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A Dynamic Theory of Populism in Power
A Dynamic Theory
of Populism in Power
The Andes in Comparative Perspective
J U L IO F. C A R R IÓ N
University of Delaware
1
3
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ISBN 978–0–19–757229–0
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197572290.001.0001
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Printed by Integrated Books International, United States of America
To the memory of Julio Cotler, teacher, mentor, colleague, and friend. To
his legendary year-long course Teoría Social del Estado, at the Universidad
Nacional Mayor de San Marcos, where I learned about liberal democracy
for the first time. To the years we worked together at the Instituto de Estudios
Peruanos, where I learned the value of asking big, important questions.
“Once you try it, Sancho,” the duke warned him, “you will be
eating your hands off after it, so sweet a thing is to give orders and
be obeyed. You may be sure that when your master gets to be an
emperor—as he undoubtedly will, the way things are going for him
now—no one will be able to take that office away from him without
a struggle, and he will be sick at heart over all the time he lost in not
being one.”
—Don Quixote, Part Two, Chapter XLII (1605)
I put for a generall inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and

restlesse desire of Power after power, that ceaseth onely in Death.
And the cause of this, is not always that a man hopes for a more in-
tensive delight, than he has already attained to; or that he cannot be
content with a moderate power: but because he cannot assure the
power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the
acquisition of more.
—Leviathan, Part I, Chapter 11 (1651)
Contents
List of Figures ix
Preface xi
Acknowledgments xv
List of Acronyms xix
1. Introduction: Democracy and Populism 1

2. A Dynamic Theory of Populism in Power 25
3. The Critical Antecedents of Populism: Mass Political
Discontent and Elite Disarray 53
4. The Tsunami Moment: Coming to Power 75
5. The Hobbesian Moment: Confronting the Opposition 103
6. The Populist Moment: Securing and Expanding Power 149
7. Reproducing Populism: Tilting the Electoral Playing Field 179
8. Conclusion: Populism and Regime Change 207
Bibliography 227
Index 257
List of Figures
1.1. The Trajectory of Unconstrained Populism in Power 20

2.1. The Dynamics of Populism in Power 29
2.2. Vote Intention for Victorious Populist Candidates in the Andes, 1990–2006 33
2.3. Varieties of Populism in Power 48
4.1. Peru 1988–1990: Vote Intention for President 76
4.2. Venezuela 1997–1998: Vote Intention for President 81
4.3. Colombia 2001–2002: Vote Intention for President 87
4.4. Bolivia 2004–2005: Vote Intention for President 91
4.5. Ecuador 2006: Vote Intention for President 96
6.1. Judicial Constraints on the Executive under
Populism in the Andes, V-Dem Data 165
6.2. Legislative Constraints on the Executive under
Populism in the Andes, Polity5 Data 167
6.3. Legislative Constraints on the Executive under Populism in the Andes,
V-Dem Data 168
6.4. Freedom of the Press Scores under Populist Presidents in the Andes 169
6.5. Freedom of Association Thick Index under Populist Presidents in the Andes 176
7.1. Clean Elections Index under Populism in the Andes, V-Dem Data 184
7.2. Peru: Electoral Playing Field Indicators under Populism 189
7.3. Venezuela: Electoral Playing Field Indicators under Populism 194
7.4. Bolivia: Electoral Playing Field Indicators under Populism 200
7.5. Ecuador: Electoral Playing Field Indicators under Populism 205
8.1. Electoral Democracy Index under Populism in the Andes, V-Dem Data 212
8.2. Polity2 Scores under Populism in the Andes 214
Preface
Latin American publics have long been first inspired and later disappointed
by populist leaders. Then populism suddenly became a global concern with
the unexpected rise of Donald Trump and his even more surprising victory
of November 2016 causing worldwide commotion. Could Trump subvert US
institutions and undermine its political pluralism and liberal foundations?
While his defeat by Joe Biden may assuage this concern, Trump eroded im-
portant norms. His open disregard for the norms of democracy was fully
exposed by his systematic refusal to accept electoral defeat and unprece-
dented effort to nullify popular will by resorting to support from friendly
governors, Republican representatives, and, astonishingly, insurrectionary
mobs. Luckily for democracy, the worst fears about the impact of his pres-
idency on the nature of the US political system have not come to pass. And
yet, the critical juncture created by his election reveals how strong the auto-
cratic impulses of populism are, and how they test the resilience of democra-
cies, even those as strong as the United States’.
A Dynamic Theory of Populism in Power studies five cases of populism in
the Latin American context, where that critical juncture played out in dif-
ferent ways. In four cases, the election of populist outsiders led to the demise
of democratic institutions; in only one case did democracy survive. This book
offers a theory to explain this divergent outcome. When a chief executive is
bent on using the state’s repressive apparatus to subvert democracy, enjoys
significant public support, and also has the strong allegiance of elected repre-
sentatives, then it requires an extraordinary effort by both the opposition and
the judiciary to avert the threat to democracy. A populist chief executive’s
popularity matters enormously, but only to the extent that it undermines the
political actors and judges who are in charge of defending the institutions of
democracy. However, the election of a populist leader does not necessarily
lead to the end of democracy. This happens only if a populist chief executive
succeeds in overcoming societal and institutional resistance.
In their highly acclaimed book, Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt (2018,
5) argue that “[d]‌emocratic backsliding today begins at the ballot box.”
Indeed, there is a recognizable pattern in the process going from the election
xii Preface
of a populist leader to the demise of a democracy. Since the erosion of de-

mocracy under populism is not a sudden event, but rather a gradual process,
its explanation requires a dynamic theory: one that explains the changes in
power symmetry (I borrow this term from Corrales 2018). This book offers
such a theory. In contexts where political elites are in disarray and mass pub-
lics reject their traditional political choices, the dynamic process that leads to
the erosion of democracy contains three identifiable moments.
There is an initial moment when the excitement created by a populist
candidate, who promises radical institutional change, leads to the election
of such a leader: a tsunami moment. This opens a “critical juncture,” a mo-
ment whose outcome generates path-dependent trajectories. A second mo-
ment then follows, when some societal and political actors decide to put up
a fight against the chief executive’s monopolistic intentions. This moment,
the Hobbesian moment, is an inflection point that determines the outcome
of the country’s political evolution. Triumphant populist leaders are now
unconstrained, gain power asymmetry, and therefore are in a position to
change the democratic nature of the political regime. Once this asymmetry
is achieved, the populist leader continues to accumulate power for, in the
words of Thomas Hobbes, “he cannot assure the power . . . which he hath pre-
sent, without the acquisition of more.” The country thus transitions to a third
moment, the populist moment. An unconstrained executive office emerges,
and with it the rapid erosion of democracy. If, on the contrary, the populist
chief executive is contained by societal and/or institutional actors, then pol-
itics re-equilibrates and, for a time at least, democracy survives. A return to
“politics as usual” may ensue. Or, perhaps another populist leader is elected.
At any rate, the immediate threat is averted.
For several years now, some theorists of populism, especially those who
study it in the industrialized world, have wondered if populism is a remedy
to worn-out democracies. These theorists exalt its redemptive potential in
democracies heavily burdened by traditions of bargaining and accommoda-
tion. But the recent ascension of populist leaders in several European coun-
tries shows that in some cases, such as Hungary, populism in power severely
undermines liberal democracy. In other cases, the worst consequences of
populist rule are contained. In Latin America, assessments of populism in
power are generally less charitable because, more often than not, populism
in this region has undermined democracy rather than enhanced it. However,
many saw in left-wing populists, such as Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and Evo
Morales in Bolivia, the potential of a democratic refoundation. The eventual
Preface xiii
trajectory of these two cases showed that populism in power where there are
weak institutions is a real threat to democracy. In some instances, the worst
inclinations of Latin American populist leaders were effectively constrained,
such as in Colombia under Álvaro Uribe and Argentina under Carlos
Menem. Still, why is it that in some cases the ascension of populism to power
leads to the end of electoral democracy whereas in others it does not? That is
the main question this book answers.
Jorge Luis Borges, in his short story A Theologian in Death, tells about the
predicament of a theologian who would write pages during the day only to
find them erased the next. This was because—Borges informs us—they were
written without conviction. The following analysis of Latin American popu-
lism is written with a strong conviction: to prevent the worst consequences of
populism in power in countries where its tradition is not long, one needs to
learn from countries with a long populist history. Populism in power poses
a dangerous threat to liberal democracy. By understanding the dynamics
that may lead to the demise of democracy under populism, I hope we will be
better equipped to thwart its autocratic impulses.
Acknowledgments
A work of this scope cannot be carried out without the support and encour-
agement of many people and institutions. The collegiality and generosity
of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the
University of Delaware made this book possible. When I started my research
on populism, Gretchen Bauer was the departmental chair. As the project
comes now to its conclusion, Dave Redlawsk chairs my department. Their
encouragement and commitment to providing research funds to faculty
enabled me to travel to Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Spain at key moments
in the research process. I deeply thank them both. I also want to acknowl-
edge the Center for Global and Area Studies for its generous support. The
University of Delaware has been my academic home for over two decades,
and I have nothing but gratitude for this great institution.
My visits to the Instituto de Iberoamérica of the Universidad de
Salamanca, Spain, the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, Peru, the Universidad
Javeriana, Colombia, and the Universidad Mayor, Chile, allowed me to ac-
cess to their libraries and provided a forum to develop my ideas. I thank
Flavia Freidenberg, Patricia Zárate, Ricardo Cuenca, Pedro Valenzuela, and
Sergio Peña for their generosity as hosts. During my stay at Salamanca, I had
the fortune to meet Simón Pachano, professor of FLACSO-Ecuador, the in-
stitution where I started my academic career. Simón gave me invaluable in-
sights into the Correa administration. I would also like to thank Freedom
House, and particularly Sarah Repucci, Amy Slipowitz, Arch Puddington,
and Tyler Roylance, for giving me the opportunity to keep abreast of devel-
opments in the Andean countries. When I was invited, in 2014, to be one of
the Academic Advisers for the Americas, I never imagined how rewarding
and eye-opening it would be. The annual meetings of country specialists,
Freedom House staff, and academic advisers, are both stimulating and infor-
mative. I know that my work is better as a result of these interactions.
Earlier drafts of various chapters were presented at meetings of the
International Studies Association, the Latin American Studies Association,
the Midwest Political Science Association, and the American Political
Science Association. I benefited immensely from the conversations I had with
xvi Acknowledgments
my fellow panelists and discussants: Felipe Albuquerque, Cynthia Arnson,

the late Ana Bejarano, Catherine Conaghan, Javier Corrales, Carlos de la
Torre, Erica Frantz, Kirk Hawkins, Anna Lüehrmann, Cynthia McClintock,
Robert Nyenhuis, Jennifer McCoy, the late David Scott Palmer, Ken Roberts,
Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, and Kurt Weyland, among others.
Two conferences were crucial in shaping my thinking as I was finalizing
the manuscript. The first was “Democracy in Decline? The Challenge of
Global Populism,” sponsored by the Department of Political Science and
International Relations at the University of Delaware. I thank the generous
funding provided by its chair, Dave Redlawsk, and the College of Arts and
Sciences. During two days in early May of 2018, renowned scholars and grad-
uate students from Delaware and other institutions, met to discuss populism
from different academic perspectives. I want to thank Bart Bonikowski for his
insightful comments to the theory underlying this book. My UD colleagues,
Daniel Green, Claire Rasmussen, Kyong-Min Son, and Daniel Kinderman,
provided great encouragement. I benefited from the talks offered by Bart
Bonikowski, William Galston, Federico Finchelstein, Noam Gidron, Thomas
Ambrosio, Kurt Weyland, Thea Riofrancos, and Ryan Carlin. I also thank the
UD graduate students who helped with the logistics of this event, in partic-
ular Kelsey Obringer, Luisa Torres, Angela Bohórquez, Christopher Tharp,
and Kathrin Reed.
The second conference was “Political Institutions and Challenges to
Democracy: America in Comparative Perspective,” co-sponsored by the
Anxieties of Democracy Project at the Social Science Research Council and
the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University.
The conference, held January 31–February 1, 2019, at Columbia University,
gave me the opportunity to present my theory in front of a knowledgeable
audience of Comparativists and Americanists. I am particularly grateful to
Kris-Stella Trump, who chaired my panel, and to Didi Kuo, who offered in-
credibly useful comments and suggestions for the theory chapter. This con-
ference gave Comparativists an opportunity to discuss the Trump presidency
using our areas of expertise as a backdrop. The result was highly illuminating
exchanges over the resilience and fragility of institutions in the face of popu-
lism. The opportunity to apply my theory to the case of Donald Trump in the
United States is reflected in the book’s concluding chapter.
As the book was taking final shape, I had the fortune to receive careful
feedback from Lauren Balasco, Javier Corrales, and Kurt Weyland. They
all went above and beyond the call of duty to read a large number of pages
Acknowledgments xvii
and offer thoughtful criticisms and suggestions. Their feedback was inval-
uable. I hope I didn’t disappoint them. I want to thank Lauren in particular
for being a constant advocate and believer of this project. Her enthusiasm
was a motivating force. Fahmida Zaman, a graduate student in my program,
helped with the bibliography. I am also very grateful to Andrew Stein for his
friendship, knowledge, and our regular academic exchanges. Finally, I want
to acknowledge Angela Chnapko, my editor at Oxford University Press, for
believing that something new could be said about populism. Two anonymous
reviewers made important suggestions for improvements, and the book is
much better as a result. Doris Hunter-Carrión, my oldest daughter, helped
enormously with her copyediting abilities. Doris, Alicia, and Antonio, you
know how grateful I am for all you give me.
List of Acronyms
Bolivia
ADN Nationalist Democratic Action

CC Civic Community
CN National Convergence
CNE National Electoral Court
COB Bolivian Workers’ Confederation
CONALCAM National Coordination for Change
CONALDE National Democratic Council
CSUTCB Unified Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia
MAS Movement toward Socialism
MIR Movement of the Revolutionary Left
MNR Revolutionary Nationalist Movement
MSM Movement without Fear
NFR New Republican Force
PODEMOS Social Democratic Power
PPB Plan Progress for Bolivia
TC Constitutional Tribunal
TCP Plurinational Constitutional Tribunal
UCS Solidarity Civic Unity
UN National Unity Front
Ecuador
CC Constitutional Court
CJ Council of the Judicature
CNE National Electoral Court
CNJ National Court of Justice
CONAIE Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador
CPCCS Council for Civil Participation and Social Accountability
CREO Creating Opportunities Movement
CUT Workers Unitary Confederation
DP Popular Democracy
ID Democratic Left
MPD Democratic Popular Movement
xx List of Acronyms
PAIS Alliance Proud and Sovereign Homeland Alliance

PRE Ecuadorian Roldosista Party
PRIAN Institutional Renewal Party of National Action
PSC Social Christian Party
PSP Patriotic Society Party
RED Ethics and Democracy Network
SUMA Society United for More Action
TCE Contentious Electoral Tribunal
TSE Supreme Electoral Tribunal
UNE Educators’ National Union
Colombia
AUC United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia

CC Constitutional Court
CNE National Electoral Council
CONVIVIR Special Vigilance and Private Security Services
FARC Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
GCD Grand Democratic Coalition for Active Abstention
PC Conservative Party
PL Liberal Party
Peru
AP Popular Action
APEMITE Peru’s Association of Small Industrial Entrepreneurs
APRA American Popular Revolutionary Alliance
C-90 Change 90
CCD Democratic Constituent Congress
CNM National Council of the Magistrature
CONEP National Evangelical Council of Peru
CONFIEP National Confederation of Private Business Institutions
FOCEP Worker Peasant Student and Popular Front
FREDEMO Democratic Front
IS Socialist Left
IU United Left
JNE National Jury of Elections
ML Freedom Movement
MRTA Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement
ONPE National Office of Electoral Processes
List of Acronyms xxi
PCP-Shining Path Communist Party of Peru-Shining Path

PPC Popular Christian Party
UDP Popular Democratic Unity
UNIR Revolutionary Left Union
Venezuela
AD Democratic Action
ANC Constituent National Assembly
CBs Bolivarian Circles
CNE National Electoral Council
CONATEL National Commission of Telecommunications
CONFAGAN National Confederation of Farmers and Stockbreeders
COPEI Social Christian Party
CSJ Supreme Court of Justice
CTUs Committees of Urban Land
CTV Venezuelan Workers’ Confederation
EMPREVEN Entrepreneurs for Venezuela
FEDEAGRO National Confederation of Agricultural Producers
FEDECAMERAS Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Production of
Venezuela
FEDENAGA National Federation of Cattle Ranchers of Venezuela
LCR Revolutionary Communist League
MAS Movement toward Socialism
MVR Fifth Republic Movement
PDVSA Petroleum of Venezuela SA
PODEMOS For Social Democracy
PP Popular Pole
PPT Homeland for All
PSUV United Socialist Party of Venezuela
TSJ Supreme Tribunal of Justice
UNT Workers’ National Union
URD Democratic Republican Union
1
Introduction
Democracy and Populism
Latin Americans, especially those residing in the Andean region, have long
encountered populism as an ingrained political reality (Conniff 2012; de
la Torre and Arnson 2013; Carrión 2015). In the past thirty years, all five
Andean countries walked away from traditional parties and elected popu-
list presidents. Except for Colombia, these populist presidents changed the
nature of their political systems, undermined democratic governance, and
ultimately created political regimes that preserve the forms of democracy but
hollow out its content. The demise of electoral democracy following the elec-
tion of a populist chief executive, I should emphasize, is not a foregone con-
clusion. There is an inflexion point—the key moment in the critical juncture
opened by the rise of populism to power—when chief executives’ efforts to
impose their supremacy can be prevented, or at least reduced. When that is
the case, competitive democracy survives, and unconstrained populist rule is
averted. This was the case in Colombia. In the four other Andean countries,
however, democracy was extinguished by populist presidents who emerged
unconstrained from this crucial moment of political confrontation.
From Democratization to De-Democratization
Many are concerned about what the rise of populism means for the prospects
of democratic rule. This growing preoccupation marks a momentous change
in contemporary politics as well as comparative politics scholarship. The fall
of Portugal’s Marcello Alves Caetano, in 1974, and the death of Francisco
Franco in Spain, in 1975, opened an historic era of democratic expansion that
is now drawing to a close. The subsequent democratization of Latin America,
South Korea, many African countries, and others, was soon followed by the
collapse of communism and the breakdown of the seemingly formidable
Soviet empire. In response to these events, comparative politics scholars
A Dynamic Theory of Populism in Power. Julio F. Carrión, Oxford University Press. © Oxford University Press 2022.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197572290.003.0001
2 A Dynamic Theory of Populism in Power
engaged in a vibrant debate about the dynamics and causes of democrati-

zation. The old debates about the dynamics of democratic breakdown (Linz
1978) were replaced by a lively discussion about the factors affecting democ-
ratization, as non-democracies were transitioning to democracies.
The pioneering studies of democratization that centered on the identifi-
cation of the prerequisites for democracy (Lipset 1959), the class coalitions
that set some countries on the path to democracy (Moore 1966), or the stages
that lead to democracy (Rostow 1960; Rustow 1970), were soon replaced by
new approaches. In the 1980s, the literature looked at the capabilities, ac-
tions, and strategies of political actors (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986).
Soon, contrasting views on the origins of democracy were offered, ranging
from cultural change triggered by economic modernization (Inglehart 1997;
Inglehart and Welzel 2005) to redistributive disputes (Boix 2003; Acemoglu
and Robinson 2005) to demands for political power by economically pow-
erful but politically disenfranchised groups (Ansell and Samuels 2014). More
recent work has called attention to the ways in which countries transition
to democracy, combining institutional and political factors (Haggard and
Kaufman 2016) or arguing that our theories need to distinguish between
elite-led and popular democracy (Albertus and Menaldo 2018). Despite their
different theoretical constructs and methodological approaches, the research
question in these works remains: how and why do countries transition from
non-democracy to democracy?
The democratization literature was criticized for its unexamined assump-
tion that, once the transition to democracy was completed, one could only
expect a process of consolidation, even if uneven. Guillermo O’Donnell’s
(1994, 56) notion of delegative democracy questions this assumption by
pointing out that some new democracies are not on the path to become rep-
resentative democracies. Political events in the last two decades confirm his
early skepticism. The new millennium brings further proof that democrati-
zation is evolving in unexpected ways. The concept of “hybrid regimes” was
coined to describe political regimes1 that combine democratic features with
authoritarian practices (Levitsky and Way 2002; Schedler 2006). Initial work
on these regimes recognized that they could emerge as the result of the decay
of either existing democratic regimes or full-scale authoritarian regimes
(Levitsky and Way 2002). Later work looks at their possible trajectories
1 I define “regime” as the rules and practices, formal and informal, that determine the selection and
replacement of chief executives and other political offices.

Introduction: Democracy and Populism 3
(Levitsky and Way 2010), the mechanics of their functioning (Schedler

2006), or the factors that either sustain or subvert them (Schedler 2013). The
global rise of populism and the clear trend toward the erosion of democracy
have reignited interest in the processes that can lead some democracies to re-
ject pluralism (Müller 2016; Galston 2018; Norris and Inglehart 2019) and to
explore how populism can trigger processes that lead to the rise of competi-
tive forms of authoritarianism (Levitsky and Loxton 2013; Cameron 2018).
Today, scholarly interest is increasingly on the drivers of de-democratization.
Populism and Competitive Authoritarianism
Indeed, the realization that we are in the midst of a global recession of democ-
racy and that populism is the “principal agent of democracy decay in our time”
(Diamond 2020, 37) has led to a conceptual shift in our preoccupations. We are
now seeking to detail the processes that lead democracies to transition into non-
democracies (Diamond 2015; Freedom House 2019). Before we continue with
this discussion, it is important to provide analytic clarity in the use of terms.
I embrace in this book the “minimalist” definition of democracy advo-
cated by Morlino (2012, 51), i.e., democracy is a political regime that has
all of these characteristics: universal suffrage, “free, competitive, recur-
rent, and fair elections,” more than one party, and guarantees a free press.
Authoritarianism, by contrast, is a political regime which, in its most ac-
cepted definition, is characterized by having limited and not responsible plu-
ralism, no elaborate ideologies—but a distinctive mentality—no intensive or
extensive societal mobilization, and a leader or small group of leaders who
“exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predict-
able ones” (Linz 1964, 255). Juan Linz (2000, 161; emphasis in the original)
stresses that the demarcation between democratic and authoritarian regimes
lies in the “almost unlimited pluralism” of the former and the “limited plu-
ralism” of the latter. This distinction is crucial, for authoritarian regimes, un-
like democratic ones, “ultimately define which groups they will allow to exist
and under what conditions.”
Competitive authoritarianism is a type of hybrid regime2 where elections
are relatively competitive but not fair. The use of “authoritarian” in the label is
meant to avoid the “democratizing bias” implied in describing these regimes
2 Hybrid regimes can be defined as those which are not full-scale authoritarian but fail to meet the
minimalist definition of democracy.

as diminished forms of democracy (Levitsky and Way 2010, 3–4). According

to Levitsky and Way (2010, 7), a competitive authoritarian regime manipu-
lates state institutions to such extent that it “seriously limits political compe-
tition” by violating “at least one of three defining attributes of democracy: (1)
free elections, (2) broad protection of civil liberties, and (3) a reasonably level
playing field.” These regimes cannot be considered cases of full-scale author-
itarianism because they do not determine, formally or informally, which
political parties are allowed to run for office. Neither are they democracies,
because they alter the electoral playing field in such a significant way that fair
competition is not possible, thus violating Morlino’s minimalist definition of
democracy.
Populism, however we choose to define it, does not signify a type of po-
litical regime because it does not provide for a set of rules on how political
leaders are selected and replaced. In the definition I embrace (see section
on defining populism later in this chapter), populism is primarily a polit-
ical strategy for seeking and exercising political power. If contained, it can
operate under the confines of democratic regimes. If not, it can serve as a
vehicle to regime change, turning electoral democracies into hybrid regimes
(competitive authoritarianism) or even eventually leading to full-scale au-
thoritarianism. In other definitions, populism is defined as a discourse that
sees the political world in particular ways (i.e., the virtuous people versus
the corrupt elite). This view does not consider populism a political regime
either. As I argue later in this chapter, the anti-pluralistic and confrontational
traits associated with populism explain populist leaders’ need to aggran-
dize their power and undermine checks and balances, which can lead to the
end of democracy. Nevertheless, populism should not be equated with non-
democracy, because it is a political strategy, not a political regime.
The main argument of this book is that populism in power, if uncon-
strained, can lead to the erosion of democracy by birthing competitive au-
thoritarian regimes. I offer a full dynamic theory to explain the factors that
enable populism to be unconstrained. I certainly am not the first to note
that populism can trigger regime change. Steven Levitsky and James Loxton
(2013, 108) argue that populism is a “primary catalyst” behind competitive
authoritarianism in Latin America for three primary reasons: first, pop-
ulist leaders tend to be outsiders with little experience with representative
democracy; second, their antiestablishment appeals grant them an elec-
toral mandate to enact political change; and, third, they usually undermine
institutions of horizontal accountability because they are controlled by
established parties. Similarly, Haggard and Kaufman (2016, 232) speak of

“populist reversions” and describe them as “a distinct causal route to author-
itarian rule,” generated by redistributive demands that existing democratic
regimes cannot address. Takis Pappas (2019, 210) argues that, once in power,
populists’ goal “is to retain it by democratic means but without necessarily
observing the institutions of liberal democracy.” He identifies a “template”
that populist leaders follow, which includes the colonization of the state with
loyalists, the reinforcement of executive capacity, the assault on liberal dem-
ocratic institutions, and the use of state patronage to benefit supporters.
What Levitsky and Loxton, Haggard and Kaufman, and Pappas do not ex-
plain is the dynamics that may lead populist governments to descend into
competitive authoritarianism. Nor do they examine the mechanisms that
enable elected populist leaders to overcome societal opposition and create
power asymmetry. Nor do they account for the reasons why some populist
governments do not end in extinguishing competitive democracy. The dy-
namic theory of populism in power advanced in this book allows us to dis-
tinguish the critical antecedents that explain the rise of populism from the
mechanisms that explain a populist leader’s success in enacting radical insti-
tutional change and their ultimate reproduction in power. This theory also
explains why some populist chief executives are constrained in their efforts
to undermine democratic governance. The existing literature on populism
stresses the degree of popular support for these leaders but it tends to ignore
how they use the repressive apparatus of the state and control of the judiciary
to pursue their goals of political supremacy. Also, while populist leaders do
exhibit personalistic attributes and try to build direct, unmediated links with
voters, some populist leaders do rely on societal organization and mobiliza-
tion to an extent that has not been properly acknowledged in the literature.
Contributions to the Literature
The study of populism in Latin America has a long tradition, and most of the
literature has focused on the reasons why populism is so attractive to mass
publics (Seligson 2007; Hawkins 2010; Carrión 2015; Rovira Kaltwasser
2015) and how it represents specific forms of political leadership in the region
(Weyland 2001; Roberts 2007). Nobody will dispute that populist leaders at-
tract voters because they tap resentments or discontent that existing democ-
racies have been unable to address. But let us not forget that populist leaders
came to power precisely because democracies, despite their flaws, were fairly
and effectively executing their most fundamental duty—that of translating
freely formed voting preferences into elected office.
Only recently have efforts been made to study populism in power (Rovira
Kaltwasser and Taggart 2016) and how it impacts on the foundations of dem-
ocratic rule (Levitsky and Loxton 2013; Carrión 2015; Barr 2017; Cameron
2018; Pappas 2019; Weyland 2020). The irony is that populist leaders tend to
undermine this most basic function of democracy by tilting the playing field
in their favor and thus reducing the opposition’s chances to compete under
fair conditions. The threat that populism poses to democracy today requires
careful empirical analysis, which means above all examining populism in
power: how populist chief executives operate, what varieties of populism in
power exist, and how populist leaders are able to undermine democratic rule
in some instances but not in others. Rather than focus on the study of pop-
ulist leaders’ discursive strategies or avowed ideologies, whether of the Left
or the Right, we obtain greater analytical leverage by examining the mechan-
isms they use to cement and expand their power. Their anti-elitist discourse
masks their real purpose, which is to rule unencumbered. To put it bluntly,
populist chief executives do not seek to redistribute wealth but rather polit-
ical power, and they want more of it.
While I do explain the critical antecedents that allow populist leaders to
come to power, using the case of the Andes as a backdrop, my main theo-
retical interest is twofold. First, to explain why populist chief executives are
able to change the rules of the political game to unfairly extend their terms in
office, leading to the end of competitive democracy. Second, to identify the
different permissive and productive conditions (power capabilities) that give
rise to different varieties of populism. To the extent that populism is a sig-
nificant driver of the process of global “democratic backsliding” (Diamond
2020), its study and that of de-democratization are intertwined. Accordingly,
this book is as much about the study of populism as it is an analysis of the
processes of democratic erosion in our time. Scholars of comparative pol-
itics are finally paying more attention to what Bermeo (2016, 5; emphasis
in the original) demanded a few years ago, namely “systematic and explic-
itly comparative work on precisely how [democracies] break down.” She goes
on to argue that the end of democracies today comes primarily through the
gradual aggrandizement of executive power and the degradation of elections
that “denotes a range of actions aimed at tilting the electoral playing field in
favor of incumbents” (13).
Since the publication of Bermeo’s influential article, additional work has

shown the range of strategies and methods that would-be autocrats pursue to
undermine the democracies that elected them (Dresden and Howard 2016;
Bogaards 2018; Corrales 2018; Tsai 2019; Diamond 2020). They are all im-
portant contributions but largely fail to address the question of how some
populist leaders succeed in undermining democracy while others are con-
tained in their efforts. For instance, Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018, 78) write that
“to consolidate power, would-be authoritarians must capture the referees,
sideline at least some of the other side’s star players, and rewrite the rules of
the game to lock in their advantage, in effect tilting the playing field against
their opponents.” They keenly identify what would-be autocrats need to do
but they do not tell us how they do it. To be fair, their book does not attempt
to develop a full-fledged theory, and they do offer some important clues.
They mention, for instance, bribery and blackmail and, when that fails, out-
right harassment and intimidation. Perhaps the most significant criticism
that one can make to their contribution is that they do not explain why some
aspiring autocrats are contained. This is a gap that I address in this book, by
explaining how the election of a populist leader does not inexorably lead to
the demise of democracy.
Kurt Weyland’s (2020) recent work on the relationship between populism
and democracy has the merit of acknowledging that populism erodes de-
mocracy only when two “permissive” causes are present simultaneously. The
first condition is institutional weakness, operationalized as high instability
and the ease of enacting para-legal and constitutional change (392–395). The
second cause is the availability of exogenous opportunities that give the pop-
ulist leaders a boost in popularity. These opportunities are “a huge resource
windfall or clear success in overcoming acute, severe crises” (390). Weyland
is absolutely correct in pointing out the importance of institutional weak-
nesses and public support in populist leaders’ ability to end democracy. What
he does not offer, because his model focuses on conditions and not processes,
is a discussion of how populist chief executives leverage both institutional
fragilities and popularity to assert power asymmetry and, in the process, de-
feat societal opposition and tilt the electoral playing field in their advantage.
In addition, Weyland pays little attention to the role that the state’s repressive
apparatus and societal organization can play in the efforts of populist leaders
to subvert democracy. My theory of varieties of populism in power relies
heavily on the combination of these two variables that buttress populist chief
executives during their moments of acute confrontation with the opposition

and other institutional actors.
Another important empirical analysis of the relationship between popu-
lism in power and the survivability of democracy comes from the work of
Pappas (2019). He too calls our attention to the conditions that enable pop-
ulist rule to end democracy, in this case a weak tradition of, or a recently
delegitimized, liberal democracy and a feeble party system (135). Unlike
Weyland, however, Pappas does not explicitly acknowledge that there are
cases when populism fails to erode democracy. In his analysis, “populist
rulers undertake an almost complete seizure of state power,” without con-
sidering that such “seizure” is the outcome of a political process that requires
unfolding in time and that there are cases where this “seizure” does not ma-
terialize. Pappas’s analysis of populist rule is also static and does not artic-
ulate a theory of how the power asymmetry that some populist leaders are
able to achieve increases over time, whereas in some other cases, such power
aggrandizement is contained. As noted, Pappas identifies a “blueprint” that
populist chief executives follow: colonization of the state, strengthening of
executive capacity, assault of democratic institutions, and the use of state pa-
tronage (210). As useful as this template is, it is not meant to be thought of a
dynamic process with identifiable sequences. I offer such a dynamic theory
in this book.
A Dynamic Theory of Populism in Power contributes to the literature of
populism in power in two main ways. First, it proposes an explanation for
how populist chief executives come to secure power asymmetry over the
opposition. I develop a dynamic model that identifies not only moments in
the process from the election of the populist leader to the end of electoral
democracy but also the causes that drive these moments. Second, my dy-
namic model explains why electoral democracy is severely eroded under
populist rule in some cases but not in others. The book’s larger theme is de-
democratization. Most analyses of Latin American populism focus on the re-
lationship between the populist leader and the masses (Roberts 1995; Knight
1998; Weyland 2001; Freidenberg 2008; de la Torre 2010; Hawkins 2010). The
analytical framework presented here shifts this focus somewhat by looking
at, in addition to the leader-follower relationship, how populist leaders uti-
lize the state apparatus—and its repressive arm—to prevail over political op-
ponents. In securing political control, populist leaders are also enabled by
the timidity of the judiciary to check the behavior of overpowering chief
executives. Elite disarray and mass discontent with existing political insti-
tutions are important factors that account for the rise of populism. They do
not fully explain, however, how populist leaders secure political supremacy
and how they are able to win subsequent elections. The explanation I offer
points to the use of the repressive apparatus of the state, the organization and
mobilization of civil society, and the transfer of political resource stocks to—
and the alteration of resource flows in favor of—the populist chief executive
(Pierson 2015). While populist leaders rely on the power of the state to subju-
gate the opposition, significant differences can be identified in terms of their
ability to organize and mobilize low-income voters and whether this mobi-
lization is fostered “from above,” or emerges “from below.” These differences
explain their contrasting varieties in power.
The theory advanced here focuses on domestic political dynamics and actors’
behaviors. This does not mean that I deny the impact that structural variables
or international conditions may have on the outcome of interest. I must, how-
ever, abstract from the broad set of factors those that I believe are central to the
argument I want to make. My analytical interest is in the actions triggered by
power-seeking presidents and the ability of the opposition and courts to con-
front them.
Many of the mechanisms and tactics that allow populist leaders to under-
mine democracy, which I identify in this book, should not be understood as
being the exclusive domain of populist chief executives. The toolbox of political
maneuvers to aggrandize power does not carry the label “for populists only.”
For instance, history has seen frequent use of direct democracy mechanisms to
sanction constitutional changes that give greater powers to the executive, and
both populist and non-populist leaders employ them. Similarly, the selective
use of the repressive forces of the state (police and/or army) for political pur-
poses is not an exclusive populist tactic.
Defining Populism
At its most basic level, the debate about populism is ontological in nature.
What is populism? A set of economic policies? A political strategy? A form
of discourse? Or even an ideology? Margaret Canovan (1981, 3), a pioneer in
the study of populism, writes with a tinge of exasperation that “the term is ex-
ceptionally vague and refers on different contexts to a bewildering variety of
phenomena.” A similarly extensive debate exists about its causes.3 Because of

its conceptual vagueness, it is necessary to discuss how populism is defined
in this book. The necessary first step toward crafting a definition is to decide
on its nature, and then list its essential features.
Two contrasting views stand out in the discussion regarding the nature
of populism. The first, known as “the ideational” approach to populism
(Mudde 2017, 27; Hawkins et al. 2018), sees populism as essentially a dis-
course, a “thin-centered”4 ideology that divides society into two antago-
nistic groups—the people and the elite—where “the people” are proclaimed
as a homogenous and virtuous community and “the elite” depicted as cor-
rupt and self-serving (Hawkins 2010; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012;
Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017). In related treatments, populism is de-
fined as a political logic in which unmet social demands produce, through
an equivalential chain, an “internal frontier,” that in turn dichotomizes “the
local political spectrum” (Laclau 2005a, 74). In similar vein, Panizza (2005,
4) writes that populism operates “in a discursive field” where the notions of
the sovereignty of the people and the inevitable clash with the powerful are
central. Others stress the Manichean character of populist discourse as its
defining characteristic (de la Torre 2008, 38; 2010, xi). Some define popu-
lism as an ideology that reacts to modernization impulses by asserting the es-
sential goodness of community,5 valuing equality, rejecting elites, longingly
seeking to restore a mythical past, which all can be achieved “by the charisma
of heroic leaders and legislators” (MacRae 1969, 163). For Canovan (2002,
33), “the populist ideology” starts with the notion of “the people,” and adds
sovereignty, democracy, and majority rule, to come to the formulation that
democracy is government by the sovereign people, where decisions are made
under popular control, preferably through direct democracy mechanisms.
The second view, an alternative to the ideational approach, treats populism
as a political strategy “for winning and exercising power” (Weyland 2001,
3 Rovira Kaltwasser (2015, 196–200) offers an insightful matrix to organize the competing ex-
planations for the emergence of populism. His typology rests on two variables: first, whether the
explanation stresses “demand-side” (i.e., the preferences of the masses) or “supply-side” (i.e., the
transformation of political actors or parties) factors and, second, whether the explanation focuses on
national or international factors. Intersecting these two criteria creates a 2x2 matrix with four distinct
types of explanations for the emergence of populism: rising social discontent, growing congruence
among mainstream political actors, demonstration effects, and the exploitation of anti-cosmopolitan
effects.
4 “Thin centered” because it takes different characteristics depending upon other ideologies to
which populism may attach itself. For the concept of “thin-centered” ideology see Freeden (1998).
5 What Taggart (2000, 3) calls “the heartland.”
12). This “political-strategic” approach to populism has a venerable tradition

in Latin American scholarship, where populism is conceived as a kind of po-
litical practice, broadly understood, which assigns secondary importance
to the content of its ideological or discursive elements. Early treatments see
populism as a type of political regime that came about as a result of rapid
processes of modernization and the inability of existing political systems to
transition to full-fledged representative democracies (Germani 1962, 36–37;
1963, 419; 1978, 134–135). Some defined populism as a regime type (Ianni
1975, 135), which expressed a multi-class alliance that included the urban
popular classes and the industrial bourgeoisie (Hennessy 1969, 29–30; Di
Tella 1974, 48; Ianni 1975, 138; Malloy 1977, 9; Weffort 1980, 75; Vilas 2003,
14–15). As early functionalist and Marxist interpretations were abandoned,
populism was increasingly conceptualized as a political practice that estab-
lishes strong direct, paternalistic, unmediated linkages between charismatic
leaders and the masses (Di Tella 1965, 53; Worsley 1969, 244; Freidenberg
2007, 12; 2008, 192; Barr 2009, 38; Conniff 2012, 4; Schamis 2013, 151).
Populism was also seen as a mode of interest representation that combines an
anti-elite discourse with top-down mobilization (Oxhorn 1998, 222; Roberts
2007, 5; 2013, 39).
Kurt Weyland offers the most encompassing definition of populism as a
political strategy. He rejects the ideational approach because it suffers from
excessive breadth given its overreliance on discourse, thus producing “false
positives” (Weyland 2017, 53). He also criticizes the implicit portrayal of
populism as a bottom-up movement because the ideational approach does
not problematize its treatment of “the people,” when in fact populism rests
on a top-down strategy (Weyland 2017, 54). Claiming it is important to
focus on what populists “actually do,” rather than what they say, Weyland
(2001, 14) defines populism as: “a political strategy through which a person-
alistic leader seeks or exercises government power on direct, unmediated,
uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized fol-
lowers.” This “political-strategic” approach, as Weyland calls it, highlights the
three central elements of any political practice: the main political actor (per-
sonalistic leader), the main political goal (seeking and exercising power),
and the main source of political support (unorganized followers).
The essential tension between these two approaches lies in where we
should look for a better understanding of this phenomenon: the discourse
that exalts the virtues of “the people” and demonizes “the elite,” versus the
characteristics and behavior of the leader in seeking and exercising power.
Weyland’s definition deserves praise because it does not obscure the central
element of power in our understanding of populism, an element that is ab-
sent in ideational accounts. However, Weyland (2001, 14) unnecessarily re-
stricts populism to “direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support” from
followers. It is undisputable that populism rests on personalistic leadership
that seeks a direct, unmediated relationship with supporters. But seeking is
not the same as relying. There is no conceptual or historical reason to demand
in our definition that political support for the leader must come from largely
unorganized followers. Although many recent cases of Latin American pop-
ulism fit this description, there are enough historical instances where this
was not the case, which Weyland himself acknowledges. In classical popu-
lism, such as Peronism in Argentina and early Aprismo in Peru, one cannot
dismiss the important role that organized, labor-based parties played. Kurt
Weyland (2001, 14) is correct in emphasizing that, even in these cases, we are
talking about parties with “low levels of institutionalization” that give popu-
list leaders “wide latitude in shaping and dominating its organization.” The
point is that these parties were central in mobilizing political support for the
populist leaders. Therefore, I would argue that whether populism rests on
the support of largely unorganized masses is an empirical question and not a
definitional feature. In fact, bottom-up organization and mobilization of civil
society provides for a variety of populism that differs from the one that relies
on unorganized masses.
Missing from Weyland’s definition is the central feature of govern-
ance: how populist chief executives exercise power once they acquire it. An
important feature of populist governance is its uneasiness, if not outright
contempt, with representative institutions and checks and balances (Taggart
2000, 99–106). Therefore this aspect needs to be included in any definition.
The unwillingness of populist leaders to subject themselves to the strictures
of constitutional rule emanates from their rhetorical emphasis on the sover-
eignty of the people, which “reinforces the implication that democracy is a
politics of will and decision rather than accommodation and compromise”
(Canovan 2002, 34). Kurt Weyland (2017, 54) astutely notes that populists’
appeal to the “sovereignty of the people” hides a “typical populist move”
which is that “the rhetorically empowered people necessarily follow a leader
who claims to act on its behalf.” Such a “populist move” requires some kind of
electoral validation; hence the reason why populism relies strongly on direct
democracy mechanisms. An added benefit of using these plebiscitary mech-
anisms is that they allow populist leaders to bypass representative institutions
and even the judiciary. The hostility of populism to checks and balances, a
central feature of its governance attributes, reveals what many observers have
noted: populism is intrinsically anti-pluralistic (Müller 2016; Galston 2018),
for it rejects compromise and accommodation, disqualifies dissent, and en-
courages personal loyalty to the leader. In this sense, “populism is an extreme
form of anti-politics” (Rosanvallon 2008, 273).
Although populism is essentially a political strategy for seeking and
exercising power, there is enough evidence to acknowledge that there is
something peculiar about how populist leaders see the political world. It may
not be an ideology, but it is certainly a mentality in the Linzian sense. The
anti-pluralism that is intrinsic to populism is complemented with a confron-
tational stance toward political opponents. Whatever populism is, it is not
politics as usual. Populism embraces a confrontational mentality, both in dis-
course and actual behavior, which is meant to subvert the status quo. The
Manichean mentality that the advocates of the ideational approach find in
populism is not a mirage, and this needs to be acknowledged in any defini-
tion of populism. Ernesto Laclau (2005b, 39) is correct when he writes that
there is no populism without the construction of an enemy. Some find in
populism’s Manichean mentality an echo of Schmitt’s reduction of politics to
the dynamic of friend versus foe (Gottfried 1995, 111; Arditi 2007, 21). Many
have identified this anti–status quo and antiestablishment discourse as an in-
tegral part of populism’s rhetorical arsenal (Hennessy 1969, 30; Di Tella 1974,
76; Panizza 2000, 179; Freidenberg 2008, 192; de la Torre 2010, xi; Hawkins
2010, 33; de la Torre and Arnson 2013, 7; Barr 2017, 44). Populist rhetoric
taps feelings of resentment and exploits them politically, using sentiments
of injury or slight—emotions—to generate deep feelings of injustice (Betz
2002, 198) and to portray the leader as a moral crusader. Moreover, popu-
list discourse offers an outlet for this outrage and a target for the attribution
of blame (199). For this reason, the anti-status-quo discourse rapidly turns
into scapegoating, or what Taggart (2000, 94) calls the demonization of the
other. Whether due to political calculations or deeply held beliefs, populist
leaders embrace a confrontational stance both on the campaign trail and in
government.
It is important to stress, however, that populism is meant to subvert the
political status quo, for populist leaders rarely embark on sweeping socioec-
onomic transformation (Carrión 2015, 169). This means removing their op-
ponents’ political influence and establishing their own political supremacy.
The sphere of populism, Weyland (2001, 11) writes, is “domination, not
distribution.” The target of the populist animosity can certainly vary; some-
times it is the political class, or the oligarchy, or some foreign power, or even
some underprivileged segment of society such as immigrants or a religious
minority, groups that may be perceived as recipients of undue benefits, who
allegedly thrive on the backs of the hard-working majority. There is always an
enemy that needs confronting, and in this battle, all power is needed to suc-
ceed. In seeking office, the confrontation against an unpopular enemy pro-
vides a good electoral strategy. In office, this mentality fosters polarization,
a strategy that pays political dividends because it usually pits a popular chief
executive against discredited political opponents or unwanted minorities.
Populism is both anti-pluralistic and confrontational.
In defining populism, the conceptual challenge is to account for populism
as both aspiring contender and established power, which means specifying
not only the attributes of the leadership and its relationship with political
supporters but also the character of its governance. Based on the previous
discussion, and building on Weyland’s definition, I define populism as a
political strategy for seeking and exercising power that has three constitu-
tive features: (1) it exhibits a personalistic style of leadership—meaning, it
seeks to establish direct and unmediated links with supporters, (2) it is anti-
pluralistic and confrontational toward opponents, and (3) has a general
distrust of institutional checks and balances. Not all populist governments
exhibit these features in similar fashion or intensity nor do they rely exclu-
sively on the support of unorganized masses. The degree to which the oppo-
sition and courts can contain the attempts of populist leaders to undermine
check and balances and the nature of the social support on which they rely
provide for different varieties of populism, as I will argue later.
Case Selection: Populism in the Andes
I use five presidencies in the Andes to test my dynamic theory of populism

in power. I select the Andean region because it provides a number of cases
where the election of a populist president led to the establishment of compet-
itive authoritarianism or even full-scale authoritarianism. At the same time,
the region also offers examples of populist rule that did not cause the end of
democracy. Thus, the cases I use for the analysis that follows offer significant
variance in the dependent variable, namely the degree of democratic erosion
in the wake of the rise of populism to power. The region provides an ideal
combination of similar historical and cultural contexts (religion, ethnic di-

versity, similar colonial experiences, language) and important differences in
political trajectories, which can control for the impact of democratic tradi-
tions on the relationship between populism in power and democratic surviv-
ability. Both Colombia and Venezuela transitioned to democracy in the late
1950s, whereas Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru did so in the late 1970s and early
1980s. Of all these cases, populism eroded democracy deeper and longer in
Venezuela, whereas democracy survived in Colombia. In the cases of Bolivia,
Ecuador, and Peru, considered more fragile democracies, different varieties
of populism emerged, with a highly contested form in Peru and Ecuador and
a hegemonic one in Bolivia.
My theoretical interest is to study the impact of populist rule on demo-
cratic governance in the era of democratization. Therefore, the scope of my
theory is limited to democratic countries (operationalized as having con-
ducted at least two consecutive free and fair elections, which could include
the election that brings populism to power) and countries where checks and
balances—as deficient as they might be—work in general. These criteria en-
compass a large number of countries today, but preclude many of the former
Soviet republics, where free and fair elections happened only once in the
wake of communism’s fall, after which the elected leader manipulated elec-
tions to remain in power.
Accordingly, I study in depth five populist presidencies in the Andes
that fulfil the previous criteria, in chronological order: Alberto Fujimori in
Peru (1990–2000), Hugo Chávez in Venezuela (1999–2013), Álvaro Uribe
in Colombia (2002–2010), Evo Morales in Bolivia (2006–2019), and Rafael
Correa in Ecuador (2007–2017). Each of these five presidents exhibit, some
more markedly than others, the three essential features of populism, as I de-
fine it. Let me briefly summarize these characteristics here for each of these
presidents. Chapters 4–6 provide abundant evidence of what it is here only
outlined.
Alberto Fujimori ran a highly personalistic presidency. Each time he ran
for office, he used a coterie of different parties, so as to indicate that the label
was not important, only the person at the top of the ticket (Carrión 2015,
175). Many scholars use his presidency as an example of the personalistic,
plebiscitarian leadership that characterizes what they call neopopulism
(Roberts 1995, 82; Barr 2003, 1161; Weyland 2003, 1096). Others have
pointed out Fujimori’s anti-pluralistic and confrontational style. Fujimori
delegitimized his opponents and “created an ‘us versus them’ framework that
played on and stoked popular disgust with the failings of the political class
to address Peru’s multiple problems” (Burt 2007, 201). Yusuke Murakami
(2012, 223) mentions that one of the traits of Fujimori’s leadership style was
to make all the decisions himself, minimizing the need for consultation. He
calls this “an authoritarian form of decision making.” One month into his
first term, Fujimori declared that legislative work is nothing but “unpro-
ductive parliamentarism that has not served our people at all” (quoted in
Degregori and Meléndez 2007, 43). Henry Pease García (1994, 122) points
out that Fujimori sought confrontation with the legislature from the begin-
ning, “seeking to take away powers from parliament.” Those who opposed his
policies were subject to verbal diatribes. He called judges “jackals” (Bowen
2000, 45), and the Catholic Church “medieval,” because it questioned his so-
cial programs (Pease García 1994, 90). Members of his government attacked
opposition newspapers, comparing them to terrorists (Conaghan 1999, 259).
Hugo Chávez, Evo Morales, and Rafael Correa are widely portrayed as
representatives of radical left-wing populism in Latin America (de la Torre
2007, 394; 2013, 26; Philip and Panizza 2011, 73–74; Barr 2017, 14; Burbano
de Lara 2018, 437). As the chapters ahead will show, these leaders embrace an
anti-pluralistic and confrontational style of governing, frequently denying
the opposition’s legitimacy to hold office. The inflammatory and aggressive
rhetoric of these populist presidencies have been widely documented. The
term “the politics of antagonism” that Philip and Panizza (2011, 95) use to
describe Chávez’s political strategy can also be extended to Evo Morales and
Rafael Correa, because both embraced a “Manichean and antagonistic rhet-
oric” (de la Torre 2016, 134). Flavia Freidenberg (2012, 145) mentions that a
“discourse with strong antagonistic content” is a component of Correa’s lead-
ership style. In similar vein, Barr (2017, 105) reports that one of his inter-
viewees described Morales’s discursive style as “permanent provocation.”
I show in later chapters how each of these populist presidents had extremely
negative attitudes toward constitutional checks and balances.
Some do not consider Álvaro Uribe of Colombia a case of populism, but
I argue that this exclusion is unwarranted. Many observers have commented
on Uribe’s autocratic leadership style that sought to bypass institutions of po-
litical intermediation (Patiño Aristizábal and Cardona Restrepo 2009, 171).
John Dugas (2003, 1134) admits the personalist character of Uribe’s leader-
ship but contends that he did not have an anti-elite rhetoric and “never sought
to build a movement based upon direct, unmediated ties to the masses.” Kirk
Hawkins (2010, 76), analyzing four of his speeches, assigns Uribe a score of
zero in his scale of populist discourse. Nevertheless, Bejarano (2013, 332) ar-
gues that Uribe used a populist style and discourse, “based on the politiciza-
tion of citizens’ fear of insecurity, as part of a strategy to concentrate power in
his hands while trying to retain the presidency.” She, however, concludes that
Uribe was not a populist (323). Other scholars, primarily based in Colombia,
dissent. Cristina de la Torre (2005) uses the label “neopopulism” to define
the Uribe administration and moreover, compares him to Fujimori, whose
style of governing, she writes, has “a surprising resemblance” to Uribe’s (19).
Uribe, like Chávez and Correa, organized direct public gatherings (com-
munity councils) and used the media as a way of building political support.
Janeth Muñoz (2010, 156) equates Uribe’s community councils to Correa’s
Citizen Links. By the end of his administration, Uribe had conducted more
than 300 of these meetings (El País [Colombia], July 4, 2010). Álvaro López
Bayona (2016, 105) concludes that uribismo is a “populist movement.”
Indeed, like Fujimori in Peru, Álvaro Uribe made extensive use of the
media to make the case for his policies (Fierro 2014, 136-137). During his
first two years in office, Uribe had an average of three daily hours of expo-
sure on television (de la Torre 2005, 101). This presence, certainly unprece-
dented in Colombia, is explained in large part by the fact that the community
councils were broadcast live and they ran for an average of eight to nine
hours. Although not to the extremes registered with Chávez and Correa,
Uribe also used harsh rhetoric against judges and members of Congress who
opposed him, calling some of them “dressed-up guerrilla fighters” (quoted
in Kline 2009, 181). Uribe’s attitude toward the media was a combination of
“carrots and sticks,” granting access to sympathetic media but harshly criti-
cizing journalists who opposed his policies (Fierro 2014, 139). María Cristina
Osorio (2012, 74–75) also argues that Uribe is a neopopulist, based on three
criteria: a personalistic and anti-party leadership that sought and established
intermediary links with society outside the traditional ones, an antiestab-
lishment discourse that made the political class the new enemy, and a redis-
tributive policy developed to ameliorate the effects of neoliberal policies. In
similar vein, Herrera Zgaib (2012, 277) concludes that Uribe and Fujimori
share clear populist characteristics. Jorge Giraldo Ramírez (2018, 112) de-
scribes Uribe’s government as an “unexpected populism.” Finally, Weyland
(2013, 25) identifies Uribe as a right-wing populist. As I show in Chapters 4–
6, Uribe easily fulfills the main attributes of my definition of populism: his
leadership was highly personalistic and confrontational and exhibited a dis-
trust of checks and balances.
The Argument in Brief: A Dynamic Theory of

Populism in Power
The theory of the dynamics of populism in power developed here relies on

key insights from Comparative-Historical Analysis (CHA) and regime-
based political institutionalism. The theory is fleshed out in the next chapter,
and the cases of Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela, and Colombia are used
to test it. The theory is neither deductive nor inductive. It is not derived from
“first principles” nor is a mere narrative of “what happened.” Rather, it has
been developed in an “abductive” fashion (Swedberg 2014; 2016). That is, it
is an attempt at theorizing complex phenomena—in this case the demise of
electoral democracy after the election of a populist leader—by providing a
causal explanation and contrasting it against evidence. It is an effort to pro-
vide a theory of populism in power that is generalizable. In addition, I pro-
vide an account of the different varieties that populism in power can take.
This account is not based on differences of ideologies, discourses, or men-
talities, but rather on the diverse nature of power capabilities and alliances
that sustain populism in power. Different varieties of populism evolve as a
result of how populist chief executives confront their crucial Hobbesian mo-
ment: first, whether they emerge victorious from this moment and, second,
how they manage to prevail when they do so.
The theory advanced in this book distinguishes between regime creation
and regime reproduction. As will be apparent, the causes that explain the
electoral victory of populism need to be distinguished from the reasons that
explain its ability to gain power asymmetry and reproduce its rule by ex-
tending its term in office. Accordingly, this book provides an explanation of
the “critical antecedents” of populism and the “permissive” and “productive”
conditions that explain the why and how of their success during the crucial
Hobbesian moment. This accounts for the creation of the regime. Once the
populist leader emerges victorious from the Hobbesian moment, then an
oversized executive (“superpresidency,” for short) takes root and with it the
mechanisms that allow the regime to reproduce itself. The transfer of polit-
ical resource stocks to the executive (superpresidency) and the alteration of
resource flows in favor of the populist president (tilting of the electoral field)
explain the reproduction of the regime.
The potential for populism arises when the public at large becomes un-
happy with the existing political order and traditional political elites are in
disarray. The reasons for mass dissatisfaction vary from country to country,
but there is no viable path for populism if voters are happy with their existing
political choices. In the case of the Andes, the causes of political discontent
range from unresolved security issues to political unresponsiveness. The
likelihood of populism coming to power increases when this public discon-
tent is coupled with elite disarray. “Disarray” primarily means the waning of
traditional elites’ electoral appeal and their inability to channel political com-
petition through their traditional organizations or parties. Popular dissatis-
faction with existing political arrangements puts institutional reform on the
agenda. Public dissatisfaction also leads voters to walk away from the options
that they used to support—a decision made easier by the disarray of political
elites. Some members of the old order weaken the existing party system by
creating new political parties; others even rally behind the rising populist
candidate. Mass political discontent and elite disunity jointly create the con-
ditions for the sudden rise of a populist challenger, generating an electoral
tsunami that leads populism to take office. The force of the populist tsunami
encourages strategic behavior among elites, some of which decide to go along
and support the rising candidate.
Since populism is anti-pluralist and confrontational and seeks to undermine
checks and balances, newly elected populist chief executives quickly move to
gain political supremacy and end opposition to their rule, even if this means
changing the existing rules of the game. In order to achieve power asymmetry,
populists engage in a battle for political supremacy, characterized by heightened
political conflict and polarization, which I call the Hobbesian moment. The
temporal gap between the tsunami moment and the Hobbesian moment may
vary from country to country, but they are analytically distinct. In his classic
study of democratic breakdown, Juan Linz (1978, 27) coins the term “disloyal
opposition” to describe the main agent of this process. To understand the dy-
namics of populism in power, and how it undermines democracy, one needs to
consider the notion of “disloyal government” to identify the main agent of this
erosion. Conflict and collaboration are central to the theory. Conflict emanates
from the efforts of chief executives to aggrandize their rule and the attempts of
the opposition and courts to block them. Collaboration stems the willingness of
the state’s repressive apparatus—ruling parties and their allies and civil societal
organizations—to subvert democracy.
The outcome of the Hobbesian moment determines whether or not pop-
ulism in power moves to the third moment, the populist moment, when
Popular Support
for Change
Tsunami Moment: Hobbesian Moment: Populist Moment:
+ Election of Populist Dispute for Political Superpresidency &
Leader Supremacy regime reproduction
Elite Disarray
Figure 1.1 The Trajectory of Unconstrained Populism in Power
populist governance takes root.6 If populist leaders are effectively con-

strained by the opposition and the courts, and thus defeated during this
moment, then the populist moment of significant power asymmetry will be
avoided. This is a case of contained or constrained populism. If populist chief
executives succeed in defeating the opposition, then the third moment, the
populist moment, will ensue. This is when populism rules unconstrained
(see Figure 1.1). It is important to point out here that different varieties of
populism will be largely shaped by the nature of the productive conditions
that enable them to prevail during the Hobbesian moment. If populist gov-
ernments primarily rely on the state’s repressive apparatus and support from
largely unorganized masses to prevail, their variety of populism would differ
in some significant ways from those populist governments that, in addition
to using the repressive apparatus of the state, rely on organized societal mo-
bilization to defeat their political opponents. In the first case we are in the
presence of contested populism, in the second we encounter dominant pop-
ulism. Dominant populism exhibits two sub-varieties based on the nature
of the societal organization and mobilization relied on: if societal organiza-
tion is generated from above, from the state, a dominant-authoritarian pop-
ulism would develop. By contrast, if societal mobilization and organization
come primarily from below, then a hegemonic form of dominant populism
would ensue.
The populist moment is characterized by the emergence of enlarged ex-
ecutive power (which I call superpresidency here, for convenience). Latin
American countries exhibit a long tradition of strong presidentialism, and
institutional change may exacerbate this tradition. But superpresidentialism
is much more than institutional change that enhances the powers of
6 I’m using the term populist governance to denote the situation where the populist president has
already secured political dominance and has successful changed the nature of governance to severely
undermine checks and balances.
presidents. Superpresidentialism implies the total subordination of the leg-

islature to the president, a complete control of the judiciary by the execu-
tive, and a monopoly of decision-making in the hands of the chief executive.
As an institution, the superpresidency is the outcome of the total political
dominance that the populist chief executive exerts in the political system, not
the cause for it. For parliamentary regimes, we will speak of severe executive
aggrandizement.
The rise of super–executive power solidifies a mode of ruling that relies on
the lack of meaningful checks and balances, uses state institutions to clamp
down conflict and obliterate the opposition, abuses state power, and engages
in opaque policymaking, all the while maintaining a veneer of legality and
democratic rule. Some private businesses would support the regime because
they find it beneficial to their economic interests, establishing corrupt links
with mid-level officials, and sometimes with top members of the govern-
ment. The reproduction of the regime through the alteration of the electoral
playing field becomes a second key characteristic of this populist moment
(Figure 1.1).
A Look Ahead
Chapter 2 details the dynamic theory of populism in power advanced in this

book. The chapter shows how CHA and political institutionalism, as devel-
oped by Schedler (2013), provide the necessary conceptual scaffolding to
analyzing the dynamics of populism in power. After that, the chapter pro-
vides an exhaustive discussion of the analytical moments in the trajectory of
populism in power and discusses the causal chain that explains the varieties
of populism in power identified in this book. The dynamic theory of popu-
lism starts with the identification of the critical antecedents that explain the
electoral victory of populist candidates, and that is the subject of Chapter 3.
This chapter focuses on two critical antecedents: mass political dissatisfac-
tion and elite disarray. These two antecedents are not the only causes of pop-
ulism. However, when they are jointly present, they are sufficient conditions
for the election of a populist candidate. These critical antecedents are dis-
cussed for each of the five cases examined here. An important claim made
in Chapter 3 is that these two antecedents are not present in the same degree
or intensity in all five cases, a fact that becomes important later, when the
critical antecedents combine causally with permissive conditions during the
Hobbesian moment. For instance, we do not see in Colombia the same de-
gree of elite disarray found in the other Andean countries.
Chapter 4 analyzes the rise to power of populist candidates. The chapter
shows that there is a recognizable pattern in the electoral attraction of as-
piring populists. Given their outsider character, they usually start their elec-
toral campaigns exhibiting low levels of electoral appeal and rise gradually
at the polls as voters turn to them in rejection of traditional candidates. The
gradual rise reaches an inflexion point, at which time it becomes clear that
their election is almost a foregone conclusion. This meteoric rise is impor-
tant because it changes the political calculations of some actors, including
the media, with some offering support and even joining the campaign of the
populist candidate, further adding to his or her political momentum. The
victory of the populist candidate opens a significant critical juncture, which
may lead to the significant erosion of democratic rule.
Chapter 5 discusses the most critical moment in the populist critical
juncture. It is the moment of acute political confrontation that ensues: the
populist chief executive tries to radically change the rules of the game to con-
centrate political power, and the opposition pushes back against those efforts.
The chapter identifies the permissive and productive conditions that deter-
mine the outcome of this zero-sum moment. The main permissive condition
is mass endorsement of radical institutional change. The key productive con-
ditions are the use of the repressive apparatus of the state to obtain political
goals and, in some cases, the organization and mobilization of civil society.
Whether populist leaders are defeated during this moment, or whether they
succeed (using exclusively the power of the state to prevail or also relying on
the organization of civil society) would determine the variety of populism
in power.
Chapter 6 studies the populist moment that arises once populist leaders
have defeated the opposition to their rule and have therefore gained power
asymmetry. The chapter focuses on two main mechanisms that populist
leaders use to secure this political dominance, namely electoral legitimation
and the transfer of political resource stocks. This transfer is achieved through
the acquisition of new constitutional powers, the total control of the state
institutions, especially the judiciary, and the reduction of societal accounta-
bility (by muzzling the press and eroding freedom of association). Since the
analytical effort in Chapters 5 and 6 is to process-trace how these permissive
and productive conditions played out in time and enabled the shift in power
symmetry in favor of the executive branch, the narrative assumes a highly
Another random document with
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„Ich habe es von meiner Schwester Elise gelernt. Es freut mich,
daß es Euch gefällt. Ich habe noch einen großen Vorrat von schönen
Liedern, und will singen, so oft es Euch Vergnügen macht.“
8. Kapitel.
Ein freier Tag.
2. Fischen und Klettern.
ach einem weitern Marsche von fünfundzwanzig Minuten
waren sie am Gestade eines Sees angelangt und wählten
eine liebliche Uferstrecke, wo der Schatten ästiger Bäume
weit ins Wasser fiel, zum Fangplatze aus.
Tom reichte Percy sogleich eine Angel und einen Wurm als
Köder.
Percy faßte behutsam den Wurm, aber als er sah, wie sich
derselbe hin- und herwand, ließ er ihn mit einem Schrei zu Boden
fallen.
„O! was soll ich jetzt machen?“
„Heb’ ihn auf! Er beißt Dich nicht!“
Nach manchen erfolglosen Versuchen gelang das schließlich.
Percy unterdrückte mutig eine Anwandlung des Schauderns und
wollte den Wurm an den Angelhaken bringen. Allein wie er es auch
anstellen mochte, stets entschlüpfte er ihm.
„Ruhig liegen, unartiges Ding!“ rief er, fast aufgeregt.
Da kam ihm Tom zu Hilfe.
„Das Zappeln kannst Du ihm leicht abgewöhnen,“ sprach er,
nahm den ‚unartigen‘ Wurm in die eine Hand und gab ihm mit der
andern einen kräftigen Schlag. Der Wurm zappelte nicht mehr, und
Percy brachte ihn mit seinen geschickten Fingern leicht an den
Angelhaken.
„Es giebt zwei Arten von Fischen,“ erklärte jetzt Tom, „kleine, zum
Beispiel Barsche und Sonnfische, die ganz nahe an der Oberfläche
schwimmen, und große, die gewöhnlich unten auf dem Grunde
bleiben. Die großen sind sehr schwer zu fangen. Sie haben Mäuler
wie Scheunenthore, und einen Angelhaken, wie den Deinen da,
verschlucken sie mit dem größten Vergnügen und ohne alle
Beschwerde; das ist nur eine kräftige Speise für sie.“
„Gewiß!“ ergänzte Quip. „Und sie thun sehr beleidigt, wenn man
den Haken wieder herausziehen will.“
„Sie sind imstande,“ fuhr Whyte fort, „plötzlich heraufzukommen
und Dich mit einer Schwanzspitze aufzuspießen.“
„Danach spüre ich nun wenig Verlangen.“
„Deshalb ist es am besten für Dich,“ nahm Tom wieder das Wort,
„wenn Du sie ganz in Ruhe läßt. — Ich rate Dir überhaupt, mit den
kleinen zu beginnen, die man am Ufer ganz leicht fangen kann. Wirf
nur dort hinten, wo der dicke Holzklotz aus dem Wasser ragt, gleich
einmal aus!“
Percy folgte der Anweisung. Ein paar Minuten lag der Kork seiner
Angelschnur unbeweglich auf der glatten Wasserfläche. Aber auf
einmal fing er an, hin und her gezerrt zu werden.
„Tom, sieh doch nur! Was ist mit meinem Korke los?“
Tom war ganz in Anspruch genommen, seine eigene Angel für
die ‚Tiefsee-Fischerei‘ instand zu setzen.
„Ist er am Ertrinken?“ fragte er, ohne seine Augen abzuwenden.
„Nein. Aber bitte, Tom, schau’ doch!“
„Vielleicht hat ein Fisch Streit mit Deinem Wurm.“ Und Tom
schlenderte seine Angel weit ins Wasser hinaus.
„Ich meine, Tom —“
„Was meinst Du?“
„Mein Kork ist fort. Ich sehe nichts mehr davon.“
„So zieh’ doch! es hängt ein Fisch daran.“
War es nun bloße Aufregung, oder glaubte Percy, es hänge ein
Walfisch oder sonst ein Wasserungetüm an seiner Schnur: kurz, er
schwang die Angelrute mit aller nur möglichen Anstrengung
aufwärts, und ein winziges Fischlein flog in die Zweige eines
Baumes empor; dort verwickelte sich die Schnur, und das Fischlein
zappelte hilflos in der Luft.
Ratlos stand Percy da. Man wußte nicht, wer mehr verdutzt war,
der Fisch oder er.
„Was soll ich jetzt machen?“ fragte er.
„Leg’ ihm etwas Salz auf den Schwanz!“ riet Harry.
„Ist Dir das bedacht, Harry?“
„Der Quip schwätzt nur Unsinn,“ versicherte Donnel, und strengte
alle Muskeln des Gesichtes an, um ernst zu bleiben. „Aber ich will
Dir einen besseren Rat geben. Geh’ zur nächsten Farm und leih’ Dir
eine Axt. Dann haust Du den Baum um und bekommst den Fisch
ohne Mühe.“
„O Johann! Eine Axt habe ich mein Lebtag noch nicht in der
Hand gehabt!“
„Baumfällen solltest Du nun doch lernen,“ sprach jetzt Keenan.
„Du weißt ja, daß der große Gladstone keine bessere Erholung
kennt.“
„Aber ich kann es noch nicht. — Vielleicht kommt der Fisch von
selbst hinunter, meinst Du nicht, Johann?“
„Er wollte es ja gern, wenn er nur wüßte, wie. — Aber Du kannst
gewiß verwirrtes Garn in Ordnung bringen, Percy.“
„Ja, ich habe es oft gethan, wenn ich meinen Schwestern beim
Garnwickeln half.“
„Gut, dann paß auf!“ Der starke Donnel ergriff Percy bei den
Knöcheln und hob ihn vom Boden auf, so daß er die Zweige, in
denen die Schnur verwickelt war, fassen konnte.
Etliche Wochen vorher wäre Percy bei einem solchen Vorgange
vor Angst in Ohnmacht gefallen. Jetzt aber blieb er ganz ohne
Furcht, entwirrte geschickt die Schnur und ließ den Fisch herab.
„O Donnel!“ sagte er, als er wieder auf dem Boden stand, „Du bist
ja ein wahrer Herkules! — Aber wie kann ich jetzt den Fisch vom
Haken bekommen?“
„Sehr einfach! Faß ihn fest am Kopfe, dann gleitet er Dir nicht
aus der Hand; wenn Du nun den Haken vorsichtig zurückdrückst, —
so —“ hier zeigte ihm Donnel den einfachen Kunstgriff — „so bringst
Du ihn heraus, ohne den Fisch weiter zu verletzen.“
„S—s—st!“ flüsterte jetzt Tom. „Seht doch, was meinem Kork
einfällt! Ich glaube, ich mache einen herrlichen Fang.“
Toms Kork bewegte sich in der That sonderbar. Anstatt, wie es
sonst zu geschehen pflegt, unregelmäßig auf und ab, nach rechts
und nach links, hierhin und dorthin gezerrt zu werden, schwamm er
in stets gleicher Geschwindigkeit, oder besser gesagt Langsamkeit,
der Mitte des Sees zu. Nur dann und wann tauchte er für einen
Augenblick unter, um sogleich die frühere Bewegung wieder
fortzusetzen.
„Festgebissen hat der Fisch noch nicht,“ sprach Keenan. „Aber er
scheint es zu wollen, sonst würde er die Angel nicht mitziehen.“
Toms Angelschnur war mit dem einen Ende auf ein Rädchen
gewunden, mittels dessen sie bequem verlängert oder verkürzt
werden konnte. Tom rollte sie um eine gute Strecke ab, und der Kork
schwamm noch weiter in den See.
Alle hatten bereits ihre Angeln aus dem Wasser gezogen und
sich erwartungsvoll um Tom versammelt.
„Was ist zu thun?“ fragte dieser nach einer Weile, indem er
wieder Schnur abrollte. „Das ist der verrückteste Fisch, der es je auf
eine Angel abgesehen hat. Er sollte doch festbeißen oder
davonschwimmen.“
„Schau’! jetzt bewegt er sich im Kreise!“ flüsterte Hodder.
„Der Fisch ist mondsüchtig,“ meinte Quip.
„Vielleicht ist es gar kein Fisch,“ versetzte Whyte.
„Zum Beispiel eine Wasserschlange!“ fuhr Percy fort, und sah
aus, als wolle er im nächsten Augenblicke davonlaufen.
„Jetzt ist meine Geduld zu Ende!“ sprach Tom. „Wenn der Fisch
nicht beißen will wie alle ehrlichen Fische auf dem weiten
Erdenrund, so kann ich meine kostbare Zeit nicht länger mit ihm
vertrödeln.“
Er gab der Angel einen starken Ruck nach oben, aber weder
Angel noch Fisch wurden sichtbar. Die Rute bog sich, als wollte sie
brechen.
„Jetzt weiß ich’s!“ rief er. „Ich habe ein tüchtiges Stück Holz
gefangen.“
„Nein! Sieh nur! Sieh nur!“ sprach Keenan.
Der Kork bewegte sich wieder der Mitte des Sees zu, aber viel
schneller als vorher.
„Der Kork ist verrückt, nicht der Fisch!“ sagte Whyte.
„Verhext ist er!“ meinte Hodder.
Percy war schon voller Aufregung.
„Leg’ ihm doch Salz auf den Schwanz, Tom!“ riet er.
Man lachte, aber nicht viel; denn die erfahrenen Fischer waren zu
gespannt, um den Scherz recht würdigen zu können.
Der Kork schwamm indes der Tiefe zu und verschwand plötzlich,
um nicht wieder aufzutauchen. Da fing Tom an zu ziehen. Aber das
rätselhafte Wesen am andern Ende der Leine zog auch. Zuerst
waren die Kräfte einander gleich. Plötzlich schrie alles vor Freude
laut auf: das gefangene Wassertier fing an nachzugeben.
„Es ist mindestens ein Haifisch,“ sprach Tom, während er
langsam die Leine weiter anzog.
„Vielleicht,“ sprach gravitätisch der Dichter Donnel, „ist es der
Schatten eines abgeschiedenen Pani-Häuptlings, der über den Styx
zurückgeschwommen ist und jetzt aus des Hades Finsternissen
emportaucht, um zu atmen im rosigen Licht!“
„Und den es gelüstet,“ fuhr Keenan fort, „noch einmal den
Kriegspfad gegen den weißen Mann zu beschreiten, mit dem seine
Nachkommen bereits die Friedenspfeife rauchen.“
„Eher ist es ein alter Holzschuh!“ beschloß Tom nüchtern die
poetischen Ergüsse.
Der Angelhaken kam indessen mit dem, was daran hing, immer
näher. Ein Fisch konnte es unmöglich sein; denn ein solcher würde
ruckweise gezerrt und gerissen haben, auch wahrscheinlich das eine
oder andere Mal aus dem Wasser gesprungen, oder für Augenblicke
nahe an die Oberfläche gekommen sein. Statt dessen merkte Tom
nur ein anhaltendes starkes Ziehen.
„Meiner Ansicht nach ist es ein Esel,“ sprach Quip ernsthaft.
„Nein,“ sprach Whyte, „dafür ist es zu dumm. Ich glaube, ein
Kürbis ist noch gescheiter, als dieses Ding.“
„Ich sehe es!“ rief Hodder. „Es ist jetzt in seichterem Wasser.“
„Nicht wahr, es hat lange Ohren?“ fragte Quip.
„Ich sehe es auch!“ rief Whyte. „Es ist rund, wie ein Schild.“
„Der Geist eines Indianerschildes!“ bemerkte Donnel.
„Nein, eine Schildkröte! Eine Schildkröte!“ riefen sie alle. „Eine
Schnappschildkröte!“
Die runde Rückenschale war sehr deutlich sichtbar, immer mehr
kroch das Tier auf dem Boden des Sees dem Ufer zu und endlich
trat es in seiner ganzen Häßlichkeit aus dem Wasser. Es klappte
sein abscheuliches, breites Maul mit wütendem Kreischen auf und
zu, vermochte aber das Drahtende der Angelschnur nicht
abzubeißen und wollte sich deshalb mit seinen ungeschlachten
Vorderfüßen von derselben befreien.
„Nimm Dich in acht!“ sprach Keenan, als Tom dem seltsamen
Fang etwas nahe kam. „Ehe Du Dich versiehst, hast Du einen Biß!
Wir wollen sie lieber erst töten.“
„Aber wie?“
Keenan hatte bereits Toms kleines Jagdgewehr geholt und gab
dem Tiere eine Ladung, die allem weiteren Sträuben ein Ende
machte.
„Herrlich!“ rief Quip. „Eine solche Fischerei hab’ ich nie erlebt.“
„Ich habe wohl schon Schildkröten gefangen,“ sagte Donnel;
„aber nicht mit der Angel und nie eine so große. Ich glaube, diese
wiegt wohl fünfzig Pfund. Es ist schade, daß man
Schnappschildkröten nicht essen kann.“
Plötzlich schaute Tom bestürzt auf.
„Wo ist Percy?“ rief er.
Percy war verschwunden.
„Percy! Percy!“ klang es in den Wald hinein.
„Hier bin ich ja!“ kam eine zitternde Stimme von oben.
Sie erhoben ihre Augen, und wer beschreibt ihre Verwunderung,
als sie Percy zehn Fuß über dem Boden rittlings auf einem dicken
Baumaste sitzen sahen!
„Aber, Percy,“ riefen sie überrascht und erfreut, „wie bist Du da
hinaufgekommen?“
„Das weiß ich selber nicht. Ich meinte immer, ich könnte gar nicht
klettern. Als aber die Schildkröte aus dem Wasser kam und so
wütend pfauchte und schnappte, war es mir, als könnte ich alles.“
„Ihr habt gut lachen,“ fuhr er fort, als er bemerkte, wie heiter man
seine Worte auffaßte. „Aber meine Lage ist keineswegs lächerlich.
O, wenn mich meine Mutter hier sähe, sie würde in Ohnmacht fallen.
Und wie soll ich wieder hinunter kommen?“
„Eine Art wäre, wieder herabzuk l e t t e r n ,“ sprach Tom, ohne sein
Gesicht zu verziehen.
Harry Quip bot sich an, eine Axt herbeizuholen. „Dann haue ich
den Baum um, und Du kommst ganz von selber aus den Boden.“
Percys Beklommenheit mehrte sich.
„Sollte es nicht in der Nähe eine Leiter geben?“ fragte er zaghaft.
Neues, herzliches Lachen begrüßte diese Bitte.
„O, was soll ich machen, was soll ich machen?“ jammerte Percy.
„Noch nie war ich in einer so schrecklichen Lage.“ Seine Lippen
zitterten, und die Augen wurden feucht.
Aber niemand hatte beabsichtigt, Percy weh zu thun.
„Es geht sehr einfach!“ sprach Donnel, der am allerwenigsten ein
Mitgeschöpf betrübt sehen konnte. „Thu’ nur genau, was ich Dir
sage. — Bring’ Deine beiden Füße nebeneinander auf den Ast, auf
dem Dein linker Fuß steht! — Prächtig, Percy! — So, jetzt kniest Du
auf diesen Ast und hältst Dich an dem obern Aste fest, auf dem Du
gesessen hast. — Gut! — Jetzt fasse den untern Ast neben Deinen
Knieen mit den Händen, und laß Dich getrost hinab!“
Percy, der auf seine Freunde großes Vertrauen setzte, wagte
alles ohne Bedenken. So konnte ihn Donnel an den Füßen ergreifen
und dann auf den Boden stellen.
Erfreut und beschämt zugleich blickte er um sich.
„Ich bin noch lange kein rechter Junge,“ sprach er. „Aber wenn
mich je wieder eine Schildkröte bedroht, so werde ich es ganz
anders machen — ich werde zeitig w e g l a u f e n .“
9. Kapitel.
Ein freier Tag.
3. Schwimmen und Rudern.
ie Gesellschaft begann jetzt ihre Fischerei von neuem und
war vom Glücke begünstigt. Auch Percy warf seine Angel
nicht vergebens aus. Zu seiner eigenen und seiner Freunde
angenehmern Überraschung fing er noch acht kleinere Fische.
Tom zog seine Uhr.
„Jetzt wäre es wohl Zeit zum Schwimmen!“
„Ihr wollt doch hier nicht schwimmen!“ rief Percy voll Schrecken.
„Gewiß! Warum denn nicht?“
„Die Schildkröten könnten Euch ja in die Beine beißen! Hu!“ Und
Percy schauderte.
„Du brauchst keine Angst zu haben,“ versicherte Tom. „Sie thun
Dir nichts.“
„Mir, Tom? Mir? I c h darf mich nicht ins Wasser wagen. Ich kann
ja noch gar nicht schwimmen.“
Tom ging zu einem der Ranzen, die man mitgebracht hatte und
kam mit einer neuen Schwimmhose zurück.
„Hier, Percy, das ist von meiner Seite ein Gegengeschenk für die
schönen Photographieen, die du uns neulich verehrt hast.“
Allein Percy legte die Hände auf dem Rücken zusammen, und
sein Gesicht drückte nichts weniger aus als Freude oder
Dankbarkeit.
„Aber, Percy, ist denn das die Art, ein Geschenk anzunehmen?“
Jetzt fühlte sich der fein erzogene Knabe an seiner
empfindlichsten Stelle getroffen. Er zwang sich zu einem Lächeln
und empfing die Gabe des Freundes mit seiner gewöhnlichen
anmutvollen Verbeugung.
„Ich bin Dir wirklich sehr verbunden, Tom. Verzeihe mir, daß ich
so spröde that! Es war mir ganz sicher nicht bedacht. — Wie nett sie
ist! Kein Zebra hat so schöne, zierliche Streifen. Ich lege sie in mein
Pult, und so oft ich sie sehe, will ich mich an Dich erinnern.“
Diese seltsame Verwendung einer Schwimmhose wollte Tom
natürlich nicht gefallen.
„Es ist doch keine Photographie von mir!“ sprach er.
„Gebrauchen sollst Du sie! Schwimmen ist nicht so schwer, wie Du
meinst. Manche finden es leichter als Klettern.“
„Das Wasser ist so kalt, Tom! Ich bekomme sicher einen
Schnupfen.“
„Nur, wenn Du zu lange drin bleibst oder Dich nachher nicht
bewegst.“
„Und wir wollen Dich schon jagen,“ rief Quip, der eben ins
Wasser gesprungen war und wieder auftauchte, vom See aus.
Aus Gefälligkeit gegen Tom beschloß Percy endlich, das Wagnis
zu unternehmen. Er unterdrückte einen Schrei, als er den Fuß in das
kalte Wasser setzte, hielt dann aber doch eine gute Zeit aus. Tom
und Joseph Whyte blieben stets um ihn, bemühten sich, ihm einige
Winke für seine ersten Schwimmübungen zu geben, und sorgten,
daß er nicht an Stellen geriet, wo der See zu tief war.
Eben hatte Percy seine Kleider wieder angelegt, als ein lauter
Juchzer seinen Lippen entfuhr. Ein kleines Boot, von Quip gesteuert
und von Keenan gerudert, erschien an einem Ufervorsprung.
„O Georg! Harry! bitte, laßt mich auch hinein! Hurra! das wird
lustig!“
„Was, Percy, Du willst in ein Boot?“ fragte Tom, der noch im
Wasser war, mit ernster Miene. „Du weißt doch, wie leicht die Boote
umkippen!“
„La, la! ich bin nicht bange!“ rief der Leichtfuß Percy. „Ich will
rudern lernen.“
„Komm, spring’ hinein!“
Percy setzte sich zu Georg in die Mitte des Kahnes.
„Gieb mir auch ein Ruder, Georg!“
„Da! Nachher kannst Du sie beide bekommen. Aber versuch’ es
erst mit dem einen. Vor allem mußt Du nun Takt halten lernen.“
„Giebt es hier Takt?“ fragte der Musiker.
„Und zwar Sieben-Elftel,“ erklärte der Steuermann lachend.
„Laß den Quip schwätzen, Percy! — Das Takthalten besteht
darin, daß Du zu gleicher Zeit mit mir das Ruder einsetzest, anziehst
und heraushebst.“
Percy heftete seine Augen auf Keenans Ruder und that richtig
die ersten Ruderschläge.
„Wenn Du so fortmachst, Percy,“ sprach Quip, „so lernst Du auch
bald, wie man eine Krabbe fängt.“
„So? wie geht das denn?“
„Du lernst es ganz von selbst, ohne Anstrengung, Du brauchst
auch nicht dabei aufzupassen.“
„Wirklich?“ fragte Percy verwundert, und schaute zu Quip auf.
Dabei wandte er naturgemäß seine Aufmerksamkeit vom Rudern ab;
er tauchte nicht tief genug ein, zog aber doch mit gewohnter Kraft
an. Infolgedessen fiel er nach hinten und würde sich den Kopf wohl
arg angestoßen haben, hätte nicht Keenan, der dieses Mißgeschick
erwartete, ihn sogleich am Knie ergriffen und festgehalten.
„Du kannst es! Du kannst es!“ rief Quip mit unsäglichem
Vergnügen. „Das ist so ganz das richtige Krabbenfangen. Du
brauchst Dich jetzt nie mehr zu üben.“
„Gewiß!“ sprach Keenan. „Die beste Anwendung dieser neuen
Kenntnis ist, daß Du sie gar nicht anwendest.“
Percy brachte sich in die frühere Stellung, schüttelte die Locken
zurück, rückte seine Mütze zurecht und begann fröhlich wieder zu
rudern. Für Quips Neckerei aber nahm er, ohne es zu wollen, bald
Rache. Als derselbe nämlich einmal über eine kleine
Ungeschicklichkeit des Anfängers lachte, flog ihm von Percys Ruder
eine gute Ladung Wasser in den offenen Mund und erstickte das
Lachen, als wäre es ein winziges Feuerflämmchen.
Kurz darauf steuerte Harry ans Land, stieg aus und verschwand
im Walde.
„Was hat er, Georg?“ fragte Percy.
„Er ärgert sich vielleicht.“
„O, das thut mir leid. Habe ich ihn beleidigt? Ich wollte es sicher
nicht. Er ist ein so guter Junge.“
„Das ist er. Aber sieh dort zwischen den Bäumen den Rauch
aufsteigen. Donnel oder Tom hat schon ein Feuer angezündet, um
unser Mittagessen herzurichten, und Quip thut nichts lieber als
kochen. Er ist meistens unser Oberkoch und Speisemeister, und wir
sind mit seiner Thätigkeit sehr zufrieden.“
„So? das freut mich!“ sprach Percy. Auch er war in der edlen
Kunst der Speisebereitung durchaus nicht unerfahren. Wie in
anderen Sachen hatten ihm auch hierin die sechs Schwestern einige
Fertigkeit anerzogen. Deswegen hatte er schon geglaubt, heute
damit seinen Freunden einen Dienst leisten zu können. Allein jetzt
sprach er gar nicht darüber, sondern beschloß, den Erzeugnissen
von Harrys Kochkunst alle Ehre anzuthun.
Um ein Uhr setzte sich die Gesellschaft zum Essen nieder. Das
Tischgebet bestand diesesmal bloß in einem andächtigen
Kreuzzeichen.
Donnel konnte sich nicht enthalten zu fragen, woher wohl die
Rosen auf Percys Wangen kämen.
„Von der Bewegung,“ erwiderte Keenan.
„Und davon, daß Du ein Junge wirst,“ fügte Tom bei.
„Ja,“ meinte Percy, „ich bin jetzt doch lieber ein Junge, als alles
andere in der Welt. — Und welch einen Hunger ich habe!“
„Schwimmen und Rudern und Krabbenfangen macht immer
Appetit, und ordentliches Kochen hilft nach,“ sprach Quip, der mit
weißer Schürze geschäftig dastand, und mit großer Genugthuung
seine Produkte verschwinden sah.
Der Nachmittag verflog in gleich angenehmer Unterhaltung.
Auf dem Heimwege aber that Percy sein Bestes, um mit Singen
und Erzählen seine Freunde zu unterhalten. Von Müdigkeit zeigte er
keine Spur, obgleich er doch den ganzen Tag auf den Beinen
gewesen war.
„Jetzt kann ich aber einen Riesenbrief an meine Schwestern
schreiben. Ich erzähle ihnen, was ich alles schon gelernt habe:
bockspringen, werfen, angeln, rudern, Krabben nicht fangen, und
auch ein kleines bißchen Schwimmen.“
„Das glauben sie Dir gar nicht,“ meinte Donnel.
„O doch! Sie glauben mir alles, was ich sage.“
„Aber das Wichtigste hast Du ausgelassen,“ bemerkte Tom.
„Was denn?“
„Du mußt vor allem schreiben, daß Du auf einen Baum geklettert
seist und doch nicht wüßtest, wie man das Klettern macht, Du
könntest klettern, obgleich Du es nicht gelernt hättest.“
10. Kapitel.
Eine Gesellschaft anderer Art.
enny hatte für seine Gespenstererscheinung eine
empfindliche Strafe erhalten und verlor selbstverständlich
das Privileg, allein auszugehen. In diese Strafzeit fiel nun
auch ein freier Tag, den der P. Rektor zur Feier eines
nationalen Ereignisses bewilligt hatte.
Der Himmel war heiter, deshalb waren schon am Morgen
manche Zöglinge ausgeflogen. Unter der Schar derjenigen aber, die
freiwillig oder unfreiwillig daheim blieben und sich geräuschvoll auf
dem Spielplatz tummelten, befand sich Kenny, natürlich in der
denkbar schlechtesten Stimmung. Er konnte sich mit dem gleichen
Schicksal der meisten seiner Genossen trösten, die seit längerer Zeit
den Ehrenvorzug ebenfalls nicht mehr besaßen.
In der übelesten Laune trieben sie sich jetzt auf dem Hofe umher
und suchten sich womöglich aller Aufsicht zu entziehen, um eine
ihrem Geschmacke zusagende Unterhaltung zu finden.
Da bemerkte Kenny, daß der Waschsaal, der sonst immer
geschlossen war, offen stand. Ah! vielleicht ließ sich dort etwas
anstellen. Sogleich holte er Prescott und Skipper herbei und betrat
mit ihnen den Raum. Im Hintergrunde desselben war eben ein
Zögling, ein kleines, zartes Kind, beschäftigt, seine Schuhe zu
wichsen. Er erschrak, als er die drei Gesellen in der Thüre erblickte.
„O bitte, kommt doch nicht herein!“ flehte er. „Ich durfte die Thüre
nicht aufstehen lassen. Aber ich habe ganz vergessen, sie zu
schließen. Bitte, bleibt doch draußen! Wenn sonst etwas geschieht,
werde ich bestraft.“
„Ah, bist Du es, Granger?“ sprach Kenny, ohne auf die Bitte zu
achten. „Du solltest doch längst spazieren gegangen sein. Du
gehörst ja zu den Braven. Was hast Du hier verloren?“
„Ich mache mich fertig, um meine Mutter abzuholen. Sie kommt
mit dem Zehn-Uhr-Zug.“
„Dann mach’ auch, daß Du hinaus kommst!“ knurrte Kenny
unwirsch. „Wir drei wollen hier allein sein.“
„O, ich darf Euch nicht drin lassen. Wenn ich fertig bin, muß ich
den Saal abschließen und P. Scott den Schlüssel gleich
wiederbringen.“
„Daraus wird nichts, Granger! Marsch hinaus! Etwas hurtiger!
Verstanden?“
Der gewissenhafte Kleine nahm seine ganze Energie zusammen
und erklärte:
„Ich thue, was der Pater gesagt hat. Wollt Ihr hier bleiben —
meinetwegen! Dann sperre ich Euch ein.“
„Das wirst Du bleiben lassen! — Vorwärts! hinaus mit Dir!“
„Laß ihn, Kenny,“ sprach Skipper leise. „Wir gehen hinaus und
sperren ihn selber ein.“
Granger stand jetzt an der Thüre, zog den Schlüssel aus der
Tasche und schob ihn mit zitternder Hand ins Schloß. Er fürchtete
sich vor den großen Burschen, aber ein Feigling war er nicht. Um
jeden Preis wollte er seine Pflicht erfüllen.
„Wollt Ihr hinaus?“ fragte er schüchtern.
Statt einer Antwort stieß ihn Kenny bei Seite, zog den Schlüssel
wieder aus der Thüre und steckte ihn ein. Seine Freunde hatten
indessen von dem Saal schon völlig Besitz ergriffen. Für sie war es
ein Hochgenuß, die Seifenstücke, Kämme, Handtücher, und was
sonst niet- und nagellos war, durcheinander zu werfen. Voll
Schrecken erblickte Granger die Verwüster in ihrer Thätigkeit. Aber
was konnte er machen? Er begann laut zu weinen.
„Ich gehe zu P. Scott und sage ihm, Du hättest den Schlüssel,
Kenny.“
„Was?“ donnerte ihn Kenny an. „Nimm Dich in acht! das sage ich
Dir! Sonst geht’s Dir schlimm.“
Skipper wiederholte seinen ersten Vorschlag:
„Wir sperren ihn selber ein.“
„Prächtig!“ jubelte Prescott schadenfroh. „Dann sieht es noch
dazu aus, als rührte diese Unordnung von ihm her. Es schadet dem
unschuldigen Kinde gar nicht, wenn es auch mal eine Strafe
bekommt. Nicht weglaufen, Granger!“ sprach er höhnend zu dem
hilflosen Kleinen, indem er ihn ergriff und festhielt. „Du sollst auch
einmal merken, daß eine Strafe weh thut.“
„Nein, das geht doch nicht!“ meinte Skipper, etwas verdutzt über
den Plan, den er angeregt.
„Wir sollten besser selbst hier bleiben,“ sprach Kenny.
„Das nützt uns wenig,“ warf Skipper ein. „P. Scott wird den
Schlüssel vermissen und uns hier entdecken. Dann geht es uns
schlimm.“
„Ich weiß, was wir thun!“ entschied Prescott nach einigem
Bedenken. „Wir schließen die Thüre nicht, sondern schicken den
Schlüssel gleich durch einen andern dem P. Scott zurück und lassen
sagen, Granger sei schon zur Bahn. Ihn selbst sperren wir in die
Lederkammer, damit er uns nicht verrät. Vorwärts mit ihm! — Nicht
so strampeln, Du Feigling!“
Die Lederkammer war ein dunkler Raum am andern Ausgange
des Waschsaals unter einer breiten Treppe, wo Schuhe,
Fußballüberzüge und ähnliches Lederzeug aufbewahrt wurden.
Der arme Granger wurde totenblaß. In den ersten Augenblicken
setzte er sich zur Wehr, freilich vergebens; dann bat er flehentlich
um Schonung, er müsse ja seine Mutter abholen; umsonst. Nur noch
ein paar Schritte war man von dem schrecklichen, dunkeln Loche
entfernt. Da schrie er in seiner Angst und Verzweiflung laut um Hilfe.
Kenny ergriff schnell ein Handtuch und wollte es mit einem Ende
Granger in den Mund pressen. Auf einmal flog er zappelnd an die
Wand und sah am hellen Tage den ganzen Himmel voll Sterne.
„Ihr Bengel!“ rief Tom Playfair, während ein zweiter Schlag
Prescott zu Boden streckte. „Ihr Bengel!“ Und auch Skipper hatte
einen gründlichen weg.
Tom hatte Grangers Angstrufe vernommen und war so schnell
herbeigeeilt, daß alle drei ihre Püffe schon in Sicherheit hatten,
bevor sie wußten, daß jemand anders da sei.
Jetzt aber wandten sie sich wutentbrannt gegen ihn.
„Er muß mit hinein!“ rief Kenny, der sich am schnellsten wieder
erhoben hatte. Zugleich ergriff er den wehrlosen Granger und stieß
ihn in die Lederkammer, vor deren Thüre sich jetzt ein heißes
Ringen entspann.
„O Du Abgott aller Knirpse!“ schrie Prescott außer sich vor Zorn.
„Jetzt sollst Du demütig werden!“
Tom, für sein Alter sehr stark und gewandt, schlug um sich, was
er nur konnte. Allein, obwohl die Drei manchen empfindlichen Puff
zu fühlen bekamen, so hätte er ihren vereinten Kräften doch auf die
Dauer nicht zu widerstehen vermocht.
Da kam unerwartet P. Scott mit ernster Miene die Treppe herab.
Sofort war Tom frei, die drei Burschen aber wurden schamrot und
zitterten wie Espenlaub ob der Dinge, die da kommen sollten. Der
Pater sprach kein Wort. Langsam und ruhig stieg er noch die beiden
untersten Stufen hinunter und trat vor sie hin, als suche er den
Zusammenhang der Dinge ohne Frage zu ermitteln.
Tom erhob sich und schlug den Staub ein wenig von seinen
Kleidern. Dann öffnete er die Thüre der Lederkammer und befreite
den zitternden Granger.
„Da, Willy,“ sagte er mit dem gewöhnlichen Tone seiner Stimme,
„nimm ein paar Datteln!“
P. Scott beobachtete alles. Aber bald verwandelte sich seine
abwartende Miene in den Ausdruck nicht des Zornes, sondern der
Trauer.
„Hätte ich es nicht mit eigenen Augen gesehen,“ sprach er, „so
würde ich es nicht für möglich halten, daß Mauracher Zöglinge
solche Gemeinheiten begehen können.“
Er hielt einen Augenblick inne. Diese einfachen, schmerzerfüllten
Worte waren für die Schuldigen härter als die unsanfteste Anrede
hätte sein können; nur Prescott schien sich nicht betroffen zu fühlen.
„Ich hätte nie gedacht, daß ich noch mit Knaben
zusammenwohnen müßte, welche handeln wie Wilde. Jetzt geht Ihr
Drei! Ich bin nicht in der Verfassung, die rechte Strafe für diese
Roheit zu bestimmen. Morgen werde ich Euch wieder sprechen.“
„Sie wollen uns doch nicht roh nennen!“ versetzte Prescott frech.
„Wie ich Euch nenne, darauf kommt es nicht an, sondern darauf,
wie Ihr Euch betragt. Und ein armes, hilfloses Kind in ein solches
Loch einzusperren, das bringen nur rohe, ja wilde Jungen fertig.“
„Playfair,“ sprach er, als die Sünder sich wie begossene Pudel
von dannen geschlichen, „Du bist doch nicht verletzt? Ich fürchte, sie
haben Dich etwas arg mitgenommen.“
„Gar nicht, Pater!“ war die heitere Antwort. „Ich habe nur etwas
mehr Bewegung gehabt, als ich heute Morgen voraussah; denn ich
wollte erst am Nachmittag spazieren gehen.“
„Du bist ein braver Junge, Playfair.“ Dann wandte er sich an den
Kleinen, dessen Thränen noch immer flossen: „Haben sie Dir weh
gethan, Willy?“
„Nein,“ schluchzte Willy, begann aber ruhiger zu werden.
„Komm’, Willy, ich will Dir helfen, Deine Kleider wieder in
Ordnung zu bringen,“ fuhr der Präfekt fort und nahm eine Bürste.

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A Dynamic Theory of Populism in

Power: The Andes in Comparative

Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press

© Oxford University Press 2022

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in

You must not circulate this work in any other form

CIP data is on file at the Library of Congress

I put for a generall inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and

1. Introduction: Democracy and Populism  1

1.1. The Trajectory of Unconstrained Populism in Power 20

of a populist leader to the demise of a democracy. Since the erosion of de-

my fellow panelists and discussants: Felipe Albuquerque, Cynthia Arnson,

ADN Nationalist Democratic Action

PAIS Alliance Proud and Sovereign Homeland Alliance

AUC United Self-​Defense Forces of Colombia

PCP-​Shining Path Communist Party of Peru-​Shining Path

From Democratization to De-​Democratization

engaged in a vibrant debate about the dynamics and causes of democrati-

replacement of chief executives and other political offices.

(Levitsky and Way 2010), the mechanics of their functioning (Schedler

Populism and Competitive Authoritarianism

minimalist definition of democracy.

as diminished forms of democracy (Levitsky and Way 2010, 3–​4). According

established parties. Similarly, Haggard and Kaufman (2016, 232) speak of

Contributions to the Literature

Since the publication of Bermeo’s influential article, additional work has

executives during their moments of acute confrontation with the opposition

phenomena.” A similarly extensive debate exists about its causes.3 Because of

12). This “political-​strategic” approach to populism has a venerable tradition

Case Selection: Populism in the Andes

I use five presidencies in the Andes to test my dynamic theory of populism

combination of similar historical and cultural contexts (religion, ethnic di-

The Argument in Brief: A Dynamic Theory of

The theory of the dynamics of populism in power developed here relies on

Figure 1.1 The Trajectory of Unconstrained Populism in Power

populist governance takes root.6 If populist leaders are effectively con-

presidents. Superpresidentialism implies the total subordination of the leg-

Chapter 2 details the dynamic theory of populism in power advanced in this

You might also like

1. Introduction: Democracy and Populism 1

AUC United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia

PCP-Shining Path Communist Party of Peru-Shining Path

From Democratization to De-Democratization

as diminished forms of democracy (Levitsky and Way 2010, 3–4). According

12). This “political-strategic” approach to populism has a venerable tradition