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FRENCH POLITICS, SOCIETY AND CULTURE

The French Centre Right and

the Challenges of a Party
System in Transition
William Rispin
French Politics, Society and Culture

Series Editor
Jocelyn Evans
School of Politics & International Studies
University of Leeds
Leeds, UK
This series examines all aspects of French politics, society and culture. In
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 William Rispin

The French Centre

Right
and the Challenges
of a Party System
in Transition
William Rispin
Hessle, UK

French Politics, Society and Culture

ISBN 978-3-030-60893-4 ISBN 978-3-030-60894-1 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-60894-1

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 Acknowledgements

This book grew out of my Ph.D. research. I would like to thank Professor
Nick Hewlett and Dr. Jessica Wardhaugh, who acted as supervisors for
both this thesis and my M.A. by Research, and who offered many very
useful comments on numerous drafts of the chapters. My two examiners,
Professor Andrew Knapp and Professor Jeremy Ahearne also provided
helpful suggestions as to how to transform my work into a book.
I am also particularly thankful to my parents, for their love, support
and encouragement throughout the whole process.

v
 Contents

1 Introduction 1
Defining the ‘Centre Right’ 7
Understanding the Problems Faced by the Centre Right
Through a New Model 9
References 12

2 A Changing French Society and the Rise and Fall

of Consensus (c.1981–2012) 15
Introduction 15
The Decline in Voter Identification with Parties 16
The Evolution of the Party System 20
The Impact of Globalisation 22
The Importance of the Cultural Element of Globalisation
in the Rise of ‘Populism’: The Issue of Cultural Insecurity 24
Triggering a Realignment 28
The Decline of Political Parties and the Rise of Individualism 29
Conclusion: The Emergence of a New Model 33
References 36

3 Parties, Party Systems and the Electorate 41

Introduction 41
The Impact of the Fifth Republic’s Institutions on the French
Party System 43

vii
viii CONTENTS

Theoretical Approaches to Party System Realignments 48

The Decline in Allegiance to Traditional Ideologies 51
Conclusion 56
References 58

4 Divisions Within the Centre Right over Identity:

2012–2017 63
Introduction 63
Cultural Insecurity: A Key Divide in French Politics 64
Cultural Insecurity and Sarkozy’s 2012 Presidential Election
Campaign 68
Cultural Insecurity and the Centre Right Under
the Hollande Presidency 69
I. The Debate over Assimilation Vs Integration 70
II. The Question of Responses to Terrorism 75
III. Divisions Caused by Social Liberalism 76
IV. Anti-elitism and the Primary of the Right and Centre 78
V. The Importance of Personality in the Debate Over
Identity 80
Cultural Insecurity and the 2017 Presidential Elections 82
Conclusion 84
References 87

5 The Centre Right and the Challenges of Economic

Reform 91
Introduction 91
Long-Standing French Concerns About Liberalism Under
the Fifth Republic 92
The Evolution of Attitudes Towards the French Economy:
A Rise in Demand for Liberalism 96
The Decline of Traditional Ideological Conflicts,
and the ‘Consensus of Government’ Over Economic Policy 100
The Weakening of Traditional Ideological Attachments
and the Growing Move Towards Reform 104
The General Consensus Within Les Républicains
over Economic Policy 106
I. Reducing the Size of the State 107
II. Improving Competitiveness 108
 CONTENTS ix

Les Républicains and the Realignment of the French Party

System 110
François Fillon as Anti-French 117
Conclusion 119
References 123

6 Europe and the Realignment of the French Party System 131

Introduction 131
Europe: A Key Divide in the New Party System 133
Nuancing the ‘Winners Vs Losers of Globalisation’ Analysis:
The Importance of the Questions of Sovereignty and Identity
in Relation to Europe 134
The New Divide Over Europe 137
Europe and the Right 138
I. A Right-Wing Vision of Europe 139
II. Two Approaches to Europe: Federalism vs Nation States 143
Europe: A Key Factor That Divided Members of Les
Républicains 149
I. Disagreement Within Les Républicains Concerning
Europe as a Way of Maximising French Influence 150
II. Conflicting Ideals on the Right: Europe vs The Nation
State 152
III. Europe as a Cultural Area 153
Beyond Left and Right: Emmanuel Macron and Europe 155
Conclusion 158
References 162

7 In Search of a Leader: The Centre Right and Its

Leadership Crisis, 2012–2017 167
Introduction 167
Leadership: A Crucial Factor During the Hollande
Presidency 168
I. The Institutions of the Fifth Republic 169
II. The Decline in Allegiance to Political Parties 169
The Changing Dynamics of Competition Within Parties 173
Defining Leadership 174
I. The Personality of the Leader in the Modern French
Political System 175
x CONTENTS

II. Representation: The Other Side of Political Leadership 181

The Importance of Leadership for the Centre Right 183
The Centre Right and the Decline of Political Parties 186
The Importance of Personality in Explaining the Fortunes
of Les Républicains 189
Emmanuel Macron and the Leadership Criteria 194
The Right Under the Macron Presidency, and the Eclipse
of Les Républicains 196
Emmanuel Macron and the Transformation of the French
Party System 198
Conclusion 200
References 203

8 Conclusion 209
What Future for Les Républicains? 222
References 227

Appendix: The Results of the 2012 and 2017 Presidential

and Legislative Elections 231

Index 239
 Abbreviations

EELV Europe Ecologie—Les Verts

FN Front National
LR Les Républicains
LREM La République En Marche
MoDem Mouvement Démocrate
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OFCE Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques
PCF Parti Communiste Français
PS Parti Socialiste
RN Rassemblement National
RPR Rassemblement pour la République
UDF Union pour la Démocratie Française
UDI Union des Démocrates et Indépendents
UMP Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (except during 2002 elections
when this acronym stood for Union pour la Majorité Présidentielle)

xi
 List of Tables

Table A.1 2012 presidential elections: First round 231

Table A.2 2012 presidential elections: Second round 232
Table A.3 2012 legislative elections (results at the national level):
First round 233
Table A.4 2012 legislative elections (results at the national level):
Second round 234
Table A.5 2017 presidential elections: First round 235
Table A.6 2017 presidential elections: Second round 235
Table A.7 2017 legislative elections (results at national level): First
round 236
Table A.8 2017 legislative elections (results at national level):
Second round 237

xiii
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction

The French presidential elections of April and May 2017 seemed to mark
a moment of rupture in the history of the Fifth Republic. The repre-
sentatives of Les Républicains and the Parti Socialiste, the two parties
representing the political currents of Centre Right and Centre Left that
have formed a majority of the governments since 1958, were both elim-
inated in the first round. The candidate who received the most votes on
23 April 2017, and who would go on to be elected president, Emmanuel
Macron, had only been made a minister in the Hollande government in
2014, and had created his own movement in April 2016. He claimed to
be neither of the Right nor of the Left, and promised a new approach
to politics, that would look to move beyond the historical dividing lines
within the traditional party system. As the outgoing Socialist government
had been deeply unpopular, the PS candidate had long been expected
to be eliminated in the first round, but it had been widely assumed that
this would be to the benefit of the Centre Right, and so the failure of
Les Républicains to be represented in the second round was even more
surprising.
The defeat of Les Républicains has largely been attributed to the
Penelopegate scandal. On 27 January 2017, the Canard enchaîné news-
paper published allegations that Fillon had used public funds to employ
his wife as his parliamentary assistant, for which she had received 680
380 euros according to the Nouvel Obs, when there was little evidence

© The Author(s) 2021 1

W. Rispin, The French Centre Right and the Challenges of a Party
System in Transition, French Politics, Society and Culture,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-60894-1_1
2 W. RISPIN

of her having carried out much, if any, work in this role. Fillon’s defence
was undermined by the fact that his wife had given an interview to the
British newspaper, The Daily Telegraph, in 2007, in which she had explic-
itly stated that she had never been his assistant. Le Canard enchaîné also
claimed that she had been paid to produce articles for the journal La
Revue des Deux Mondes, again with scant proof that she had done so.
Further allegations followed, regarding Fillon’s employment of his chil-
dren using public funds when he had been a senator between 2007 and
2012, when they were only students, and his acceptance of designer suits
from businessman, Robert Bourgi.
The scandal was certainly a major factor in alienating potential voters.
Throughout his political career, Fillon had developed a reputation for
integrity, which had been crucial to his success in being chosen as the
candidate of Les Républicains in the Primary of the Right and Centre
of 2016. Furthermore, as Piar (2017) has demonstrated, coverage of the
revelations, with new allegations emerging on a regular basis, dominated
news coverage and distracted attention from Fillon’s political message.
Figures within Les Républicains emphasised the importance of
‘Penelopegate’ in explaining Fillon’s defeat. In the aftermath of Macron’s
victory, and before the legislative elections of June 2017, it suited politi-
cians on the Centre Right to blame their presidential candidate for the
party’s predicament. Laurent Wauquiez, who would be elected party
leader in December 2017, claimed that the defeat of the party in the
presidential elections was due to a rejection of Fillon, rather than a lack
of support for the Centre Right and its ideas.
However, the ongoing decline in the party’s fortunes following the
May 2017 presidential elections challenges this analysis. Immediately
upon taking office, Macron named Edouard Philippe, and Bruno Le
Maire, both members of Les Républicains, as Prime Minister and Minister
of the Economy, respectively. In the June legislative elections of that
year, Les Républicains gained 112 seats, 73 fewer than it had won in
2012 under its previous incarnation, the UMP. Following the election,
more figures from the Centre Right were named in the Macron govern-
ment, while a number of Les Républicains députés, calling themselves
Les Constructifs, chose to sit separately from their colleagues in the
National Assembly and pledged to support the new administration from
the outside. This group would later transform itself into a new party, Agir.
In addition to losing members to Macron and En Marche, Les Répub-
licains was further undermined by internal disagreements. A significant
 1 INTRODUCTION 3

number of the party’s supporters were alienated by the election of Laurent

Wauquiez, known for favouring a tough approach to immigration, and for
being something of a Eurosceptic, as party leader in December 2017. It
therefore seems clear that the problems of the PS government had masked
the Centre Right’s own inability to respond to the political realignment
that was occurring in France.
This book seeks to understand the divisions that emerged within
Les Républicains during the Hollande presidency, which were crucial
to its defeat in the presidential and legislative elections of 2017, and
its subsequent disintegration into several separate entities. It examines
the evolution of voters’ attitudes towards political parties, leaders and
institutions, how this undermined the long-standing party system, and
continued and reinforced a political realignment. It examines how such
change provoked quarrels within the Centre Right, which would fatally
weaken its political power.
The difficulties faced by the Centre Right in France during the
Hollande presidency are of particular interest, as they reflect a wider devel-
opment in the Western world, where voters would appear to have become
disillusioned with traditional politics and representative institutions. In
Britain in 2016, the Leave campaign won the referendum on membership
of the European Union, despite the leaders of all major political parties
supporting a Remain vote—marking an abandonment of traditional party
loyalties that the 2019 General Election would show even more clearly.
Populist movements were gaining strength in Italy, Germany, Spain and
elsewhere in Europe. Party systems that had been based on the alterna-
tion in power of the Centre Left and Centre Right were coming under
strain.
Not only are voters more distrustful of traditional parties than in the
past, but they also adopt a more personalised approach to political activity.
As Perrineau (2012) has argued, whereas previously many voters had
strongly identified with a particular class, a factor which influenced their
voting habits, this is less likely to be the case nowadays. As a result, the
Left/Right divide that had been underpinned by class differences has
been undermined, and it could be claimed that traditional ideologies that
are related to this split have a weaker appeal for much of the electorate.
As some such as Brochet (2017) have noted, voters no longer adopt a
single coherent worldview, but rather pick and choose (often contradic-
tory) policies from across the political spectrum, which makes them less
likely to support the parties of government with which they previously
4 W. RISPIN

identified, and more likely to be open to new, and often more radical,
movements.
While much attention has been paid to the problems of the Centre Left
in this context, there has been less focus on the issues facing the Centre
Right. Parties of the mainstream Right in many Western countries faced
significant problems during the period between 2012 and 2017, including
the Conservative Party, which saw splits emerge following the Brexit
referendum, the German Christian Democrats who were challenged by
Alternative für Deutschland, and the mainstream of the Republican Party,
who were not able to prevent the maverick Donald Trump from securing
the party’s nomination as its candidate for the 2016 presidential elec-
tions. In France, the Centre Right was not only split internally, but was
challenged by ‘unconventional’ parties from the outside, first by the FN,
and then by En Marche. The French experience can therefore be seen to
reflect a much wider phenomenon.
This book will focus on the difficulties encountered by the Centre
Right within the French political system during the Hollande presi-
dency. Under the Fifth Republic, Centre Right movements had produced
a majority of the presidents and of the governments in the National
Assembly, but by 2017, the party had fallen into disarray, and it was
difficult to see how its various currents could come together and win elec-
tions. The downfall of Les Républicains was not simply a political accident
but was part of a more general trend in the evolution of the French party
system.
During the Fifth Republic the Right had often been split between
various parties but by the early 2000s many believed that it was neces-
sary to bring together its disparate elements into a single movement—the
UMP—in order to win elections. Unity would be maintained through
allegiance to a single leader, the then president, Jacques Chirac, and by the
common aim of obtaining and retaining power, rather than by agreement
over a particular programme. The UMP strategy was initially successful,
and, in 2007, survived the transition from Chirac to Sarkozy, but the
latter’s defeat in 2012 heralded a new stage in the party’s history, for two
reasons.
Firstly, the years 2012–2017 were the first during which the UMP held
neither the presidency nor a majority in the National Assembly, and as
a result the party was now faced with a period of at least five years in
opposition. Some députés had been uneasy with Sarkozy’s campaign in
the 2012 presidential elections, and in particular his hard-line stance on
 1 INTRODUCTION 5

immigration and identity. Without the necessity to present a united front,

as when in government, debates over strategy would become a source of
contention, as the party tried to define a programme for the 2017 elec-
tions, and would reveal the significantly different positions of its members
that would threaten the very existence of the movement.
Secondly, following Sarkozy’s resignation, the UMP found itself
without a leader, and with no obvious candidate to replace him. The
question of who should succeed the former president would remain unre-
solved throughout the Hollande presidency. Centre Right parties had
often united around a leader capable of gaining power, as was seen under
de Gaulle, Chirac and Sarkozy. Without a single, accepted figure at its
head, one of the key features that had ensured the cohesion and stability
of the Centre Right, and had preserved unity and harmony, was no longer
present.
It was often thought that the problem of unifying the Centre Right
could be solved if the appropriate leadership candidate could be identi-
fied, but finding a solution to this issue was made more complicated by
the realignment of the party system that had been underway for some
time. Since the decision of François Mitterrand, the first Socialist presi-
dent of the Fifth Republic, to move away from the dramatic expansion
of the public sector that had been promised in his manifesto, towards
a programme that gave a greater role to private enterprise, many voters
have believed the Left/Right bipolar divide has been losing its relevance
(Hayward 1994; Perrineau 2012; Sainte-Marie 2015; Behrent 2017). The
similar policies enacted by governments of the Centre Left and Centre
Right caused an increasing number of voters to feel disenfranchised, and
to either transfer their support to the Far Left or Far Right, or to abstain.
This trend accelerated during the Hollande presidency. The need to react
to the growth of more extreme movements provoked debates and splits
within both the Centre Left and Centre Right. Whoever replaced Sarkozy
would need to have not only a programme acceptable to their party,
but also one that would be capable of winning support from outside
the movement. Les Républicains looked to resolve debate over leader-
ship by holding a primary to choose their representative for the 2017
presidential elections. Both Les Républicains and the PS felt that they
had to organise primaries in an attempt to broaden their support beyond
their party membership. Previously, the candidates of the two established
parties of government had been almost certain to be present in the second
round. However, the decline in faith in traditional political movements,
6 W. RISPIN

and the rise of alternatives on the political extremes and in the Centre
meant that this was no longer the case during the Hollande presidency.
The decision to designate a leader in this way was also influenced by the
success of the primary held by the Parti Socialiste in 2011, which had
dominated media coverage, and which had enabled party members to
rally behind the winner, François Hollande.
The aftermath of Fillon’s victory in the primary of November 2016
revealed how the link between voters and parties had evolved. Although
it had been expected that all party members and supporters would rally
behind him, many of the supporters of his defeated opponents, both
within the party and among the general public, seemed to feel a greater
loyalty to the candidate for whom they had voted in the primary than to
the party itself. Some defected to En Marche before the elections, while
others did so following Macron’s victory. The travails of Fillon therefore
provide further evidence of the decline in the electorate’s ties to tradi-
tional movements and ideologies, and its adoption of a more individualist
and volatile attitude to voting.
In order to understand the divisions within Les Républicains, it is
important to consider the long-term political realignments, which inten-
sified during the Hollande presidency. Several different models have been
proposed to explain this (Fourquet 2017; Bherer 2017; Gougou and
Persico 2017; Martin 2017), but none provide a comprehensive analysis
of the situation.
Some argue that society is now divided between the winners and
losers of globalisation—a view supported by both Macron (2016) and
Marine Le Pen (Barbarit 2017)—largely ignore the fact that globalisation
is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon, involving several different
economic, cultural and political elements. Amalgamating the different
reasons for opposition to globalisation obscures the fact that it is possible
for voters to support certain elements, while being wary of others.
Those models that consider several elements separately, rather than
grouping them together as part of globalisation, have often overlooked
the role of division over Europe, despite Macron making his positive
vision of the EU a key aspect of his campaign, and one which would
enable him to reach out to voters across the Left/Right divide.
Others fail to recognise the complexity of the problems facing the
Centre Right. Martin (2017) argues that there are two major axes
of conflict. One concerns socially liberal opinions vs socially conserva-
tive views, while the other opposes liberal economic policies to a more
 1 INTRODUCTION 7

protectionist stance. His argument that this has created three blocs: ‘pro-
tectionist environmentalist’, ‘liberal pro-globalisation’ and ‘conservative-
identarian’ does not represent the position of Les Républicains, many of
whose representatives and supporters favoured liberal economic policies
alongside a more traditionalist approach to national identity.
The issues raised by the divisions within Les Républicains are worthy of
study not only because the Centre Right has been (along with the Centre
Left) one of the two currents that have dominated politics under the Fifth
Republic, but also because they can help us to identify broader political
trends that occurred between 2012 and 2017. In terms of the study of the
evolution of the Right in France, it is crucial to understand the problems
faced by the UMP (and later Les Républicains) and why the union formed
in 2002 fell apart in 2017. To achieve this, a new model is required to
explain the evolution of the French party system—one that takes into
account the key areas of identity and economic liberalism considered by
others, but which also gives the issue of Europe its proper place. Such an
analysis must also recognise the multifaceted nature of globalisation, and
how different policy areas affected the Centre Right in different ways.

Defining the ‘Centre Right’

The focus of this book is on the party, which from 2002 was called
the UMP, before being renamed Les Républicains by Sarkozy in 2015,
following his re-election as party leader. In order to make observations
about the evolution of this movement both throughout the course of the
Hollande presidency, and also during the wider period from 2002, the
term ‘Centre Right’ will be used to refer to both parties.1
MoDem and the UDI, which some might class as being part of the
Centre Right, will be referred to as the Independent Centre parties. This
highlights their desire to have greater freedom of action, as could be seen
when both parties chose to form a separate list from Les Républicains for
the European elections, and by their decision not to present candidates in
the Primary of the Right and Centre of 2016. MoDem, in particular, was
more a party of the Centre than one of the Centre Right. In the 2012
presidential elections, Bayrou supported Hollande rather than Sarkozy,
and in 2017, he rallied behind Macron rather than Fillon. Surveys showed
that MoDem voters often found themselves politically caught between
the PS and the Centre Right. In the 2015 Ipsos/Sopra Steria Fractures
françaises survey, 51% of MoDem supporters agreed with the statement
8 W. RISPIN

‘To establish social justice, it would be necessary to take from the rich in
order to give to the poor’, compared with 72% of those close to the PS,
and 30% of those close to the UMP (Teinturier and Zumsteeg 2015;
32). On social issues that were less related to the economy, MoDem
supporters were close to the Centre Left in some cases, but had more
in common with supporters of the Centre Right in others. For example,
53% of MoDem supporters felt that anti-white racism was a relatively
rare phenomenon in France, compared with 70% of those of the PS, and
47% of those from the UMP (Teinturier and Zumsteeg 2015; 69). The
situation was reversed on some questions concerning the integration of
immigrant communities. While 60% of MoDem supporters felt that immi-
grants made an effort to integrate, and 63% of those from the PS shared
this view, 29% of UMP supporters agreed with this statement (Teinturier
and Zumsteeg 2015; 67). For this reason, MoDem is better classified as
an Independent Centre party.
The term ‘Centre Right’ will also exclude Macron and his party, En
Marche. During the presidential elections, Macron stressed that he was
‘neither of the Right, nor of the Left’, situating himself above the bipolar
divide. Commentators have offered slightly different interpretations of his
position within the political landscape. Jaffré (2017) has argued that the
leader of En Marche was a ‘Centre Left candidate and is now a Centre
Right president’ while for Elgie (2017; 25):

LREM can be interpreted as a combination of moderate right and

moderate left députés that has won some support from moderate right
and moderate left députés in the Assemblée and that has been systematically
opposed there by both the extreme right and what we can interpret as the
extreme left in the context of the contemporary French party system.

That Macron had been a minister in the Hollande government (without

being a member of the PS) and that, once elected president, he appointed
a former member of Les Républicains as his prime minister reinforces the
view that he is best characterised as being both of the Right and of the
Left, and so will not be considered as part of the Centre Right.
 1 INTRODUCTION 9

Understanding the Problems Faced

by the Centre Right Through a New Model
In this book, we will argue that the fractures within Les Républicains
and the disintegration of the party following the 2017 presidential and
legislative elections were due, in a large part, to its failure to respond
to an ongoing political realignment that reached its culmination during
the Hollande presidency. We will demonstrate how the Left/Right divide
that had long dominated the French party system had been weakened,
as citizens became less attached to traditional ideologies, and would
pick and choose policies from across the political spectrum. The polit-
ical scene had evolved and was structured by different dynamics. Rather
than being based on a single divide, such as Left/Right or pro- and
anti-globalisation, we will show that parties were arranged on three axes,
according to their policies relating to identity, economic liberalism and
France’s relationship with the European Union. As we shall see these axes
were not considered of equal importance for all voters and in all contexts.
Each one of these areas posed different challenges for Les Républicains.
In Chapter 2, we will demonstrate how the party system that had long
existed under the Fifth Republic, based on a division between the Left
and the Right, had already come under increasing strain prior to the 2012
presidential and legislative elections. Sociological and political factors that
had developed from around the early 1980s caused a blurring of the class
divides that had underpinned the arrangement of parties. As Centre Left
and Centre Right governments pursued similar policies in their competi-
tion for the support of the middle classes, an increasing number of voters
felt disenfranchised and turned to more radical alternatives—particularly
to the FN. In addition, a series of crises that emerged from 2008 seriously
reduced the confidence of the electorate in their political representatives.
The combined effect of a sense of political alienation and a growing
mistrust of the political class was that the bipolar party system based on a
division between the Left and the Right had been significantly weakened
by the start of the Hollande presidency in 2012.
Chapter 3 sets discussion of the political realignment during the
Hollande presidency in the broader context of political change in France
since 1958, and examines some of the existing theory that will underpin
the chapters that follow by considering what constitutes a party system,
and a political realignment. We shall see how the Hollande presidency
(2012–2017) constituted a period when large sections of the electorate
10 W. RISPIN

were less attracted to traditional ideologies than in the past, and that many
voters were now inclined to select policies from across the political spec-
trum in order to create their own worldview, a factor that made their
voting behaviour particularly volatile.
The following three chapters will each discuss an area of policy that
forms part of our new model in order to explain the problems faced by
the Centre Right during the Hollande presidency.
Chapter 4 examines the debate over identity. The defeat of Nicolas
Sarkozy in 2012, whose campaign for re-election had focused on a hard-
line stance on immigration and integration left his party divided. Some
thought that his strategy had avoided an even worse result and should
be continued, while others felt that a more liberal approach would be
required to win over voters from the Centre and the Left. These opposing
positions would endure throughout the Hollande presidency, and would
be exacerbated by further conflicts that emerged over issues such as gay
marriage and how to respond to the threat of terrorism. Les Répub-
licains would split into two camps—socially conservative Traditionalists
and socially liberal Modernists. Fillon’s ability to win over the Tradition-
alists would ensure his victory in the primary, but his socially conservative
programme would also be an important factor in his subsequent defeat in
the presidential elections of 2017.
Chapter 5 considers the issue of economic liberalism. Against the
background of significant support among the French population for inter-
ventionist policies, there has often been a ‘consensus of government’,
as parties of both the Centre Left and the Centre Right in France
have implemented economic programmes when in power that have put
emphasis on liberal measures. During the Hollande presidency, French
voters as a whole became more receptive to the idea of giving support
to private enterprise and to reducing the size of the state. At the same
time, many voters still wanted to preserve some protective elements. The
2017 elections were, to a certain extent, a contest to see which candi-
date and party could offer the programme that was best able to balance
liberal economic reform of the capitalist system with the preservation of
elements of state protection. While the radical reforms proposed by Fillon
were popular on the Centre Right, his emphasis on a rapid liberalisation
of the economy, meant that he was unable to widen his support much
beyond his party base.
In Chapter 6, we will explore the question of Europe. The impact of
the issue of French membership of the European Union in influencing
 1 INTRODUCTION 11

voters during the 2017 presidential election campaign has often been
overlooked, despite it playing an important role in Macron’s success.
His pro-European federalist agenda revitalised what had been a tradi-
tional dividing line between the Right and the Centre, which also ran
through Les Républicains. It would persuade a significant number of
the supporters of the Independent Centre parties and of those who
had voted for Juppé in the primary of the Right and Centre—who had
been expected to rally behind the Right—to support the candidate of En
Marche.
Having considered policy issues in the preceding three chapters,
Chapter 7 discusses how these were closely entwined with the question of
how to select an appropriate leader. Although leadership has always been
important under the Fifth Republic, particularly for the Centre Right, the
decline in allegiance to traditional ideologies and the parties that repre-
sented them gave it an even greater emphasis. Many voters who struggled
to identify with a party now looked for a figure in whom they could have
confidence. The head of a party must balance questions of personality
and representation, in seeking the support of members and of the wider
electorate in order to be successful. Fillon was able to better respond to
the expectations in this area of participants in the primary of 2016, but
would fail to appeal to a broader section of voters in the presidential elec-
tions. This response to the challenges of the issue of leadership would be
a determining factor in both Fillon’s defeat and the Macron’s victory.
This book will therefore explain how many of the phenomena that have
been observed in political systems throughout the Western world, such as
the decline in allegiance to traditional parties, citizens’ adoption of a more
independent and volatile approach to voting, and the rise of new and also
more radical movements, were witnessed in France during the Hollande
presidency. It will show how these factors contributed to and reinforced a
process of political realignment, which was fundamental to the problems
faced by Les Républicains in the presidential and legislative elections of
2017. Through analysis of the Centre Right, it seeks to demonstrate the
political evolution taking place within the Fifth Republic, and to under-
stand why the defeat of Les Républicains in 2017 did not mark the end
of its struggles, but rather suggested that a long period of difficulty for
the party lay ahead.
12 W. RISPIN

Note
1. The only exception to this rule will be in Chapter 5, where we will examine
Europe as a key area of division between the UMP/Les Républicains, and
the Independent Centre parties of the UDI and MoDem. In order to
avoid any confusion that might arise from referring to the ‘Centre’, and
‘Centre Right’, in this chapter alone, we will use ‘the Right’ to refer to the
UMP/Les Républicains. The FN shall always be distinguished by being
referred to either by its name, or by the terms ‘the Far Right’ or ‘the
Radical Right’.

References
Barbarit, Simon. 2017. «Patriotes» contre «mondialistes», Marine Le Pen lance
sa campagne à Lyon. publicsenat.fr, February 5. https://www.publicsenat.
fr/article/politique/patriotes-contre-mondialistes-marine-le-pen-lance-sa-cam
pagne-a-lyon-54258. Accessed 13 February 2018.
Behrent, Michael C. 2017. Twilight of the Political? On the Ideological Disarray
of French Politics. Modern & Contemporary France 25 (1): 75–81.
Bherer, Marc-Olivier. 2017. Christophe Guilluy «Macron le candidat des
métropoles mondialisées». Le Monde, April 26. http://www.lemonde.fr/
idees/article/2017/04/26/christophe-guilluy-m-macron-est-le-candidat-
des-metropolesmondialisees_5117791_3232.html#kSTwwMi2vemASbXC.99.
Accessed 13 February 2018.
Brochet, Francis. 2017. Démocratie smartphone: Le populisme numérique de
Trump à Macron. Paris: Editions François Bourin.
Elgie, Robert. 2017. The Election of Emmanuel Macron and the New French
Party System: A Return to the éternel marais ? Modern & Contemporary
France 26 (1): 15–29.
Fourquet, Jérôme. 2017. Un nouveau clivage: Perdants versus gagnants de la
mondialisation. Commentaire 158 (2): 265–270.
Gougou, Florent, and Simon Persico. 2017. A New Party System in the Making?
The 2017 French Presidential Election. French Politics 15: 303–321.
Hayward, Jack. 1994. Ideological Change: The Exhaustion of the Revolutionary
Impetus. In Developments in French Politics, ed. Peter A. Hall, Jack Hayward,
and Howard Machin, 15–32. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Jaffré, Jérôme. 2017. Jérôme Jaffré: «Macron était un candidat du centre
gauche, c’est un président du centre droit». Le Figaro, December 18. http://
www.lefigaro.fr/vox/politique/2017/12/18/31001-20171218ARTFIG0
0241-jerome-jaffre-macron-etait-un-candidat-de-centre-gauche-c-est-un-pre
sident-de-centre-droit.php. Accessed 14 September 2018.
Macron, Emmanuel. 2016. Révolution. Paris: XO Editions.
 1 INTRODUCTION 13

Martin, Pierre. 2017. Un séisme politique: L’élection présidentielle de 2017.

Commentaire 158 (2): 249–264.
Perrineau, Pascal. 2012. Le choix de Marianne: Pourquoi et pour qui votons-nous?.
Paris: Fayard.
Piar, Christophe. 2017. La présidentielle vue par les JT. In Le vote disruptif:
Les élections présidentielles et législatives de 2017 , ed. Pascal Perrineau, 73–99.
Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.
Sainte-Marie, Jérôme. 2015. Le nouvel ordre démocratique. Paris: Editions du
Moment.
Teinturier, Brice, and Stephane Zumsteeg. 2015. Fractures françaises Vague 3:
Ipsos/Sopra Steria pour Le Monde, La Fondation Jean Jaurès et Sciences Po.
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jaures.org/nos-productions/fractures-francaises-edition-2015. Accessed 22
November 2020
 CHAPTER 2

A Changing French Society and the Rise

and Fall of Consensus (c.1981–2012)

Introduction
French politics under the Fifth Republic has long represented a conflict
between the Left and the Right.1 By the 1970s, this took the form of a
four-way contest between the PCF and PS on the Left, and the UDF and
RPR on the Right. The decline of the PCF and UDF in the 1980s and
1990s produced a new arrangement, and by the time of Sarkozy’s election
as president, Grunberg and Haegel (2007) could argue that French Poli-
tics was now not only bipolar, but increasingly bipartisan, based on the
relationship between the PS and the UMP. As Hewlett (1998) has argued,
from the 1980s, the differences in the policies supported by members
and supporters of the Centre Left and Centre Right declined, creating
a form of political consensus. Yet by 2012, this established party system
was already under strain, as was revealed by the success of the FN in the
presidential elections of that year, when Marine Le Pen came third in
the first round with 17.9% of the vote (Ministère de l’Intérieur 2012c).
The question of how to respond to the rise of the Front National would
prove to be an important area of discussion within the Centre Right
during the Hollande presidency. This debate was already present under
Sarkozy’s leadership of the UMP. He had managed to secure the support
of many FN voters, which contributed to his winning the presidential
elections of 2007 (see, for example, Hewlett 2007; Mayer 2007). When
faced with poor approval ratings as president, he turned further to the

© The Author(s) 2021 15

W. Rispin, The French Centre Right and the Challenges of a Party
System in Transition, French Politics, Society and Culture,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-60894-1_2
16 W. RISPIN

Right, notably in the Discours de Grenoble in 2010, in which he explicitly

linked the issue of crime to those relating to integration and immigration
(see Guerrier 2014). The election of Marine Le Pen as leader of the FN,
and the increase in support enjoyed by the Far Right, further encouraged
this move, and Sarkozy’s 2012 presidential election campaign was firmly
based on an appeal to FN voters. The FN claimed to be ‘neither of the
Right, nor of the Left - French !’ (Shields 2007; 274), and its relative
success in 2012 significantly undermined the bipolar and near bipartisan
arrangement of parties. This chapter will examine both the long-term and
short-term factors that had destabilised the traditional party system, based
on a Left/Right divide, in the period before Hollande came to power.

The Decline in Voter Identification with Parties

A key factor in destabilising the traditional Right/Left divide was the
decline in the number of voters identifying strongly with the established
parties of government which had historically represented them—a devel-
opment which had been in progress since the 1970s. Perrineau notes that
in the second round of the 1974 presidential election, 74% of manual
labourers voted for Mitterrand, while 66% of those in upper manage-
ment and the liberal professions chose Giscard d’Estaing. By 2007, this
social divide was no longer reflected in voting patterns. Nicolas Sarkozy
received 52% of the votes of blue-collar workers and 57% of those in upper
management and the liberal professions (Perrineau 2012; 67). This leads
Perrineau to conclude that:

the idea of “class warfare” between the bourgeoisie and the working class
is somewhat dated. Nowadays, middle class employees are often more Left-
wing than the blue-collar working class – upper management and those in
the intellectual professions are much more likely to describe themselves as
Left-wing (38% in the Ifop survey of September 2010) than blue-collar
workers (33%), among whom the most popular response is that they are
“neither of the Left nor of the Right” (37%)

The evolution of voting patterns might be explained by the increased

importance of cultural rather than economic criteria in defining notions of
Left and Right. Following the conversion of the Parti Socialiste to a more
moderate approach in the early 1980s, the established parties of govern-
ment from both sides of the political divide often proposed similar liberal
 2 A CHANGING FRENCH SOCIETY AND THE RISE … 17

economic policies, as for example, in 1984, when Mitterrand reduced the

taxation imposed on businesses. This trend of the Left moving closer to
the Centre continued under the Jospin government of 1997–2002, which
privatised sections of some state-owned businesses. By 2012, it was easier
to distinguish between parties of the Left and Right by their positions
concerning cultural values, such as attitudes regarding gay rights, than
by those related to economic issues. As Bouvet (2012; 219) recognises,
those from more economically disadvantaged backgrounds were often
more socially conservative, and so less likely to identify as left-wing than
those in upper management and the intellectual professions, who tended
to be more socially liberal.
The evolution of the political Left was driven by the shrinking and
fragmentation of the working-class, which had in the past formed a major
part of its core electorate, and this was particularly the case for the PCF.
As Dalton (2008; 7) notes, from the 1970s there was a decline in heavy
industry, while the service sector greatly expanded. This shift in the struc-
ture of the French economy reduced the size of the blue-collar working
class and increased the divisions within this socio-economic group. As
a result, Perrineau (2012; 72) observes that working-class voters were
now found in greater numbers in smaller businesses in the service sector
than in heavy industry, a feature that weakened the ability to create a
specific class identity. New dividing lines emerged, which meant that, by
2012, workers often saw their identity in a more fragmented way than
they had in the past. Whereas in the legislative elections of 1978, 69% of
the blue-collar working class voted for candidates of the Left (Gougou
2007; 18), this had fallen to 40% by the presidential elections of 2012
(Fleurot 2012).
Bouvet (2012; 143) dates the rise of a more individualist approach to
the years following 1968, and, as Perrineau (2012; 72) has shown, the
fragmentation of the working class into different categories accelerated
from the 1980s. Those with secure jobs had different expectations from
those with unstable or marginal positions. French workers had different
requirements from their foreign counterparts, and young workers had
different expectations from those of older generations. For example,
Aunis (2012) notes that younger workers, who had become used to
periods of economic crisis, were keen to protect their employment, but
did not see their work as a vocation, unlike many of their older counter-
parts who entered the job market at times of economic growth. Younger
workers were also more supportive of moves to increase the flexibility
18 W. RISPIN

of the workforce. To these differences, Mayer (2009; 176) adds those

between workers in the private and public sector. The former were much
more affected by the continuing high level of unemployment, and came
to consider those working in the public sector as privileged, because
their jobs were protected and they received better pensions. Class soli-
darity was much weakened (Bouvet 2012). This fragmentation of class
identity was recognised by political parties. Whereas Socialist parties in
the past had often sought to emphasise the importance of the working
class as a coherent whole, sharing similar aspirations, the PS noted in its
programme Un nouvel horizon published in 1991:

The Socialists, who have for too long been taken for proponents of collec-
tivism, reaffirm that individual autonomy, the right of every woman and
every man to happiness are the goals that they set themselves. […] From
this perspective, society can be seen as a huge cluster of relations between
individuals.

A further indication of the decline of class divisions can be seen in

changes in the way people have chosen to identify themselves in socio-
logical terms over time. In 1966, of those French people who identified
as being members of a particular socio-economic group, 39% felt that they
belonged to the working class, and 21% to the middle class. By 2006, this
relationship had reversed, with 75% identifying as middle class and 16% as
working class (Perrineau 2012; 74). Even among those who, according
to sociological statisticians, formed part of the working class, 64% felt that
they were middle class (Perrineau 2012; 74). Guilluy (2010; 78) argues
that many were keen to identify as middle class as it was a way of differ-
entiating themselves from those who lived in the banlieues and allowed
those falling down the social ladder to claim that they still maintained
cultural links with their former status. As many voters tried to emphasise
that they belonged to the same social group, rather than focusing on the
specificity of their own class as distinct from other sections of society, the
class divide was further reduced.
Class convergence was also favoured by the narrowing of the standard
of living between the working and middle classes. As Mendras (1988; 37)
argued:

The quality of life for blue-collar workers has rapidly improved […]
despite taking longer than other social categories, today, just like the
 2 A CHANGING FRENCH SOCIETY AND THE RISE … 19

rest of the French population, almost all blue-collar households possess

a fridge, television, washing machine etc. […] According to Michel Verret
(1979): “The conclusion is clear: no matter how it is measured […] the
working class has, in an extraordinarily short period of time, reduced the
extraordinarily large gap between its living conditions and those of other
classes”

The shrinking of the gap between the working and middle classes did not
only occur during the 1980s. Between 1996 and 2007, average wealth
in France increased by 16.7%. For those in the lowest decile the increase
was 21%, whereas it was 14.7% for those in the highest decile (Perrineau
2012; 76).
The reduction in the difference between classes was not solely based
on material factors. Cultural changes also played a role. As Guilluy (2015;
23) states, ‘Jean Viard notes correctly that we have all become urban, we
all watch the same television news and we shop in the same supermar-
kets’. While it might be objected that people of different backgrounds
bought different products, many often still mixed in the same spaces,
and enjoyed similar cultural experiences. This evolution led to the weak-
ening of what was once a strong particular working-class culture, and
parties that used to rely on this, particularly the Parti Communiste, now
struggled in elections.
While the social conditions of the blue-collar working class improved,
convergence also occurred through the reduction in living standards of
certain sections of the middle class. Dalton (2008; 151), writing about
evolutions in the Western world, notes that:

the expanding ranks of low-paid and low-status white collar employees

and the growth of white-collar unions are producing a proletarianiza-
tion of part of the middle class. Few individuals now possess exclusively
middle-class or working-class social characteristics, and the amount of class
overlap is growing over time. In sum, the convergence of life conditions
may contribute to the convergence of class voting patterns.

In France, between 1995 and 2010, house prices increased 2.5 times,
while wages only rose by 1.6 times their starting level (Guilluy 2010;
79). Sections of the lower middle class were faced with the prospect that
they would never be able to own their own home, and, due to rising
property prices and rents in big cities, many were forced to move into
the smaller towns, where there were fewer opportunities, and therefore
20 W. RISPIN

found themselves marginalised. Whereas previous generations could aspire

to be more prosperous than their forebears, by the time of the Hollande
presidency, around a quarter of 30–40 year olds were poorer and located
lower down the economic social scale than their parents (Guilluy 2010;
82). Class divisions were therefore no longer as clear as they had been, and
the close identification between sections of society and particular parties
historically considered to represent them had diminished.

The Evolution of the Party System

Changes in the social structure of French society further undermined the
traditional Left/Right bipolar divide, by encouraging convergence in the
policies pursued by the parties of government of both Left and Right
from the 1980s, as both sides sought to win over the expanding middle
classes. However, voters disappointed with one of the established parties
of government, finding that its rival did not offer a significant alternative,
would therefore turn to more radical movements. Parties were generally
unable to rely on the support of a specific class or section of society, and
had to try to broaden their appeal as far as possible. As Dalton (2008;
151) states:

[o]ver the latter half of the twentieth century, many political parties tried
to broaden their electoral appeal to attract new middle-class voters. This
outreach led parties to moderate their positions on traditional class-based
issues. Socialist parties in Europe […] adopted more moderate domestic
and foreign policy goals. Conservative parties also tempered their views and
accepted the basic social programs proposed by the Left. Socialist parties
vied for the votes of the new middle class, and conservative parties sought
votes from the working class.

The evolution of the Parti Socialiste provides an example of this develop-

ment. In 1971, Mitterrand had talked of ‘a break with capitalist society’
(Grunberg 2011), and in his 1981 programme he had proposed to
expand the public sector through the nationalisation of nine industrial
groups (Le Monde diplomatique 2012). However, once in power, he
soon abandoned his more statist approach as the difficult economic situ-
ation, made worse by international competition, forced him to perform a
U-turn. He justified his change in policy in an interview in 1983, when he
stated: ‘the French people are beginning to understand that it is business
 2 A CHANGING FRENCH SOCIETY AND THE RISE … 21

that creates wealth, business that creates jobs, business that determines
our standard of living and our place in the global hierarchy’ (Mitter-
rand 1983). This was seen as a key moment in the evolution of the PS’s
approach to economic policy, and an event that increased convergence
between the parties of government on the Left and on the Right. The
support by the PS for more liberal policies did not end with Mitterrand.
As Behrent (2017) argues, in economic terms, the Jospin government
(1997–2002) combined measures that followed socialist principles, such
as the 35-hour week, with more liberal ones such as the privatisation of
state industry. Mitterrand’s turn towards economic liberalism was there-
fore not merely a short-term adaptation intended to respond to particular
problems, but rather the start of a more definitive shift in the direction of
the PS.
As the Left moved rightwards on economic policy, the Right moved
leftwards on questions of social values. For Raymond (2016), this process
had already started in the 1970s under Giscard d’Estaing, whose govern-
ment legalised abortion and lowered the age of majority to 18. Attitudes
on the Right would continue to develop in a more liberal direction,
reflecting the changing views of the electorate. To take the example of
the death penalty, whereas in 2000, 54% of Right-wing voters supported
its reintroduction (Duhamel and Lecerf 2016; 185), by January 2012,
only 46% were in favour of such a measure (TNS-Sofrès 2012; 6).
This convergence in both policy and attitudes between both the parties
of the Centre Left and Centre Right, and also in the attitudes of their
supporters, would cause Sainte-Marie (2015; 23) to state, that ‘in France
the Left/Right divide has been under severe strain for some time’. The
change he describes was already evident before 2012, and an OpinionWay
poll in 2011 found that 59% agreed that the idea that Left and Right
no longer had any meaning (Perrineau 2012; 19). As Touchard (1981
16) argues, ‘Right’ and ‘Left’ are not essential values, but rather ‘the
truth is that Left and the Right can only be defined in relation to the
period in question and to each other, according to the problems faced
at a specific period, according also to the character of the Right or Left
of that particular period that they oppose’. Under the Hollande presi-
dency, Sainte-Marie (2015; 19) would argue that ‘in the long term, the
only viable criteria by which to measure this dichotomy is to go by what
people say: he who says he is of the Left, or accepts to be described in
such a way, is of the Left, and the same is true of the Right’. Such was the
convergence between the parties of government of the Left and the Right
22 W. RISPIN

that when trying to distinguish them, the best way to do so was to ask
voters how they defined themselves. Although Left and Right remained
terms in the political debate, as Martin (2000; 18) notes, this was because
the political system imposes an adversarial arrangement between a govern-
ment and an opposition. In Parliament, parties must either support or
oppose laws, and parties struggling for power must choose between
siding with or opposing the government. Yet this adversarial relation-
ship, imposed by the logic of the institutions, was not reflected in policies
supported by the Centre Left and Centre Right.
The evolution of the PS and Centre Right in relation to one another
further weakened the traditional arrangement of the party system. In the
words of Sainte-Marie (2015; 22):

If issues that are judged to be a cause of disagreement by public opinion are

treated as areas of consensus by the main leaders of the Left and the Right
[…], or if the actual policies pursued by both sides when in government
appear to be similar […] then the established system comes under strain.

As both the PS and the UMP were targeting the same middle-class
sections of the electorate, certain groups, such as the blue-collar working
class, felt excluded and sought representation elsewhere, particularly from
the political extremes. In 2012, both Marine Le Pen and Jean-Luc Mélen-
chon were arguably able to benefit from the feeling that, unlike the
established parties of government, they offered a real alternative, and
claimed to take into account the concerns of those who felt ignored by
other political movements. An Ifop-Fiducial poll concerning the 2012
presidential elections showed that 61% of those who voted for the Front
de Gauche candidate did so because he represented change, and 46% of
Le Pen voters justified their own decision in the same way (Ifop-Fiducial
2012; 24).

The Impact of Globalisation

A final important, long-term factor which was influential in reshaping
the French party system was globalisation, a complex and multifaceted
phenomenon, that Heywood (2012; 11) defines as ‘the emergence of
a web of interconnectedness which means that our lives are shaped
increasingly by events that occur, and decisions that are made, at a great
distance from us, thus giving rise to “supraterritorial connections between
 2 A CHANGING FRENCH SOCIETY AND THE RISE … 23

people.”’ He identifies three separate, if interrelated, elements. The first

is economic globalisation, which is ‘the process through which national
economies have, to a greater or lesser extent, been absorbed into a single
global economy’. The second element is cultural globalisation, which is
‘the process whereby information, commodities and images produced in
one part of the world have entered into a global flow that tends to flatten
out cultural differences worldwide’. Finally, there is political globalisa-
tion, ‘the process through which policy-making responsibilities have been
passed from national governments to international organisations’.
Heywood’s definition is useful, but incomplete. As regards cultural
globalisation, Giddens (2002; xxii), like Heywood, argues that ‘cultural
standardisation is an intrinsic part of this process’, but he also notes that ‘a
more profound effect of globalisation is to produce greater local cultural
diversity, not homogeneity’. This is a crucial feature that will be essential
to our argument, particularly in Chapter 4.
Some commentators have focused on economic globalisation in their
explanation of the rise of populist movements on the political extremes in
the early part of the new millennium. More and more businesses operated
at an international level, which led not only to freer movement of capital
around the world, but also to the transfer of businesses to areas where
production costs were lower and to the migration of workers to areas
where salaries were higher. The decline of blue-collar jobs in industry hit
the white working class particularly hard. Goodliffe (2013; 97) argues
that the success of the FN:

suggest[s] that the break-up of the Fordist economic and social model
has had a profound impact on France […] Capitalising on the fears and
uncertainties raised by the new post-Fordist economic realities, the FN has
succeeded in combining the extreme right’s age-old appeal among petits
indépendants with a politics of ‘welfare chauvinism’ directed to the working
class.

He adds that continued economic globalisation will probably perpetuate

this trend and that ‘the extreme right is likely to remain the principal
refuge for the losers of globalisation in France for the time to come’.
Economic factors were certainly important in encouraging some voters
to turn to the radical parties by 2012. As Guilluy (2014; 11) argues,
in France, globalisation produced new divisions, between the big cities,
where jobs and investment were concentrated, and ‘rural areas, small and
24 W. RISPIN

medium-sized towns, certain peri-urban areas where 80% of the working

classes live today’. Yet the insecurity created by globalisation transcended
the class divide, as the ‘poorest, including blue-collar workers, white-
collar workers, small farmers, small independents, young people, those
in work, the unemployed and pensioners’ were all concerned by the
geographical changes brought about by globalisation (Guilluy 2014; 19).
As Guilluy (2014; 19) notes, ‘despite having opposing interests in the
past, they now share the same fate […] the disappearance of traditional
categorisations between blue-collar and white-collar workers, between the
secondary and tertiary sectors contributes to the structuring of the new
working classes’.
It is these groups that suffered most from the closure of factories
outside major cities, as French manufacturing faced increased competi-
tion from Eastern Europe and Asia, where production costs were cheaper.
Guilluy (2014; 56) argues that the wider public was often unaware of
most factory closures and industrial job losses, as they happened in small
towns and received little media attention, despite the fact that their impact
on the local economy was considerable. These areas suffered economi-
cally from globalisation, and, by 2012, the inhabitants had in many cases
turned away from the traditional parties of Right and Left to the FN.
As we have seen, there were many long-standing issues which under-
mined the traditional Left/Right divide. To these were added several
more short-term crises, which emerged during the Sarkozy presidency,
and would contribute to the collapse of an already weakened party system.

The Importance of the Cultural Element

of Globalisation in the Rise of ‘Populism’:
The Issue of Cultural Insecurity
One of the most important shorter-term factors that weakened the estab-
lished party system concerned the rise of parties on the political extremes.
As Bouvet (2015; 7) observes, ‘the rise of populist movements, in France,
as elsewhere in Europe, is the most striking evidence of the deep political
crisis that is affecting the country and the continent’.
Part of the explanation for the disengagement of sections of the elec-
torate from their traditional allegiances is related to economic issues.
Bouvet states that the success of the parties of the Far Right and Far
Left ‘is a worried and apparently inescapable reaction to the symptoms of
 2 A CHANGING FRENCH SOCIETY AND THE RISE … 25

a society overwhelmed by persistent unemployment, growing inequality, a

generalised feeling of downward social mobility, the visible rise of poverty
or even for a growing number of citizens being forced to move to more
disadvantaged areas’.
However, events such as the rise of the Front National cannot simply
be explained by economic changes but must also take into account the
impact of cultural globalisation. Bouvet considers that cultural insecu-
rity is also a key factor. He identifies various social issues, in particular
that some elements of the white working class feel that their way of life
and national identity are under threat from immigration and the rise of a
more visible presence of Islam within the Republic. It is this that caused
many to turn towards the FN. This phenomenon became more relevant
following the attacks on America on 11 September 2001, and its influ-
ence was reinforced by the emergence of terrorist movements from the
Arab Spring.
As Bouvet (2015; 138) argues, were economic globalisation the sole
factor behind the disillusionment of sections of society with traditional
parties, then one might expect to see the Front de Gauche perform as
well as the FN, as both parties share a similar opposition to globalised
capitalism. However, in the first round of the 2012 presidential elections,
Marine Le Pen received 6% more of the vote than Jean-Luc Mélenchon
(Ministère de l’Intérieur 2012a). In the following legislative elections in
the 11ème circonscription du Pas de Calais (a Northern area significantly
affected by the decline of heavy industry and mining, where both Le Pen
and Mélenchon were candidates) the FN leader gained 42.26% of the
vote, almost double that of her counterpart from the Front de Gauche,
who received 21.46% (Ministère de l’Intérieur 2012b). As Bouvet notes,
it could be argued that part of the explanation of the success of the FN
was that it was better at appealing to blue-collar workers affected by issues
covered by the term cultural insecurity.
Whereas opposition to immigration had been based, in part at least,
on concerns about certain ethnic groups, by 2012 it had become focused
particularly on Islam. Bouvet (2015; 25) notes that, ‘opposition to immi-
gration is now based above all on a suspicion, or even hostility towards
Islam and Muslims. Ethnic criteria and attacks on “Arabs” or “Africans”
are clearly of less significance than religion – specifically Islam’. The focus
of concerns about immigration is now ‘cultural’, and while objections
to the economic threat of globalisation still exist, it can be argued that
they are often of secondary importance. This could be seen in the years
26 W. RISPIN

preceding the Hollande presidency. In 2010, an Ifop poll found that 42%
saw Islam as a threat to French identity, almost twice as many as those
who considered that it enriched French culture (22%) (Ifop pour le Figaro
2012; 5). Fears relating to immigration and Islam would feature promi-
nently in Marine Le Pen’s 2012 campaign, such as her claim that all meat
in Paris was halal (See Le Pen 2012; Le Parisien 2012).
The question of cultural insecurity is frequently linked to that of anti-
elitism, as certain parts of the electorate feel ignored by the traditional
parties which they consider to represent a privileged and powerful group
that dominates the social scene. Some analysts claim that this sense of
division became visible not only over the issue of identity but could also
be seen in responses to political globalisation, and in the evolution of
attitudes of different sections of society towards the European Union.
Hooghe and Marks (2009) have argued that Europe became a feature
of debate particularly following the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in
1992. They claim that, whereas the creation of the single market was
considered to be something that had little impact on the general public,
the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty ‘opened a complex elite bargain
to public inspection, and precipitated referendums and a series of national
debates that alerted publics to the fact that European integration was
diluting national sovereignty’. The effect of this was to reveal a difference
in appreciation of Europe between the elite and the wider population,
which had a more sceptical outlook (Hooghe and Marks 2009; 21), and
to provoke splits within the established parties of government and their
support groups.
Once again, these divisions concern several different elements of glob-
alisation, one relating to economic aspects and others which are ‘cultural’
and, as we have seen above, political. As Bouvet (2015; 19) notes, ‘the
European Union is widely seen as a Trojan Horse promoting a destruc-
tive form of globalisation, rather than as an effective rampart against its
effects’. He identifies the cultural element in the feeling among sections
of the working class that there exists an elite which gives preference to
the demands of minorities on issues such as open borders, free movement
of people and the deregulation of markets (Bouvet 2015; 73). Nor is the
elite solely represented by political parties in the eyes of this section of the
electorate; it also includes the media and big business. In 2005, the editor
of left-leaning Libération, Serge July, raged against the workers and those
politicians on the Left who had voted against the European Constitution
in the referendum. In an article entitled ‘Masochistic masterpiece’, he
 2 A CHANGING FRENCH SOCIETY AND THE RISE … 27

argued that the ‘No’ vote represented ‘a general disaster and an epidemic
of populism’.
It might be argued that the word ‘populism’ could often be seen as
a way by which some groups and politicians stigmatise those who do
not subscribe to their own values. As Delsol (2015; 7) notes, ‘the term
“populism” is above all an insult: it is used to describe those parties or
political movements that are considered to be made up of idiots, fools
and even nutters’. Mouffe offers a similar analysis, arguing that ‘It is very
convenient for parties of the Centrist consensus to use the term populist
to disqualify their opponents. The “populism” accusation is particularly
useful for the so-called left-wing parties, as it allows them to avoid self-
criticism, and any recognition that, having abandoned the defence of the
popular classes, they are to a large extent responsible for the crisis of repre-
sentation that is the underlying cause of the emergence of a wide-range
of “anti-establishment” parties’ (Errejón and Mouffe 2016; 96).
This crisis of representation contributed greatly to the rise of the Front
National, due to its programme based on the rejection of the ‘establish-
ment’ and the way in which it attacked the parties of government which
seemed to be defending a broken system. Marine Le Pen would refer
frequently to the UMPS, claiming that Left and Right both proposed the
same failing policies.
The sense that there was an opposition between ‘an elite’ and ‘the
people’ did not merely arise because voters have turned against certain
political parties, but also because some parties rejected those sections of
society that used to form part of their core electorate. As Bouvet (2012)
observes, whereas in the past, the working class was seen as admirable,
and praised by many on the Left, since 1968, the attitude towards the
workers, particularly from sections of the Left, has become hostile. He
argues that many sections of the working class fail to recognise themselves
in the more liberal social values incarnated by political parties, and so
have been seen as an obstacle, resistant to change, rather than a means
of bringing it about. He claims that in popular culture, a ‘prolophobia’
emerged, where the white, working-class man, who had been celebrated
in the 1930s as incarnated by Jean Gabin, became a figure of fun, to be
mocked and looked down on. Bouvet argues that this further reinforced
the alienation of the workers from traditional parties, seen as representing
an elite, and made them more likely to turn to the extreme parties which
claimed to listen to their views.
28 W. RISPIN

The decision by sections of the Left to seek new electorates, and to

give less priority to winning over working-class support could be seen in
a report published in 2011 by the Left-wing think tank Terra Nova for
the Parti Socialiste, which argued:

It is no longer possible today for the Left to try and reconstruct its historic
class coalition : the blue-collar working class is no longer the core electorate
of the Left, it no longer shares all its values, it can no longer be, as it was
in the past, the motor driving the creation of an electoral majority of the
Left. (Jeanbart et al. 2012; 13)

Rather than looking for support in its traditional constituencies, the

report argued that the Left should seek to bring together those who
shared its progressive values.

Triggering a Realignment
Although the presence of cultural issues linked to economic concerns
were an essential element in destabilising the French party system based
on the traditional Left/Right divide, their effect was compounded by the
economic and political crises that emerged after 2008.
The rise in support for the Front National, a party which arguably sat
outside the traditional Left-Right arrangement, was one of the early indi-
cations that a realignment would take place. In 2012, the FN proposed
a programme that combined elements of both the Left and the Right,
arguing in favour of tougher measures to reduce immigration, which was
closer to the policies proposed by the Centre Right, while also supporting
more state intervention in the economy, which placed it closer to the Left
(see Le Pen 2012). In this way, the Far Right was not simply an extension
of the Right, but often brought together a coalition of those who were
opposed to the current political system, if for different reasons.
The failure of Sarkozy and of his government, to deal with the
economic recession further contributed to the rise of the FN. As Cole
et al. (2013; 9) argue, ‘[b]y 2012, the ongoing and highly unpredictable
economic crisis had sapped the popularity of most incoming governments,
including of the French’. This loss of confidence, not just in parties but
also in politicians themselves, can be seen in the changes in the popu-
larity ratings of Sarkozy during his presidential term. When he came to
power in 2007, 63% of French people had confidence in him, a percentage
 2 A CHANGING FRENCH SOCIETY AND THE RISE … 29

which fell to 20% by May 2011, before rising slightly to 37% in May 2012
(Kantar TNS). Although this loss of public support was due to a range of
factors, a TNS Sofres report on the evolution of the public’s faith in the
president noted that, from 2009, ‘the economic and social problems that
have arisen from the crisis are weighing down on public confidence, due
to the constant rise of unemployment’ (TNS-Sofres 2011a; 11).
In addition to economic concerns, fears about terrorism and the
refugee crisis caused a rise in support for the Front National. Concerns
about terrorism increased following the attacks by Mohamed Merah in
Toulouse in 2012. Marine Le Pen linked these to the arrival of migrants,
when she stated during the 2012 presidential election campaign, ‘How
many Mohamed Merahs are there in the boats and aeroplanes that arrive
in France every day?’ (L’Obs avec AFP 2012).

The Decline of Political Parties

and the Rise of Individualism
One of the most important consequences of the long-term decline in
ideological attachments, of reactions to globalisation and of more short-
term destabilising events such as the economic and migration crises,
was the loosening of traditional attachments to political parties and the
creation of a more individualised approach among the electorate. The fact
that many voters were no longer able to identify strongly with a partic-
ular party was another factor which weakened the traditional Left/Right
bipolar system and created a more volatile party system. As Rouban
(2013; 3) would observe, ‘it is possible to demonstrate that more and
more voters are deciding who to support based on personal factors, and
fewer and fewer are doing so according to their class, group identity or
even their professional situation’.
This more individualised approach to politics could be seen in the
decline in the number of people joining political parties. As Duhamel
notes, party membership has gradually fallen since the end of the Second
World War. Whereas there once were mass movements—the Gaullist
Rassemblement du peuple français had around 400,000 members and the
Communists over 500 000 during the period that followed the Libera-
tion (see Charlot 1983; 88; Boulland 2018; 39)—in 2012, both the PS
and the UMP (the dominant parties of this period) each claimed to have
around 200,000 militants (see Bruckert 2016; Gaboulaud 2012).
30 W. RISPIN

The disassociation between parties and their membership size was

driven by two different major dynamics. On the one hand, many voters
ceased to identify with political parties. On the other, as Duhamel notes,
the parties placed less emphasis on enlarging membership and now
focused more on voters rather than members (Bruckert 2016). Lefebvre
(2016) argues that as since 1988, parties receive most of their funding
from the State, there is no longer such an incentive to seek members.
The time of mass membership of parties appears to be largely over, at
least in France.
The ‘rise in individualism’ is also confirmed by the decline of other
representative institutions, such as the reduction in the number of people
joining trade unions. In the immediate post-war period, over a quarter of
all workers were members of a union (Amossé and Pignoni 2006; 405),
a percentage which had fallen to around 8% by 2011 (Perrin 2011). Not
only has the number of unionised workers fallen, but so has the faith
of the public in trade unions. Whereas in the 1970s, 60% of salaried
employees had confidence in unions, and this figure was 54% in 2004
(Andolfatto and Labbé 2006; 292), by 2012, more people had more faith
in big business (42.6%) than in trade unions (35.2%) (Chanvril 2017).
The growth of information media has also transformed the way that
citizens interact with politics, and helped to drive the development of a
more individualised approach to politics by voters. Politicians are now able
to contact the public directly, independently of party structures, without
having to pass through the traditional media channels. The importance
of the Internet and social media to campaigns and its impact on party
membership is recognised by Duhamel. He argues that:

Political campaigns now take place in the media and on social networks.
Political parties have lost their role […] Outside major election campaigns,
members have no contribution to make. They are aware of this and so
fewer and fewer are joining. (Bruckert 2016)

While the role of social media in politics has developed greatly since 2012,
before this date, politicians were already making use of the opportunities
that it offered. Pages were set up on Facebook to support political figures,
and campaign teams were able to communicate the details of their meet-
ings directly to the public. The meetings themselves were streamed over
the Internet to reach all voters, not just those able to be present on the
ground. For many voters, the advantages they might gain from being
 2 A CHANGING FRENCH SOCIETY AND THE RISE … 31

a member of a particular party were now less clear, and so fewer were
prepared to join a political movement.
The rise of new media has also changed the way in which the electorate
interacts with political parties. YouTube allows politicians to reach out to
voters directly. This was used by all main parties during the 2012 presi-
dential campaign to spread their ideas and directly attack the proposals
made by their rivals. The Internet also allows voters to contact their
elected representatives, and to discuss policies and their implications with
people from across the country and across the world. In such a context,
people are less willing to accept parties or groups that seek to set an
agenda without consulting their members. By 2012, there was already a
proliferation of independent websites beyond the control of parties, able
to participate in debates, and to influence the electorate. When an Ifop-
Fiducial poll asked voters which media sources had been most useful in
helping them to decide whom to vote for in the presidential elections of
that year, 15% gave the Internet as one of their answers, which placed it
in joint fourth place behind politics programmes on television, television
news and the radio (Ifop-Fiducial 2012; 51).
This evolution in the relationship between political movements and
their members would have important consequences in determining the
outcome of the 2012 presidential elections, and through this, on the PS
government that was formed. This was first seen in the decision of the
Parti Socialiste to hold an open primary in 2011 to choose its candi-
date for the 2012 presidential elections. This proved a great success, as it
allowed the candidates to develop their ideas for the 2012 campaign in
public, before the campaign itself started. Comment on the PS dominated
the news agenda, and the first-round debate on 15 September 2011 was
the most watched programme on television that night (lefigaro.fr 2011).
In the hope of emulating this success, Les Républicains would decide to
follow suit and hold their own primary in 2016, but, as we shall see,
this would play a decisive role in the demise of the party.
Further proof of the electorate’s dissatisfaction with political parties
was visible in the rise in abstention in legislative elections. Participation
in the first round fell from 81% in 1973 to 57% in 2012 (de Boissieu).
Between 1997 (the last election before the reduction of the presidential
term from 7 to 5 years, which ensured that presidential and legislative
elections would be held in the same year) and 2012, participation in
the first round fell by just over 10% (de Boissieu). This can in part be
explained by the fact that the result of the presidential elections strongly
32 W. RISPIN

influences that of the legislative elections, as voters look to avoid cohabita-

tion which would limit the ability of the new president to implement their
programme. However, the evidence that participation fell by a further 7%
between 2002 and 2012 also suggests that there was a growing feeling of
disillusionment with politics.
The loss of faith in politicians in general was further shown by a TNS
Sofres poll in 2011, where 72% said that they felt that French politicians
were ‘rather corrupt’ (TNS-Sofres 2011b; 4), a figure which had risen
from 32% in 1977, and from 58% in 2002 (Grunberg and Mayer 2003;
217). As Gaffney (2015) argues, scandal has played an important role in
determining public appreciation of politicians. Both sides of the political
spectrum have been affected, and have had a history of using public funds
for party political purposes. Notable examples from the 1980s include the
Urba affaire for the PS, and the RPR’s use of fake jobs when Chirac
was Mayor of Paris. As regards Sarkozy, by 2012 he was linked to a
significant number of scandals, including allegations that his 2007 presi-
dential campaign had in part been funded by the Libyan government, and
that his party had received substantial illegal donations from the L’Oréal
heiress, Liliane Bettencourt. In 2012, allegations of political corruption
were therefore prominent in the mind of the public.
The fall in public confidence in political parties and in their representa-
tives was a crucial part of the undermining of the traditional Left/Right
divide. Dalton (2008; 186) recognises that, ‘as long-term party and
social-group cues are losing importance, the decision-making process
shifts toward the issues and candidates of specific campaigns’. The focus
on candidates rather than parties observed by Dalton could be seen
in France in relation to Sarkozy. His ‘omniprésident’ governing style,
where he sought to focus media attention largely on himself and his
own personality was widely criticised. The 2012 presidential elections
witnessed a backlash, and the result has been characterised more as a vote
against Sarkozy than one in favour of Hollande. Cole et al. (2013; 4)
talk of the presidential elections as ‘an anti-Sarkozy referendum’, while
Gaffney (2012; 349) argues that ‘Sarkozy’s defeat was […] a passionate
disavowing of the personality and character of the President’.
Perhaps even more significant than the decline in public confidence in
politicians was that many people had also lost faith in the institutions.
Whereas in 2000, a Cevipof study found that 72% of those questioned
were satisfied with the way the Assemblée Nationale functioned (Grun-
berg and Mayer 2003), this had fallen to 38% in a similar survey in 2009,
 2 A CHANGING FRENCH SOCIETY AND THE RISE … 33

which also showed that 33% had confidence in the presidency, and 42% in
the EU (Le Monde 2013). These values continued to fall, and by the time
the same study was repeated in December 2012, only 31% had confidence
in the presidency, and 28% in the Assemblée nationale. There was disaf-
fection not only with national, but also international bodies, as only 33%
of French citizens had faith in the European Union (Le Monde 2013).
The distrust towards politicians and political institutions that existed at
the end of the Sarkozy presidency was not improved by the arrival of a
new government in power, and the failure of the Hollande administra-
tion to reverse this trend would further undermine the bipolar French
party system. Voters arguably seemed not only unconvinced that politi-
cians could resolve their problems, but also felt that the institutions of
government were no longer fit for purpose.

Conclusion: The Emergence of a New Model

The first round of the 2012 presidential elections, in which Marine Le
Pen came third with 18% of the vote, demonstrated that the established
arrangement of the party system, that had long been dominated by the
Parti Socialiste and the Centre Right, was under threat, with both the Far
Left and the Far Right gaining support from those who were disillusioned
with the established parties of government.
Many of the causes of this realignment could be traced back to the early
1980s. Whereas in the past, there had been close links between parties and
certain sections of the electorate, such as between the Parti Communiste
and the blue-collar working class, changes in French society had under-
mined these traditional relationships. This evolution was in part driven
by economic factors. The general trend of the French population benefit-
ting from a growing economy from the 1960s to the 1980s had already
reduced the difference in living conditions between the middle and
working classes. The number of jobs in industry had declined between the
1980s and 2012, and more working-class people now found employment
in the service sector. The reduction in mass factory employment weak-
ened the power of workers to organise, along with the ability of parties
to appeal to them as a single group. As a result, among the working class,
identity became fractured and attitudes more individualist.
The class divide was also undermined by the problems faced by certain
sections of the middle class. Following the end of the Trente Glorieuses,
over a number of years, wages stagnated and living standards declined. In
34 W. RISPIN

this context, the economic gap between part of the middle class and the
working class narrowed, and further disturbed traditional conceptions of
class divisions. However the changes were not solely linked to economic
factors. In cultural terms, there was a blurring of aspects of the working-
class and middle-class identities. As Guilluy (2010) has noted, sections
of the working class who had fallen down the social ladder continued to
identify as middle class so as to distinguish themselves from those who
lived in the banlieues.
The effect of economic and social change was exacerbated by the
strategies of parties of the Centre Left and Centre Right, which adapted
to win over the support of the expanding middle class. In the 1980s, the
Parti Socialiste moved closer to the Centre, with the adoption of more
liberal economic policies. From the 1990s, the Centre Right embraced
more liberal social policies, again reducing the gap between the estab-
lished parties of government on both Left and Right. While this produced
a greater sense of political stability, as changes of government were not
followed by major shifts in policy, it left significant sections of society
feeling unrepresented, many of whom turned to the radical parties of Left
and Right.
The crises that emerged after 2008—both the economic recession,
and later the migrant crisis—further weakened confidence in the tradi-
tional parties that had alternated in power since 1981. The inability of the
Sarkozy government to respond effectively to the economic crisis further
undermined the political system, and favoured the rise of the radical
parties that criticised neoliberal capitalism. The emergence of the refugee
crisis, and the rise in terrorist incidents, heightened fears that France and
its identity was under threat, and increased calls for a tougher approach
to immigration and to the integration of migrants. The perceived failure
of successive governments to address these questions caused sections of
the electorate to turn to the FN.
In seeking to explain the decline in public confidence in politicians,
analysts have emphasised the importance of economic globalisation. This
certainly played a role, as manufacturing jobs been shifted to coun-
tries where wages and production costs were lower, while services were
concentrated in the major cities. Small former industrial towns found
themselves isolated from areas of high employment, and with few ameni-
ties for their population. The inhabitants of such towns felt abandoned
by traditional politicians and political institutions.
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Harshman 84 Sept
8715
Peter H 14
16 June
2677 Hart George Cav
K 30
16 June
2202 Hart W
K 19
39 June
1980 Harney E
B 15
15 Oct
10606 Hathaway S Cav
B 10
15 Mar
12791 Hanch L 65
D 18
Sept
8608 Hawkins J W 79 I 64
12
Hayward W G, June
2326 16 I
Cor 22
Aug
5192 Hayworth F Cav 7 I
10
June
1852 Hegenberg W 24 F
11
77 Sept
8798 Helch S
K 15
31 Aug
6489 Hendson Geo B
C 22
23 July
1162 Henry Wm P
A 17
6035 Herdson Wm H 107 Aug
C 18
14 Sept
8428 Herrell Wm Cav
K 11
84 June
2365 Hess H
G 27
38 June
1906 Hester John
G 13
Sept
7865 Hicks Geo W 65 F
5
11 Sept
8303 Hicks H
G 10
85 May
1102 Hicks W
D 15
14 Nov
12070 Highland C Cav
C 17
24 Apr
725 Hilderbrand N
G 25
115 Sept
8830 Hill Aaron
C 15
36 Mar
67 Hill David, Cor
A 19
11 Sept
8721 Hill Henry
- 14
Aug
4489 Hill J Cav 9F
1
Feb
12683 Hinchcliff J 8B 65
20
112 Aug
6117 Hoen Peter 64
H 19
July
3825 Hoffman J Cav 7 I 64
23
11847 Hofman R 35 Nov
 C 5
98 June
2098 Hook Jas J, S’t
E 17
112 July
3255 Hoppock I
F 13
Sept
9880 Honeson A F 38 F
27
Sept
9214 Hormer J 38 F
19
86 Nov
12090 Horn T
A 18
Mar
89 Horseman W Cav 16 I
21
79 Aug
5812 Howard D N, S’t
E 16
Howard G S, 127 Nov
10782
Cor K 3
July
3211 Howell J W 78 F
12
100 Oct
11506 Hoye J
A 26
Aug
5741 Hude C 24 F
15
107 Aug
6035 Hudson W H
C 13
125 Sept
9962 Hughes D L
H 28
14 Mar
12755 Hulse A B 65
D 12
108 Oct
11140 Hungerford N 64
I 19
Aug
6085 Huntley R 89 F
18
 1136 Hulburt D 84 May
C 16
23 May
1162 Hurry W B
A 16
104 Aug
5019 Hutchins S
A 8
92 Aug
4583 Hustand B F, S’t
D 2
July
4091 Hyber John Cav 6A
27
July
3312 Iverson J S Cav 16 I
14
Jaccards S A, 29 July
4132
S’t E 28
51 June
2658 Jackson H
C 29
123 Oct
10287 Jackson M
F 4
Mar
12797 Janks J P Cav 3A 65
18
73 July
3686 Jarvis J 64
K 20
30 Aug
6733 Jenningsen G B
E 24
June
1845 Jenny E H, Cor 79 F
11
14 June
2135 Jewet F
A 18
June
1996 Johnson C W Cav 7F
15
Johnson 125 Sept
9458
Joseph K 21
1412 Johnson J S 7C May
 27
Johnson 100 Aug
5395
Samuel B 12
27 Sept
9827 Jones G W
E 27
117 Sept
8971 Jones J
E 16
41 Aug
4889 Jones P
G 6
112 Apr
644 Jones Thomas
E 12
June
2567 Jones Thos Cav 16 F
27
27 July
2990 Jones Wm
D 7
84 June
1764 Jordan B W
D 9
38 Sept
9153 Jordan M
C 18
July
2961 Joy B 16 I
6
90 June
2241 Joyce A
D 20
Oct
10513 Justice H Cav 7H
8
95 Nov
12052 Kane H
A 16
29 July
4308 Kappel H
H 30
Aug
4743 Keefe James P Art 2M
5
20 Sept
8348 Kelaze E
G 10
 18 Kell M R, Cor 49 Mar
D 7
Aug
7183 Kelly John 75 F
29
Aug
6795 Kelley William 94 I
25
38 Aug
5518 Kennedy M
C 13
Jan
12488 Kent J 14 F 65
19
96 Aug
5707 Kerbey John 64
H 15
22 Apr
396 Kiger John
E 6
42 Oct
10520 Kilkreath J
A 8
Mar
82 Kimball Jas Art 25 L
20
16 Mar
158 Kinkle John
G 25
82 Apr
696 Kinderman G
D 26
38 Sept
7807 Kingham J
G 4
65 Apr
685 Klinehaus D
G 23
113 Aug
4766 Kenigge A
C 5
Aug
4908 Knight J 9H
6
108 Nov
11891 Knoble P
E 7
4700 Koahl J Cav 16 Aug 64
 H 4
July
2754 Krail J “ 16 I
1
14 Feb
12685 Kreiger J 65
E 20
16 Apr
652 Kaiber John 64
D 20
June
1809 Keyser John 32 I
10
89 Sept
7927 Lacost J M
E 5
100 Aug
7299 Ladien J
H 23
38 Aug
7105 Lambert C
D 20
78 Oct
10419 Lamsden W H
A 6
59 Nov
12044 Lance V
D 16
14 Dec
12270 Langley G
K 12
Aug
5906 Lanner W A Cav 9E
16
93 May
1233 Law Henry
G 20
89 Sept
9635 Lawrene L G
G 24
125 Oct
10179 Lape J
A 1
98 Oct
10896 Leatherman M
E 14
115 Sept
8464 Leach W
B 11
4172 Lee A 112 July
B 28
16 Sept
8524 Lee P, Corp
A 12
May
963 Lee Thomas 8E
9
May
1297 Lee W E Cav 16 I
23
79 Oct
11258 Lewis Charles
A 21
Aug
6238 Lewis Thomas 2L
20
Oct
10148 Lickey J B, S’t 96 F
1
113 Sept
8295 Liday J
I 9
112 Aug
6295 Liken John, S’t
I 20
57 June
1685 Linday B
H 6
99 Sept
7768 Linderman H A
B 4
113 Aug
6414 Lindsay A
D 22
June
1818 Linebergh I, Cor 16 F
10
Oct
11449 Linwood J 79 F
25
Dec
12358 Lipsey D, Cor Cav 2C
30
112 Oct
10405 Lord L B, Corpl
B 6
11222 Lorsam C 89 Oct
 C 20
16 June
2268 London L Cav
D 21
35 May
1017 Lowry Frank
E 11
29 June
2342 Lusk John
B 23
23 May
1456 Lutz John
H 29
100 Sept
8196 Lyman J
D 8
38 Oct
11467 Lynch V, Corpl
C 26
14 Oct
10849 Mack J Cav
G 13
96 Aug
5390 Madden L
D 12
Maddock J W, 79 Oct
11358
S’t A 23
12 Aug
10982 Madrill A
A 12
38 July
3935 Malcolm J R
K 25
215 July
2868 Manning A
A 4
16 May
953 Manty P, S’t Cav
E 8
16 June
2050 Markman Wm Cav
K 16
Aug
6333 Marritt H Cav 16 L
21
Marshall A, 96 July
2762
Corpl C 2
8444 Martin A Cav 16 L May
28
July
4071 Martin I 9K
27
42 Mch
12757 Masman S 65
G 12
93 May
863 Mason Thos B 64
B 3
111 May
1428 Massey W H
D 28
12 April
746 Master Wm
A 26
Mathening A D, April
429 79 I
S’t 8
32 Mch
12744 Mathews F M 65
G 7
19 May
1061 Maxem H C 64
H 13
July
3280 Maxwell S Cav 8C
13
Sept
10319 May M H 89 I
29
104 July
3100 McCampbell D
B 10
Mch
56 McCleary Thos Cav 16 L
17
16 May
1315 McClusky Jas Cav
K 27
103 Aug
4850 McCray A
A 6
96 June
1617 McCready Wm
C 4
6513 McCreary J 119 Aug
 C 22
16 Aug
5724 McCone R Cav 64
K 15
13 July
3050 McCunne H
C 8
16 July
3470 McEntire L Cav
K 17
30 Aug
5283 McGee Wm
D 11
119 Oct
11623 McGivens J
A 28
89 Nov
11952 McLarens B
A 10
June
1634 McLaughlin B 90 I
5
McLing Benj, 23 July
3169
Cor E 11
93 Aug
4725 McMahon M
E 4
McMillan W B, 112 May
1337
Cor E 24
78 Sept
9763 McMiller W B
D 25
80 April
692 McShaw B
B 23
92 Sept
9710 McWorthy W M
G 25
19 July
3279 Mead G
H 14
Aug
4648 Medler H 38 I
3
51 Aug
6266 Mee William
C 20