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LINEAR
SYSTEMS
THE ORY
SECOND EDITION

Ferenc Szidarovszl<y
A. Terry Bahill

0 ~y~~f~~~~~"P
Boca Raton London New York

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Szidarovszky, Ferenc.
Linear systems theory l Perene Szidarovszky, A. Terry Bahill.-
2nd ed.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-8493-1687-1 (alk paper)
l. System theory. 2. Control theory. 3. Dynamics. I. Bahill,
Terry. Il. Title
Q295.S995 1997
003-dc21 97-42062
CIP

This book contains information obtained from authentic and highly regarded sources. Re-
printed material is quoted with permission, and sources are indicated. A wide variety of references
are listed. Reasonable efforts have been made to publish reliable data and information, but the
author and the publisher cannot assorne responsibility for the validity of all materials or for the
consequences of their use.
Neither this book nor any part may be reproduced or transmitled in an y form or by an y means,
electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, microfilming, and recording, or by any infor-
mation storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publisher.
CRC Press LLC' s consent does not extend to copying for general distribution, for promotion,
for creating new works, or for resale. Specific permission must be obtained in writing from CRC
Press LLC for such copying.
Direct all inquiries to CRC Press LLC, 2000 Corporate Blvd., N.W., Boca Raton, Florida
33431.

© 1998 by CRC Press LLC

No claim to original U.S. Government works


International Standard Book Number 0-8493-1687-1
Libary of Congress Card Number 97-42062
Contents
Aut hors vii

Preface ix

Introduction x iii

l Mathematical Background l
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l
1.2 Metric Spaces and Contraction Mapping Theory l
1.2.1 :Nletric Spaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2.2 :Nlappings in :Nletric Spaces . . . . . . . 9
1.2.3 Contraction 1vlappings and Fixed Points 14
1.3 Some Properties of Vectors and Matrices .. 18
1.3.1 Norms of Vectors and 1viatrices 18
1.3.2 Special Matrix Forms 30
1.3.3 Matrix functions 41
Problems. 53

2 Mathematics of Dynamic Processes 57


2.1 Solution of Ordinary Differential Equations 57
2.1.1 Existence and Uniqueness Theorems 57
2.1.2 Solution of Linear Differential Equations .. 65
2.1.3 Laplace Transform . . . . . 75
2.2 Solution of Difference Equations . . . . . . . . 89
2.2.1 General Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
2.2.2 Solution of Linear Difference Equations 92
2.2.3 Z-transform .. 95
Problems. 103

3 Characterization of Systems 107


3.1 The Concept of Dynamic Systems 107
3.2 Equilibrium and Linearization . 112
3.3 Continuous Linear Systems . 119
3.3.1 State-Space Approach . 119

iii
iv Contents

3.3.2 Transfer Functions . . . . . . . . . 121


3.3.3 Equations in Input-Output Form . 125
3.3.4 Combinations . . . . . . . . 129
3.3.5 Adjoint and Dual Systems . 140
3. 4 Discrete Systems . . . . . . . . . . 144
3.5 Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
3. 5.l Dynamic Systems in Engineering 149
3.5.2 Dynamic Systems in Social Sciences 173
Problems. 191

4 Stability Analysis 197


4.1 The Elements of the Lyapunov Stability Theory . 198
4.1.1 Lyapunov Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
4.1.2 The stability of time-variant linear systems 205
4.1.3 The Stability of Time-Invariant Linear Systems . 206
4.2 BIBO Stability . . . . . . . . . . . 219
4.3 Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
4.3.1 Applications in Engineering . . . . 224
4.3.2 Applications in the Social Sciences 229
Problems. 238

5 Controllability 243
5 .l Continuous Systems . . . . . . . 243
5.1.1 General Conditions . . . 244
5 .1.2 Time-Invariant Systems 256
5.1.3 Output and Trajectory ContraHability 264
5.2 Discrete Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268
5.3 Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274
5.3.1 Dynamic Systems in Engineering . 274
5.3.2 Applications in the Social Sciences 281
Problems. 287

6 O bservability 293
6.1 Continuous Systems . . . . . . 294
6.1.1 General Conditions .. . 294
6.1.2 Time-Invariant Systems 299
6.2 Discrete Systems 303
6.3 Duality . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307
6.4 Applications . . . . . . . . . . . 310
6.4.1 Dynamic Systems in Engineering 310
6.4.2 Applications in the Social Sciences 316
Problems. 322
Contents v

7 Canonical Forms 327


7.1 Diagonal and Jordan Forms 329
7.2 ContraHability Canonical Forms. 333
7.3 Observability Canonical Forms . 342
7.4 Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . 346
7 .4.1 Dynami c Systems in Engineering . 346
7 .4.2 Applications in the Social Sciences and Economics 360
Problems. 369

8 Realization 375
8.1 Realizability of Weighting Patterns 376
8.1.1 Realizability Conditions . . 377
8.1.2 Minimal Realizations . . . . 380
8.1.3 Time-Invariant Realizations 387
8.2 Realizability of 'fransfer Functions 396
8.2.1 Realizability Conditions 397
8.2.2 Minimal Realizations . . . . . 404
8.3 Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . 407
8.3.1 Dynamic Systems in Engineering . 407
8.3.2 Applications in the Social Sciences and Economics 412
Problems. 419

9 Estimatian and Design 425


9.1 The Eigenvalue Placement Theorem 426
9.2 Observers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 431
9.3 Reduced-Order Observers . . . . . . 435
9.4 The Eigenvalue Separation Theorem 437
9.5 Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 441
9.5.1 Dynamic Systems in Engineering . 441
9.5.2 Applications in the Social Sciences and Economics 450
Problems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 457

10 Advanced Topics 463


10.1 Nonnegative Systems . 463
10.2 The l(alman-Bucy Filter 469
10.3 Adaptive Control Systems . 472
10.4 Neural Net\vorks . . . . . 484

References 499

Index 503
Au t hors
Ferenc Szidarovszky has been a Professor of Systems and Industrial En-
gineering at the University of Arizona in Thcson, AZ, since 1988. He
received his Ph.D. in mathematics from the Eotvos University of Sci-
ences, Budapest, Hungary, in1970. He received a seeond Ph.D. in eco-
nomics from the Budapest Economics University, Hungary, in 1977. His
research interests are in the field of dynamic economic systems, game
theory, numerical analysis, and their applications in natural resources
management. He is the author of five textbooks and three monographs
published in Hungarian, as \vell as Principles and Procedures of Nu-
merical Analysis (\vith Sidney Yako\vitz), Plenum, 1978, Introduction
to Numerical Gomputatians (\vith Sidney Yako\vitz), :Niacmillan, 1986
(seeond edition, 1989), Techniques of Multiobjective Decision Making in
System lvianagement (\vith lVIark Gershon and Lucien Duckstein), El-
sevier, 1986, The Theory of Oligopoly with Multi-Product Firms (with
Koji Okuguchi), Springer, 1990, and The Theory and Applications of
Iteration lv!ethods (\vith Iannis l(. Arguros), CRC Press, 1993.

A. Terry Bahill has been a Professor of Systems and Industrial Engi-


neering at the University of Arizona in Thcson, AZ, since 1984. Here-
ceived his Ph.D. in electrical engineering and computer science from the
University of California, Berkeley, in 1975. He is a Fellow of the Institute
of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE). His research interests are
in the fields of modeling physiological systems, eye-hand-head coordina-
tion, validatian of expert systems, concurrent engineering, and systems
design theory. He is the author of Bioengineering: Biomedical, Medi-
cal, and Clinical Engineering, Prentice-Hall, 1981, Keep your Eye on the
Ball: The Science and Folklore of Baseball (with Bob Watts), W.H. Free-
man, 1990, Verifying and Validating Personal Computer-Based Expert
Systems, Prentice-Hall, 1991, Engineering Modeling and Design (with
Bill Chapman and vVayne vVymore), CRC Press, 1992, and Metrics and
Case Studies for Evaluating Engineering Designs (\vith Jay :Nioody, Bill
Chapman, and David Van Voorhees), Prentice-Hall, 1997.

vii
Preface
How is this book different from scores of other books on systems theory?
First, it is more rigorous mathematically. All developments are based
on precise mathematical arguments, many being innovative and origi-
nal. But no derivations are included just because they are elegant; each
derived theorem or lemma is used later in the book. Second, the theory
is general; often it ap p lies to (l) linear and nonlinear systems, (2) con-
tinuous and discrete systems, and (3) time invariant and time varying
systems. Third, modern, computer-oriented methods are presented, not
graphical techniques. Fourth, it has examples from most major fields
of engineering, economics, and social sciences, with special emphasis on
electrical engineering.
This book is self-contained. It starts \Vith a solid mathematical foun-
dation in Chapters l and 2. These chapters have all the mathematical
developments that \vill be used later in the book. Ho\vever, these chap-
ters can be skimmed if the results are already known to the reader or
if the reader is uninterested in the mathematical details. This rigorous
presentation of basic principles allo\vs fast, efficient development of later
material.
This text \Vas primarily \vritten for first-year graduate students in
electrical engineering, although it is suitable for graduate students in
other engineering fields as \Vell as those in economics, social sciences, or
mathematics. It \vould also be suitable for some advanced undergrad-
uate students. The prerequisites are the fundamentals of calculus and
matrix algebra only. The instructor can select the examples and appli-
cations that match the students' backgrounds. For example, for a course
in electrical engineering the instructor may \Vis h to present the seeond,
third, fourth, sixth and ninth problems of the Engineering Applications
sections. These five systems are introduced in Chapter 3 and are re-
peated in various forms in each of the subsequent chapters. For such a
class the instructor might present same of the other problems just for
the fun of it. On the other hand, an economics professor might ignore
the engineering applications and study instead the economics examples.

ix
x Preface

This book is an outgrowth of courses taught over the last two decades
to electrical, mechanical, systems, chemical and bion1edical engineers
at the University of Arizona and Carnegie Mellan U niversity and to
economics students at the Budapest University of Economics, Hungary.
The objective of this book is to help students develop their capabilities
for modeling dynamic systems, examining their properties, and applying
this knowledge to real-life situations. These objectives are served by four
main features of the book. The theoretical foundation and the theory of
nonlinear and linear systems are given in a comprehensive, precise way.
A unified approach is presented for continuous and discrete systems. We
develop a unified treatment of contraHability and observability that is
valid for both time-invariant and time-varying systems. In selecting the
theoretical material and methodology to be covered in this book, we con-
centrated mainly on modern, computer-oriented techniques and omitted
the old-fashioned, pre-computer age (mostly graphical) methods.
For example, in this text we present only four techniques for assessing
stability of a system: Lyapunov functions, the boundedness and con-
vergence of the state transition functions, the location in the camplex
plane of the eigenvalues of the coeffi.cient matrix or the location in the
camplex frequency plane (s-plane) of the poles of the transfer function,
and the Hurwitz criterion. Proving stability with Lyapunov functions
is general: it also works for nonlinear and time-varying systems. It is
good for proving stability and asymptotkal stability. Ho,vever, proofs
based on Lyapunov functions are difficult, and failure to find a Lyapunov
function that proves a system is stable does not prove that the system
is unstable. The seeond technique we present requires checking if the
state transition function is bounded and even converges to the zero ma-
trix if t ---+ oo. This method can be used for both time-invariant and
time varying linear systems. The third technique is bas ed on finding the
location in the con1plex plane of the eigenvalues of the time-invariant
coefficient matrix or finding the poles of the transfer function. This task
is sometimes difficult because it requires finding and factoring the char-
actedstic equation of the system. However, many computer packages are
now available to do this job. Finally, we present the Hurwitz technique
because it can assess the stability of a system without factoring poly-
nomials. Routh's criterion is similar to the Hurwitz approach, so it is
not presented here. These techniques were developed in the nineteenth
century. In the twentieth century, many more techniques were developed
to help assess the stability of a system without factoring polynomials,
such as Bode plats, Nyquist's criterion, Sylvester's condition, Kalman's
extension of Lyapunov's criterion, and the roat locus technique. We do
not present any of these because for real world problems no one would
ever apply them by hand. One would use a computer program that
implemented the method. And if one were to use a computer program,
Preface xi

you might as well have it solve the characteristic equation. Many com-
mercial software packages implement common linear systems techniques.
We think the users of this book would benefit by having one of these
computer programs available. Advertisements in technical publications
such as the IEEE Contro l Systems M agazine and IEEE Spectrum and
the article by Foster [13] describe many appropriate software packages.
In this book, theory is illustrated by simple numerical examples that
are easy to follow and help the student understand the essence of the
methodology. At the end of each chapter we present real-life applica-
tions. They are selected from most n1ajor fields of engineering with spe-
cial emphasis on electrical engineering, social sciences, and economics.
In addition to the illustrative examples and applications, we present
hornework problems at the end of each chapter. The last five or six
hornework problems in each chapter need a deep understanding of the
material and an ability to develop mathematical proofs.
The organization of the book is as follows. Chapter l presents the
mathematical background that will be used in later chapters. It is self-
contained and presents all the material t hat will be needed later. Ch ap-
ter 2 contains the basics of differential and difference equations as well
as Laplace and Z transforms. In Chapter 3, characterizations of non-
linear and linear systems are discussed both in state space form and by
using the transfer function method. The stability of dynamic systems
is analyzed in Chapter 4. Conditions are derived for marginal stability,
asymptotkal stability, global asymptotkal stability, uniform stability,
uniform exponential stability and BIBO stability. We present a unified
general approach that can be used for continuous and discrete and for
nonlinear and linear systems. ContraHability and observability are stud-
ied in Chapters 5 and 6, respectively. In Chapter 6 we also introduce
the concept of duality, \vhkh has many theoretical and practical conse-
quences. In solving and examirring the properties of dynamk systems,
special forms, called canonical forms, are often used. These canonical
forms are introduced in Chapter 7. System realizations and minimal
realizations are discussed in Chapter 8, \Vhere conditions for the realiz-
ability of \Veighting patterns and transfer functions are also introduced.
Special system structures, such as the use of observers for constructing
feedback compensators, are analyzed in Chapter 9. In Chapter 10 we
introduce four advanced topics: nonnegative systems, Kalman filters,
adaptive control, and neural networks.
There are several major additions to this seeond edition. New sta-
bility concepts are introduced and analyzed in Chapter 4. We added
illustrative examples in all chapters, and \ve added five to six "theoreti-
cal" hornework problems to each set. These theoretkal problems can be
very useful for stimulating grad u a te students to t hink about the main
concepts and the main results of the chapters. Engineering applications
x ii Preface

N umber six and nine are new, and their different aspects are examined
in each chapter. With these new case studies we puta greater emphasis
on electrical engineering application.
There is enough material for a full academic year course, hut for grad-
uate students the essence of the book can be covered in a three-unit,
ene-semester course. The first edition of this book, with certain emis-
sions, has been used in a ene-semester, three-unit, graduate course at
the University of Arizona. A chapter-dependency chart is illustrated in
Figure 0.1, w hi ch should hel p instructors tailor individual course pro-
grams.

Figure 0.1 Chapter dependency chart.

In preparing the manuscript we obtained significant help from our


students, especially from Jerome Yen, Dan Liu and Ling Shen who care-
fully read the manuscript, checked for misprints and understandability,
and prepared the solutions for the hornework problems. \Ve also thank
Jerome Yen for writing the neural network programs used in Chap-
ter 10. Mo Jamshidi provided us with helpful critiques. The figures
were camposed by Morgan, Cain and Associates of Tucson, Arizona.
Our most special thanks should be addressed to our families, who pro-
vided the needed support and personal understanding while we prepared
the manuscript.

Ferenc Szidarovszky
and
A. Terry Bahill
Tucson, AZ
In troductian
The technological revolution of the past century occurred because people
learned to control large systems composed of nature, machines, people,
and society. When they used and improved devices to help them con-
tro! such systems, they found that they could control bigger and bigger
systems. To show this evolution to bigger systemslet us consicler trans-
portation systems. A horse-drawn coach was handled quite well by the
coachman, using simple direct controls. The early automobile was simi-
lady controlied in a direct manner. However, modern a utomobiles have
a multitude of devices to help the driver control the vehicle: electronic
automatic transmission, povver steering, and four-wheel anti-lock brakes,
to mentio n a fe\v. To fly an airplane the pilot needs contro l devices to
translate his manual actions into the large forces required to move the
wing control surfaces. Some of the devices he uses amplify his strength
and others augment his intelligence. On many airplanes the intelligence
devices are so good the pilot can put the airplane on autopilot and let
the plane fly itself. As systems become more complicated, the human
does less of the controlling and the rnachine does more. If we make a
manned voyage to :Nlars, humans \vill play a small role in controlling the
spacecraft.
The design of control devices is called control engineering. Early con-
trol devices \vere mechanical: and their design \Vas mainly intuitive.
However, recent contro l devices are algorithms embedded in comput-
ers, and their design is very mathematical. The linear systems tools
presented in this book comprise the basic mathen1atical portion of the
control engineer's toolkit. This introduction discusses these tools, hut
does so in nonmathematical terms. It is meant to motivate the main
concepts and help the reader see the forest through the trees.
Chapters l and 2 of this book present the mathematical basis for
understanding the concepts, methods, and derivations in later chapters.
The material presented may at first be foreign to you, hut we encourage
you to bear \Vith us, because after you master this material the rest of
the book will be easy.

xiii
xiv In tro d uction

Chapter 3 shows how \Ve rnadel dynamic systems. The term "dy-
namic" means that the patterus describing the system change with time
and the characteristics of the patterus at any time period are interre-
lated with those of earlier times. A system is a process that converts
inputs to outputs. A system accepts inputs and, based on the inputs
and its present state, creates outputs. A system has no direct control
over its inputs. An example of a system used in everyday lifeisa traffi.c
light. It accepts inputs, such as pedestrians pushing the walk hutton or
cars driving over sensors, and based on its current state, creates outputs
that are the colors of the lights in each direction. Defining the state of
a system is one of the most important, and often most diffi.cult, tasks
in system design. The state of the system is the smallest entity that
summarizes the past history of the system. The state of the system and
the sequence of inputs allows computation of the future states of the
system. The state of a system contains all the information needed to
calculate future respanses without reference to the history of inputs and
responses. For example, the current balance of your checking account is
the state of that system. There are many ways that it could have gotten
to the current value, but when you are ready to write a check that his-
tory is irrelevant. The names of the states are often camposed of a set
of variables, called state variables. For systems described by difference
or differential equations, these state variables are often the independent
variables of these dynamic equations. If the time scale is assumed to
be continuous, then the system is described with differential equations,
whereas if the time scale is assumed to be discrete (as for computers),
then the system is described with difference equations. For sequential
logi c circuits (computers) the outputs of the memory elements are usu-
ally the state variables. However, it is important to nate that the choice
of state variables is not unique. Most physical systems can be described
with many different sets of state variables.
In Chapter 4 we analyze stability and instability of systems. With-
out giving a formal definition we can say that in an unstable system
the state can havelarge variations and small inputs may produce very
large outputs. A common example of an unstable system is illustrated
by someone painting the microphone of a public address (PA) system
at a speaker; a loud high-pitched tone results. Often instabilities are
eaused by too mu ch gain. So to quiet the P A system, decrease the gain
by painting the microphone away from the speakers. Discrete systems
can also be unstable. A friend of ours once provided an example. She
was sitting in a chair reading and she got cold. So she went over and
turned up the thermostat on the heater. The house warmed up. She got
hot, so she got up and turned down the thermostat. The house cooled
off. She got cold and turned up the thermostat. This process continued
until someone finall y suggested t hat she p ut on a sweater (reducing the
In troductian XV

gain of her heat loss system). She did and was much more comfortable.
We called this a discrete system because she seemed to sample the en-
vironment and produce outputs at discrete intervals about 15 minutes
apart.
In Chapter 5 we mathematically analyze controllability. Informally, a
system is controllable if we can construct a set of inputs that will drive
the system to any given state. A real world example of an uncontrollable
system is iii ustrated by a mother in a grocery store with two toddlers.
The mother cannot control the states; she can never the exact be-
havior she wants. But continual action by an intelligent controller can
restrain the children to acceptable behavior. Notice that this is not an
unstable system; the children are always within the confines of the store.
stability and controllability are not the same.
In Ch ap ter 6 we mathematically analyze o bservability. Informally,
observability means that by centrolling the inputs and watching the
outputs of a system we can determine what the states were. A person
driving a ear is a nonobservable system. Most aspects of the ear can
be observed, but we cannot put electrodes inside the driver's skull to
observe the driver's states and control signals. When engineers must
control nonobservable systems, they sometimes build observers. In one
prosthetic system, electrical signals recorded from the upper arm of an
amputee were used to control a prosthetic arm. This technique was not
successful until a computer \Vas placed in bet\veen the human's arm and
the prosthetic device. The computer contained a type of observer that
modeled the body's internal states.
There are different \vays to say the same thing. Here are three ways
to describe events in a particular baseball game. Joe hit two home runs.
Joe homered t\vice. T\vo home runs -vvere hit by Joe. These all say
about the same thing. But each \vould be best in certain situations.
Similarly, the canonical forms, presented in Chapter 7, show how the
same system can be represented in many different mathematical \Vays.
Most canonical forms can be used for most systems, but for any given
situation one may be more useful.
When building a new system, management vvould like to know if the
system the engineers design is the simplest one that satisties the cus-
tomer's requirements. Suppose a customer asked for a system that
receives radio station I<:UAT F:NI, and the engineers come up with a
design for an A:NI-F:NI-tape system. Is the engineer's system minimal?
No, a simpler system could be built. (Hovvever, given the realities of
manufacturing, it may not be less expensive.) In Chapter 8 we present
mathematical tools to hel p build a system and determine if it is minimal.
As shown in Chapter 9, adding feedback loops can reduce the sensi-
tivity to variations in certain parameters, increase rejection of output
disturbances, and change system dynamics. For example, have a friend
x vi I11troduction

hold a book in her hand with her elbow at her hip and her forearm
perpendicular to her body. Instruct her to close her eyes and hold her
arm steady. In a few minutes, as her muscles get tired, her arm will sag.
Now allow her to open her eyes and look at the book. She will be able
to hold her arm steadier because the visual feedback loop has reduced
her sensitivity to muscle fatigue. Once again ask her to close her eyes.
This time push down on the book. The book will move quite some dis-
tance before she can reject your disturbance and return it to its original
position. Now allow hertoopen her eyes and do the same thing. Using
visual feedback she will be better at rejecting your disturbances. Finally,
when feedback is used to change system dynamics, it is usually used to
speed up the system. Imagine using flash cards to help a fifth grader
learn the multiplication tables. First do it without feedback. Show him
a card, wait for his answer, put it down, and show him another. He will
learn, but very slowly. Next give him feedback.

For example, if you show him the card with 7 x 3, and he


says, "21."
Respond with, "Very Good." :-)
<That symbol is a smiling face turned on its side.>
However, if he says, "22."
Respond with, "No. I t is 21." :- (
<That is a frowning face turned on its side.>

He will learn faster with feedback. Notice that you can tailor the
feedback to get almost any dynamic you want. If you give him ten
cents for each correct answer and take away five cents for each incorrect
answer, he will learn mu ch faster.
In Chapter 10 we present four advanced tools of systems theory. If the
state variables of a model are, for example, human body temperature and
blood pressure, then we know that they should never become negative;
if they could, then the model is wrong. In Section 10.1 we present simple
mathematical tools that can be used to check if a system's state variables
always remain nonnegative, and we discuss the main properties of such
systems.
In Section 10.2 we present a Kalman Filter. It represents a class
of adaptive systems often used in signal processing to separate signals
from noise. These filters are designed to extract signals from white
noise. However, white noise would have equal energy at all frequen-
cies, therefore it is impossible to make; so, real systems use bandlimited
white noise, \vhich is called pink noise. The human auditory system
uses adaptive filters to extract signals from noise. At a party most peo-
ple are able to listen to one person (the signal) in spite of many back-
ground conversatians (noise). However, when they walk away and start
In troductian xvii

conversing with another person (with different frequencies, intonations,


and accents), they must change their filters. Same of us have difficulty
understanding the first few sentences with a new conversant, while our
filters are still adapting. Following one voice out of many is easy in
person, but difficult over a telephone, uniess the speaker has increased
the signal-to-noise ratio by talking directly into the mouthpiece. Some
hearing aids have been fitted vvith l{alman Filters. They are better at
separating signals from noise.
Section 10.3 presents a different type of adaptive system, a type used
to control time-varying systems. Many systemschange with time due to,
for example, hearing wear, warming of lubricants, or fatigue of muscles.
When controlling such systems the controller must also change with
time. One of the biggest challenges in designing adaptive systems is
proving that the resulting systems are stable. In this section we present
techniques for designing stable adaptive control systems.
Artificial neural networks are computer systems composed of a very
large number of adaptive units connected in parallel. They are useful
for pattern recognition and have been used, for example, in banks to
verify signatures on checks. Because they can recognize patterns of
input variations and specify appropriate outputs, they have also been
used as controllers in control systems. The basic operation of neural
networks is explained in Section 10.4.
This brief overview of systems theory \vas provided to help motivate
the mathematical analysis that follo\vs. We hope that knowledge of
these mathematical techniques 'vill help engineers design systems for
the betterment of mankind.
chapter one

Mathematical Background

1.1 Introduction
This chapter provides the foundation for understanding the mathemat-
ical details to be discussed in later chapters of this book. It is devoted
to two fundamental topics of applied mathematics: metric spaces and
matrices. We will see in later chapters t hat many pro b lems in dynami c
systems theory can be solved by evaluating the solutions of linear and
nonlinear algebraic equations as ·well as by computing the solutions of
ordinary differential and difference equations. The most commonly used
techniques are iterative, \v hi ch d etermine a sequence of real (or complex)
numbers, vectors, or functions that converge to the desired solutions.
The theory of metric spaces and contraction mapping establishes the
basis of such methods. This theory \vill be outlined in the first part of
this chapter. In the seeond part \Ve present the basic properties of linear
structures, which \vill be needed in analyzing linear systems. In this
section, norms, transformations, and function of matrices are discussed.

1.2 Metric Spaces and Contraction Mapping Theory


Metric spaces and special mappings defined in metric spaces play very
important roles in the solution methodologies of linear and nonlinear
algebraic, difference, and differential equations. The solutions of these
equations are real or camplex vectors, scalars, or functions defined on
discrete or continuous time scales. Therefore, the convergence analysis
of iteration methods for solving such equations requires the concept of a
certain kind of distance bet\veen vectors, scalars, and functions. A uni-
fied approach using 1netric spaces is given in this section. The elements
of this theory are outlined below.

1
2 chapter one: Mathematical Background

1.2.1 Metric Spaces


If A and B are any sets, then A x B denotes the Cartesian product of A
and B:
A x B= {(x, y) i x E A, y E B}. (1.1)

If A and B are single-dimensional intervals, then A x B is the rectangle


shown in Figure 1.1.

A x

Figure 1.1 Cartesian product in one dimension.

DEFINITION 1.1 A pair (NI, p) is called a metric space if M is a set, and


p is a real valued function defined on M x M with the Jollowing properties:

(i) For all x, y E NI, p( x, y) ~ O, and p( x, y) =O if and only if x y.


(ii) Forallx,yEM,p(x,y) p(y,x).
(iii) For all x, y, z E NI, p( x, z) ::; p( x, y) + p(y, z).
Function p is called metric, which represents the distance between
elements of set M. Property (i) requires that the distance of different
elements is always positive, and the distance of any element from it-
self is zero. Property (ii) represents the symmetry of the distance, and
Property (iii) is known as the triangle inequality, which statesthat the
direct distance between two elements is never larger than the sum of
their distances from a third element.

Example 1.1
Let M be the set R (or C) of real (or complex) numbers, and define
p( x, y) lx -y j. Properties (i) and (ii) are satisfied obviously, and
the triangle inequality is the obvious consequence of the well-known
1.2 A!Jetric Spaces and Contraction Mapping Theory 3

inequality la+ bl la l + lbl, when we select a = x y, b y - z,


and a+ b x z. Hence, (M, p) is a metric space.

Example 1.2
Let lvf be the set R n (or en) of the n-dimensional real (or complex)
vectors.
(A) Select the metric function as

(1.2)

where x i and Yi are theithcomponents ofvectors x and y,respectively.


Properties (i) and (ii) are satisfied, and (iii) can be verified as follows.
From the previous example we know that for all i,

(1.3)

Assume that

Poo(x, z) = m~x lxi- Zil = lxio


1,
Zi 0 l .

Then

Figure 1.2(a) illustrates this distance.


(B) Select now the function

n
P1 (x, y) L lxi Yil · (1.4)
i= l

We can easily show that (111, p 1 ) is also a metric s pace because prop-
erties (i) and (ii) are satisfied, and (iii) can be proven by ad ding inequal-
ities (1.3) for i l, 2, ... , n. Figure 1.2(b) shows this distance.
(C) The most commonly used metric function defined on n-dimensional
vectors is given as

(1.5)

Properties (i) and (ii) are obvious again, and the triangle inequality
can be proven by applying the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, which can
4 cl1apter one: Mathematical Background

a) Distance p""'

Poo(X, Y)

b) Distance p 1

c) Distance p 2

Y (YPY2)

Figure 1.2 Distances in R 2 .


1.2 Metric Spaces and Contraction Mapping Tbeory 5

bestatedas follows: If u (ui) and v= (vi) are real (or complex)


n-dimensional vectors, then

Use the triangle inequality and the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality for


vectors x y and y z to get

n n
2 2
P2(x, z) = L lxi- zil ~ L[lxi- Yil + IYi- zilf
i=l i= l

n n n

L lxi Yil
2
+L IYi zil
2
+ 2 L[lxi
i= l
Yii·IYi zil]

n
< L lxi
i= l
Yil
2

[{
t; ix; - Y;l
n
2
} 1/2
+
{
t; IYi
n

Figure 1.2(c) illustrates this distance.


Hence1 R n (or en) is a metric space with distances Poo 1 P1 1 and P2·
No te that the above three metric functions p 00 , p1, and P2 are all special
cases of the more general Minkowski distance

Pv(x,y) {~ (1.6)

where p 2:: l is a given constan t.


6 cl1apter one: Matbematical Background

Example 1.3
Let M be the set C [a, b] of the continuous functions on the finite closed
interval [a, b]. Define

p(f,g) max lf(x)- g(x)l, (1.7)


xE[a,b]

which is illustrated in Figure 1.3.

a b x

Figure 1.3 Distance of continuous functions.

We now prove that (M, p) is a metric space. Nate first that the
continuity of function If( x) g(x)l implies that the maximum exists.
Properties (i) and (ii) are obvious, and the triangle inequality can be
proven as in the case of distance Poo of n-dimensional vectors.

Example 1.4
If M is an y set, then we can define

l, ~f x =l= y
p( x, y) { 0, If X= y. (1.8)

Properties (i), (ii), and (iii) can be proven easily. The resulting metric
s pace (M, p) is called discrete.

Let (M, p) be a metric s pace, and M 1 c A1. Define function p 1 on


M1 x M1 as Pl(x, y) p(x, y) (x, y E M1). Then (Mb Pl) is also a
metric space and is called the subspace generated by subset M 1 .
An open ball with center x E M and radius r> O is defined as

B(x,r) ={y l y E 1\II,p(x,y) <r}, (1.9)

and the set


B(x,r) {y l y E M,p(x,y):::; r} (1.10)
1.2 Metric Spaces and Contraction Mapping Tbeory 7

is called the clo sed ball with center x and radius r.


Let M 1 ~ NI. A point x E M1 is called an interior point of M1 if for
somG r> O, B(x, r) lv11 . A point x E M is called a boundary point of
M 1 if for all r> O, B(x, r) contains points that belong to M1 and points
t hat do not belong to M l·
A set M 1 is called open if each point of M 1 is interior. A set M 1 is
closed if M - Jv11 is open. Note that the empty set is considered to be
both open and closed.

DEFINITION 1.2 A sequence {xn} of elements of M is said to be conver-


gent and to have the limit point x* E lvf, if p(xn, x*) ~O as n~ oo. This
property is denoted as Xn ~ x* or as limn~CXJ Xn x*.

First we prove that the limit point of any convergent sequence is


unique. In contrast to the assertion, assume that x* and x** are both
limit points of sequence {X n}. Then

O :::; p( x*, x**) :::; p( x*, Xn) + p(xn, x**) = p(xn, x*)+ p(xn, x**) .

Since both terms of the right-hand side converge to zero, p( x*, x**) =O.
Hence, x* x**.
Let lvf1 ~M be a closed set, and assume that for all n 2:: l, Xn E M 1
and sequence Xn converges to an x* E M. We will next prove that
x* E JvJ1. Assume in contrast to the assertion that x* ~ M 1 . Since
M1 is closed, A1- lvf1 is open. Therefore, there is a ball B(x*, r) ·with
some r > O that is in 111 Jvl1 . Convergence Xn ~ x* implies that
for sufficiently large values of n, p(xn, x*) < r, that is, Xn E B(x*, r)
implying that Xn E Jvl- M1 contradieting the assertion that Xn E M 1 .
This property of closed sets can be formulated by saying that a closed
set Jvf1 contains all limit points of sequences from M 1 .

DEFINITION 1.3 A sequence {xn} of elements of M is called a Cauchy


sequence if p(xn, Xm) ~O as n, m~ oo.

THEOREM1.1
If {X n} is convergent, then it is also a Cauchy sequence.

PRO OF Le t the limit point of {X n} be denoted by x*. Then


8 chapter one: Mathematical Background

Because both terms of the right-hand side converge to zero, we conclude


that p(xn, Xm) ---t O as n, m oo. l

REMARK 1.1 A Cauchy sequence is not necessarily convergent, as


the case of metric space (Jvf, p) with NI (0, oo) and p(x, y) lx-Yl
illustrates. Consicler sequence Xn = 1/n (n ~ 1), which has no limit
point in NI (the zero limit does not belong to M), but for n, m ---t oo,
1(1/n)- (1/m)l ---t O. l

DEFINITION 1.4 A nzetric space (Af, p) is called complete if all Cauchy


sequences of elements in }/J have linzit pointsin M.

I t is weil known from calculus that in the set of real (or complex)
numbers all Cauchy sequences are convergent, so R (or C) is com-
plete. The convergence of vectors in any of the discussed distances means
component-wise convergence. Because each component is a real (or com-
plex) number, Rn(or en) is also complete. The convergence in C[a, b]
is the well-known uniform convergence. It is also weil know from calcu-
lus that the limit function of uniformly convergent continuous functions
defined on a closed interval b) is also continuous implying that C[a, b]
with distance (1. 7) is also complete.
In the next theorem we prove t hat p( x, y) is a continuous two-variable
function.

THEOREM1.2
If Xn ---t x* and Yn y* for n oo, then p( Xn, Yn) p( x*, y*) for n oo.

PROOF By applying the triangle inequality we have

+p( x*, Yn) :S p(xn, +p( x*, y*) + p(y*, Yn) ,

that is,

By interchanging Xn with x* and Yn with y* we conclude that

+ p(y*' Yn) ·

Hence
1.2 Metric Spaces and Contraction Mapping Theory g

where the right-hand side tends to zero as n -t oo. Thus, p(xn, Yn) -t

p( x*, y*) for n - t oo. l


In the next section, mappings between metric spaces will be defined
and their main properties will be examined. These properties then will
be applied in proving the contraction mapping theorem, which will be
very useful in showing the existence of a unique state trajectory in con-
tinuous systems.

1.2.2 Mappings in Metric Spaces


Any iteration method consists of the repeated application of a certain
mapping. In order to analyze the convergence of iteration procedures,
the basic properties of such mappings have to be investigated. This
section is devoted to this subject. Assume that (M, p) and (M', p') are
two (not necessarily different) metric spaces. The domain D(A) and
range R(A) of a single-valued mapping A from M to M' are defined as
follows:

D(A) ={x l x E M and A(x) is defined} ,

R(A) ={x' l x' E NI' and there exists x E D(A) such that x' A(x)} .

O bviously D (A) ~ l\1 and R( A) ~ Jt;f'. The domain and r ange of


mappings are illustrated in Figure 1.4.

M M'

Figure 1.4 Darnain and range of mappings.

DEFINITION 1.5 Mapping A is said to be continuous at a point x E


D (A), iffor every sequence {X n} front D (A) converging to x, A (X n) - t A (x)
as n -too.
lO cl1apter one: Matbematical Background

Similar ly, a mapping A is said to be continuous if it is eontinuous at every


x E D(A).

DEFINITION 1.6 Mappin g A is ealled bounded if there exists a nonneg-


ative eonstant K sueh that for all x, y E D( A),

p'(A(x), A(y)) ::; K· p( x, y). (1.11)

Bounded mappings are illustrated in Figure 1.5.

M M'

p(x, y)'--+-+-+-++-~• 1•--~t-+--+--+-+•p'(A(x), A(y))


~~H+--~-------+--~~~

Figure 1.5 Bounded mappings.

Note first that every bounded mappingis continuous, because if x*, Xn E


D( A) (n 2: l) and Xn -7 x*, then

O::; p'(A(xn), A(x*)) ::; K· p(xn, x*) .

Since the right-hand side converges to zero, A(xn) A( x*) as Xn -+x*.


It is easy to see that a continuous mappingis not necessarily bounded.
As an example, consicler M ]1.1[' R, p(x, y) = Jx- yJ, p' =p, and
A(x) = x 2 . In this case, for all x =f. y,

p'(A(x), A(y)) lx2 y2J


p( x, y) lx-y l = Jx+yJ'

which can be arbitrarily large, if x and y are sufficiently large positive


numbers.
A special class of bounded mappings is defined next.

DEFINITION1.7 MappingA is ealled a contraction ifit is bounded with


a eonstant O ::; K < l.
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lines. Downright fraud is possible, as in the concealment or false
weighing of dutiable articles, the publication of false statements
regarding the financial condition of fiduciary institutions, the covering
up of defects in tenement house building, and so on. Practices of this
character are extremely dangerous, however, as they are subject to
detection and consequent punishment by the first more than
ordinarily inquisitive inspector. Criminal chances are materially
improved by the bribery of officials who are thus bound to
concealment both by money interest and their own fear of exposure.
Vigilant and honest administration of the laws and the infliction of
sufficient penalties, particularly if they involve the imprisonment of
principals, may be trusted to reduce such practices to a minimum.
There are, however, other and more open methods of attack upon
the regulation of business by the state. Appeal may be made to the
courts in the hope that laws of this character may be declared
unconstitutional. Business interests may also seek their repeal or
amendment at the hands of the legislature. No one who accepts the
fundamental principles of our government can quarrel with either of
these two modes of procedure. While doubtless intended to secure
the public interest, attempts to regulate industry by the state may in
given cases really defeat this end. And the latter likelihood would be
increased almost to the point of certainty if legitimate protests from
the businesses affected were stifled. On the other hand attempts
may be made by business interests to influence courts or
legislatures corruptly. Assuming that the honesty of all the
departments of government would be proof against such attempts
there is still another possibility. A business affected by some form of
state regulation may endeavour to call to its aid the influence of
party. This final method of procedure may also be conducted in a
perfectly legitimate fashion. Public sentiment may be honestly
converted to the view that the amendment or repeal of the law, as
demanded by the business interest, is also in the interest of the state
as a whole. On the other hand the effort may be made, either by
large contributions to campaign funds, or by other still more
objectionable means, to enlist the support of party regardless of the
public welfare. Carrying out these various methods of procedure to
their logical conclusion brings us, therefore, face to face with the
question which underlies the whole fabric of political corruption,
namely how shall our party organisations be supported and
financed?
Reserving this issue for subsequent discussion, certain general
features of the reaction of industry against state regulation must be
noted as of immense importance. Black as it is corruption after all is
a mere incident in this struggle. The broad lines of development
which the Republic will follow in the near future would seem to
depend largely upon the outcome of this great process. Certain
social prophets tell us insistently that there are but two possibilities: if
the state wins the upper hand the inevitable result will be socialism; if
on the other hand business triumphs we must resign ourselves to a
more or less benevolent financial oligarchy. Imagination is not
lacking to embellish or render repulsive this pair of alternatives. From
Plato to Herbert George Wells all social prophets have been thus
gifted with the power of depicting finely if not correctly the minutiæ of
the world as it is to be. Time, the remorseless confuter of all earlier
forecasters of this sort, has shown them to be singularly lacking in
the ability to anticipate the great divergent highways of development,
—sympodes in Ward’s phrase,—which have opened up before the
march of human progress and determined the subsequent lines of
movement. So it may well be in the present case. The social futures,
one or the other of which we are bidden by present day prophets to
choose, are like two radii of a circle. They point in very different
directions, it is true, but between them are many possible yet
uncharted goals. And if social development may be likened to
movement in three instead of only two dimensions the lines open to
the future are enormously more divergent than our seers are wont to
conceive. Employing a less mathematical figure, prophecy usually
proceeds from the assumption that cataclysmic changes are
immediately impending. Otherwise, by the way, the prophets would
utterly fail to attract attention. But this presupposes an extremely
plastic condition of society. If social structures, however, really are so
plastic, they may then be remoulded not into one or two forms
merely, but into many other forms conceivable or inconceivable at
the present time. Current and widely accepted forecasts to the
contrary, therefore, one may still venture to doubt that our through
ticket to 1950 or 2000 a.d. is inscribed either “socialism” or “financial
oligarchy,” and stamped “non-transferable.”
Whatever the future may bring forth faith has not yet been lost in
the efficacy of state regulation. It is certainly within the bounds of
possibility that some working balance between government and
industry may be established through this means which will continue
indefinitely. As late as 1870, according to Mr. Dicey, individualistic
opinions dominated English law-making thought.[57] Reaction from
the doctrine of laisser faire was, if anything, even later in the United
States. For a considerable period after the turning point had been
passed measures of state regulation were weakened by survivals of
old habits of thought. Even to-day the period of construction and
extension along the line of state regulation seems far from finished.
Certain inevitable errors have required correction, but no major
portion of the system has been abandoned. Further progress should
be made easier by accumulating experience and precedents.
It is significant of the temper of the American people on this
question that an increasing number of the great successes of our
political life are being made by the men who have shown themselves
strongest and most resourceful in correcting the abuses of business.
Under present conditions no public man suspected of weakness on
this issue has the remotest chance of election to the presidency or to
the governorship of any of our larger states. On the purely
administrative side of the system of state regulation new and more
powerful agencies,—such as the Bureau of Corporations and the
various state Public Service Commissions,—have been devised
recently to grapple with the situation.
Considering the extreme importance of the work which such
agencies have to perform it is improbable that either their position, or
the position of government in general, is as yet sufficiently strong
with reference to corporate interests. Under modern conditions
success in business means very large material rewards. Important
as are industry and commerce, however, certain parts of the work
which the state is now performing are, from the social point of view,
immensely more valuable. The commonweal requires that our best
intellect be applied to these tasks. Any condition which favours the
drafting of our ablest men from the service of the state into the
service of business is a point in favour of the latter wherever the
conflict between them is joined. Yet not infrequently we witness the
promotion of judges to attorneyships for great corporations, the
translation of men who have won their spurs in administrative
supervision of certain kinds of business to high managerial positions
in these same businesses. As long as our morals remain as
mercenary as those of a Captain Dugald Dalgetty there may seem to
be little to criticise in such transactions. Doubtless loyalty is shown
by the men concerned to the government, their original employer,
and to the corporation, their ultimate employer. If, however, there is
to be an exchange of labourers between these fields it would be
vastly better for the state if the man who had succeeded brilliantly in
business should normally expect promotion to high governmental
position. As things are at present the glittering prizes known to be
obtained by ex-government officials who have gone into corporation
service cannot have the most favourable effect upon the minds and
activities of officials remaining in public positions requiring them to
exercise supervision over business activities.
It is high time that there should be a reversal of policy in this
connection. We need urgently greater security of tenure, greater
social esteem, much higher salaries, and ample retiring pensions for
those public officials who are on the fighting line of modern
government. Incomes as large as those of our insurance presidents
or trust magnates are not needed, although in many cases they
would be much more richly deserved. There is recompense which
finer natures will always recognise in the knowledge that they are
performing a vitally important public work. In spite of the loss which
political corruption causes the state it is probably more than made up
by the devoted, and in part unrequited, work of its good servants.
Still the labourer is worthy of his hire. It is both deplorable and
disastrous that the current rewards of good service should be so
meagre while the rewards of betrayal are so large.[58]
But it may be objected that public sentiment in a democracy will
not support high salaries even for the most important public services,
that democracies notoriously remunerate their higher officials very
much less adequately than monarchies. The time is ripe, however,
for challenging this attitude. As long as government work is looked
upon as a dull, soulless, and not extremely useful routine, popular
opposition to high salaries is not only comprehensible but
praiseworthy. Once convinced of the value of certain services,
however (and there is plentiful opportunity to do this), it is doubtful if
self-governing peoples will show themselves less intelligent than
kings. Even now engineers directing great and unusual public
undertakings are frequently paid larger salaries than high officers of
government charged with the execution of ordinary functions.
Recognition of the importance of the work of the specialist is much
more common now than formerly. The development of science and
large scale industry is daily enforcing this lesson. As regards the
unwillingness of democracy to pay well, a change that has recently
come over the policy of certain labour unions is worth noting. Instead
of ordering strikes they have on occasion taken a lesson from the
procedure of their employers, and resorted to the courts for the
redress of grievances. And in doing so they have called in the very
ablest lawyers they could find, paying the latter out of the funds of
the union fees as large as they could have earned on the opposing
side. A similar illustration is afforded by the policy of the Social-
democratic party in Germany which for a considerable period has
recognised and met the necessity of remunerating its leaders in
editorial, parliamentary, and propagandist work at professional rates
far higher than the average wages received by the party rank and
file.[59] Demos may despise aristocracy of birth but he is perhaps not
so incapable of comprehending the aristocracy of service as many of
his critics suppose.

By the system of regulation, as we have seen, government is


brought into close contact with business along many lines. But the
state is also one of the largest sellers and buyers in the markets of
the world, and as such has many other intimate points of contact
with economic affairs. Like any individual or corporation under the
same circumstances it is liable to be victimised by practices
designed fundamentally to make it sell cheaply or buy dearly,—both
to the advantage of corrupt outside interests. Franchise grabbing is
perhaps the most magnificent single example of the difficulties the
state encounters when it appears as a vendor. Popular ignorance of
the real nature of such valuable rights has been responsible for
enormous losses on this score. A city which for any reason had to
dispose of a parcel of land would find itself safeguarded in some
measure by the fact that a large number of its citizens were familiar
with real estate values and methods. Knowledge of intangible
property is very much less common. There has been a great deal of
effective educational work along this line, however, and that
community is indeed backward which at the present time does not
understand perfectly that perpetual franchises without proper
safeguards of public interests are fraudulent on their face.
Administrative agencies such as were referred to in connection with
business regulation, and particularly public service commissions, are
doing extremely valuable work in cutting down the possibilities of
franchise corruption. The grabbing of alleys, the seizure of water
fronts, and the occupation of sidewalks are minor forms of the same
sort of evil which can no longer be practised with the impunity
characteristic of the good old free and easy days of popular
ignorance and carelessness.
In disposing of its public domain, although here, of course, the
price obtained was not the major consideration on the part of the
government, notorious cases of corruption were of common
occurrence. Recent developments, particularly in connection with
timber, mineral, and oil lands, reveal the stiffer attitude which the
public and the government are taking on this question. Time was
also when deposits of public funds yielded little or no interest to cities
and counties. At bottom such loan transactions were sales, i.e., the
sale of the temporary use of public monies. Quite commonly
treasurers were in the habit of considering themselves responsible
for the return of capital sums only, and any interest received was
regarded as a perquisite of office. The system had all the support of
tradition and general usage; it was frequently practised with no effort
at concealment and without protest on moral or business grounds.
Nowadays its existence would be regarded as a sign of political
barbarism, and would furnish opportunity for charges of corruption
about which effective reform effort would speedily gather.
The element of selling is not of major importance in many services
performed by the state which nevertheless require constant watching
in order to prevent corrupt misuse. Efforts to use the mails
improperly are continually being made by get-rich-quick schemes,
swindlers, gamblers, and touts of all descriptions. Crop reports are
furnished without charge, but extraordinary precautions are
necessary to prevent them from leaking out.
Instances such as the foregoing also serve to illustrate the point
that any extension of the functions of government results in an
enlargement of the opportunities for political corruption. Government
railways, for example, would afford venal public officials many
crooked opportunities (as e.g., for false billing, charges, and
discrimination) which do not now exist as direct menaces to public
administrative integrity. Private management of railways, however,
has not been so free from such evils as to be able to use this
argument effectively against nationalisation. Municipalities selling
water, gas, or electricity, are notoriously victimised on a large scale
by citizens whose self-interest as consumers overcomes all thought
of civic duty or common honesty.[60] There is one other closely
related phenomenon connected with the extension of the economic
functions of government which will perhaps not so readily be thought
of as corrupt, and which yet deserves consideration from that point
of view. Public service enterprises under government ownership and
management are always exposed to what some writers stigmatise as
“democratic finance,”—that is strong popular pressure to reduce
rates. Cost of production and the general financial condition of a
given city may make the reduction of the prices charged for water,
electricity, or gas, frankly contrary to public policy. Yet the self-
interest of the consumer suggests the use of his vote and political
influence to compel such reductions. Of course his action is not
consciously corrupt, but it has every other characteristic feature of
this evil.
The state is a much larger buyer than seller, and manifold are the
possibilities of malpractice in connection with its enormous
purchases of land, materials, supplies, and labour. Yet nothing in our
contemporary political life is more marvellous than the light-hearted
indifference with which the public regards the voting and expenditure
of sums running into the millions. We recall vaguely that the great
constitutional issues of English history were fought out on fiscal
grounds, but we find the budget of our own city a deadly bore. We
rise in heated protest whenever the tax rate is advanced by a
fraction of a mill, but we regard with indifference the new forms either
of necessary expenditure or needless extravagance which make
such increases inevitable. There is one general advantage which
state buying has over state selling, however. A great many of the
purchases of government are made in competitive markets where
fair price rates are ascertainable with comparative ease. Even large
public contracts such as for erecting public buildings or for road
construction are usually resolvable into a number of comparatively
simple processes and purchases. Of course there are exceptions, as
for example government contracts with railroad companies for
carrying mail. But as a rule the ordinary purchasing operations of the
state are simpler and more easily comprehensible than such acts of
sale as franchise grants,—to mention the one of most importance
from the view point of possible corruption. It is precisely at this
vulnerable point on the buying side of governmental operations that
the New York Bureau of Municipal Research has struck home. With
a skill that amounts to positive genius this voluntary agency has
placed before the people the ruling market prices and the
enormously higher prices actually paid by officials for public supplies.
Taking the purchasing departments of our best organised private
corporations as a model it has drawn practical plans for the
installation of similar methods as part of our municipal machinery.
Equipped with field glasses and mechanical registering devices its
agents have kept tab upon the flaccid activities of labourers in the
public service and have contrasted the long distance results thus
obtained with the suddenly energised performances of the same
men when they knew themselves to be under observation. It has co-
operated quietly and effectively with all willing officials in improving
the methods of work in their offices, in installing more logical
accounting systems and better methods of recording work done; and
it has fought effectively, with the penalty of discharge by the
Governor in two cases, those officials who were not amenable to
proper corrective influences. And finally the Bureau has attacked the
city budget and has even succeeded in making that dry and
formidable document the object of active and intelligent public
interest. Yet the cost of the Bureau’s work has been out of all
proportion small in comparison with the benefits obtained. “Less than
$30,000 was spent in 1908 in securing for four million people the
beginnings of a method of recording work done when done, and
money spent when spent, which will henceforth make inefficiency
harder than efficiency, and corruption more difficult than honesty.”[61]
It is extremely gratifying to note the widespread interest which this
work is arousing. Philadelphia and Cincinnati have established
bureaus under the supervision of the parent organisation, and other
cities are earnestly considering similar action. There would seem to
be ample opportunity for the employment of the same sort of agency
in connection with our state governments, and possibly in certain
fields of national administration. Altogether it is by far the most
noteworthy recent effort to stamp out governmental inefficiency and
corruption. Other efforts are being made to the same end,
particularly where extravagance is concerned. In many cities
business men’s clubs, improvement associations, and taxpayers’
leagues, are watching expenditure as it has never been watched
before. Public officials have co-operated loyally in a number of
cases. Occasional discoveries have been made of safeguards and
powers in the law which had been long forgotten or unused. The
progress of uniform bookkeeping is rapid and highly significant in this
connection. Aided largely by the latter development census reports,
particularly the special issues dealing with statistics of cities of over
30,000 inhabitants, are making it possible to compare municipalities
on strictly quantitative lines as to the cost and efficiency of various
services. Altogether we are developing a new financial alertness and
intelligence that should materially cut down various forms of political
inefficiency and corruption, particularly on the purchasing side of
governmental operations. It is not too much to say that the methods
by which these results are to be effected are either at hand or
capable of being worked out on demand. The question now is simply
one of funds and the training of specialists to do the work.

Efforts by the state to regulate or suppress vice and crime bring


about reactions on the part of the interests affected not unlike those
which follow from the attempt to regulate legitimate business.[62] The
corrupt practices thus occasioned are among the commonest and
most objectionable that society has to contend with. Very large
money returns in the aggregate are obtainable by political
organisations which protect vice. It is doubtful, however, whether
such sources of income are ordinarily so productive financially as the
various corrupt relationships between business and politics
described above. On the other hand the alliance between politics
and the underworld has the advantage, from an unmoral point of
view, that it yields not only money but also strong support at the
polls. And as some of the voters whose support is thus secured may
be depended upon for work as repeaters, ballot-box staffers, and
thugs, the net political power which they wield is much greater than
their number alone would indicate. There is one other important
difference between the corruption arising from the attempt to
regulate legitimate business and that which arises from the
regulation of vice. In the former case a “deal” can frequently be
consummated between two principals, the leader of a centralised
business interest on the one hand and the leader of a centralised
political organisation on the other. Something of the secrecy and the
binding personal obligation of a “gentleman’s agreement” are thus
obtained. Of course to carry out the compact the political leader must
control the action of his dependents in public office, but the latter,
whatever they may suspect, know nothing definite about the
agreement into which the boss has entered. The protection of vice
cannot be managed by so small a number of conspirators.
Compliance by the whole police force with orders from the “front” is
necessary. Every patrolman knows what is going on when he is told
that he must not molest dives, gambling hells, or brothels. Members
of the force may or may not be used to collect protection money and
pass it “higher up,” but since there are many establishments which
must pay tribute the employment of a considerable corps of
collectors is necessary. In any event the number of those who have
knowledge amounting to legal evidence is likely to be much larger in
the case of the protection of vice than in the case, for example, of a
corrupt franchise grant. Exposure either by some disgruntled police
officer or by some overtaxed purveyor of vice is likely to come at any
moment.
When revelations of this kind are made the moral uprising which
follows seldom lacks force. Cynics may sneer at such popular
manifestations as paroxysms of virtue, but practical political leaders
are not likely to underestimate the damage which they are capable of
inflicting. Even if the machine emerges comparatively unharmed
from such a period of attack the heads of some of the leaders are
likely to fall before the popular fury. Remembering Fernando Wood’s
caution about the necessity of “pandering a little to the moral
element in the community,” farsighted bosses are therefore more
and more inclined to limit their operations in the field of vice
protection and to seek support from their relations with legitimate
business interests. If this process is carried on further, as now seems
likely, the general problem we are considering will be simplified by
the reduction to a minimum of corruption by the vicious element,
although, of course, we would still have on our hands the large
question of corruption in the interests of otherwise legitimate
business.
With all their mistakes and wasted energy moral uprisings will help
this development materially. After a “spasm” things seldom fall back
into the lowest depths of their former state. We need more frequent
spasms, at least until we shall have learned to live continuously and
steadily on a higher plane. The gravest evil of the present
intermittent situation would seem to be that in our occasional fits of
indignation we write requirements into the law which, considering the
prevalence of minor vicious habits among large masses of the
people, are impossible of execution. One of the lessons which we
have learned in attempting to regulate business is that legislation of
this sort must be supplemented by special administrative agencies if
it is to have any effect whatever. Admirable child labour laws, for
example, remain absolutely futile without labour commissioners and
a force of inspectors created particularly to see them enforced. Yet in
the regulation of vice we rush on heedlessly piling one new duty after
another upon an already overburdened and underpaid police force.
As a consequence its chiefs become habituated to the idea that they
can exercise discretion as to what laws are to be enforced and what
laws may with impunity be neglected. Usually the police decision of
such questions is that crime must be dealt with vigilantly and
severely, vice, on the other hand, with large tolerance. No better
situation could be devised for the schemes of corruptionists.
Moreover the latter are materially aided in their nefarious work by the
high standards and the severe penalties which the moral element
has written into the law. Using these as clubs the corrupt politician
can extort much larger contributions than would otherwise be
possible. There are only two ways in which this situation may be
met. Either we must reduce our too ambitious programmes for the
regulation of vice, or we must strengthen our police forces until they
are adequate to meet the demands placed upon them.
In whatever way this question may be decided there is ample
ground for demanding the application of the most thoroughgoing civil
service reform rules to our police establishments. It is well known
that the rank and file of our police forces despise the dirty work
forced upon them by the political wretches “higher up.” No man
capable of the heroic deeds which are commonplace in the annals of
the police service rings the doors of bawdy houses and collects a
tithe from the sorrowful wages of shame except under the
compulsion of the sternest bread and butter necessity. Usually it is
necessary to select the yellow dogs of the force for this particular
devil’s work, and the promotion of such creatures for their pliancy is
a stench in the nostrils of their honest comrades. If one doubts that
this is the real spirit of the police force let him consider the character
of the fire departments of nearly all of our cities. The men in the latter
service are chosen from the same class, face dangers of the same
magnitude, and receive wages of about the same amount as
policemen. In the main they deserve and receive high praise for their
efficiency and honesty. It is true that they are not exposed to the
corrupt temptations which surround policemen, and also that their
work is held up to exacting standards by business men and
insurance companies. The fact remains that our police forces are
constructed of the same human material as our fire fighting forces. It
is difficult to avoid the conclusion that if we adapt our requirements in
the regulation of vice to the capacities of our forces, (or vice versa); if
we criticise and appreciate their work in the same way as we do the
work of their sister department; if we place their appointment, tenure,
and promotion, upon grounds of merit and utterly exclude the
influence of the corrupt “higher-ups,” we will have gone a long ways
toward drying up the most despicable of the sources of political
corruption.

Certain of the moral aspects of tax dodging have been dealt with
in an earlier connection.[63] Contrary as it may seem to the principle
of economic interest there is a good deal of carelessness and
stupidity in this field, and cases are occasionally found of property
that has been over-assessed. On the other hand more or less
deliberate dodging is indulged in very largely. So far as this practice
deserves the stigma of corruption it is a stigma which rests to a very
considerable extent upon the so-called class of “good citizens.”
Certain residents of “swell suburbs” who daily thank God that their
government is not so corrupt as that of the neighbouring city are
among the worst offenders of this kind. As directors of corporations
men of the same standing are sometimes responsible for
monumental evasions. Of course what was said with regard to the
reaction of business against state regulation holds good here also.
There are plenty of legitimate methods of protesting against unjust or
oppressive taxes,—before the courts, before legislatures, and by
open propaganda designed to influence party organisations. But the
furtive concealment or misrepresentation of taxable values is a
matter of entirely different moral colour, and it is the latter practice
that we now have to consider.
Tax dodging is so common and so well established that it has built
up an exculpatory system of its own. Instead of bringing his
conscience up to the standards set by the law the ordinary property
owner inquires into the practice of his neighbours, and governs
himself accordingly. Wherever business competition is involved the
threat of possible bankruptcy practically forces him into this course.
Yet withal our citizen is likely to be somewhat troubled in his mind
about his conduct, at least until he learns how shamelessly John
Smith who lives just a little way down the street has behaved. This
information quite restores his equanimity, and at the next
assessment he may outdo Smith himself. Thus the extra legal, if not
frankly illegal, neighbourhood standard tends constantly to become
lower. And not only taxpayers but tax officials themselves are
affected by local feeling and fall into the habit of closing their eyes to
certain kinds of property and expecting only a certain percentage of
the valuation fixed by law to be returned.
Back of such neighbourhood ideas on taxation there are at least
two lines of defence. One is that our present tax system is highly
illogical, bothersome, and burdensome. To a considerable extent,
unfortunately, this is the case, but it does not justify illegal methods
of seeking redress. Not much argument is required to convince the
ordinary property owner that all the inequities of the existing system
fall with cumulative weight upon his devoted head. His pocketbook
affirms this view more strongly perhaps than he would care to admit,
but anyhow the net result is that he feels himself more or less
pardonable for evading the burden as far as he can. The other
common excuse for tax dodging is supplied by the conviction that
much of the money raised by government is wasted or stolen. The
logic based upon this premise is most curiously inverted, but none
the less it sways the action of great multitudes. Politicians are a set
of grafters, says our taxpayer. The more money they get the more
they will waste and steal. I will punish the rascals as they deserve by
dodging my taxes, that is by becoming a grafter myself. Seldom,
however, is the latter clause clearly expressed. Yet the existence of
corruption on one side of the state’s activities is thus made the
excuse for corruption on another side whereby the state is mulcted
of much revenue which it might receive. Of course evasion results in
higher tax rates, which, by the way, fall crushingly upon the citizen
who makes full and honest returns, and thus part of the loss in
income to the government is made up. It seems clear, however, that
in the long run government income is materially reduced by the
feeling prevalent among taxpayers which has just been described
and the procedure based upon it. On the whole this is by far the
most serious single economic consequence of political corruption. It
is bad enough that public money should be stolen, that public work
should be badly done, and that politicians and contractors should
grow rich in consequence, but it is far worse that the state should be
starved of the funds necessary to perform its existing functions
properly and to extend its activities into new fields. In the regulation
of industry, in education, philanthropy, sanitation, and art, American
government is very far from achieving what it should do in the public
interest and what it could do more efficiently and cheaply than any
other agency. Yet our progress toward this goal is perpetually
hindered by the existence of waste and corruption on the one hand,
and the consequent peremptory shutting of the taxpayers’
pocketbooks on the other hand.
Consideration of the theory underlying tax dodging reveals certain
broad lines of correction. In proportion as our tax system
approximates greater justice, the evasion which defends itself on the
ground of the inequities of the present system will tend to disappear.
To show how this may be done is beyond the limits of the present
study. Suffice it to say that the work which reformers and students of
public finance are now doing on inheritance, income, and corporation
taxes, on the taxation of unearned increment, on various applications
of the progressive principle, and so on, should eventuate in the
tapping of much needed new sources of income, and thus facilitate
the correction of present unjust burdens. The introduction of
economical methods and the elimination of the grosser forms of
corruption in the field of government expenditure will weaken the
excuses offered for evasion on the ground of public waste and graft.
There is an overwhelming mass of evidence to show that the
American taxpayer, once convinced of the necessity of a given public
work and further assured that it will be honestly executed, is
generous to the point of munificence. The annals of our cities are full
of the creation of appointive state boards composed of men of the
highest local standing and intrusted with the carrying out of some
great single project,—the erection of a city hall building, the
construction of a water works and filtration plant, or of a park system.
Very few such commissions are grudged the large sums of money
necessary for their undertakings. If every ordinary branch of our
government enjoyed public confidence to a similar degree such
special boards would no longer be needed, and ample funds would
be forthcoming from taxpayers for all our present functions and for
other new and worthy functions which might be undertaken greatly to
the public advantage. Finally our system of tax administration, like
our system of government regulation of business, needs
strengthening. Larger districts and centralised power in the hands of
the assessors will help to lift them above the neighbourhood feeling
which is responsible for so much evasion. Higher salaries will bring
expert talent and backbone sufficient to resist the pressure brought
to bear by large interests. As a matter of fact the first threat of a virile
execution of the laws wipes out a considerable part of the tax
dodging in a community.
There would also seem to be much virtue in the plan for the
reduction of the tax rate advocated by the Ohio State Board of
Commerce.[64] Given a community with a high general tax rate it
may be the case, for example, that only about fifty per cent of true
value is being returned. Everybody knows it; everybody is sneakingly
ashamed of it. Still fundamental honesty is supposed to exist in the
man who does not cut the percentage below say, forty; the really
mean taxpayer is he who risks twenty-five per cent on what he feels
obliged to return and conceals whatever he can into the bargain.
Under such circumstances it is proposed to take the heroic step of
reducing the tax rate to one-half its existing figure or even less.[65] If
this can be done it is hoped that taxpayers can be induced to return
their property at full value, and that much personal property will
come out of the concealment into which it has fled under the menace
of a high general property tax rate. In support of this argument cases
are cited where a reduction of the personal property tax rate alone
has brought in much larger returns and converted into a source of
revenue a form of taxation which everywhere under high rates shows
a tendency to dwindle to practically nothing.
As against the plan it may be said that taxpayers are habitually
suspicious and extremely likely to regard any change whatever as
certain to increase their burdens. Many of them would see nothing in
the proposition beyond a tricky device to screw up their valuations
under the pretext of low rates with the intention of falling upon them
later with rates as high or higher than before. Unless the reform were
fully understood and then backed up by the most vigorous
administration there would be grave danger that revenues would
materially suffer. Given these conditions essential to success,
however, the plan would seem decidedly worth trying. A community
willing to take the plunge, it is pointed out, would enjoy large
advantages over its less enterprising competitors in the advertising
value of a low tax rate, particularly as a means of inducing new
industries to locate in its midst. The reform would probably not
increase revenue, indeed it does not aim to do so, but it would yield
a moral return of immense value. Self respect would be restored to
many otherwise thoroughly good citizens, and public opinion, to the
tone of which the taxpaying class contributes largely, would be lifted
to higher planes. Under the present vicious system there must be a
considerable number who realise secretly and more or less vaguely
the inherent kinship between their conduct and that of the corrupt
political organisation under which they live, and who in consequence
remain inactive and ashamed when movements for better things in
city, state, or nation, are on foot.

In our earlier study of the nature of political corruption an effort


was made to distinguish between bribery and auto-corruption. As
examples of the latter, legislators may employ knowledge gathered
on the floor of the chamber or in committee rooms for the purpose of
speculating to their own advantage on stock or produce exchanges;
administrative officials who by virtue of their position learn in
advance any information which may affect the market (i.e., crop
reports) can do likewise; knowledge of important judicial decisions
before they are handed down may be exploited in a similar fashion;
insiders who have access to plans for projected public improvements
are in a position to acquire quietly the needed real estate for sale at
much advanced prices to the city or state when condemnation
proceedings are actually begun. In addition to large and striking
transactions of this sort there are innumerable smaller possibilities
for auto-corruption which present themselves to public functionaries
ranging in rank from the highest places in the official hierarchy to that
of the policeman on his beat. Logically the practices under
consideration are not separable from the general forms of political
corruption as the term is applied in the present discussion. Instead
they would seem to be a special method of carrying on corrupt
transactions of many different kinds. All cases of auto-corruption,
however, have the common feature that bribery by an outside
interest is excluded, and this absence of bribery has sometimes led
to the assertion that the practices included under this heading are
“honest grafts.” An illusory appearance of innocence is also
conferred by the difficulty of tracing the incidence of the burdens
resulting from such transactions. There is no moral ground for such
favourable distinctions, however. On the contrary, auto-corruption is
clearly worse than bribery in that an entire transaction of this
character must be guiltily designed and executed wholly by one
person, and that person an official charged with knowledge which
should be used only in the public interest. Moreover the profits of his
secret treachery may be turned entirely into his private bank
account. If so he cannot even plead in justification that he has been
acting in behalf of a party organisation by gathering and contributing
the funds necessary to its management. The latter feature of auto-
corruption stands in need of special consideration.
It may be laid down as a principle of fairly general applicability that
political corruption as such is disadvantageous to the party
organisation permitting it. From a purely tactical point of view it would
be the extreme of bad party management to tolerate loose conditions
under which a large number of officials could graft freely on their own
account and place the entire proceeds in their own pockets. Whether
they confined themselves to auto-corruption or accepted bribes
singly or in combinations the case would not be materially altered. A
day of reckoning at the polls would surely come, and it would find the
party treasury unprovided with the means of defence. Yet conditions
of this character prevailed pretty generally prior to the advent of
strongly centralised political machines. Corruption was extremely
diffuse, personal responsibility for it widely scattered, party
responsibility not so clear. Manipulation required whole corps of
lobbyists, “third houses,” “black horse cavalry,” and the like. Under
present conditions the party organisation with strongly centralised
management has a direct interest in limiting corruption and also in
seeing that contributions which arise from such practices as it
tolerates actually flow into the party war chest. Corruption in purely
selfish interest becomes treachery to the party as well as treachery
to the state. Of course even under strong centralised and permanent
party control cases of auto-corruption still occur, and at times officials
receive bribes without turning in their quotas. If so, however, it may
fairly be presumed that they make their peace with the organisation
in other ways. They may be exempt from paying tribute, but they are
nevertheless obliged to deliver votes or influence. Many sins are laid
at the door of the machine. It has at least the advantage of enabling
us to centralise responsibility for all corrupt practices which occur
under its management.
From this point of view one may undertake an outline of the form
of corruption connected with political control. All the preceding forms
of political corruption may be considered the obverse, this is the
reverse of the die. None of the practices earlier considered can be
carried on without danger; the corruption of political control is the
crooked means of avoiding the cumulative effects of these practices.
It is not popular, it is not good politics even in the narrowest practical
acceptance of that term, for a political organisation to grant corrupt
favours to business, to wink at the violation of the law by vice, to
allow its partisans in office to sell government property cheap and
buy government supplies dear. If any of these things are permitted
the organisation, like the common criminal, must take care to lay
aside “fall money” against a day of trial.
One might feel greater confidence in the restraining influence of
party centralisation were it not for the fact that the more dangerous
to party success are the forms of corruption which an organisation
tolerates the more lucrative they are apt to be. Though its sins be as
scarlet still they produce funds sufficient to buy indulgences and to
leave a handsome profit over. In connection with business
regulation, for example, bribery in any considerable amount is not
possible until legislation is enacted or close at hand. And legislation
of this kind is not likely to be passed or threatened unless a strong
public sentiment demands action. Political manipulation which
attempts to frustrate regulation at such a juncture must sooner or
later prepare itself to reckon with the public sentiment which it has
flouted. Vice cannot be tolerated except in contravention of laws
against it, and to do so means to offend the moral sentiment in the
community which placed such laws on the statute books. Franchise
grabbing is not profitable on a large scale until the experience of
earlier public service corporations has impressed upon the public
mind the great value of such grants. If, nevertheless, grabs are
permitted by the machine, the boodle must be sufficient to pay both
for the personal services involved and to repair any resulting
damage to party prestige at the next election. Of course many
citizens are apathetic with regard to such abuses or even ignorant of
their existence, and there are others who are so involved in corrupt
practices, particularly in connection with tax dodging, meter fixing,
and the protection of vice, that they feel themselves allied in interest
with the party organisation and accordingly vote its ticket. Always,
however, there is a contingent, and frequently it is large enough to
hold the balance of power, which is neither ignorant nor apathetic,
and which, although perhaps too quiescent ordinarily, will rise in
revolt against any organisation which grafts too boldly and too
widely.
The situation of the venal machine is, therefore, substantially this:
more money can be obtained at any time if certain practices

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