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THE SCIENCES PO SERIES IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND
POLITICAL ECONOMY
Contemporary
Populists in Power
Edited by Alain Dieckhoff · Christophe Jaffrelot ·

Elise Massicard
The Sciences Po Series in International Relations and
Political Economy
Series Editor
Alain Dieckhoff, Center for International Studies (CERI), Sciences Po -
CNRS, Paris, France
Advisory Editor
Miriam Perier, Center for International Studies (CERI), Sciences Po -
CNRS, Paris, France
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Alain Dieckhoff · Christophe Jaffrelot ·
Elise Massicard
Editors
Contemporary
Populists in Power
Editors
Alain Dieckhoff Christophe Jaffrelot
Center for International Studies Center for International Studies
(CERI) (CERI)
Sciences Po - CNRS Sciences Po - CNRS
Paris, France Paris, France
Elise Massicard
Center for International Studies
(CERI)
Sciences Po - CNRS
Paris, France
The Sciences Po Series in International Relations and Political Economy

ISBN 978-3-030-84078-5 ISBN 978-3-030-84079-2 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84079-2
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Notes from the Editors
This book is a translation from the French and an augmented and updated
version of l’Enjeu mondial. Populismes au pouvoir (Première édition),
published by the Presses de Sciences Po in 2019.
All chapters except chapters by David Camroux, Asma Faiz, Paulic
Henneton, Paulus Wagner and Nira Wickramasinghe have been translated
from the French by Cynthia Schoch. The editors wish to thank her for
her engagement during the entire publication process.
v
Contents
1 Introduction: Populists in Power, a Global Perspective 1

Alain Dieckhoff, Christophe Jaffrelot, and Élise Massicard
2 Populists in Power: A Comparative Perspective 15
Alain Dieckhoff
Part I Populist Roads to Authoritarianism

3 Populism Against Democracy or People Against
Democracy? 35
Christophe Jaffrelot
4 We Are on the Same Page: The Curious Case of Imran
Khan’s Populism in Pakistan 55
Asma Faiz
5 From Chávez to Maduro: From Delegative Democracy
to De-Democratization 75
Thomas Posado
6 Populism and Authoritarian Drift: The Presidency
of Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil 93
Frédéric Louault
vii
viii CONTENTS
7 Mahinda Rajapaksa: From Populism

to Authoritarianism 113
Nira Wickramasinghe
Part II Consolidating Power

8 Orban’s Hungary: From “Illiberal Democracy”
to the Authoritarian Temptation 133
Jacques Rupnik
9 Israel: Dedemocratization by Stealth 153
Samy Cohen
10 Tatay (Daddy) Digong, The Punisher:
President Rodrigo Duterte’s Punitive Populism
in the Philippines 171
David Camroux
11 Ruling for the People or Ruling the People?
Governing the Third Sector in Turkey 193
Elise Massicard
12 Populist Welfarism in India: How Modi Relates
to the Poor 211
Christophe Jaffrelot
Part III The Limits of Populism in Office

13 The Movimento Cinque Stelle (M5S) in Italy. The Rise
and Fall of an Anti-Political Movement 237
Jean-Louis Briquet
14 The Austrian Far Right in Government: The Role
of Coalitions 253
Paulus Wagner
15 Defensive Populism in Tutelary Democracies: The
Case of Thaksin Shinawatra vs the Deep State
in Thailand 271
Eugénie Mérieau
CONTENTS ix
16 “The System Is Strong”: American Democratic

Resilience and the Great Trumpian Stress Test 289
Lauric Henneton
Index 309
Notes on Contributors
Jean-Louis Briquet is a Political Scientist and CNRS Research Director

at the Centre européen de sociologie et de science politique (CESSP,
Université Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne). His work focuses on unoffi-
cial politics (clientelism, corruption, criminality) as well as contemporary
Italian politics.
David Camroux is Honorary Senior Research Fellow within the CERI
and an Adjunct Professor at Sciences Po, Paris. He is also a Professorial
Fellow at the Vietnam National University (USSH), in Hanoi. He teaches
and writes widely on contemporary Southeast Asian politics and society,
EU–Asia relations and regional integration in the Indo-Pacific.
Samy Cohen Emeritus Research Professor at Sciences Po (CERI), is
the author of several books, The Resilience of the State. Democracy and
the Challenges of Globalisation, London, Hurst, 2006; Democracies at
War against Terrorism. A Comparative Perspective (Ed.), New York,
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008; Israel’s Asymmetric Wars, New York Palgrave
Macmillan, 2010; Doves Among Hawks. Struggles of the Israeli Peace Move-
ments, London, Hurst Publishers & New York, Oxford University Press,
2019.
Dr. Alain Dieckhoff is CNRS Research Professor and Director of CERI
(Center for International Studies, Sciences Po). His main field of research
is politics and society in Israel, as well as the transformations of contem-
porary nationalism. He has authored six books, edited twelve, published
xi
xii NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
more than fifty articles in journals and edited volumes. Books include
Modern Roots. Studies of National Identity (co-ed, Ashgate, 2001); The
Invention of a Nation: Zionist Thought and the Making of Modern Israel
(CUP, 2003); The Politics of Belonging: Nationalism, Liberalism, and
Pluralism (ed., Lexington Books, 2004); Revisiting Nationalism: Theories
and Processes (co-ed., Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Routledge Handbook of
Modern Israel (ed., Routledge, 2013); Nationalism and the Multination
State (Hurst, 2016). He is a member of the Advisory Council of the
Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies.
Dr. Asma Faiz is Assistant Professor of Political Science in the Depart-
ment of Humanities and Social Sciences at Lahore University of Manage-
ment Sciences (LUMS). She is the author of books, In Search of Lost
Glory: Sindhi Nationalism in Pakistan (Hurst Publishers, 2021) and
India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society In (RCSS Publications,
2007). Dr. Faiz has also edited a volume, Making Federation Work:
Federalism in Pakistan After the 18th Amendment (Oxford University
Press, 2015). Her research interests include nationalist movements, ethnic
politics, federalism and populism.
Dr. Lauric Henneton is Associate Professor in the English department at
Université de Versailles Saint-Quentin (France). He has published Histoire
religieuse des Etats-Unis (Flammarion, 2012), La Fin du rêve américain?
(Odile Jacob, 2017) and Atlas Historique des Etats-Unis (Autrement,
2019). He has edited Du Bon Usage des Commémorations: Histoire,
Mémoire et Identités (with B. Cottret, Presses Universitaires de Rennes,
2010), Fear and the Shaping of Early American Societies (with L. H.
Roper, Brill, 2016) and Le Rêve américain à l’épreuve de Donald Trump
(Vendémiaire, 2020).
Dr. Christophe Jaffrelot is Senior research fellow at CERI-Sciences
Po/CNRS, Professor of Indian Politics and Sociology at the King’s India
Institute (London) and President of the French Political Science Associa-
tion. Among his recent publications are, (as a coeditor with A. Kohli and
K. Murali) Business and Politics in India (OUP, 2019) and (as a coed-
itor with A. Chatterji and T. B. Hansen) The Majoritarian State. How
Hindu Nationalism Is Changing India (Hurst, 2019), as coauthor with
Pratinav Anil, India’s First Dictatorship. The Emergency, 1975–77 (Hurst,
2020) and as sole author Modi’s India. Hindu Nationalism and the Rise
of Ethnic Democracy (Princeton University Press, 2021).
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS xiii
Dr. Frédéric Louault is Professor of political science at the Univer-

sité Libre de Bruxelles (ULB); Director of the Centre d’étude de la
vie politique (CEVIPOL/ULB); and Co-director of the Center for the
Study of the Americas (AmericaS/ULB). He is also Vice-president of
the Political Observatory of Latin America and the Caribbean (OPALC,
CERI/Sciences Po). He has published various books and articles about
Brazilian studies and Latin American politics.
Dr. Elise Massicard is Research Professor at the Centre National de la
Recherche Scientifique/Centre for International Studies (CERI), Paris.
Her main research interests are the political sociology of contemporary
Turkey, Turkish politics, political parties, sociology of the state and state–
society relations. She coedited with Marc Aymes and Benjamin Gourisse
Order and Compromise. Government Practices in Turkey from the Late
Ottoman Empire to the Early 21st Century, Leiden—Boston, Brill, 2015;
and authored Street-Level Governing. Negotiating the State in Urban
Turkey, Stanford, Stanford UP, 2022.
Dr. Eugénie Mérieau is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Centre for Asian
Legal Studies, National University of Singapore and a Research Asso-
ciate at Sciences Po-CERI (France). She held positions at Sciences Po,
Göttingen University (Germany) and Thammasat University (Thailand)
and worked for the International Commission of Jurists. Prior to joining
NUS, she was a visiting researcher at the Institute for Global Law and
Policy, Harvard Law School. Her publications on Thailand have appeared
in the Journal of Contemporary Asia, Asian Journal of Comparative Law,
Southeast Asian Affairs, among others. Her upcoming book is entitled
Constitutional Bricolage: Thailand’s Sacred King Versus the Rule of Law
(Hart Publishing).
Dr. Thomas Posado (Ph.D. in Political Science from the University
Paris-8 France) has focused on Venezuelan politics, labor relations and
Latin American studies. He coauthored (with Jean-Baptiste Thomas)
Révolutions à Cuba, de 1868 à nos jours. Emancipation, transformation,
restauration (Syllepse, 2020) and coedited Gouvernements progressistes en
Amérique latine (1998–2018). La fin d’un âge d’or (Presses Universitaires
de Rennes, 2021). He has published in Pouvoirs, Cahiers des Amériques
latines, Nuevo Mundo, Politique étrangère, among others.
xiv NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
Dr. Jacques Rupnik is Emeritus Research Professor at CERI Sciences

Po, Paris. A specialist of Eastern Europe and the Balkans, democratic
transition, he has published extensively and in several languages.
Paulus Wagner is a Ph.D. candidate at the Center for European
Studies and the Laboratory for the Interdisciplinary Evaluation of Public
Policy, Sciences Po Paris. His work focuses on welfare states and polit-
ical populism. In his thesis, he uses mixed methods and tools from
both sociology and political science to analyze the formation of “wel-
fare chauvinist” and “producerist” policy preferences among European
publics.
Dr. Nira Wickramasinghe is Chair/Professor of Modern South Asian
Studies at Leiden University, The Netherlands.
List of Tables
Table 2.1 Populist parties in power in Europe (14 February 2021) 25

Table 4.1 The PTI’s performance in the National Assembly
elections (1997–2018) 61
xv
CHAPTER 1
Introduction: Populists in Power, a Global

Perspective
Alain Dieckhoff, Christophe Jaffrelot, and Élise Massicard
Populism is on the rise, and so are academic studies on populism.

However, already in 1969, in their seminal work on populism, Populism,
Its Meanings and National Characteristics Ernest Gellner and Ghiţa
Ionescu called it an “elusive” concept. This elusiveness has in fact led
some scholars to completely disregard it as a concept. We disagree with
this vision, and the vast academic literature on the subject has helped us
to circumscribe the terms of the debate. Although there are many ways
of classifying the theories on populism (Mudde 2017, 2–5; Carlos de la
Torre 2018, 31–71), we have chosen, for the sake of clarity, to adopt
A. Dieckhoff (B) · C. Jaffrelot · É. Massicard

Center for International Studies (CERI), Sciences Po—CNRS, Paris, France
e-mail: alain.dieckhoff@sciencespo.fr
C. Jaffrelot
e-mail: christophe.jaffrelot@sciencespo.fr
É. Massicard
e-mail: elise.massicard@sciencepo.fr
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Switzerland AG 2022
A. Dieckhoff et al. (eds.), Contemporary Populists in Power, The Sciences
Po Series in International Relations and Political Economy,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84079-2_1
2 A. DIECKHOFF ET AL.
the threefold classification based on three sets of approaches: ideolog-

ical, political-strategic, and cultural. This taxonomy dominates the current
discussion on populism and has been taken up by various authors (Rovira
Kaltwasser et al. 2017; Urbinati 2019, 26–351 ).
The first perspective, well represented by the works of political scientist
Cas Mudde, a specialist of political extremism and populism in Europe
and the United States, emphasizes the role of ideas and characterizes
populism as a “thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ulti-
mately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic camps, ‘the pure
people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite,’ and which argues that politics should be
an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people” (Mudde
2017, 6; Stanley 2008). Here, populism is based on a moral conception
of politics, and the people derives its “purity” from its “authenticity.”
Mudde acknowledges that the word “ideology” may be a bit strong, as
he considers populism to be only a “thin-centered ideology” from which
no specific public policy can emerge. But he insists that ideas do play a key
role. For Mudde, the vox populi is based on so-called “common sense.”
The second trend, represented primarily by Kurt Weyland, turns its
back on the first, and defines populism simply as “a political strategy
through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government
power through direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support from large
numbers of followers” (Weyland 2001, 14). In this perspective, ideas
matter less than acts that betray the populist’s opportunism—a keyword
of Weyland’s theory. Kurt Weyland devalues the role of ideology to such
an extent that he distinguishes populists from ultranationalists, whose
ideological rigidity prevents them from adapting to variations in public
opinion and broadening their base, which the populist, as a pragmatist,
constantly does out of a thirst for power.
The third trend is represented by different authors among whom Pierre
Ostiguy (Rovira Kaltwasser et al. 2017, 73–98), Pierre-André Taguieff
(2007, 31–32), and Francisco Panizza (2005, 1–31). This approach
emphasizes populism as a political style. There are clearly nuances among
1 Nadia Urbinati introduces a fruitful distinction between minimalist and maximalist

theories of populism. She classifies among the first, interpretations of populism that analyze
its ideological tropes, its style of politics and the political strategies devised to achieve
power. The maximalist theories go beyond analytical purposes: they aim to develop a full-
fledged theory of populism which sees how populism can invigorate democracy. Ernesto
Laclau has been the pioneer of this maximalist understanding of populism (Laclau 2005).
In this volume, we focus mostly on the former.
1 INTRODUCTION: POPULISTS IN POWER … 3
these authors, but their affinities tend to outstrip their differences: they
are all interested in the methods, the practices, and the words through
which populist leaders interact with the people, who can therefore see
“one of us” in them—and, at the same time, a strong leader as well. It is
this third approach that we favor in the chapters of this edited volume.
However, the divide between the three theoretical trends listed above
should not be overstated. Indeed, the last perspective under review is not
so far, as acknowledged by Cas Mudde himself, from his thin-ideology
approach (Rovira Kaltwasser et al. 2017, 29). If, indeed, the ideology
of populism is reduced to three core concepts, the (pure) people, the
(corrupt) elite and the general will, the ideological and the political style
approaches can easily be matched. We defend and promote this dual
approach throughout the present volume and hope to contribute to the
literature through this crosscutting perspective and through in-depth case
studies of less explored regions and countries in studies on populism.
This dual approach also allows us to put under the same roof
right-wing populism (also known as national populism, which is domi-
nant in the contemporary world) and left-wing populism (periodically
re-emergent in Latin America, in particular, since the mid-twentieth
century). These two types of populism, although leaning in different
political directions, share some common features (a dichotomy between
the political, economic and cultural elites depicted as “outsiders,” and the
“people”—the incarnation of authenticity) and, to some extent, the same
political style.
Main Argument of the Book

The study of populism has long focused on the way its spokespersons have
behaved as an oppositional force, notably in times of electoral campaigns
during which they have sought to weigh on the strategy of traditional
political parties, in Western countries in particular (Heinich 2003; Taggart
2004) In fact, populists have long served as pressure groups, in partic-
ular during the many social and political movements of the 1990s, within
Europe and under the direction of leaders with clear oratorical skills, who
used a demagogical repertoire, such as Jean-Marie Le Pen in France and
Jörg Haider in Austria (Betz 1994).
Even if the discourses and practices of those populists exercising a
protest function warrant closer analysis, in particular to understand how
they can appear to their popular supporters as both “one of ours” and
someone of a superior essence—superhuman in some cases—, this edited

volume trains the focus on populist governments. Indeed, the real novelty
of the past decade is that many of these populists are now (or have been)
in power, not only in Europe but also in other regions of the world, from
Latin America to Asia through the Middle East.
As a result, this book intends to play a pioneering role from
a geographical and analytical standpoint. Populism has been widely
analyzed in three areas: Europe, Latin America, and the United States (see
among others Taggart 2004; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012). This is no
coincidence: populism has existed in these regions for a long time, even if
its reemergence has been cyclical. Our volume will not ignore these fields
of study, but because the populist phenomenon tends to propagate and
disseminate globally, we aim to examine other parts of the world where
it has gained momentum, including the Middle East (Turkey, Israel)
and—mostly—Asia (India, Thailand, the Philippines, Pakistan, Sri Lanka).
In terms of analytical perspective, the contributors of this volume will
examine and analyze populist leaders’ relationship to power, i.e., how they
take, exercise, and keep power. In line with some previous studies which
have started to look at the record of populist parties in power (Albertazzi
and McDonnell 2015; Akkerman et al. 2016; Pappas 2019), our aim is
to answer the following question: what becomes of populism when it is
no longer an opposition and contentious force? Similar questions have
arisen for political phenomena that had initially been structured as oppo-
sition movements and as a protest to the established political order—such
as communism and Islamism. Political scientists have long wondered if
these parties and groups (Communist parties, Islamist parties linked with
the Muslim Brotherhood) can fit into the democratic political systems.
The same is true of populism today. Thus the guiding line of our argu-
ment follows these questions: what does populism do to democracy? Do
populists become so “commonplace” that they lose their specificity, or do
they govern in their own way, threatening or renewing democracy? These
questions have received much attention at a theoretical level (Panizza
2005; Pasquino 2008; Urbinati 2019). The empirical answer, presented in
the different chapters of the book, is mixed: while in office, some populists
of the left do try to renew patterns or forms of political participation,
or try to improve the political representation of otherwise marginalised
social groups. On the contrary, some national-populists, once in power,
claim to represent a “people” they define in restrictive (ethnical, religious,
political…) terms and tend to limit pluralism.
Populist leaders are often Janus-like figures, policy-wise. On the

one hand they claim that they represent the poor and the weak, the
people against the elite, the establishment—and they claim to be part
of this plebe (hence their victimization discourse). On the other, the
economic policy they defend and apply is often conservative in socio-
economic terms and business friendly—leading some scholars to stress the
affinity of right-wing populists with neoliberalism (Kitschelt and McGann
1995). However, a more sophisticated approach shows that national-
populists defend the social status quo strategically: they very often choose
deliberately to remain vague on economic issues—while emphasizing
sociocultural issues—in order to have a large cross-class appeal (Rovny
2013).
The national-populists who have often won elections by targeting
some of the threats allegedly facing “their people”—migrants and minori-
ties in terms of domestic threats, enemy countries in terms of external
threats—often implement new, aggressive, security-oriented laws and
reform citizenship and welfare policies in a restrictive manner once in
office. This politics of fear (Wodak 2015) is aimed to help them retain
the indispensable support of “their people,” including the poor—to
whom they may make other symbolic gifts acknowledging their need for
recognition, dignity, and self-esteem.
The analysis of various experiences of populists in power in a global
and comparative perspective is presented in the following pages.
Book Outline
The book opens with a general introduction by Alain Dieckhoff who
approaches populism obliquely by looking at the three meanings of
the term “people”: its political dimension (the people as sovereign); its
historical-cultural dimension (the people as a community sharing a collec-
tive identity); and its social dimension (the people as the working class).
Populism is strongly linked with either the cultural or social approach
giving way to two different forms of populism, right-wing national
populism or left-wing populism. Turning to the crux of the matter, i.e.,
the relation of populists with power, the chapter stresses the fact that
both access to power and the way power is exercised depend heavily on
structural factors (voting system, type of regime, and so on).
The book develops our understanding of populists in power in three
main sections.
The first one opens with a theoretical contribution by Christophe

Jaffrelot on the affinities between populism and authoritarianism. While
populists claim that they will rejuvenate democracy if elected, they have
promoted authoritarian tendancies on many occasions once in office.
Populism is potentially conducive to authoritarianism because of the
personalization of power it implies: populist leaders often win elections
because of their charisma and their parties need them more than they need
them. Secondly, populists claim that the popular legitimacy they embody
through their election prevails above the state’s institutions—including
those in charge of checks and balances, such as the judiciary. These affini-
ties are particularly obvious in the case of national populism which relates
clearly to an ethnicization of democracy (a form of illiberalism). Two
other specific versions of authoritarianism—“electoral authoritarianism”
and “sultanism”—match especially well with populism: the former fulfills
the populist’s need to win elections to legitimize his claim to “be the
people,” and sultanism kills three birds with one stone: its arbitrariness is
in tune with the populist personalization of power, its patrimonial dimen-
sion gives the populist ruler the resources he needs to win elections, and
the privatization of violence allows him to neutralize dissent.
However, there are different populist routes to authoritarianism. Asma
Faiz, in Chapter 4, shows that, in Pakistan, Imran Khan’s populism
naturalizes and amplifies preexisting authoritarian features of the regime.
Certainly, Khan epitomizes many characteristics of the populist checklist: a
former—very popular—captain of the national cricket team, he projected
himself as a new man—a man of the people—against the establishment,
ceaselessly denouncing its corruption. His party, the PTI (Pakistan Move-
ment for Justice) won the 2018 elections because of him rather than the
opposite. But if Imran Khan did not win because of his party, his success
was largely due to the army’s support. The Pakistani army, which has
continued to rule the country in key domains—including foreign policy—
after the end of Musharraf’s military regime in 2008, ten years later was
looking for a prime ministerial candidate who would be more pliable than
the outgoing one, Nawaz Sharif. Since 2018, Imran Khan has indeed been
“on the same page” as the army, and this has resulted in an increasingly
obvious form of militarization of the state.
In Chapter 5, Thomas Posado shows that Venezuela has also followed
a specific route from populism to authoritarianism, because the hardening
of the regime was not so much due to Hugo Chavez—a typically populist
of the left—, as to his successor, Nicolas Maduro (even though there were
signs of de-democratization by the end of Chavez’s reign). The trajectory

of Venezuela illustrates a rather common mechanism: while the populist
leader could rule, rather unchallenged, on the basis of his charismatic
legitimacy, his successor—lacking this asset—tends to resort to repressive
measures to counter the opposition—as well as dissent at large—and to
limit the balancing power of institutions in charge of the rule of law. In
parallel, the regime relies on propaganda and the army—hence a certain
militarization of the public space.
If Chavez epitomizes the Latin American tradition of the populist of
the left, Frederic Louault shows in Chapter 6 that Jair Bolsonaro exem-
plifies the national-populist repertoire of the subcontinent. Not only did
he not rely on any political force (in fact he left his party soon after being
elected and remained partyless for most of his term in office), but also,
while he claims to represent the people, Bolsonaro, in fact, favors elite
groups—and even though he adopts a disruptive style of politics, he is
culturally conservative as well. After his election in 2019, his transition
from populism to authoritarianism has found expression in attacks against
the Congress (in the name of anti-parliamentarism) and the judiciary.
Bolsonaro has also militarized the politics of Brazil, as evident from the
very large number of officers in his government.
The case of Sri Lanka, as analyzed by Neera Wickramasinghe in
Chapter 7, also combines familiar aspects of the transition from populism
to authoritarianism with very specific features. Mahinda Rajapaksa’s rise
to power fits in the national-populist conquest of power by a plebeian
leader who projected himself as a defender of the sons of the soil against
a so-called threatening minority. But Rajapaksa could cash in on a rare
achievement: the crushing of a guerilla, the Tamil Tigers, and the end of
a three-decade-long civil war. His national-populist style, in this context,
bore electoral results, but his nepotistic and authoritarian rule were
resisted by the citizens who voted him out, before he could stage a come-
back in 2019. Since then, the transition to authoritarianism has resulted
in a more complete capture of the state—and even, to some extent, to its
militarization.
Is the slide into authoritarianism the only reason for the consolida-
tion in power of many populists? The second section of the book deals
with countries where populist leaders have won several elections in a
row. Where the rulers still need to be elected to stay in office, what
are the dynamics of populist consolidation in power? This section shows
that populist consolidation in power is certainly linked to the weak-

ening of checks and balances and therefore the creation of an uneven
electoral playing field, but not exclusively. The chapters in this section
examine the reasons why populists are often reelected, and therefore how
they entrench their power while in office. They address both the way
they change the institutional system, but also, and more specifically, the
patterns of their social support, and the bases of their legitimacy. This
section, therefore, looks at how populists remain in power when they face
the electorate in a rather competitive context. The chapters in this section
show that the dynamics of their consolidation in power are manyfold, but
converge to some extent.
The most obvious dynamics of their consolidation in power is best
exemplified by Hungary’s case, as studied by Rupnik in Chapter 8.
Many of Viktor Orban’s illiberal measures helped him to strengthen his
grip on power. His comfortable parliamentary majority enabled him to
profoundly transform the institutional system. Orban undermined checks
and balances, especially the independence of the judiciary, and established
a stranglehold on the administration. The party in office also enhanced
state control over the media. Taken together, this explains the deteriora-
tion of political rights and civil liberties, restrictions on pluralism, and a
clampdown on the public space. However, the government also strength-
ened social support by wielding nationalist and patriotic rhetoric, drawing
on the defense of an endangered nation. This helped criminalize the
opposition as agent of foreign forces and enemies of the people, and had
polarizing effects—Orban’s party itself enjoys support from a network of
friendly grassroots organization. Finally, political power has intermeshed
with economic interests. However, the 2019 municipal elections showed
that even if distorted, political competition through elections still has a
degree of unpredictability.
In Chapter 9, Samy Cohen analyzes Netanyahu’s terms in office in
coalition with right-wing and far-right parties. There are striking similar-
ities with Orban’s Hungary, such as anti-liberal laws affecting the very
nature of the state. Mainly through legal means, but also often playing
with the limits of legality, Netanyahu’s governments have weakened the
independence of the judiciary and increased attacks against the media.
They have put limits on pluralism, restricting rights and personal freedoms
and discredited the opposition under the pretense of the people’s will.
They have especially targeted NGOs—those defending human rights and
having foreign ties. Cohen especially stresses the identity dimension of
the “people” in whose name these processes have been initiated. Together
with growing ethnic nationalism and religious revival, they have benefited
the dominant group and ended up excluding minorities. Taken together,
those shifts have enhanced the polarization of society. The government
has employed security narratives and exploited fear, framing any form of
protest as betrayal. Eventually, the judiciary has damped down somewhat
on these tendencies.
Duterte’s terms in office in the Philippines, as analyzed by David
Camroux in Chapter 10, provides another case in point. Like all populists
in this section, Duterte exhibits features of a strongman. Likewise, he
has restricted freedom of information and manipulated the media. Disre-
garding the rule of law, he has strengthened the legal arsenal to crush
opponents—sometimes going so far as to fabricate charges—resulting
in a slide into authoritarianism. Camroux coins the term of “punitive
populism” to stress both the violent and moral dimension of Duterte’s
action in office. Relying on calls against disorder, Duterte has applied
anti-terror laws in a draconian way to repress and even kill dissenters—
especially, but not exclusively, against drugs. He has also used a dichoto-
mous narrative, criminalizing the “unworthy people”—the enemies of the
virtuous citizens. This nationalist narrative articulated both inclusive and
exclusive dimensions. Duterte hasn’t built support through mass organi-
zations, but was able to build legitimacy through the provision of social
and public goods—urban infrastructure, improving social security and
education, and by increasing social spending.
Likewise, once in power, Erdoğan and his governments dismantled
nonelected, tutelary powers (military, bureaucracy, justice), as Elise Massi-
card shows in Chapter 11. This has resulted in releasing the JDP from
checks and balances and making it electorally hegemonic, thereby estab-
lishing a government of the majority. Massicard especially stresses how
Erdoğan has enacted in practice the populist dichotomy between the
“people” and its “enemies.” The chapter examines how the JDP has
produced and constructed the “people’s will,” by framing popular partic-
ipation. In particular, it suggests that the JDP in office has produced new
ways of governing NGOs. These have encouraged the construction of a
close and cooperating third sector, and marginalized alternative elements
of it. Such patterns of cooperation produce the image of a government
that is close to the people and listens to it, while sidelining or even crim-
inalizing many bottom-up expressions of popular will, and resulting in
extreme political, but also social, polarization.
In India, Modi, like his counterparts, has restricted checks and

balances. But in Chapter 12 Christophe Jaffrelot specifically scrutinizes
the social bases of his electoral successes, stressing two dimensions: on the
one hand, like Erdoğan and Duterte, Modi has cashed in on his image as a
plebeian. He has both cultivated a compassionate political style and imple-
mented welfare programs, as proof that he was paying attention to the
poor—what Jaffrelot calls “populist welfarism.” However, most of Modi’s
policies were not in favor of the plebeians, and the situation of farmers
has worsened considerably. On the contrary, like many populists, Modi
was supported by upper-middle-class groups—and in fact, elite groups
have benefited from the Modi regime in many different ways. Not only
did the upper castes regain their hegemony in the government, but the
rich became richer. Most upper-middle-class groups who apprehended the
rise of plebeian groups have supported the BJP largely because its Hindu
nationalist ideology offered an effective antidote to caste politics: the BJP
encouraged the plebeians to forget about caste and class and to think of
themselves as Hindu first. Thus, ethno-nationalist narratives also enabled
Modi’s BJP to gather support from poor and rich alike, albeit for different
reasons—but in the end resulting in growing inequalities.
The third section looks at the limits of populists in office and ultimately
their failure (at least temporarily). Three scenarios are presented. The
first is the unsuccessful political institutionalization of populism. Populism
starts often as a protest movement that rises up against the “system,”
i.e., the political and social order in place. The thorny question populist
leaders have to answer is the following: what should they do if their
election results allow them to join the government? If they remain in
opposition, they can keep their ideological purity, but they will remain
devoid of real power. If they choose to take part in government they will
influence policy to varying degrees, but they will have to make compro-
mises and risk alienating at least part of their electorate. This dilemma is
not specific to populist parties. Communist parties in the past and Green
parties today face a similar choice.
Both Chapters 13 and 14 show that the conversion from protest move-
ment to accountable party of government is a difficult task which may well
weaken populism rather than strengthen it. In the Italian case, analyzed
by Jean-Louis Briquet, the Five Star Movement, with its strong anti-
system message, experienced meteoric electoral growth in both the 2013
and 2018 general elections. The success was such that M5S assumed
a pivotal role within the system it criticized so loudly. The movement
became part of the governing coalition, first with the Lega, its right-wing
populist counterpart and, after August 2019, with the Democratic Party
(the main center-left grouping). Although M5S was able to push for social
measures, it was not rewarded at the polls in regional elections and its
electoral prospects are grim. The fate of M5S points up the difficulty for
an antipolitical movement to maintain its momentum when it comes to
power: almost inevitably it will disappoint some of its voters and nurture
divisions within the movement between “fundamentalists” who speak in
favor of the return to radical antipolitics and the “realists” who defend
participation in government to push forward part of their program.
The Austrian case studied by Paulus Wagner has some similarities
with the Italian one. The populist radical right-wing represented by the
Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) participated twice in an Austrian govern-
ment, from 2000 to 2005 and from 2017 to 2019, in coalition with
the conservative party (ÖVP). The first experiment ended with a split
within the party, with the more accommodating wing—ironically led by
Jörg Haider, who engineered the populist turn of FPÖ in 1986—building
another party (BZÖ). The second experiment was short-lived, terminated
after a corruption scandal. The right-wing populist party benefited from
the willingness of the conservative party to break with the “grand coali-
tions” (with the social-democrats), but drawn into coalition governments,
the FPÖ experienced difficulty in sustaining its electoral strength as a
junior partner with the conservative party, which kept at bay the more
radical measures defended by FPÖ while recycling some others (especially
on migration policy).
The second scenario is peculiar, maybe unique, and is exemplified
by the Thai case analyzed by Eugénie Mériau in Chapter 15. Thaksin
Shinawatra, who became prime minister in 2001, was initially close to the
business elites. However, very quickly he faced opposition from the Deep
State (composed of the military, the monarchy, and the judiciary) who
refused to open up the political system. He gradually turned to his polit-
ical supporters (mainly in rural areas) and became populist because it was
the sole means of countering the establishment. This reactive, defensive
populism was, however, short-lived, owing to the military coup of 2006,
which ousted Thaksin from power. The case of Thailand shows that in
unconsolidated and fragile democracies, populism, as a reaction to threats
from the Deep State, can induce the traditional elite and middle classes to
turn against democracy and fuel a strongly authoritarian reaction ending
in a military dictatorship. Contrary to the classic pattern of populism
leading to authoritarianism, well documented throughout this book, the

Thai case shows how counter-populism can lead to authoritarianism.
The third scenario is the containment of populism through demo-
cratic institutions, a scenario most evident in the case of the United States
closely analyzed by Lauric Henneton in the last chapter. Trumpulism—
Trump’s idiosyncratic incarnation of populism—deployed strong rhetoric
based on five pillars: nostalgic restorationism, exclusivist protectionism,
emotionalism, vulgarism, and unrealism (so-called alternative facts, i.e.,
lies). However, despite populist measures taken here and there, Trump’s
policy had little substance because his populist promises were thwarted
by the institutional checks and balances at both the federal and state
level. There was an authoritarian temptation in Trump, but it could never
materialize. At the end of the day, Trump’s presidency proved that US
institutions were structurally resilient enough to prevent backsliding into
authoritarianism. Ironically, the main victim of the Trumpian wave could
arguably be the Republican Party, which has been weakened by Trump’s
own excesses.
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CHAPTER 2
Populists in Power: A Comparative

Perspective
Alain Dieckhoff
In the plethora of books and articles written on populism, virtually all

contain a passage in which the author starts by emphasizing the poly-
semic nature of the term, and rightly so. However, contrary to what is
sometimes asserted, polysemy in no way disqualifies having recourse to
this category of analysis. After all, the meaning of many social science
terms is disputed, which does not rule out making use of them. On the
other hand, instead of devising an a priori definition of populism—which
is likely to be complicated given the heterogeneity of observable situa-
tions—, it may be more heuristic to start from the root from which it
is formed, the word people, and which is used disproportionately in the
speeches of leaders labeled populist. They do not have a monopoly on
the word, but they use it systematically, and above all, the meaning they
confer on it distinguishes them from other political currents, on both the
right and the left.
A. Dieckhoff (B)
Center for International Studies (CERI), Sciences Po—CNRS, Paris, France
e-mail: alain.dieckhoff@sciencespo.fr
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 15

Switzerland AG 2022
A. Dieckhoff et al. (eds.), Contemporary Populists in Power, The Sciences
Po Series in International Relations and Political Economy,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84079-2_2
16 A. DIECKHOFF
Returning to the last French presidential election in April–May 2017

and the slogans of the five main political parties, Benoît Hamon,
the Socialist candidate, chose to “Make France’s heart beat again.”
François Fillon, for Les Républicains, was confident that he embodied
“the willpower France needs,” while Emmanuel Macron proclaimed
“Together, France.” All three chose to spotlight “France,” a concrete
and yet rather vague reference. Marine Le Pen (Front National, since
renamed Rassemblement National) on the other hand, aimed to speak
“in the name of the people,” while Jean-Luc Mélenchon, candidate
for La France Insoumise (France Unbowed), promised to express “the
people’s strength.” France three times, the people twice. Certainly, the
last two parties in the lineup do not share the same conception of
people, especially regarding migrant issues, their main point of diver-
gence. Indeed, while the matter of migrants is central to the Front
National discourse, La France Insoumise upholds a cosmopolitan model.
However, as will be seen further on, these two movements in fact call
up two models of populism, one on the right, the other on the left. This
should come as no surprise as historically populism, just like nationalism,1
has shifted from left to right. The term in fact first appeared around
1870 in Russia, in reference to the narodnichestvo (from narod, “peo-
ple”) movement, calling on intellectuals and city dwellers to “go to the
people.” The idea was to awaken the peasantry and convince it to revolt.
This vast movement gave rise to Russia’s revolutionary socialists, who
in turn were eventually quashed by the Bolsheviks. A form of left-wing,
transformational populism therefore does indeed exist.
During the same period, the United States experienced a comparable
phenomenon, however in a different context. Like Russian populism,
which championed the peasantry, the populism embodied by the People’s
Party, founded in 1892, also had an agrarian dimension. Its main purpose
was to mobilize farmers, mainly white and with small holdings, against
the nascent oligarchies and large conglomerates. These populists enjoyed
1 Regarding the shift from left to right in nationalism, see Girardet, Raoul. 1983. Le
Nationalisme français: 1871–1914. Paris: Seuil, pp. 7–33. Nathalie Heinich notes that
“the shift of a left-wing cause toward the right of the political spectrum is a constant
in the history of values,” in Heinich, Nathalie. 2018. Ce que n’est pas l’identité. Paris:
Gallimard, p. 20.
2 POPULISTS IN POWER: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 17
a certain following in America, even if they never managed to get a candi-

date elected to the presidency. The movement subsequently merged into
the Democratic Party, positioning it on the left of the political spectrum.
In late nineteenth-century France, a different form of populism,
rooted in the right, emerged with General Boulanger. Unlike the
agrarian roots and democratic intentions of the Russian and American
versions, Boulangism was an urban phenomenon and, owing to its anti-
parliamentarian stance, had a strong authoritarian dimension. A point of
convergence nevertheless exists between the various forms of populism: a
rejection of those in positions of economic and/or political domination,
what are known today as the elites, and this in the name of a non-inclusive
definition of the people (Hermet 2001).
What “People” Do Populists Defend?

The political understanding of “people” is that of the sovereign people,
the body of citizens, in which power ultimately resides, as a consequence
of the transfer of the monarch’s sovereignty to the people ordained by
the American and French revolutions. Thus, the Constitution of the
United States begins with these famous words: “We, the people of the
United States […] do ordain and establish this Constitution.” Along
the same lines, the first Constitution of the French Republic, in 1793,
declared that “the sovereign people embraces the whole of French citi-
zens.” This conception of the people’s sovereignty is intrinsically bound
up with the idea of nation. On the face of it, populist leaders seem to want
to perfect democracy, because they all insist on the need to strengthen
popular sovereignty by establishing grassroots, or even direct, democracy.
Among other things, this would involve systematic recourse to referenda
by popular initiative, making it possible to hear what the people have to
say. Populism thus at first appears to be the actualization of democracy,
but it is precisely this hyperdemocracy, as the Spanish philosopher Ortega
y Gasset (1932, 17–18) termed it back in the 1920s, that is highly prob-
lematic. Such intrusion of the masses, determined to take direct action,
gives rise to a rather “untamed” expression of the general will that objects
to any sort of mediation, frequently leading to, if not unapologetic anti-
parliamentarianism, at least very stringent supervision of parliamentary,
and more generally speaking, political action. The idea occasionally put
forward of an imperative or recallable mandate leads either to the abso-
lute negation of free parliamentary debate, or to permanent suspicion of
18 A. DIECKHOFF
elected officials. The suggestion made by Jean-Luc Mélenchon, leader

of La France Insoumise, to institute a recall referendum by which an
elected representative could be dismissed from office if a segment of the
electorate wishes, in the event that the official has not kept his or her
promises, falls within this rationale of systematic control. By waving such a
threat, the measure would be very likely both to encourage demagoguery,
with the officials in question endorsing even the most preposterous voter
demands, and to maintain chronic instability, which would ultimately
weaken democracy. Paradoxically, the preservation of stability would then
require the intervention of a strongman. Here is thus a situation akin to
the Roman era with the institution of an extraordinary high office, in
the form of dictatorship, to address a state of emergency arising from a
domestic political crisis and external tensions. Far from being the opposite
of populism, hyperdemocracy is more a facilitating factor, and, against all
expectation, calls for a strong leader.
We might add that, full democracy can be seen, to use Georges Sorel’s
term as a myth, i.e., a force of mobilization, but not something which
can be achieved in practice (Sorel 1919). Rereading what Jean-Jacques
Rousseau wrote in 1762 in On the Social Contract, the inalienability of
sovereignty is certainly such that “the Sovereign, who is no less than
a collective being, cannot be represented except by himself” (Rousseau
2003, 34). Only ongoing deliberation, and hence direct democracy, are
legitimate in principle. Yet, Rousseau himself immediately rectifies this
demand for the absolute by observing that “Were there a people of gods,
their government would be democratic. So perfect a government is not
for men” (Rousseau 2003, 55). The weakness of civic virtues, among
other reasons (oversized states, social inequality among citizens, etc.),
thus prevents the establishment of a permanent democracy. Simply stated,
there is no alternative to electoral processes for designating the political
leaders of the various nations.
Behind their ritual invocation of people’s sovereignty, populists actually
have real trouble with the inclusive nature of the concept. They perpet-
ually criticize the “elites,” a catch-all category in which they haphazardly
place national political leaders, Eurocrats, financiers, opinion leaders,
intellectuals, and so on. Populists arbitrarily exclude them from political
sovereignty, even though the elites are as equally entitled as the masses to
expressing it. As stated in article 3 of the Fifth Republic French Constitu-
tion, “National sovereignty shall belong to the people, who shall exercise
it through their representatives and by means of referendum. No section
of the people nor any individual may arrogate to itself, or to himself, the
exercise thereof .” It is precisely such arrogation that populists call for, and
do so in the name of other, narrower conceptions, of the people (Mény
and Surel 2000, 177–222).
One “alternative,” historical and cultural meaning of people refers
to the existence of common attributes: language, history, territory, reli-
gion, customs and folklore, blood ties (real or symbolic). It is the people
as a community, the people viewed as sharing a collective identity. Its
“cultural content” will vary: among some, language will be valued as
a unifying factor, whereas others will emphasize the specific nature of
a historic trajectory. Nevertheless, as soon as a people casts itself as
a specific nation, the characteristics it emphasizes will be more or less
similar. They all partake of what Anne-Marie Thiesse aptly named “iden-
tity check-list ” (Thiesse 2001, 14) combining linguistic, historic, and
geographic features. “Forming a people” thus cannot be reduced to a
political compact. It also must fit within a specific historical and cultural
environment. However, it is one thing to acknowledge the political and
cultural duality of a people as a nation, but quite another to hold up
the people as an ethno-cultural community to the exclusion of all others.
This is precisely the path taken by national-populists on the right, from
Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom in the Netherlands to the Rassemble-
ment National in France, from the Danish People’s Party to the Lega in
Italy. Today, this highly organic conception of the people is always asso-
ciated with exclusionary dynamics focusing on immigrants, especially of
the Muslim faith, whether or not they can lay claim to citizenship in a
European state. These dynamics functioned exactly in the same fashion
in the past, with eviction mechanisms targeting Jews first and foremost,
but other religious minorities as well. To borrow the rhetoric of Action
Française theorist Charles Maurras, this restrictive conception of identity
invokes the “real country,” the “real people” who have supposedly been
stripped of power, over and above the “legal country” represented by
parliamentary assemblies (Maurras 1925).
Another “alternative” conception, this one social in nature, clearly
points the finger at those who do not belong to the people: major
financiers and industrialists, and large capitalist business owners. Does
that mean that all other social groups belong to the people of workers
often exalted by a certain left that viewed them in virtually messianic
terms as history’s agent of collective redemption? It all depends on how
these working classes are defined. Those who only have their labor to
20 A. DIECKHOFF
sell, who own no land, real estate or capital, are undeniably part of them.
Manual workers and unlanded peasants make up this people as prole-
tariat. It is worth pointing out that if the Marxist intuition had proven
accurate, the simplification of class antagonisms should have led to an
irreducible division into two enemy camps, two diametrically opposed
classes, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Against a minority capitalist
elite, a proletariat would have thus risen up and expanded enormously,
having absorbed all other social groups (self-employed, shopkeepers, the
middle classes, etc.). This binary perspective did not materialize because
modern societies, far from having become simplified, have grown more
complex, leading to a profusion of socio-economic groups as well as
the development of the middle classes. Consequently, the question of
belonging to the “people” as a social group arose once again, in particular
for the left, eager to be in a position to mobilize as broadly as possible.
An inclusive approach led to aggregating manual workers together with
the large cohort of employees as well as intermediary professions (tech-
nicians, supervisory staff, administrative personal, etc.). Eventually, the
much touted “real people” end up including all those who possess little
property, the have-nots who sell their labor or have limited means of
production. This ultimately gives rise to a conception in which the
immense conglomerated mass that makes up “the people” stands against
a handful of “bigwigs” (Birnbaum 2010). This view of things, largely
championed by leftist populisms (but also certain right-wing populisms
combining the social and the national dimensions), also tends to extol
the “people in action,” those who come to the fore in labor struggles
(strikes, factory occupations, demonstrations, even riots) that supposedly
defend the general interest, whereas they are often led by active minorities
and are far from culling support from the majority of the population.2
Populism at its core is thus tangled up in a serious contradiction: it is
founded on the constant glorification of popular sovereignty while crit-
icizing the elites and invoking some sort of “people’s truth” said to be
either ethno-national or social. Just as authoritarianism emerges due to an
abuse of authority, there is populism when one uses and abuses the word
“people,” pronounced as if the referent were sacred. That is the mark of
2 See for example the booklet on popular intervention put out by La France Insoumise,
which considers struggles in ZAD [“zones to defend”] as “spontaneous popular interven-
tions” in the service of the general interest (https://avenirencommun.fr/livret-intervent
ion-populaire/).
its specific “political style” (Taguieff 2007, 31). But while populism may
be a type of rhetoric, it is also a political agenda, a particular mode of
mobilization and a set of practices put into action when it is in power.
Populists in Power
The noteworthy development in the past fifteen years is the shift from
mere populist movements to wholesale populist regimes. In some coun-
tries, populists performed a protest function, speaking from a soapbox.
Now they are, or have been, in power, but under highly different circum-
stances.3 Their participation in power partly flows from structural factors,
such as the type of regime and the voting system. If the regime type
is presidential, as in Russia and Turkey, it enables the president, being
elected by universal suffrage, to claim considerable legitimacy.4 As these
presidents are vested with considerable institutional powers, they have
a strong potential to hypertrophy the executive, whereas the role of
the legislative assembly, under the firm grip of the presidential party,
is reduced to virtually naught. The situation is ripe for establishing a
managed democracy, with increasingly pronounced autocratic dimen-
sions. If the regime is a parliamentary one, as is the case in most European
countries, the election system plays a significant role. Proportional repre-
sentation, whether applied across the board or combined with a plurality
vote, fosters a more faithful representation of the electorate, and thus
also of populist forces. The considerable impact of the “election system”
variable is undebatable. In June 2017, with 13% of the vote in the legisla-
tive elections, the Front National won 8 seats (out of 577), whereas the
Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), with 26% of the vote, garnered 51 seats
(or nearly one-third) in the National Council and thus was assured of a
prominent place in the government led by Christian-Democrat Sebastian
Kurz up until May 2019.
The ways in which power is exercised are also highly variable. In some
cases, populists hold the reins alone, as in Poland with the Law and Justice
3 The present analysis will focus on Europe and its outer confines.
4 Characterization of the Putin regime is open to debate. While some deem that it
indeed comes under populism, others believe that despite an occasionally populist tone, the
regime is more characterized by a neo-Soviet form of “statism,” established along vertical
lines of power. That being said, Putinism shares with populism an overt antipluralism and
indeed serves as a model for a number of national-populists in Europe.
22 A. DIECKHOFF
Party (PiS) or in Hungary with the Fidesz. In Italy, up until September

2019, there was an unusual configuration associating the right-wing
populist party Lega and the Five Star Movement, a rather undefinable
political grouping that is far more difficult to categorize but that has
leftist leanings to some degree (as shown by the institution of a basic
“citizen’s income”). However, in most cases, populists share their office
with others in a coalition. They may be the largest political force (Greece,
Slovakia, Czech Republic), or on virtually equal footing (Austria), in the
minority (Bulgaria, Norway, Switzerland) or supportive of the govern-
ment without being part of it, such as in Denmark where the Danish
People’s Party in the past twenty years has provided essential backing for
conservative and liberal groups. It should be noted that in two cases, a
left-wing “social-populism” was in power, in Slovakia with SMER and in
Greece with Syriza. Significantly, these two parties had forged a parlia-
mentary majority by joining forces with right-wing nationalist parties,
with which they share the same sovereignism, over and above genuine
ideological differences.
The type of policies they implement naturally depends on the sort of
power they exercise. When they hold it in a monopolistic fashion, they
encounter little difficulty in overtly challenging liberal democracy and the
separation of powers. Each time the same recipes are applied: a constitu-
tional revision to strengthen the executive, limitations set on the power of
the judiciary, restrictions on freedom of the press, control over universi-
ties, weakening of civil society (in particular, by obstructing NGO action),
etc. The potential for a political alternative becomes very complex in
practice. While populist regimes are not dictatorships, they restrict the
opposition’s room to maneuver using more or less legal means so as to
remain in power longer. This paves the way for evolutions toward forms
of more or less assertive autocracy.
When populist movements are in a situation of coalition, their latitude
for action is kept more in check, but it is far from non-existent. They can
for instance exact a price for their support of traditional right-wing parties,
forcing them to consider some of their demands. All throughout Europe,
political participation of national-populists has thus resulted in the tight-
ening of migration policies, with Muslims primarily in the crosshairs. The
“we” of national collective identity is always conceived in opposition to
“them,” meaning migrants and/or Muslims. Populists mobilize this divi-
sive representation in a reactive mode in countries with high immigrant
populations, as well as in a proactive mode in others with a marginal rate

of Muslim immigration (Poland, Hungary).
Hostility toward Islam is justified in the name of defending Euro-
pean identity. Populists are likely opposed to the “ever closer union
among the peoples of Europe” mentioned in the Lisbon Treaty that
came into effect in 2009. They firmly dispute the whole process that
led to greater European integration and a Union allegedly cut off from
its peoples and, conversely, want states to recover portions of national
sovereignty to form a Europe of nations based on a common civiliza-
tion. There is no general agreement, however, as to the content of such
civilization. In Eastern Europe, the Christian heritage of the Old Conti-
nent is openly invoked.5 The national profession of faith that serves
as a preamble to the Hungarian Constitution thus includes this state-
ment: “We acknowledge the role Christianity has played in preserving
our nation.” Similarly, in Poland, the party in power, PiS, has revived a
national-Catholic view of the nation, shared by the fundamentalist wing
of the Church. But beyond asserting the importance of Christianity for
their respective nations, Eastern populist leaders freely insist on the foun-
dational role of Christianity to define European identity. They criticize the
faintheartedness of the Treaty of the European Union, which makes only
a passing reference to “the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance
of Europe.” Conversely, they champion a militant view of Christianity
that ought to serve to regenerate European societies, which, under the
impetus of unbridled multiculturalism, have lost their bearings. They
believe this renaissance involves, inter alia, championing the traditional
(heterosexual) family, which Hungary even enshrined in its constitution.
It is not an exaggeration to say that some populist leaders readily see
themselves as the saviors of a Western Europe on the road to moral ruin.
In that part of the continent, precisely, where the secularization process
began earlier and has been deeper than in Poland, it is more problematic
to invoke a religious “Europeanness.” Western Europe thus departs from
the Eastern trend in two ways. First, the appeal to Europe’s Christian
foundations is more discreet and often boils down to vaguely mentioning
an attachment to Judeo-Christian roots. The inclusion of Judaism is
significant, however. While, historically, right-wing populism once had
5 Regarding the dialectics between religion and populism, see Marzouki, Nadia,
McDonnell, Duncan and Roy, Olivier (eds). 2016. Saving the People. How Populists Hijack
Religion. London: Hurst.
24 A. DIECKHOFF
strong anti-Semitic roots, today it seeks greater respectability, verging on

the philo-Semitic (and very pro-Israel). Geert Wilders, leader of the Party
for Freedom in the Netherlands, the second largest group in Parliament
(but not a member of the ruling majority), is a fairly typical representative
of this tendency. He moreover casts himself as champion of a Euro-
pean civilization based, rather than on “Christian roots,” on tolerance
for liberal values such as gender equality, gay marriage, and so on. It is
thus in the name of an emancipatory agenda that Wilders and others are
embarked on an unyielding crusade against Islam, seen as a backward
religion that is diametrically opposite to Europe’s modern values.
As a political phenomenon, there is every reason to believe that
populism is bound to last, for three main reasons. First, representative
democracy is ailing, accused by turns of producing political elites out of
touch with reality, of sustaining corruption and clientelism, and of lacking
legitimacy and effectiveness. This democratic malaise is easily to exploit by
populists, who boast of making more direct contact with the people and
implementing more effective policies as regards protection, redistribution,
immigration, and so on.
Second, the social gap is widening. Many studies show a strong corre-
lation in Europe between the populist vote, low education level and lower
socio-economic groups (manual workers, employees). The deepening of
social inequalities goes hand in hand with a territorial divide. Populist
movements are on the whole more present in rural areas and small towns
than in the large European metropolises, whether in the east or the west
of the Old Continent.
Last, there remains a question, too often unanswered by traditional
political parties, that fuels the populist logic. It pertains to collective iden-
tity: what holds us together to make a society? Right-wing populists claim
to answer by defending the idea of revitalizing national identity and rein-
stating assimilation policies. Such a program is no doubt inadequate, but
it is not enough merely to dismiss it. In its place there needs to be a
proposal for an inclusive society that does not shirk from the issue of
living together. Merely advocating some sort of cosmopolitanism will not
stem the tide of populism (Table 2.1).
Translated by Cynthia Schoch
Table 2.1 Populist parties in power in Europe (14 February 2021)
Countries Parties Electoral results (in the Election results Parliamentary support Government
last legislative elections: in at the last involvement
percentage and in seats)a presidential
(if applicable)
Bulgaria United Patriots (OP) 2017 2016 Coalition with Citizens 3/19 ministers
27/240 seats Krassimir for European (including two
2
9.3% Karakatchanov: Development of Deputy Prime

(alliance of several 14.97% (beaten in Bulgaria (GERB), Ministers)
nationalist and populist the 1st round) party of Prime
parties) Minister Boyko
Borissov
Spain Podemos 2019 – Coalition with the 2/25 ministers
26/350 seats Spanish Socialist (including Pablo
9.8% Workers’ Party (PSOE) Iglesias Turrión,
Unidas Podemos (alliance Second Deputy
with the United Left and Prime Minister)
Equo)
36/350 seats
12.8%
Hungary FIDESZ—Hungarian 2018 – Coalition with the Ruling party
Civic Alliance 117/199 seats Christian Democratic (9/16 ministers
49.3% (with the Christian People’s Party. including the
Democratic People’s Qualified two-thirds Prime Minister)
Party) majority—133/199
seats
(continued)
POPULISTS IN POWER: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
25
26
Table 2.1 (continued)
(if applicable)
Italy Five Star Mouvement 2018 – Grand coalition 4/23 ministers

A. DIECKHOFF
(M5S) 227/630 seats around Mario Draghi

33.3% with Lega, the
Democratic Party
(PD), Forza Italia,
Italia Viva and Free
and Equal (LeU)
-545/630 seats
Lega 2018 – Grand coalition 3/23 ministers
124/630 seats around Mario Draghi
17.4% with M5S, the
Democratic Party
(PD), Forza Italia,
Italia Viva and Free
and Equal (LeU)
-545/630 seats
Latvia KPV-LV (For a 2019 – Coalition with 5/14 ministers
Humane Latvia) + KPV-LV right-wing parties
National Alliance « All 16/100 seats Unity, New
for Latvia!» 14.3% + Conservative Party
National Alliance (JKP) and
13/100 seats Development/For!
11.1% (AP)—66/100 seats
(if applicable)
Montenegro For the Future of 2020 - Coalition with Peace is The leader of
Montenegro (ZBCG) 27/81 seats Our Nation (MNN) the movement,
32.55% and United Reform Zdravko
2
(alliance of several Action (URA)—41/81 Krivokapić, is

nationalist and populist sièges the Prime
parties) Minister of a
technocratic
government
Poland Law and Justice (PiS) 2019 2020 Absolute majority in Ruling party
235/460 seats Andrzej Duda: parliament (14/22 ministers
43.6% 51.03% including the
(elected in the 2nd Prime Minister)
round)
Czech Action of Dissatisfied 2017 2018 Coalition with the Minority
Republic Citizens (ANO) 78/200 seats Do not compete Czech Social government
29.6% Democratic (5/15 ministers
Party—93/200 seats including the
Chairman of the
Government),
supported by the
Communist
Party (KSCM)
(continued)
27
28
Table 2.1 (continued)
(if applicable)
Russia United Russia 2016 2018 Qualified two-thirds Ruling party

A. DIECKHOFF
343/450 seats Vladimir Poutine: majority—343/199 (13/23

48.4% by first past the 76.7% seats ministers)
post (203/225 seats) (elected in the 1st
54.2% by proportional round)
representation (140/225
seats)
Slovakia OLaNO (Ordinary 2020 – Coalition with 11/16 ministers
People and OLaNO Freedom and (including the
Independent 53/150 seats Solidarity (SaS) and Prime Minister
Personalities) + 35.3% + For the People and a Deputy
We Are Family (Sme Sme Rodina (ZL)—95/150 seats Prime Minister)
Rodina) 17/150 seats
11.3%
Slovenia SDS (Slovenian 2018 2017 Initially in the 8/18 ministers
Democratic Party) 25/90 seats Romana Tomc: opposition. Coalition (including Janez
24.9% 13.74% (beaten in with the Modern Janša, Prime
the 1st round) Center Party (SMC) Minister)
and New
Slovenia—Christian
Democrats (NSi) since
March 2020—(41/90
seats)
Switzerland Swiss People’s Party/ 2019 – – Federal Council:
Democratic Union of 53/200 seats 2/7 councilors
the Centre (UDC) 25.6%
(if applicable)
Turkey Justice and 2018 2018 People’s Alliance, Ruling party

Development Party 295/600 seats Recep Tayyip coalition with the (6/16 ministers,
(AKP) 42.6% Erdogan: 52.6% Nationalist Movement presidential
2
(elected in the 1st Party (MHP), absolute regime since

round) majority—344/600 07/10/18)
seats
a Lower House of Parliament in bicameral systems
Source Elaborated by the author
29
30 A. DIECKHOFF
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PART I
Populist Roads to Authoritarianism

Another random document with
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Phot.: E. Bieber, Berlin.
Generalfeldmarschall von der Goltz.
An jenem schmucklosen Grab, das die irdischen Überreste des
Feldmarschalls nur vorübergehend barg, hatte gleich nach dem
Siege von Kut-el-Amara eine um so eindrucksvollere Feier
stattgefunden, bei der Refik Bei, der Chef des Etappenwesens der 6.
Armee, die folgenden schönen Worte sprach:
„Ruhmreicher Märtyrer, großer Marschall! An dem Tag, da dein
sterblicher Teil in die osmanische Erde und dein unvergängliches
Andenken in die osmanischen Herzen gesenkt wurden, da sprach
mit vor Rührung zitternder Stimme dein Generalstabschef Oberst
Kiasim Bei, zu deinem Haupte stehend und dein hohes Bild vor
Augen, diese Worte: deine siegreiche Armee, die dort unten mit dem
Feinde kämpft, wird binnen kurzem Kut-el-Amara einnehmen und
den Lorbeerkranz des Siegs dir um die Stirn flechten. Ruhmreicher
Heerführer! Möge die glückliche Botschaft zu deinem Ohr dringen:
deine Armee hat den verheißenen Sieg erfochten, Kut-el-Amara
eingenommen und 5 Generale, 500 Offiziere und 13000 englische
Soldaten zu Gefangenen gemacht. Deine Armee hat das an Zahl
überlegene feindliche Heer gezwungen, vor ihren Bajonetten zu
fliehen. Das osmanische Heer, das du liebtest, wie dein eigenes
Leben, wird mit Hilfe des Allmächtigen den Feind aus ganz
Mesopotamien vertreiben. Unsterblicher Lehrmeister des
osmanischen Heeres! Wir geloben an deinem Grab, daß deine
Armee darnach streben wird, deine Seele mit neuen
Siegesbotschaften zu erfreuen. Ruhe sanft, geliebter großer
Heerführer!“
Als dann der Sarg jenseits des Bosporus angelangt und bei
Therapia beigesetzt war, wurde auch in Berlin eine Trauerfeier für
von der Goltz veranstaltet. Sie fand am 18. Juni 1916 in einem der
großen Säle des Reichstagsgebäudes statt. Der Saal war mit
Flaggen und Palmen geschmückt. Hinter dem Rednerpult standen
Büsten des Kaisers, des alten Moltke und des Toten selbst. Mehrere
Redner ergriffen das Wort, alles Zivilisten. Als der letzte geendet
hatte, erhob sich — ganz unprogrammäßig — Generaloberst
Hellmuth von Moltke — schritt zum Rednerpult und widmete seinem
alten Kameraden folgende tiefempfundenen Abschiedsworte:
„Hochverehrte Anwesende! Das Bild des Mannes, zu dessen
Gedächtnisfeier wir uns hier versammelt haben, ist in einer so
ausführlichen, glänzenden und wahrheitsgetreuen Weise geschildert
worden, daß Sie es von mir nicht als Vermessenheit ansehen wollen,
wenn ich Sie bitte, mir zu einem ganz kurzen Worte ein geneigtes
Ohr zu schenken. Es sind zwei Gründe, die mich dazu bewegen, zu
Ihnen zu sprechen: erstens meine langjährigen persönlichen,
kameradschaftlichen, ich darf wohl sagen, freundschaftlichen
Beziehungen, die mich mit dem Verstorbenen verbunden haben, und
zweitens die Empfindung, daß an dem Grabe eines Soldaten auch
aus soldatischem Munde ein Wort für ihn erklingen muß; denn
Soldat war er doch in erster Linie. Ich war ein junger Offizier, wie ich
von der Kriegsakademie zum Generalstab kommandiert wurde und
mit dem damaligen Major von der Goltz in Beziehungen trat. Er hatte
die reichen Erfahrungen, die er im Verlauf des Feldzugs 1870/71 bei
der Armee des Prinzen Friedrich Karl gesammelt hatte, bereits
schriftstellerisch verwertet zum Segen der Armee, und wir sahen
schon mit einer gewissen scheuen Ehrfurcht zu ihm auf. Diese
Ehrfurcht wich aber bald einer aufrichtigen Verehrung und
Hingebung. Wie rasch lernten wir den Mann kennen, der uns nicht
als Vorgesetzter, sondern als Kamerad entgegentrat, in dem
Bestreben: wir alle wollen dasselbe, wir alle wollen arbeiten für die
Armee und für unser Land. Ich glaube, wenn auf irgend jemand der
lateinische Spruch: ‚Homo sum, nihil humani mihi alienum esse puto‘
zutrifft, so war es der Verstorbene. Seine hervorragenden
menschlichen Eigenschaften, seine Herzensgüte, gewannen ihm die
Herzen aller, die mit ihm in Berührung traten. Diese
kameradschaftlichen Empfindungen sind allen denjenigen geblieben,
die das Glück gehabt haben, mit ihm in persönliche Beziehungen zu
treten. Bei mir haben sie angedauert bis an sein Ende, und sie sind
ausgeklungen in einem Briefwechsel, der erst kurze Zeit vor dem
Tode des Feldmarschalls seinen Abschluß gefunden hat. Meine
hochverehrten Herrschaften, ich darf das nicht wiederholen, was hier
gesagt worden ist. Sie wissen ja den Lebensgang des Verstorbenen,
Sie wissen, daß er als junger Offizier bereits nach der Türkei ging,
daß er dort zwölf Jahre lang dem Sultan gedient hat, und daß er
damals den Grundstein gelegt hat zu den freundschaftlichen
Beziehungen, die heute das Osmanische Reich und das Deutsche
Reich in gemeinsamen Kriegsunternehmungen vereinigt. Sie wissen,
daß er, von dort zurückgekehrt, die Geschäfte als Generalinspekteur
der Pioniere übernahm, und alle diejenigen, die damals mit ihm
gearbeitet haben, bewahren ihm noch heute ein Andenken, denn
auch diese ihm fremde Materie wußte er nach kurzer Zeit
entsprechend zu beherrschen. Dann kam seine schönste Zeit, als er
von Sr. Majestät zum Kommandierenden General des 1.
Armeekorps berufen wurde. Wie freute sich sein Herz, da war er in
seinem Element, unermüdlich im Zusammenleben mit der Truppe,
die höchsten Anforderungen an sich selbst stellend. Keine Mühen
scheuend, lebte er mit seinen Soldaten zusammen, als Vater,
Freund und Kamerad. Er mußte dann die Stellung eines
Generalinspekteurs übernehmen, die ihm die Truppen in die Ferne
rückte, und erst nach Eröffnung des jetzigen Feldzugs, als ihm das
Generalgouvernement von Belgien übertragen wurde, trat er wieder
in aktive Tätigkeit. Ich habe damals Gelegenheit gehabt, des öfteren
mit ihm zusammenzutreffen. Wenn ich nach Brüssel kam —
während der Belagerung von Antwerpen — man traf ihn selten zu
Hause; stets hieß es: ‚Der Feldmarschall ist draußen an der Front.‘
Es hielt ihn nicht an dem Schreibtisch, er mußte hinaus, und
diejenigen, die mit ihm waren, erzählten, mit welch unbeschreiblicher
Tapferkeit und Todesverachtung er mitten im Gefecht stand in den
Reihen seiner Soldaten, als wenn er sich auf dem Exerzierplatze
befände, und wenn er abends zurückkam, besprach er die
Ereignisse des Tags, wie man ein Manöver bespricht, mit
vollständiger Ruhe und Objektivität, und mancher von denen, die mit
ihm im Schützengraben waren, kehrte nicht mehr zurück; der
Feldmarschall selbst ward auch verwundet. Aber wenn er auch mit
unermüdlicher Treue und Aufopferung durch seinen scharfen
Verstand es wohl verstanden hat, die zerrütteten Teile des
okkupierten Landes zunächst wieder in geordnete Verhältnisse zu
bringen, so war doch sein Herz nicht bei der Sache, er war Soldat,
und ich glaube, er ist nicht ungern von seinem schwierigen und
undankbaren Posten zurückgetreten, als er dann auf Wunsch des
Sultans von dort als oberstes Bindeglied zwischen der osmanischen
und deutschen Armee nach der Türkei berufen wurde. Er erlebte den
gewaltigen Kampf unserer Bundesgenossen auf Gallipoli, er sah die
Früchte seiner jahrelangen Tätigkeit greifbar vor sich, und dann kam
der Augenblick, da er selbst das Kommando übernehmen mußte
und hinauszog nach Bagdad, um den Kampf gegen die Engländer
aufzunehmen. Als er in Bagdad eintraf, fand er die Engländer in
starker Stellung bei Kut-el-Amara. Seine Aufgabe war, sie
zurückzuschlagen. Mit wie schwierigen Verhältnissen, mit welch
schlechten Zufahrtstraßen, mit einer wie großen Entfernung mußte
er rechnen, bis überhaupt Verstärkungen herangeführt werden
konnten. Meine verehrten Herrschaften, es wiederholt sich in der
Geschichte öfters, daß Heldentum und Tragik nebeneinander
stehen. So war es auch hier. So, wie es Moses einstmals zwar
vergönnt war, einen Blick in das Gelobte Land zu tun, nicht aber es
zu betreten, so war es auch dem Generalfeldmarschall nicht
vergönnt, den letzten Kampf seiner Armee zu erleben, aber sein
scharfer Blick hat wohl den Ausblick in das Gelobte Land getan,
denn sicher hat er den Sieg von Kut-el-Amara vorausgesehen.“
„Meine verehrten Herrschaften, ich habe dem Bild des
Feldmarschalls nur noch eine persönliche Note hinzufügen können.
Ich habe es getan, weil ich glaube, daß ich in diesem Falle wohl im
Namen der Armee und namens des Generalstabs sprechen darf,
dem wir beide lange Jahre angehört haben. Ich will nicht sprechen
von dem tiefen Schmerz, der auch mich ergriffen hat, als die Kunde
von dem tragischen Ende des Feldmarschalls eintraf, und ich
möchte nicht, daß dieser Tag vorübergeht, ohne daß wir an diesem
Tag ein Lorbeerblatt auf die Bahre gelegt haben.“
Als Moltke geendet, stieg er vom Rednerpult herab, drückte der
Freifrau von der Goltz die Hand und kehrte auf seinen Platz neben
Generaloberst von Kluck zurück. Da reckte er sich plötzlich, führte
die Hand zum Herzen, sank zusammen und war binnen wenigen
Minuten eine Leiche. Die Tragik, in der ihm noch soeben das
Schicksal seines Freundes von der Goltz erschienen war, daß er wie
Moses das Gelobte Land — den Sieg — nur aus der Ferne schauen
durfte, hatte ihn selbst getroffen.
Und diese traurig-wunderbare Fügung war nicht die einzige bei
diesem erschütternden Vorfall. Sobald die Erkrankung des
Feldmarschalls in Berlin bekannt geworden, hatte man zwei
Schwestern zu seiner Pflege nach Bagdad geschickt. In
Konstantinopel erreichte sie die Nachricht von seinem Tode, darauf
kehrten sie zurück. Beide waren bei der Trauerfeier in Berlin
zugegen, als Moltke jene letzte Rede hielt, und erwiesen nun i h m
den letzten Liebesdienst, der seinem Freunde versagt geblieben
war. Und ich selbst — war ich nicht der Bote eines Toten an einen
Toten geworden? Moltkes Brief, den er mir zum Geleit auf diese
meine Reise mitgegeben hatte, fand seinen Empfänger im Grabe;
aber es sollte mir auch nicht mehr vergönnt sein, ihn der Hand
seines Absenders zurückzustellen. Bei meiner Rückkehr nach Berlin
blieb mir die traurige Pflicht, ihn der Witwe des von mir so
hochverehrten Mannes zu übergeben.
Merkwürdig war auch, daß Gräfin Moltke mir bereits im Februar
1916 anvertraut hatte, sie fürchte, daß ihr Mann noch vor Ende des
Weltkriegs heimgehen werde. In einem Traumgesicht hatte sie ihn
bereits auf der Bahre liegen sehen, von Palmen und Kandelabern
umgeben in demselben Zimmer, wo der Sarg des Feldmarschalls
Moltke vor fünfundzwanzig Jahren gestanden hatte. Sie war daher
auf das Schlimmste vorbereitet, als sie in den Saal des
Reichstagsgebäudes zur Leiche ihres Gatten geführt wurde, und
ertrug ihren Schmerz mit bewundernswerter Fassung.
Phot.: August Scherl.
Generaloberst Hellmuth von Moltke.
Tags darauf stand denn auch der mächtige, schwere Eichensarg
mit den großen silbernen Handgriffen dort, wo der Feldmarschall
aufgebahrt worden war. Sechs hohe Kandelaber, jeder mit sechzehn
Lichten, brannten in einem Wald von Palmen. Thorwaldsens
Christus streckte segnend seine Hände über das Haupt des
entschlummerten Kriegers, und dem Toten gegenüber stand eine
Büste des Oheims. Offiziere trugen den Sarg hinaus nach dem
Invalidenfriedhof.
Hellmuth von Moltke war einer der tüchtigsten und edelsten
Männer des jungen Deutschlands und einer der vornehmsten
Charaktere, die ich kennen gelernt habe. In seiner Nähe verspürte
man die Macht und zugleich die große Bescheidenheit der
überlegenen Persönlichkeit. Er war einer der wärmsten Patrioten
Deutschlands, was viel besagen will in einer Zeit, in der das ganze
Volk alles für das Vaterland opfert. Dabei war er ein frommer Christ
und starb wohlvorbereitet in dem Augenblick, als er den Kranz auf
das Grab des Kameraden niederlegte.
Seine hervorragendsten Eigenschaften waren unerschütterliche
Ruhe und ein Ernst, der auch nicht einem flüchtigen Scherz Raum
gab. Er war niemals heftig, und harte Worte hörte man von ihm nie.
Tadel und Herabsetzung Abwesender waren ihm fremd. Jeder liebte
und bewunderte ihn, und wer Gelegenheit gehabt hat, viele Stäbe an
den verschiedenen Frontstellen zu besuchen, der weiß, daß über
Moltke in der Armee nur ein Urteil herrschte. Er war wortkarg wie
sein Onkel, aber was er sagte, war klar und tief, und mit wenigen
Sätzen wußte er Fragen zu beantworten, die andern lange zu
schaffen machten. Als ihn im zweiten Kriegsjahr ein amerikanischer
Zeitungsmann über die Stimmung Deutschlands gegen Amerika
aushorchen wollte, antwortete er kurz und bestimmt: „Wir sind in der
Lage eines Mannes, den drei Straßenräuber überfielen. Er verteidigt
sich tapfer und schlägt einem nach dem andern die Waffen aus der
Hand. Hinter den dreien aber steht ein vierter, der ihnen immer
wieder neue Waffen in die Hände drückt. Dieser Vierte ist Amerika,
das den Kampf von Jahr zu Jahr verlängert.“
Mit Recht wurden an Moltkes Bahre folgende Worte gesprochen:
„So hat er sein Werk als einer der intimsten Mitarbeiter an der Seite
seines geliebten kaiserlichen Herrn geleistet. Seine Lebenstat war,
das deutsche Heer auf den gewaltigsten und größten Krieg, den die
Geschichte kennt, vorzubereiten, und wir können an Generaloberst
von Moltke nicht denken, ohne uns des 4. Augusts 1914 zu erinnern,
des Tags, da er, ein Lächeln auf den Lippen, sagen konnte, nicht
eine einzige Frage sei an den Großen Generalstab
zurückgekommen. Die unerhörte Maschinerie arbeitete mit
unerschütterlicher Ordnung.
„So lenkte er das deutsche Schwert. So bereitete er den
Aufmarsch der deutschen Armeen und den herrlichen Siegeszug
vor, und daher denken wir bei seinem Namen an die wundervollen,
überwältigenden, unvergeßlichen Tage, als in dieser schwersten Zeit
der Mut, die Siegesgewißheit und das Vertrauen des ganzen
deutschen Volkes so herrlich erstarkten. Ja, für dieses Volk arbeitete
er, und diese Tage krönten sein stilles, geduldiges Arbeiten. Für
dieses Ziel dachte und strebte er. Dazu lenkte und erzog er uns, und
die deutschen Feldherrn, Generale und Offiziere, die an seiner Seite
arbeiteten, denken mit tiefster Dankbarkeit an das Große und
Herrliche, was Moltke für sie gewesen ist.“
Selten oder nie sind wärmere und edlere Worte aufrichtiger
Trauer einer Feder entflossen als die, welche der Kaiser an die
Gräfin nach dem Tode ihres Gemahls richtete. So spricht nur der, der
weiß, daß er einen Freund verloren hat, auf dessen Treue er zu
jeder Stunde felsenfest bauen konnte. Ich zweifle nicht, daß die
Zukunft Moltke in die erste Reihe der germanischen Gestalten des
Weltkriegs stellen wird.
In seiner Denkrede auf von der Goltz erinnerte Moltke an den
Mut des Feldmarschalls und seine Todesverachtung, von der auch
ich in meinem Buche „Ein Volk in Waffen“ bewundernd gesprochen
habe. Als ich damals von der Goltz mein Buch sandte, antwortete er
mir am 11. Juni 1915 aus Konstantinopel:
„Ihre Bemerkung, die mich betrifft, hat mich tief gerührt und in der
Tat den geheimen Wunsch getroffen, den ich im Herzen trug. Wer
der Vollendung seines 72. Lebensjahres nahesteht, wie ich, und eine
52jährige aktive Dienstzeit, die sich jetzt noch um ein Jahr
verlängert, sowie drei große Kriege hinter sich hat, kann sich, wie
Sie mit Recht bemerken, kaum einen schöneren Abschluß denken
als den Sie erwähnen, aber das Schicksal hat ihn mir bisher
verweigert; ich konnte es nur bis zu einem leichten Streifschuß unter
dem linken Auge bringen. Das Geschoß, ganz in der Nähe aus
einem englischen Schützengraben abgefeuert, als ich übers Feld in
den unsrigen gehen wollte, meinte es ehrlich, es hatte aber den
Fehler, einen Zoll zu weit nach rechts zu fliegen, worüber ich ihm
eigentlich böse bin.
„Nun hat es aber doch wohl so kommen sollen, und Allah, mein
alter Beschützer, verfolgte noch einen Zweck dabei. Er wollte mir die
Gelegenheit geben, mich an der Wiedererhebung der Türkei, an der
ich in früherer Zeit 13 Jahre lang emsig mitgearbeitet habe, zu
erfreuen. Was die türkischen Truppen heute leisten, ist zugleich die
beste Antwort auf die häßlichen Angriffe gegen meine Person, die in
ganz ungerechtfertigter Weise nach dem unglücklichen Balkankriege
in bezug auf meine ältere hiesige Tätigkeit gegen mich und meine
Kameraden gerichtet wurden. Die Unterlegenheit in jenem Krieg
erklärt sich durch ganz besondere Umstände, der tüchtige Kern
aber, der im türkischen Volke steckt, kann sich heute, wo es von
einer energischen und wohlgesinnten Regierung geleitet wird, kräftig
entwickeln und gute Früchte tragen, die in den Kämpfen an den
Dardanellen sich gezeigt und die Welt, aber nicht die alten Freunde
des Landes überrascht haben. — — — Am endlichen Siege unserer
guten Sache zweifeln wir alle nicht; wir könnten immer noch ein paar
Feinde mehr vertragen. Ich beispielsweise erwarte solche zurzeit
leider vergeblich mit meiner Armee an der stark bewehrten Küste
des Schwarzen Meeres ....“
Anfang April 1916 war von der Goltz auf einem der Tigrisdampfer
nach Bagdad zurückgekehrt. Derselbe Dampfer brachte auch kranke
Soldaten flußaufwärts, darunter viele, die an Flecktyphus
darniederlagen; die unterwegs starben, wurden den trüben Wellen
des Tigris übergeben. Die Kranken lagen auf Deck, und der
Feldmarschall ging während der Fahrt von einem zum andern, an
alle aufmunternde Worte richtend. Es wimmelte von Ungeziefer, aber
er achtete nicht der Gefahr, der er sich aussetzte. Und diesmal kam
er in ihr um; auch er erlag der mörderischen Krankheit und starb in
wenigen Tagen.
Seinen Wunsch, den echten Soldatentod zu sterben, hat ihm das
neidische Schicksal nicht erfüllt.
Phot.: Schölvinck.
Englische Gefangene.
Dreizehntes Kapitel.
Kut-el-Amara.
W ie ich schon erwähnte, hatte ich in meiner Jugend einmal Kut-

el-Amara besucht, das damals noch eine junge Stadt, aber ein
wichtiger Handelsplatz für die arabischen Wollhändler der
Umgegend war. Seither ist es bedeutend gewachsen, und heute hat
es obendrein einen historischen Namen: es bezeichnet einen der
schönsten Siege der Türken und eine der größten Niederlagen der
Engländer während des Weltkrieges.
Gleich zu Kriegsbeginn hatten die Engländer Basra besetzt. Der
Wali von Bagdad, Dschavid Pascha, hatte nur zusammengeraffte
Araber zur Verfügung, mit denen nichts auszurichten war. Ein
tapferer Offizier in Bagdad, Ali Askari Bei, gab jedoch die Hoffnung
auf Wiedereroberung der Stadt nicht auf. Die Kriegsleitung in
Konstantinopel versprach, ihm reguläre Truppen zur Unterstützung
zu schicken; aber er antwortete, er könne sich ohne sie behelfen.
Tatsächlich gelang es ihm, mehrere Araberstämme aufzubieten und
die „Muschtehids“, die hohe Priesterschaft von Kerbela, für sein
Unternehmen zu gewinnen.
Mit einem bunt zusammengewürfelten Heer von wie es hieß
20000 Mann, so gut wie ohne Artillerie, zog er gegen Basra. Einige
junge Deutsche nahmen an diesem abenteuerlichen Zuge teil, die
Herren Lührs, Schadow und Müller; der zuletzt genannte führte
Material mit sich, um im Schatt-el-Arab Minen zu legen. Auch ein
Österreicher namens Back war dabei.
Als Ali Askari Bei mit seinen Scharen das Dorf Schaïbe bei Basra
erreicht hatte, wurde er von den Engländern angegriffen und völlig
geschlagen, außerdem noch im Rücken von einigen Araberstämmen
überfallen, deren Mut wuchs, als sie sahen, daß es den Türken
schlecht ging. Der tapfere, aber etwas unvorsichtige Befehlshaber
wurde verwundet und in einen Wagen geschafft und beging
Selbstmord. Der Rückzug seiner Truppen vollzog sich in weniger
guter Ordnung, als der Xenophons; sie wurden zersprengt, und nur
ein Teil erreichte Amara.
Der Deutschen und ihres österreichischen Kameraden warteten
auf der Flucht traurige Schicksale. Auf ihrer Wanderung
tigrisaufwärts fielen sie feindlichen Arabern in die Hände und wurden
bis auf die Haut ausgeplündert. Dann gelang es ihnen, sich bis zu
Fasil Pascha durchzuschlagen, der sie vom Tode rettete und mit
allem Nötigen versah, und endlich erreichten sie Bagdad, wo ich
später zwei dieser unverwüstlichen Männer traf.
Petros Ibn Chamis, 16jähr. Chaldäer aus
Sannat.
Auf ihrem Rückzug versuchten die türkischen Scharen
vergebens, sich in Amara und Kut-el-Amara zu halten. Sie mußten
sich bis nach Sulman Pak zurückziehen, das auf dem linken
Tigrisufer in der Nähe von Ktesiphon, gerade gegenüber den Ruinen
von Seleucia, liegt. Die Engländer rückten nach und kamen im
Sommer 1915 bis Sulman Pak; hier entschlossen sie sich jedoch,
sich gegenüber den Türken einzugraben. Diese hatten mittlerweile
Verstärkungen erhalten; Halil Pascha war von Aserbeidschan an der
kaukasischen Front her mit einer Division zu ihnen gestoßen. Mitte
November griff der neue Befehlshaber Nureddin Bei die englischen
Stellungen an. Anfangs hatte er auch Erfolg; der Widerstand war
aber doch zu stark, und er dachte schon daran, die Offensive
aufzugeben, als Halil durch einen kräftigen Flankenangriff von
Norden her die Lage rettete. Die Engländer räumten ihre Gräben
und zogen sich in neue, stark geschützte Stellungen bei Kut-el-
Amara zurück. Nureddin Bei folgte und griff von neuem an, wurde
aber mit großen Verlusten zurückgeschlagen.
Da kam Feldmarschall von der Goltz, der zum Chef der 6. Armee
ernannt war, in Bagdad an und fuhr ohne Aufenthalt nach Kut-el-
Amara weiter. Er sah sogleich, daß eine Fortsetzung der Angriffe
zwecklos war, weil die Türken nicht genügend Artillerie besaßen. So
begann auch hier der Stellungskrieg.
Inzwischen erhielten auch die Engländer Verstärkungen. Eine
neue Armee marschierte zum Entsatz nach Kut-el-Amara
tigrisaufwärts. Hier war jetzt Halil Pascha Oberbefehlshaber, da man
Nureddin Bei wegen eines Dienstversehens zurückgerufen hatte. Ein
Teil der Truppen Halils ging den Engländern entgegen, und beim
Wadi Kelal kam es Anfang Januar 1916 zum Kampf. Der Ausgang
veranlaßte den Feldmarschall zum Rückzug in die Stellung bei
Fellahije, die sich im Norden auf ein Sumpfgebiet stützte.
Verschiedene Angriffe der Engländer gegen sie scheiterten an der
gut geleiteten Verteidigung.
Mitte Februar machte der Feind deshalb einen Versuch, auf dem
rechten Tigrisufer vorwärtszukommen. Eine neue türkische Division,
die jedoch drei Bataillone an die persische Front hatte abgeben
müssen, wurde nun über den Tigris geschafft, um in einer Stellung
bei Simsir die Engländer aufzuhalten. Diese griffen vom 8. bis 11.
März zweimal an, und die Lage der Türken wäre mehr als kritisch
geworden, hätte nicht Halil rechtzeitig die Gefahr bemerkt und alle
verfügbaren Truppen nachgeschickt. Eine Division, gegen 4000
Mann, wurde in einer einzigen Nacht auf Fähren und Booten über
den Tigris gesetzt. Die Deutschen rühmten dieses Unternehmen als
besonders gut ausgeführt. Die Schnelligkeit, mit der Halil seine
überraschenden Bewegungen ausführte, brach die Angriffskraft der
Engländer und zwang sie, ihren Vormarsch auf dem rechten
Flußufer ganz aufzugeben.
Ein Belem mit zwei französischen Schwestern.
Im April unternahmen nun die englischen Truppen unaufhörliche

Angriffe auf die Stellung bei Fellahije. Lange ohne Erfolg, und ihre
Verluste waren groß. Schließlich aber räumten die Türken ihre
vordere Stellung, die von der auf beiden Flußufern aufgestellten
englischen Artillerie flankiert wurde. Die Engländer bemerkten die
Bewegung erst einen Tag später und verschwendeten noch 20000
Geschosse auf die leeren Schützengräben. Dann aber gingen sie
zum Sturm über und drangen bis zur hinteren Linie vor, die von der
Goltz inzwischen hatte anlegen lassen. Hier wurden sie mit
mörderischem Feuer empfangen, und nach großen Verlusten gaben
sie auch diesen Vormarsch auf. Der britische Befehlshaber hätte
ganz leicht seine Absicht erreichen können, wenn er, statt immer an
der Front anzugreifen, am Kanal Schatt-el-Hai entlang, durch den
der Tigris einen Teil seines Wassers an den Euphrat abgibt,
vorgerückt wäre und die Fellahijestellung umfaßt hätte. Nach Ansicht
der Verteidiger beging die englische Armeeleitung unbegreifliche
Mißgriffe. Schon damals hätte sie durch einen kühnen Handstreich
Bagdad nehmen können. In der Nacht vom 21. zum 22. November
hatten die englischen Truppen obendrein den Dijala überschritten,
und ihre Vorposten waren nur 12 Kilometer von der Stadt der Kalifen
entfernt, die Nureddin Bei mit einer Handvoll Leute besetzt hielt.
Mehrere Tage standen die feindlichen Heere einander gegenüber.
Die Ausfälle der Besatzung wurden zurückgeschlagen, und die
Engländer rückten schon bedrohlich vor. Da warf sich Halil im
rechten Augenblick auf sie und schlug sie aufs Haupt. So wurde die
Stadt für diesmal gerettet.
Drei vornehme Priester auf dem Kai des englischen Konsulats.
Bagdads Bürger befanden sich in den entscheidenden Tagen in
größter Aufregung; jeden Augenblick konnten ja feindliche Truppen
einrücken. Die Europäer hatten ihre Wertsachen eingepackt, und
Wagen standen bereit, sie nach Aleppo zu schaffen. Mit Halils
Erscheinen war die Gefahr gebannt, man atmete wieder auf und
blieb.
Bald darauf, Anfang Dezember, wurde General Townshend mit
ungefähr anderthalb englischen Divisionen in Kut-el-Amara
eingeschlossen. Das lähmte auch die übrigen Unternehmungen der
Engländer auf den Kriegsschauplätzen. Verstärkungen wurden
tropfenweise zu Entsatzversuchen eingesetzt, die von den Türken
sämtlich blutig abgewiesen wurden. Schließlich, am 29. April 1916,
mußte Townshend die Waffen strecken. Dabei fielen außer dem
Oberbefehlshaber 5 Generale, gegen 500 Regiments- und
Kompagnieoffiziere, sowie 13200 Unteroffiziere und Mannschaften,
darunter 4500 Engländer, in die Hände der Türken.
Townshend durfte seinen Säbel behalten und wurde sofort nach
Bagdad geschafft, wo man ihn, wie alle übrigen Offiziere, mit der
größten Achtung und Gastfreundschaft behandelte. Von den
englischen Offizieren waren drei vor dem Krieg bedeutende
Kaufleute in Bagdad gewesen. Bei Kriegsausbruch hatte man sie als
Gefangene nach Aleppo gebracht; ihr Ehrenwort, an
Feindseligkeiten gegen die Türkei nicht teilzunehmen, verschaffte
ihnen aber die Erlaubnis zur Heimreise. Nun waren sie zum
zweitenmal gefangen, und man hielt sie von den übrigen getrennt.
Es hieß, wenn sie vor ein Kriegsgericht gestellt würden, sei ihr
Schicksal besiegelt.
Am Abend des 7. Mais gaben die in Bagdad sich aufhaltenden
deutschen Offiziere im Garten des deutschen Konsulats Halil
Pascha und etwa zwanzig türkischen Offizieren ein Fest zu Ehren
des Sieges von Kut-el-Amara. In den Gängen brannten Fackeln und
Pechpfannen und unter den Palmen zahllose bunte Laternen.
Herzog Adolf Friedrich feierte in packender Rede den Sultan und
Halil Pascha und gedachte dabei auch des toten Feldmarschalls und
seiner hohen Verdienste. In seiner weichen schönen Muttersprache
dankte Halil mit kernigen Worten.
Halil Pascha, der nach von der Goltz’ Tode und in seinem Geiste
die Operationen gegen Kut-el-Amara leitete und jetzt der Nachfolger
des Feldmarschalls als Chef der 6. Armee war, wohnte an der
vornehmsten Straße Bagdads in einem einfachen Ziegelhaus, das
ein kleiner Hof umgab. Im jugendlichen Alter von dreiunddreißig
Jahren hatte er diese hohe Würde errungen und einen Ruhm, der
seinen Namen in der ganzen Welt bekannt gemacht hat. Halil
Pascha ist ein großer, schlanker Mann von ebenmäßigem
Körperbau, schönen, sympathischen Gesichtszügen und hellem,
offenem Blick. Er trägt sich äußerst einfach, die ihn trefflich
kleidende türkische Offiziersmütze aus Lammfell mit stolzer
Siegesgewißheit keck zurückgeschoben; kein Abzeichen verrät
seinen hohen Rang; auf der Straße konnte man ihn für einen
gewöhnlichen Leutnant halten.
Alter christlicher Araber in Bagdad.
Als ich ihn zum Fall von Kut-el-Amara beglückwünschte, machte
er nicht viel Wesens von dem Erfolg, den er und seine Truppen
erstritten hatten. Von dem britischen Befehlshaber General
Townshend sprach er mit bescheidener Zurückhaltung, wunderte
sich aber immer wieder über die Kapitulation, da die Engländer
ungefähr fünfmal so stark gewesen waren, wie die Türken.
Gerade als mir Halil Pascha in vortrefflichem Französisch von
den letzten Tagen der Festung erzählte, wurde unsere Unterhaltung
durch die hohe Priesterschaft Bagdads unterbrochen, die in vollem
Ornat dem Feldherrn ihre Aufwartung machte und um die Erlaubnis
bat, die neugebaute Hauptstraße nach ihm zu benennen. Sie läuft
parallel mit dem Ufer des Stroms und erleichtert die Verbindung
zwischen dem oberen und unteren Teile der Stadt. Zahlreiche am
Wege stehende Häuser wurden rücksichtslos niedergerissen, und
man hatte es damit so eilig, daß ihren Besitzern oft nur wenige Tage
Frist blieb, ein neues Unterkommen zu suchen. Denn diese Straße
hatte zugleich auch eine symbolische Bedeutung: sie ging quer
durch das Grundstück des englischen Konsulats, das vor dem
Kriege niemand hätte antasten dürfen; jetzt waren keine Engländer
mehr da, die Einspruch hätten erheben können.
Zwei Tage nach dem vorhin erwähnten Siegesfest stand ich mit
dem Herzog und Schölvinck aus der hochgewölbten, kühlen
Veranda des englischen Konsulats und erwartete die Ankunft des
ersten Trupps englischer Gefangenen. Ein französischer Arzt und
mehrere französische Dominikanerschwestern waren ebenfalls
zugegen; auch sie waren Gefangene der Türken, hatten aber in
Bagdad bleiben dürfen unter der Bedingung, daß sie in den mehr als
dreißig Krankenhäusern, die alle überfüllt waren, Dienst taten. Es
hieß, 6 bis 7000 Plätze seien belegt, meist mit Typhus und Ruhr.
Während wir uns mit den französischen Schwestern und dem
Arzt unterhielten, kam der Raddampfer „Hamidije“ mit zwei Booten,
die zu beiden Seiten an ihm festgemacht waren, langsam und
majestätisch den Strom herauf. Aus dem oberen Deck des
„Hamidije“ saßen englische Offiziere in Korbstühlen und auf Bänken,
und in den beiden Booten weiße und farbige Unteroffiziere.

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Contemporary Populists in Power 1st

Edition Alain Dieckhoff (Editor)

Edited by Alain Dieckhoff · Christophe Jaffrelot ·

More information about this series at

The Sciences Po Series in International Relations and Political Economy

Cover illustration: MirageC/Getty Images

1 Introduction: Populists in Power, a Global Perspective 1

Part I Populist Roads to Authoritarianism

7 Mahinda Rajapaksa: From Populism

Part II Consolidating Power

Part III The Limits of Populism in Office

16 “The System Is Strong”: American Democratic

Jean-Louis Briquet is a Political Scientist and CNRS Research Director

Dr. Frédéric Louault is Professor of political science at the Univer-

Dr. Jacques Rupnik is Emeritus Research Professor at CERI Sciences

Table 2.1 Populist parties in power in Europe (14 February 2021) 25

Introduction: Populists in Power, a Global

Alain Dieckhoff, Christophe Jaffrelot, and Élise Massicard

Populism is on the rise, and so are academic studies on populism.

A. Dieckhoff (B) · C. Jaffrelot · É. Massicard

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

the threefold classification based on three sets of approaches: ideolog-

1 Nadia Urbinati introduces a fruitful distinction between minimalist and maximalist

Main Argument of the Book

someone of a superior essence—superhuman in some cases—, this edited

Populist leaders are often Janus-like figures, policy-wise. On the

The first one opens with a theoretical contribution by Christophe

signs of de-democratization by the end of Chavez’s reign). The trajectory

that populist consolidation in power is certainly linked to the weak-

In India, Modi, like his counterparts, has restricted checks and

leading to authoritarianism, well documented throughout this book, the

Mudde, Cas. 2017. “Populism: An Ideational Approach.” In The Oxford Hand-

Populists in Power: A Comparative

In the plethora of books and articles written on populism, virtually all

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 15

Returning to the last French presidential election in April–May 2017

a certain following in America, even if they never managed to get a candi-

What “People” Do Populists Defend?

elected officials. The suggestion made by Jean-Luc Mélenchon, leader

Party (PiS) or in Hungary with the Fidesz. In Italy, up until September

populations, as well as in a proactive mode in others with a marginal rate

strong anti-Semitic roots, today it seeks greater respectability, verging on

9.3% Karakatchanov: Development of Deputy Prime

Table 2.1 (continued)

Italy Five Star Mouvement 2018 – Grand coalition 4/23 ministers

(M5S) 227/630 seats around Mario Draghi

(alliance of several Action (URA)—41/81 Krivokapić, is

Table 2.1 (continued)

Russia United Russia 2016 2018 Qualified two-thirds Ruling party

343/450 seats Vladimir Poutine: majority—343/199 (13/23

Turkey Justice and 2018 2018 People’s Alliance, Ruling party

(elected in the 1st Party (MHP), absolute regime since

Populist Roads to Authoritarianism

W ie ich schon erwähnte, hatte ich in meiner Jugend einmal Kut-

Ein Belem mit zwei französischen Schwestern.

Im April unternahmen nun die englischen Truppen unaufhörliche

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