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Ryszard Zięba
Poland’s
Foreign and
Security Policy
Problems of Compatibility with the
Changing International Order
Poland’s Foreign and Security Policy
Ryszard Zięba
Poland’s Foreign and Security

Policy
Problems of Compatibility with the Changing
International Order
Ryszard Zięba
Faculty of Political Science and International Studies
University of Warsaw
Warsaw, Poland
ISBN 978-3-030-30696-0 ISBN 978-3-030-30697-7 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30697-7
© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part
of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations,
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The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
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from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book
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The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
To my Family
Contents
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 What Is a Foreign and Security Policy? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Why Is Poland’s Foreign and Security Policy Worth
Studying? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.3 The Research Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4 The Structure of the Book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2 The Main Determinants of Poland’s Foreign and Security Policy
in the Twenty-First Century . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.1 The Geopolitical Situation and the Potential of a Medium-Rank
Country . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2 Polish Foreign and Security Policy’s Immersion in History . . . . . . 22
2.2.1 Selective Historical Memory and the Theory of Two
Enemies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.2.2 The Idea of Poland’s Mission in the East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.3 Political Instability and the Lack of Consensus on Foreign
and Security Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.4 Poland as an Element of the Atlantic Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.4.1 Poland’s “Return to the West” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.4.2 Polish Membership in NATO and the European Union . . . . . 39
2.5 The Reconfiguration of the International Order and the Return
of Central European Geopolitics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3 Russia as the Main Problem in Polish Foreign and Security
Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.1 History Weighs on Polish–Russian Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.1.1 Negative Historical Experiences from Polish–Russian
Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.1.2 Disputes Over History in the Period After 1989 . . . . . . . . . 60
3.2 Different Visions of European Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
vii
viii Contents
3.3 Polish Fears About Energy Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

3.4 The Impact of Polish–Russian Relations on Poland’s Ability
to Pursue Its Interests on the International Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4 Bandwagoning with the USA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.1 The Importance of the USA for Poland’s Security, and Attempts
to Establish a Strategic Partnership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.2 Strategic Partnership or Self-vassalization? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.3 Attempts to Rationalize Relations (2007–2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4.4 Poland’s Clientelism with Respect to the USA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
4.5 Features of the Polish–American Political Relationship . . . . . . . . . 126
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
5 The Dialectic of Strengthening and Weakening the European
Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
5.1 Poland’s Stance on Institutional Reform of the EU . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
5.2 Poland and the Financial Crisis in the Euro Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
5.3 Poland in the EU’s Defense Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
5.3.1 Poland Caution in Joining the ESDP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
5.3.2 Poland’s Position on the CSDP’s Stagnation . . . . . . . . . . . 149
5.4 Poland and the Migration Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
5.5 Poland’s Stance on the Future of the European Union . . . . . . . . . . 162
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
6 Poland Pushes NATO and the EU Eastward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
6.1 Poland’s Part in Promoting Democracy in the East . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
6.2 The Ukraine Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
6.3 The North Atlantic Alliance’s “Open Door” Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
6.4 Strengthening NATO’s Eastern Flank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
7 “Make Poland Great Again”: The Meanders of the Three Seas
Initiative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
7.1 The Antecedents and Premises of the Three Seas Initiative . . . . . . 201
7.2 The Essence of the Three Seas Initiative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
7.3 Opportunities and Obstacles in Implementing the Three
Seas Idea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
8 Poland’s Decreasing Activeness for Collective Security at the UN
and OSCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
8.1 Poland’s Activeness During the Cold War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
8.1.1 Polish Arms Reduction Initiatives in Central Europe . . . . . 218
8.1.2 The Role of People’s Poland in the CSCE Process . . . . . . . 221
Contents ix
8.1.3 Polish Initiatives for Peace and Universal

Disarmament . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
8.2 Poland’s Activeness After 1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
8.2.1 Activeness at the UN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
8.2.2 Involvement in the CSCE/OSCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
8.3 The Declining Significance of the OSCE for Poland . . . . . . . . . . . 239
8.4 Collective Security in Poland’s Foreign and Security Policy
Since 2015 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250
9 The Evolution of Poland’s International Roles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
9.1 The Conceptualization of Poland’s International Roles . . . . . . . . . 255
9.1.1 The Notion of a State’s International Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
9.1.2 Poland’s International Position as a “Medium Size/Rank”
Country . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256
9.2 Roles Expected of Poland by the Actors of the Euro-Atlantic
System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258
9.2.1 The Role of a State Having Conducted Successful
Democratic Transformations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259
9.2.2 The Role of a Stabilizing Force in the Region . . . . . . . . . . 259
9.2.3 The Role of the “Antechamber to Europe” . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
9.2.4 The Role of an Active Participant in European
Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261
9.2.5 The Role of US Ancillary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261
9.3 Roles Declared by Poland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
9.3.1 The Role of Initiator and Leader of Democratic
Transformations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
9.3.2 The Role of Regional Leader . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263
9.3.3 The Role of Exporter of Democracy to the East . . . . . . . . . 264
9.3.4 The Role of Principal Loyal US Ally in Central
Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266
9.3.5 The Role of a Strong European State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267
9.4 Roles Performed by Poland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268
9.4.1 The Role of a Model of Successful Political
Transformations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
9.4.2 The Role of Impediment to Russia’s Imperial
Ambitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270
9.4.3 The Role of a US Satellite and Client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271
9.4.4 The Role of a Brake on European Integration . . . . . . . . . . 272
9.4.5 The Role of a Pragmatic and Engaged Participant in
European Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273
9.4.6 The Role of European Union Wrecker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273
9.5 The Specific Nature and the Effectiveness of Poland’s
International Roles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 What Is a Foreign and Security Policy?
A state’s foreign policy is a fragment of its general policy that aims to ensure the
meeting of the state and society’s needs and interests that cannot be met within the
framework of the state’s internal functions, but which can be met by acting upon
the international environment. A state’s foreign policy is formulated within the
state’s internal system, but is carried out by the state’s organs on the international
stage, in the state’s relations with other international actors, other states above all,
but also international organizations. Foreign policy is thus one of a state’s sectoral
policies. Its recognition, understanding, and explanation should be based on the
assumed unified nature of state policies or, in other words, the interdependence of
sectoral (specific) policies. Foreign policy is one of the state’s public policies, which
means that its conditions, aims, actions, and effects are of a public nature. These are
intentional actions of the state directed at the international environment and seeking
to shape that environment. Historically, foreign policy is the oldest part of a state’s
general policy. Its essence is the activity aiming to achieve goals that express the
needs and interests of the state and society (the nation) through cooperation and
competition with other actors of the international system. Foreign policy is made of
aims formulated and implemented, decisions made, values represented, and activi-
ties conducted by the state in international relations with the intention of shaping and
controlling them.1
1
Zięba, R. (2016). Teoretyczne aspekty polityki zagranicznej państwa: wnioski dla Polski
w kontekście zmieniającego się ładu międzynarodowego. In R. Zięba, T. Pawłuszko (Eds.).
Polityka zagraniczna Polski w zmieniającym się ładzie międzynarodowym: wybrane problemy
(pp. 13–15). Kielce: Uniwersytet Jana Kochanowskiego; Webber, M., Smith M. et al. (2002),
Foreign Policy in a Transformed World. Harlow: Routledge, pp. 9–10.
© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 1

R. Zięba, Poland’s Foreign and Security Policy,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30697-7_1
2 1 Introduction
The most important need and interest of the state is to ensure its security,
including external security.2 This is particularly important in the context of a
changing international order. For this reason, the analysis of foreign policy is usually
combined with the analysis of external security. Most countries in the modern world
do not have the capacity to fully meet all their needs on their own, and this means
that they focus their international activities on security issues. This is especially the
case for small- and medium-sized countries, which focus their foreign policy on
ensuring their own security. State security also has an important internal dimension,
but when analyzing foreign policy, researchers focus on the diplomatic activity of
states and other activities aimed at ensuring external security, sometimes referred to
as the international security of states. It is therefore justified to combine foreign
policy with security policy. In fact, it is a matter of combining the foreign policy of
states with the external aspects of their security. In essence, such analyses relate to
states’ external security policy. The same is the case for the foreign and security
policy of the European Union.
1.2 Why Is Poland’s Foreign and Security Policy Worth

Studying?
Poland is a medium-rank country located in Central Europe. It was in the past and
remains an important element of the international order. In remote times, Poland was
a great power expanding in the east of Europe. This expansion was halted in the
second half of the seventeenth century, and at the end of the following century
Poland ceased to exist as a state, because it was divided by three other powers at the
time—Prussia, Russia, and Austria. Following a fairly fortunate recovery of its
independence after World War I, Poland was reborn as a medium-sized country
(388,000 km2) yet still gravitated to the east, and its territory was inhabited by
numerous national minorities, which made up 35.1% of the total population.
Conflicting relations with Germany and the USSR led to the loss of independence
in 1939. After World War II, Poland was reduced territorially (to 312.700 km2) and
shifted to the west. As a result of the Cold War division of Europe, Poland became
one of the key elements of the Soviet-led Eastern Bloc. The Poles played a leading
role in questioning the authoritarianism of real socialism and initiated several anti-
systemic crises—in 1956, 1968, 1970, 1976, and 1980–81. Against the background
of the perestroika in the Soviet Union, the Poles were the first in the Eastern Bloc to
bring about political transformations, regain their sovereignty and start building a
democratic state (in 1989). The Polish transformations encouraged the other Eastern
Bloc countries to embark on the path of reforms, and the consequence of all these
2
Zięba, R. (2004). Cele polityki zagranicznej państwa. In R. Zięba (Ed.). Wstęp do teorii polityki
zagranicznej państwa (pp. 50–52). Toruń: Adam Marszałek.
1.2 Why Is Poland’s Foreign and Security Policy Worth Studying? 3
internal transformations was the erosion of the Eastern Bloc and the subsequent
collapse of the USSR.
In the 1990s, Poland carried out successful democratic transformation, and was
one of the fastest growing countries in Europe. That is why Poland was perceived as
a transformation leader, which periodically competed with the Czech Republic and
Hungary. By choosing the path of political reforms, Poland reorientated its foreign
and security policy, and set the course for closer bilateral relations with Western
states and for accession to NATO and the European Union. In this way, it became a
significant element of the Atlantic community, which expanded to include the
countries of Central Europe. This new political orientation was facilitated by the
evolution of the European order after the Cold War, consisting in the expansion of
Western influence and the emergence of US hegemony in the new international order
of the 1990s, but also by the weakness of Russia, which was unable to oppose the
expansion of the West.
Toward the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, the international
situation began to change in an unfavorable way for the West. Russia, having grown
stronger under Vladimir Putin had announced in 2007 a policy of balancing the
dominant position of the USA and the West and of opposing its further expansion
into the post-Soviet states. Despite the fact that Poland’s international position had
grown stronger after it joined NATO (1999) and the European Union (2004) and the
fact that it lay in the vicinity of the emerging new division line in Europe, it did not
take on a moderating policy and became one of the main proponents (alongside the
USA) of the expansion of Western influence in the post-Soviet area (promotion of
democracy, support for the Atlantic aspirations of Ukraine and Georgia, Eastern
Partnership of the EU, strengthening of NATO’s eastern flank). This could not have
produced positive results, especially as Poland openly supported the anti-Russian
policy of the USA. The growing rivalry between the West and Russia reduced the
role of small- and medium-sized countries while giving the decisive say to the great
powers. The clearest manifestation of a return to competition for spheres of influence
was the Ukrainian crisis, especially since the spring of 2014, when Russia annexed
Crimea and supported the secessionists in Donbass. During this crisis, the weaken-
ing of Poland’s role was clearly visible. Poland, along with Germany and France,
had initially tried to find a compromise between the President of Ukraine, Viktor
Yanukovych, and the Maidan protesters, but after moving to a sharp anti-Russian
policy, Poland eliminated itself from the group of mediators in Ukrainian affairs.
Poland’s effective action to persuade the EU to impose sanctions on Russia and to
militarily reinforce NATO’s eastern flank has not had, despite the positive opinion
on this subject shared by most of the Polish political elite, any beneficial effects,
either for Poland or for the security of the countries of the eastern part of Europe. The
conflict over Ukraine became the main manifestation of a return to a situation of high
tension, sometimes referred to as the “new Cold War,” between the West and
4 1 Introduction
Russia.3 In the event, Poland’s role has been reduced because, as happens in times of
rivalry, the fate of the world is determined by the great powers.4 Poland, which had
shown a pro-American attitude since the beginning of the transformations, had now
moved to an extreme bandwagoning policy. This policy, especially under the
conservative-nationalist Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość—PiS) party,
reveals a clientelistic attitude toward the USA that jeopardizes the cohesion of the
North Atlantic Alliance and Poland’s relations with its EU partners. Polish foreign
and security policy has been pro-American for a long time, and under the rule of PiS
it draws its ideological motivation from the conservative nationalism of that political
party, as well as from an affinity with the populist and anti-liberal policy of US
President Donald Trump.
The analysis of Poland’s foreign and security policy since the end of the Cold
War should take into account the evolution of the entire international order, espe-
cially in Europe. Even though it is influenced by distant history (the Jagiellonian era
and the myth of “two enemies”—Russia and Germany) and the naïve belief in the
identity of Polish and US interests by means of a continuity of political thought and
references, Polish policy is largely dependent on trends in the evolution of the
international order. Unfortunately, Polish politicians on the right of the political
spectrum fail to understand the consequences of this evolution and take steps that do
not serve Polish national interests well, shy away from conciliation and compromise
solutions with their rivals and even with their EU partners, and choose a course of
action in keeping with their nationalist and anti-liberal beliefs and this exacerbates
disputes and confrontations. This means that Poland does not behave in a way that is
typical of medium-rank countries, that is, in a usual way for countries of this group,
and that the theses of international relations theory having to do with middle powers
are not borne out by the example of Poland, especially not when the nationalist right
is in power.5
This book is published while Poland is celebrating several important anniversa-
ries. In 2018, Poland celebrated 100 years of independence, which was restored after
the First World War. The year 2019 saw other important anniversaries: 30 years
since the beginning of the successful transition from the system of real socialism to
parliamentary democracy; 20 years since Poland’s admission to NATO; and 15 years
of its accession to the European Union. At the same time, Polish politics has been
taking a conservative-nationalist turn for several years now, turning Poland into a
negative driving force behind a wider political wave marked by a departure from
liberal values and the rule of law. While Poland had earlier enjoyed a fine reputation
3
See Legvold, R. (2016). Return to Cold War. Boston: Polity; Cohen, S. F. (2018). War with
Russia: From Putin & Ukraine to Trump & Russiagate. New York: Hot Books; Khudoley, K. K.
(2019). Russia and the USA: Cool War Ahead? Teorija in Praksa, (University of Ljubljana), 56(1),
98–117. Comp. McFaull, M. (2018). From Cold War to Hot Peace. Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Harcourt, p. 409 et seq.
4
Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W.W. Norton.
5
Comp. historical assessment Bull, H. (1995). The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World
Politics. Basingstoke: Macmillan, p. 103.
1.3 The Research Perspective 5
and was cited as an example of successful democratic transformations, since autumn

2015 the Law and Justice party has been turning it into an authoritarian state that is
undoing its political achievements, weakening the European Union, and supporting
the conservative and dangerous policies of US President Donald Trump. This turn of
events is due to the pursuit of an authoritarian course in internal politics, to the
violation of the rule of law, and of the principle of separation of powers. It also
shows the importance of an internal policy based on conservative-nationalist ideol-
ogy as a determinant of Polish foreign and security policy.
This book seeks to verify the hypothesis that the foreign and security policy of
Poland has several specific features, namely (1) it is strongly influenced by a
selective historical memory; (2) its principal aspects are disputes with Russia;
(3) Poland shows a preference for a policy of bandwagoning with the USA;
(4) Poland is a member of the Atlantic community through its membership in
NATO and the European Union, but its behavior in this community shows prefer-
ences of a provincial and destructive nature; (5) Poland seeks to strengthen its
security and to increase its role in Central Europe, but its efforts are unsuccessful;
(6) since the second half of the 1990s, Poland’s activeness for collective security
(in the UN and the OSCE) has weakened; and (7) as a result of all the above,
Poland’s international roles are imposed upon it by the international system, and
Poland has difficulties in reaching its declared roles.
The author’s analysis concerns Poland’s foreign and security policy during the
entire post-Cold War period. However, his main arguments focus on the study of
Poland’s international activeness in the twenty-first century—accession to the
two most important structures of the Western world, NATO and the European
Union—against the background of the ongoing reconfiguration of the global inter-
national order. It also presents Poland’s most important attainments during the last
decade of the twentieth century, that is, after the political watershed of 1989. These
attainments have made it possible to show how Poland, as a medium-sized
European country, has shaped its foreign and security policy through the post-
Cold War period. This setting also allows us to examine to what extent the changing
international system, especially the closest, Euro-Atlantic one, influences Poland’s
international roles, what roles are declared by Warsaw and, lastly, what are Poland’s
real international roles. This setting makes it possible to assess the role and
importance of Poland in the entire Euro-Atlantic security system.
1.3 The Research Perspective
In my research into foreign and security policy, my point of departure is the classic
realistic approach that is predominant in research on these issues. I, therefore, stress
the importance of factors that determine this policy, such as potential and geopolit-
ical position. As in classic security research, I point out that a state’s security policy
focuses on analysis of arising threats, especially those of a military nature, and on a
6 1 Introduction
search for means and ways to eliminate them,6 and claim that Poland’s foreign and
security policy is strongly influenced by a sense of threat from Russia.
The evolution of the international order should be given extensive consideration
in any effective examination of Poland’s foreign and security policy, as this makes it
possible to better understand that policy’s evolution. Such an approach is justified by
the fact that Poland is a middle-rank country and its actions depend more on the
impulses created by the international environment than on the sovereign decisions of
the Polish authorities. This type of assessment can also be applied to most other
medium-sized states, as indicated by researchers of the English School of interna-
tional relations.7 This preliminary assumption is contested by many Polish politi-
cians, especially when power is in the hands of right-wing parties, which have a
particularly a-historical understanding of their country’s sovereignty. In practice,
however, even steps which such parties take and justify as sovereign, are in most
cases the expression of accommodation (adaptation) to the demands of the interna-
tional system. To the greatest extent, they are the result of the bandwagoning
strategy that Poland adopted with respect to the USA and which, according to
right-wing and nationalist Polish politicians, is supposed to ensure autonomy from
supposed limitations on Poland’s sovereignty entailed by its membership in the
European Union. On the one hand, this is indicative of a mistaken and dogmatic
understanding of sovereignty and of the a priori assumption that the national
interests of Poland and the USA are one and identical and, on the other hand, it is
the result of American pressure, which Poland is susceptible to because it is guided
by a constant fear of Russia.
This situation means that Poland’s behavior on the international stage depends on
the changing international order, especially in Europe. When cooperative trends
were dominant in that order, as they were during the first post-Cold War decade,
Poland pursued a sovereign foreign policy, and when relations between the West and
Russia began to worsen in subsequent decades, Poland shifted to a pro-American
policy. Another factor that led Polish governments to adopt such a course was the
sense of strength that they derived from NATO and EU membership. A constant
feature of Polish foreign and security policy is Warsaw’s sense of threat from Russia.
6
For more, see Zięba, R. (1989). Pojęcie bezpieczeństwa państwa w stosunkach
międzynarodowych. Sprawy Międzynarodowe, 10, 49–70; Kolodziej, E. A. (2005). Security and
International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 127–174.
7
Wight, M. (1978). Power Politics, edited by H. Bull, C. Holbraad. Leister: Leister University
Press; Holbraad, C. (1971). The Role of Middle Powers. Cooperation and Conflict, 6(1), 77–90;
Holbraad, C. (1984). Middle Powers in International Politics. New York: St Martin’s Press; Bull,
H. (1995). The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. Basingstoke: Macmillan;
Vayrynen, R. (1971). On the definition and measurement of small power status. Cooperation and
Conflict, 6(1), 91–102. For more, see Włodkowska-Bagan, A. (2015). Środki i metody polityki
zagranicznej państw średniej rangi. Casus Polski po 1989 roku. In J. Zając, A. Włodkowska-Bagan,
M. Kaczmarski (Eds.). Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe Polska-Europa-Świat. Księga
Jubileuszowa dedykowana Profesorowi Ryszardowi Ziębie z okazji czterdziestolecia pracy
naukowej (pp. 294–309). Warsaw: Wydział Dziennikarstwa i Nauk Politycznych Uniwersytet
Warszawski.
It arises from a selective understanding of history, as well as from the observation of

the Russian opposition to the West’s ongoing expansion in the east of Europe, and in
the non-Russian post-Soviet states in particular. In a sense, Russia’s natural shift to a
balancing policy at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century is perceived
in Poland as Russian revisionism. This means that Poland—like most Western
countries—perceives it as undermining the existing international order.
It is a fact that in the first post-Cold War decade an asymmetrical international
order emerged, one that was beneficial for Western countries, including Poland. That
is why Polish and other Western politicians are not only in favor of maintaining it but
also of furthering this asymmetry. When the West widens its influence in the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and embarks on many armed interven-
tions guided by great power expansionism (such as the intervention against the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999, the one in Afghanistan in 2001, the Iraq
war in 2003, the intervention in Libya in 2011, and the intervention in Syria in 2011),
Polish politicians do not call it revisionism. It is a paradox that many scholars of the
neorealist current claim that the Russian Federation’s policy aiming to halt this
Western expansionism is “revisionist.” However, when writing about US interfer-
ence in the affairs of many states and NATO enlargement and the EU’s eastern
policy, they do not call it a “revision” of the international order. This is indicative of
a biased and unscientific approach, which in fact constitutes a form of ideological
support for the foreign policy of the USA and the West, and in some cases also the
adoption of an ethno-phobic value judgment of Russia as a state inferior to others
states, especially Western ones.
Considering the clear dependence of Poland’s foreign and security policy on the
international system, in this book I have adopted a neorealistic approach. I find
Kenneth Waltz’s assumption that the behavior of states in the international system
depends on the structure of that system, and especially on the changing redistribution
of capabilities, to be particularly useful.8 Poland provides an excellent example of a
policy that is dependent on the surrounding international order, as well as on the
growing power of the state, which after its accession to NATO and the EU, and as a
result of uninterrupted economic growth since the beginning of this century, is
steadily increasing its economic and military potential. In 2014, a stronger Poland
shifted toward a clearly anti-Russian policy, and the Ukrainian crisis only acceler-
ated this. On the other hand, Poland’s shift to the position of the USA client, without
taking into account the opinion of its European allies within NATO and its EU
partners it highly illogical from a neorealistic perspective. Separate studies should be
undertaken to fully explain why Poland chose a clear policy of clientelism and
servilism with regard to the USA in 2015. The thesis, which appeared in later
political science commentaries and some scholarly analyses, that this was due to
the ideological affinity between the conservative-nationalist Polish government and
the policy conducted by US President Donald Trump explains only partially
8
Waltz, K. N. (1979). Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing
Company, pp. 71–128.
8 1 Introduction
Poland’s decision to subjugate itself to the USA. In this context, one should point out
that Poland’s pro-US orientation began earlier, during Warsaw’s initial diplomatic
efforts to join NATO in the 1990s, after which Poland pursued, with varying
intensity, its policy of bandwagoning with the USA. This means that Poland’s
pro-Americanism has a wider background.
Generally, the presentation of Poland’s foreign and security policy against the
background of the evolution of the international order is based on neorealist premises.
Especially useful are the indications of Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer about
the ongoing reconfiguration of the international order, consisting in the erosion of the
United States’ hegemonic position and the emergence of a new concert of the powers.9
In this reconfiguration, Poland sees the increasing role and importance of Russia and,
therefore, an increased military threat from that country. In this situation, Poland,
having no possibility of “balancing,” resorts to a policy of “bandwagoning” with
regard to the USA. The theory of bandwagoning—in Stephen Walt’s words—consists
in joining an opponent, in keeping with the idea that “if you can’t beat them, join
them.”10 Later, the sense of a “bandwagoning” strategy changed and today it means
joining a stronger but allied state, for instance, the leader of a bloc.11 Poland has
chosen a strategic partnership with the USA, which in practice means
“bandwagoning” with regard to this superpower.
The use of a realistic approach is insufficient to fully examine Poland’s foreign
and security policy, and in particular to demonstrate that, this policy contains a
number of contradictions leading Poland to have a problem of compatibility with the
changing international order. For this reason making use of social constructivism
and international role theories proved useful. Constructivism made it possible to
explain the important role of principles, ideas, norms (intersubjective ideas), insti-
tutions, actions, opinions, views of history, views related to the current international
situation, and the identity of subjects.12 These ideational factors or structures, to use
the expression of Alexander Wendt,13—point to deeply ingrained and historically
rooted resentment of Poland’s neighbors, especially of Russia and Germany, an
overestimation of the harm sustained at their hands, a heroic history of struggle for
independence, especially from the late eighteenth to the early twentieth century, a
9
Waltz, K. N. (2000). Structural Realism after the Cold War. International Security, 25(2), p. 30;
Mearsheimer, J. J. (2018). The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities. New
Haven: Yale University Press.
10
Walt, S. M. (1987). The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 21–22.
11
Schweller, R. L. (1994). Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back
in. International Security, 19(1), pp. 92–93.
12
Wendt, A. (1992). Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics.
International Organization, 46(2), pp. 391–425; Onuf, N. (1989). World of Our Making. Columbia:
University of South Carolina Press; Kratochwil, F. (1989). Rules, Norms and Decisions: On the
Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
13
Wendt, A. (1999). Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
longing for the great power position once enjoyed by the Polish state in Central and
Eastern Europe, and an oversensitivity to the issue of Poland’s sovereignty, on that
leads even to nationalism.
Constructivist scholars disavow objective quantifiers of greatness for states, and
stress the self-perception of small states and the way they are seen by other actors.14
The same can be said to middle powers. For example, the Polish diplomat and
scholar, Przemysław Grudziński, emphasizes the importance of self-definition and
self-perception in the motivation of states on the international stage and points out
that “there are no reasons to ignore a factor that has to do with self-esteem, prestige,
political culture and legitimacy of the governing circles.”15 This escapes beyond
rationalism and leads to choosing idealistic concepts and, in consequence, to risky
initiatives on the international stage. The result is an ineffective foreign and security
policy, and this is borne out by the international roles the state performs.16 In
Poland’s case, those roles are out of step with its declared roles and from the
expectations of its most important partners from the Euro-Atlantic area.
The constructivist interpretation of Poland’s foreign and security policy is com-
plementary with regard to the (neo)realistic approach. This is very visible in the
analysis of all the directions of this policy and when I point to Poland’s normative
approach to shaping a favorable international order, reinforced by Polish politics’
conservative-nationalist current, which clearly came to the fore after Poland’s
accession to the European Union in 2004. Constructivism has allowed us to notice
the important “non-material” factors determining this policy, those that have to do
with history, the ongoing disputes with Russia, the naive belief in the identity of the
national interests of Poland and the USA, Poland’s hesitant stance in the European
Union, the ineffective policy in Eastern and Central Europe, and the weakening
commitment to collective security in Europe and in the world. The quintessence of
the application of social constructivism is a fuller look at the examined problem and
the evaluation of the specificity and low effectiveness of Poland’s international roles
in the entire post-1989 period.
The neorealistic approach prevails in this book, however, because Poland’s
external security is shaped mainly by objective and subjective aspects of the
evolution of the international order in Europe. Even the conservative-nationalist
turnaround in Polish politics under the PiS governments is based on the global crisis
of liberalism and the rise of conservative-nationalist and populist ideologies else-
where. A similar ideological and political course can be observed in Hungary, in the
United Kingdom’s leaving of the European Union, in the USA with the Donald
Trump administration, and in various forms of nationalism affecting the politics of
Russia, Turkey, and China. Even Western European countries are struggling, albeit
14
Hey, J. A. K. (Ed.). (2003). Small States in Word Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior.
Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, p. 3.
15
Grudziński, P. (2008). Państwo inteligentne. Polska w poszukiwaniu międzynarodowej roli.
Toruń: Adam Marszałek, p. 36.
16
More on international roles theory, see Chap. 9.
10 1 Introduction
effectively, with a wave of anti-liberal movements (the Netherlands, France,

Germany, Austria, Italy).
1.4 The Structure of the Book
The structure of this book raises some problems. Its individual chapters attempt to
validate the author’s hypothesis. Chapter 2 presents the main determinants of
Poland’s post-Cold War foreign and security policy with an accent on phenomena
defining that policy in the twenty-first century. The chapter begins with a character-
ization of Poland’s geopolitical location and of its potential as a medium-rank state.
It then goes on to examine the most important factors affecting Poland’s foreign and
security policy, which the author considers to be its “immersion” (entanglement) in
history—something that became increasingly apparent immediately with the resto-
ration of sovereignty in 1989 and which is especially evident when right-wing
parties hold power in the country. Poland’s policy is greatly affected by the
rather low political culture of its society and the specificity of its political system,
which despite the advances in the growth of democracy in the 1990s, has many
visible drawbacks. These became apparent in the next decades as the political stage’s
domination by conservative-nationalist and populist forces, which in the middle of
the second decade of the twenty-first century produced violations of the rule of law
and authoritarian government—something that caused difficulties for Poland in the
European Union. A very important factor determining Polish foreign and security
policy is Poland’s accession to the structures of the Atlantic community—NATO
and the European Union. And lastly, Poland’s policy is significantly affected by the
reconfiguration of the international order, including the European order in the
twenty-first century and which has led to a reappearance of Central European
geopolitics in many countries of the region.
The above-mentioned determinants made Russia or, more precisely, the ongoing
sense of threat that the Polish political class senses in connection with this powerful
neighbor, the main problem of Polish foreign and security policy. Chapter 3 exam-
ines Poland’s attitude toward Russia and distinguishes three groups of contentious
problems in Polish–Russian relations, namely contemporary disputes over the his-
tory of Polish–Russian relations; different visions of security and European gover-
nance; and Polish obsessive fears about Poland’s energy security resulting from its
dependence on supplies of Russian oil and natural gas. On the basis of the analysis of
the above-mentioned contentious issues, the author shows how the state of Polish–
Russian relations impacts Poland’s ability to pursue its interests in the international
environment. This impact is mostly negative.
Chapter 4 is devoted not so much to the analysis of Poland’s policy toward the
USA, as there is essentially no such policy, but to the discussion of Poland’s
relations with its most important political partner, the USA. It begins by explaining
the importance of the USA for Poland’s security and the causes for Poland’s choice
of a policy of bandwagoning with the USA, leading to the emergence of an
1.4 The Structure of the Book 11
asymmetrical strategic partnership, which under the rule of PiS governments took
the form of clientelism and relegated Poland to the role of a US satellite. In this
chapter, there is a chronological argument showing Poland’s progressive self-
vassalage, interrupted in the years 2007–2015 by an attempt to place relations with
the USA on a more rational footing. Lastly, the features of Poland’s political
relations with the USA are presented in synthetic form.
Chapter 5 describes the dialectic of Poland’s strengthening and weakening the
European Union and analyses Poland’s changing stance on the stagnation of the
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defense
Policy (CSDP). Poland showed great reserve with respect to the defense policy
proclaimed by the European Union in 1999. Starting in 2009 it took steps, along with
Germany and France, to reinvigorate the CSDP and also initiated—especially during
its presidency at the EU Council in the second half of 2011—constructive measures
to bring the EU out of the financial crisis threatening the survival of the eurozone,
and made a major contribution to creating new mechanisms to overcome that crisis.
This chapter presents the pro-European attitude of the Civic Platform (PO) and
Polish People’s Party (PSL) governments, and then the Euro-skeptic policy of the
conservative-nationalist Law and Justice (PiS) government, reflected in Poland’s
unreliability in efforts to solve the immigration crisis and working for the survival of
the EU, threatened by Brexit and weakened by nationalisms. Along with Hungary,
Poland has become one of the forces destroying the European Union by violating the
rule of law principle and by its many pronouncements against closer integration
within the EU framework.
Chapter 6 examines how Poland uses NATO and the European Union to further
its anti-Russian eastern policy. It does so by participating in the promotion of
democracy in post-Soviet countries, including supporting “color revolutions”; by
taking advantage of the Ukrainian crisis that broke out in the autumn of 2013; by
supporting NATO’s “open door” (further enlargement) policy, including the efforts
of Ukraine and Georgia to join the Alliance; and through the military reinforcement
of NATO’s eastern flank—whether by means of autonomous initiatives of through
the Bucharest Nine (B9).
In Chap. 7, I present the meanders of the policy called the Three Seas Initia-
tive (Trimarium). This policy is the latest expression of Poland’s return, announced
in 2016, to the idea—dating from previous historical periods—of establishing a
Central European federation of states (Intermarium) under Polish leadership. This
time, Poland has moved away from actively trying to involve post-Soviet republics
such as Ukraine and Belarus in the project. The Three Seas Initiative, launched
jointly with Croatia is addressed only to twelve countries located on the eastern
fringes of the EU and between the Baltic, Adriatic, and Black seas. The analysis of
the political premises of the Three Seas Initiative concept makes it possible to
distinguish the project’s three purposes: to establish an anti-Russian barrier, an
alternative to the European Union, and an economic instrument of regional policy.
This policy enjoys strong support from the US President Donald Trump who, in
his 2016 electoral campaign, made use of the slogan “Make America Great Again.”
PiS came to power in 2005 and 2015, and on both occasions spoke of building a new
12 1 Introduction
Poland: In 2005, it called for the establishment of a “Fourth Republic,” while its
motto in 2015 was “Good Change.” The aim each time was to “raise Poland from its
knees” and restore the Polish state to the greatness it had known in the fifteenth to
seventeenth centuries. The first part of the title in Chap. 7—“Make Poland Great
Again”—refers to the illusion that, for the second time, is guiding the Polish
nationalist right in its foreign and security policy. It is a fitting analogy, for this
policy serves ambitions that are similar to those of President Trump, except that they
are not pursued autonomously, as in Washington’s case, but through Poland’s
bandwagoning with the USA.
Chapter 8 is devoted to the analysis of Poland’s diminishing activity for collective
security through the UN and OSCE. This is shown against the background of the
Polish People’s Republic’s considerable Cold War era experience in such matters
within both organizations. Democratic Poland sought to continue this positive
involvement during the 1990s, but its efforts waned during the two subsequent
decades. In this chapter, I am seeking to explain the reasons for this and to show
the abandonment of the idea of collective security by the PiS government from 2015
onwards.
The last (Chap. 9) chapter constitutes a summary, in which I attempt to concep-
tualize Poland’s international roles over the past 30 years. To do this, I use the
analysis of Poland’s foreign and security policy against the background of the
evolving international order. I show this policy on three levels—that of the roles
expected from Poland by the international system; of the roles declared by Poland;
and of the roles performed by Poland. Lastly, I point to the specific features of
Poland’s international roles, their low level of effectiveness, and even to their
mutually conflicting nature.
All the arguments presented in this book lead to the conclusion that Poland is an
important element of the European international order, but that the efforts of its
political elites—especially those of a rightist provenance—do not provide any
justification for the claim that they are restoring Poland to greatness—to the “Golden
Age” it knew in the sixteenth century.
References
1. Bull, H. (1995). The anarchical society: A study of order in world politics. Basingstoke:
Macmillan.
2. Cohen, S. F. (2018). War with Russia: From Putin & Ukraine to Trump & Russiagate.
New York: Hot Books.
3. Grudziński, P. (2008). Państwo inteligentne. Polska w poszukiwaniu międzynarodowej roli.
Toruń: Adam Marszałek.
4. Hey, J. A. K. (Ed.). (2003). Small states in word politics: Explaining foreign policy behavior.
Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
5. Holbraad, C. (1971). The role of middle powers. Cooperation and Conflict, 6(1), 77–90.
6. Holbraad, C. (1984). Middle powers in international politics. New York: St Martin’s Press.
7. Khudoley, K. K. (2019). Russia and the USA: Cool war ahead? Teorija in Praksa (University of
Ljubljana), 56(1), 98–117.
References 13
8. Kolodziej, E. A. (2005). Security and international relations. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-

sity Press.
9. Kratochwil, F. (1989). Rules, norms and decisions: On the conditions of practical and legal
reasoning in international relations and domestic affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
10. Legvold, R. (2016). Return to cold war. Boston: Polity.
11. McFaull, M. (2018). From cold war to hot peace. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
12. Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). The tragedy of great power politics. New York: W.W. Norton.
13. Mearsheimer, J. J. (2018). The great delusion: Liberal dreams and international realities. New
Haven: Yale University Press.
14. Onuf, N. (1989). World of our making. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
15. Schweller, R. L. (1994). Bandwagoning for profit: Bringing the revisionist state back
in. International Security, 19(1), 72–107.
16. Vayrynen, R. (1971). On the definition and measurement of small power status. Cooperation
and Conflict, 6(1), 91–102.
17. Walt, S. M. (1987). The origins of alliances. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
18. Waltz, K. N. (1979). Theory of international politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
19. Waltz, K. N. (2000). Structural realism after the cold war. International Security, 25(2), 5–41.
20. Webber, M., Smith, M., et al. (2002). Foreign policy in a transformed world. Routledge:
Harlow.
21. Wendt, A. (1992). Anarchy is what states make of it: The social construction of power politics.
International Organization, 46(2), 391–425.
22. Wendt, A. (1999). Social theory of international politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
23. Wight, M. (1978). In H. Bull & C. Holbraad (Eds.), Power politics. Leister: Leister University
Press.
24. Włodkowska-Bagan, A. (2015). Środki i metody polityki zagranicznej państw średniej rangi.
Casus Polski po 1989 roku. In J. Zając, A. Włodkowska-Bagan, & M. Kaczmarski (Eds.),
Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe Polska-Europa-Świat. Księga Jubileuszowa dedykowana
Profesorowi Ryszardowi Ziębie z okazji czterdziestolecia pracy naukowej (pp. 295–309).
Wydział Dziennikarstwa i Nauk Politycznych Uniwersytet Warszawski: Warsaw.
25. Zięba, R. (1989). Pojęcie bezpieczeństwa państwa w stosunkach międzynarodowych. Sprawy
Międzynarodowe, 10, 49–70.
26. Zięba, R. (2004). Cele polityki zagranicznej państwa. In R. Zięba (Ed.), Wstęp do teorii polityki
zagranicznej państwa (pp. 37–58). Toruń: Adam Marszałek.
27. Zięba, R. (2016). Teoretyczne aspekty polityki zagranicznej państwa: wnioski dla Polski
w kontekście zmieniającego się ładu międzynarodowego. In R. Zięba & T. Pawłuszko (Eds.),
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Chapter 2
The Main Determinants of Poland’s Foreign
and Security Policy in the Twenty-First
Century
2.1 The Geopolitical Situation and the Potential of a

Medium-Rank Country
Bringing a geopolitical approach to the analysis of a state’s foreign and security

policy consists in examining elements of that state’s geographical situation while
taking its international environment into account. Researchers have been drawing
attention to the importance of geographical factors for a state’s policies, including its
foreign policy, since the mid-eighteenth century, when Montesquieu’s De l’Esprit
des Lois appeared (1748).1 In the nineteenth century, political geography began to
develop in Germany and this led the following century to the emergence of a field of
study called geopolitics. Geopolitical analyses assume that a country’s geographical
location is a determinant factor in its conflicting relations with its neighbors, and
point to the limited nature of political will among decision-makers who succumb to
the pressure of objective natural factors. This means that states are from the outset
condemned, so to speak, to conduct a specific foreign policy, the direction of which
is imposed by a specific spatial and political configuration.2 In this book, I will not be
making use of the classic geopolitical approach as much as drawing attention to the
importance of Poland’s location at the center of Europe in the international political
configuration as it exists and evolves in the twenty-first century.
The size of a country’s territory and its borders is an important factor in the
foreign and security policy of every country. During the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, Poland was a major European power and was engaged in a number of
1
Frankel, J. (1963). The Making of Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Decision-Making. London:
Oxford University Press, pp. 57–61; Merle, M. (1974). Sociologie des relations internationales.
Paris: Dalloz, pp. 149–158; Morgenthau H. J., revised by Thompson, K. W. (1993). Politics among
Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, brief edition. Boston: McGrow-Hill, pp. 124–133.
2
For more on the essence of geopolitics, see Moczulski, L. (2010). Geopolityka. Potęga w czasie i
przestrzeni, Warsaw, Bellona, pp. 70–78.
© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 15

R. Zięba, Poland’s Foreign and Security Policy,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30697-7_2
16 2 The Main Determinants of Poland’s Foreign and Security Policy. . .
conflicts. With the conclusion in 1569 of a real union with the Grand Duchy of
Lithuania, the so-called Commonwealth of Both Nations was established, and the
ethnically non-Polish Podlasia, Volhynia, Podolia, and Kiev regions were annexed
to the indigenous Polish lands called the Crown. In 1582, the Commonwealth’s total
area amounted to 815,000 km2. As a result of many wars with Russia during the
following century, the Commonwealth’s territory grew to include the regions of
Smolensk, Chernigov, and Seversk. In 1634, the area of the Commonwealth reached
990,000 km2, the greatest in its history. In 1667, the Commonwealth lost the three
above-mentioned regions, left-bank Ukraine, and the city of Kiev, to Russia. In the
years that followed, Poland also lost Podolia. In 1699, the Commonwealth’s area
amounted to 773,000 km2 and remained unchanged until 1772, when its immediate
neighbors—Prussia, Russia, and Austria—proceeded to carve out pieces of the
Commonwealth’s territory in the First Partition of Poland. After Poland regained
its independence in 1918, it had an area half as large, with 388,000 km2, on nearly
half of which the majority population was made up of other Slavic nations.
This historical sketch of how Polish territory evolved indicated that the great
power ambitions proper to the thinking of some Polish politicians have certain
historical connotations, as Poland used to be a large multinational European state
driven to expansion eastward. This expansion, referred to in our day as the pursuit of
the Jagiellonian Idea (the name comes from the Jagiellonian dynasty), created in the
consciousness of the Polish elites the image of a civilizational mission of sorts with
respect to the nations living in the east. At the same time, the fact that this mission
was carried out by the gentry which ruled the Commonwealth led to Poland being
perceived as the “lordly Poland” extending its rule over peasant nations living on
territories to the east. Poland’s expansion was resisted and countered by Russia,
which was expanding westward, toward the Baltic Sea. This rivalry led Poles to see
Russia as a threat and as Poland’s natural enemy. This positive-negative
mythologization of the Commonwealth’s eastern policy gave rise to the image of
an enemy threatening the existence of the Polish state. Of key importance for the
perpetuation of this image, however, was Russia’s later suppression of successive
Polish national uprisings, the Polish-Soviet War of 1920, and the persecution and
mass deportations of the Polish population to distant confines of the USSR during
the Second World War.
The borders of present-day Central Europe reflect the decisions taken in 1945 at
the Yalta and Potsdam conferences, at which the shape of post-war Europe was
determined. Poland had to cede 45.6% of its territory to the USSR and was given
compensation from Germany in the west and the north. Those acquisitions, which
were not even formulated in the programs of any Polish political party, and the
subsequent development of those territories, constitute one of Poland’s greatest
attainments in its recent history—comparable to the restoration of the country’s
independence in 1918. Poland was permanently shifted westward and gained wide
access to the Baltic Sea. To all indications, this is a permanent development, which
created conditions for a positive change in Poland’s foreign policy, and freed it from
the disastrous pursuit of the Jagiellonian Idea. In addition, it entailed the reduction of
the country’s area to 312,700 km2 and to Poland’s firm anchoring in Central Europe.
2.1 The Geopolitical Situation and the Potential of a Medium-Rank Country 17
Since 1945, Poland has had a compact territory resembling a circle whose perimeter
amounts to 3511 km.
During the Cold War division of Europe, Poland—referred to as “People’s
Poland” by its authorities and by historians—was surrounded by other Eastern
Bloc countries—the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and the German Democratic Republic.
This was a fundamental factor shaping its foreign policy. After the political trans-
formations of 1989, the breakdown of the division of Europe and the disintegration
of the USSR, Poland found itself in a new environment. Poland now had a larger
number of neighbors: the Russian Federation, Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine,
(independent states which emerged from the ruins of the USSR) to the north and
east; the Czech Republic and Slovakia (which emerged from the break-up of
Czechoslovakia) to the south; and to the west, the Federal Republic of Germany,
which had incorporated the Länder of the former German Democratic Republic. The
length of Poland’s current borders are as follows: 796 km with the Czech Republic,
541 km with Slovakia, 535 km with Ukraine, 467 km with Germany, 418 km with
Belarus, 210 km with Russia, and 104 km with Lithuania.
Today, the geographical nature of borders, that is, whether they are natural or
artificial, is of little importance but their geopolitical aspect is significant.3 Poland
shares an undisputed and mutually recognized border with seven states. Most of
them are NATO allies and EU member states—Germany to the west, the Czech
Republic and Slovakia to the south, and Lithuania to the northeast. The other three
neighbors, Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia, are not members of those two organiza-
tions. Poland’s border with those states denotes a geostrategic divide in Europe, as it
is an external border of both NATO and the EU—a border subject to Schengen
regulations. This geopolitical situation is, therefore, the most important geopolitical
factor informing Warsaw’s foreign and security policy, and placing Poland in the
position of an advanced defense post of the Atlantic community. At the same time, it
constitutes an asset that increases the chances of conducting an active eastern policy
and playing the role of a bridging and transit country for East-West economic
cooperation. The latter role is influenced by Poland’s possession of relatively
abundant natural resources (mainly coal), but also its high dependence on imports
of crude oil and gas from Russia.
Another factor of objective significance is demographic potential. The foreign
and security policy of each country is influenced by such demographic features as
the size of the country’s population; its natural growth rate, age structure, and ethnic
composition; the number of citizens abroad and number of immigrants; and the
dominant religion.4 In 2018, Poland was home to 38.4 million people, which places
it in ninth place in Europe (with the population of Russia and Turkey is taken into
3
About how this aspect is understood, see Jean, C. (2003). Geopolityka. Wrocław: Ossolineum,
pp. 60–97. For more, see Chauprade, A. (2003). Géopolitique: constantes et changements dans
l’histoire. Paris: Ellipses.
4
See: Merle, M. (1974). op. cit., pp. 190–197; Colard, D. (1977). Les relations internationales.
Paris: Masson, p. 38.
account) and sixth place in the European Union. During most of the second decade
of the twenty-first century Poland had a negative population growth rate (0.6 per
thousand), and only in 2017 did it rise, for the first time in 5 years, (by 0.1 per
thousand). Nevertheless, according to the 2014 long-term forecast of the Central
Statistical Office, Poland’s population will decrease systematically, with the rate of
this decrease accelerating with time. It is expected that in 2030 Poland’s population
will amount to about 37.2 million, and in 2050 to a little under 33.9 million.5
This disadvantageous demographic trend is the weakest aspect of Poland’s
demographic potential as a factor underpinning the entirety of Poland’s policy. It
signals the beginning of the gradual aging of Polish society and a further decline in
the size of the working age population. This latter trend, measured by indicators such
as the employment rate and the activity rate of the population of productive age
(20–64) is unfavorable in relation to the country’s population as a whole. According
to Eurostat, in 2017 these rates were 66.1% and 74.5%, respectively, and were lower
than the EU-28 average, which stands at 72.2% and 78%. If we consider this in
conjunction with the low-fertility trend since the mid-1990s, we will see that this will
lead to a decrease in the working-age population of almost 1.5 million (6.2%), from
24 million in 2018 to about 22.5 in 2030.6 At the same time, the forecasts of the
Central Statistical Office indicate that as Polish society grows older, the share of
people of post-productive age will increase, to 24.5% (9.1 million) in 2035 and to
32.7% (11 million) in 2050. In addition, this trend will be compounded by the
number of retirees following the reduction (as of October 2017) of the retirement age
for women to 60 and that of men to 65.
Another factor making the situation worse is the large number of young Poles
(about 2.5 million) who have emigrated since Poland’s accession to the European
Union. All this is already posing a growing challenge for the Polish economy and
foreign policy as Poland is facing a growing need to open up its labor market to
workers from outside the EU, and this, in turn, implies the need to take steps to
liberalize the visa regime. With this in mind, after joining the EU in 2004, the Polish
government agreed to open the border for Ukrainians and to allow them to work both
officially and under the table. Reliable statistics are not available, but the number of
Ukrainians taking up work in Poland, mostly as hired employees, is estimated at
roughly 1.2 million.
Qualitative aspects of Poland’s demographic potential, such as ethnic and reli-
gious homogeneity, are also important for the state’s foreign policy. Since the end of
the Second World War, Poland has essentially been a nationally homogeneous
country, with ethnic Poles making up about 96% of the population. National
minorities are few in number and do not pose problems for the state’s foreign policy.
The largest minority groups are the Germans, Ukrainians, and Belarusians, followed
5
Population Projection 2014–2050, Central Statistical Office, Warsaw 2014, p. 162.
6
Comp. Hajec, M. (2015, November 24). Wpływ zmian demograficznych na rynek pracy w Polsce,
Rynek pracy w Polsce. https://rynekpracy.pl/artykuly/wplyw-zmian-demograficznych-na-rynek-
pracy-w-polsce. Accessed June 28, 2019.
by the Lithuanians, Czechs, and Slovaks. The human rights of those minorities are
guaranteed under many bilateral agreements and/or OSCE regulations. Working
economic migrants from Ukraine also benefit from the protections offered by
Polish law.
A special factor affecting the state’s foreign and security policy and politics in
general is the religiosity of society. The statistics available in Poland are not entirely
reliable, but it is commonly assumed that over 90% of Poles are Catholics and that
over 60% of them practice their faith “out of custom.”7 Given the positive role
played by the Catholic Church during Poland’s long struggle for independence and
in the communist period, the church continues to enjoy a very influential position in
society. Poland’s Catholic Church has become involved in politics and this involve-
ment is felt above all in various aspects of domestic policy (notably that affecting
education and the family), in which Polish church hierarchs—some of the most
conservative in the entire Catholic Church—effectively influence decisions taken by
the state. This is especially visible under right-wing conservative governments.
There are also examples of positive Church influence on political attitudes in society,
such as acceptance, under the influence of John Paul II (Karol Wojtyła), for Poland’s
accession to the European Union and calls by some bishops to accept immigrants
and refugees during the migration crisis of 2015–2016. Regrettably, such calls had a
negligible effect on social attitudes.
The importance of a state’s economic, scientific, and technical potential for its
foreign and security policy has to do with the fact that one of the basic aims of every
state’s policy is to create conditions in which the ever greater material and civiliza-
tional aspirations of society can be met. These needs form the assumptions for the
formulation of aims and tasks that also concern the state’s foreign policy, if only in
the form of seeking new partners for trade and economic cooperation. On the other
hand, economic potential is a very important factor affecting a state’s power and its
ability to exert influence on the international stage.8
Poland is a country with a medium level of GDP, which in 2017 amounted to
467,167 billion euros, or 3% of the EU’s overall GDP, and placed Poland in seventh
place in the EU. Poland’s per capita GDP measured in purchasing power parity
(PPP), according to IMF data, terms in 2019 exceeded 30,000 euros, placing Poland
in 22nd place within the EU, before Portugal, Hungary, Greece, Romania, Croatia,
and Bulgaria.9 Of all EU member states, Poland was least affected by the financial
crisis, which began in the fall of 2008. While in 2008, Polish year-to-year GDP grew
by 4.2%, and in 2009 by 2.8%, which was the greatest increase in Europe that year,
7
According to studies conducted by the Statistical Institute of the Catholic Church, in 2017
Catholics represented 91.3% of Poland’s population, while only 38.3% went to mass on Sunday.
See Krzyżak, T. (2019, January 9). Polacy są ciągle religijni, ale bierni. Rzeczpospolita.
8
Comp. Waltz, K.N. (1979). Theory of International Politics. Reding MA: Addison-Wesley
Company, p. 131.
9
World Economic Outlook, Washington, April 2019; Tempo rozwoju gospodarczego Polski na tle
Europy. https://www.locja.pl/raport-rynkowy/tempo-rozwoju-gospodarczego-polski-na-tle-
europy,142. Accessed June 28, 2019.
the EU as a whole suffering a drop of 4.3%. In subsequent years, Poland enjoyed

modest but systematic economic growth with a yearly average of 3.2%.10
Generally, it should be noted that the Polish economy has been growing system-
atically and in a stable manner ever since the country joined the EU and this has led
to increased living standards. In 2003, Polish per capita GDP in PPS terms amounted
to 48.8% of the EU-27 average, and by 2017 it had reached 70%. EU funds,
especially those granted as part of the Cohesion Policy, have played a decisive
role in this growth. Poland is the largest net beneficiary of EU funds: during the first
15 years of EU membership (2004–2019) Poland received 108 billion euros net from
the EU.11 EU membership and economic growth have greatly encouraged the influx
of foreign direct investment (FDI). Only during the first 10 years of its membership
in the EU, Poland attracted over 100 billion euros in the form of foreign direct
investments, a figure that grew to 159 billion euros by 2016.12 This flow continues,
but it has been threatened since the fall of 2015 by the Polish authorities’ breaking
the rule of law and the ensuing climate of uncertainty for foreign investors. This
could also contribute to the reduction of the EU funds for Poland in the EU’s
2021–2027 financial perspective.13
Poland’s weakness is its modest scientific and technical potential. Poland’s
spending on research and development as a portion of GDP in 2007 amounted to
0.57%, which placed Poland fifth to last among EU member states. This figure rose
to 0.97% in 2016, while the EU average amounted to 2.03%. This is definitely too
little, especially considering the underfunding in previous years. This state of affairs
augurs ill for the country’s long-term growth prospects. Even though the Polish
economy is quite flexible, if it is not based on innovation and new technologies, it
will not be able to compete on high-tech markets, not only with highly developed
countries like Finland and Germany, but also with countries whose level of eco-
nomic development is similar to Poland’s. This situation creates the necessity for the
country’s foreign policy to support efforts to increase the flow to Poland of structural
funds and programs from the EU and other international organizations; to support
the EU in its efforts to establish a common European research space leading to the
transfer of know-how within a network uniting world-class European scholars.
10
Real GDP growth rate—volume.
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab¼table&init¼1&language¼en&
pcode¼tec00115&plugin¼1. Accessed June 28, 2019.
11
Chabasiński, R. (2018, August 9). Ile pieniędzy Polska dostała od Unii Europejskiej przez cały
okres członkostwa? https://bezprawnik.pl/ile-pieniedzy-polska-dostala-od-unii/. Accessed June
28, 2019; Polska dostała 100 mld euro z UE. I to na czysto. Forbes, August 2, 2018. https://
www.forbes.pl/gospodarka/bilans-wplat-i-wyplat-polska-budzet-ue-od-2004-roku/qqnvmf6.
Accessed June 28, 2019.
12
Foreign direct investments in Poland. Polish Investment and Trade Agency, April 2018. https://
www.paih.gov.pl/poland_in_figures/foreign_direct_investment. Accessed June 28, 2019.
13
On January 17, 2019, the European Parliament adopted a resolution announcing that in the next
budgetary perspective (2021–2027) the transfer of EU funds would be conditional on respect of the
rule of law by Member States.
The state’s ability to build-up a modern military potential is intimately related to its
economic, scientific, and technical potential. The possession of such military poten-
tial provides military means to conduct foreign policy, and especially security policy.
In 2018, the size of Poland’s armed forces was approximately 144,100 soldiers,
including 12,000 soldiers in the National Reserve Forces. The Polish military
composed of 110,000 professional soldiers making up the Land Forces, the Air
Force, the Navy, the Special Forces, and the Military Police. The Territorial Defense
Force was formed in 2017, and by 2018 its units were 17,100 strong. Since 2002,
Poland’s expenditures on defense have amounted to 1.95% of the previous year’s
GDP. After the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine in 2014, Poland began to increase
its defense budget, and in 2018 it set aside 2.0% of GDP, or 10.4 billion USD, for
this purpose.14 The PiS government also took the political decision to increase
expenditures on defense and to increase the size of the Polish Armed Forces to
200,000 soldiers—130,000 professional soldiers, and the territorial defense units. In
2018, it decided to form a new division to reinforce defense in case of an attack from
the direction of Belarus. There is general agreement in the Polish Parliament on
increasing defense spending. On September 15, 2017, the Sejm voted—with one
vote against and five abstentions—to increase such spending to 2.5% of GDP for
2030 and subsequent years. Polish leaders are declaring further increases in defense
spending. President Andrzej Duda announced that the 2.5% level would be reached
in 2024.15 There is no current national security strategy, however, and the present
government does not consider the November 2014 strategy as current.16
It is difficult to assess the combat capabilities of the Polish army. It undoubtedly
possesses great experience coming from its participation in UN peacekeeping mis-
sions (since 1953 in Korea), intervention in Iraq alongside the USA, in Afghanistan
as part of NATO forces and in several foreign military missions of the European
Union. Poland has earned a good reputation during these foreign missions and
operations. However, due to a political decision taken in 2008, the following year
Poland withdrew from the main UN peacekeeping operations. This was an erroneous
decision through which Poland did not increase its capability to defend its territory,
but reduced its ability to provide its soldiers with practical training during crisis.
In addition to military training, it is very important to provide the army with
equipment meeting the requirements adequate for envisaged actions (defense and crisis
response) and compatible with modern communication systems. Things are not well in
this respect, and the combat capabilities of the Polish army are restricted by the absence
of certain types of weapons, which are indispensable on a modern battlefield. These
14
Podstawowe informacje o budżecie resortu obrony narodowej na 2018 r. https://archiwum2019.
mon.gov.pl/d/pliki/dokumenty/rozne/2018/02/budzet2018.pdf. Accessed June 28, 2019.
15
Prezydent: Polska mogłaby wydawać na wojsko 2,5 proc. PKB już w 2024 roku. PAP. August
15, 2018. https://businessinsider.com.pl/finanse/prezydent-andrzej-duda-25-proc-pkb-na-
obronnosc-w-2024-r/2n9ztq4. Accessed June 28, 2019. Those are enormous expenditures of
about 115 billion PLN (31 billion USD) a year, and could be used to address many other issues,
like the underfunded health care and education systems, research and development, etc.
16
National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland (2014). Warsaw: National Security Bureau.
include combat helicopters, combat drones, a tight air defense, and some naval
components. There are several obstacles to overcome in order to modernize Poland’s
armaments. The first is the fact that its own defense industry is being rebuilt following
its collapse in the early 1990s and it is not able to provide the armed forces with the
modern equipment it needs. Secondly, arms purchases abroad are extremely expensive.
Moreover, Poland gives into US pressure to purchase American equipment and
the choices that Polish leaders themselves make are often based on political criteria
instead of technical and military considerations when they consider American offers.
This entails very high costs and, in addition, leads to dependence on the main
weapons supplier chosen. For example, having chosen to purchase multipurpose
F-16s in 2003, Poland was obligated, as it were, to follow it up with successive
purchases of armaments (such as air-soil JASSM missiles) for them from the same
supplier. Poland, like many other EU member states, officially calls for the building
of a European defense industry and an integrated supply market, but usually rejects
offers from European firms and chooses American ones.
2.2 Polish Foreign and Security Policy’s Immersion

in History
2.2.1 Selective Historical Memory and the Theory of Two

Enemies
Polish foreign and security policy is strongly influenced by historical factors. First
among them is a selective memory of historical experiences involving relations with
neighboring or more distant countries. The Polish political and intellectual elites tend
to emphasize primarily negative experiences, wars, the persecution of Poles and the
numerous Polish victims who died in defense of their country. This is especially the
case with regard to Poland’s relations with its two largest neighbors, Russia and
Germany. Memories of anything negative connected with them, along with descrip-
tions of the numerous wrongs suffered by Poland at their hands, are transmitted from
generation to generation. Such a portrayal of history is meant to depict Poles as victims
on the one hand, and their heroism in a succession of defensive wars on the other. This
tendentious view of Polish-Russian and Polish–German relations is also the back-
ground from which the theory of two enemies—Russia and Germany—derives. In this
theory, Poland is presented as the victim of its two neighbors.17 The “victim
17
Interestingly, at the end of the eighteenth Century, Poland as a state was wiped off the map by
three European powers—Prussia, Russia and Austria. During the partition period, Poles were
treated most generously by this third power, which did not subject them to the brutal policy of
de-polonization. This probably meant that Austria (from 1867 Austro-Hungary) was not seen by the
Polish elite as Poland’s third enemy. In any case, the greatest harm done to Poles was that done
during World War II by Nazi Germany and the Stalinist Soviet Union.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
large room originally used for breakfasting parties, continued in
existence for many years, and was not pulled down till 1865.
[Walford, v. 45., ff.; Walpole’s Letters, ii. 212, 23 June, 1750; The
Connoisseur, No. 68, 15 May, 1755; Low Life, 1764; Davis’s
Knightsbridge, 253, ff.; Notes and Queries, 3rd ser. viii. 166; Angelo’s
Picnic (1834), s.v.]
VIEWS.
1. The north front of Jenny’s Whim Bridge and the Old Public
House at the foot of the Bridge, water colour drawing, 1761. Crace,
Cat. p. 311, No. 58.
2. “A west view of Chelsea Bridge” (showing Jenny’s Whim).
Boreman pinx. Lodge sculp. (1761), W. Coll.; Crace, Cat. p. 311, No.
59 (cp. Walford, v. 43).
CROMWELL’S GARDENS,
Afterwards FLORIDA GARDENS, BROMPTON
Cromwell’s Gardens consisted of grounds immediately adjoining

(and perhaps at one time belonging to) Hale House, Brompton, a
mansion popularly known as Cromwell House from a tradition,
seemingly unfounded, that the Protector or his family had once
resided there. Some of the entrance tickets of Cromwell’s Gardens
consisted of rude imitations of Oliver’s pattern-shillings, and had his
effigy on the obverse.
The Gardens were in existence at least as early as 1762,[248] and
in 1776 they are described as frequented by fashionable gentlemen
of Kensington and the West End, and by various ladies who were
apparently not always of irreproachable character. Brompton was
then and long afterwards in the midst of gardens and nurseries, and
was noted for its salubrious air. Cromwell’s Gardens were within a
pleasant rural walk from the Park, Chelsea and Knightsbridge. The
grounds were neatly kept: there were “agreeable” arbours for
drinking tea and coffee, and in one part of the garden trees, curiously
cut, surrounded an elevated grass plat. Their retired situation
rendered them (in the opinion of the “Sunday Rambler”) “well
adapted for gallantry and intrigue.”
Music of some kind seems to have been provided, and at one
time equestrian performances in the open air were exhibited by
Charles Hughes, the well-known rider, who in 1782 founded with
Dibdin the Royal Circus, afterwards the Surrey Theatre. The
admission was sixpence,[249] and the gardens were open at least as
late as nine at night.[250]
In 1781 (or 1780) the gardens were in the hands of Mr. R. Hiem, a
German florist, who grew his cherries, strawberries, and flowers
there. About that time he changed the name to Florida Gardens,[251]
erected a great room for dining in the centre of the gardens, and
opened the place to the public at a charge of sixpence. A bowling-
green was formed and a band (said to be subscribed for by the
nobility and gentry) played twice a week during the summer. An air-
balloon and fireworks were announced for 10 September, 1784. It
was a pleasant place where visitors could gather flowers, and fruit
“fresh every hour in the day,” and take the light refreshment of tea,
coffee, and ice creams, or wine and cyder if they preferred it. Hiem
specially recommended his Bern Veckley as “an elegant
succedaneum for bread and butter, and eat by the Noblesse of
Switzerland.” However, like many proprietors of pleasure-gardens,
he subsequently became bankrupt, between 1787 and 1797 (?).
Maria, Duchess of Gloucester, having procured a lease (before
September 1797)[252] of the place, built there a villa, at first called
Maria Lodge, then Orford Lodge, at which she died in 1807. Shortly
after 1807 the premises consisting of about six acres were
purchased by the Rt. Hon. George Canning, who changed the name
of the house to Gloucester Lodge, and lived there for many years.
The house was pulled down about 1850 and the ground let on
building leases. Part of Courtfield Road, Ashburn Place, and perhaps
other streets, occupy the site of Gloucester Lodge which stood
immediately south of the present Cromwell Road, and west of
Gloucester Road near the point where the Gloucester Road
intersects Cromwell Road.
[Sunday Ramble (1776); A Modern Sabbath (1797), chap. vii.;
Faulkner’s Kensington (1820), pp. 438, 441; Lysons’s Environs,
supplement to first ed. (1811), p. 215; Wheatley, London P. and P. s.v.
“Cromwell House” and “Gloucester Lodge”; Fores’s New Guide
(1789), preface, p. vi.; The Public Advertiser, 10 July, 1789; The
Morning Herald, 7 July, 1786; and newspaper cuttings in W. Coll.]
VIEWS.
There seem to be no views of the Cromwell and Florida Gardens.
There is a view of the garden front of Gloucester Lodge in Jerdan’s
Autobiography (1852), vol. ii. frontispiece.
VI
SOUTH LONDON GROUP

BERMONDSEY SPA GARDENS
The Bermondsey Spa Gardens owe such celebrity as they

attained to the enterprise of their founder and proprietor, Thomas
Keyse, a self-taught artist, born in 1722, who painted skilful
imitations of still life and exhibited pictures at the Royal Academy.
About 1765 he purchased the Waterman’s Arms, a tavern in
Bermondsey, together with some waste ground adjoining, and
opened the place as a tea-garden, exhibiting there a collection of his
own pictures. At that time, and for several years in the present
century, Bermondsey was surrounded by open country.
About 1770 a chalybeate spring was discovered in the grounds,
and Keyse’s establishment thereupon acquired the name of the
Bermondsey Spa Gardens. Keyse was a cheery, ingenious landlord,
remarkable among other things for his preparation of cherry-brandy.
In 1784 he obtained a license for music from the Surrey magistrates,
and spent £4,000 in improvements. The gardens (covering not less
than four acres) were opened during the summer months on week-
day evenings and Sundays, and the price of admission on week-
days was a shilling. Each visitor was, however, given on entering a
metal check,[253] which was exchanged for refreshments to the
extent of sixpence. On special occasions the admission was half-a-
crown or three shillings.
In the gardens were the usual arbours and benches for tea-
drinking. The space before the orchestra was about a quarter of the
size of that at Vauxhall, and on the north-east of the garden was a
lawn of about three acres. A row of trees leading from the entrance
to the picture gallery was hung at night with lamps of red, blue,
green, and white, in humble imitation of the Grand Walk at Vauxhall.
[254]
Jonas Blewitt, one of the most distinguished organists of the latter

half of the eighteenth century, composed the music of many songs
for the entertainments at the Spa.[255] The Spa poets were Mr. J.
Oakman and Mr. Harriss. Songs of hunting, drinking, and seafaring
took their turn with ditties full of what may be described as sprightly
sentiment. The other music[256] consisted of burlettas, duets, and
interludes, performed by vocalists of only local fame. In a burletta
called the ‘Friars,’ certain nuns who had been forced by wicked
guardians to take the veil, make their escape with the assistance of
two friars. These reverend men, after singing an anacreontic song,
divide the gold which the ladies have given them as their reward,
and the whole concludes with a chorus. The words of the burlettas
and songs were printed in little books, sold for sixpence at the bar
and in the exhibition room.[257]
An occasional display of fireworks took place, and the gardens
and a cascade (introduced about 1792) were illuminated.[258] From
time to time there was a representation of the Siege of Gibraltar by
means of fireworks, transparencies and bomb shells.[259] The
apparatus for the Siege, which was designed by Keyse himself, was
set up in a field divided from the lawn by a sunk fence, the rock
being fifty feet high and two hundred feet long. The blowing up of the
floating batteries and the sinking of boats in ‘fictitious water’ were
(we are assured) ‘so truly represented as to give a very strong idea
of the real Siege.’
A permanent attraction was the Gallery of Paintings, an oblong
room described as being about the same size as W. M. Turner’s
studio in Queen Anne’s Street. Here were exhibited Keyse’s pictorial
reproductions of a Butcher’s Shop and a Greengrocer’s Stall and
many other paintings, including a Vesuvius, and a candle that looked
as if it were really lighted.
On the whole, the Bermondsey Spa appears to have been a
respectable, though hardly fashionable, resort, which brought its
proprietor a moderate income and supplied harmless, if not very
exalted, means of recreation.
It being not unnecessary to provide for the safe convoy of the
visitors after nightfall, Keyse inserted the following advertisement in
the newspapers:—“The Spa Gardens, in Grange Road,
Bermondsey, one mile [the distance is rather understated] from
London Bridge; for the security of the public the road is lighted and
watched by patroles every night, at the sole expense of the
proprietor.” The lighting and patrolling were probably somewhat
mythical, but no doubt the announcement served to reassure the
timid.
J. T. Smith, the author of A Book for a Rainy Day, has left a
graphic description of a visit that he paid on a bright July evening of
1795. The popularity of the gardens was then waning, and on
entering he found no one there but three idle waiters. A board with a
ruffled hand within a sky-blue painted sleeve directed him to the
staircase which led “To the Gallery of Paintings,” and he made a
solitary tour of the room.
The rest of the visit may be described in Smith’s own words.
“Stepping back to study the picture of the ‘Greenstall,’ I ask your
pardon,’ said I, for I had trodden upon some one’s toes. ‘Sir, it is
granted,’ replied a little, thick-set man, with a round face, arch look,
and closely-curled wig, surmounted by a small three-cornered hat
put very knowingly on one side, not unlike Hogarth’s head in his print
of the ‘Gates of Calais.’ ‘You are an artist, I presume; I noticed you
from the end of the gallery, when you first stepped back to look at my
best picture. I painted all the objects in this room from nature and still
life.’ ‘Your Greengrocer’s Shop,’ said I, ‘is inimitable; the drops of
water on that savoy appear as if they had just fallen from the
element. Van Huysum could not have pencilled them with greater
delicacy.’ ‘What do you think,’ said he, ‘of my Butcher’s Shop?’ ‘Your
pluck is bleeding fresh, and your sweetbread is in a clean plate.’
‘How do you like my bull’s eye?’ ‘Why, it would be a most excellent
one for Adams or Dollond to lecture upon. Your knuckle of veal is the
finest I ever saw.’ ‘It’s young meat,’ replied he; ‘anyone who is a
judge of meat can tell that from the blueness of its bone.’ ‘What a
beautiful white you have used on the fat of that Southdown leg! or is
it Bagshot?’ ‘Yes,’ said he, ‘my solitary visitor, it is Bagshot: and as
for my white, that is the best Nottingham, which you or any artist can
procure at Stone & Puncheon’s, in Bishopsgate Street Within.’ ‘Sir
Joshua Reynolds,’ continued Mr. Keyse, ‘paid me two visits. On the
second, he asked me what white I had used; and when I told him, he
observed, ‘It’s very extraordinary, sir, how it keeps so bright. I use the
same.’ ‘Not at all, sir,’ I rejoined: ‘the doors of this gallery are open
day and night; and the admission of fresh air, together with the great
expansion of light from the sashes above, will never suffer the white
to turn yellow. Have you not observed, Sir Joshua, how white the
posts and rails on the public roads are, though they have not been
repainted for years; that arises from constant air and bleaching.’
‘Come,’ said Mr. Keyse, putting his hand upon my shoulder, ‘the bell
rings, not for prayers, nor for dinner, but for the song.’
“As soon as we had reached the orchestra, the singer curtsied to
us, for we were the only persons in the gardens. ‘This is sad work,’
said he, ‘but the woman must sing, according to our contract.’ I
recollect that the singer was handsome, most dashingly dressed,
immensely plumed, and villainously rouged; she smiled as she sang,
but it was not the bewitching smile of Mrs. Wrighten, then applauded
by thousands at Vauxhall Gardens. As soon as the Spa lady had
ended her song, Keyse, after joining me in applause, apologised for
doing so, by observing that as he never suffered his servants to
applaud, and as the people in the road (whose ears were close to
the cracks in the paling to hear the song) would make a bad report if
they had not heard more than the clapping of one pair of hands, he
had in this instance expressed his reluctant feelings. As the lady
retired from the front of the orchestra, she, to keep herself in
practice, curtsied to me with as much respect as she would had
Colonel Topham been the patron of a gala-night. ‘This is too bad,’
again observed Mr. Keyse, ‘and I am sure you cannot expect
fireworks!’ However, he politely asked me to partake of a bottle of
Lisbon, which upon my refusing, he pressed me to accept of a
catalogue of his pictures.”
Keyse died in his house at the Gardens on 8 February, 1800[260]
and his pictures were subsequently sold by auction. His successors
in the management of the Bermondsey Spa failed to make it pay,[261]
and it was closed about 1804.[262] The Site, now in Spa Road, was
afterwards built upon.
[Lysons’s Environs, vol. i. (1792), p. 558; Smith’s Book for a Rainy
Day, p. 135, ff. under “1795”; G. W. Phillips’s History and Antiquities of
Bermondsey, 1841, pp. 84, 85; Dict. Nat. Biog. art. “Keyse”; Walford,
vi. 128, 129; Histories of Surrey; E. L. Blanchard in the Era Almanack
for 1870, p. 18; Rendle and Norman’s Inns of Old Southwark, pp.
394–396; A Modern Sabbath (1797), chap. ix.; Kearsley’s Strangers’
Guide to London (1793?); Fores’s New Guide (1789), preface, p. vi.;
Picture of London, 1802, p. 370, where “the pictures of the late Mr.
Keys” are mentioned; “Public Gardens” Coll. in Guildhall Library,
London; Description of some of the Paintings in the Perpetual
Exhibition at Bermondsey Spa, Horselydown (circ. 1785?) 8vo. (W.
Coll.). Song-books (words only) of Bermondsey Spa, W. Coll.]
VIEWS.
A pen and ink sketch of Bermondsey Spa and a portrait of Keyse
were in J. H. Burn’s Collection, and at his sale at Puttick’s were
bought by Mr. Gardner (Notes and Queries, 6th ser. i. 506).
ST. HELENA GARDENS, ROTHERHITHE
These gardens were opened in 1770, and in May 1776 music and
dancing were advertised to take place there in the evenings.
Towards the close of the century the Prince of Wales (George IV.)
and various fashionable people are said to have occasionally visited
the place. St. Helena’s was a good deal frequented as a tea-garden
during the first thirty years of the nineteenth century,[263] chiefly by
the dockyard population of the neighbourhood. In 1831 fireworks and
other entertainments were introduced on the week-day evenings and
the place was for some years styled the Eastern Vauxhall. In 1832
the gardens occupied about five acres and a half, and in this year
the performers advertised included Mr. G. R. Chapman “from the
Adelphi and Astley’s” as organist and musical director, Mrs. Venning,
“from the Nobility’s Concerts,” Miss Wood, “the Infant Prodigy, only
six years of age,” and Miss Taylor who performed “many difficult airs
on that delightful instrument, the Musical Glasses.” Concerts,
dancing and other amusements continued till about 1869 when the
gardens appear to have been closed.
St. Helena Tavern and Tea Gardens.
Rotherhithe.
In 1874, the gardens passed into the hands of Messrs. W. H. and
J. R. Carter who erected an orchestra and a dancing platform, and
provided music and fireworks for an admission of sixpence. The
gardens had fallen into a neglected state, but the walks were once
more well laid out, and the old chestnut trees, the elms and planes
were still standing.
ORCHESTRA AND DANCING-PLATFORM, ST. HELENA GARDENS, circ. 1875.
The gardens ceased to exist in 1881 and were eventually built
over.[264] The site was to the west of Deptford Lower Road, and just
south of Corbett’s Lane and the present St. Helena Road. St.
Katharine’s Church (consecrated 18 October, 1884) in Eugenia Road
(south of St. Helena Road) stands on part of the site.
[Newspaper cuttings, W. Coll.; and see notes.]
VIEWS.
1. The entrance to the St. Helena Tavern and tea-garden, water-
colour drawing, signed R. B. 7 June, 1839 (W. Coll.).
2. Admission ticket in white metal. Size 1·5 inch. Nineteenth
century, circ. 1839? (British Museum). Obverse: View of the entrance
to the tavern and gardens (similar to No. 1); in foreground, two posts
supporting semi-circular board inscribed “St. Helena Tavern and Tea
Gardens. Dinners dress’d”: in exergue, “Rotherhithe.” Reverse:
“Refreshment to the value of sixpence” within floral wreath.
3. Lithographed poster of the St. Helena Gardens, circ. 1875,
showing the orchestra, dancing-platform, and gardens illuminated at
night (W. Coll.).
FINCH’S GROTTO GARDENS
Finch’s Grotto Gardens situated on the western side of St.

George’s Street, Southwark, near St. George’s Fields,[265] derived
their name from Thomas Finch, a Herald Painter, who, having
inherited from a relation a house and garden, opened both for the
entertainment of the public in the spring of 1760. The garden
possessed some lofty trees, and was planted with evergreens and
shrubs. In the centre was a medicinal spring over which Finch
constructed a grotto, wherein a fountain played over artificial
embankments and formed “a natural and beautiful cascade.” The
spring enjoyed some local celebrity, and was recommended to his
patients by a doctor named Townshend, who resided in the
Haymarket and afterwards in St. George’s Fields. In our own time Dr.
Rendle has described the water as “merely the filtered soakage of a
supersaturated soil,” which could be obtained almost anywhere in
Southwark.
A subscription ticket of a guinea entitled the holder to such
benefits, as Finch’s spring conferred and gave admission to the
evening entertainments that were introduced from about 1764. The
ordinary admission was a shilling, raised on special nights to two
shillings. The gardens were open on Sunday when sixpence was
charged, though the visitor was entitled for his money to tea, half a
pint of wine, cakes, jelly or cyder.
ADMISSION TICKET, FINCH’S
GROTTO.
An orchestra containing an organ by Pike, of Bloomsbury, stood in
the garden, and there was another orchestra attached to a large
octagonal music-room decorated with paintings and festoons of
flowers. This Octagon Room was used for occasional balls and for
the promenade and concert on wet evenings.
The place appears to have been respectably conducted, but there
is little evidence that it was ever a modish resort, in spite of the
assertion of the country-bred Mrs. Hardcastle[266] that no one could
“have a manner that has never seen the Pantheon, the Grotto
Gardens, the Borough and such places where the nobility chiefly
resort.”[267]
The vocal and instrumental concerts which took place every
evening in the season (May-September) were of a creditable though
not very ambitious character. About fifteen hundred persons are said
to have been present on some of the Freemasons’ nights and on the
benefit nights of the performers.
Mrs. Baddely.
Numerous singers and instrumentalists were engaged,[268] of
whom the best known are Robert Hudson the organist, Miss Snow
and Thomas Lowe. Sophia Snow, the daughter of Valentine Snow,
sergeant trumpeter to the King, married Robert Baddeley the
comedian, who introduced her to the stage at Drury Lane in 1765. As
Mrs. Baddeley, she became notorious for her beauty and intrigues.
She had some powers as an actress in genteel comedy and her
melodious voice made her popular at Ranelagh (from 1770) and
Vauxhall.
Lowe was the well-known tenor singer of Vauxhall and lessee of
Marylebone Gardens from 1763 to 1768. Becoming bankrupt in
1768, he was glad to accept engagements at the humbler Finch’s
Grotto. He was announced to sing in August 1769, and appeared
under the designation of Brother Lowe at one of the Freemasons’
Concerts at the Grotto.
Finch died on October 23, 1770, and his successor, a Mr.
Williams, advertised the place as Williams’s Grotto Gardens. The
concerts were continued and among the musical entertainments
were Bates’s “The Gamester” (1771) and Barnshaw’s “Linco’s
Travels.”[269]
The programmes of entertainments under Finch and Williams
included concertos on the organ, pieces for horns and clarionets,
Handel’s Coronation Anthem, an Ode to Summer with music by
Brewster, and songs, such as “Thro’ the Wood, Laddie”; “Water
parted from the Sea”; “Oh what a charming thing is a Battle”; “British
Wives”; “O’er Mountains and Moorlands”; “Cupid’s Recruiting
Sergeant” (with drum and fife accompaniment); “Swift Wing’d
Vengeance,” from Bates’s Pharnaces; “Shepherds cease your soft
complainings;” a satirical song on Garrick’s Stratford Jubilee; “Hark,
hark, the joy inspiring horn”; “The Season of Love,” sung by Mr.
Dearle, (1765):—
Bright Sol is return’d and the Winter is o’er,
O come then, Philander, with Sylvia away.[270]
Fireworks were occasionally displayed, and when a ball was

given, the place was illuminated at a cost of about five pounds, and
horns and clarionets played till twelve in the garden. In 1771 and
1772 a grand transparent painting forty feet wide and thirty high, with
illuminations, was displayed. Over the centre arch of this
masterpiece was a medallion of Neptune supported by Tritons: on
each side were two fountains “with serpents jetting water,
representing different coloured crystal.” On one wing was Neptune
drawn by sea-horses; on the other, Venus rising from the sea; and
the back arches showed a distant prospect of the sea. In June 1771
a representation was given “of the famous Fall of Water call’d Pystill
Rhiader near the seat of Sir Watkin Williams Wynne, Bart., in
Denbighshire.”
Apparently these entertainments failed to pay the proprietor and in
1773 (?) he pulled down the grotto over the spring and rooted up the
shrubs to form a skittle ground in connection with the tavern, which
still continued to be carried on.
About 1777 the “messuages and lands known as the Grotto
Gardens” were purchased for the parish of St. Saviour’s, Southwark,
part of the ground being used for the erection of a workhouse and
part for a Burial Ground (consecrated in 1780). In 1799 the
Workhouse was sold to Mr. John Harris, hat manufacturer, and M.P.
for Southwark in 1830, who used it as his manufactory and
residence. Some relics of the old Grotto were to be found many
years after the closing of the Gardens, notably the Octagon Room,
which was converted into a mill and at one time used as the armoury
of the Southwark Volunteers.
In 1824 “a very large and old mulberry tree” was standing at the
end of a long range of wooden tea-rooms formerly belonging to the
gardens and converted into inferior cottages. Behind the cottages
was a water-course derived from Loman’s Pond dividing them from a
field, once part of the gardens, though only occupied at that time by
dust and rubbish.
The tavern attached to the Gardens continued to be carried on
under the sign of the Grotto till 28 May, 1795, when it was destroyed
by fire. The new tavern erected in its place bore the sign of The
Goldsmith’s Arms, and afterwards of the “Old Grotto new reviv’d.”
In the front of this house was inserted a stone bearing the
inscription:—
Here Herbs did grow
And Flowers sweet,
But now ’tis call’d
Saint George’s Street.[271]
This building was removed for the formation of the present

Southwark Bridge Road in 1825 and a public house named The
Goldsmith’s Arms—still standing—was built on the western side of
the new road, more upon the site of the old Grotto Gardens. The
main site of the gardens is now occupied by the large red-brick
building, which forms the headquarters of the Metropolitan Fire
Brigade.
[Wilkinson’s Londina Illustrata, vol. ii., “Finch’s Grotto Gardens”;
Manning and Bray’s Surrey, iii. 591; Brayley and Mantell’s Surrey, v.
371; Rendle and Norman’s Inns of Old Southwark, 360–364; Walford,
vi. 64; newspaper cuttings, W. Coll.]
VIEWS.
The only view is one of the second tavern published in Wilkinson’s
Londina Illustrata, 1825:—
“South-east view of the Grotto, now the Goldsmith’s Arms in the
Parish of St. George’s, Southwark.” This shows the inscription: “Here
Herbs did grow.”
CUPER’S GARDENS
Cuper’s Gardens, a notable resort during the first half of the last
century, owe their name and origin to Boyder Cuper, who rented, in
the parish of Lambeth on the south side of the Thames opposite
Somerset House, a narrow strip of meadow land surrounded by
water-courses.
About 1691 or earlier he opened the place as a pleasure garden
with agreeable walks and arbours and some good bowling-greens.
As an old servant of the Howard family he obtained the gift of some
of the statues that had been removed when Arundel House in the
Strand was pulled down. These, though mutilated and headless,
appeared to the proprietor to give classic distinction to his garden,
and they remained there till 1717, when his successor, a John
Cuper, sold these ‘Arundel Marbles’ for £75.[272]
During the first twenty or thirty years of the last century, Cuper’s
was a good deal frequented in the summer-time. A tavern by the
waterside, called The Feathers, was connected with the grounds.
It is not certain that music and dancing were provided at this
period, and the company appears to have consisted chiefly of young
attorneys’ clerks and Fleet Street sempstresses, with a few City
dames, escorted by their husbands’ ’prentices, who (perhaps after
paying a visit to the floating ‘Folly’) sat in the arbours singing,
laughing, and regaling themselves with bottle-ale.[273]
The place was popularly known as Cupid’s Gardens, and is even
thus denominated in maps of the last century. This name is
preserved in the traditional song, once very popular, “’Twas down in
Cupid’s Garden”:—
’Twas down in Cupid’s Garden
For pleasure I did go,
To see the fairest flowers
That in that garden grow:
The first it was the jessamine,
The lily, pink and rose,
And surely they’re the fairest flowers
That in that garden grows.[274]
In 1738 the tavern and gardens were taken by Ephraim Evans, a

publican who had kept the Hercules Pillars opposite St. Dunstan’s
Church, Fleet Street. During his tenancy (1738–1740) he improved
the gardens and erected an orchestra in which was set up an organ
by Bridge. A band played from six till ten and Jones, the blind Welsh
harper, was engaged to perform selections from Handel and Corelli.
The admission was then and thenceforward one shilling, and the
gardens were opened on Sunday free of charge.[275] It was
announced that care would be taken to keep out bad company and
that no servant in livery would be admitted to walk in the garden.
View of the Savoy, Somerset House and the Water entrance to
Cuper’s Garden.
From a picture in the Collection of
The Revd. Philip Duval, D.D. & F.A.S.
There was a back way to the gardens leading from St. George’s
Fields, and watchmen were appointed “to guard those who go over
the fields late at night.” The favourite approach, however, was by
water, and the visitors landed at Cuper’s Stairs, a few yards east of
the present Waterloo Bridge. The season lasted from April or May till
the beginning of September.
Evans died on 14 October, 1740,[276] but the tavern and gardens
were carried on by his widow. It was under the spirited management
of the widow Evans that Cuper’s Gardens especially flourished, and
her advertisements figure frequently in the newspapers (1741–
1759). ‘The Widow,’ as she was called, presided at the bar during
the evening and complimentary visitors described her as “a woman
of discretion” and “a well-looking comely person.” By providing good
music and elaborate fireworks, she attracted a good deal of
fashionable patronage. The Prince and Princess of Wales visited the
place and some of Horace Walpole’s friends,[277] Lord Bath and Lord
Sandys, for instance, both of whom had their pockets picked there.
The well-dressed sharper was, in fact, by no means unknown at
Cuper’s. One night in 1743 a man was caught stealing from a young
lady a purse containing four guineas, and while being taken by a
constable to Lambeth was rescued by a gang of thieves in St.
George’s Fields. On the whole, Cuper’s was looked upon as a
decidedly rakish place at which a prudent young lady was not to be
seen alone with a gentleman.[278]
For the evening concert of 16 June, 1741, Mrs. Evans announced
“a new grand concerto for the organ by the author, Mr. Henry
Burgess, junior, of whom it may be said without ostentation that he is
of as promising a genius and as neat a performer as any of the age.”
Composers better known to fame than Mr. Henry Burgess, junior,
were also represented. The programme, for instance, of one July
evening in 1741 consisted of “The Overture in Saul, with several
grand choruses composed by Mr. Handel”; the eighth concerto of
Corelli; a hautboy concerto by Sig. Hasse; “Blow, blow thou wintry
wind,” and other favourite songs composed by the ingenious Mr.
Arne, and the whole concluded with a new grand piece of music, an
original composition by Handel, called ‘Portobello,’ in honour of the
popular hero, Admiral Vernon, “who took Portobello with six ships
only.” On other occasions there were vocal performances (1748–
1750) by Signora Sibilla and by Master Mattocks. The Signora was
Sibilla Gronamann, daughter of a German pastor and the first wife of
Thomas Pinto, the violinist. She died in or before 1766. Mattocks,
who had “a sweet and soft voice,” was afterwards an operatic actor
at Covent Garden. Mrs. Mattocks sang at the gardens in 1750.
After the concert, at half-past nine or ten, a gun gave the signal
for the fireworks for which the place was renowned.
On 18 July, 1741, the Fire Music from Handel’s opera, “Atalanta,”
was given, the fireworks consisting of wheels, fountains, large sky-
rockets, “with an addition of the fire-pump, &c., made by the
ingenious Mr. Worman, who originally projected it for the opera”
when performed in 1736. The Daily Advertiser for 28 June, 1743,
announced that “this night will be burnt the Gorgon’s head ... in
history said to have snakes on her hair and to kill men by her looks,
such a thing as was never known to be done in England before.” For
another night (4 September, 1749) the entertainment was
announced to conclude with “a curious and magnificent firework,
which has given great satisfaction to the nobility, wherein Neptune
will be drawn on the canal by sea-horses and set fire to an
Archimedan (sic) worm and return to the Grotto.”
In 1746 (August 14) there was a special display to celebrate “the
glorious victory obtained over the rebels” by the Duke of
Cumberland, consisting of emblematic figures and magnificent
fireworks, with “triumphant arches burning in various colours.” In
1749 (May) there was a miniature reproduction with transparencies
and fireworks of the Allegorical Temple that had been displayed in
the Green Park on 27 April, 1749, to commemorate the peace of Aix-
la-Chapelle. At the opening of the gardens on April 30 for the season
of 1750, the edifice from which the fireworks were displayed was
altered “into an exact model of that at the Hague, made on account
of the General Peace.”
The season of 1752, practically the last at Cuper’s, lasted from
May till near the end of September. The principal vocalist was Miss
Maria Bennett.[279] The fireworks and scenic effects were novel and
elaborate. A song commemorating the Prince of Wales’s birthday
was “shown curiously in fireworks in the front of the machine.” The
fireworks building, when the curtain was withdrawn, disclosed a
perspective view of the city of Rhodes—sea, buildings, and
landscape, with a model of the Colossus, from under which Neptune
issued forth and set fire to a grand pyramid in the middle of the
canal. Dolphins spouted water; water-wheels and rockets threw up
air-balloons and suns blazed on the summit of the building.
On one occasion the crowd near the fireworks was so great that a
gentleman took up his position in a tree, and when St. George and
the Dragon came to a close engagement and the clockwork began to
move the arms of St. George to pierce the Dragon, he let go his
hands to clap like the rest and fell headlong upon the bystanders.
[280]
The ‘Inspector’ of the London Daily Advertiser took his friend the
old Major, to Cupid’s Gardens (as they were still called) on a
pleasant August evening in this year. The Major was delighted with
all he saw. “Now I like this. I am always pleased when I see other
people happy: the folks that are rambling about among the trees
there; the jovial countenances of them delight me ... here’s all the
festivity and all the harmless indulgence of a country wake.”[281]
The country wake element was in evidence late in the evening,
and constables stationed at the gate had occasionally to interfere.
One night, for instance, a pretty young woman, accompanied by a
friend, promenaded the gardens dressed as a man wearing a long
sword. No small sensation was caused in the miscellaneous
company, which included a physician, a templar, a berouged old lady
and her granddaughter, and the sedate wife of a Cheapside fur-
seller. “A spirited young thing with a lively air and smart cock of her
hat” passed by. “Gad,” said she, as she tripped along, “I don’t see
there’s anything in it; give us their cloathes and we shall look as
sharp and as rakish as they do.” “What an air! what a gate! what a
tread the baggage has!” exclaimed another.
But the days of Cuper’s were numbered. In the early part of 1752
the statute-book had been dignified by the addition of 25 George II.,
cap. 36, entitled, “An Act for the better preventing thefts and
robberies and for regulating places of public entertainment and
punishing persons keeping disorderly houses.” By section 2 of this
enactment it was required that every house, room, garden, or other
place kept for public dancing or music, &c., within the cities of
London and Westminster, or twenty miles thereof, should be under a
licence. The Act took effect from December 1, 1752, and the
necessary licence for the season of 1753 was refused to the
management of Cuper’s Gardens. The widow Evans complained
bitterly that she was denied the liberty of opening her gardens, a
misfortune attributed by her to the malicious representations of ill-
meaning persons, but which was really owing, no doubt, to the
circumstance that Cuper’s was degenerating into the place which
Pennant says he remembered as the scene of low dissipation.
Meanwhile Mrs. Evans threw open the grounds (June 1753) as a
tea-garden in connection with the Feathers, and the walks were
“kept in pleasant order.”
In the summer of 1755 entertainments of the old character were
revived, but they were advertised as fifteen private evening concerts
and fireworks, open only to subscribers, a one guinea ticket
admitting two persons. It is to be suspected that the subscription was
mythical, and was a mere device to evade the Act. However, a band
was engaged, and on June 23 loyal visitors to Cuper’s
commemorated the accession of King George to the throne by a
concert and fireworks. Clitherow, who had been the engineer of
Cuper’s fireworks from 1750 (or earlier), was again employed, but
had to publish in the newspapers a lame apology for the failure of
the Engagement on the Water on the night of August 2 (1755), a
failure which he explained was not due to his want of skill but “owing
to part of the machinery for moving the shipping being clogg’d by
some unaccountable accident, and the powder in the ships having
unfortunately got a little damp.”
From 1756–1759 Cuper’s Gardens were again used as the tea-
garden of the Feathers. There was no longer a Band of Musick but
(as the advertisements express it) “there still remains some harmony
from the sweet enchanting sounds of rural warblers.”
The last recorded entertainment at the place was a special
concert given on August 30, 1759 by “a select number of gentlemen
for their own private diversion,” who had “composed an ode alluding
to the late decisive action of Prince Ferdinand.” Any lady or
gentleman inspired by Prussian glory was admitted to this
entertainment on payment of a shilling.
For several years the gardens remained unoccupied, but from
about 1768 three acres of them were leased to the firm of Beaufoy,
the producers of British wines and vinegar. The orchestra, or rather
the edifice used from 1750 for the fireworks, was utilised for the
distillery. Dr. Johnson once passed by the gardens: “Beauclerk, I,
and Langton, and Lady Sydney Beauclerk, mother to our friend,
were one day driving in a coach by Cuper’s Gardens which were
then unoccupied. I, in sport, proposed that Beauclerk, and Langton,
and myself, should take them, and we amused ourselves with
scheming how we should all do our parts. Lady Sydney grew angry
and said, ‘An old man should not put such things in young people’s
heads.’ She had no notion of a joke, sir; had come late into life, and
had a mighty unpliable understanding.”[282]
PLAN OF CUPER’S GARDENS.
J. T. Smith[283] tells us that he walked over the place when

occupied by the Beaufoys, and saw many of the old lamp-irons along
the paling of the gardens, humble reminders of the days when the
walks of Cuper’s Gardens were “beautifully illuminated with lamp-
trees in a grand taste, disposed in proper order.” In 1814 part of the
ground was required for making the south approach to Waterloo
Bridge. The “fireworks” building and the rest of Messrs. Beaufoys’
works were then taken down and the Waterloo Road, sixty feet in
width, was cut through the three acres, thus passing through the
centre of Cuper’s Gardens which had extended up to the site of the
present St. John’s Church (built in 1823) opposite Waterloo Station.
The Royal Infirmary for Children and Women erected in 1823 on
the eastern side of the Waterloo Road stands on (or rather over) the
centre of the site of the gardens. The Feathers was used during the
building of the bridge for the pay-table of the labourers, and when it
was taken down (about 1818?) its site was occupied by a timber-
yard, close to the eastern side of the first land-arch of the Waterloo
Bridge.
The public-house now called the Feathers, standing near the
Bridge and rising two stories above the level of the Waterloo Road
was built by the proprietor of the old Feathers in 1818.
[Wilkinson’s Londina Illustrata, vol. ii. “Cuper’s Gardens,” Public
Gardens Coll. in Guildhall Library, London (newspaper cuttings, &c.);
Charles Howard’s Historical Anecdotes of the Howard Family (1769),
98, ff.; Pennant’s Account of London, 3rd ed. 1793, 32–34; Musical
Times, February 1894, 84, ff.; Hone’s Every Day Book, i. 603; E.
Hatton’s New View of London, 1708, ii. 785; Lysons’s Environs, 1792,
i. 319, 320; Walford, vi. 388, 389; The Observator, March 10, 1702-3;
newspaper cuttings, W. Coll.]
VIEWS.
1. View of the Savoy, Somerset House, and the water entrance to
Cuper’s Gardens, engraved by W. M. Fellows, 1808, in J. T. Smith’s
Antiquities of Westminster, from a painting (done in 1770, according to
Crace, Cat. 188, No. 219) by Samuel Scott.
2. Woodcuts in Walford, vi. 391, showing entrance to the gardens
(the back entrance) and the “orchestra” during the demolition of the
buildings; cp. ib. 390. Walford also mentions, ib. p. 388, a view
showing the grove, statues, and alcoves, of the gardens.
3. Water-colour drawings of Beaufoys’ and Cuper’s in 1798 and in
1809 (Crace, Cat. 648, Nos. 49, 50).
4. Wilkinson, Lond. Illust. (1825), vol. ii. gives three views, Pl. 155,
view of the Great Room as occupied for Beaufoys’ manufactory, with a
plan of the gardens; Pl. 156, another similar view; Pl. 157, view of the
old Feathers Tavern.

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