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Brothers of Italy.
A New Populist Wave

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Vampa
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Brothers of Italy
A New Populist
Wave in an Unstable
Party System
Davide Vampa
Brothers of Italy
“Sophisticated, well-argued and based on a wealth of data, Vampa’s book tells

you everything you need to know about the trajectory of Giorgia Meloni’s party
in light of the mainstreaming of Europe’s populist radical right today. Its detailed
analysis of the party’s ideology, organisation, electorate, alliances and policies will
shape debates on Brothers of Italy for years to come.”
—Professor Daniele Albertazzi, University of Surrey, UK
“Vampa’s new book is a fascinating attempt to put Giorgia Meloni and her
Brothers of Italy into a wider historical and European context. The result yields
important insights that extend far beyond Italian politics. Anyone interested in
contemporary Europe should read it.”
—Professor Erik Jones, Director of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced
Studies, European University Institute, Florence, Italy
“The rise of Giorgia Meloni and her Brothers of Italy party has been one of
the most remarkable recent phenomena of European politics. Vampa’s book
masterfully explains how, in just under a decade, Meloni’s party has marched
from the margins of Italian politics to the centre of power.”
—Professor Duncan McDonnell, Griffith University, Australia
Davide Vampa
Brothers of Italy
A New Populist Wave in an Unstable Party System
Davide Vampa
School of Social Sciences
and Humanities
Aston University
Birmingham, UK
ISBN 978-3-031-26131-2 ISBN 978-3-031-26132-9 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-26132-9
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023

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About This Book
This volume examines the origins, ideology, organisation, leadership,

political alliances, electoral performance and institutional role of the right-
wing party Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d’Italia, Fdl). FdI’s meteoric rise is
only the latest in a series of shocks that have hit Italy’s unstable polit-
ical system in recent years. However, it would be a mistake to brand
FdI as yet another Italian anomaly. Indeed, the party stands at the cross-
roads between an established political tradition, that of the post-fascist
and conservative right, and the more recent populist waves that have
affected many mature democracies. By placing Giorgia Meloni’s party in a
comparative analytical framework, the author shows that its success stems
from a mix of past legacies and current developments seen in much of
Europe (and beyond): the growing role of right-wing female leaders and
their reliance on new media; the mainstreaming of the far right mixed
with populist repertoires; the de-alignment and (partial) re-alignment of
voters; the reconfiguration of electoral geographies; and ultimately the
emergence of an illiberal model of democracy. In short, rather than being
an exception, FdI can be seen as one of the most recent and advanced
manifestations of a broader process of political change sweeping the West.
v
Contents
1 Brothers of Italy, the Radical Right and Populism in Italy 1

Brothers of Italy: Between Past, Present and Future 2
Re-Igniting the Flame: From the Post-Fascist Tradition
to the Populist Turn 4
A Multi-Dimensional Framework of Analysis 8
Structure of the Book 10
References 12
2 Ideology and Policy Positions 15
FdI’s Ideological Diamond: Nativism, Authoritarianism,
Populism and Sovereignism 15
FdI’s Programmatic Positions 18
FdI’s Programmatic Development (2013–2022) 26
Conclusion 33
Postscript: FdI’s Ideological and Programmatic Profile
in Comparative Perspective 34
References 36
3 Organisation and Leadership 39
A ‘Presidential’ Party 40
Organisational Structure 41
Party Membership and Resources 44
Giorgia Meloni’s Leadership 47
Conclusion 53
vii
viii CONTENTS
Postscript: FdI’s Organisation and Leadership

in Comparative Perspective 54
References 58
4 Political Friends and Foes 61
Exiting the Political Mainstream to Become the New
Mainstream 62
Domestic Allies: League and Forza Italia 64
Domestic Opponents: Democratic Party and Five Star
Movement 69
International Connections: From the European
Conservatives and Reformists to Trump’s Republicans 71
Conclusion 73
Postscript: Right-Wing Populist Integration in Other
European Countries 74
References 78
5 Winning Votes 81
A Meteoric Rise 82
Analysing FdI’s Electoral Success: Where? How? Who? 83
Multi-Level Electoral Success: The Local, Regional
and European Arenas 96
Conclusion 98
Postscript: The Electoral Success of FdI in the Western
European Context 99
References 103
6 Winning Seats (and Government) 105
Translating Votes into Political Power 106
Who Was Elected? 108
In Government 111
Local, Regional and European Levels 116
Conclusion 118
Postscript: FdI and the Institutional Role of Populist
Radical Right Parties in Other Western European Countries 120
References 123
CONTENTS ix
7 Conclusion: Ten Lessons from Giorgia Meloni’s

Brothers of Italy 125
Radical Legacies and Populist Innovations 126
The Growing Importance of Sovereignism
in a Multi-Dimensional Ideological Framework 126
Leaders and Followers: Old Organisational Imperatives
and New Media Strategies 127
Female Leaders in Männerparteien 128
Systemic Integration and the Importance of Establishing
Alliances (And Finding the Right Opponents) 128
An International Network of Nationalists 129
The Complexities of Electoral Geography 130
Education: The New Political Divide? 131
Populists Competing for Votes 132
Between Inclusion-Moderation and Democratic Backsliding 133
References 134
Index 137
About the Author
Davide Vampa is Senior Lecturer in Politics at Aston University, Birm-

ingham, and was co-convenor of the Italian Politics Specialist Group
of the UK Political Studies Association between 2018 and 2021. His
work focuses on the links between territorial party politics and public
policy. He has also published extensively on recent transformations in
democratic representation (at local, regional and national levels), rising
populism and the crisis of social democracy. He published a mono-
graph with Palgrave Macmillan, The Regional Politics of Welfare in Italy,
Spain and Great Britain (2016). More recently, he has co-edited a book
entitled Populism and New Patterns of Political Competition in Western
Europe (2021, with Daniele Albertazzi) and co-authored a monograph
on the Italian Northern League under its former leader Umberto Bossi,
Populism in Europe: Lessons from Umberto Bossi’s Northern League (2021,
with Daniele Albertazzi).
xi
Abbreviations
Abbreviation Original party name English party name

AfD Alternative für Deutschland Alternative for Germany
AN Alleanza Nazionale National Alliance
DC Democrazia Cristiana Christian Democracy (Italy)
DF Dansk Folkeparti Danish People’s Party
EL Elliniki Lisi Greek Solution
FdI Fratelli d’Italia Brothers of Italy
FI Forza Italia Forward Italy (not used in the
text)
FN Front National National Front (France)
FPÖ Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs Austrian Freedom Party
FrP Fremskrittspartiet Progress Party (Norway)
LFI La France insoumise France Unbowed
LN—Lega Lega Nord—Lega Northern League—League
(Italy)
M5S Movimento 5 Stelle Five Star Movement (Italy)
MSI Movimento Sociale Italiano Italian Social Movement
PCI Partito Comunista Italiano Italian Communist Party
PD Partito Democratico Democratic Party (Italy)
PIS Prawo i Sprawiedliwość Law and Justice (Poland)
PS Perussuomalaiset Finns Party
PVV Partij voor de Vrijheid Party for Freedom
(Netherlands)
RN Rassemblement National National Rally (France)
SD Socialdemokratiet Social Democrats (Denmark)
SVP Schweizerische Volkspartei Swiss People’s Party
UKIP United Kingdom Independence United Kingdom Independence
Party Party
VB Vlaams Belang Flemish Interest (Belgium)
xiii
List of Figures
Fig. 1.1 From the Italian Social Movement to Brothers of Italy 6

Fig. 2.1 FdI’s ideological diamond 16
Fig. 3.1 The multi-level organisation of Brothers of Italy 43
Fig. 3.2 FdI income from 2013 to 2021 (Source Author’s own
elaboration based on party budgets, available at https://
www.fratelli-italia.it/) 47
Fig. 3.3 The popularity of Giorgia Meloni and other Italian leaders
from 2018 to September 2022 (Source Author’s own
elaboration based on data provided by Demos and Pi,
www.demos.it) 51
Fig. 3.4 Mapping social media following of the main Italian party
leaders and organisations (Source Author’s own elaboration
based on Facebook and Twitter follower numbers on 25
September 2022) 53
Fig. 4.1 Changing equilibria within the right: share of right-wing
vote controlled by FdI/AN, League and FI/PdL
from 1994 to 2022 (Source Author’s own elaboration
based on data from the Italian Interior Ministry) 65
Fig. 4.2 FdI’s (AN in 2003–2007) electoral alliances in regions
and regional capitals (capoluoghi) (Source Author’s own
elaboration based on data from the Italian Interior Ministry) 68
Fig. 5.1 The electoral performance (in %) of FdI and the other
main Italian parties between 2013 and 2022 (general
elections) (Source Author’s own elaboration based on data
from the Italian Interior Ministry) 82
xv
xvi LIST OF FIGURES
Fig. 5.2 Provincial vote (−) versus urban vote (+) for FdI
(and predecessors) and the other four main Italian
parties (Source Author’s own elaboration based on data
Fig. 5.3 Voting intentions (%) from 2013 to 2022 (Source Author’s
own elaboration based on data from Demos and Pi
[www.demos.it]) 91
Fig. 5.4 Best electoral performance of existing populist radical
right parties in Western Europe (Source Author’s own
elaboration based on data from the Political Data
Yearbook [https://politicaldatayearbook.com/]. Data refer
to general elections or, in the case of France, presidential
election; country and year of best performance in brackets) 100
Fig. 6.1 Share of seats won by FdI and other main parties
in both Chamber of Deputies and Senate (2013–2022)
(Source Author’s own elaboration based on data
Fig. 6.2 Largest share of seats won by existing populist radical
right parties in Western Europe (Source Author’s own
elaboration based on data from the Political Data
Yearbook, https://politicaldatayearbook.com/. Data refer
to the lower chamber of parliament; country and year
of best performance in brackets) 121
List of Tables
Table 2.1 Ideological dimensions and policy issues (salience

and position) of FdI and other main Italian parties
(2014–2019) 20
Table 2.2 FdI’s key (top 20) programmatic categories
and comparison with other parties (2018) 23
Table 2.3 FdI’s CHES scores in 2019 compared to those of other
key populist radical right parties in Western Europe 35
Table 3.1 Leadership, organisation, social media communication:
comparing five populist radical right parties 55
Table 4.1 AN/FdI, League and FI: consistent electoral allies,
(increasingly) inconsistent governmental partners 67
Table 4.2 National and international integration of five populist
radical right parties 76
Table 5.1a Electoral results (%) of FdI and the other right-wing
Italian parties by region (general elections from 2013
to 2022) 84
Table 5.1b Electoral results (%) of PD and M5S by region (general
elections from 2013 to 2022) 85
Table 5.2 Vote shifts from the 2019 European election
to the 2022 general election (%) 92
Table 5.3 Partisan distribution of voters (%) by socio-economic
and demographic characteristics (comparing 2018
and 2022) 94
Table 5.4 Performance of FdI and the other main Italian parties
in local, regional and European elections 97
xvii
xviii LIST OF TABLES
Table 5.5 FdI and other key Western European populist radical
right parties in the electoral arena 102
Table 6.1 Characteristics of elected MPs by group (% of the group
in the Chamber of Deputies) 110
Table 6.2 Elected representatives (share of the total) by territorial
level and by party 117
Table 6.3 Characteristics of regional councillors by party
(2018–2022) 118
Table 6.4 FdI and other key Western European populist radical
right parties in the parliamentary arena 122
CHAPTER 1
Brothers of Italy, the Radical Right

and Populism in Italy
Abstract This chapter places the case of Brothers of Italy (Fratelli

d’Italia, FdI) in the Italian and European context, also discussing its
origins. The analysis presented in this volume is based on the general
argument that FdI represents a new populist wave in Italy, which is
not only disruptive but also characterised by considerable complexity.
The party stands as the latest representative of recent trends that make
populism a fundamental new dividing line in the political landscape of
‘mature’ democracies. At the same time, however, FdI is part of a long
political tradition, the post-fascist one, which has its roots in twentieth-
century Italian history, well before today’s crises. The continuous work
of mediation between past, present and future, carried out by an entire
political community and its leadership, has thus given rise to an original
project, which has proved successful but not without contradictions.
Keywords Brothers of Italy · Origins · Populism · Post-fascism · Radical

right
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Switzerland AG 2023
D. Vampa, Brothers of Italy,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-26132-9_1
2 D. VAMPA
Brothers of Italy: Between

Past, Present and Future
Late December is not the ideal time to found a new party. Voters
are too distracted by preparations for the upcoming festivities: family,
friends and the domestic sphere become the main sources of interest and
concern. Election skirmishes and bombastic promises of radical change
are not supposed to draw much attention in the peaceful and concilia-
tory atmosphere sweetened by the smell of panettone. Yet Italian politics
is accustomed to precipitating crises during periods destined for tranquil-
lity: long summers and festive winters have marked most of the turning
points in the country’s recent political history. Thus, confirming this
pattern, a few days before Christmas 2012, the sudden break-up of the
supermajority that had backed a technocratic government for just over a
year plunged the Italian political system towards new elections. Against
this backdrop of confusion and rapid electoral repositioning, Giorgia
Meloni—a young former minister in the last government led by Silvio
Berlusconi and a member of his party (The People of Freedom—Popolo
della Libertà, PdL)—posted a tweet on 20 December:
‘It’s official. Guido Crosetto and I are leaving the PdL. Fratelli d’Italia,
a centre-right movement, is born. Honesty, participation, meritocracy’.
(author’s translation)
The logo chosen for the new party was rather simple—there was no time
for graphic experiments: a circle dominated by the colours of the Italian
flag (green, white and red) and an inscription with the first verse of the
Italian national anthem ‘Fratelli d’Italia’ (Brothers of Italy) in the top
half on a blue background (the colour of the Italian national football team
and most other sports teams). In the general election in late February
2013, less than 700,000 Italians would draw a cross on that new symbol,
not even two per cent of the voters, electing only 9 representatives out of
630 in the Chamber of Deputies and no senator.
Ten years later, Georgia Meloni’s name would appear in large letters
in the party logo, above a tricolour flame (again, green, white and red)—
a revived symbol of the neo- and post-fascist right-wing tradition. But
even more importantly, Meloni would become Italy’s first female Prime
Minister, after winning the 2022 general election.
1 BROTHERS OF ITALY, THE RADICAL RIGHT AND POPULISM … 3
The meteoric rise of Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d’Italia, FdI) is remark-

able but not so surprising in a European context that has accustomed
us to the rapid success (and sometimes equally rapid decline) of populist
parties. FdI thus appears to be yet another populist wave in the already
disrupted Italian political landscape. However, it would be reductive to
focus on the populist profile of Meloni’s party without considering its
ideological core, which can be traced back to the political tradition of the
post-fascist right. In light of historical legacies and the long path taken by
important sectors of the Italian right, the rise of FdI appears less sudden.
It is instead the result of a long process of mediation between past, present
and future political paradigms. The past, as already mentioned, refers to
the post-fascist right and its attempts to carve out a space for itself in the
democratic electoral arena; the present is characterised by the increasingly
sharp dividing line between ‘people’ and ‘elite’ that shapes contempo-
rary political debates and partisan competition; the future may see the
construction of a new model of illiberal democracy (which is already a
reality in some countries).
In this chapter, therefore, the case of the Brothers of Italy will be placed
in the Italian and European historical/political context so as to prepare
the ground for the analysis developed in the following chapters. The next
section looks at the ideological and organisational origins of the party and
how they relate to its current place in Italian and European politics. Next,
the various analytical dimensions addressed in the individual chapters will
be briefly presented: ideology, organisation, leadership, alliances, electoral
strategies, key constituencies and representation. Generally, the purpose of
the book is threefold:
1. To show the ideological, organisational, strategic and electoral simi-

larities between FdI and other populist waves in recent Italian
political history and in contemporary Europe;
2. To highlight FdI’s peculiarities and the novelties its success brings
to the Italian and European political landscape; and
3. To shed light on developments that are emerging not only in Italy
but, more generally, in mature democratic systems: the growing
role of right-wing female leaders and their reliance on new media;
the mainstreaming of far-right political repertoires; the de-alignment
and (partial) re-alignment of voters; the reconfiguration of electoral
geographies; and ultimately the emergence of an illiberal model of
democracy.
4 D. VAMPA
Re-Igniting the Flame: From the Post-Fascist

Tradition to the Populist Turn
FdI stands at the crossroads between a well-established political tradition,
that of the post-fascist and conservative Italian right (Ruzza and Fella
2008), and the more recent rise of anti-establishment movements that
have generally been described as populist (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017).
We begin with the first part of the story, the one with the deeper roots. We
will then focus on its connections with the populist phenomenon and the
emergence of a political orientation that some have termed ‘sovereignist’
(Basile and Mazzoleni 2021).
A crucial moment in the history of the Italian right occurred in
the early 1990s, with the collapse of the Italian party system after the
end of the Cold War (Morlino 1996). From the fall of the fascist
regime until then, Italian politics had been dominated by a large centrist
party, the Christian Democrats (Democrazia Cristiana, DC) with its
government allies (from liberals to social democrats, from republicans to
socialists). This coalition faced the opposition of the Italian Communist
Party (Partito Comunista Italiano, PCI), the largest communist party in
Western Europe. In this context of ‘blocked’ democracy (Rhodes 1997),
the radical right, which had regrouped after World War II in a new party
called the Italian Social Movement (Movimento Sociale Italiano, MSI),
had been systematically kept on the margins of the political landscape.
The legacy of fascism was too heavy and painful to allow a full integra-
tion of its heirs into normal patterns of party competition and coalition
building. A timid attempt to include the MSI in the government majority
in 1960—when the executive was led by Christian Democrat Fernando
Tambroni—provoked great protests and had the opposite effect as it
paved the way for the creation of the moderate centre-left alliance that
would hold power for another three decades (Pinelli 2010).
The MSI, however, was not a pure continuation of the old Fascist
Party, which was outlawed after the war. Rather, it marked a process of
adaptation and modernisation within an ideological platform that sought
to mix strong nationalist sentiments with deeply conservative values and
a focus on social justice (from a paternalist and statist perspective). Addi-
tionally, there was no general consensus among the leading activists of
the radical right on how the party should deal with the fascist legacy and
this in turn resulted in ideological and programmatic tensions between
different factions and groups (Ignazi 1989; Gallego 1999; Parlato 2008).
The MSI even incorporated elements of the old monarchist and conser-
vative traditions that had never been fully absorbed into the fascist
project but were nevertheless alien to the new democratic mainstream
(Ungari 2008). The end of four decades of post-World War II political
equilibrium—in the wake of corruption scandals—thus opened up new
opportunities for a political movement that, despite the symbolic warmth
of its tricolour flame, had in fact remained frozen for four decades,
almost completely untouched by the heated political debates and alliances
involving the main democratic parties.
Being the party least close to the levers of power, the MSI was spared
from the political crisis of the early 1990s. The year 1993 saw the
beginning of a period of success and electoral growth, but also divi-
sions and continuous reshuffling on the Italian right (Tarchi 2003; Ignazi
2005). The transformation of the MSI into National Alliance (Alleanza
Nazionale, AN) under the leadership of Gianfranco Fini was accompanied
by several splits with the more radical (but clearly minority) components
of the so-called ‘social right’, which tried to keep various versions of the
old MSI alive, as shown in the lower part of Fig. 1.1. It is therefore not
only the Italian left that has displayed a continuous tendency towards
fragmentation and infighting. Even the right was torn by dilemmas and
identity crises, albeit in a period of growth and greater political centrality.
However, at least from the mid-1990s until the late 2000s, AN would be
by far the leading force in this sector of the political spectrum: a strongly
patriotic and conservative right-wing party, which, at the same time,
was no longer excluded from power—given its participation in various
governments in 1994–1995 and from 2001 to 2006. It is precisely the
rise of Silvio Berlusconi with his ‘neo-liberal populist’ party Forza Italia
(FI) (Mudde 2007: 47), of which AN would remain the most loyal ally,
that favoured the emergence of a ‘bipolar’ system of party competition
(Bartolini et al. 2004) allowing the post-fascist right to reinvent itself
and occupy a more mainstream position in the Italian political landscape
(Ignazi 2005).
In becoming more moderate, AN gradually abandoned the symbols of
its radical past. The flame itself, which would remain in the party logo,
would become smaller and smaller, first placed under the party name
and then further down, dominated by the name in big letters of Gian-
franco Fini, whose leadership was never seriously questioned in the period
of the party’s existence. The flame was finally extinguished at the 2008
general election, when AN and FI merged into the People of Freedom
6 D. VAMPA
Freedom and Future for Italy
(Futuro e Libertà per l’Italia)
2010-2015
Forza Italia Forza Italia
1994-2009 2013-
The People of
Freedom
(Il Popolo della

Libertà)
BROTHERS OF
Italian Social Movement National Alliance 2009-2013
ITALY
(Movimento Sociale (Alleanza Nazionale)
Italiano) (Fratelli d’Italia)
1995-2009
1946-1995 2012-
Social Action
(Azione Sociale)
Social Movement Tricolour National
Flame 2003-2009 Movement for
The Right
(Movimento Sociale Fiamma Sovereignty
Tricolore (La Destra)
(Movimento
1995- 2007-2017 Nazionale per la
Social Alternative Sovranità)
(Alternativa 2017-2019
Sociale)
Social Idea Movement 2004-2006
(Movimento Idea Sociale)
2004-
Fig. 1.1 From the Italian Social Movement to Brothers of Italy
(Popolo della Libertà, PdL), giving birth to a large centre-right party

winning almost 40 per cent of the vote (Wilson 2009). This led to the
gradual marginalisation of Fini and, at the same time, to the assimilation
of important sectors of the dissolved AN into Silvio Berlusconi’s ambi-
tious personal party project. Fini then attempted to regain the autonomy
he had lost in the PdL, leaving the party and creating an even more
moderate and centrist force than AN (and also the PdL), Future and
Freedom for Italy (Futuro e Libertà per L’Italia, FLI), which however
failed miserably at the polls (Hine and Vampa 2011).
Giorgia Meloni, who at the time of the merger with FI and the
creation of the PdL, had already been president of AN’s youth organ-
isation (Azione Giovani) and would later become minister of youth in
the new Berlusconi government (2008–2011), decided not to follow Fini
and remained in the PdL. However, it soon became clear that staying
in Berlusconi’s party in a weak position did not guarantee much room
for political manoeuvre. The right, damaged by the rifts with Fini, risked
once again being pushed to the margins of the political system or, in any
case, losing the political visibility it had gained with difficulty at the end
of the twentieth century (Boezi 2020). Thus a battle began to deter-

mine the future direction of the PdL—a party itself in crisis after the
fall of the Berlusconi government and the birth of Mario Monti’s tech-
nocratic cabinet in the 2011 financial storm. Meloni and other former
AN representatives who had not followed Fini began to call for greater
collegiality in party decisions and, in the face of Berlusconi’s political
weakening, went so far as to demand greater openness in the selec-
tion of the party’s leadership. An opportunity seemed to have opened
up in the autumn of 2012 with the calling of primaries to decide the
new leadership of the PdL, an unprecedented step given Berlusconi’s
tendency to treat the party as his own business firm (Hopkin and Paolucci
1999). However, Berlusconi’s ‘democratic’ move was short-lived and the
precipitous turn of events in December 2012, with the fall of the Monti
government, led to the cancellation of the primaries. We have thus come
to the point from which we started in the introduction of the chapter:
Giorgia Meloni, unable to compete for the leadership of the PdL (which,
within a year, would go back to being Forza Italia), decided to create
a new party, Brothers of Italy. She was followed by numerous (but not
all) ex-members of AN and also some representatives of the more ‘liberal’
sectors of the PdL, including Guido Crosetto—mentioned in the Tweet
quoted above—who, despite not coming from the MSI tradition (Puleo
and Piccolino 2022), would later hold important roles in the new party.
Thus the Italian right entered a new phase. The beginning was not
easy as the Italian political system had been hit by a new populist shock
triggered by former comedian Beppe Grillo and his Five Star Move-
ment (Movimento 5 Stelle, M5S) (Tronconi 2015). It was a time of
great crisis, in some respects comparable to the early 1990s. Accusa-
tions of corruption, bad governance, in a context of strong economic
turbulence, stoked the fire of discontent that was skilfully exploited by
the M5S. In this scenario, FdI did not seem to occupy a privileged or
particularly visible position. Meloni and the tradition she represented had
little populist credentials. Italy’s radical right was certainly nativist and
nationalist, and even authoritarian—not in a necessarily anti-democratic
sense—but it did not fully espouse that vision of popular revolt against
the elites that is fundamental in a populist movement (Giubilei 2020). In
fact, on the right, both Northern League (Lega Nord, LN) and Forza
Italia had certainly drawn on the populist repertoire far more than FdI
did (and AN had done before the creation of the PdL) (Albertazzi and
McDonnell 2015).
8 D. VAMPA
The aim of the heirs of the MSI and AN was to (re-)launch a conser-
vative rather than populist project (Giubilei 2020), but this had to come
to terms with a new political reality increasingly dominated by anti-elitist
rhetoric and the centrality of the ‘will of the people’. The concept of
‘sovereignism’ would thus enrich the nationalist tradition of the radical
right with a new emphasis on the principle of ‘popular re-empowerment’
(‘taking back control’) that connects the people to the nation state
(Mazzoleni and Ivaldi 2022: 306). Giorgia Meloni herself would be
much more comfortable being called a sovereignist rather than a populist
(Tarallo 2018), even though the two concepts are strongly intertwined
and under her leadership the political community orphaned by the MSI
and AN has in fact shifted to more populist positions. In the following
chapters we will investigate in more detail how Giorgia Meloni’s project
has reinterpreted some of the historical themes of the Italian right in the
light of emerging contemporary populism. What is already clear is that
under the umbrella of sovereignism, most of the different political tenden-
cies that had split in the aftermath of the changes in the early 1990s could
finally be reunited—the lower and upper parts of Fig. 1.1 converge into
FdI.
A Multi-Dimensional Framework of Analysis

The overview of FdI’s origins already suggests the existence of a complex
and not entirely linear story. To this we should add that FdI, in its current
form, cannot be studied as a purely electoral or ideological phenomenon.
Nor is it merely the expression of a leader’s will. Instead, there is a
multi-dimensionality in the birth and development of this political party—
and any other political party for that matter. Thus, for instance, FdI’s
ideological-programmatic profile should be linked to its organisational
dimension, as already emphasised by classical theories on parties and
party systems (Michels 1968; Panebianco 1988). Parties that aim to
achieve deeply transformative programmatic goals—e.g. radical institu-
tional reforms or economic redistribution—have traditionally invested
significant resources in the creation of mass organisations to mobilise
large sectors of the electorate. At the same time, however, changes in
society and the emergence of new communication tools have also brought
about a transformation in political parties’ internal structures (Katz and
Mair 2018). The role of leadership, another pillar in the ‘internal supply
side’ of party politics along with organisation (Mudde 2007), has also
changed dramatically. In general, a weakening of intermediate party elites

and organisational bodies has been accompanied by a strengthening of
the leader: a process that has also been defined as personalisation or
‘presidentialization’ of politics (Poguntke and Webb 2005).
The internal dimension of a party is closely connected to the external
one. Leadership is often the link between the two because, after inter-
preting and channelling the preferences of members and activists, a leader
is crucial in shaping the outer face of the party and determining its posi-
tion in the wider political space through coalitions with some actors or
opposition to others. This strategic dimension—deciding how to respond
to challengers and potential allies (Albertazzi et al. 2021)—is then linked
to the electoral dimension, which in turn determines the party’s role
in institutions. A party’s success in the competitive electoral market—
achieved by emphasising key issues, establishing effective alliances and
choosing the right opponents—can translate into greater representational
weight in policy-making fora.
Applying this framework to the study of Brothers of Italy means
considering first of all the ideological-programmatic evolution of the
party—with the tensions and synergies between neo/post-fascist tradi-
tion and populism—and how this relates to the organisational question:
what structure should be given to a party with deep roots in the twentieth
century that, at the same time, must embrace the new populist zeitgeist
(Mudde 2004) to succeed?
It is also interesting to note that the few books (published in
Italian until 2022) on FdI—apart from having a rather journalistic tone
and more or less explicitly advancing a political agenda—do not focus
so much on the party, but rather on its leader, Giorgia Meloni, and
her entourage, following an increasingly widespread tendency among
observers to analyse politics as a struggle between personalities. Instead,
in this volume the certainly important figure of Meloni is placed in the
broader discussion of the party’s organisational set-up and then linked to
its political and electoral strategies.
FdI also stands out as an intriguing case when analysing its relationship
with other parties. Indeed, in the multi-level context of European poli-
tics, it is not only its interactions with other Italian players that generate
interest but also its international positioning within European transna-
tional alliances (McDonnell and Werner 2019). FdI has in fact emerged
as one of the pillars of the European Conservatives and Reformists Party,
of which Giorgia Meloni became president in 2020 (Giubilei 2020).
10 D. VAMPA
Moreover, the analysis of the relationship between elections and repre-

sentation can reveal new aspects of the tension between representative
and responsible government (Mair 2009) and highlight the existence of
dilemmas not only for so-called ‘mainstream’ parties but also for populist
and radical ones getting closer to power (van Spanje 2011). To this we
can add the growing gaps between economically dynamic and backward
regions, between large cities and provincial areas, which call for a more
in-depth study of territorial electoral dynamics (Rodden 2019). On these
points FdI offers another set of interesting insights in a country like Italy
where strong social and territorial divisions intersect.
In short, a number of important questions and issues arise in light of
FdI’s electoral triumph. Hence the multi-dimensionality of the framework
adopted here. Italy can be regarded, once again, as the political laboratory
of a broader process of political re-structuring and re-alignment that is
sweeping Europe. The aim of this volume is to present a brief overview of
the origins, ideology, organisation, leadership, political alliances, electoral
performance and institutional role of a party that could mark the begin-
ning of a new phase, not only for Italian politics—by now accustomed to
multiple shocks—but also for the increasingly fragile and interconnected
European liberal democracies.
Structure of the Book

The book is structured on the basis of the multi-dimensional frame-
work presented above. Chapter 2 explores the key programmatic positions
of the party (mainly on the socio-economic and socio-cultural dimen-
sions) stemming from its ‘ideological diamond’, which combines nativism,
authoritarianism, populism and, the latest addition, ‘sovereignism’. It
includes a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the party’s manifestos
from 2013 to 2022, looking at how positions have evolved over time—in
particular, programmatic shifts are assessed on issues such as immigration,
moral values, law and order, functioning of institutions, European Union
and the economy (trade and globalisation). The quantitative analysis is
based on the most recent data from the Chapel Hill expert survey (Jolly
et al. 2022) and the Manifesto Corpus (Burst et al. 2021).
Chapter 3 focuses on the organisation of the party from the national to
the local level and also considers the role and personal appeal of its leader,
Giorgia Meloni. The first part is based on the framework provided by
Reinhard Heinisch and Oscar Mazzoleni (2016) and includes an analysis
of the party’s statute (outlining the territorial structure of the organi-

sation and defining the role of party members) and the party’s budgets
from 2013 to 2021 (showing how the party financed its activities through
membership subscriptions, state resources and private donations). This
strictly organisational analysis is followed by a discussion on how the party
reaches out to the electorate using traditional tools and more innovative
forms of communication. This point is then linked to the role played
inside and outside the organisation by Giorgia Meloni, paying particular
attention to her presence on social media.
Chapter 4 examines the party’s position in the Italian party system—
starting from the concept of negative integration developed by Mattia
Zulianello (2020). It then analyses its relationship with other political
actors in Italy and at the European/international level (McDonnell and
Werner 2019). The first part looks at the role played by FdI in the
centre-right political camp in Italy, its relationship with Matteo Salvini’s
League and Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia. It also considers how the party
approached other populist or left-wing competitors. Strategic interactions
between the party and competitors are assessed based on the framework
developed by Daniele Albertazzi et al. (2021). The second part, instead,
provides a discussion of the international alliances established with other
EU parties, paying particular attention to the European Conservatives
and Reformists Party.
Chapter 5 analyses the party’s electoral results. The first part focuses on
the general elections from 2013 to 2022. Particular attention is paid to
the geographical distribution of the vote not only across regions but also
between cities and peripheral areas. The analysis highlights the similarities
and differences existing between FdI and its main right-wing populist
competitor, the League, while also evaluating vote shifts from one party
to the other (and the profiles of their voters). The second part considers
FdI’s results in the local, regional and European elections, thus providing
a multi-level assessment of its electoral performance.
Chapter 6 considers the role of FdI in public office. It examines the
profiles of the party’s elected members in the Italian parliament and
provides an overview of its position in the government formed after the
2022 general election. As in Chapter 5, the final part presents a multi-level
account of FdI’s presence in local, regional and European institutions.
Each chapter is followed by a postscript comparing FdI to the main
right-wing populist parties in Western Europe, with a focus on France,
Spain and Germany.
12 D. VAMPA
The conclusion summarises the main results of the analysis presented in

the various chapters, highlighting FdI’s peculiarities but also its similari-
ties with other parties in Italy and Europe. The book’s final considerations
are based on a discussion of the tensions between legacies (the post-fascist
tradition), current developments (FdI’s electoral growth in a context of
political instability exacerbated by new populist waves) and future implica-
tions (the possible effects of FdI’s success on Italian and European politics
and democracy).
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CHAPTER 2
Ideology and Policy Positions
Abstract This chapter explores the ideology and key policy positions of
Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d’Italia, FdI). It starts by introducing the four
key ideological dimensions of nativism, authoritarianism, populism and
sovereignism. It then includes a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the
party’s manifestos, looking at how positions have evolved over time—in
particular, programmatic shifts are assessed on issues such as immigration,
law and order, the economy (trade and globalisation), welfare, individual
rights, institutional reforms and European integration. The postscript
compares FdI to the main populist radical right parties in France, Spain
and Germany.
Keywords Brothers of Italy · Party ideology · Party manifesto ·

Populism · Nativism · Authoritarianism · Sovereignism
FdI’s Ideological Diamond: Nativism,

Authoritarianism, Populism and Sovereignism
The success of Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d’Italia, FdI) can also be
described as a ‘new populist wave’, as the sub-title of this book suggests.
This is because the FdI phenomenon did not emerge in a vacuum. Rather,
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 15

Switzerland AG 2023
D. Vampa, Brothers of Italy,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-26132-9_2
16 D. VAMPA
it is the latest in a series of ‘shocks’ caused by different political actors—

from Silvio Berlusconi to Umberto Bossi, from Beppe Grillo to Matteo
Salvini—who, over almost thirty years of Italian political history, have
skilfully exploited the ‘people vs. elite’ dichotomy. However, Chapter 1
has already made it clear that it would be too simplistic to use only
the populist category to define Giorgia Meloni’s party. Indeed, FdI also
belongs to the political tradition of the Italian radical right, which has its
roots in the twentieth century. The populist wave originating from this
party is therefore ‘new’ not only because it is the latest chronologically,
but also because it offers an original combination of populism and other
ideological dimensions and traditions.
Figure 2.1 identifies an ‘ideological diamond’ that we can use to inter-
pret FdI’s political identity in its complexity and multi-dimensionality.
It revolves around four strongly interconnected points and is the result
of a long period of elaboration and reflection on the key principles that
animate a party of the radical right in the twenty-first century.
We can read the diamond clockwise, starting with nativism and author-
itarianism, which are at the core of FdI’s ideology (Puleo and Piccolino
2022). Nativism aims at protecting the interests of the ‘native born’
and refers to the centrality of the national community and its cultural
and moral cohesion. It is this aspect of FdI’s ideology that inspires
the party’s positions on immigration—but also on ethnic/linguistic
minorities (in Italian regions such as South Tyrol and Aosta Valley).
Authoritarianism
Nativism Populism
Sovereignism
Fig. 2.1 FdI’s ideological diamond

2 IDEOLOGY AND POLICY POSITIONS 17
Authoritarianism shapes the idea of national community by giving it an

ordered and coherent form, appealing above all to traditional principles
and demanding the strict application of norms and rules that enforce
these principles—the removal of which would cause a deep identity
crisis (Norris and Inglehart 2019). Socially conservative and law-and-
order policies therefore respond to this second dimension of the party’s
ideology.
Populism was added to FdI’s ideological repertoire in more recent
years after having been cultivated by other right-wing parties—Forza
Italia (FI) and the Northern League (Lega Nord, LN) (Albertazzi and
McDonnell 2015)—and having been re-elaborated in an eclectic way by
Beppe Grillo’s Five Star Movement (Movimento 5 Stelle, M5S) (Pirro
2018). FdI’s populism manifests itself in the celebration of the will of
the people, thus abandoning those hierarchical and ‘top-down’ tenden-
cies typical of the neo- and post-fascist tradition. At the same time, it
opposes technocratic government solutions and inter-party compromises
that in a parliamentary democracy are thought to sacrifice represen-
tation in the name of responsibility (Mair 2009). Populism has been
defined as a ‘thin-centred’ ideology (Mudde 2007) and can also act as
an amplifier of instances originating from other ideological inclinations.
In the (right-wing) populist view, nativism and authoritarianism take
on a special legitimacy because they derive from the common sense of
people belonging to the same national community. They are not political
formulas devised by extremist sects. Instead, they are perfectly embedded
in a ‘pathological normalcy’ (Mudde 2010). However, populism is not
only used to enhance the impact of the ideologies it is coupled with.
It can also make an original contribution to the elaboration of an idea
of institutional order that responds more directly to the (presumed)
will of the people. Populism can therefore be linked to FdI’s positions
on the reforms to be introduced in the perennially crisis-ridden Italian
representative system.
The last ideological offshoot stems from the concept of sovereignism,
which projects the three concepts discussed above outside national
borders. In the European context, the concept of national community
can be used to challenge supranational integration processes (Basile and
Mazzoleni 2021; Basile and Borri 2022). Thus, populism, in addition
to focusing on the domestic arena, tends to evolve into sovereignism
when—combined with nativism and authoritarianism—it aims to assert
the primacy of the national interest (emanation of the will of the people)
18 D. VAMPA
against alleged global threats (Mazzoleni and Ivaldi 2022). Hence FdI’s
positions on the European Union (EU) and globalisation.
Within this framework, the economic policies proposed by right-wing
populists seem to play a marginal role. In his seminal work, Cas Mudde
(2007: 132) wrote that for these parties economics is ‘marginal and
instrumental’. Writing at around the same time, Sarah de Lange (2007)
pointed out that from a position of hard neoliberalism, the new radical
right had shifted to a more centrist position on the socio-economic
dimension. In general, the radicalism of right-wing populist parties is
more socio-cultural and does not seem to be reflected much in policy
positions related to the productive sectors, welfare and finance. However,
over time, some scholars have come to the conclusion that economic posi-
tions may play a role in entrenching the appeal of right-wing populism
to working class constituencies. As highlighted by Roger Eatwell and
Matthew Goodwin (2018: 222), ‘whereas some national populists often
differ on economics, they have increasingly sought to set out an alter-
native to the status quo, including the adoption of policies that in the
past were advocated by the left’. Gilles Ivaldi and Oscar Mazzoleni
(2020) have likewise argued that economic issues are becoming increas-
ingly salient for radical right populist parties and emphasised that the
above-mentioned concept of sovereignism also has an economic dimen-
sion. Thus economic sovereignism ‘seeks to achieve economic prosperity
through popular and national re-empowerment’ (Ivaldi and Mazzoleni
2020: 205), although it may translate into ‘different economic prescrip-
tions in domestic politics and different orientations in the area of trade
and foreign economic dimensions’ (ibid.: 212) that derive from the
particular economic context and political opportunities in which they are
deployed.
Having outlined the ideological perimeter within which a populist
radical right party may operate in the twenty-first century, we can now
move on to an analysis of FdI’s political programme. The question is how
the principles described in this section translate into concrete positions
with respect to various issues and policy debates.
FdI’s Programmatic Positions

There are a number sources that allow us to present a general (and
comparative) overview of FdI’s positions on specific issues and policies.
This section starts with a quantitative analysis built on data from the
Chapel Hill expert survey (CHES) (Jolly et al. 2022) and the Manifesto
Project (MARPOR) (Burst et al. 2021). Subsequently, a more qualita-
tive discussion will be developed focusing on manifestos produced by FdI
from 2013 to 2022.
CHES provides scores based on responses to surveys compiled by
experts. Instead, MARPOR quantitatively analyses the content of parties’
election manifestos in order to infer parties’ policy preferences. It has been
argued that expert survey estimates are generally more accurate than esti-
mates based on content analysis of party manifestos because the former
contain smaller measurement error (Benoit and Laver 2007). At the same
time, it is not always clear which element of the party an individual
expert evaluates to determine its position, whereas within MARPOR
parties can be compared longitudinally and cross-sectionally on the basis
of the same type of evidence (their manifestos). In addition, MARPOR
allows a more detailed exploration of policies and issues that are often
overlooked in expert surveys. In general, all quantitative measures of
party positions have advantages and disadvantages. MARPOR and CHES,
while presenting clear similarities in their results (Bakker et al. 2015), can
complement each other and thus, when analysed together, can allow for
a more balanced evaluation of where a party stands in the political space.
Starting with CHES data, Table 2.1 provides the scores of FdI in 2014
(shortly after its foundation) and in 2019. We can also compare the party
with the other four largest Italian groups represented in the national (and
European) parliament. The general score on left–right continuum shows
that from 2014 to 2019 FdI moved further to the right of the political
spectrum, overtaking the League (which was perceived as more gener-
ally right-wing in 2014). The radical-authoritarian credentials of Giorgia
Meloni’s party are particularly evident on the socio-cultural GALTAN
(Liberalism vs. Authoritarianism) dimension, while in socio-economic
terms FdI appears more centrist than the League and even Forza Italia
(FI). The latter result derives from the ‘social’ and ‘statist’ orientation
of the Italian post-fascist right, which was rather hostile to neoliberal
doctrines (see Chapter 1). At the same time, moving from 2014 to
2019, value-based GALTAN issues seem to have become more salient
than economic issues. This shift in the party’s focus brings it closer to
other radical right populists, who tend to emphasise the socio-cultural
dimension more than the socio-economic one.
20
Table 2.1 Ideological dimensions and policy issues (salience and position) of FdI and other main Italian parties (2014–
2019)
Dimensions and issues FdI League FI M5S PD

D. VAMPA
2014 2019 2014 2019 2014 2019 2014 2019 2014 2019
Left (0)–Right (10) [General] 7.9 9.1 8.9 8.8 6.7 6.9 4.7 4.8 3.6 3.2
Left (0)–Right (10) [Economy] 5.6 6.4 7.3 7.7 7 7.8 3.4 3.2 4.6 3.6
Salience Left–Right [Economy] (0–10) 7.5 6.5 8.2 6.8 8.3 7.3 7.3 6.9 9 7.2
GALTAN: Libertarian (0) vs. Authoritarian (10) 9.3 9.4 9.1 9.2 7.3 6.8 2.6 3.7 2.4 2.3
Salience GALTAN (0–10) 7.2 7.8 7.2 7.4 5.7 5.1 6.7 5.2 6.3 6.8
Civil Liberties (0) vs. Law and order (10) 9.2 9.6 9 9.3 8 6.8 4.2 4.6 3.6 2.8
Liberal policies (0 support–10 against) 9.8 8.5 9.2 8.2 7.6 6.2 2.2 2.9 3.2 2.3
Religious principles (0 against–10 support) 7 7.9 5.6 8.1 6.8 6.5 1.8 2.8 3.4 3.3
Immigration (0 support–10 against) 8.8 9.8 9.5 9.9 7.8 7 4.3 6.6 3.3 3.1
Multiculturalism (0) vs. Assimilation (10) 6 9.9 5.8 9.8 5.2 7.4 6 5.6 4.6 2.7
Ethnic minorities’ rights (0 support–10 against) 8.8 8.6 9.8 8 8.3 6.5 5.7 3.8 2.5 2
Cosmopolitan (0) vs. Nationalist (10) 9.4 9.8 9.6 9.1 7.2 6.4 3.8 4.3 3.4 2
Elite (0) vs. People (10) n/a 6.6 n/a 6.9 n/a 4.1 n/a 9.3 n/a 5.3
Anti-elite salience (0–10) 6.3 8 8.8 8.3 4 4.2 10 8.9 4.4 1.9
EU Position (1 against–7 support) 2.2 1.9 1.1 1.7 3.4 4.9 1.4 3.5 6.6 6.8
EU Salience (0–10) 6.8 7.5 8.9 8.4 5.9 5.8 8.9 6.1 7.6 7.9
Trade Liberalisation (0) vs. Protectionism (10) n/a 8.9 n/a 8.4 n/a 3.8 n/a 6.4 n/a 3.2
Market deregulation (0 against–10 support) 3.4 4.3 5.2 6.5 7.6 8.1 3.6 3.1 5.4 3.9
Redistribution (0 support–10 against) 5.4 5.5 5.6 7.3 8.8 6.9 3.4 1.9 2.8 2.7
Improving services (0) vs. Reducing taxes (10) 4.8 7.1 7 8.9 7.8 8.5 4 3.3 5.2 3.6
Support cities (0) vs. Support countryside (10) 10 5.6 7.3 6.8 5 3.1 4 4 4.3 2.6
Pro-environment (0) vs. Pro-growth (10) 7.2 7.6 5.8 7.6 8 7.6 1.8 2.4 4 4.1
Decentralisation (0 support–10 against) 8 7.7 1 2.9 6 4.7 3.7 5.3 4.8 4.1
Source Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Jolly et al. 2022)

In general, FdI seems to have consolidated the aspects of its

programme that are most directly related to the nativist and authori-
tarian principles of its ideology. The party is an advocate of law and order
and religious principles while opposing policies inspired by liberal values,
immigration, multiculturalism, ethnic minority rights and cosmopoli-
tanism. As outlined by Table 2.1, on many of these issues FdI was or
has become more radical than the League (only immigration and reli-
gious values are exceptions, although the two parties are very close). The
distance from Forza Italia, on the other hand, has increased on almost
everything, despite the fact that Meloni founded FdI as a split from Silvio
Berlusconi’s party, the People of Freedom (Popolo della Libertà, PdL),
from which FI would also be resurrected in 2013. Finally, the M5S, which
to some extent is closer to left-wing populism, and the centre-left Demo-
cratic Party (Partito Democratico, PD) appear very distant from Brothers
of Italy.
As for its populist side, even if it is not possible to make a compar-
ison with 2014 with respect to the ‘Elite vs. People’ dichotomy, FdI is
clearly positioned closer to the ‘People’ end of the continuum, along with
the League (with M5S even more clearly populist). Compared to 2014,
the salience of anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric has also increased
significantly, aligning FdI with the League and M5S. Thus, while not
explicitly defining itself as populist, over the years Giorgia Meloni’s party
seems to have absorbed the populist zeitgeist.
Populism, as we have said, is accompanied by a more external,
sovereignist dimension, whereby the emphasis on national sovereignty
also translates into Eurosceptic positions. This becomes even more
evident, both in terms of position and salience, as we move from 2014
to 2019: the EU has a more negative connotation and acquires a greater
centrality in the party’s programmatic platform. FdI converges with the
League, while appearing more distant from FI and the M5S, both of
which have tended towards less Euroscepticism in more recent years. The
centre-left PD remains the only party clearly in favour of the European
Union, and increasingly so.
As pointed out in the previous section, FdI’s sovereignism also has
an economic component and in fact the party presents itself as the
most fervent supporter of protectionist measures to shield the national
economy from global competition. More generally, FdI also differs from
other right-wing parties in its opposition to market deregulation—the
22 D. VAMPA
League and FI (and, in 2014, even the PD) appear as more free-market—
, its greater support for redistribution, and greater focus on functioning
public services than on cutting taxes (although on this last point there
seems to be a convergence with the League and FI in 2019). In short,
as already highlighted, the social and statist legacy of the Italian Social
Movement (Movimento Sociale Italiano, MSI) is still identifiable in the
party’s economic policy positions.
There are other interesting programmatic aspects, in addition to those
closely related to the four poles of the ideological diamond. For example,
FdI seems to be particularly attentive to the needs of the countryside
as opposed to metropolitan areas, although its pro-countryside position
has moderated since 2014 and, as we shall see in Chapter 5, its electoral
base is in fact rather urban. In line with other right-wing parties, FdI also
appears less sensitive to environmental issues (but, as we shall see below,
its 2018 manifesto paid quite a lot of attention to this theme). Finally, a
crucial difference with Matteo Salvini’s League is FdI’s position on decen-
tralisation and federalism. Although Salvini’s party has morphed from a
regionalist to a national (and nationalist) party (Albertazzi et al. 2018),
it is still in favour of transferring competences and economic resources
to regional governments, as shown in the bottom row of Table 2.1. In
contrast, FdI remains sharply critical of institutional reforms that would
threaten Italy’s territorial integrity. In sum, the two parties, despite their
convergence towards sovereignism, continue to be influenced by their
origins (Basile and Borri 2022): of the two, it is FdI that proves to
be more faithful to its nationalist origins, while in the League the turn
promoted by Salvini has less deep roots and has not led to a complete
rejection of federalism.
A quantitative content analysis of party manifestos confirms some (but
not all) of the results from the Chapel Hill expert survey and it also allows
us to go into more detail on the various issues and policies. Table 2.2 is
based on MARPOR’s codebook and shows the top 20 categories in FdI’s
2018 manifesto (the last one fully analysed by MARPOR at the time of
writing): their scores correspond to the percentage of ‘quasi-sentences’
devoted to a specific issue (out of the total number of quasi-sentences in
the manifesto). FdI’s scores are again compared to those of the other four
main Italian parties.
Law and order (605 in MARPOR) is the category with the highest
percentage of quasi-sentences, a result similar to (in fact, slightly higher
than) that of the League. This issue is also quite important for FI but
Table 2.2 FdI’s key (top 20) programmatic categories and comparison with other parties (2018)
Position MARPOR Category Meaning of the category Share of quasi-sentences in manifesto (%)
FdI League FI M5S PD
1 605 Law and order 11.538 11.145 9.375 4.39 2.03

2 504 Welfare state expansion 8.791 4.809 9.375 3.085 9.524
3 502 State funding of cultural facilities 7.143 5.267 1.042 0.998 5.386
4 501 Environmental protection 6.593 10.611 3.125 22.84 3.201
5 706 Supporting women, university students, 6.044 1.527 3.125 0.43 2.888
old, young, or middle-aged people
6 402 Assistance to businesses 5.495 3.511 7.292 0.829 4.606
7 403 Market regulation 4.945 4.198 1.042 4.728 1.171
8 406 Protectionism 4.945 0.916 0 0.353 0.078
9 601 Supporting national way of life 4.945 4.046 2.083 0.169 1.405
2
10 506 Education expansion 3.846 3.13 4.167 4.083 4.606

11 608 Opposing multiculturalism 3.846 2.748 0 0 0
12 104 Importance of external security and 3.297 0.992 2.083 0.046 0.078
defence
13 201 Personal freedoma 3.297 0.153 1.042 0.89 1.015
14 303 Governmental and administrative 2.747 5.344 8.333 3.745 7.65
efficiency
15 110 Negative view of European Union 2.198 6.031 5.208 2.256 0.156
(continued)
IDEOLOGY AND POLICY POSITIONS
23
24
Table 2.2 (continued)
Position MARPOR Category Meaning of the category Share of quasi-sentences in manifesto (%)
FdI League FI M5S PD
D. VAMPA
16 411 Promoting technology and infrastructure 2.198 5.115 11.458 9.977 10.07
17 503 Promoting social justice 1.648 1.527 5.208 0.798 5.621
18 603 Supporting traditional morality 1.648 0.916 1.042 0 0
19 606 Appeals for national solidarity and unity 1.648 1.069 0 1.044 1.093
20 704 Support for middle class 1.648 0.916 1.042 1.305 3.591
Source Author’s own elaboration based on MARPOR data (Burst et al. 2021). The categories in which FdI has the largest percentages among the
main parties are indicated in bold
a Personal freedom has a relatively high score but when checking the MARPOR hand coding of the manifesto only one sentence refers to this category
and it is about the ‘reorganisation of the State machine according to the principle of equal dignity between the public administration and the citizen’.
So this category is not discussed in the main text.
much less relevant for the M5S and even less for the PD. It is also inter-
esting to note that welfare state expansion (504) ranks as the second issue
for the party, in line with the social dimension that also emerged in the
previous analysis, although (surprisingly) FI takes the lead here. The third
and fourth categories of the ranking, on the other hand, deviate from the
profile already outlined on the basis of the CHES data (and generally asso-
ciated with right-wing populist parties). FdI proposes public investment
in cultural facilities (502) and also focuses on environmental protection
(501), although the M5S and the League (another surprise) pay even
more attention to this issue. Reading the 2018 programme, it becomes
clear that category 502 on culture is inflated by point 10 (of the 15
pledges in the document) entitled ‘Culture and beauty at the heart of
Italian identity’. Qualitative analysis thus helps us place FdI’s pro-culture
stance in an identity/nationalist perspective, which other studies analysing
the populist radical right in government have also stressed (Paxton and
Peace 2021).
The high percentage of the 501 category that refers to environmental
protection is instead due to point 13 of the 2018 manifesto which,
indeed, appears very ambitious (though not very detailed) in listing a
series of actions in support of environmental sustainability, appropriate
use of natural resources and the preservation of ‘rural culture’. This last
point perhaps makes FdI’s emphasis on the environment less surprising,
as it is not incompatible with a conservative view of the economy based
on more traditional sectors (including agriculture).
The 706 category that includes favourable mentions of ‘non-economic
demographic groups’—a somewhat generic definition—is consistent with
the type of welfare promoted by right-wing populist parties (Rathgeb and
Busemeyer 2022). Indeed, it refers to parts of the FdI programme that
support women as housewives (with tax recognition of domestic work)
and offer economic assistance to ‘crime victims’ or pensioners who decide
to move to poorer regions in southern Italy. There are also points on
youth employment incentives. We can also note the mix of pro-business
policies (402) and measures that regulate and protect the market (403
and 406), which make FdI a right-wing but less neoliberal party than the
League and FI.
FdI is more committed than all its competitors to promoting the
‘national way of life’ (601), a category of MARPOR that also includes
hostility to immigration and can be linked to opposition to multicultur-
alism (608). The authoritarianism of Giorgia Meloni’s party’s ideology
26 D. VAMPA
also translates into an emphasis on ‘external security and defence’ (104)

and support for ‘traditional morality’ (603), all themes that seem more
crucial to FdI than any other party, including the League.
A significant difference with Salvini’s party can be seen in the posi-
tion on Europe (110), which is much more negative for the League (and
FI!) than for FdI. It should be remembered, however, that the figures
presented in Table 2.2 refer only to the 2018 manifestos. More gener-
ally, MARPOR’s quantitative data, although useful, can only provide a
partial picture and, being percentages based on predefined categories,
tend to simplify and decontextualise specific cases. For this reason, the
next section presents a qualitative overview of FdI’s policy development
based on its manifestos from 2013 to 2022.
FdI’s Programmatic Development (2013–2022)

The CHES data presented in Table 2.1 have already given us an idea not
only of FdI’s peculiarities compared to other Italian parties, but also of
the evolution of its positions on key issues. It is undeniable that the organ-
isation founded by Giorgia Meloni, although clearly rooted on the right
side of the political spectrum, has gone through a process of program-
matic reworking (Donà 2022). The sections below provide an overview of
some of the party’s main policy documents, from the first one, presented
before the 2013 general election, to the most recent one published in
2022.1
2013: ‘The Challenges Ahead for Italy’

The 2013 manifesto (‘The challenges ahead for Italy’—‘Le sfide per
l’Italia’) is based on a list of sixteen, rather general points. To be sure,
the fact that FdI was founded only a couple of months before the general
election did not leave much room for in-depth political elaboration. It is
1 The FdI manifestos considered here are: 2013 “Le sfide per l’Italia” (https://
www.fratelli-italia.it/le-sfide-per-l-italia-9-gennaio-pomeriggio/); 2014 “In Europa a
testa alta” (https://www.fratelli-italia.it/programma-europa/); 2018 “Il voto che unisce
l’Italia” (https://www.flipsnack.com/fratelliditalia/programma-in-sintesi.html); 2019
“Porogramma elezioni europee” (https://www.fratelli-italia.it/wp-content/uploads/
2019/04/Programma-completo-1.pdf); 2022 “Pronti a risollevare l’Italia” (https://
www.fratelli-italia.it/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Brochure_programma_FdI_qr_def.
pdf).
also interesting that the topics included in the document were selected
through a deliberative process open to activists and voters (Donà 2022).
Here one can see the influence of the emerging M5S and its idea of direct
and participatory democracy (Tronconi 2018), which FdI clumsily tried
to echo in its programme.
Surprisingly, immigration and integration issues linked to the party’s
nativist ideological dimension do not dominate the manifesto. There is
only one point (the penultimate one) with proposals that could come
from a mainstream (rather than radical) conservative political organisa-
tion. It merely calls for the regulation of migration flows, the punishment
of human trafficking, the promotion of incentives to learn Italian, and
some restrictions on the granting of citizenship to second-generation
immigrants (although in fact the party’s proposal appears almost liberal,
as it seems to accept a conditional extension of citizenship rights).
Throughout the document, there is little mention of ‘authoritarian’
policies based on traditional moral values. Instead, in the aftermath of
the financial storm and the Eurozone debt crisis, the big topic of the
2013 election was Italy’s position as a member of the EU. In this period
of turmoil in which economic and financial developments were strongly
influenced by transnational decisions, the party began to elaborate a
concept of sovereignism that would shape its idea of the European Union
in the following years. Point 1 of the programme begins: ‘We belong to
Italy and we are pro-European, because we believe in the Europe of the
people, but not in that of finance and oligarchies’.2 It then goes on to
state: ‘We believe in popular sovereignty as the foundation of national
loyalty and of a just and shared relationship between state and person’.
Therefore, sovereignty is for FdI the principle that must guide Italy’s
action in Europe. Associated with this is the attack on oligarchies and
elites, a clearly populist theme. Hostility to the political elite also emerges
in other points of the programme calling for ‘a new public ethic’ (point
2) and ‘attacking waste and privilege’ (point 3). Returning to point 1, it
is also interesting to note that the ‘will of the people’ can only find its full
expression with the transformation of Italy into a presidential republic, a
long-standing goal of the post-fascist right re-proposed in populist terms
(with plebiscitary overtones).
2 All passages directly quoted from the manifestos are translated by the author.
28 D. VAMPA
FdI’s economic proposals in 2013 are a mixture of conservative fiscal

policies: cutting ‘wasteful’ spending and public debt, accompanied by tax
cuts (points 4 and 5). At the same time, the party calls for greater vigi-
lance on the funds disbursed to banks to restore liquidity to the system
after the financial crisis in order to verify that they ‘actually reach fami-
lies and businesses, without stopping in the coffers of credit institutions
that, on the contrary, close the taps’ (point 7). The lowering of taxa-
tion on labour should be accompanied by active training policies and the
introduction of a single contract for all workers with growing protections
and greater flexibility in the first years. In short, no radical proposal can
be found in the economic part of the programme. On social policy, FdI
proposes an end to the largely inefficient and costly ‘assistenzialismo’—a
welfarist approach ‘that places the citizen as a passive bystander’—, while
it supports the creation of a less costly system ensuring equal or better
services. In FdI’s proposed welfare model, private and voluntary organi-
sations play an important role and, through a system of social vouchers,
each citizen would be free to choose health and social assistance services
(point 8). This is clearly inspired by the market-oriented right, but also
linked to a more traditional system of subsidies to support the family and
motherhood (point 11)—the woman-mother figure is a constant in the
social policy model proposed by the Italian right.
A final interesting aspect of this first party manifesto is the focus on
justice reform (point 10, the longest in the list) but not necessarily in
an authoritarian and repressive sense. Rather, the approach to this issue
still seems to be influenced by Berlusconi’s battles against the judiciary,
accused of using various investigations and trials to damage his political
reputation. Thus, the call for speeding up and streamlining trials is accom-
panied by statements in support of the ‘presumption of innocence’, with
the safeguarding of suspects and their reputations before a final verdict.
2014–2019: The years of Radicalisation

Policy positions directly related to the ideological diamond in Fig. 2.1
were already present in the 2013 manifesto, albeit embedded in a tradi-
tionally conservative programmatic framework. The manifestos for the
2014 and 2019 European elections and for the 2018 general election
are characterised by two important developments. The first is a reduc-
tion and simplification of the political message. From around forty pages
of the 16 points in 2013—which, however, already lacked precision and
policy detail—we observe a shift to less than twenty pages in 2014 and
just fifteen pages in 2019. At the 2018 general election, FdI presented 15
short statements in just four pages.
The second development is a clear radicalisation of the political
message: the greater conciseness of the programmes brings out the back-
bone of FdI’s ideological system. Thus, for example, the programme for
the 2014 European election (‘In Europe with our heads held high’—‘In
Europa a testa alta’) begins by pledging to ask the European Commission
‘to proceed to an agreed and controlled dissolution of the Eurozone’
(point 1), a much more radical position than the one presented the year
before. The manifesto goes on to attack European interference in national
political choices (points 2 and 3) and accuses the European Union of
having left Italy alone to manage the phenomenon of ‘wild immigration’
(point 4). The clear nativist/anti-immigration imprint is also accompa-
nied by themes of economic sovereignism, with the explicit proposal to
apply ‘intelligent protectionism’ to international trade. Identitarian and
sovereignist themes are also applied to the discussion of specific economic
sectors such as agriculture, against ‘the homologising drives that originate
from a globalisation without rules’ (point 11).
Principles such as the ‘defence of Christian roots’ and the ‘non-
negotiable values of life, the person, the family’ (point 7) are also explicitly
mentioned in the 2014 manifesto, which thus has a more socially conser-
vative and authoritarian outlook than that of 2013. These issues are also
mentioned in the manifesto for the 2018 general election (‘The vote that
unites Italy’—‘Il voto che unisce l’Italia’), which, being more focused on
the domestic sphere, emphasises, in addition to the usual sovereignism
(point 2), the themes of security and legality (point 3) and the opposi-
tion to the extension of integration and citizenship rights (point 4). The
defence of traditional values is even more evident than in 2014 with an
explicit attack on the ‘process of Islamisation’ (point 5). It is also inter-
esting to note the increased focus on the issue of welfare, interpreted,
however, from a strongly authoritarian/conservative value perspective.
The first point of the programme in fact proposes ‘the most extensive
plan to support families and increase the birth rate in the history of Italy’
and at the same time affirms the ‘defence of the natural family, the fight
against gender ideology and support for life’ (this last point reveals a
critical stance towards the right to abortion). At the same time, the oppo-
sition to welfarist measures such as the ‘citizenship income’ proposed by
the M5S is reiterated. However, unlike in 2013, the need for more state
30 D. VAMPA
intervention to combat poverty is emphasised. Also in the area of health

a ‘pact between the state and citizens’ is advocated. Opposition to the
pension reform that would postpone the retirement age is accompanied
by support for a flat tax at 15 per cent for families and businesses—a
measure that makes the income tax system less progressive. Finally, the
populism that permeates several points of the programme is also reflected
in a plebiscitary vision of democracy—advocating, once again, the trans-
formation of Italy into a presidential system and a series of measures to
reduce the number of parliamentarians, abolish bicameralism and impose
a mandate constraint on elected representatives (point 15).
The manifesto for the 2019 European election (‘Programme for the
European election’—‘Programma elezioni europee’) reiterates many of
the points of 2014 and 2018: reference to sovereignism in the European
context, defence of the traditional family, combating illegal immigration
and any meaningful extension of citizenship rights. Yet it also presents
further developments. For instance, it no longer calls for Italy to leave
or renegotiate its position in the Eurozone. Furthermore, in the eclectic
mix of economic policies there is a more open hostility to austerity,
emphasising the need for more public investment. This is accompanied by
calls for the streamlining of bureaucracy and a reduction in taxes. Some
ostensibly pro-market measures are, nevertheless, aimed at defending and
strengthening the domestic production system as part of a protectionist
economic approach.
2022: ‘Ready to Revive Italy’

The 2022 manifesto marks a departure from the period of radicalisation.
First of all, the programmatic points are presented in more detail in a
forty-page document. Moreover, already in the title—‘Ready to revive
Italy’ (‘Pronti a risollevare l’Italia’)—a change in the party’s political
role is emphasised. Whereas until 2020 FdI was an outsider and ran as
an opposition party aiming to win enough votes to elect a group of
representatives, in 2022 it is standing as one of the main contenders
for the leadership of the Italian government. The tones are therefore
calmer, although the ideological orientation remains clear. In particular,
the populist and sovereignist set-up is reiterated in this statement included
in the programme’s introduction:
We will … have the opportunity to close a disgraceful historical phase: the one
that in ten years has seen the birth of no less than seven governments , resulting
from palace games played on the heads of the Italians. A historical phase in
which the Italian left has always remained in the rooms of power, even in
defiance of the will of the people. It was certainly an anomalous parenthesis of
our democracy, which generated a failure of representation, mortifying and
debasing the fundamental constitutional principle that ‘sovereignty belongs
to the people’. (p. 3)
The first point of the programme, as in 2018, places the issue of support
for the (traditional) family at the core of the party’s action, but this time
without a value-based reference to the issue of ‘gender ideology’. In the
election campaign, however, the issue of the right to abortion was repeat-
edly taken up by Giorgia Meloni. While the leader of FdI declared that she
did not want to repeal the law that gives women the right to abortion, she
pledged to guarantee ‘the right not to have an abortion’ (Ricciardi 2022).
These words certainly hint at a socially conservative view of society in
line with the authoritarian populism (Norris and Inglehart 2019) already
described above.
Many of the key points in FdI’s 2022 programme deal with economic
and fiscal issues. The party sees Italy’s recovery and resilience plan
(PNRR) financed through the EU support package as an opportunity
that the outgoing government, chaired by technocrat Mario Draghi, did
not fully exploit. Therefore, the plan needs to be reshaped and updated
(point 2).
In the area of taxation, reference is once again made to a flat tax but
also to a system favouring large families (point 3). While there is no longer
any open reference to economic protectionism, points 4 and 5 of the
programme emphasise the need to support the Italian entrepreneurial
system. This should be accompanied by a ‘valorisation of the Italian
language abroad, the defence of the Italian character, culture and symbols
throughout the world’ (point 5). Thus, consistent with many other cases
of right-wing populist parties, socio-cultural and identity values permeate
the party’s economic approach.
The social dimension of Giorgia Meloni’s party emerges in point 9,
which includes a commitment to build a ‘universal social security model
for all workers’. This is a further step to the ‘left’ on the socio-economic
dimension—a far cry from the residual, voucher-based welfare that was
proposed in 2013. Here, too, FdI’s trajectory appears in line with that of
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Brothers of Italy A New Populist Wave in An Unstable Party System Davide Vampa Full Chapter

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Brothers of Italy.

A New Populist Wave

“Sophisticated, well-argued and based on a wealth of data, Vampa’s book tells

ISBN 978-3-031-26131-2 ISBN 978-3-031-26132-9 (eBook)

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023

Cover illustration: © Melisa Hasan

This volume examines the origins, ideology, organisation, leadership,

1 Brothers of Italy, the Radical Right and Populism in Italy 1

Postscript: FdI’s Organisation and Leadership

7 Conclusion: Ten Lessons from Giorgia Meloni’s

Davide Vampa is Senior Lecturer in Politics at Aston University, Birm-

Abbreviation Original party name English party name

Fig. 1.1 From the Italian Social Movement to Brothers of Italy 6

Table 2.1 Ideological dimensions and policy issues (salience

Brothers of Italy, the Radical Right

Abstract This chapter places the case of Brothers of Italy (Fratelli

Keywords Brothers of Italy · Origins · Populism · Post-fascism · Radical

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Brothers of Italy: Between

The meteoric rise of Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d’Italia, FdI) is remark-

1. To show the ideological, organisational, strategic and electoral simi-

Re-Igniting the Flame: From the Post-Fascist

Freedom and Future for Italy

(Futuro e Libertà per l’Italia)

(Il Popolo della

Fig. 1.1 From the Italian Social Movement to Brothers of Italy

(Popolo della Libertà, PdL), giving birth to a large centre-right party

of the twentieth century (Boezi 2020). Thus a battle began to deter-

A Multi-Dimensional Framework of Analysis

changed dramatically. In general, a weakening of intermediate party elites

Moreover, the analysis of the relationship between elections and repre-

Structure of the Book

of the party’s statute (outlining the territorial structure of the organi-

The conclusion summarises the main results of the analysis presented in

and Change, South European Society and Politics,. https://doi.org/10.1080/

Ideology and Policy Positions

Keywords Brothers of Italy · Party ideology · Party manifesto ·

FdI’s Ideological Diamond: Nativism,

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 15

it is the latest in a series of ‘shocks’ caused by different political actors—

Fig. 2.1 FdI’s ideological diamond

Authoritarianism shapes the idea of national community by giving it an

FdI’s Programmatic Positions

Dimensions and issues FdI League FI M5S PD

Source Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Jolly et al. 2022)

In general, FdI seems to have consolidated the aspects of its

1 605 Law and order 11.538 11.145 9.375 4.39 2.03

10 506 Education expansion 3.846 3.13 4.167 4.083 4.606

Table 2.2 (continued)

also translates into an emphasis on ‘external security and defence’ (104)

FdI’s Programmatic Development (2013–2022)

2013: ‘The Challenges Ahead for Italy’

FdI’s economic proposals in 2013 are a mixture of conservative fiscal

2014–2019: The years of Radicalisation

intervention to combat poverty is emphasised. Also in the area of health

2022: ‘Ready to Revive Italy’

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