the thieves had appropriated them in
order to accommodate their plunder. And this was how Chief Waller
had known the fact.
Frank realized that he was within reaching distance of all the
proceeds of the late robbery. How he would have liked jumping out
and snatching those suit-cases away from the taller man. But Frank
was too discreet a boy to think of attempting such a foolhardy thing.
Besides, he must be concerned principally now in saving his beloved
aeroplane from sharing the fate of the jewelry.
The bags were being fastened to the skeleton framework of the
monoplane, so as not to interfere with the working of the motor, or
the steering apparatus.
“Make zem tight, Jean. It would be a catastrophe, should we escape,
but drop our prizes,” said the smaller man; who was standing close
to the propeller of the aeroplane, and giving it a few trial spins.
“It is fixed,” the other replied, as he came back to where his
companion stood. “And now, shall we not push it out in the open.”
“Zat will not be hard,” replied Jules, bending his shoulders to the
task.
The aeroplane had been nicely balanced on the three bicycle
wheels, and upon being started immediately began to pass out of the
hangar.
Frank could feel Andy quivering with indignation and resentment,
and knew that the other was almost on the point of an explosion.
Unless he were checked, he was apt to rush out, and try, single-
handed, to hold the robbers back.
 CHAPTER XII.
HELD BACK.

“Hush! Don’t make a sound yet!” was what Frank whispered.

“But look at them, Frank! The skunks are stealing our neat little trick!
They mean to fly away in her!” answered Andy. And perhaps his
husky voice might have been heard only that just then Jules
happened to have started the engine, and the noise of its throbbing
pulsations drowned all other sounds.
Evidently the skilled aviator was bent on making sure that everything
was correct before starting aloft. It was dangerous business under
even the best of conditions; and certainly when they were about to
risk their lives in a craft made by a couple of green-horn lads.
Still, Jules was voicing his surprise and gratification. He had certainly
never expected to find a machine so nearly perfect as the result of
inexperienced lads.
“Marvelous! superb! excellent!” he was saying with his French
extravagance of speech. “I take off my cap to zese boys. Zey are
surely bound to make zare mark in ze profession. Jean, it ees no
longer a chance we take. It ees a certainty. We sall laugh at ze
gendarmes as we soar over zere heads in ze sky. Pouf! a turn of ze
hand, and ze propeller it will buzz. Zen we are off wiz a rush. Get
aboard, Jean!”
The taller man did not seem to have quite so much confidence as
Jules. Doubtless he feared that they would be accepting unusual
risks in thus trusting their lives and fortunes to a contraption made by
mere boys. Still, the situation was such that he had to yield to the
opinion of his comrade. And if all went well, it was an ideal method of
giving their enemies the slip.
So, after giving a last look around him, with somewhat of a sigh he
started to attach himself in the position which Jules had pointed out.
The new monoplane had been built especially for two. Frank and his
cousin had that in mind when starting in to construct the machine;
since neither of them wished to cruise through the air alone.
Hence, there was a place for the second man, where he would just
balance matters nicely. And Jules had himself marked out where the
two heavy suit-cases should be tied fast. In this, his former
experience stood him well, since he was aware of all the little tricks
developed by gliding aeroplanes when at work.
“You stay inside here, and when you hear me shout just whoop it up
at the top of your voice. I’m going out to see if I can play a trick on
them, and prevent an ascent,” whispered Frank.
Immediately he was gone, and Andy, feeling mighty shaky, as he
afterwards frankly confessed, succeeded in crawling out from under
the work bench. Still clutching his wrench weapon he tiptoed over to
the vicinity of the open doors, where he stood almost holding his
breath in his desire to have a full supply in his lungs when the signal
came to let loose.
Frank had meanwhile crept softly outside. The shadow cast by the
hangar served to hide him more or less. And besides, both men
seemed to be completely taken up with what they were doing, for
they certainly failed to look his way.
It was apparent that Frank had conceived some sort of idea. These
things often came to him like a flash of light. It was fortunate in the
present instance, for time was of considerable value. At any moment
now, Jules, finding that his companion had settled himself, was apt
to switch the power on to the shaft, and start the propeller to whirling
around.
When that occurred it would be too late for any one to think of
stopping the monoplane, which must begin to move off on its
wheeled base, increasing in momentum with each yard of progress,
until finally it would take gradually to the air, if all went well, in a
graceful upward curve.
Frank had picked up the padlock belonging to the doors, and which
was hanging, open, on a convenient nail. He knew that just outside
there was a long and stout chain, which had been used somehow
with the lumber brought from the yard, and forgotten when the
wagon pulled out.
It was in connection with that same chain that his thoughts ran just
now. And he had faith to believe that, if given just half a minute of
time, he could fix it so that the bold thieves would find some difficulty
in breaking away from old Mother Earth when Jules chose to set that
propeller whizzing.
Again was Frank indebted to the noise of the churning engine, for it
effectually deadened what clanking sounds the chain made when he
took hold of its ends, and crept forward.
He kept as low down as he could. Even the moon seemed to be in
full sympathy with the boy’s mission. She had very conveniently
hidden her smiling disc behind quite a dark cloud just then, and
brought a shadow across the face of the land. Perhaps Jules had
noticed this fact. Perhaps he was waiting until it grew light again, so
he could see what lay ahead of them. This ascending from an
unknown field must have all sorts of dangers attached to it, which an
experienced aviator understood.
And so Frank was allowed to reach the rear of the aeroplane without
being detected. His perfect knowledge concerning the build of the
machine served him well at this crisis, for he knew just where to go
in order to find what he sought.
Fortune favored him to a most remarkable degree. Why, if he had
the ordering of the whole affair he could hardly have improved upon
the arrangements. They had pushed the aeroplane out possibly a
score of feet beyond the doors of the hangar. And in so doing the
wheels just avoided a weighty object which Frank had had dumped
there, intending to use the same as an anchor, to which the
monoplane could be fastened when they came to trying her propeller
at full speed.
This was a large iron post, that must have weighed all of three
hundred pounds. It had a large ring attached. Once upon a time it
stood in front of the Whympers domicile, and horses were tied to the
ring; but lately it had come to be a nuisance, so that the colonel had
ordered it uprooted, and taken to the dump in the rear, from which
the young aviators had rescued it.
And through that same ring Frank now slipped his chain. His
purpose was plain. Instead of keeping restive horses from taking to
their heels, the old post was now intended to act as a restraining
power to a steed of the upper air currents, and curb the ambition of
the monoplane when the propeller started to turning.
When Frank had managed to pass his chain through the frame of the
rudder he brought the two ends together, and snapped the padlock
shut. Its jaws held the ends of the chain fast, forming an effectual
brake.
Satisfied that he had managed to anchor the aeroplane to the
ground, the boy next crept back toward the shed. He knew that the
explosion must come in a brief time now, and wished to be as far
away from the two robbers at that critical moment as possible.
Andy saw some one creeping toward him. The moon was still behind
the cloud, although just about to appear again, having given Frank
all the time he needed. At first Andy thought it must be one of the
robbers coming back to finish him, or else get something that had
been forgotten. And he had even mechanically half raised the big
monkey wrench before he caught a low sign that told him the truth.
What Frank had done he could not even guess; but he had faith in
the other, no matter what the circumstances might be, and believed
now that in some way his chum must have managed to block the
game of grab.
“Did you fix it?” he whispered, as the other joined him.
“Watch and see what happens,” came the low reply. “And when I let
go, shout like a house afire. If there’s a policeman inside of half a
mile he’ll come here on the tear.”
The face of the moon began to appear beyond the dark curtain. That
was to be the signal for the start. Jules was bending over even now.
“Hold tight, Jean! It ees to go!” they heard him say, in a thrilling tone.
“I am ready. Let loose!” answered the other, recklessly, as he clung
to the upright, close to which he had taken his position.
Andy held his breath. Both boys were staring hard at their beloved
monoplane, seen there in the moonlight. How brave she looked; and
to think that two rascally law-breakers were occupying the seats they
had fondly hoped should be their portion when the maiden flight was
taken.
The engine still worked steadily, with a series of little explosions that
denoted an expenditure of only a part of its capacity. Suddenly the
propeller commenced to turn swiftly around. Jules had made the
shift!
The monoplane began to move forward on its padded bicycle
wheels; and Andy could not repress a cry of chagrin, as he saw his
darling machine start off.
But his outburst was as nothing compared to the startled
exclamations and angry shouts that arose from the two occupants of
the monoplane, when, after going a dozen feet, it suddenly brought
up with a round turn that almost sent them backwards from their
seats.
And with propeller whizzing aimlessly, and engine working steadily,
the trapped aeroplane refused to budge another foot, being held fast
by the lumber chain, and the ground anchor that had once been a
massive hitching post!
 CHAPTER XIII.
THE BIRD BOYS IN LUCK.

It was certainly an exciting moment all around.

Even the usually cool Frank felt a thrill pass over him, as he
contemplated the frantic efforts of the aeroplane to leave its
anchorage, and take a maiden spin through the balmy atmosphere
of that July night.
Both the Frenchmen were spluttering with dismay and rage. One of
them believed that something must have happened to the machinery
of the monoplane, and his outcries were hurled against the “fool
boys” who had believed they could produce a flier capable of making
good.
But Jules, who had had much experience with such things, knew
differently. He easily recognized in those tugs and jerks a willingness
on the part of the little air craft to mount upward, if given a fair
chance.
So Jules, having shut off the futile power, was now climbing down
from his seat bent upon investigation. Of course he must speedily
discover the smart trick that had been played upon them, whereby
the “sky-lofter” had been pinned down to earth by a mere lumber
chain, and a castoff hitching post.
What then? Would he endeavor to break loose from the anchor; or
on the other hand might they expect that he would dash toward the
shed where two boys were giving tongue by now at the top of their
strong voices, calling for help?
Andy still gripped that big monkey wrench. In a pinch he believed it
would not prove a bad thing to cling to, and might make an effective
weapon of defense. And Frank had groped around until he once
more found the billet of wood which he had laid down upon issuing
forth upon his recent errand.
They saw Jules finally land upon the ground. Thanks to the moon for
being so accommodating, there was now an abundance of light, and
they could see everything.
So could Jules. He immediately discovered just why the sturdy little
engine of the aeroplane, which had excited his ardent admiration a
short time before, proved unable to break away from the near vicinity
of the hangar.
He was evidently so excited, and “flustrated,” as Andy afterwards
termed it, that he came near having a fit. The boys indeed thought
he was choking, from the many strange sounds that broke forth from
his throat; but this was only Jules’ way of trying to jumble every
expletive he could think of into one solid mass.
No need to tell him to whom they owed this failure of their brilliant
scheme for slipping away from those who were searching far and
wide to find them. The series of outcries from the open doors of the
hangar gave the secret away.
The second robber had by this time managed to release himself from
his seat; for being in fear lest he should topple out of the reeling
aeroplane Jean had apparently fastened himself in by means of a
handy rope.
He, too, showed signs of tremendous excitement, nor could he be
blamed, since by this time there were symptoms to indicate that the
entire community had been aroused by the whoops of the two boys.
Lights flashed in various windows of the nearest houses, and the
hoarse voices of men could be heard calling to each other.
Apparently, unless Jules and his companion made haste to vanish,
they were apt to be surrounded, and their escape cut off.
A light that had been moving speedily along the road suddenly made
a swerve, and turned into the field at the gate. It had the brilliancy of
electricity, and was undoubtedly the acetylene searchlight on a
motorcycle.
“The police are coming!” shouted Frank several times, at the top of
his voice. Of course this was only a mere guess on his part, but he
thought it would do no harm to add to the alarm of the two rogues,
and confuse them more than ever. There was no longer a possibility
that they would attack the boys, for the time would not allow of such
a thing. Nor could they by any means manage to detach the coveted
monoplane from its secure anchorage. Hence, the only thing left was
for them to run while the chance remained.
The man on the motorcycle was coming straight toward the shed.
Though possibly his machine wobbled more or less on the far from
smooth field, he knew how to keep his seat. More than that, he even
managed to discharge a pistol in the air, for the purpose of assuring
those who called for help that assistance was near at hand.
That finished the panicky condition of Jules and his confederate.
They knew now that it was indeed an officer of the law who had
happened, so fortunately for the owners of the aeroplane, to be
passing when the alarm was given. Doubtless, in their excited
imagination, they could picture a dozen similar guardians of the
peace surrounding the field; and they may even have believed that
they had walked into a trap, of which the wonderful little airship was
the bait.
Everything was forgotten but the fact of their peril. Jules shouted in a
voice as shrill as a siren that his comrade was to take to his heels,
and run for all he was worth. And so they made off, running like a
pair of foxes with a pack of hounds in full cry.
As if by some prearranged system they separated in making their
flight. Doubtless this was done to confuse pursuit; and they could
meet again, if lucky enough to get clean away, at some appointed
rendezvous.
Frank stopped shouting. There was quite enough racket already, he
thought, and the one aim of their combined chorus had been
attained, since the thieves were in full flight. Besides, he was rather
short of breath.
“Shucks! they’ve got away!” declared Andy, visibly chagrined; as if he
had begun to cherish a hope that the pair of precious rascals might
be captured through a combination of all forces, some of the glory
falling to the Bird boys.
“Yes, but the police will be hot on the track after this exposure,” said
Frank. “You see, they will know now just where to take up the trail. If
they had a pair of good dogs they could easily run those fellows
down now.”
“What’s all this racket mean?” asked the man on the motorcycle, as
he jumped out of his saddle, and leaned forward to stare at the two
boys, who must have presented rather a strange picture just then,
seeing that they were clad only in their striped pajamas, and
barefooted.
“It was those two robbers who cleaned out Leffingwell’s place!”
replied Andy, with his usual impetuosity. “They wanted to steal our
new aeroplane in order to escape. One of them is Jules, the French
aviator, who knows all about airships, and can tell a good one when
he sees it.”
By this time other men were beginning to come panting to the spot.
They were neighbors of Colonel Josiah’s, hastily clad, and bearing
all manner of arms, from an old double-barrel shotgun to an up-to-
date Marlin repeating rifle. A stableman even carried a two-pronged
hay fork, with which he was making wicked lunges in the air, as in
imagination he speared desperate foes.
“Don’t you know us, Joe Green?” asked Frank, recognizing the
officer.
“Why, bless my soul,” said the man, “if it ain’t Frank Bird, and Andy,
too! Is this your aeroplane, boys? And you say those slippery rascals
were trying to get away with it, meanin’ to slip out of the county by
the air route? No use chasing after ’em now, because they’ve
disappeared from sight. But I’ll get in touch with the Chief over the
phone, and have him come out here with more men.”
Even Colonel Josiah put in an appearance, clad in a wonderful
Japanese dressing gown of gorgeous colors, and waving in one
hand a tremendous sixshooter that no doubt had a history of its own.
“What happened?” he cried, as he limped, crutch and all, into the
little circle surrounding the two boys. “Let me get a chance at the
rogues, and I’ll settle their hash! Who are they, and what have they
been trying to do, Andy, my lad?”
Half a dozen voices tried to explain at once.
“Stop!” shouted the old man, waving his crutch like the baton of a
band master. “Let Andy speak. He was on the spot, and ought to
know. We don’t want hearsay evidence in this court. Now, lad, what’s
all the blooming row?”
So Andy had to once more tell how they had been aroused by the
sounds of some one trying to get into the shed; how they crouched
under the workbench while the two bold robbers examined the
monoplane, and determined to sail away in it, so as to leave no trail
behind that could be followed—and finally how Frank had conceived
his brilliant scheme for balking this evil intention.
Every eye was of course turned upon the chain and anchor, and men
began to even chuckle when the full force of Frank’s design was
understood.
“A clever dodge, my lad,” said Colonel Josiah, after he had bent
down and examined the novel method of holding a runaway
monoplane. “I never knew a smarter trick to be turned on the spur of
the moment. It does you credit, hanged if it doesn’t. And are you
sure they did no harm to your machine?”
“I am confident that they had no time to think of that, sir,” replied
Frank, who was now beginning to think of getting more clothes on
him, if this audience were to be prolonged.
“That’s lucky, yes, deuced lucky,” declared the anxious colonel, who
seemed to be about as much concerned over the safety of the
monoplane as the builders themselves. “But what is this you’ve got
here, boys? All ready to make a journey, were you, and take your
grips along?”
Frank and Andy sprang forward. Apparently up to now they had quite
forgotten a very important fact, until it was thus forcibly brought to
their attention by the words of the veteran traveler.
One look they gave into the body of the air craft. Then they reached
out their right hands, as if governed by some mutual inspiration.
“Shake!” said Frank, with a laugh; “sure we’re in great luck after all,
cousin!”
So they were; for in their great haste to depart to safer regions the
two robbers had quite forgotten to carry off the suit-cases containing
their plunder!
 CHAPTER XIV.
A GOOD NIGHT’S WORK.

“Ain’t this the greatest thing ever?” cried Andy, as with trembling
fingers he started to unfasten the cords by which the suit-cases had
been secured, so they might not drop out, should the sailing aircraft
wobble in space.
“It certainly does takes the cake for dumb luck!” observed Frank,
hardly less excited himself and forgetting all about his lack of
clothes.
“Suppose you explain then?” suggested a neighbor. “We’d like to join
in congratulations if we only knew what it was all about.”
“Why, you see,” began Andy, “these ain’t our bags at all.”
“They belong to the two gentlemen who thought to borrow our
machine for a little moonlight spin across lots to the next county,”
Frank went on, his face covered with a wide grin, as he hefted one of
the suit-cases, and found it mighty solid.
“What!” exclaimed Joe Green, the officer, as though suddenly waking
up.
“Feel the weight of that bag, Joe!” remarked Frank. “Strike you it’s
quite hefty for a lot of soiled linen? Well, it’s strapped nice and
secure, and we’ll let it stay so till Chief Waller comes to take charge,
but I rather guess these two bags hold all the stuff that was grabbed
out of Leffingwell’s jewelry store!”
His word produced another spasm of excitement. Men crowded
around to gaze at the suit-cases and exchange remarks.
“It’s so, I reckon,” remarked one; “’cause here’s the letters A. N. S.
on the end of this bag, and they stand for Arthur Nelson Sage, the
cashier of Leffingwell’s store. Did you ever hear of such luck? Sure
these boys are in clover!”
“I should remark they were,” observed another, enviously. “With a
reward of five hundred falling to ’em for the recovery of the stuff.
Some people just tumble head over heels into luck. I never struck
such a juicy thing in all my life.”
“Well, they deserve it, all right,” declared Colonel Josiah, defiantly.
“What d’ye think of boys who could build such a trump outfit as that
ere? And then stick by it through thick and thin? And wasn’t that a
cute dodge, holdin’ the aeroplane back with a hog chain and my old
hitching post? Why, Si Clapp, you’d never have thought up such a
game as that in a thousand years, let alone in ten seconds. So I say
again they deserve it. What they get they’ve won fair. Ain’t it so,
neighbors?”
A rousing cheer answered him. And leaving the two bags in charge
of Colonel Josiah, the Bird boys scurried inside to pick up a few
more clothes and get shoes on their feet, since it was apparent that
they were in for a couple of hours’ siege.
Andy’s teeth fairly rattled with excitement. Had he been in a freezing
atmosphere he could not have shivered at a greater rate.
“Say, Frank, looks like this being broke up in our sleep was going to
be a regular thing,” he remarked, while dressing.
“That’s right,” replied his cousin, laughing. “One night it’s a sandbag
from a passing balloon that lands with a smash on our pile of boards.
Then we are awakened by a couple of prowlers, who want to steal
our dandy little airship. Wonder what it will be the next time?”
“Yes,” said Andy, quickly; “but you forget that two nights ago we had
visitors here, even if we didn’t know it at the time. That makes three
in succession. The first may have been along the order of an
accident. The second was what Professor Gregg would call a
coincidence. But I declare the third time makes it a habit!”
“Well, Andy, we’ll get used to it in time, perhaps. Though if this thing
keeps going we’ll have to take a nap in the daytime to make up for
lost sleep. Did Joe go with Mr. McGovern to ’phone headquarters?”
“Yes, that was what he said he meant to do,” replied the other, as he
finished lacing his second shoe. “And so I reckon we’ll have a squad
of the police out here as soon as they can get the patrol wagon
moving to take charge of those bags and ask all sorts of fool
questions. Do you think they’ll find Jules and his pal?”
“Not unless they show more smartness than they have up to now,”
replied Frank. “Of course, the two men will be as mad as hops to
think they allowed the bags to stay. But since the whole county is
aroused by now and every day makes it harder for them to get away,
they’ll be thinking only of escape. And you know there are plenty of
fine hiding places in the woods bordering the lake, where they can
stay for a week if they only find some way to get grub.”
By this time the boys were dressed. Upon going out again they found
that the group had been increased by the arrival of several more
belated neighbors, who, having heard of the row, could not resist the
temptation to get out and investigate.
All sorts of questions were asked and the boys replied good
naturedly. Indeed, they had reason for feeling genial just then.
Fortune had been very kind to them, since not only had they been
able to save their valuable aeroplane without its suffering the
slightest damage, but here the alarmed rascals had actually
presented them with their bags of plunder.
Presently a wagon was heard coming furiously along the road. Of
course this was the police, headed by the chief himself, clad in a
resplendent uniform, with a glittering silver star on his broad and
manly chest to designate his official importance.
“Oh, say! Do we have to go over all this stuff again?” groaned Andy.
“Well, you see, they have to know how we came by this loot,”
laughed Frank. “Otherwise we might get pulled in for receiving stolen
property. So make up your mind to stick to the statements you’ve
already given. After they’ve taken the plunder away perhaps we can
shoo these good people off, trip our machine back in the shed and
once more try to get a little nap before another day comes.”
So when the chief came up, asking questions and examining the
suit-cases, both of the boys were ready to tell all they know.
Chief Waller was a big man, in point of size; and, according to his
own mind, a brainy one in addition. He had a self-important air about
him, but that never deceived Frank an iota. The boy knew that just
now the chief envied them their good fortune and was only too willing
to share, even in a small degree, the glory that must come in
connection with the recovery of the stolen property.
“You boys are justly entitled to the reward,” he said, pompously, after
a time. “And I’ll see that you get it. I can appreciate the clever nature
of the game you played, Frank, for that is exactly what I would have
done under similar circumstances.”
Neither of the boys allowed even a smile to flicker across their faces,
though it was almost ludicrous, the idea of Chief Waller ever having
a brilliant idea. He had been at the head of the force three years or
more, and while he did his duty decently and impressed tramps with
a fitting sense of the majesty of the law, no one had ever known him
to make a clever play.
The boys were only too glad to see the patrol wagon depart, bearing
the two recovered suit-cases, filled with plunder, and the several
officers.
“We’ll get to work in the morning,” the chief had promised ere
departing; “and run the rascals to earth. They’re in the last ditch now,
and the hour is not far away when they’ll be in the clutches of the
law!”
But Frank and Andy had their own opinion about that. They chanced
to believe that if the matter depended solely upon the smartness of
the police head, Jules and his confederate would prove too cunning
to fall into any trap.
“Come, let’s push the aeroplane back into its quarters,” said Frank.
“That’s the ticket,” remarked Andy, promptly. “Just unlock that chain
and give us a chance. Hi, careful there, Phil! Don’t knock up against
that plane again that way. They don’t like rough handling, even if
they are keyed up with stanch wire cables. Now, push easy like.