Global Political Economy: Evolution

and Dynamics 5th Edition Robert

O’Brien
Visit to download the full and correct content document:
https://textbookfull.com/product/global-political-economy-evolution-and-dynamics-5th-
edition-robert-obrien/
More products digital (pdf, epub, mobi) instant
download maybe you interests ...

An Introduction to Medical Spanish: Communication and

Culture 5th Edition Robert O. Chase

https://textbookfull.com/product/an-introduction-to-medical-
spanish-communication-and-culture-5th-edition-robert-o-chase/

The Political Economy of Xenophobia in Africa 1st

Edition Adeoye O. Akinola (Eds.)

https://textbookfull.com/product/the-political-economy-of-
xenophobia-in-africa-1st-edition-adeoye-o-akinola-eds/

Regulating Blockchain Law Technology and the Ethics of

Political Economy Robert Herian

https://textbookfull.com/product/regulating-blockchain-law-
technology-and-the-ethics-of-political-economy-robert-herian/

The Political Economy of Peripheral Growth: Chile in

the Global Economy José Miguel Ahumada

https://textbookfull.com/product/the-political-economy-of-
peripheral-growth-chile-in-the-global-economy-jose-miguel-
ahumada/
New Perspectives on the History of Political Economy
1st Edition Robert Fredona

https://textbookfull.com/product/new-perspectives-on-the-history-
of-political-economy-1st-edition-robert-fredona/

International Political Economy Perspectives on Global

Power and Wealth J. Lawrence Broz

https://textbookfull.com/product/international-political-economy-
perspectives-on-global-power-and-wealth-j-lawrence-broz/

Unheard Voices: Women, Work and Political Economy of

Global Production Farah Naz

https://textbookfull.com/product/unheard-voices-women-work-and-
political-economy-of-global-production-farah-naz/

The Making Of Global Capitalism The Political Economy

Of American Empire Sam Gindin

https://textbookfull.com/product/the-making-of-global-capitalism-
the-political-economy-of-american-empire-sam-gindin/

Aristotle s Critique of Political Economy With a

Contemporary Application 1st Edition Robert L.
Gallagher

https://textbookfull.com/product/aristotle-s-critique-of-
political-economy-with-a-contemporary-application-1st-edition-
robert-l-gallagher/
Global Political Economy
This page intentionally left blank
GLOBAL
POLITICAL
ECONOMY
EVOLUTION & DYNAMICS
ROBERT O’BRIEN & MARC WILLIAMS

5TH
EDITION
© Robert O’Brien and Marc Williams 2004, 2007, 2010, 2013, 2016
All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this
publication may be made without written permission.
No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted
save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence
permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency,
Saffron House, 6–10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS.
Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication
may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.
The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this
work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
First edition 2004
Second edition 2007
Third edition 2010
Fourth edition 2013
Fifth edition 2016
Published by
PALGRAVE
Palgrave in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited,
registered in England, company number 785998, of 4 Crinan Street,
London, N1 9XW.
Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC,
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.
Palgrave is a global imprint of the above companies and is represented
throughout the world.
Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States,
the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries.
ISBN 978–1–137–52312–9 hardback
ISBN 978–1–137–52311–2 paperback
This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully
managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing
processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the
country of origin.
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.
 To our daughters
Isabella and Louisa
The world is yours to explore and improve
This page intentionally left blank
 Contents

List of Boxes, Tables, Figures and Maps x Trends in Contemporary GPE Theory 32
Preface to the Fifth Edition xiii Consolidation 32
List of Abbreviations xiv Integration 33
Expansion 34
Introduction 1
Approach of the Book 36
Further Reading 38
Part 1 Theoretical Perspectives 5
1 Theories of Global Political Part 2 Evolution 39
Economy 6
3 Forging a World Economy:
Understanding the Global Political Economy 6
1400–1800 40
The Economic Nationalist Perspective 8
Regions of the World Economy 41
Key actors 8
The Middle East 42
Key dynamics 9
China 43
Conflict and cooperation 10
India 44
Economic nationalism today 10
Africa 45
The Liberal Perspective 12
The Americas 45
Key actors 13
Europe 46
Key dynamics 13
European Expansion 51
Conflict and cooperation 13
Into the Americas 51
Liberalism today 14
Along Africa: the triangular trade 54
The Critical Perspective 16
On the peripheries of Asia 56
Key actors 17
Conclusion 58
Key dynamics 17
Further Reading 62
Conflict and cooperation 18
Critical theory today 18 4 Industry, Empire and War:
Contending Perspectives: A Summary 19 1800–1945 63
Further Reading 21 The Industrial Revolution 64
What was the Industrial Revolution? 64
2 International Political Economy
Why Britain? Why then? 66
and its Methods 22
What did the others do? 67
Locating the Field 22
Pax Britannica 68
Economics 23
The gold standard and capital flows 68
Political science 24
Free trade 71
Political economy 24
Balance of power 71
International relations 25
Renewed Imperialism 74
Methodological Issues 26
War and Economic Disorder 77
Case studies and large n studies 26
The world wars 77
Rational choice 27
Interwar economic failure 79
Institutionalism 28
Conclusion 82
Constructivism 30
Further Reading 85
viii Contents

5 Growing a Global Economy: Theoretical Perspectives: The Mundell-

1945–2015 86 Fleming Model 151
The Cold War Era: 1945–89 86 Major Developments 153
The US-led Western political economy 86 IMS: from fixed to floating and regional
The communist political economy 89 currencies 153
The southern political economy 89 Credit: financial innovation and
The Post-Cold War Era: 1990–2015 91 repeated crises 157
Competing capitalisms and state Key Issues 166
transformation 91 Global credit crisis 166
The information revolution 93 Future of the US dollar 168
International organizations and The European sovereign debt
governance 95 and euro crisis 170
Conclusion 97 Corporate and individual tax abuse 173
Further Reading 100 Conclusion 177
Further Reading 178

Part 3 Dynamics 101 9 Global Division of Labour 179

Definitions 179
6 International Trade 102 Theoretical Perspectives: Adam Smith and his
Definitions 102 Critics 181
Theoretical Perspectives: Free Trade and Major Developments 184
Protectionism 103 Changes in the production process 185
Proponents of free trade 104 From the new international to the
Critics of free trade 105 global division of labour 186
Major Developments 108 Key Issues 187
Growth and protectionism 108 Global restructuring: the rise of
Changing institutional arrangements 112 China and India 188
Key Issues 115 The struggle for workers’ rights in a global
Developing country interests 115 economy 191
Regional trade agreements 120 The division of labour and global stability 193
Legitimacy 122 Conclusion 196
Conclusion 124 Further Reading 197
Further Reading 124
10 Gender 198
7 Transnational Production 125 Definitions and Background 198
Definitions 127 Theoretical Perspectives: GPE as if Gender
Theoretical Perspectives: Explaining Mattered 200
the Growth of TNCs 128 Major Developments 203
Major Developments 131 Women in the world economy:
The globalization of production 131 employment trends and prospects 203
Changing organizational principles 135 Gender and global public policy 205
Key Issues 138 Key Issues 210
Re-evaluating the benefits of FDI 138 The feminization of poverty 210
State–firm interactions 142 Globalization of reproductive work 211
Regulating capital 145 Gender and global restructuring 214
Conclusion 146 Conclusion 216
Further Reading 147 Further Reading 216

8 The Global Financial System 148 11 Economic Development 217

Definitions and Background 148 Definitions 218
 Contents ix

Theoretical Perspectives on Growth and Ideas, interests and the global

Development 222 financial crisis 274
Major Developments 226 Conclusion 277
Development and national capitalism, Further Reading 278
1947–81 227
Development, neoliberalism and 14 Security 279
beyond, 1982–2015 229 Definitions: Three Views of Security 279
Key Issues 232 The traditional state-centric approach 279
The organization of development 232 New security studies 280
Debt and debt relief 235 Human security 281
North–South conflict 237 Theoretical Perspectives: Integrating
Conclusion 239 Security and Political Economy 282
Further Reading 240 Major Developments 285
The Cold War security structure 285
12 Global Environmental Change 241 The post-Cold War security structure 286
Definitions and Background 242 Key Issues 290
Theoretical Perspectives: IPE and Economic statecraft and security 290
Environmental Studies 244 Transnational crime and corporate
IPE debates 244 espionage 293
Environmental studies’ debates 246 Disease, pandemics and security 296
Major Developments 249 Conclusion 298
Bringing the environment in 249 Further Reading 298
Mainstreaming environmentalism 251
Key Issues 253 15 Governing the Global Political
Sustainable development 253 Economy 299
Climate change 256 Definitions 299
Transnational land acquisitions 259 Theoretical Perspectives: Whither the
Conclusion 260 State? 300
Further Reading 261 Major Developments 301
Proliferation of governance levels 302
13 Ideas 262 Proliferation of actors 305
Definitions 262 Rise of the BRICS 307
Theoretical Perspectives: Ideas about Ideas 263 Twenty-First-Century Challenges 310
Major Developments 266 Development and growth 310
The information revolution and the Equality and justice 311
information society 266 Democracy and regulation 313
The rise and stall of the Washington Conclusion 316
Consensus 268 Further Reading 316
Key Issues 271
Technological diffusion 271 Bibliography 317
Property rights and life (HIV/AIDS) 272 Index 342
 List of Boxes, Tables,
Figures and Maps
Boxes 6.4 The Cairns Group 117
6.5 The cotton initiative 118
1.1 Profile: Susan Strange – unorthodox realist 11 6.6 Australia and its regional trade
1.2 Relative versus absolute gains 12 agreements 120
1.3 Profile: Robert Keohane – liberal 6.7 The Trans-Pacific Partnership
institutionalist 15 Agreement (TPP) 121
1.4 Profile: Robert Cox – historical materialist 19 6.8 Democracy and the WTO 123
2.1 IPE or GPE? 23 7.1 Vertical, horizontal and conglomerate
2.2 What is globalization? 26 TNCs 128
2.3 Prisoner’s dilemma 29 7.2 Government regulation, international
2.4 Profile: John Ruggie – constructivist capital and financial instability: the
practitioner 31 case of South Korea 134
2.5 American, British and other forms of IPE 35 7.3 Export processing zones: an ILO
2.6 Approach of this book 36 perspective 135
3.1 Ancient Chinese technology 44 7.4 Global value chains and global value
3.2 The utility of money 48 chain analysis 138
3.3 Banks and financial instability 49 7.5 Walmart, the TNC 139
3.4 Europe on the precipice: the Mongol 7.6 Spain defends its TNCs 142
invasion 50 7.7 Illicit financial flows from the
3.5 Ecological imperialism 53 developing world 144
3.6 Ayutthaya versus Venice 57 8.1 Bretton Woods institutions 150
3.7 Tulip mania in the 17th century 60 8.2 Balance of payments confusion 151
4.1 Increased productivity in the Industrial 8.3 Mundell-Fleming model summary 152
Revolution 64 8.4 Foreign exchange trading 154
4.2 Encouraging factory work 66 8.5 Black Wednesday: UK forced out of
4.3 The gold standard 70 the ERM 155
4.4 Comparative advantage 72 8.6 Dollarization, ‘randization’ and
4.5 Imperialism in the Congo 74 ‘pulaization’ in Zimbabwe 156
4.6 Global famines 77 8.7 Microcredit: financial innovation
4.7 The League of Nations 79 for the poor 159
4.8 Fascism vs. liberalism in 1930s Germany 81 8.8 Financial innovation and crisis in
5.1 Five lessons Western powers drew from the private sector 160
the Second World War 87 8.9 Financial crisis: Mexico 163
5.2 Decolonization and violence 90 8.10 Financial crisis: East Asia 164
5.3 Sheltering wealth offshore 93 8.11 Government deficits and debt 168
5.4 Corporations, states and control of the 8.12 The US–China financial relationship 169
internet 95 8.13 How do government bonds work? 171
6.1 The costs of protectionism: a liberal 8.14 The euro vs. Greek economic growth 173
perspective 106 8.15 Sovereign debt crisis: Argentina 174
6.2 Health risks and hormone-treated beef 111 8.16 Financial institution crime 177
6.3 Developing country coalitions in the 9.1 Gender and ethnicity in a cruise ship
WTO 116 crew 182
 List of Boxes,Tables, Figures and Maps xi

9.2 Flags of convenience 184 14.1 Food security 281

9.3 Globalizing elites 186 14.2 Defence procurement 284
9.4 How do you make those Apples? 190 14.3 Conflict minerals in the DRC 288
9.5 Forced migrant labour in Malaysia and 14.4 ISIS as a new threat 290
Thailand 192 14.5 Sanctions against Iran 292
9.6 Popular opposition to Greek austerity 194 14.6 Transnational crime: the MS-13 and
9.7 Runaway inequality 196 M-18 gangs 294
10.1 Feminization as devalorization 199 14.7 Canadian intelligence services and the
10.2 Gender inequality facts 199 resource economy 295
10.3 Measuring the global gender gap 200 14.8 The securitization of HIV/AIDS 297
10.4 Significance of a gendered analysis 201 15.1 Cities in the global economy 303
10.5 The glass ceiling 205 15.2 The covert world 307
10.6 Gender, the MDGs and the SDGs 208 15.3 The Global Compact 308
10.7 UN Women 209 15.4 How many planets do we need? 312
10.8 Gender and structural adjustment 15.5 The Global Call to Action Against
in the UK 212 Poverty 314
10.9 Global Pornography Industry 213 15.6 Bitcoin – a new currency for a new age? 315
10.10 Professional women and illegal
women domestic workers 214
11.1 The Millennium Development Goals 218
11.2 The Sustainable Development Goals 218
TaBles
11.3 Confucianism and economic 1.1 Interpretations of the Asian financial crisis 7
development 226 1.2 Comparing the perspectives 20
11.4 G77 membership, 2015 228 3.1 Summary of European expansionist
11.5 Structural adjustment: the case of Mexico 230 activity 52
11.6 North–South conflict over World Bank 5.1 Decline in value of selected high-tech
president’ appointment 235 stocks, 2000–3 94
11.7 List of Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 236 6.1 Growth in the volume of world exports
11.8 China as a development actor in Latin and production by major product groups,
America 238 2005–13 (percentage change) 108
12.1 The Anthropocene 242 6.2 Percentage share of world merchandise
12.2 Five commonly accepted features of trade by region, 2013 109
environmentalism 244 6.3 GATT negotiating rounds 113
12.3 Technocentric and ecocentric approaches 6.4 World merchandise trade
to sustainability 248 (billion US dollars, current prices) 115
12.4 Bhopal 251 6.5 GDP composition by sector:
12.5 The Summers memo 252 agriculture, 2014 (per cent) 117
12.6 Consumption and ecological shadows 254 7.1 The 25 largest corporations by
12.7 Earth Summit 2012 257 revenues, 2014 (millions of dollars) 126
13.1 Challenging epistemic knowledge: 7.2 World FDI flows, 2007–13
the climate change fight 264 (billions of US dollars) 126
13.2 Internet statistics 268 7.3 Cross-border mergers and alliances,
13.3 The Occupy movement 270 by sector, 2007–8, 2012–13 (millions of
13.4 Cloud computing 272 dollars) 137
13.5 The uneven distribution of knowledge: 8.1 National expenditure on social
patents and Nobel Prize winners 273 services versus debt 161
13.6 Bioprospectors and biopiracy 274 8.2 Corporate profit shifting strategies 175
13.7 Twelve financial deregulation policies, 9.1 Remittances from migrants, 2000–9
1998–2008 276 (billion dollars) 187
xii List of Boxes,Tables, Figures and Maps

9.2 Remittance flows to developing Figures

countries, 2010–13 (billion dollars) 187
10.1 Male and female labour force participation 1.1 Economic nationalism as marbles 12
rates (LFPR), 2002 and 2012 204 1.2 Liberalism as a cobweb 16
11.1 Social indicators of development for 1.3 Critical theory as a layer cake 18
selected countries, 2013 220 8.1 Developing country external debt as a
11.2 Comparing HDI and GNI rankings 221 percentage of GNP 162
11.3 Economic and welfare indicators for 8.2 Regional averages: external debt as a
Asian NICs 224 percentage of GNP 163
11.4 Comparison of Latin American and East 8.3 Government debt as a percentage of
Asian economies, 1965–80 (per cent) 225 GDP: Greece, the US and the eurozone 172
11.5 Economic growth by region, 2012–15 231 9.1 Gender inequality in economic activity 181
11.6 IDA-IBRD commitments by region,
fiscal year 2014 232
11.7 IDA-IBRD disbursements by region,
fiscal year 2014 233
MaPs
11.8 IDA-IBRD lending by theme, fiscal year 3.1 Regions of the 15th-century world
2014 233 economy 42
11.9 IDA-IBRD lending by sector, fiscal year 3.2 European political economy, 1400–1500 46
2014 233 3.3 Transatlantic triangular trade 56
12.1 Traditional IPE theories and the 4.1 Pre- and post-scramble Africa 76
environment 247
15.1 IMF voting rights versus share of world
population 304
15.2 BRICS key indicators (with US for
comparison) 2011–14 309
15.3 BRICS summits 310
 Preface to the Fifth Edition
The aim of the book, as in previous editions, is to pro-
vide tools that will enable readers to understand and
explain developments in the global political economy.
As a result, the main structure of the book remains
unchanged from previous versions. This structure – a
discussion of theoretical perspectives and methods, a
survey of the historical evolution of the world economy,
and exploration of key frameworks and structures of the
global political economy – has proved successful. Nev-
ertheless, recognizing the importance of contemporary
events, we have revised chapters to take account of
recent significant changes in the global political econ-
omy since the fourth edition was published in 2013.
It has been a pleasure to continue working together
to produce this fifth edition of our textbook. Our joint
efforts are aided by many others. We would like to thank
the anonymous reviewers of this and previous editions
who provided detailed and helpful suggestions. A num-
ber of people were generous in responding to surveys
and questions about the book. We have greatly benefited
from their comments, even if we are not able to respond
adequately to all the advice. We also owe an ongoing
debt to present and former colleagues and students at
the universities of Sussex, New South Wales and
McMaster. Numerous instructors and students at other
universities have also provided helpful feedback. Our
textbook now also appears in Greek and Chinese trans-
lations and we thank the publishers, students and aca-
demics in those countries interested in our work. Finally,
thanks go to Steven Kennedy who has now retired from
the publishing industry, but who was instrumental in
the initiation of this text and its subsequent editions. We
have enjoyed working with his successor, Stephen Wen-
ham. Although we greatly appreciate everyone’s help,
the responsibility for errors remains ours alone.
ROBERT O’BRIEN, DUNDAS
MARC WILLIAMS, SyDNEy
 List of Abbreviations
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation ICT information and communications
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations technology
BIS Bank for International Settlements IEOs international economic organizations
BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China, South ILO International Labour Organization
Africa IMF International Monetary Fund
CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of All IMS international monetary system
Forms of Discrimination Against IPE international political economy
Women IPR intellectual property rights
COP Conferences of the Parties IR international relations
DDA Doha Development Agenda ISI import substitution industrialization
ECB European Central Bank IT information technology
EEC European Economic Community ITO International Trade Organization
EOI export-oriented industrialization LDC least developed country
EPZ export processing zone MAI Multilateral Agreement on Investment
ERM exchange rate mechanism MDGs Millennium Development Goals
EU European Union MDRI Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative
FDI foreign direct investment MERCOSUR Southern Common Market
FOC flag of convenience MFA Multifibre Agreement
FSF Financial Stability Forum MFN most favoured nation
G5 Group of 5 NAFTA North American Free Trade
G7 Group of 7 Agreement
G8 Group of 8 NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
G20 Group of 20 NGOs nongovernmental organizations
G77 Group of 77 NICs newly industrializing countries
G90 Group of 90 NIEO New International Economic Order
GATS General Agreement on Trade in NTBs non-tariff barriers
Services (WTO) OECD Organisation for Economic
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Co-operation and Development
Trade OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting
GCC global commodity chain Countries
GDP gross domestic product PPMs process and production methods
GHG greenhouse gas R&D research and development
GNP gross national product RTA regional trade agreement
GPE global political economy S&D special and differential treatment
HDI Human Development Index SAPs structural adjustment programmes
HIPC heavily indebted poor countries SARS severe acute respiratory syndrome
HIV/AIDS human immunodeficiency virus/ SPS Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
acquired immunodeficiency syndrome TNC transnational corporation
IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction TPP Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement
and Development TRIMs Trade-Related Investment Measures
ICFTU International Confederation of Free TRIPS Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Trade Unions Property Rights
 List of Abbreviations xv

TTIP Transatlantic Trade and Investment UNDP United Nations Development

Partnership Programme
UN United Nations UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention
UNCED United Nations Conference on on Climate Change
Environment and Development UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for
UNCHE United Nations Conference on the Refugees
Human Environment UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade WHO World Health Organization
and Development WTO World Trade Organization
This page intentionally left blank
Introduction

T
he aim of this textbook is to provide an accessible introduction to the study
of international political economy (IPE). In pursuit of this aim, it follows
two strategies that distinguish it from many other IPE textbooks. First, it
adopts a historical approach to the study of IPE and offers students, the interested
public and scholars a broad overview of how the modern global political economy
has come into being. Instead of beginning with an analysis of contemporary global
political and economic structures, the book seeks to provide an easily accessible but
brief history that draws out important factors in the creation of our present situa-
tion. In our teaching, we have found that the best way for students to appreciate the
nuances of the present is to expose them to the origins of political economy prac-
tices of the past. This is even more vital as we move from a world dominated by the
US and Europe to a more multilateral future. Second, the book seeks to move
beyond the repetition of the three dominant theoretical perspectives (economic
nationalism, liberalism, Marxism) on IPE as a framework of analysis. It seeks to
reflect both the developments in IPE scholarship in the past 30 years and the main
debates between orthodox and heterodox scholars through attention to a broad
range of themes, issues and perspectives in IPE. Unorthodox or heterodox
approaches to IPE have become much more developed since the first wave of IPE
texts in the 1980s by Spero (1981), Gilpin (1987), Strange (1988) and Gill and Law
(1988). Ecological, feminist, neo-Gramscian and poststructural approaches now
compete with traditional perspectives and shed new light on old problems. Central
to our strategy is a framework that integrates material and ideational aspects of IPE.

Plan of the Book

The text is divided into three parts. Part 1 examines key theories, locates the field
in the broader social sciences and considers important methodological issues
(Chapters 1 and 2). The complexities of the global political economy cannot be
properly understood through a study of the ‘facts’ without recourse to theories of
IPE. Because the meaning and impact of economic and political change are
controversial and contested, Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the traditional
competing perspectives in IPE. Economic nationalism, liberalism and Marxist/
critical theories are introduced, with particular attention to how these theories
highlight different actors, dynamics and views on cooperation and conflict. In
each case, the work of a prominent proponent of these approaches (Susan Strange,
Robert Keohane, Robert Cox) is showcased to highlight how theoretical perspec-
tives can be developed and deployed. The chapter concludes by offering a summary
of contending perspectives. Chapter 2 locates IPE among a range of disciplines –
economics, political science, political economy and international relations. It
considers the methods by which IPE is studied, such as case studies, rational
2 Introduction
choice, institutionalism and constructivism. An example
of how one academic (John Ruggie) furthered a partic-
ular method in his writings and his work in the UN is
provided. The chapter concludes by considering the
direction of IPE theory today and outlining the book’s
own theoretical approach.
Part 2 (Chapters 3–5) considers the evolution and
eventual domination of a European-based world
economy. Chapter 3 provides an overview of key histor-
ical processes that led to the transformation of regional
economies and the beginnings of the creation of the
contemporary global economic system. It is organized
into two main sections. The first contrasts various
regional political economies – the Middle East, China,
India, Africa, the Americas and Europe in the early
15th century. The second charts the expansion of a
European-centred international political economy into
other areas of the world, namely Africa, the Americas
and Asia. It stresses the variety of patterns of interaction
including slavery, genocide, war and trade, and assesses
the varied pattern of European–non-European interac-
tion. Chapter 4 examines the rise and fall of a liberal
world system from 1800 until 1945. It begins by looking
at the domestic and international basis of British power
in the mid-19th century, the development of the Pax
Britannica as a structure of international governance
and the rise of imperialism in the 19th century. It
concludes by analysing the descent of Europe and the
world into war and depression. Chapter 5 turns its
attention to the post-1945 era. The first section exam-
ines the Cold War era and the distinct western, commu-
nist and southern political economies. The second part
turns its attention to the post-Cold War era from 1989
to 2015. The competition between forms of capitalism
and accompanying state transformation, the impact of
the information revolution and the proliferation of
international organization as a form of global govern-
ance are highlighted.
Part 3 (Chapters 6–15) focuses on the recent
dynamics of the global political economy. In one sense,
the global political economy can be treated as a single
whole, as we do in Part 2 of this book, but in another
sense it is also composed of various structures or frame-
works, each with its own set of actors, processes, institu-
tions and rules. Of course, many actors participate in
more than one framework and there are linkages
between them. Nevertheless, in common with standard
texts in economics and political economy, we have clas-
sified the diverse practices in the world economy into
certain key frameworks. We do not claim that any single
framework is dominant, but we do suggest that the ten
frameworks (trade, production, finance, labour, gender,
development, environment, ideas, security and govern-
ance) analysed in this book constitute critical spheres
of activity in the world economy.
The argument in each chapter in Part 3 is divided
into four sections – definitions, theoretical perspectives,
major developments and key issues. The section on
definitions provides an introduction to some of the key
terms and concepts used in analysis of the particular
framework. The aim here is not to proffer definitive
definitions but rather to discuss some of the key issues
pertinent to an understanding of the framework. The
theoretical perspectives section is important in raising
key issues related to the normative elements of the
global political economy framework. It shows the
importance of knowledge in the construction of frame-
works or structures in the global political economy. In
our analysis, knowledge and knowledge claims are
co-constitutive parts of the framework. In other words,
knowledge is internal and integral to the structure
rather than an external set of considerations. What
counts as knowledge is not secondary but rather a
central feature of the political economy framework. The
beliefs that actors hold about cause and effect relations
will influence the actions they will take. Within the
world economy, states, firms, international organiza-
tions and social movement actors have conflicting
views about the issues under scrutiny. In keeping with
the historical focus of this book, the section on major
developments provides an overview of key changes
within the particular framework in the period since
1945. Finally, in each chapter we focus on three current
issues (with exception of the finance chapter, which
looks at four). There are other equally important issues
that cannot be addressed in each chapter, but we have
chosen ones that combine topicality with relevance to
the evolution of the global political economy and
contrasting IPE perspectives.
GloBalization
Writing at the beginning of the 21st century, it is impos-
sible to ignore the phenomenon of globalization.
An intense debate currently exists between proponents
and opponents of what may be termed ‘globalization

studies’. The book enters the globalization debate
through a number of its concerns. One of the central
issues of contention in the controversy over globaliza-
tion is that of historical evidence. In delineating the
scope, nature, depth and breadth of change in the global
economy this book contributes to this debate. More-
over, insofar as globalization is a process of historical
change rather than a specific condition, the evidence
here contributes to an assessment of this process.
Second, in charting the evolution of the modern state,
the book confronts a central issue in the globalization
debate. We reveal the historical development of the
modern state, and consequently challenge arguments
that present essentialized portraits of the state.
Our analysis in Part 3 is informed by the evolving
nature of globalization. We believe that the intensifica-
tion of globalization since the early 1970s has changed
Introduction 3
the world political economy from an international to a
global undertaking. While there are some who suggest
that talk of globalization is overblown (Hirst and
Thompson, 1996), we are of the view that the decreasing
significance of time and space as barriers to human
interaction is having a profound impact on the organi-
zation of production, the exchange of products and
services, the circulation of finance, the gendered divi-
sion of labour, the possibilities for development, the
ecology of the planet, the transmission and power of
ideas, the pursuit of security, the mobilization of polit-
ical forces and forms of national and international
governance. The spread of economic relations world-
wide has had a significant impact on how people live
their lives and how governance is practised. Our book
explores these issues in further detail in the following
chapters.
This page intentionally left blank
ParT 1

THEORETICAL
PERSPECTIVES
chapter 1
Theories of Global Political Economy
chapter 2
International Political Economy and its Methods
 Chapter
Theories of Global
1 Political Economy

I
Understanding the Global
n its present form, the field of international political economy (IPE) or global
Political Economy 6 political economy (GPE) is a relatively new undertaking at universities. This
chapter introduces readers to three of its main theories. Chapter 2 gives read-
The Economic Nationalist
ers an overview of the relationship of IPE to other fields, considers some of the
Perspective 8
methods used to study IPE and examines the future directions of GPE theory.
The Liberal Perspective 12
The Critical Perspective 16
Contending Perspectives: Understanding the global Political
A Summary 19
economy
Further Reading 21
During 1996 and into 1997, a small number of investors and currency traders
began to have doubts about whether Thailand’s economy would be able to con-
tinue its record of remarkable growth. Fearing a reduction in economic prosperity
and profit, some of these investors began to withdraw their money and invest-
ments. The outflow of money forced the Thai central bank to devalue its currency,
the baht. This began a process which was later called the 1997 ‘Asian financial
crisis’. By the time the crisis had run its course, several Asian countries experi-
enced economic depression, the government of Indonesia was overthrown, coun-
tries previously labelled economic miracles, for example South Korea, were forced
to seek loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the viability of the
international financial system was called into question.
Although the 1997 Asian financial crisis was clearly a significant development
in the global political economy, it was not immediately apparent what caused the
events, what were its most significant aspects or what lessons might be drawn
from the crisis to prevent a similar event from occurring. Indeed, a number of
different stories are told about the crisis (see Table 1.1). One story, the liberal story,
locates the causes of the crisis primarily in the financial policies followed by Asian
states (McLeod and Garnaut, 1998). This view suggests that resources were
directed to inefficient uses because of corrupt business practices and political
influence over financial institutions. The term ‘crony capitalism’ was developed to
capture this inappropriate model of political economy. The lesson to be drawn
from the crisis is that financial markets will eventually punish economic activity
which violates or ignores liberal economic principles. The solution is for develop-
ing countries to have more transparent financial practices and follow a more lib-
eral economic model.
A second story stresses the significance of state power in creating and exploit-
ing the crisis (Weiss, 1999). In this view, the problem arose because developing
countries liberalized their economies prematurely and allowed large amounts of
money to flow into and out of their countries too quickly. This undermined the
 Chapter 1 Theories of Global PoliTiCal eConomy 7

Table 1.1 Interpretations of the Asian financial crisis

Liberal State power Critical

Causes Crony capitalism, lack of overrapid liberalization, reduced Predatory liberalism, power of
transparency state capacity to regulate financial interests, systemic flaws
Key issue(s) Corruption, lack of liberal economic Clash of anglo-american versus human suffering caused by financial
practices asian models collapse
lessons increase transparency and good limit financial speculation through reform international financial
practice in developing countries state policies system, defend national system

East Asian model of political economy and caused a
crisis. This approach would stress how the US used the
Asian crisis as an opportunity to force some states to
restructure along lines that benefited American busi-
ness. During the crisis, Asian states attempted to coun-
ter American initiatives at the IMF and to continue to
resist the undermining of their particular form of capi-
talism (Higgott, 1998). The lessons from the crisis are
that states need to be careful about liberalizing their
economic activity and must pay attention to guarding
their national interest.
A third story (critical) focuses on the role of US pri-
vate business interests and the US government in creat-
ing the conditions for a financial collapse. It suggests
that the US government pressured developing states
into liberalizing their economies because this suited the
interests of the US Treasury and leading financial firms
on Wall Street (Wade and Veneroso, 1998). Once the
crisis took place, the same interests pressed the IMF to
demand that Asian economies restructure in a way that
would open markets for US firms. This story also
stresses the high degree of suffering caused by the
financial collapse and the fact that its costs were une-
venly distributed. For example, the collapse of the Indo-
nesian economy pushed millions further into poverty,
but left wealthy financial interests in developed coun-
tries relatively untouched. In this view, the international
financial system facilitates the rapid movement of
money between countries and contributes to the reoc-
currence of financial crisis in many parts of the world
(Walton, 2002). Action needs to be taken to curb finan-
cial speculation, such as a tax on large short-term for-
eign exchange transactions. States should also consider
restricting the ability of investors to move their funds
abroad rapidly.
This brief example of the Asian financial crisis
demonstrates that the same event can be analysed in
several different ways. Indeed, most major
developments are interpreted through competing
explanations. Facts do not exist independently of
explanatory frameworks. Facts are pieces of informa-
tion that are thought to correspond to reality and be
true, but the way in which they are perceived and
judged is influenced by theory. In order to make sense
of the world and to enable us to take constructive
action, humans develop theories to help determine
which facts are most important and what significant
relationships there are between different events.
Theories are used for a variety of purposes:
◗ they can prioritize information and allow individu-
als to turn their attention to the most important
issues
◗ they can be used to make predictions about the
future so that action can be taken to prepare for
upcoming events
◗ they can be used to plan action or mobilize support
for particular action
Every person utilizes theory to run their life even if
they do not engage in explicit theorizing. Actors in the
global political economy and those studying it use a
variety of theories for a variety of purposes. Some peo-
ple are interested in prediction. For example, they
would like to be able to predict what type of monetary
system would lead to stable economic growth, or to pre-
dict the likelihood of war between democratic states.
Others believe that prediction is nearly impossible
because so many factors come together to influence
events. These people are more likely to use theory in an
attempt to understand the world rather than to predict
what will happen next.
In this book, we use and describe a number of theo-
ries to guide us in understanding the world. The
development of IPE is often presented as a debate
between three contending schools of thought,
8 Part 1 TheoreTiCal PersPeCTiVes
paradigms or approaches. Some commentators refer to
contending paradigms, others to different schools of
thought and yet others to competing approaches. It
does not really matter for our purposes whether they
are seen as theories, paradigms, schools of thought or
approaches. The central point is that three main con-
tending perspectives have been used to explain devel-
opments in the global political economy. Although
analysts distinguish between these three approaches,
there is a wide variety of thought within each approach
and much work in IPE draws on more than one of
them. In addition, there are a number of other
approaches, such as environmentalism, feminism and
poststructuralism, which contribute to the study of
IPE. These will be introduced later in the text. Let us
begin by looking at the oldest approach – economic
nationalism.
the economic
nationalist PersPective
One school of thought brings together analysts who
focus on the role of the state and the importance of
power in shaping outcomes in the international politi-
cal economy. These theories stress the importance of
the interest of the nation or the state in understanding
activity in international relations (IR). This grouping is
variously termed ‘mercantilist’, ‘neomercantilist’, ‘statist’,
‘state-based theory’, ‘power politics’ or ‘economic nation-
alist’. The equivalent in IR theory is realism. We use the
term ‘economic nationalism’ to refer to this perspective
because at the centre of such analyses is the protection
of the national unit. The underlying economic argu-
mentation may alter, for example, but the objective of
economic intercourse remains the same.
The origin of this school of thought can be traced
back to the emergence and expansion of the nation-
state in Europe in the 15th century. Mercantilism was a
doctrine of political economy that governed the actions
of many states until the liberal revolution in Britain in
the mid-19th century. Mercantilists believed that there
was only a limited amount of wealth in the world and
that each state must secure its interests by blocking the
economic interests of other states. This is known as a
‘zero-sum game’. One state’s gain is another state’s loss.
From the 15th until the 19th centuries, European states
strove to establish overseas empires that would be as
self-sufficient as possible. Trade between neighbouring
colonies of rival empires was discouraged.
Two famous advocates of mercantilist theory were
Alexander Hamilton ([1791]1991) and Fredrick List
([1885]1991). Hamilton was a founding father of the
United States. Writing in the 1790s, he urged Ameri-
cans to protect their manufacturers from foreign com-
petition so that they could industrialize and increase
their power. Almost a hundred years later, List argued
that Germany should industrialize behind trade barri-
ers so that it could catch up with the economic might of
Great Britain. He believed that only the economically
strong advocated free-trade policies because other
states would lose out in the ensuing competition. While
Great Britain led the Industrial Revolution in the early
1800s and opened up its borders to free trade, both
Germany and the US followed more economic nation-
alist policies.
One central question for students of the contempo-
rary global economy relates to the persistence of mer-
cantilist thought. It could be assumed that an economic
perspective based upon unrivalled state power is of
limited relevance in a world characterized by globaliza-
tion. While this may be correct, contemporary eco-
nomic nationalist thought should not be dismissed as
some atavistic throwback to an earlier era. It reflects, on
the one hand, an acknowledgement that states remain
at the centre of power within the global political econ-
omy and, on the other, that there is an intimate connec-
tion between power and wealth. Economic nationalist
thinking, whether it is termed ‘neomercantilism’ or ‘stat-
ism’, remains important in both analysis and practice in
the contemporary global economy. For example, states
may protect strategic industries against foreign rivals or
attempt to export more than they import for long peri-
ods of time. Japan has been accused of being a mercan-
tilist state because in comparison with other advanced
industrialized countries its economy is relatively closed.
Even states that are generally seen to follow liberal poli-
cies, such as the US, will pursue economic nationalist
policies in particular sectors. For example, the US uses
defence spending to support its commercial aerospace
industry.
Key actors
Economic nationalist or mercantilist theories view the
state as the main actor in the global political economy.
 Chapter 1 Theories of Global PoliTiCal eConomy
A major assumption of economic nationalists is the pri-
macy of the political over other aspects of social life.
Statist writers focus on the group (the state or nation)
rather than the individual. Economic nationalist
thought begins from two major assumptions. The first
is that the inter-state system is anarchical and it is there-
fore the duty of each state to protect its own interests. At
the core of the various historical versions of economic
nationalism is the belief that an economic community
persists and acts for the good of all its members. The
second assumption concerns the primacy of the state in
political life. As the state is the central instrument
through which people can fulfil their goals, it follows
that the state remains the preeminent actor in the
domestic and international domains. Economic policy
should be used to build a more powerful state.
From this perspective, the state is prior to the mar-
ket and market relations are shaped by political power.
Economic nationalist thought is both descriptive and
predictive. Descriptive economic nationalists maintain
that production, consumption, exchange and invest-
ment are all governed by political power. Markets are
not ‘natural’; they can only exist within a social context.
For mercantilists, political needs and purposes are seen
largely as being achieved through the form of the state.
It remains at the core of social life. But economic
nationalists move beyond description and also provide
policy advice. Given their analysis of the dynamics of
political economy, such advice is geared towards sup-
porting and maintaining state power.
Economic nationalists recognize the importance of
market-based actors such as firms, but subordinate
their importance to that of the state. Within this per-
spective, the economic power of transnational corpora-
tions (TNCs) is acknowledged, but the overall power of
such firms remains limited. In the end, firms are subject
to the dictates of states. Insofar as firms have become
important economic actors, this is only because states
have abandoned regulation or lessened controls on the
movement of capital. When firms encounter economic
or political trouble, they quickly turn to their home
states for protection.
Key dynamics
From an economic nationalist perspective, interna-
tional political economy is constituted through the
actions of rational states. If international relations are
9
conceived as a struggle for power, international politi-
cal economy is a struggle for power and wealth. The
determination of a state’s fate resides in its ability to
ensure that its citizens reap advantages from interna-
tional production and exchange. Market relations are
important indicators of power and wealth but the
market is governed by the activities of states. Eco-
nomic activity is subordinate to political goals and
objectives. Furthermore, economic actors are subject
to political authority. The consequence of the salience
of the state is that international economic relations
are international political relations. The global econ-
omy in this view is subordinate to the international
political system.
IPE scholars working in this perspective argue that
the nature of the global economy reflects the interests
of the most powerful states. For example, Krasner
(1976) has suggested that systems of free trade are most
likely when a single power dominates the international
system. This dominant, or hegemonic, power is needed
to provide leadership and absorb the short-term costs
of maintaining a free-trade regime. Analysts such as
Gilpin (1981) have argued that changes in the distribu-
tion of power between states increase the chances of
conflict in the international system. Because of this
view, considerable time can be devoted to contemplat-
ing the rise and fall of great powers (Gilpin, 1987; Ken-
nedy, 1987).
In the heated debate over globalization, both defen-
sive and sceptical economic nationalist perspectives
can be heard. The defensive posture arises from a fear
that globalization may prevent state actors from fulfill-
ing their goals. This is, of course, merely the continua-
tion of the long-held suspicion of economic exchange
held by economic nationalist thinkers. Unlike propo-
nents of free trade, economic nationalists believe that
the gains from trade are unequally distributed and
favour those with greater economic and political power.
Thus, defensive economic nationalists can recognize
globalization as a threat and seek to counter its impacts.
On the other hand, sceptical economic nationalists
reject many of the current liberal arguments about glo-
balization. They contend that globalization is largely a
myth and that the power of the state remains undimin-
ished. Since economic actors are subordinate to politi-
cal power, these analysts argue that the policy
environment conducive to globalization has been cre-
ated by states. It therefore follows that states can alter
this environment by changing their policies. Moreover,
10 Part 1 TheoreTiCal PersPeCTiVes
it can be claimed that since states remain powerful
actors and the only legitimate centres of authority in
the modern world, nothing significant has occurred in
the global political economy.
Conflict and cooperation
Within IR theory, realism, with its focus on the primacy
of the state, the anarchical nature of international rela-
tions and the inevitability of conflict, provides the foun-
dation for economic nationalist thought. If realism is
the perspective in international politics, economic
nationalism is its equivalent doctrine in political econ-
omy. Both share a commitment to the state and to the
role of power in social life. Power-based theories such
as economic nationalism and realism view the world as
anarchic – lacking any central authority. Relations
between states are thus characterized by unending con-
flict and the pursuit of power.
International economic relations are therefore per-
ceived as a zero-sum game where the gain of one party
necessitates a loss for another party. The system’s struc-
ture is perceived in conflictual terms. While economic
nationalists believe that market relations can be posi-
tive, they think that such activity can also be negative.
Since participating in markets is potentially negative,
economic nationalists argue in favour of state control of
key economic activities or for state assistance to central
economic sectors. The continued salience of economic
nationalist perspectives is easily visible today in pro-
duction, consumption, trade and investment. In terms
of production, economic nationalist sentiment is visible
in arguments concerning the continued production of
some good or service within particular national bor-
ders. This can be seen in terms of security concerns;
that is, a state should not be reliant on the import of a
specific good, because in times of conflict, this good
may become unavailable. Some countries, such as
France, protect their agricultural sector, while the US
defends defence technology. It can also be seen in terms
of the preservation of the cultural values of the nation.
For example, many economic nationalists believe that it
is vital to maintain the production of certain cultural
products, such as films and music, within national bor-
ders. In relation to consumption, economic nationalist
arguments have been made against cultural imperial-
ism, that is, in favour of the view that the import of
some products pollutes the nation through the
introduction of foreign values. Whereas a liberal would
argue that the sovereignty of the consumer is para-
mount, economic nationalists maintain that the values
of the nation are more important. From the foregoing, it
is easy to see how, in the sphere of exchange, economic
nationalists support the protection of domestic indus-
tries. Furthermore, economic nationalist thought is
behind arguments that seek to restrict foreign invest-
ment, and supports the ‘rights’ of local investors over
foreigners.
Economic nationalism today
Although the dominant approach to global political
economy as espoused by the leading international insti-
tutions and economic theorists is liberalism, economic
nationalism continues to inform thinking and action.
Countries continue to protect their markets from for-
eign competition even though they have committed
themselves to free trade. Although protectionism has
been reduced as countries have lowered tariffs, many
other mechanisms are used to keep out foreign prod-
ucts. Chapter 6 reviews how states have used a variety
of reasons to restrict trade, for example health and
safety, environmental, cultural, employment, infant
industry. Trade in services such as education and
healthcare is a particularly sensitive subject, with many
states unwilling to open up to foreign competition.
States have actively involved themselves in support-
ing particular industries, contrary to liberal theory.
Many developing countries have relied on their states to
boost economic activity, shield domestic industries
from competition, and direct finance to selected indus-
tries. China has enjoyed remarkable economic growth,
but has imposed strict conditions on foreign invest-
ment, intervened to make sure its currency is relatively
cheap and guided finance into particular activities
through five-year plans. While benefiting from a gener-
ally liberal and open economic system, China has
engaged in economic nationalist policies in pursuit of
development.
Concerns about economic nationalism increase in
times of economic downturn. Politicians and the public
may wish to increase discrimination against foreign
economies and firms when growth slows in the belief
that steps should be taken to support national econo-
mies. Such an approach risks retaliation and the closing
of world markets, which damages the interest of all
 Chapter 1 Theories of Global PoliTiCal eConomy 11

Box 1.1 Profile: Susan Strange – unorthodox realist

Susan Strange (2002) admitted that she never meant to become a professor, but ended up in the role after
stints in journalism (with the Observer and The Economist) and working at Chatham House, a British foreign
affairs research institute. She eventually became a professor at the London School of Economics and
Warwick University.
Strange’s theoretical approach is difficult to characterize neatly (Tooze and May, 2002). It contains a
strong element of power politics or economic nationalism because it focuses on the exercise of power
and pays considerable attention to key state policies in structuring the global economy. Strange takes a
realist approach by advising students to focus on the role of interests and to constantly ask the question
‘Who benefits?’ Yet, her work is also unorthodox because she urges observers to take account of the
role of markets, corporations and technological innovations in changing the environment in which the
state operates. In a series of exchanges with US IPE scholars, Strange continually went against the main-
stream by variously arguing that the study of regimes was faddish and mistaken (1982), that US hegem-
ony was not declining in the 1980s (1987) and that globalization was transforming the nature of state
authority (1996).
Strange viewed IPE as a method of understanding the world that focused on the relationship between
markets and authority. She argued that IPE should be an interdisciplinary area that brought together IR and
international economics. Her broad approach is set out in a 1988 textbook called States and Markets, which
argues that in addition to relational power (A forces B to do A’s will), power resides in structures. Structural
power is the ability to shape the rules of the game in a particular area. Those who create the operating
framework for everyone’s activities exercise power by eliminating some possibilities and making some out-
comes more likely than others. Strange maintained that there were four key structures of power (security,
production, finance, knowledge) and numerous secondary structures (transport, trade, energy, welfare).
Strange reasoned that since the US exercised considerable structural power in the key structures, talk of
decline was mistaken.
In the 1990s, Strange increasingly turned her attention to non-state actors. A major collaboration with a
business school professor (Stopford and Strange, 1991) argued that traditional notions of diplomacy being
an inter-state practice had to be expanded to include state–firm and firm–firm interactions. In a following
book, Strange (1996) identified other actors such as business associations, bureaucrats and even mafias that
were operating transnationally and undermining the authority of states. Most of Strange’s empirical work
was in the area of finance and credit. She argued that the creation and control of credit was a significant
source of power in the global economy. True to her realist roots, she traced the liberalization and globaliza-
tion of finance to particular decisions or non-decisions of the most powerful states. Finance was globalized
because it suited the interests of the most powerful states (principally the US and the UK). However,
Strange also worried that the failure of states to exercise proper regulatory control over financial flows was
turning the system into a form of ‘casino capitalism’ (1986). Her fear was that a widespread financial col-
lapse would lead to a closing of the global economy (1998).
Strange played a prominent role in founding and supporting the study of IPE as an interdisciplinary field
in Britain. Her pioneering studies in the field of finance inspired a new generation to examine the power
relations flowing around credit issues. Strange’s insistence that IPE be an open field of intellectual enquiry
influenced the development of the field in Britain by bringing in work from a number of different
disciplines. Her stinging criticism of US intellectual trends provided room for British scholars and students
to ask different types of questions and use different methodologies from their US counterparts.

states because it reduces the possibility of growth
through trade. Protectionist policies of the 1930s are
often blamed for worsening the Great Depression and
this lesson is used against those advocating economic
nationalist policies.
Visually, the economic nationalist approach can be
represented by a game of marbles (Figure 1.1). The
marbles are states, with different attributes, varying in
their design, size, strength and beauty. They crash into
each other in a competition to determine a winner.
12 Part 1 TheoreTiCal PersPeCTiVes

of force and coercion in human affairs and emphasize

Figure 1.1 Economic nationalism as marbles
the liberal PersPective
In contrast to the economic nationalist theories, liberals
focus either on the individual or on a wide range of
actors from the state to the corporation to interest
groups. They do not see the state as a unitary actor, but
as influenced by numerous factors. Rather than stress
the inevitability of conflict, liberals search out the con-
ditions for cooperation. They tend to play down the role
the ability of individuals to choose between attractive
courses of action or negotiate their differences. Liberals
see the world system as one of interdependence rather
than anarchy. States and peoples can cooperate for
mutual benefit in the liberal view. Rather than a zero-
sum game where one’s gains are the other’s losses, liber-
als see a positive-sum game where the pie grows bigger
and everyone gains. Box 1.2 examines the debate over
relative verses absolute gains.
Liberal theories of political economy emerged in
18th- and 19th-century Britain alongside the Industrial
Revolution. They offered a critique of economic nation-
alist thought by arguing that protectionism and restric-
tion of economic activity were actually impoverishing
states. Scottish moral philosopher Adam Smith
([1776]1983) advocated freeing up commerce and cre-
ating larger national and international markets as a
method of generating wealth for everyone. Englishman
David Ricardo ([1817]1992) introduced the revolution-
ary theory of comparative advantage, which demon-
strated that all nations can benefit from free trade even
if they are not as competitive as other states.
Today’s global economy is governed largely accord-
ing to liberal principles. The trade regime is based upon

Box 1.2 Relative versus absolute gains

In many ways, disagreements between economic nationalists and liberals can be traced back to differences
over relative and absolute gains. Relative gains refer to one actor doing better or worse compared with
another actor. Absolute gains refer to whether an actor is better off compared with a previous point in time.
Economic nationalists and their international relations cousins (realists) argue that since states are in
competition with each other, their primary concern is how a state performs relative to its rivals. Does a
particular arrangement increase or decrease the gap between states? In contrast, liberals believe that states
are rational and will support measures that will increase their absolute wealth by the greatest amount.
As an example, imagine that the US and China were presented with two economic agreements that
would govern their relationship for 20 years. Under agreement A, which involves carefully managing trade
between the two countries, the US will grow at an annual rate of 2 per cent and China will grow at an
annual rate of 2 per cent. Under agreement B, which involves a broad free-trade deal, the US will grow at
an annual rate of 5 per cent and China will grow at an annual rate of 10 per cent.
An economic nationalist would opt for agreement A because it delivers similar benefits to both coun-
tries, whereas agreement B causes China to grow much faster than the US. Liberals would disagree, arguing
that the US should sign agreement B because it would increase growth by 5 per cent each year rather than
the meagre 2 per cent of agreement A. The free-trade arrangement will make the US richer and more pros-
perous than the managed trade agreement. A focus on relative gains would lead policy makers to prefer
agreement A, while a focus on absolute gains would lead policy makers to choose agreement B. Which do
you think the US should sign?
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
of the meteorological conditions, while I quickly “took the sun,” which
showed that we were about 87° 50′ north.
It appeared to us that the plane lay safe and sound and
Ellsworth and I decided to walk across to N 25. We expected that by
walking along by the water-lane we would be able to cover the
distance in one and a half hours, and for safety’s sake took the
canvas boat along with us. We did not bother about provisions or
anything else. Before we started we hoisted our brave Norwegian
flag on the top of the iceberg.
Ellsworth and I set out most confidently, but reaped our first bitter
experience of marching on the polar ice. It looked difficult to get
along, but it proved to be still more so. We climbed up and down
icebergs, carrying our canvas boat, of which we had to take the
utmost care so that no sharp piece of ice should tear a hole in it.
Soon we had to use the boat as a bridge in order to cross a small
crack filled up with broken ice and mush—or as an aid to fighting our
way through thin new ice in somewhat broader ditches. At last we
got full use of the boat in a broad water-lane, where we paddled
along a good distance. Now and again we got sight of N 25 above
the icebergs as we approached. Suddenly we saw the propeller
moving. We were therefore certain that the crew and also the plane
were “all right,” and as the new ice was completely blocking our
course, we decided to return to N 24. With the same toil (and after
we had tumbled into the water several times) we returned tired and
fagged out.
Omdal awaited us with steaming chocolate and it tasted
excellent. Whilst we had been away he had discovered that several
exhaust pipes of the aft engine had become clogged, so they had to
be exchanged for spares. He expected that the work would take two
or three days. Meantime the ice started to close in round the plane,
which we therefore decided to turn round with the nose pointed out
of the water-lane so that, if necessary, we could leave by only using
the “fore” engine.
It was easier said than done because, first of all, the ice had to
be broken round about the flying machine, and more than once we
got thoroughly drenched. But after three hours’ work the plane was
in the desired position. The question now was whether the crew of
N 25 had seen us. We presumed they had seen our flag, but of
course this was not certain. If everything was in good order, they
would start off to join us as soon as they had been able to take
careful observations. Anyway we were sure that they would see us
when they started out, and so we climbed a little higher than we
already were. We had nothing else to do but to put our engines in
order as quickly as possible, to be ready at the earliest moment. We
therefore put our tent up “on the land” of the ice-plain, and took the
necessary mess requisites and sleeping bags with us. In addition we
also armed ourselves with a gun and revolver, in case we should be
surprised by a polar bear. A seal we had already seen, and a bear
might also be lurking about. Omdal was to work solely on the motor,
helped if necessary by Ellsworth and myself, whilst we had to do the
cooking, take observations, keep a lookout and now and again pump
the boat free of water. The leakage proved to be less than I
expected, but still large enough to make us prefer to stick to our tent.
This was quite small and light, made of thin aeroplane cloth. The
bottom was of the same material. It was quite snug and warm when
the Primus stove was lit, but when the snow underneath started to
melt, on account of the heat in the tent, it got damp on the floor. We
were of course entirely cut off from wood, leaves or branches of
trees.
At midday—still on the 22nd—the sky got overcast and we could
no longer see N 25. With our lack of experience in the ice regions
Ellsworth and I had the impression that we were quite safe where we
were. Omdal, who had some experience from his sojourn in Alaska,
was not quite so calm about it, but thought that the new ice where
we lay would in any case act as a protection against possible drift
ice.
In the afternoon the weather cleared again for about an hour and
it seemed to us that we could see the top of N 25 again. Later the
sky was overcast with threatening snow squalls. It was clear that the
ice was constantly on the move. Meantime the water-lane was so
broad that we were not afraid of it closing in. What concerned us
most was the uncertainty about N 25 and its crew. We reasoned out
and imagined every possible theory. If everything was all right, they
would of course fly down to join us in this place, where they could
land without difficulty. If the machine had been hopelessly damaged,
they would come on foot over the ice to us. We ruminated thus,
because it seemed to us that they must have seen our flag, and, as
meantime we saw nothing of them, we presumed that they had some
necessary repairs to effect.
The whole night, until the morning of the 23rd of May, we had
snow—with bad visibility. Omdal worked at the motors while
Ellsworth and I pumped. The leakage appeared to be getting
gradually worse. We had a northerly breeze and about -10° c.
At midday the weather cleared and the sun shone out from a
clear sky. In the course of the day I was able to make two good
observations, although the spirit level which Ellsworth had brought
with him was too small and besides was of a very unsuitable
construction. I had already pointed this out at Spitzbergen, but there
was no opportunity of getting a new one. I must admit that I was
disappointed with the result of our observations. I had believed that
we were considerably nearer the Pole. The others thought the same.
Judging by the flying and our speed through the air, we must have
had a very strong wind current against us. At that time, however, we
did not doubt that we could continue northwards as soon as the
motors were in working order again.
At midday we saw N 25 again. It had drifted nearer to us, and we
noticed that tarpaulins had been put over the motor-gondolas and
that the flag was flying over it. If only the weather would remain clear
now, they ought to be able to see us. We tried several times to
attract their attention by using smoke-bombs, and now and again we
fired a gun.
The part of the water-lane where we were encamped froze up
more and more, a condition which rather pleased us as we expected
that we would soon be able to make a start from the ice.
In the afternoon we at last noticed that N 25 must have observed
us because we noticed a flag being waved backwards and forwards.
This was the customary sign used in the Navy for starting flag-
signaling. I was not slow in taking up the challenge, and soon a
connection was established. The distance was so long that we had
to use glasses, and as these had to be dried continuously the
signaling took some time. At last we got the following message: “We
are frozen in twenty meters from the water-lane—working in order to
get free. If your position hopeless come to us, bring food, axes,
deflection instruments, engine O.K.” We replied: “Expect we can
start on the ice from here, but are leaking badly, therefore longer
sojourn on the water impossible.”
I think few can imagine what relief it was to us to have
established signal-communication with each other. I immediately
gave a grateful thought to Riiser-Larsen and to my naval education.
The whole night, until the morning of the 24th of May, we had a
fresh breeze with drifting snow, the temperature being -11° to -12°. It
was bitterly cold in the tent and the wind was blowing right through it.
The sleeping-bags were very excellent, but really only meant for
summer use. We had the “Thermix” heating apparatus with us. It
was really extraordinarily good, but, as we had hardly any petrol to
spare, we did without the comfort of a heated tent. On our flight
northwards we had been exceedingly economical regarding the
consumption of petrol, and we therefore still had half a drum more
than half our original quantity. But one could not tell how much might
be required for our return journey.
In the course of the day (24th of May) the whole fjord was frozen
over. The leakage in the boat got continually worse, and thus we
were quite pleased to see the ice freezing round our machine as it
would form a resting place for the wings, and would prevent the
machine sinking further, even if we should stop pumping-work, which
took up much time and prevented us from performing other
necessary tasks.
During the course of the afternoon Omdal finished changing the
exhaust ventilators, and we thought that the motors were now all
ready. The fact that they would not start in the severe cold, and
especially in the strong wind which hindered the warming of the
motors, did not concern us greatly. Spring was on the way, and the
temperature would soon rise.
The movements of the ice, however, disturbed us very much. We
had the feeling that the icebergs on the other side of the water-lane
had come somewhat nearer, and the whole “landscape” seemed to
change from time to time. In order to be on the safe side we decided
to put all our provisions and outfit ashore. We started this
immediately, and in the course of the forenoon everything was on the
ice-plain near the tent.
Gradually the ice began to encroach more and more. To our joy
we noticed that the two machines got nearer together, and we
decided to try and get into communication with N 25. We were
anxious to find out their position in order to discuss things with our
leader, the only one with experience of drift ice, and the only one
who could judge the situation.
On account of the uncertain conditions we did not want to leave
more of our equipment behind than was absolutely necessary. We
tried first of all to put our canvas boat (loaded with provisions, etc.)
on the ski-sledge. This was the course we should have to adopt if for
one reason or another we had to march southwards. After a few
hundred meters of toil, fighting our way amongst the icebergs, we
realized that it would be quite impossible to get along in a
reasonable time, handicapped by this outfit, so we therefore took
only the most necessary things in our knapsacks. All the same it
amounted to forty kg. each, and with this on our backs we started off
on our skis. We toiled forward over high icebergs and ice-clumps,
and crossed the most fantastic and uneven territory, where skis of
course could not be used. Therefore we carried them again, and
jumped over the water-lanes or crossed the new ice which moved
under our weight. This was very exciting and tiring and I admired the
progress made by Ellsworth, who is not a skiing man. (In addition to
his many excellent qualities he is also a true sportsman.) Omdal’s
Alaskan experiences also came in handy. He was very clever in
finding the easiest and safest passages, and we progressed without
accident. N 25 was getting nearer and nearer with every minute’s
march. After we had traveled about half the distance a long water-
lane covered with very thin new ice stopped our progress. It was
right across our path, about a quarter of a mile broad, and reached
as far as the eye could see. On the other side lay N 25. We were so
near that Riiser-Larsen and I could signal to each other without
difficulty and without using glasses. We received word that they
considered it impossible for us to get across, and we had nothing
else to do but to go back the way we had come. Before leaving we
arranged that we should signal to each other the next day at ten
o’clock Greenwich mean time.
After seven hours’ toil we were back again at N 24. It was lying
just as we had left it and all three of us went to “bed.” It was bitterly
cold, but we got the first decent sleep since we had left Spitzbergen.
We had gradually got more accustomed to the use of sleeping-bags;
it required a good deal of practice to get down into them with the
thick clothes we had to wear, for while sleeping we had to be clad in
as many clothes as possible.
The 25th of May dawned with the same hopeless overcast sky
as before. Now and again we had heavy snowdrifts. The
temperature was about -10° c. After having tried in vain to start the
aft motor, Omdal worked some time at the engine, but still it would
not start. At 10 a.m. they signaled from N 25 that it appeared as if we
could now manage to get to them if laden only with small packages
and taking extreme care. We replied that we first wanted to try our
engines and endeavor to get N 24 on to the ice-plain beside the tent,
where it would be quite safe under any circumstances. We therefore
started to prepare a slide over which we could push the machine.
Whilst busy with this we received a further communication from N 25
that they required help as soon as we were ready to give it. We
replied that we now expected an early result, and that we then would
cross at the first opportunity in order to help them.
Meantime the aft engine was out of order and remained so.
Compression was poor and Omdal poured buckets of warm oil on
the valves, lighting all the Thermix apparatus and setting them in the
motor gondola in the hope that the engine might start. The water-
lane where we had landed was now nearly closed, and the icebergs
on the other side were encroaching nearer so that the situation was
not particularly bright. Until now we had lived only for lunch and
dinner, eating the traveling provisions which Director Knutsen had
given us and taking a cup of chocolate as well. For dinner we had a
cup of pemmican soup, but instead of using one and three-quarter
tablets per man, which was the original calculated ration, we only
used two tablets altogether. In order to be on the safe side we
started rationing the biscuits by allowing each man six biscuits
served in threes, twice a day, although none of us expected then that
we should remain here for weeks.
After a hard day’s work we sat again in the tent enjoying a pipe
of tobacco after our evening meal, when I started to blink as my eyes
suddenly began to smart. At first I thought it was the smoke, but the
smarting did not stop; it got worse and worse. Tears flowed slowly
and scaldingly. There could be no doubt about it. I had become
snow-blind. It had come on me without any warning. We had had an
overcast sky and snow most of the time, but it had never dawned on
me to use snow-glasses. It seemed therefore that I would have to lie
like a wreck for a few days, and I admit it now seemed to me that the
situation was fairly precarious. I did the only things possible, namely,
to get into my sleeping-bag and shut my eyes. Notwithstanding the
pain and the trepidation, nature craved its right after the last day’s
toil and mental strain, and I slept soundly. Late in the forenoon the
following day I wakened somewhat confused in my head. To my
great joy I could open my eyes. I noticed that it was twelve o’clock,
but whether day or night I did not know. The other two slept, but as
Ellsworth awakened at that moment, I learned that it must be
midday, as he had crept into his sleeping-bag about 11 P.M. and had
slept a long time. My eyes pained a little, but I could see all right, and
I put on my spectacles immediately. We had a quiet meal and then
arose the question of how to start the engine. We worked and
worked, but there was no result. Probably it had been so warm that
the valves must have got jammed, and it would take Omdal a week
to take the cylinders off and put things right. After this discovery
there was only one thing to do. We must secure the machine in the
best possible way and try to get across to N 25. We presumed that
with united efforts, we could have it ready for flight in the course of a
few days, and then Feucht could remain with Omdal and help him to
get the aft motor going.

AMUNDSEN—BEFORE THE
TRIP

AMUNDSEN—AFTER
 ELLSWORTH—BEFORE

ELLSWORTH—AFTER

We started the first motor, therefore, and with the help of this got
the machine as far as possible up the slip. Ellsworth and Omdal
worked like heroes in order to turn the machine, whilst I worked the
engine. But what could three men do with such a heavy machine?
We got it well up onto the ice-floe so that only the after-end and part
of the propeller remained in the water-lane. It could not sink now in
any case, and the new ice outside would in all probability prevent the
drift-ice from getting near it while we were away. We considered
under the circumstances that it was lying in as safe a position as
possible, and we got ready to go across to N 25. The ice in the
water-lane did not look very safe and N 25 had drifted somewhat
nearer. We lightened our packs, but they still weighed forty kg. It was
impossible to know beforehand how long the trip would take us. First
there was one thing and then another which we thought we ought to
have with us. Off we went right across the water-lane, although it
presented such an uncanny appearance. Omdal led. I followed, and
then came Ellsworth. As soon as we had to leave the new ice, it was
a case of climbing up and down high icebergs, where in addition to
other things we had to carry our skis. We remained as near as
possible to the edge of the water-lane, and everything went well until
we were near the other machine. We were already going to start
boasting, as we had no idea of any danger, when I suddenly found
myself immersed in water up to my neck. I noticed that my skis had
disappeared, but my knapsack, which weighed forty kg., was very
embarrassing. I shouted loudly as soon as I fell through, and Omdal
quickly turned round. I had hardly seen his face when he also
disappeared like magic. There we both were. I managed to get my
gun up over the ice, which had broken several times under my
hands. I got a good firm hold and remained as quiet as possible
because I knew that Ellsworth would soon be with me—unless he
also tumbled in. The current was strong and pulled my legs up in
front of me under the ice so that my boot-tops actually touched it. To
get out by my own efforts with the heavy knapsack was hopeless. I
was not going to risk losing my knapsack, before I knew how it stood
with Ellsworth. Omdal called for assistance in the hope that the crew
of N 25 would come and help. In a little while Ellsworth, who had
saved himself by getting out of the water-lane, came to my rescue.
He came creeping along, and handed me a ski, which I got hold of,
and by its help I wriggled along to the edge of the firm ice. In a
second I managed to slip off my knapsack and its precious contents,
and got it onto the ice, and I scrambled up after it with Ellsworth’s
help. Then Ellsworth dashed off to Omdal, who was getting weaker
and weaker. I stumbled to my legs and ran as quickly as my tired
condition allowed me. Omdal was so exhausted that it was
exceedingly difficult to get him out. I got my knife and cut the straps
of his knapsack, whilst Ellsworth held him up, and with our joint
efforts we at last got him safely onto the land. He could not stand on
his legs. We had both had a narrow escape, and we have to thank
Ellsworth’s self-possession and quickness that we escaped with our
lives. The honor which he received later—the gold medal for bravery
—pleased Omdal and myself as much as it pleased him. It was well
earned.
RIISER-LARSEN—BEFORE

RIISER-LARSEN—AFTER
 DIETRICHSON—BEFORE

DIETRICHSON—AFTER

Our foresight in unstrapping the laces of the skis and putting our
boots loosely into the ski-shoes, putting on our air-filled lifebelts was
what made it possible to save us at all. How we blessed this, our
own farsightedness! By way of curiosity I may mention that Riiser-
Larsen and I bought the lifebelts in Bodö just as we were on the
point of starting. A man came on board and announced himself as
the manufacturer of the lifebelt “Tethys.” He brought a sample which
appealed to us, and so we ordered six belts. It is strange how life is
full of chance actions which lead to fateful results.
About forty minutes after the accident we reached the N 24. We
received a hearty reception, and as Omdal and I got a good drop of
spirit and some dry clothes, we soon started talking. Answers to
innumerable questions tripped off our tongues. I can well remember
that I said, “I am glad to see you again,” when I pressed Roald
Amundsen’s hand. It is a saying which generally does not mean
much, but I believe Amundsen understood. These few words, and
still more the handshake, were an expression of joy at being again
with our beloved leader, whose insight, experience and great
capability, in conjunction with his untiring energy, overcame all
difficulties. I have the impression that Amundsen’s few words to me,
“same here” (“i like maate”), were just as sincere. All three of us from
N 24 had arrived with a whole skin, and we could report that the
machine in the meantime at least was safe, and, with our combined
efforts, could be got ready to start in a few days’ time.
N 25’s position was such that only our united strength could save
it from its precarious situation. It had made a forced landing and was
lying worse than N 24, but both its motors were in working order. If
the machines had by chance separated instead of coming close
together we would probably not have been able to get into contact
with one another and one crew, unless reënforced by the other,
could hardly have managed to start its machine alone.
Even now, although we were six men all told, it seemed to us
something of a riddle how we, with our primitive implements, should
manage to get the machine onto the great ice-plain, which was our
goal. But in this difficulty our leader’s wide experience and inventive
mind was put to its full use. It became apparent that if six men are
working on a matter of life and death they can accomplish the
unbelievable. Most of us soon knew that our only salvation lay in
getting one or both machines in a good position to start. A march
southwards would (no matter which way we chose) have very little
chance of success.
Our work and our mode of life in the weeks which followed are
described in another chapter, so I shall only add that we were
disappointed in our hopes of being able to get N 24 ready as soon as
we had finished with N 25. Instead we had weeks of strenuous work
to get N 25 into readiness for flight. It was absolutely a game of “cat
and mouse,” but it was a game in which life and death were the
stakes.
The thought of leaving our machine there behind us, in the ice,
was very bitter at first. But as time passed and we saw the difficulties
we had to contend with on every side, the bitterness gradually got
less and less—especially when we found that it would be necessary
to use N 24’s supply of petrol to augment the other supply for the
homeward flight and for the various attempts to start which had to be
made before N 25 finally got clear away.
I might mention too that the absence of landing places made it
seem advisable for the return journey to be accomplished with one
machine. The risk of having to make a forced landing would thus
only be half as great, and the forced landing of one of the machines
would have meant a catastrophe for the whole expedition. (I
personally did not share this opinion, for in spite of the misfortune to
the aft engines my trust in both of these was great, as they had gone
like clockwork during the entire northward flight.) Circumstances
however settled the question of choice, and as we at last, on the
15th of June, found ourselves in our right element again, it was only
a passing thought which we gave to our dear N 24 as it disappeared
behind us in the fog.
 Part V
WHILST WE WAIT

LEAVES FROM THE DIARY OF FREDRIK

RAMM
From May 21st to June 18th
 WHILST WE WAIT
LEAVES FROM THE DIARY OF FREDRIK
RAMM
From May 21st to June 18th

Ny-Aalesund, King’s Bay. Thursday, 21st May. Now they have

gone! The daring journey has started! At five o’clock in the afternoon
Amundsen, Riiser-Larsen and Feucht were on board N 25, Ellsworth,
Dietrichson and Omdal on N 24, and we began to say farewell. Each
one shook hands and received a nod of courage from all who should
remain behind. To speak was impossible because of the noise from
the four engines, which had all been working for a couple of hours,
making such a din that our very words appeared to be torn in pieces
and thrown into the snow spray which was whirled up by the
propellers. At 5:15 N 25 glides out on to the ice. We are astonished,
for there is no signal. Riiser-Larsen simply lets his engine out; the
propeller whirs and the machine glides down from the strand onto
the ice. The forward movement continues, and before we realize
what is happening, the machine is gliding over the snow-clad plain
and swings out onto the ice, suddenly giving a mighty swerve right
round, and with continued speed rushes forward. One second—or is
it a minute?—before Dietrichson’s machine follows? It disappears
onto the ice in a cloud of snow making us wonder whether we are
standing on our heads or our heels!
But what is this?
N 24 remains absolutely still on the plain, and where is N 25?
There! A little gray fleck on the ice traveling towards the foot of the
glacier. Will they have to lighten it? No! now it is in the air! No! Yes!
Yes, it is! Just the fraction of a second passes, and we know that the
start is successful in spite of the heavy load. We shout “Hurrah” as
we see the space between the ice and the gray machine increasing
and increasing till at last, there, high above the iceberg, and with the
sky for a background, they swing round and set their course direct
across the fjord. N 24 remains quite still. We cannot understand why
and are about to cross over to make inquiries. But almost before we
start the machine rises high into the clear blue sky and follows N 25
far out over the fjord. The two machines, so far as we can judge, are
about 300 to 400 meters high, with N 25 a few hundred meters in
front of N 24. We hear the even humming of the engines, echoing
quite clearly on account of the high hills on the fjord’s opposite side
—the noise decreases, ’tis now only like the humming of a fly. We
follow the machines through binoculars, clearly seeing the
propellers, the motor gondolas, the wings, and even the heads of the
observers and pilots. Their speed must be 150 kilometers per hour.
The two machines get smaller and smaller—the hum of the motors
fainter and fainter. At last they have disappeared altogether. We look
at the clock, they had left according to program and are in the air at
5:22—seven minutes after N 25 glided down onto the ice—both
flying boats out of sight! Seven minutes.... It might almost have been
seven hours. So much has happened.

Later
We remained standing as though suddenly realizing the
difference in the work of those six on board the machines and
ourselves. Till now we have all appeared to be actual members of
the expedition. We have felt that there was no great difference in our
desires to reach a common goal. We have lived under the same
roof, fed in the same mess, have shared the same work, but now the
others have gone, and we have become the land party again! The
six ought to return after a few days’ absence and we should again be
part of the expedition. But the few hours which have passed since
5:15 this afternoon have opened a tremendous gulf between us. The
six may now be fighting for their very lives, while we hang around
here exactly as we did yesterday, the day before, and every other
day in the six weeks we have been in Ny-Aalesund. We have
suddenly become superfluous! Until this afternoon we had tasks to
perform, but from now we can only wait, just like all the rest of the
world, for the six who have gone—and we know that we can give
them no more help than any one else can. We have become
passive.
The humming of the motors can still be heard in our dreams; in
fact the whole occurrence appears only as a dream. Could it have
really been we who saw them off? We, who are now packing up and
getting ready to go on board the “Fram” and the “Hobby,” which lie
ready by the quay to set off northwards to Danskeöen. The
landscape is unchanged. The sun still shines high in the light blue
polar sky, making the glacier scintillate with lovely colors. But the six
have gone! At the end of the fjord’s north side lies Cape Mitra—that
pointed corner which is one of the best landmarks in the world.
During the evening meal on board the “Fram” we talk of nothing
but the start. We listen with pride to Schulte-Frohlinde’s praise
regarding the pilots’ management of the two heavy machines. He
says no one could have done it better, and we agree with him
unanimously, although we don’t know the difference between a
sporting and a bombarding machine. He has walked across the ice
and examined the trails, and noted that the ice was broken into small
pieces at the spot where Dietrichson stuck, and the same was the
case in a 200–300 meter length along Riiser-Larsen’s track before
he had been able to rise. The starting track was about 1,400 meters
long, and Schulte-Frohlinde says that the trail gets less and less until
towards its end it might only have been marked in the snow with
one’s little finger.
For the first two hours after the machines had disappeared we
scanned the heavens with our binoculars as, before starting,
Amundsen had told Captain Hagerup of the “Fram” that if everything
should not be in order, the machines would return again; and if one
machine had had to make a forced landing, the other would fly back
to King’s Bay and warn the ships to go quickly to their aid. It is seven
o’clock. It is now eight, and no machine is to be seen, so now we
know that all is well. Eleven o’clock, and “Fram’s” bunkers are well
filled; the ship leaves the quay. Half an hour later, when “Hobby” is
ready, we steer out of the fjord. We pass Cape Mitra, steering past
the seven glaciers. So far as we can see northwards, it appears to
be clear. The sea lies calm as a mirror. There is hardly any swell,
and for the first time in the open sea we are all at the same moment
free from seasickness. Westward above the horizon lies a low
cloudbank. We ask Bjerknes and Calwagen what it can be; can this
gray cloud-mass threaten danger to the airmen? No! It can’t do that,
for it is only the dispersing fog which has hung over King’s Bay
during the last days, and which was blown away by the northeast
wind, making a start possible. During the night we passed drift-ice.
We all stand on the bridge looking northwards every second.
Here we pass along the Coast over which the two machines flew
this afternoon.
“The small hours begin to grow.” We bless the “Fram’s” steward,
who brings us coffee, and we go to our bunks. “Fram” is no
passenger boat, but we are quite happy to sleep wherever we can
find a comfortable spot.

Virgo-havn between Danskeöen and

Amsterdamöen. Friday, May 22nd
For the rest of the night and the early morning hours “Fram”
steers northwards, along the glacier coast. At 6:30 we enter South
Gate Sound, between Danskeöen and Spitzbergen’s mainland,
where we lie until midday. “Hobby” continues northwards, sailing
round Amsterdamöen towards Norskeöene to study the ice
conditions, returning to fetch “Fram” after the inspection. And now
the two ships steer towards Virgo-havn, and we drop our anchor at
three o’clock in the afternoon. The entire time on both ships we have
kept a sharp lookout from the bridge, carefully searching the horizon
westward and northward for any sign of life. It might have been
possible that both boats, on account of motor trouble, had been