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Richard M. Robinson
Imperfect Duties of
Management
The Ethical Norm of
Managerial Decisions
Imperfect Duties of Management
Richard M. Robinson
Imperfect Duties
of Management
The Ethical Norm of Managerial Decisions
Richard M. Robinson
Business Administration
SUNY Fredonia
Fredonia, NY, USA
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2019
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The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
To my spouse Dr. MaryAnn Robinson, and to my colleague
Prof. Marwan ElNasser, both of whom provided
great patience and inspiration.
Preface
vii
viii Preface
References
Coase, Ronald H. 1937. “The Nature of the Firm.” Economica 4 (November):
386–405.
Jensen, Michael C., and William H. Meckling. 1976. “Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure.” Journal of
Financial Economics 3 (October): 305–360.
Contents
4 Relations of Virtue 65
ix
x Contents
References 223
Index 237
List of Figures
Chapter 6
Fig. 1 The expected profit stream 132
Chapter 9
Fig. 1 Perquisites and market value of equity 207
Fig. 2 Capital structure 210
Fig. 3 Liquidity effects 212
Fig. 4 Perquisites and the market value of equity 220
xi
List of Tables
Chapter 6
Table 1 Value of firm’s assets in two-state future 136
Table 2 Value of firm’s debt payment in two-state future 136
Table 3 Value of firm’s equity in two-state future 137
xiii
CHAPTER 1
each vision were analyzed, but the perfect competition model seldom
applies empirically to any particular industry, and neither does the model
of monopoly.3 The two extremes are analyzed in economics, and we do
pose the competitive model as having moral dimensions applicable to
aspects of social efficiency.
The neoclassical analysis concerned free individuals getting the maxi-
mum from their efforts within resource constraints. The combination of
individuals being free from government interference, plus the neoclassi-
cal notion of “economic efficiency,” were emphasized.4
This perfect competition model of neoclassical economics extends
from the foundation of classical economics as reviewed above. It poses
the following as interrelated advantages of competitive markets:
under uncertainty (See Fama and Miller, 1971; Copeland and Weston,
1983). This extension changes the profit motive into that of Shareholder
Wealth Maximization (SWM). Jensen (2002) argued the benefits of
envisioning the maximization of a single-value function of numerous
inputs, i.e., SWM. The mathematical analytical presentation of this pro-
cess exhibits real advantages for clarity and consequent understanding.
It is valuable for capital structure decisions, dividend distribution deci-
sions, capital budgeting decisions, working capital management, and
in general deciding the levels of inputs. One can also envision an SWM
analysis for managerial imperfect duties as inputs, i.e., a marginalist solu-
tion for optimal inputs of imperfect duties. Unlike the much simpler
financial decisions (capital structure, capital budgeting, dividends, and
working capital), any analysis of the imperfect duties of management is
much more complex, and a mathematical SWM approach would appear
to be vast overkill. Clarity would not be derived from such an approach.
The term “shareholder wealth pursuit” appears to the author to be more
appropriate than SWM. That “pursuit” term is therefore utilized in this
monograph rather than “shareholder wealth maximization.”
In the latter chapters, two important analyses are presented as illus-
trations of the nexus of imperfect duty approach. The imperfect duty
conception is shown to particularly apply to managerial perquisites, espe-
cially when these are broadly characterized into excessive managerial
risk aversion in capital structure decisions, excessive liquidity levels, and
“pet project” selections. This is shown to be a considerable extension
of Jensen and Meckling (1976). As such, it offers a substantial contri-
bution, thereby demonstrating the robustness of the nexus of imperfect
duty model.
The second illustration uses the nexus model to form a theory of
stakeholder relations, i.e., a theory of fair negotiations applicable to man-
agerial relations with stakeholders. Fair negotiations are shown to be a
natural subset of the nexus theory. Maxims applicable for these stake-
holder negotiations are suggested. This concept of fair negotiation with
stakeholders is shown to be the moral alternative to paternalistic stake-
holder-balance theory. This also is a substantial contribution.
In general, the purpose of this monograph is to explain the nexus
of imperfect duty approach to management theory. It poses a particu-
larly moral theory of management; it poses the ethical norm that effec-
tively allows a moral analysis of management. It also poses direction to
1 INTRODUCTION: THE NEXUS OF IMPERFECT … 7
Notes
1. See Ferguson (1972, Chapters 1 and 2), for the utility maximization the-
ory of the consumer. Also see Henderson and Quandt (1958, Chapter 2).
2. Friedman and Friedman 1980, titled their popular book Free to Choose:
A Personal Statement as well as their popular television series as based on
classical and neoclassical economic notions of personal freedom and market
efficiency.
3. We do have regulated monopolies and some other regulated industries
such as those in some agricultural markets that are highly competitive.
4. The neoclassical theory of economic efficiency was based on “the law of
diminishing returns,” and marginalist analysis.
5. See Henderson and Quandt (1958) and Ferguson (1972).
6. See Henderson and Quandt (1958, Chapter 7) and Ferguson (1972,
Chapter 16) for reviews of welfare economics.
1 INTRODUCTION: THE NEXUS OF IMPERFECT … 9
References
Alchian, Arman A., and Harold Demsetz. 1972. “Production, Information
Costs, and Economic Organization.” American Economic Review 62
(December): 777–795.
Coase, Ronald H. 1937. “The Nature of the Firm.” Economica 4 (November):
386–405.
Copeland, Thomas E., and J. Fred Weston. 1983. Financial Theory and
Corporate Policy. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Fama, Eugene and Merton Miller. 1971. The Theory of Finance. Dryden Press,
Hinsdale, IL.
Ferguson, C. E. 1972. Microeconomic Theory. 3rd ed. Homewood, IL: Richard
D. Irwin.
Fleischacker, Samuel. 2004. On Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations: A Philosophical
Companion. Princeton University Press, Princeton. NJ.
Henderson, James M., and Richard E. Quandt. 1958. Microeconomic Theory: A
Mathematical Approach. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
Jensen, Michael C. 2002. “Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the
Corporate Objective Function.” Business Ethics Quarterly 12 (2): 127–138.
Jensen, Michael C., and William H. Meckling. 1976. “Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure.” Journal of
Financial Economics 3 (October): 305–360.
Kant, Immanuel. 1785. “Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals.”
In Basic Writings of Kant, edited by Allen W. Wood, The Modern Library
Classics. New York: The Modern Library.
Kant, Immanuel. 1797. The Metaphysics of Morals, edited by Mary Gregor.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Malthus, Thomas. 1826. Essay on the Principle of Population, J. Johnson,
London, UK.
Marshall, Alfred. 1890. Principles of Economics. Prometheus Books, London, UK.
Mill, John Stuart. 1848. The Principles of Political Economy. John W. Parker.
London, UK.
Ricardo, David. 1817. On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, Johm
Murray, London, UK.
Robinson, Richard. 2016. “Friendships of Virtue, Pursuit of the Moral
Community, and the Ends of Business.” Journal of Business Ethics, published
10 R. M. ROBINSON
axioms. The ability to form the synthetic a priori principle or idea creates
the ability to use practical reason to generate broad principles of conduct
that Kant called “the autonomy of the will.” This reasoning ability gen-
erates the dignity of all thinking persons. From this notion of reflective
reasoning, Kantian ethics follow (See Allison, 1995).
Kant’s transcendent metaphysics, plus the human autonomy that is
based on everyone’s reasoning capability, leads to his categorical imper-
ative (presented in the next section), and that implies duties some of
which bind unconditionally, and some of which are volitional. From the
“autonomous will,” people have dignity and “ends in themselves.” From
these notions, Kant poses a theoretical “kingdom of ends,” where each
person respects each other’s universalizing wills and acts on those personal
maxims you would have everyone act on (See Downie, 1995). It is the pur-
suit of this theoretical kingdom, a union of people pursuing the moral
maxims they legislate for themselves that provides moral motivation.
(Much more is explained about moral motivation in Sect. 3.)
The late eighteenth century was an age of budding democracy
when the common populace reasoned for itself. This reasoning also
posed duties for this populace. In Kant’s often cited Answer to the
Question: What is Enlightenment? (1784, 8: 36 and 8: 37), we might
perceive a notion of duty:
7.
The purpose of education is to disseminate knowledge, not to
mold feelings or character.
has …” Since the three formulae are interrelated, one derivable from the
other, this “common reason of men” argument applies to all three by
extension. This “common reason of men” also provides the ethical foun-
dation for the process. It is important to keep in mind that these formulae
are axiomatic guides for society’s reasoned discourse, from which society
derives our applicable and practical duties:
Formula 2—the formula for the respect for the dignity of persons: “Act so
that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of any
other, always as an end and never as a means only” (Kant, 1785, 4: 429).
The practical maxims derived from the CIP include both perfect duty
(avoiding those actions which are prohibited) and imperfect duty (those
volitional actions which we should consider doing, but which have prac-
tical limits such as with actions of beneficence). This CIP derives our
social maxims while constraining deliberations to adhere to what Kant
termed the universal principle of justice (UPJ):
Behave in such a way that your choices are compatible with the greatest
amount of external freedom for everyone. (Kant, 1797, 6: 230)