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i

Advanced Praise for Intelligence Success and Failure

“Psychological dysfunctions have long been a preoccupation of post-

mortems on intelligence failures. Bar-Joseph and McDermott contribute
important insights of this sort regarding failures in warning and response.
More importantly, however, they go further to apply them in powerful
ways to the all-too­neglected dimension of intelligence studies: cases of
success in assessment and decision. Their study provides new perspectives
on old cases and useful lessons for future analysts.”
Richard K. Betts, Director, Saltzman Institute of War
and Peace Studies, Columbia University,
and author of Enemies of Intelligence

“This fascinating book, based on a series of important case studies,

moves the reader squarely into the realm of psychology—a discipline too
often ignored in political science and national security studies—as these
outstanding authors search for reasons why some policymakers are unable
to understand and cope with indicators that point toward an incipient
surprise attack.”
Dr. Loch K. Johnson, Regents Professor of
International Affairs, University of Georgia

“This finely crafted study makes a major contribution to the intelligence

literature. It is an extraordinary combination of theory and historical
detail that enriches and adds a new dimension to our understanding of
intelligence and deterrence failure.”
James J. Wirtz, Dean, School of International
Graduate Studies, Naval Postgraduate School
ii
iii

Intelligence Success and Failure

iv
v

Intelligence Success
and Failure
The Human Factor
vwv
Uri Bar-​Joseph and Rose McDermott

1
vi

1
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers
the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education
by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University
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vii

In memory of Alexander George,

Michael Handel, and Amos Tversky,
and the ever vital presence of Robert Jervis.
viii
ix

CONTENTS

Acknowledgments  xiii

Introduction  1

PART I: The Theoretical Framework

1. Surprise Attack: A Framework for Discussion   9
a. The concept and the context   9
b. Surprise attacks: success and failure   13
c. Surprise attacks: academic comparative studies   17
d. Pearl Harbor: uniqueness and methodological implications   19
e. Warning failures: the human factor   25
2. Examining the Learning Process   27
a. Psychological factors   29
i. Psychological factors and the learning process   29
ii. Social psychological factors: universal contributions   31
b. Unique psychological issues   41
i. Personality style: openness   42
ii. Narcissism   45
c. Applying the learning process to examine the nature
of failure and success   48

PART II: The Empirical Evidence

3. The First Dyad: Barbarossa and the Battle for Moscow   53
Introduction  53
Case Study I: The Failure   56
a. Hitler’s road to war   56
b. The Soviet surprise   61
i. The Soviet intelligence assets   61
ii. The information   67
iii. Intelligence estimate and the decision-​making process   74

( ix )
x

(x) Contents

c. Explaining the lack of preparedness   84

i. State level   84
ii. Decision-​making   87
iii. The personal level   87
Case Study II: Success: The Battle for Moscow   97
a. The setting   99
i. The dilemma   99
ii. The information   101
iii. The decision and its impact   105
b. The explanation   110
i. The issue at stake   111
ii. The quality of the intelligence information   111
iii. Decision-​making   112
iv. Stalin’s learning process   115
4. The Second Dyad: The USA in the Korean War   123
Introduction  123
Case Study I: Failing to Forecast the War   124
a. The road to war   124
b. The American surprise   127
i. The American intelligence assets   127
ii. The information and its estimate   130
c. Explaining the lack of preparedness   135
i. State level   136
ii. Decision-​making   141
iii. The personal level   143
d. Summary   143
Case Study II: Failure II: The Chinese Intervention of Fall 1950   143
a. The Chinese road to war   145
b. The American surprise   147
i. The intelligence information and its estimate   147
ii. The decision-​making process: Washington,
Tokyo, Korea   153
c. Explaining the intelligence failure   159
i. The state level   161
ii. Decision-​making   163
iii. The individual level   171
╇ xi

Contentsâ•… (â•›x iâ•›)

5. The Third Dyad: Intelligence Failure and Success in the War

of Yom Kippurâ•…â•… 184
Introductionâ•…â•…184
Case Study I:╇ The Failure╅╅ 188
a.╇ Egypt’s road to warâ•…â•… 188
b.╇ Israel’s surpriseâ•…â•… 191
i.╇ Israel’s intelligence assetsâ•…â•… 191
ii.╇ The information and its estimate╅╅ 194
c.╇ Explaining the failure╅╅ 201
i.╇ State level╅╅ 201
ii.╇ Decision-╉making╅╅ 204
iii.╇ The personal level╅╅ 207
Case Study II:╇ The Success╅╅ 216
a.╇ The setting╅╅ 216
b.╇ The intelligence warning of October 12 and its impact╅╅ 221
c.╇ Explaining success╅╅ 223
╛i.╇ State level╅╅ 224
╛ ii.╇ Decision-╉making forums╅╅ 228
iii.╇ The individual level╅╅ 230
a. Eli Zeiraâ•…â•… 230
b. Zvi Zamirâ•…â•… 232
6. Conclusionsâ•…â•… 235

Indexâ•…â•…245
xii
xiii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Our overriding debt lies with Robert Jervis for providing the original idea
of studying intelligence successes which inspired this work. We are also very
grateful to him for his pioneering work in this area, and for his helpful advice
and suggestions throughout the process of writing this book. We are deeply
grateful to him for all his contributions.
We are also very grateful to the many people at Oxford University Press
who have helped shepherd this work to completion: David Pervin for his origi-
nal interest in the project and for introducing us to David McBride, and David
McBride for his support and encouragement of this project from the outset;
Rob Wilkinson for his careful help with project managing the book; Emily
MacKenzie for her kindness and responsiveness to all manner of inquiries;
and Kathleen Weaver and Anne Rusinak for their help with production and
publicity.
Uri Bar-Joseph would like to extend his heartfelt thanks to the following
colleagues, friends and family:
To Joshua Teicher, for calling my attention to the theory of the need for
cognitive closure (NFCC). This theory furnished me with the psychological key
I needed to understand the personality of Israel’s military intelligence direc-
tor, Maj. Gen. Eli Zeira, the main culprit in the intelligence fiasco of the Yom
Kippur War in 1973. It also deepened my belief that providing comprehensive
explanations of intelligence failures demands looking into the personality of
key actors in the warning-response process.
To Nehemia Burgin, a brilliant and original thinker as well as a great expert
on Russian and Soviet history; to Dima Adamsky, a student who became a
colleague and friend; and to Yaacov Falkov, an expert on partisan intelligence
in the Great Patriotic War, to whom I owe several very useful insights into the
Russian/Soviet conduct in Barbarossa and the Battle for Moscow. Their exper-
tise supplied me with the safety net that I needed in order to investigate these
complex case studies with (hopefully) minimal mistakes.
To Yu Bin, an expert on the Chinese involvement in the Korean War and
a personal friend since our first meeting at Stanford in 1985, who played a
similar role with regard to the Korean War case studies.

( xiii )
xiv

( xiv ) Acknowledgments

To Udi Eiran, Arie Kruglanski, and Jack Levy, for their generosity in answer-
ing my questions.
To Michael Handel, a genuine intellectual, original thinker, and the best
teacher I have ever had, who inspired me to pursue intelligence studies.
To Alexander George, my main source of inspiration during post-graduate
studies at Stanford University.
And finally to Nir for always being on hand with useful editorial sugges-
tions and to the rest of my family, especially Talila and Nina.
Rose McDermott would like to thank:
My father, Lt. Commander Leo George Dwyer McDermott, USN, Ret.
who served on the USS Sunnadin which was stationed in Pearl Harbor on
December 7 1941, and whose experience that day, and the lifelong conse-
quences which resulted, spurred my interest in all things military in general,
and the critical importance of proper intelligence in parti­cular. He received
commendation for his 36 straight hours of effort that day fishing men out
of the Harbor and trying to salvage the ships that were hit. He believed to
his dying day on June 2 1979, wrongly I now think, that Roosevelt knew
about the incipient attack and allowed it to happen in order to bring the
United States into the War. He lost a lot of close friends that day, and he
never forgot, nor ever forgave, Roosevelt. Indeed, he made me pee on his
grave when I was 2 years old. Although I have no memory of it, and I com-
pletely understand his motivation, I did go out to the grave and apologize
when I was working in the Hyde Park archives for my Presidential Illness
book. My father was at the opening of the USS Arizona Memorial Museum
and went down the list saying all the names, followed by, “I knew him …
he was a great guy …” after too many names. And despite my making endless
trips taking visitors to the memorial, he never returned. I gave his memora-
bilia, including the flag that flew on his ship that day, to the museum when
I left Hawaii. I kept two items: a sterling silver knife from the officer’s mess
which has the ship’s name carved on the side; and a solid brass garbage can he
retrieved from the ship that I use in my bathroom to this day to remind me of
both the transience of life and the tenacity of memory.
Philip Tetlock for suggesting Amy Edmondson whose work on learning in
medical teams proved very helpful and influential for informing our under-
standing of how this process works in other kinds of teams.
Amos Tversky for providing the foundations of my understanding of human
psychological processes in general and biases in decision making in particular.
His stress on the importance of asking more complex and interesting ques-
tions, rather than seeking particular kinds of answers, provided a model for
thinking about how the best work in intelligence should proceed. Although
he died many years ago, on June 2 1996 of the same disease as my father,
melanoma, the training he offered continues to deeply inform my scholarship.
xv

Intelligence Success and Failure

xvi
1

Introduction

A lthough surprising an opponent is a goal as old as human conflict, the

systematic study of the theory of strategic surprise started only dur-
ing the Cold War. This was a time when the experience that was gained in
WWII combined with the Western fear of a Soviet surprise attack to pro-
duce a growing body of literature whose main focus was to explain warn-
ing failures. Roberta Wohlstetter’s pioneering work on the Pearl Harbor
attack1 paved the way for numerous studies, some of which focused on
a single case study2 while others, of a more comparative nature, used a
vast number of cases.3 Their goal was the same—​to provide answers to
the question: why do states so often fail to meet the challenge of surprise
attacks?

1. Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 1962).
2. In addition to Wohlstetter’s Pearl Harbor, the main books in this category
include Gordon W. Prange and Donald M. Goldstein, At Dawn We Slept: The Untold
Story of Pearl Harbor, rev. ed. (New York: Penguin, 1991); Gordon W. Prange, Pearl
Harbor: The Verdict of History, with Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon
(New York: Penguin, 1991); Henry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee, Pearl Harbor: Final
Judgement (New York: Crown, 1992); Barton Whaley, Codeword Barbarossa (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1974); Gabriel Gorodetsky, The Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German
Invasion of Russia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999); David Murphy, What
Stalin Knew? The Enigma of Barbarossa (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005);
Uri Bar-​Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise of Yom Kippur and Its Sources
(Albany: State University of New York, 2004).
3. The two most prominent works in this category are Richard K. Betts, Surprise
Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1982);
Ephraim Kam, Surprise Attack: The Victim’s Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1988).

(1)
2

(2) Introduction

Fundamentally, the corpus of works in the last 60 years ruled out insuffi-
cient information about the looming threat as a cause for warning fiascos.4
Instead, it suggested a plethora of explanations for the failure to translate
available information into concrete action. Some of them, such as conceal-
ment, deception, compartmentation, or the “cry-​wolf” syndrome, are more
unique to the dynamics between the initiator of the surprise attack and its
victim. Others are based on theoretical studies from other fields, primarily
works on obstacles to information processing. They are usually divided into
three levels of analysis: the individual,5 the small group,6 and the organiza-
tion.7 While most studies regard warning failures as the product of unin-
tentional actions, recent studies show that motivated biases among certain
key people in the warning-​response process can play a major role in the
debacle as well.8
Impressive as the body of literature on surprise attacks is, we identify in
it three lacunas: First, though much attention had been given to warning
failures, insufficient attention has been paid so far to cases of success, that
is, cases in which the victim correctly identified the enemy’s intentions and
acted accordingly, preventing a strategic surprise. Because we assert that
such successes are born of failure, we compare three pairs of case studies in
which the first is a failure and the second is either a success or a second fail-
ure. The three are Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the USSR
in June 1941 (failure), and the Battle for Moscow, which involved a cor-
rect estimate of Japan’s intentions four months later (success); the North
Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950 (failure) and the Chinese
intervention in the war five months later (failure); and the Arab attack on
Israel on Yom Kippur 1973 (failure) and the second Egyptian offensive
in the war six days later (success).The intervening variable that explains

4. For some exceptions to this rule, see discussion in Chapter 1.

5. Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 1957); Joseph De Rivera, The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy
(Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill, 1968); Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception
in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976); Irving L.
Janis and Leon Mann, Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and
Commitment (New York: Free Press, 1977); and Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos
Tversky, eds., Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1982).
6. Irving L. Janis, Groupthink (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982); Paul ’t Hart, Eric
K. Stern, and Bengt Sundelius, eds., Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and
Foreign Policy-​Making (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997).
7. Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban
Missile Crisis (New York: Longman, 1999); Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics
and Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1974).
8. Uri Bar-​Joseph and Jack Levy, “Conscious Action and Intelligence Failure,” Political
Science Quarterly 124, no. 3 (2009): 461–​88.
3

Introduction (3)

success or failure in each second case is the quality of the victim’s learning
process following the first failure.
The second lacuna involves the role of specific individuals in causing
major warning failures. Former studies discussed cognitive biases to recep-
tivity but rarely linked general pathologies to specific individuals’ psychol-
ogy. As we show in our study, the higher the resolution of the dynamics
that led to the failure, the more it becomes evident that the individuals
who were exposed to the same information about the looming threat esti-
mated the threat differently. Indeed, based on the information that has
become available in recent years about classic failures such as Barbarossa
and Yom Kippur, we can accurately map the behavior of individuals accord-
ing to the accuracy of their estimates prior to the attack. Such estimates
can involve assessments of many different aspects of a situation, from the
number of troops and weapons an enemy possesses to the subjective prob-
ability of threat, danger or risk. Given that these individuals played a major
role in each of our cases, we seek not only to identify them but also to
explain the nature of their failings. Here we use ample evidence concerning
their personalities to analyze their way of thinking, and thus to explain
why they fell victim to particular psychological biases. While some of these
biases may be cognitive and unmotivated in nature, more often problems
arise as a result of meaningful psychopathologies on the part of important
decision-​makers. Specifically, we find that a high degree of narcissism, in
particular, a common characteristic of many leaders, constitutes an espe-
cially prominent and problematic block to successful learning from infor-
mation or experience. In leaders like MacArthur this feature becomes
magnified when they surround themselves with sycophants and yes men
who simply tell them what they want to hear.
Thirdly, most studies of surprise attacks focus on the American experi-
ence in the field, primarily surrounding the Pearl Harbor and 9/​11 attacks.
We assume that to build a general theory of warning failures, detailed study
of other cases is required. Our study provides a proof concept that learning
from experience proves to be critical in distinguishing success from failure,
and that particular psychopathologies can impair the ability of decision-​
makers to undertake this task successfully. Notably, we do not claim that
our conclusions are of a universal nature. Certainly, other work can help
determine the conditions under which our suppositions appear operative,
as well as and specify its particular limitations. Broader claims of generaliz-
ability will have to wait until such further in-​depth comparative studies of
other significant cases in the field are made, primarily those we mention in
our introduction. But we do assert that our conclusions are valid for the six
cases we present in this book. As a result, our study provides an important
4

(4) Introduction

plausibility probe based on detailed, extensive, and often newly uncov-

ered empirical evidence. Such an examination can help generate additional
hypotheses about strategic surprise and the individual and organizational
structures that serve to either support or undermine intelligence successes
and failures. And given the significance and historical importance of the
cases we examine, we believe we have achieved a reasonable correlation
between the amount of empirical evidence we examine and the size of the
historical and theoretical advance we make.

The first part of this book sets its theoretical framework. We start with a
review of the studies of surprise attacks, and highlight what we consider to
be their main shortcomings. Specifically, we claim that Pearl Harbor con-
stitutes a unique case in which insufficient information about the target of
the Japanese attack was the main cause of the failure and that as a result,
its centrality in the study of warning failures created a methodological
bias.9 Instead of Wohlstetter’s classic explanation, emphasizing the impor-
tance of signal-​to-​noise ratio, a trope often repeated in the wake of the
9/​11 attacks, we suggest that the explanation lies with specific obstacles to
high-​quality information processing among the most influential individu-
als in the warning-​response process. Then, given that the learning curve is
our intervening variable in explaining success and failure, the book’s sec-
ond chapter describes in detail the main psychological factors that deter-
mine the quality of this process, and links those to the study of sudden
attacks.
The second part of the book presents empirical evidence using the meth-
odology of structured focused analysis. Our first dyad encompasses the
Soviet surprise of June 1941 contrasted to Stalin’s effective use of intel-
ligence during the Battle for Moscow (October–​December 1941). The sec-
ond focuses on two consecutive American failures: the June 1950 surprise
involving North Korea’s invasion of South Korea, and the lack of warning
of a massive Chinese intervention in the war first in October 1950, and
then, even more strongly, in late November. The third dyad includes the
Israeli warning failure at the beginning of the 1973 October War and the
effective learning process that led to a high-​quality use of critical pieces of
intelligence six days later, which led to the strategic change in the course
of the war in its second half. Each of the six case studies starts with an
analysis of the initiator’s decision to launch war or a second attack. We
then turn to the victim and describe the main intelligence assets available

9. Rose McDermott and Uri Bar-​Joseph, “Pearl Harbor and Midway: The Decisive
Influence of Two Men on the Outcomes,” Intelligence and National Security (2016): 1–​14.
5

Introduction (5)

to meet this challenge, the information that was at its disposal on the eve
of the attack, the intelligence and the decision-​making processes that were
triggered by the intelligence information, and their outcomes. This part is
followed by explanations for each outcome at the state, decision-​making,
and personal levels.
In the last chapter, we summarize our main findings, suggest some
policy-​oriented conclusions and also suggest elements of a further research
agenda into the study of surprise attacks and warning failure and success.
6
7

PA R T I
vwv
The Theoretical Framework
8
9

CHAPTER 1
w
Surprise Attack
A Framework for Discussion

A. THE CONCEPT AND THE CONTEXT

The term strategic surprise refers to “the sudden realization that one has
been operating on the basis of an erroneous threat perception.”1 As this
definition implies, it encompasses the misperception not only of military
threats but also of political, diplomatic, social, economic, and any other
sudden developments that might have a significant impact on a given
state’s security. Moreover, whereas a strategic surprise usually connotes
something negative—​that is, the emergence of unexpected threats—​a
strategic surprise can also be positive. The sudden collapse of the Soviet
bloc was a welcome strategic surprise for the West, just as Egyptian presi-
dent Anwar Sadat’s 1977 peace initiative surprised the Israelis but allowed
them to end the conflict with their arch enemy.2
Being caught by a surprise attack means that “the victim does not appre-
ciate, whether, when, where or how the adversary will strike.”3 As a result
of such a failure, the victim lacks military preparedness and is highly vul-
nerable. Consequently, a successful surprise attack is considered to be a

1. Ariel Levite, Intelligence and Strategic Surprises (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1987), 1.
2. For an excellent discussion of diplomatic surprise, including Sadat’s peace initia-
tive, see Michael Handel, The Diplomacy of Surprise (London: Cass, 1981).
3. Richard K. Betts, Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning (Washington
DC: Brookings Institution, 1982), 4.

(9)
10

( 10 ) Intelligence Success and Failure

force multiplier.4 The destruction of the American fleet at Pearl Harbor

within just a few hours or the destruction of the Egyptian Air Force in the
first three hours of the 1967 War, with minimal damage to the attackers,
are typical examples of this effect. The effect of surprise attacks is also
psychological: the failure and its cost provoke emotions which, if strong
enough, may throw elements of the victim’s public and chain of command
off balance.5 Successful surprise attacks, however, do not necessarily pro-
duce a victory in war. As a rule, the longer the conflict is, the greater the
chance that the impact of the initial success will diminish. This is because
in most cases, the initiator is the weaker side, and the longer the conflict
goes on, the greater the ability of the victim to mobilize its resources and
to ultimately win the war.
The concept of surprise attack is neatly tied to other central concepts of
strategic theory, primarily deterrence and crisis. Deterrence is “the persua-
sion of one’s opponent that the cost/​or risks of a given course of action
he might take outweigh its benefits.”6 A crisis, in Herman’s classic defini-
tion, is a situation that meets three necessary conditions: “(1) threatens
one or more important goals of the state, that is, the group of authorita-
tive policy makers who constitute the state; (2) allows only short time for
decisions before the situation is significantly transformed; and (3) occurs
as a surprise to the policymakers.”7 Hence, if a crisis is the stage between
normal times and war, and deterrence aims at motivating the opponent to
avoid launching a war, the goal of surprise is to convince the target that its
deterrence strategy is still effective so that it will be unprepared when the
attack is launched. In other words, the goal of the surprise is to minimize
the time span of crisis stage—​the stage in which the defender can prepare
for the attack—​as much as possible. Under certain circumstances, such as
in the Yom Kippur War, the crisis stage can be cut to a few hours. In others,

4. Michael Handel, “Intelligence and the Problem of Strategic Surprise,” Journal of

Strategic Studies 7, no. 3 (1984): 229–​81, 229–​30.
5. Ephraim Kam, Surprise Attack: The Victim’s Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1988), 7.
6. Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 11.
7. Charles F. Herman, “Threat, Time, and Surprise: A Simulation of International
Crisis,” in Charles F. Herman, ed., International Crisis: Insights from Behavioral Research
(New York: Free Press, 1972), 187. Snyder and Diesing defined a crisis as “a sequence of
interactions between the governments of two or more sovereign states in severe con-
flict, short of actual war, but involving the perception of a dangerously high probabil-
ity of war.” See Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict among Nations: Bargaining,
Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crisis (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1977), 6. Given Herman’s emphasis on the elements of surprise and
limited time of response, we prefer his definition.
11

S u r p r is e At ta c k ( 11 )

for example, North Korea’s invasion of South Korea in June 1950, it was
completely eliminated: the first time President Truman understood that
there was a problem in the Korean Peninsula was after the North Korean
invasion had started.
Strategic warning in this context has a dual purpose. The first task is to
inform policymakers that their deterrence strategy has ceased to be effective
and that the enemy has decided to change the status quo using force. This
decision usually takes place long before the attack materializes: Hitler decided
to attack the USSR in the summer of 1940, even before ending the occupation
of France; the Japanese started planning the attack on Pearl Harbor in early
1941; and Sadat decided to attack Israel without waiting for additional arms in
October 1972, a year before the beginning of the Yom Kippur War. A warning
about such strategic shifts can create a mental and organizational framework
that would make the task of warning more feasible. Moreover, accurately esti-
mating the opponent’s intentions eliminates a common mistake in which the
victim asserts that the high state of the initiator’s military readiness is aimed
at deterrence, though in reality, it is aimed at attack. Stalin fell victim to such
wishful thinking in the days before the German attack, as did some Israeli
estimators on the eve of the Yom Kippur War. At the same time, in situations
in which one side attempts to deter and the other side ignores those deterrent
massages, the failure of deterrence may lead to a military strike, as was the
case with the Chinese attack against the UN forces in the fall of 1950.
The second task of strategic warning is to provide a high-​quality warn-
ing before the actual attack takes place. The quality of such a warning is
measured by two standards. One is the volume at which it is conveyed.
It should be clear and loud enough to convince the relevant policymakers
to take the actions necessary to meet the threat. The other is timing. The
warning should allow the victim sufficient time to take the measures neces-
sary to meet the threat.
Both standards are context dependent. Stalin was so certain in his belief
that Hitler would not attack in 1941 that even the excellent information
he received about Operation Barbarossa did not change his mind about the
nature of the threat he confronted. Similarly, Gen. Douglas MacArthur was
close-​minded when presented with warnings that a large-​scale Chinese
intervention in the Korean War was likely. Even after that intervention
took place, in late October 1950, MacArthur denied the possibility that
a second one might follow.8 On the other hand, in December 1941, the
American leadership estimated that a Japanese attack was possible and

8. MacArthur exhibited a similar pattern of behavior on December 8, 1941.

A Japanese attack on his air force in the Philippines destroyed half of it, including 18
of 35 B-​17s and 51 of 72 P-​40s. The attack was carried out nine hours after the attack
12

( 12 ) Intelligence Success and Failure

reacted immediately, the minute even a single concrete piece of solid infor-
mation arrived, despite lacking specific information about the intended
target. The source of the catastrophe in Pearl Harbor is to be found else-
where. And in Israel in 1973, some policymakers, such as prime minister
Golda Meir and the chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), sup-
ported the mobilization of the reserve army in response to a high-​quality
last-​minute warning, while others, such as defense minister Moshe Dayan,
estimated such a move to be premature.
Hence, there can be no standard for the clarity and the volume of the
warning. A warning that may convince one decision-​maker that a threat is
imminent might leave another still disbelieving. In this sense, the person-
alities of the decision-​makers and their belief systems are as critical to the
final outcome as the quality of the warning. The same is true with respect
to the timing of a warning that convinces policymakers to prepare for an
attack. Its quality is the function of the time it allows the victim to take the
preplanned measures necessary to forestall the effectiveness of the coming
attack. Getting the Red Army to fully deploy for the German onslaught in
1941 demanded that a decision be made and implemented weeks before
the attack. In the Israeli case of 1973, the decision needed to be made at
least 48 hours before an Arab attack. In the case Pearl Harbor, a few hours
would have allowed the ships to get out of the harbor, the planes to scram-
ble into the air, and other defensive measures to be taken that could have
reduced the severity of the damage to the US Pacific Fleet. And in 1967, a
15-​to 30-​minute warning would have enabled the Egyptian Air Force to
launch a number of its fighter planes to meet the Israeli attack planes in
the air and made it harder or impossible for them to accurately bomb the
runaways and prevent the takeoff of Egyptian aircraft.
The study of sudden attacks thus far has focused almost exclusively on
situations in which the attacks actually took place; however, a reassuring
estimate that the potential enemy does not intend to attack might be, in
certain circumstances, critical as well. As one of the case studies in this
book shows, on the eve of the Battle for Moscow, in late 1941, the Soviet
intelligence organizations provided Stalin with highly reliable informa-
tion that Japan’s Kwantung Army did not intend to attack Siberia. This
convinced Stalin to order the delivery of forces from the Far East Front

on Pearl Harbor. Despite repeated requests by his subordinates, MacArthur, who failed
to cope with “the urgent demands that were being made upon him,” avoided giving the
necessary orders, and his air force was still deployed in a peacetime manner. William
Bartsch, December 8, 1941: MacArthur’s Pearl Harbor (College Station: Texas A&M
University Press, 2012); William Manchester, American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur,
1880–​1964 (New York: Dell, 1978), 231.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
espero sino de la muerte que
dellos fue la causa. Y por tanto no
te deues fatigar en dar consejo a
quien no puedes dar socorro. E
no quieras ver más de mi daño,
sino que en sola la muerte está su
remedio. Verdad es que tu
intencion fue sana, mas tu
parecer es falso, pensando que
con hazer mayor tu mal que el
mio, me ponias en él algun
consuelo, y es al contrario; antes
me le quitas viendo que siendo el
tuyo tan pequeño te tenga tan
cegado que no conozcas la clara
differencia que hay del vno al
otro. Quieres tú hazer yguales tus
desseos e sospiros que de sola
passion de bien querer con tus
quexas nacen, con mis lagrimas
que la muerte de aquella por
quien yo alegre biuia lo causa.
¡Qué engaño recibes tan grande
queriendo ygualar con las
angustias mortales los
pensamientos ó congoxas
veniales! Por mi amor, que pues
bien me quieres, mal no me trates
tornando á enojarme con otra
semejante embaxada que tales
razones la acompañen. En
especial queriéndome dar a
entender que mis lastimas con el
tienpo y la razon se harán
menores, pues que es por el
contrario, que ante la razon, como
es razon, las hará siempre
mayores y el tiempo quanto mas
se alargará mas las hará alargar.
Porque quantos mas mis dias
fuesen pues que en todos y en
cada vno he de contino de sentir
nuevos e muchos dolores del bien
que he perdido, más seran las
penas que en ellos sentire. De
manera que quanto mas presto mi
vida se acabe tanto mas presto mi
mal se acabará, e quanto más
durare por el contrario. E si
quieres saber más claras razones
por do conozcas quanto mi
desuentura es mayor que la tuya,
escriueme las causas della e yo
te mostraré las de mi daño e assi
vernás en el verdadero
conocimiento de todo; y porque
conozcas della parte, glosa este
villancico y verlo has.

Si el remedio de mis males

es morir,
¿que vida me es el biuir?
Si en el mal de mi querella
no hay remedio sin la muerte,
claro está que desta suerte
la vicia es ocasion della,
pues si está el bien en
perdella
con morir,
todo el daño está en biuir.

LO QUE FLAMIANO HIZO

DESPUES DE HAUER OYDO Á
 FELISEL E LEIDA LA CARTA
Muy atentamente Flamiano
escuchó todas las cosas que
Felisel le contó y no podia menos
hazer de no derramar infinitas
lagrimas acompañadas de
muchos sospiros, e despues de
hauerle oydo començo a leer la
carta, e leyda como dicho es,
estuvo una pieça callando sin
ninguna cosa dezir; e passado un
poco espacio tornó a preguntar a
Felisel muchas cosas por menudo
particularmente, de las quales
cosas siendo muy bien de todas
informado, publicando lo mucho
que los males de Basquiran le
dolian, començo assi á dezir:
¡Por quantas vias e maneras en
esta misera vida los pesares e
desuenturas á los humanos
saltean de impensadas congoxas,
e aquellos más de perder estan
seguros que menos tienen que
perder puedan y en aquellos
menos los muy lastimados golpes
de la manzilla lastiman que más
gruesso o rudo el entendimiento
para sentirlo tienen! De manera
que en esta vida trabajosa no se
puede reposar ninguno del miedo
del perder sino con el misero
defeto de la pobreza, nin se
puede alcançar de carecer de no
doler sino con la mengua del
saber, e assi los que no tienen
fatigas con la pena del dessear,
los que algo posseen
atormentados del temor de
perder, los de agudo ingenio
lastimados con las vexaciones de
los acontecimientos desastrados,
los rusticos o grosseros
aborrecidos por su defecto, a los
vnos e a los otros nunca jamas
les falta lugar por do el mal entre.
De manera que biuir no se puede
por ninguna via sin penar. Al fin
todos desseamos alcançar las
prosperas vanidades desta que
llamamos fortuna e con este
desseo cegamos nuestro
entendimiento; ella con lo que nos
da turba nuestro juyzio; en
conclusion, quien menos della
alcança más sin remedio bive.
Pues quien no teme no pena,
quien pena no siente contento se
halla, quien contento viue siempre
está alegre, pues do está alegria
no hay tristeza, e quien no está
triste siempre con el plazer rie e
no llora. Como por el contrario
agora este sin ventura Vasquiran
e yo hazemos. El con lo que ha
perdido sin remedio de cobrarlo,
yo con lo que desseo sin
esperança de alcançarlo,
nuestros dias siempre en lagrimas
veremos consumir assi como
hazemos.
Acabado su razonamiento se
voluio a Felisel e dixole: Por mi
amor, que no ayas en fatiga tornar
a ver a tu amigo e mi hermano
Vasquiran, y lleuarle has vna carta
mia, porque aunque con las
razones della enojo reciba, más
vale que mi enojo le ocupe el
tiempo que no que el
pensamiento del suyo le trastorne
el juyzio con su dolor, como
podria acontecer, e aun a mí el
mio.
E ante que mi carta le des le dirás
de parte mia que aunque mis
embaxadas e cartas alguna
importunidad le den, más pesar e
fatiga siento yo de la de la que el
dolor a él le da, e que me parece
vna cosa que le deue a él
contecer assi como a mí, que el
platicar en las cosas de mi
passion tantas passiones me trae
a la memoria que de allí dan en el
pensamiento; del pensamiento
dan en el coraçon, llegados alli la
calor de su fuego haze destilar en
lagrimas por los ojos el pesar y en
sospiros por la boca las
congoxas. E assi andando de la
vna a la otra parte no dexan a sus
ponçoñas que en las entrañas se
reparen porque de tristeza las
ahogan, porque como sabe, dulce
compañia es á los atribulados
estas dos cosas, y que juzgue de
mi voluntad lo que deue y no lo
que le parece, e que ya sabe que
el buen marinero en la mayor
fortuna en medio del golfo busca
saluacion y en la tierra el mayor
peligro. E que assi yo en el golfo
de sus fortunas y en el de las
mias mejor podremos saluarnos
nauegando que no surgendo
sobre las ancoras de la
desesperacion en el puerto de los
agenos plazeres con nuestras
tristezas.
Pues recebida la carta Felisel y
todo su razonamiento bien
entendido, otro dia se partio. E
llegado á Felernisa halló que ya
Vasquiran a la ciudad era tornado,
el qual con mucho amor aunque
con poca alegria lo recibio.
Apeado que fue començaron
passeandose por vnos corredores
que sobre la huerta salian, a
hablar de muchas cosas entre las
quales Felisel le contó todo lo que
en las justas passadas hauia
passado. E despues de mucho
hauer los dos razonado a cenar
se retraxeron. E otro dia de
mañana hauiendo oydo missa
Vasquiran caualgó e Felisel con él
e salidos fuera de la ciudad
tornaron de nueuo al mesmo
razonamiento, en el qual le contó
todo lo que de palabra su amo le
hauia encomendado, y en el fin le
dió su carta, la qual assi dezia.
 CARTA DE FLAMIANO Á
VASQUIRAN EN RESPUESTA
DE LA SUYA
Basquiran, recebida que houe tu
carta e leyda, considerando el
amor que te tengo y la pena que
en ti conozco, aunque mi passion
me tiene atribulado vine en
conocimiento del engaño que con
el pesar recibes, de manera que
me ha sido forçado vsar contigo
tres cosas en mi carta. La primera
será consolarte de tu mal. La
segunda sanamente como amigo,
de tu demasiado sentimiento
reprehenderte e de los estremos
que con él hazes. La otra será
desengañarte del engaño que
recibes de ti mesmo en lo que
sientes, no conociendo la ventaja
que le haze lo que siento. E pues
eres discreto juzga mi intencion
que es sin malicia, y conoceras tu
yra ser demasiada. E has de
saber que a darte consuelo,
piedad me mueue; a reprehender
tu flaqueza, amistad me obliga; a
contradezirte me combida e aun
me costriñe la razon. Una cosa te
ruego, que no te desuies con la
passion de la verdad, porque más
presto vengas en conocimiento
della. E assi digo que para tu
consuelo deues mirar lo primero,
como todos somos más obligados
a loar lo que Dios haze que no a
querer lo que nuestra voluntad
dessea, e que quien esto no haze
como sabes, grauemente yerra
como hazes, en especial en estas
cosas de la muerte y de la vida
cuyos terminos estan en sola su
mano y secreto determinados, ni
como vees ninguno de los
mortales puede escusarse de no
pasar por este trance. Y querrias
agora tú repunar lo que no es
possible, e assi yerras todo lo
possible. A lo que he dicho que
quiero reprehender tu demasiado
quexarte, digo que semejantes
autos a los feminiles coraçones
son atribuydos e aun assi lo
demasiado parece feo, y en los
varones, en especial como tú, son
feamente reprouados. Mucho
llorar es de niños, poco suffrir es
de hembra. Bien sé que si a otro
lo viesses hazer, lo mismo e mas
le dirias, e libre que te haya
dexado la passion en ti lo
conoceras; pues corrige por Dios
con discrecion lo que los que
como yo no te aman te afearán
con razon e algunos con malicia
te juzgarán con menoscabo de tu
honrra, que ya sabes quanto mas
que la vida e todas las otras
cosas te deue ser cara. Lo tercero
que dixe que desengañarte queria
y contradezir, por tantas partes lo
puedo hazer que no sé por qual
començar. Te quexas porque
gozauas la cosa que en el mundo
mas amauas y que la has perdido
posseyendola; ninguna cosa se
possee segura, mas pareceme a
mi que pues que gozaste no
perdiste, sino que se acabó tu
gozo. Todas las cosas han de
hauer cabo, e aun a ti del gozo te
queda la vanagloria de lo que
alcançaste y la gloria de lo que
has gozado. Por la menor cosa de
las que tú has hauido que el
encendido fuego de mi deseo
alcançasse, sola vna hora, no
pediria más bien ni temeria más
mal e daria mill vidas en cambio,
e con tal morir me contaria más
glorioso que con biuir como biuo.
Bien sabes tú quanto más cara es
la cosa desseada mayor gloria es
alcançalla, e no hay más bien en
el desseo de complirlo e complido
ningun recelo queda dél; pues
¿qué te quedaua que pedir, ni qué
tienes de que quexarte si todo lo
que dessear se pudo alcançaste y
gozaste? Quissieras que no
houiera cabo? Aqui está tu yerro;
querer lo que no puede ser,
hauiendo gozado lo que puede
ser. Yo te ruego que te acuerdes
quál cosa te daua mas pena en el
tiempo que penando amauas; el
desseo de ver el fin de tu desseo
no teniendo esperança o agora el
dolor de la memoria del plazer
pasado. Sola vna cosa te
condena a que nunca deuieras
ser triste; esta fue el dia que
alcançaste lo que agora plañes,
porque claro manifiestas en el
dolor que muestras de lo que has
perdido el gran bien de lo que
ganaste en ganarlo, porque no
pudo menos ser el plazer que es
el pesar sino ante mas. Sin
ventura yo que todos los males sé
y padezco e para ninguno de
ningun bien tengo esperança. A ti
tu ventura te endereçó a lugar
donde el sobrado plazer plañes; a
mi mi desuentura me guió a parte
donde todas las esperanças e
razones no solo de gloria me
despiden, mas aun donde con mi
pena no me dexan viuir contento.
Assi que tú plañes hauer visto de
tu bien el cabo, yo desespero de
nunca verlo en mi mal. Tú plañes
agena muerte, yo desseo la mia
como esta cancion lo muestra.

Quien viue sin esperança

de ver cabo en su querella,
¿que puede esperar enella
pues remedio no se alcança?
¿Que vida puede viuir
quien viue desesperado?
pues no espera en su cuydado
mas remedio de morir,
con el qual esta en balança
de la vida por perdella
viendo que de su querella
ningun remedio se alcança.
RESPUESTA DE VASQUIRAN Á
FELISEL
Acabada de leer Vasquiran la
carta, hauiendo yo oydo el
razonamiento de Felisel se boluió
a el e dixole: Verdaderamente,
Felisel, más descanso siento
contigo que consuelo con las
cartas que me traes, porque tu
buena criança y el amor que me
tienes, e la voluntad que te tengo,
dan causa para lo vno; lo poco
que las cartas me aprouechan
quitan el aparejo á lo otro; e assi
huelgo más de verte a ti que de
responder a quien te embia,
porque tu buen seso, mi mucho
mal, tu reposo y buena razon con
mi fatigado e lastimado hablar, tu
mucha criança con mi poca
paciencia, mejor cierto las vnas
cosas con las otras se templan
que no hazen las ansias de
Flamiano con las mias. Las suyas
baylan e cantan, las mias gimen e
lloran; al templezillo sonarán
juntas. ¡Qué ensalada se hará de
su morado y encarnado e blanco
con mi pardillo e negro e amarillo!
El entre canciones, yo tras
lamentaciones, él haciendo
cimeras para justar, yo
inuenciones para sepulturas; casi
juntos andamos, el vno cantando,
el otro llorando e los dos
sospirando; de ti me pesa que
padeces sin merecello, porque él
con su porfia de embiarte te da
trabajo, yo con mi poca alegria te
do tristeza, de manera que los
dos te damos fatiga. A la verdad
porque tú me vengas a ver so
contento de responder a él, y assi
te ruego que aunque algo lo
sientas graue, que por mi amor lo
sufras e no dexes de venir
muchas vezes con la
importunidad de sus vanidades a
ver la de mis lástimas. E por esta
vez de palabra de mi parte no le
dirás ninguna cosa, porque vna
carta que le lleuarás le dirá lo que
no querra hauer oydo quando la
aya leydo.
Pues otro dia de mañana ante
que Felisel se leuantase vino a él
el camarero de Vasquiran el qual
le dixo como dos horas antes del
dia su señor se era partido para
aquella heredad donde la primera
vez lo hauia hallado, e diole la
letra que para Flamiano hauia de
lleuar, e con ella vna ropa suya
forrada en armiños de raso
carmesí, vn sayo de terciopelo
morado con vnas faxas de raso
blanco bordadas encima dellas de
oro e de grana vnas madexas,
con vna letra que dezia:

No m'a dexado alegria

que dexe su compañia.
Diole vn jubon de brocado que
con aquel atauio Vasquiran se
hauia vestido vn dia poco ante de
la muerte de su señora
acompañandola a vnas fiestas de
las bodas del conde de Camarlina
que cerca de la ciudad de
Felernisa se heran hechas, a las
quales ella fué combidada e
nunca quiso yr sin él; e diole vna
hacanea en que él hauia
caualgado aquel dia con vna
guarnicion de terciopelo morado,
con vnas franjas de hilo de plata e
bordada con la mesma bordadura
e dixole:
Esto te ha mandado dar mi señor
para en satisffacion de alguna
parte del trabajo que passas en
venirle á ver e para en señal del
amor que te tiene e aun por
respecto de quitar el
inconueniente de ver estas ropas
porque no le traya a la memoria el
dia que se las vestio que fue el
ultimo de sus plazeres y
contentamiento. E hauiendolo
todo Felisel recebido con la carta
de Vasquiran se partio para
donde su señor estaua. Llegado a
Noplesano donde le halló,
despues de muchos
razonamientos passados le
mostró todo lo que el camarero de
Basquiran de su parte hauia
dado, e diole su carta la qual
Flamiano començo luego a leer, e
dezia en esta manera:

CARTA DE VASQUIRAN A
FLAMIANO
Si ansi como te puedo responder
e condenar tu razon pudiesse,
Flamiano, conortarme e dar
remedio á mi mal, quan presto los
dos seriamos satisffechos! A tus
consolaciones no quiero
responder pues que no me dan
consuelo; a tus reproches e
castigo, aunque á mi proposito
hazen poco, digo que no desseo
ni reprueuo lo que Dios haze e
ordena, ante por ello le doy
alabanças, pero esto no me
escusa a mi que no pueda plañir
lo que su juyzio me lastima con el
dolor que siento de lo que pierdo,
lo que si no hiziesse mostraria
menospreciar lo que él haze, o
seria juzgado por irracional. Dizes
que es fragilidad o poquedad casi
de niño o de hembra semejante
estremo. Mayor estremo seria
semejante crueldad que la que
dizes, porque si miras el estremo
de mi pérdida poco estremo es el
de mi lloro. Temes que no sea
juzgado por lo que hago, mas
temeria serlo si esso hiziesse, en
especial que ya tú me embias á
dezir que lagrimas y sospiros son
descanso de los males. Pues
¿cómo me consejas vna cosa en
tu razon y escriuesme otra
contraria en tu carta? Bien
muestras en lo que hazes lo que
dizes, que tu passion te tiene tan
desatinado que no sabes de ti
parte e quieresla saber de mi. A lo
tercero te respondo que dizes que
no perdi sino que se te figura que
se me acabó mi bien; pues tú lo
dizes ¿qué quieres que
responda? si te parece que es
pequeño mal acabarse el bien, tú
lo juzga pues que sabes que a
esta razon el Dante respondió:
Quien ha perdido el bien...
Dizes que me deue bastar la
vanagloria de lo que alcancé e la
gloria de que gozé; dizes verdad
que estas me bastan para sentir
lo que yo siento e mucho más,
porque si quanto la gloria de lo
ganado fue grande y el dolor de
hauerlo perdido fuesse ygual, no
bastaria mi juyzio a sofrirlo como
el tuyo no basta a entenderlo.
Dizes que por la menor cosa de
las que yo gozé que tu
alcançasses, contento darias mill
vidas, tú darias mill por hauerlo
¿e no quieres que pierda yo vna
por perderlo? Dizes que no hay
más bien en el desseo de
complirlo; dizes verdad; mas
tampoco no hay mayor mal en el
bien que perderlo; dizes que
alcancé todo lo que se pudo
dessear, también perdi todo lo
que se pudo recelar; e dizes que
gozé de lo possible, tambien peno
lo possible. Dizes que me
acuerde del tiempo que penando
desseaua sin esperança; ¿no te
parece que peno agora con
menos esperança? pues si
entonce me penaua la poca
esperança del desseo, ¿no me
dará más pena agora la
desesperación de no cobrar lo
que he perdido? Quexaste que
penas sin esperança e que
desesperas della; si no esperas lo
que ganar se puede no recelarás
perderlo como yo hize; no deuio
ser tuya la letra que dixo: todo es
poco la possible. Pones por
dificultad los merecimientos e
virtudes e noblezas de Belisena,
que son las cosas que
contentamiento te deuen dar. Esto
es querer con el defecto de tus
flaquezas dar culpa á tus virtudes.
E señalaslo en vna cosa que
dizes: que por sola vna hora que
gozasses darias mill vidas; más
razon seria ofrecerlas porque ella
viuiesse mill años como es razon.
No te oya nadie tal razon; que
parece que desseas poco, o
mereces poco, o tienes tu desseo
en menos, porque la cosa cara
ante de hauerse dessea
alcançarse, despues de hauida
dessease posseer, de manera
que nunca el deseo pierde su
oficio. Pluguiera a Dios que sin
alcançar lo que he perdido,
perdiera yo la vida, porque ella
viniera e yo no gozara, porque
agora no plañera, o que de nueuo
pudiesse con la que me queda
conprar la que ella perdio, que
con esto seria mas contento que
con viuir como viuo, como esta
cancion mia te mostrará.

Yo no hallo a mi passion
comienço, cabo ni medio,
ni descanso, ni razon,
ni esperança, ni remedio
Es tanta mi desuentura,
tan cruel, tan sin medida,
qu'en la muerte ni'n la vida
no s'acaba mi tristura,
ni el seso ni la razon
no le pueden hallar medio,
ni tiene consolacion
ni esperança ni remedio.

FLAMIANO A FELISEL
Leyda que houo Flamiano la letra
mandó llamar a Felisel e dixole.
Pareceme que segun Vasquiran e
yo con nuestras passiones te
tratamos que con mas razon te
podras tu quexar de nosotros que
nosotros de nuestras quexas, o
mejor será que te consolemos de
la fatiga que te damos que no tú a
nosotros de lo que sentimos. Esto
te digo porque agora que hauias
menester descansar con algun
reposo del trabajo que has
passado en estos caminos que
has hecho, te tengo aparejado de
nueuo otro trabajo en que
descanses. Esto es que yo he
sabido que la señora duquesa va
a caça la semana que viene con
otras muchas señoras e damas
que para ello tiene combidadas;
ya vees qué jornada es para mi,
pues que mi señora Belisena va
allá. Es menester que tomes por
descanso esta fatiga; da recaudo
a mi necessidad con tu diligencia,
e mañana daras orden como se
haga para mi vn sayo e una capa,
e librea para estos moços e pajes
de las colores que te dare en vn
memorial, e que hagas adereçar
vn par de camas de campo e mis
tiendas e algunas confituras e
todas las cosas que te pareceran
que son necesarias para tal
menester, porque su señoria
estara allá toda la semana y es
necessario que para estos
galanes que alla yran vayas bien
proueydo, en especial de cosas
de colacion; por causa de las
damas te prouee sobre todo. Assi
que reposa esta noche y de
mañana sey comigo e acabarte
he de dar la informacion de lo que
has de hazer.
AQUI EL AUCTOR CUENTA LO
QUE FELISEL OTRO DIA
PUSO EN ORDEN, E TODOS
LOS ATAUIOS DE LAS
DAMAS E CAUALLEROS
QUE A LA CAÇA FUERON, E
ALGUNAS COSAS QUE EN
ELLAS SE SIGUIERON

Otro dia de mañana venido a la

camara de Flamiano Felisel,
Flamiano le mandó que para el le
hiziesse hazer vn sayo de
terciopelo encarnado con vnas
faxas de raso blanco e vnos
vasariscos[286] de oro bordados
en ellas, con vna letra que
dixesse.

Lo que este liaze hazeys

a quantos veys.

E dixole mas. Harásme hazer vna

capa de paño amarillo con vnas
tiras de raso blanco y encarnado
antorchadas vnas con otras de
tres en tres tiras, guarnecida toda
la capa con vna letra que diga.

Son de vuestra condicion

porque s'espere de vos
la color do van las dos.

Harás más para los pajes ropetas

de paño encarnado guarnecidas
de raso blanco, y a los moços de
espuelas vnos capotines
encarnados e la manga yzquierda
blanca; las calças la derecha
blanca y encarnada, la yzquierda
amarilla, e harás para todos
jubones de raso amarillo e en las
mangas derechas vna letra
bordada que diga.

¿Qué se puede esperar

dellas
sino lo que va con ellas?

Acabado de darle la informacion

de lo que hauia de hazer, con
mucha diligencia Felisel dio en
todo complido recaudo.
Assimesmo todas las damas e
muchos caualleros que a la caça
hauian de yr se atauiaron de la
manera que adelante vereys; e
fue assi concierto entre todas las
damas que no pudiessen
atauiarse para esta jornada sin
que cada vna llevase en las ropas
o guarniciones sus dos colores
principales, las quales en las
inuenciones se señalarán. Sabido
esto los caualleros todos se
vistieron de los colores de las
damas que seruian con alguna
otra color que les hazia al
proposito de la letra, como arriba
haueys oydo que Flamiano
añadio lo amarillo a las dos
colores de la señora Belisena.