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Yanru Chen

Communication
Campaigns and
National Integration
in China’s Market
Economy Era
Reviving the National Soul
Communication Campaigns and National
Integration in China’s Market Economy Era
Yanru Chen

Communication Campaigns
and National Integration
in China’s Market
Economy Era
Reviving the National Soul

13
Yanru Chen
Xiamen University
Xiamen
China

ISBN 978-981-287-732-1 ISBN 978-981-287-733-8 (eBook)

DOI 10.1007/978-981-287-733-8

Library of Congress Control Number: 2015947415

Springer Singapore Heidelberg New York Dordrecht London

© Springer Science+Business Media Singapore 2016
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Contents

1 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 In Search of China’s National Soul: Is the Nation Falling Apart?. . . 5
1.2.1 Ideological Schism—Is There an Identity Crisis?. . . . . . . . . 6
1.2.2 Party-State-Nation: Consequences
of Structural Differentiation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.2.3 Historical Discontinuity—A Spiritual Vacuum. . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.2.4 Substantive Conflicts—Does the Nation
Seem Fair to All?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.3 Reaching the Soul of the Nation: Empirical Justification
for Study. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

2 Theoretical Foundations of the Study. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

2.1 Literature Review. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.1.1 Communication in National Development. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.1.2 Mass Mobilisation and National Integration:
The Role of Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.1.3 Mass Campaigns—an Old Topic, a New Perspective . . . . . . 28
2.2 Theoretical Horizons of the Study. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.2.1 An Overview of Prospect. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.2.2 Further Elaboration on Theoretical Significance
of the Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

3 Empirical Approaches to the Study. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

3.1 Again, What Is This Study?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.2 Approach to the Analysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.2.1 Why These Specific Cases?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

v
vi Contents

3.2.2 Main Sources of Data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

3.2.3 Basic Analytical Procedures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.3 Possible Outcomes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

4 A Nation in Action: Communication and China’s

Bid for Year 2000 Olympics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4.1 Introduction: A Moment of Experience of the Nation. . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4.2 Analysis: From the Bid to a Collective Experience of the Nation. . . 46
4.2.1 Nationalising a Wish for the Bid: The Media
as Articulator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.2.2 Declaring—Displaying National Will:
The Media as Facilitator. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.2.3 Demonstrating National Work: The Media as an
Integrating Interpreter. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.2.4 Final Presentation of Wish—Will—Work:
The Nation Experienced as One. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.2.5 Re-affirming National Strength and Redefining
National Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.3 Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

5 Beyond the Planned Campaign: Construction of the “Nation”

in the Bid for Olympics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
5.1 Awareness—Activation–Action: Constructing a “Nation” . . . . . . . . 83
5.1.1 Spreading Awareness, Stimulating
Participation—The Bid Links the Nation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
5.1.2 Activating Awareness of the Bid: Relating
the Individual to the Nation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
5.1.3 Action in Support of the Bid: Mass Participation
in the Nation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
5.1.4 Aligning All the Chinese: Projecting All-inclusiveness
of the Nation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
5.2 “The Whole China Is Mobilised”—Featured in Foreign Eyes. . . . . . 97
5.2.1 IOC’s Appreciation of Beijing’s Bid Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
5.2.2 IOC Members’ Quoted Impression of Beijing/China. . . . . . . 97
5.2.3 Reporting on the Other Bidding Cities: Beijing
Is Strong! . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
5.2.4 International Expressions of Support—Integrated
into National Strength . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.2.5 Covering Objections to Beijing: National
Will Re-affirmed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Contents vii

5.3 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

5.3.1 Defining the Nation: The Bid as a Process
of National Integration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.3.2 Idealism—Pragmatism–Idealism: Metamorphosis
of Promotional Thrust in Relation to the Nation. . . . . . . . . . 103
5.3.3 The Media’s Integrating Framework for Reporting
and Interpretation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

6 In Memory of Mao: Re-making a Nation Maker. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
6.1.1 The Emergence of Mao Craze in the 1990s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
6.2 The Commemoration: Integrating Straying Sentiments
Under One Head. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
6.2.1 Re-placing Mao’s Ideologies—Official Line:
Continuity from Mao to Deng . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
6.2.2 Re-interpreting Mao’s Ideologies—Academic Line
Integrated with Party Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
6.2.3 Re-enacting Mao’s Personal Image: Mao
and His People as One. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
6.2.4 Mass Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
6.3 Conclusions: Integrating Mao into Post-Mao China. . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
6.3.1 A Non-campaign Campaign: Notes on the Process. . . . . . . . 127
6.3.2 Levels of Integration Manifest in the Process . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
6.3.3 The Campaign and the Identity—Strength—Mission
of the Nation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130

7 Revealing the National Soul: 50th Anniversary of Victory

Over Japanese Invasion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
7.1 Introduction: A Fully Planned Case. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
7.2 The Analysis: History as Resources for National Integration . . . . . . 135
7.3 Re-enactment of History: A Portrait of Collective Resistance. . . . . . 137
7.3.1 Telling the Story: And Telling You How to Read It. . . . . . . . 137
7.3.2 Dramatising History. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
7.3.3 Displaying History. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
7.4 Interpretation of History: How to Place the Actors in the Portrait. . . 143
7.5 Abstraction of Patriotic Theme from History: Interaction
Between the People and the “Nation” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
7.6 Direction for the Campaign: Towards a Guided Conception
of the Nation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
7.6.1 Official Directives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
7.6.2 Media Editorials as Directives for Education. . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
viii Contents

7.7 Sublimation: The Moments Glorified—Reaching the Soul

of the Nation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
7.8 Immortalisation: Preserving References to the National Soul. . . . . . 156
7.8.1 Mass Participation in Creating National Memory. . . . . . . . . 156
7.8.2 Cast in Stone: Physical Concentration of National Memory. . . 158
7.8.3 Into Personal Memory: Knowledge Contests. . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
7.9 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162

8 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
8.1 Changing Environment of Campaigns. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
8.2 Comparative Analysis of Mechanisms of Campaigns. . . . . . . . . . . . 169
8.2.1 National Time and National Space: Grounded Concepts. . . . 171
8.3 Campaigns and the Construction of “Nation”. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
8.4 National Integration—Concertedness; Continuity; Compatibility. . . 176
8.5 Role of the Media in the Campaigns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
8.6 “Communications and National Integration” Revisited. . . . . . . . . . . 182
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189

9 Revelations from Recent Campaigns. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191

9.1 A Campaign that Started After Its Conclusion:
Bid for Year 2008 Olympics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
9.1.1 The Bidding Campaign Became a Celebration Campaign. . . 194
9.1.2 Comparing the Bid for Year 2000 Olympics
and Bid for Year 2008 Olympics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
9.2 Demonstrating National Strength: 50th Anniversary of the PRC . . . 203
9.3 Strengthening the Party: Celebrating CCP’s 80th Anniversary. . . . . 205
9.4 Calls for National Unity and Stability: Three Campaigns
Against Negative Forces (1999–). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
9.4.1 Harnessing National Emotions: Campaign Against
U.S. Hegemony . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
9.4.2 Promoting National Integration: Campaign Against
“Two Nations Theory”. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
9.4.3 Uniting All Against One Evil: Campaign
Against Falun Gong Cult. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
9.5 All People of One Heart: Campaign Against the Flood in 1998 . . . . 219
9.6 Revelations on Propaganda Techniques from the Campaigns. . . . . . 225
9.7 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
List of Tables

Table 4.1 People’s Daily special forum on Olympics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Table 4.2 Cable messages of support from mass organisations . . . . . . . . . . 71
Table 4.3 Chinese State Leaders’ direct messages in support of Beijing. . . 79
Table 5.1 Reports of support for Beijing’s bid from Hong Kong Chinese. . . 95
Table 5.2 Reports of support from Chinese in regions
other than Hong Kong. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Table 5.3 Media reports on IOC members’ visits to Beijing. . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
Table 5.4 Themes of media reports on other bidding cities . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
Table 6.1 Official forums commemorating Mao. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
Table 7.1 Theoretical abstractions of patriotism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
Table 7.2 Directives for patriotic education from leaders and experts. . . . . 149
Table 8.1 A summary comparison of three campaigns. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173

ix
Chapter 1
Introduction

To any nation in the world, patriotism is a banner that never

fades; to any era in history, patriotism is a theme that never
vanishes; to any people, patriotism is a torch that never fails
to bring their hearts together. …Patriotism is the spiritual
propeller for building a strong, socialist China.
Yin Yungong, “Patriotism”, in Guangming Daily,
3 January 1993

1.1 Introduction

This study is the outcome of long-term systematic observation of China’s national

events, combined with reflections on the possible effect (or lack of it) of such
events which might create a spiritual bond holding the nation together for the
purpose of development. Specifically, the chunk of this study consists of analy-
ses of three national campaigns: bid for year 2000 Olympics, commemoration of
Chairman Mao’s 100th anniversary, and celebration of the 50th anniversary of
China’s victory over Japanese invasion. The main concern is whether and how
these campaigns figured in the process of spiritually integrating the nation, as well
as the role of the media in the processes.
In the larger social context, impetuous forces of a market economy have been
pulling at individuals and institutions and tearing at the social and cultural fab-
ric in all directions besides that of striving for the national good (Watson 1992).
Politically, this trend has not been explicitly acknowledged by the national leaders,
who albeit revealed their concern with the challenge in their public emphasis on
the urge to forge a stronger cohesive force and cultivate “socialist” and “traditional
Chinese” virtues which value collectivism above pursuit of individual interests.
Former Premier Li Peng’s Report on Government Work (Li 1993) included such
evidence.

© Springer Science+Business Media Singapore 2016 1

Y. Chen, Communication Campaigns and National Integration in China’s Market
Economy Era, DOI 10.1007/978-981-287-733-8_1
2 1 Introduction

As two scholars documented in their survey research on the impact of com-

munication on cultural change in China, the cultural tradition has been under-
mined, first by decades of revolution and then by Western cultural influences
filtered through the media (Chu and Ju 1993). To phrase it in the words of the
Chinese literati, whose personal observations find sporadic expressions in newspa-
pers, magazines, and other public occasions, while the nation moves toward mate-
rial modernisation, the spiritual dimension of life, i.e. its soul, is quickly divorced
from its body. Vaguely, if ever, defined, a national “soul” is believed to be a neces-
sity to the progress, prosperity, and preservation of the nation.
The same argument is perhaps more convincingly and eloquently made by
Chinese social scientists who have been engaging themselves in a reflective
national soul-searching process. For example, a member of China’s intelligentsia
observes that the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) had sunk the nation in political
tumult and social unrest (Zhang 1995). He argues that the Revolution destroyed
the faith of two generations in a collective ideal, and collapsed the pillar of moral-
ity, which found its root in both China’s cultural heritage and Western thought
that had left its mark on the Chinese society in the century following the opium
war in the 1840s. The socialist ethic that the Party had been trying to cultivate in
and among the Chinese citizens in the utopian Maoist nation-state had been more
quickly eroded than built. In sum, his overall picture of public morality and the
spiritual state of the nation was rather gloomy.
Apparently the Chinese government has been alarmed by this increasingly
widely perceived problem (Selden 1993; Shirk 1993). The mere fact that the
observant and critical few had been clamouring for the lack of popular concern
with this problem is an indication of its perceived severity. The persistent, repeated
emphasis by national leaders on building a “socialist spiritual civilisation” accom-
panying economic development may be interpreted as an indication of their con-
cern with the spiritual state of the population (Cody 1997; Zhang 1997). The
term as well as the ideas it connotes has come to be taken for granted, as part of
the commonsensical knowledge in China. A call for enhancing spiritual civilisa-
tion came shortly after the Sixth Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
14th National Congress in 1996, which passed a Resolution on Building Socialist
Spiritual Civilisation (CCPCC 1996). To the average Chinese, such as a factory
worker or an adult student in college, such a campaign call was essentially a
­harping on the chord of upgrading public morality.
How do specific campaigns/national events reflect upon the government’s effort
in implementing this policy? In what ways are the functions of the media related
to the attempt to “revive the national soul?” Ultimately, what is “national integra-
tion” and how does communication figure in its process? These are the central
questions to be answered in this book, and will be phrased in more rigorous terms
as the chapters unfold.
One of the major steps taken by the central government was the national
patriotic education campaign launched in March 1993. It is also an ongoing pro-
gramme intended for being carried over into the twenty-first century. After nearly
two years of deliberation by central leaders, educational experts, and members
1.1 Introduction 3

of the public, policy guidelines were issued in official directives distributed to

the whole population regarding the measures to enlighten the youth so that they
will “know our China, love our China, and build our China” (Central Propaganda
Department, 1994).
The media were reckoned upon as an important tool for patriotic education, to
complement the formal indoctrination in schools and work units. To get a feel of
the campaign before delving into the conceptual levels of the questions, several
features selected from China Central Television reports might serve as illustrations
of joint efforts by the government and the media to educate the population as to—
What is China? What is she to me? What am I to Her?

Feature 1  Anticipating a historic moment in the nation’s history

Time: Towards midnight, 23 September 1993
Venue: A street in Beijing
Actors: CCTV reporters and passers-by
CCTV reporter: The International Olympic Committee is about to cast the fateful
votes on who gets to host the Year 2000 Olympics. What is on the
minds of the Chinese people at this moment?
Passer-by: I hope China will win. We will win the Bid!
Comment: The entire nation is hoping China will win the Bid
(Source: CCTV special report, 23 September 1993)

Feature 2  Attending a daily ceremony featuring the nation

Time: 5:15 am, May Day 1995
Scene: Flag-raising ceremony in Tiananmen Square, Beijing
Actors: People flocking to watch the ceremony on a voluntary basis
CCTV reporter: What does the ceremony invoke in your mind?
Participants:
– The national flag is the symbol of China, and its dignity is worthy of the
­sacrifice of my life;
– The ceremony reminds me of the sacrifice of our predecessors who have
brought about what we have today, and I realise what was worth their blood
needs to be carried on by us;
– Attending this ceremony gives me a sense of our national strength.
(Source: CCTV news, 1 May 1995)

Feature 3  Visiting a historic site bearing witness to the nation’s history

Time: Children’s Day, 1995
Scene: Marco Polo Bridge in suburban Beijing, where the first shot of
anti-Japanese war was fired in 1937
Visitors:  Representatives of outstanding youngsters attending national
conference of Young Pioneers
CCTV reporter: What do you see here during the visit that strikes you the most?
4 1 Introduction

Youngsters:
– I have found our national spirit of resistance against all adversities—I am proud
of being a descendant of such a nation.
– I have found our goal—goal for our generation.
– I realise our responsibility to history: we are to build our nation for a better
future; we are to make a new history.
– Shared wish: may there be eternal peace in the world and eternal prosperity in
our country.
(Source: CCTV news, 1 June 1995)
A first note to be made of the three features should regard the functions of the
media. Beyond the theoretical conceptions in the discipline of communication,
such as “gatekeeper”, “agenda-setter”, we see that the media’s function in relation
to national history can be thus captured: witness, memory, and reminder.
As is also seen from the brief unfolding of these past scenarios, there was a dis-
tinct and almost uniform expression of wish and will for the future of the Chinese
nation. Such expressions had been evoked by special events and ceremonies fea-
turing patriotic education.
Of the numerous features printed in or aired through the Chinese national
media, these particular three were selected to highlight the introduction to research
focus. The first featured a moment of the nation “looking forward” to an extraordi-
nary event; the second featured an otherwise mundane daily practice of “salute” to
the nation; the third featured a “reflection” upon the nation’s history.
The style of presentation chosen for this introduction helps to capture the main
thrusts in the well-orchestrated activities and news reports thereof during the
national patriotic education in the new era. From the above illustrations we can
read the following messages out of the minds of these targets of the campaign:
our nation is everything to me; I am proud to be part of this big family; our fore-
fathers had sacrificed all to make this nation, and our historical mission is to build
the nation and make it strong and competitive among the host of nations. At the
level of rhetoric, such elicited responses do seem to indicate some effect desired
by those who had orchestrated the campaign.
Feature three concluded with a good wish on the part of the youngsters who are
affectionately labelled by the media as the “flowers of our nation” and the “hope
of our future”. It was a direct echo to the Chinese national government leaders’
stated goals for the nation in broadest terms typically pronounced on diplomatic
occasions: we seek peace and progress, which should also be the predominant
theme of development for all the other countries of the world. Could such a media-
staged expression be taken as an indication of “effects” of the government-initi-
ated patriotic education campaign on the youthful targets, who have never lived in
periods of great national security crises such as war times nor experienced cycles
of engulfing national political turmoil such as the Cultural Revolution? Or the
young people, after having been exposed on a voluntary and/or compulsory basis
to the repeated media messages featuring the themes and goals of this campaign,
which was officially launched in 1993, have internalised the political language
deemed most proper to speak into a TV camera?
1.1 Introduction 5

Beyond such speculations, the role of the media is not to be overlooked in

p­ ositioning individual events in a perspective of history and placing the partici-
pants in relation to the nation. A reasoned observation underlying this study is
that the media could to some extent focus national attention on the making of the
nation’s history, in addition to arousing people’s consciousness of experiencing
their nation (e.g. Feature 2). Further exploration and elaboration on this point will
be pursued through case analyses in the chapters on findings.

1.2 In Search of China’s National Soul: Is the Nation

Falling Apart?

A generally accepted observation about the Chinese intellectual tradition is that

the clamour for reviving the national soul via cultural changes, political revolu-
tion, or economic development is usually first uttered by concerned scholars,
media critics, and educators (Goldman 1987; Lin 1994). This was perhaps most
true about the decades following China’s failure in the Opium War in the 1840s.
At the turn of the twentieth century and in the 1930s, in fact all the way up to the
founding of the People’s republic, Chinese intellectuals had constantly engaged
themselves in national soul searching with the purpose of finding a way to revive
the nation. This was especially true at times when China was threatened by exter-
nal forces or suffered defeat at the hands of foreign powers (Lin 1994). But under
the Communist rule, we must qualify the observation by taking into account the
crucial fact that scholars, critics, and educators may be organised by the Party and
the state to air concerns about national soul as well.
An example presented itself on the national CCTV on 30 November 1993, at a
forum hosted by the Ministry of Culture, Ministry of Radio, Film and Television,
Central Propaganda Department of the CCP, and Beijing Municipal Government.
The forum convened a number of scholars, educators and media critics for dis-
cussion on the airing of patriotic movies targeted at young audience across the
nation. Together they expressed the like opinion that the spiritual cultivation of
the Chinese youth had become an increasingly pressing concern, lamenting young
people’s lack of knowledge about and interest in China’s history and culture, espe-
cially the heroic deeds of the founding fathers who had begotten the People’s
Republic.
During the televised forum, some scholars expressed their concern about a
depressing phenomenon, which can be more aptly summed up as the “divorce”
of the nation’s “soul” (spiritual dimension) from her “body” (material dimen-
sion). Some exclaimed: how can we immerse ourselves in materialistic pursuits
and lose sight of the long-term spiritual loss? Morality is degenerating; nothing
evokes any lofty feelings any more! One author indicated that China had always
lacked one kind of spiritual regulating force, that is, a religion. A belief system
that holds something up to be sacrosanct, for which people are ready to die. He
complained against the romantic bubbles and violent plots which stuffed the popu-
lar e­ ntertainment media.
6 1 Introduction

On the surface, the experts were airing concerns about individual morality.
In essence, they implied that the people are bearers of the national soul and should
individual morality be eroded, the nation will be deprived of its soul, i.e. a spiritual
regulating force that holds the nation together and keeps it going.
Some experts at the forum seemed to hold such an assumption: what used to
work in educating us to love our nation decades ago should still work today on
a different generation. At the forum, media professionals who had participated in
the production of the 100 movies selected for airing featuring the patriotic theme
also gave their view based on personal experience and reflection. They held in
high regard these movies, some black and white made in the 1950s, as good agents
of education, the content of which was said to have inspired in them a patriotic
passion.
Echoing their observation, educators at secondary and tertiary levels thus
expressed their view at the same forum: children know so little about our nation’s
culture and history. The national heroes we admired and emulated when at their
age are now totally forgotten. The kids are dreaming of instantaneous rise to fame
and gain, like the pop stars. And the media have a fair share of responsibility for
this tendency. The 100 selected movies depict the heroic deeds of our predeces-
sors and had educated a whole generation of youth decades ago. They are what
the children need today to expand their reference frame, to understand their nation
better.
In sum, a gloomy air floated above the spiritual state of the nation’s youth,
and the general populace, for that matter. What happened to the “spirit” or
“soul” of the nation? To explore the disintegrating forces, begin with the deepest
background.

1.2.1 Ideological Schism—Is There an Identity Crisis?

The above discussion unfolded a concern with the lack of a cohesive force holding
the nation together. Winding its way into expression through cultural producers,
it had its deeper root grounded in ideology, and has not eluded the attention of
China’s national leaders.
A move towards market economy in China had been a topic of academic and
political debates since the mid-1980s (Ding 1994; Shih 1995; Solinger 1993), and
steps had been taken in a small way since then to experiment with the idea (Ogden
1989). It was only in late 1992, after the CCP’s 14th National Congress, that such
a transition on a national scale was officially pronounced in policy terms, with the-
oretical justification based on Deng Xiaoping’s theory of “building socialism with
Chinese characteristics” (CCPCC 1993).
As a point of departure, the official adoption of a market economy ­policy,
accompanied by corresponding changes in policies on matters of political
thinking, cultural values, social life, etc., could be anticipated to spiritually
­
­unsettle the nation’s population to varied extents.
1.2 In Search of China’s National Soul: Is the Nation Falling Apart? 7

What are the repercussions of such an unsettling process?

A nation in economic transition and social transformation is a most vivid illus-
tration ground of conflicts between the passing and emerging ideologies, values,
pursuits, and even beliefs. Conflicts are bound to be fierce between entrenched
interests and superseding ones. Such competing interests would find expression
through many outlets, one of which are the media. But given the current owner-
ship and control the state government still has over the national media in China, it
would be overly optimistic to expect individual, local, regional interests competing
against national goals to find a corresponding amount of expression in the media.
However, to China watchers overseas and to domestic commoners alike, the
gap has become evident between the Party’s version of Marxist ideology which
had been the one ruling force under which China was governed for decades past
and the idea of a market economy which is capitalistic by origin and practice. One
political scientist in the China field even attacked, “It is capitalism with Chinese
characteristics!” (Vohra 1994, p. 46). In no attempt to take issue with this theo-
retically derived claim, we are albeit justifiably alarmed to the distinction. Do the
Chinese people believe that they are headed towards a “socialist market economy”
leading to material prosperity and spiritual progress? Does the Chinese govern-
ment have a compelling need to project the Chinese image to the international
community as one that is still a “socialist country”? The answer to this second
question is probably yes, based on other scholars’ analysis of the legitimacy of the
CP and the state government, which is grounded in Socialism (Dittmer and Kim
1993; Gregor 1995).
The conflicting requirements of ideological legitimacy and national identity
(Dittmer 1992), though temporarily reconciled by way of the CCP’s balancing
between market pragmatism and ideological socialism, nonetheless intensified
after 1992. For decades before, China had defined itself as a leader of the Third
World countries with twin identification as a member of the socialist bloc. Its
international role had largely emanated from a given Chinese national identity.
While this is still the case, China’s quest for national identity is not a purely
domestic problem (Shih 1990). With the radical change in the Communist Bloc
countries, China has increasingly resorted to a self-definition as a developing
nation. A question then follows: who should define national identity? Scholars
(e.g. Fitzgerald 1994) warn us against an overly state-centred notion of national
identity. They make a distinction between mass identifications that derive from
a sense of commonality and those identifications promoted by the elite to justify
policies or to manipulate the populace. At a national level, identity ­influences
attitudes and policies since it is the psychological foundation for a country’s roles
and behaviours in the world. Here we may note that national ­campaigns could be a
ground where such distinctions become salient.
At the level of the individual, then, is there anything detrimental to national
coherence and development if the population by and large believes and feels
justified in pursuing ends following the individualistic values inherent in a
­
­market-oriented way of life?
8 1 Introduction

The final question is crucial and central as it gave rise to the larger patriotic
education campaign, part of which is being studied. Invariably, the editorials in
People’s Daily and commentaries issued by the official Xinhua News Agency
addressing the importance of a cohesive force drawing the people together for a
national goal would make an emphatic note in summary form. Specifically, the
message is that the further the nation advances into constructing a market econ-
omy, the more pressing and relevant it is to uphold, advocate and propagate social-
ism, collectivism, and patriotism. Noteworthy is the fact that in certain emulation
campaigns promoting role models who personify devotion to and sacrifice for the
nation, the keynote used to abstract their spiritual essence to the level of philo-
sophical values and outlooks on life is patriotism. Further, the ideal of patriotism
is stretched to cover a wide range of virtues labelled “traditional” and “Chinese”.
(Chen 1999)
How to interpret this unprecedented emphasis on patriotism that is not coupled
with other ideologies as was the case in the past?
At the ideological level, the previous isms have basically vanished from the
Chinese media and hence from the national vocabulary. A spiritual vacuum
appears in the spiritual sphere of national life. Once lifted as a force to rule, it
cannot be restored or reinstated, for the minds of the people have been exposed
to all the alternatives open to them, the influence of foreign cultures included.
Yet given the above reasons, the need for the state to keep harping on the same
chord of a lofty socialist ideology still exists. Since the early 1990s, the Party and
state leadership have been invoking the famous slogan “only Socialism can save
China”. Even just a few months before Deng Xiaoping’s famous inspection tour of
Southern China which ultimately set the economy free for the market, the national
media were still alerting the population to the danger of peaceful (subtle) evolu-
tion (transformation) towards capitalism (Cheng 1994).
A possible role of the media is to be used as an instrument to perceptually rec-
oncile the two conflicting ideologies, i.e. socialism and the pragmatism accom-
panying market economy. The argument is that market economy, by virtue of its
prerequisites, tends to undermine the already declining, if not defunct, faith in
socialism (Gregor 1995). The paradox is that this spiritual erosion can in turn con-
tribute negatively towards the building of market economy at its fledgling stage. In
order to fully develop market economy and maximise output to increase national
wealth and strength, it is still necessary for at least some members of the popula-
tion to work on a self-sacrificial basis for the national goal (Li 1993), because the
government at this stage does not yet have the financial capacity to offer full mate-
rial reward for all the work that needs to be extracted.
Therefore, for a pragmatic reason of mobilising the population to work for a
material goal, the government is confronted with the challenge to project an image
and a message through various means of education that socialism (ideology) and
market economy (policy) can be integrated in action.
Perhaps it is on this logical ground that patriotism can be used to gloss over the
ideological schism.
1.2 In Search of China’s National Soul: Is the Nation Falling Apart? 9

1.2.1.1 Defining Patriotism

Definitions are as numerous as scholars, as universal in the last analysis as the

number of nation each individual can belong to—one. For a nation with a long his-
tory and weighty cultural heritage like China, whose definition should count? Or,
to be more relevant to the study, whose definition should be propagated through
the mass media for widest appeal to the largest possible number of people? Many
prominent Chinese in history have written lengthy treatises to indoctrinate the
people on what it means to be patriotic, and many prominent Chinese have risen
at critical moments to act on what they believe to be patriotism and have become
illustrations of the doctrine. Among our contemporaries, Li Yanjie should be
counted as one, if not the one, most quotable source if our aim is to locate a most
inspiring and agitating definition. Li was a professor at Beijing Teachers’ College
who established his unintended fame among the young people at home and abroad
with his prolific lectures and speeches on patriotism. He has been recognised and
delegated by the national government as an unofficial ambassador to draw the
young people’s hearts and minds towards their nation. “Patriotism is love for one’s
home nation. It is a deepest sentiment and affection cultivated and fortified over
thousands of years. Such love is deeply rooted in the hearts of the people, and
becomes a monumental moral force of righteous courage”. (Li 1981, p. 157)
Under no demand to make his definition universally applicable, we may take
note of the four main factors implied in it. First, by Chinese cultural standards it
is defined in terms of sentiment. Surely, a psychologist will use the term “affect”
instead. Second, it is considered as ingrained in a nation’s culture and history.
Third, it is believed to be innate in people’s thinking and emotion. Fourthly and
most importantly, it is believed to carry with it a kind of forceful strength which,
if ignited with spiritual dynamites, can amount to explosive effects in collective
endeavour. Such ignition is no more or less than the agitating effect of mass prop-
aganda expounded upon by Lenin (Yu 1963a). This study allows us a chance to
see whether and how such patriotism might work, or be worked up, under what
conditions.
Doob (1964) makes a useful distinction between nationalism and patriotism.
What appears to be nationalistic fervour to outside observers may well be, in a
domestic context, manifestations of patriotic sentiments. With the premise that
the three main ingredients of a nation as an object of patriotism are land, people,
and culture, Doob defines patriotism as a conscious conviction of a person that his
own welfare and that of the significant groups to which he belongs are depend-
ent upon the preservation or expansion of the power and culture of his society. As
for nationalism, it could be an ideological commitment to the pursuit of unity, a
consciousness on the part of individuals or groups of membership in a nation, or a
condition of mind in which loyalty to the ideal or to the fact of one’s national state
is superior to all other loyalties. The case analyses in this study might produce new
insight.
As a sentiment capable of being translated into action, patriotism as a subject
for indoctrination and illustration through many avenues including the media
10 1 Introduction

should be taken as the Party and the state’s effort at appealing to the people in the
name of the nation. But what is the nation?

1.2.1.2 Defining the Nation

Historically, this term in the context of China’s recent past used to encompass
the package of Party, state, military, and the people. This has been the standard
mention used by China’s national leaders and media when they refer to the entire
population on important occasions. Disputably, political philosophers contemplat-
ing the definition of nation had over time equated it with either the people or the
government (Fitzgerald 1994). Surely, by modern democratic definition, the peo-
ple represented by the government constitute the nation. Perceptually, the formula
should look as follows which might come closest to representing the currently
most salient contour of China:
Nation = People + Government
In other words, the Party and the military have faded from the media lime-
light—understandably, though, given the pragmatic nature of economic reform
and revival which exhibits itself in most policies from the state. This direction
of this formula has yet to be tested in the three case studies, which will reveal
whether it is well grounded, and whether the combination is vertical (top–down),
horizontal, or circular, or otherwise.
Here we are again confronted with the issue of ideological legitimacy. To politi-
cal scientists, nation is a sociopsychological concept referring to a self-conscious
and self-differentiating community bound together by common history and soli-
darity, while state is a legal concept referring to an internationally recognised
political entity possessing tangible territorial, demographic, and governmental
attributes. One of the major functions of the state is to express a sense of political
and social identity of its citizens (Dittmer and Kim 1993).
It goes without saying that Marxism has always been associated with the
Communist Party. It is also an established fact that the ideological affiliation of
China today as is pronounced in diplomatic interactions with other nations is still
socialism. But given the corruption among some Party officials, which is now
taken as a fact, some pessimistic Western scholars observe that the CP has to a
deplorable extent been discredited (Ogden 1989; Ding 1994). And following the
collapse of the Communist Bloc, some pessimists have hastened to announce
Communism as an ideological failure. To the Chinese public, it is presumably dis-
credited as well, even though by sound logic ideology should be separated from its
bearer—political organisations.
If the validity and reliability of an ideology reside solely in its workability in
practice, the current ideology being promoted by the Chinese government is a
pragmatic one—patriotism. In Chinese, the words ideology and ism are used inter-
changeably, and patriotism is a universal ism that transcends not only spatial but
also temporal boundaries, i.e. valid in any given period in history. In so doing, the
1.2 In Search of China’s National Soul: Is the Nation Falling Apart? 11

state is essentially de-ideologising the nation, which might lead partially to restor-
ing its own credibility by reducing the association with Stalinist Communism and
increasing the perceptual link with a non-partisan ideology—patriotism.
By now it becomes clear that the farthest backdrop on China’s national stage
today is the above-analysed ideological conflict. To be more accurate, it is tension
between the orthodox socialist ideology and the unorthodox market economy pol-
icy. In the language of researchers, it is the incompatibility between theory and
methods. To adapt Festinger (1957)’s theory of cognitive dissonance and extrapo-
late it somewhat inappropriately to the national scale, there are only two possi-
ble ways to conflict resolution: modify the ideology or modify the policy—at least
perceptually through the media, so that the two would appear to be integrated. Or,
an evasion of solution is to gloss over by way of manipulating the interpretation
of facts reported through the media, akin to inflating or discounting the weights
of certain evidence in historical research and justifying errors in hard-core social
scientific research through statistical means.
For China today, the option of evading the solution is more reliably discernible
in practice, as the ensuing chapters will show. How can it be done? National cam-
paigns, by virtue of their orchestration and firm direction, will inevitably become
a conveniently malleable database or generator of national knowledge featuring
whatever theme they serve to highlight, rendering other issues relatively obscure.
The media’s involvement throughout the process can only make it more intriguing
a subject for analysis.

1.2.2 Party-State-Nation: Consequences of Structural

Differentiation

If the relationship between intellectuals and the state is a barometer of the political
climate of a nation, what does the following statement imply: “Chinese intellectu-
als can no longer regard Party, state and nation as one” (Dittmer and Kim 1993,
p. 268).
China’s increasing structural differentiation between the Party and the state
and the society has been noted by a few scholars as an inevitable phenomenon of
­economic modernisation (Watson 1992; Wu 1996; Yeh 1992).
As was briefly explained above, China is more than the sum total of all
the Chinese people. Moreover, it is more than the aggregate of party, state, and
society. Drawing on the Durkheimian notion that a social entity has its own life
and organisational needs distinguishable from the sum of its constituent parts,
Kim and Dittmer (1993) argue that national identity is the characteristic collec-
tive behaviour of the national system as a whole, in interaction with other sub-
national, national, and international systems, flowing from the totality of shared
attributes and symbols of a solidarity political group known as the nation-state.
It involves national essence—the core sentiments and symbols of the state—with
which a mass of people most commonly identify and on this basis they contract to
12 1 Introduction

live together and act in concert to defend their common identity. It is this essence
we have to get at, perhaps through studies of such cases as the bid for Olympics,
where China as a nation was “manifestly” interacting with other nations (as
opposed to other less noticed interaction such as business cooperation).
National identity theories seek to define the conditions for the state–citizenry
relationship both in terms of what the state is and in terms of what the state does.
Analogous to personal identity, national identity cannot be constructed or enacted
in isolation. It becomes fully activated when faced with external threats or oppor-
tunities (Dittmer and Kim 1993). This axiom justifies the selection of three
national campaigns for this study.
Identity mobilisation encompasses the enactment of a nation’s national essence.
It can link the symbolic and behavioural dynamics of a people, their nation sate,
and the world at large (Dittmer and Kim 1993).
Accepting the premise that national identity enactment is changing and situa-
tion specific, this study builds on the argument that national campaigns are one
major type of such situations which tend to facilitate the enactment of a nation’s
identity, which is the basis for national integration apart from state coercion.
This disquisition on national identity is cited to shed light on the relation-
ship between the structural elements of the Chinese nation. Works are few which
­specifically address the structural differentiation in China accompanying economic
reform and liberalisation (Saich 1995), but are nonetheless illuminating.
At a theoretical level, Perry (1994) raises the question whether the post-Mao
economic and political reforms have been producing a significant change in the
relative power of state and society in favour of the latter. Goldstein (1994), on the
other hand, attacks China’s political institutions and observes that they are becom-
ing less coherent, less legitimate, and less effective.
Liu (1992) makes the point in a more forthright manner. He maintains that the
departure of Mao Zedong from the Chinese political stage marked the end of myth
making in China, and a true China emerged from behind the mask of pseudo-
model nation, revealing all its diversity and individual dynamism. Instead of one
country, we now see regions, provinces, communities, and social groups differing
significantly from one another in their socio-economic profiles. He argues that in
the midst of such profound change, communications, being both the vehicle and
the essence of political, social, and economic process in any society, provides a
strategic point to observe, analyse and assess China’s development.
Liu (1992) concludes that the liberating effect of communication in China
since the 1980s reveals the true state of China’s development and integration—“a
diverse, plural, and partly segregated society” (p. 140). The past nationalism cre-
ated by ultra-Leftist propaganda turns out to be artificial, and important groups in
society, such as intellectuals, new entrepreneurs, and the public in various ways
declare their alienation from the state. Occupational, ideological, and social iden-
tifications have been established by newly rising social groups such as dissidents
and migrants. These are what Liu considers as the potential building blocks of a
new nationhood, which will be much more substantial and enduring than the
­artificial ones created by propaganda.
1.2 In Search of China’s National Soul: Is the Nation Falling Apart? 13

To confound the situation, political volatility resultant from power struggle

within state leadership and regional disparities in the extent of development add
to the obstacles blocking the emergence of a genuine Chinese nationhood (Liu
1992, p. 140). In other scholars’ words, China faces a major identity crisis (Kim
and Dittmer 1993).
Labelling China a “nationless state”, Fitzgerald (1994) distinguishes between
official history preserved by the state and the records in the immense repositories
of cultural memory, including today’s modern media. He perceives an asymme-
try between state and nation—the ideological foundations and the direction in
which the country is heading. However, the state reserves the right to define the
nation and to specify its relationship to the state. Overall, though, probably out
of no choice, more recently there has been a wider recognition of the distinction
between the Party and the state, and between the state and the nation (Link 1994;
Su 1994).

1.2.3 Historical Discontinuity—A Spiritual Vacuum

According to Link (1994) in his writing on national identity, many Chinese intel-
lectuals feel distraught with the lack of a “point of purchase” in their spiritual life
in the money-first ethos that has recently prevailed in China. He observes that the
era is long gone when ideological pronouncements from the centre were accepted
at both rhetorical and practical levels. White (1995) observes that with the weak-
ening of party organisations and the virtual demise of study groups at the grass-
roots level, which used to serve as the transmitter of a central ideology, most
individuals and institutions are free to ignore the once prevalent unifying core.
Moreover, with the moral authority and political power of the centre diminished
to some extent, local work units and governments are far more independent than
before (Wu 1996). What does such independence mean? At least in part it means
that the previous thread of ideology woven into the fabric of national life and
dominant in regulating individual relationship with the state is no longer function-
ing. Individualism, however, had never been a point of purchase in the life of the
majority of Chinese people, and it has proven less than something they can hold
on to today.
An ensuing problem is that there is no publicly accepted set of moral values to
define proper behaviour. Intellectuals speak of an ideological crisis and a spiritual
crisis, lamenting that the traditional moral ideologies are no longer playing their
due role in China (Link 1994).
And for individuals, a sense of emptiness within can be as much of a prob-
lem as the lack of external symbols. Kim and Dittmer (1993)’s work touched
upon a series of three belief crises—the crisis of belief in Marxism, the crisis of
faith in socialism, and the crisis of trust in the government, which they consider
to be chipping away at the acceptance of the People’s Republic as an authentic
socialist state. The question of how the Chinese nation should act out its identity
14 1 Introduction

will be put to test in the study of the first of the three cases, China’s bid for year
2000 Olympics.
What about the “make-money” ideology? While affirming its benefits as a
short-term ideology to develop a poor country, Link (1994) disclaims it as a stop-
gap that leaves deeper and inevitable questions such as: what makes China distinc-
tive? Does China really need, in a modern world, another moral–social–political
cosmological core both to set it apart and to hold it together? This question has
entered scholarly reflection by both Western and Chinese social scientists (e.g. Lin
1994; Zhang 1995). Without evading this question, a quick review of the change
and continuity in the national identifying core in China’s recent history might be
helpful.
Such a unifying core binding the masses together during the pre-1949 revolu-
tionary era was an ideal, a simple ideal that all people should be fed and clothed
and employed, and that under the leadership of the Communist Party (Wou 1994).
It continued into the mid-1950s, during which period an eager push at the ideal to
its extreme distorted China’s underdeveloped reality and led to a national catas-
trophe. In the ensuing 10 years till the outburst of the Cultural Revolution in
1966, the aggravated Chinese reality in the midst of political struggles and incited
class hatred, which retarded national development, gradually deviated from the
ideal. Another 10 years that followed witnessed national turmoil in all scales and
spheres, which paralysed the national economy in the midst of a clash between
China’s national ideal and national reality (Zhang 1995). To what extent, if at all,
has the past ideal of common prosperity been revived and revitalised to re-charge
the population with zeal for development after Mao? That is another way of ask-
ing whether an ideal or ideology is functioning as the identifying core in China
today.
Given the fact that the mature segment of China’s population had previously
been intensely indoctrinated with the socialist ideology, the government cannot
afford to cognitively disorient them thoroughly from their old norms. It is not so
true that a popular faith in the old isms still exists, but it is true that a good number
of the people, including officials, cherish strong nostalgia for certain past values
and virtues, ways that are reminiscent of the benefits of past socialist ideology. So
there is a pressing need to integrate the past with the present, to provide a sense of
historical continuity in order to justify the new policy to the population, especially
those members who have suffered from the side effects of such policy and become
disillusioned with the increasingly fierce competition and increasingly indifferent
attitude towards interpersonal relationships.
On the one hand, the drive for a modernised future is strong and compelling.
On the other hand, the nostalgic pull from at least part of the history left behind
is lingering. It may best be found by locating what objects invoking memories of
the past are most keenly pursued and cherished. In the words of a China watcher
(Cheng 1994), one of the symbols unifying the attention of the largest num-
ber of Chinese people in the early 1990s had been the late Mao Zedong, repack-
aged in popular cultural activities and products. The phenomenon has not found
unanimous explanation. One explanation that has found more echo than do others
1.2 In Search of China’s National Soul: Is the Nation Falling Apart? 15

is this: the popular sentiment expressed seemingly towards Mao as is now sym-
bolised in cultural products is but a guise for the inexpressible nostalgia for the
less materialistic bond between people during his time. This explanation must be
accepted with much caution. More reflection on China during the Mao era would
suggest that this is a distorted picture of the past, indicative of an attempt to grasp
some uniting sentiment that can hold the people together, who are now pushed by
the market force into highly individualistic pursuits of gains and, on such competi-
tive grounds, are more likely to be foes than friends.
An alternative explanation could be that current China in transformation is
undergoing a new round of identity redefinition. According to Liu (1992), national
spiritual “disintegration” could encompass several dimensions: (1) national iden-
tity in crisis; (2) legitimacy of government in question; (3) the government having
difficulty initiating and sustaining economic development.
Before addressing the question of which one of the above best describes the
Chinese case, we may reason by concession and ask other questions: what was
the main source of China’s identity 10 or 20 years ago? 100 years ago? 1000 years
ago? In the recent past, ideology was the source of identity. In the further past
before the Communist revolution, culture was the source of identity.
A third-generation overseas Chinese in Singapore with a basic amount of
knowledge of China’s history thus answered the question regarding identity:
“For an old nation like China, people do not really need to be told what they are.
Culture and history are so ingrained in their life that it will live by itself” (Personal
interview, 15 December 1995, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore).
Upon first hearing, that comment almost devastated the central argument under-
pinning this study, to the extent of overthrowing its main thrust. However, second
thoughts reminded us that the long history of unsettling class struggles and revolu-
tion had disconnected the people from their cultural tradition and historical legacy
(Chu and Ju 1993). At the current historical juncture when a vacuum appears in
the nation’s spiritual atmosphere and hence in the hearts and souls of the people,
it would be a legitimate juncture for resorting to the history and culture of the
Chinese nation for a possible source of identity.
Enough disquisition has been produced on national identity, but for this study a
workable and simple definition should be “what we are as a nation, ideologically,
historically, and spiritually”. Further, we look into what functional components
the nation encompasses—the government and the people are bearers of national
identity. Again, disputing definitions on linguistic grounds alone is much ado
about nothing. The core of the matter lies in the source of such definitions—by
academics? by the media? by national governments? by the people who exercise
their common sense? Further pursuit of this topic can easily distract our atten-
tion into the area of cultural anthropology and defeat the focused effort. As such
definitions bear on this project, if the discussion on ideological schism strikes
the point on “what should our nation believe in”, the issue of historical continu-
ity could hopefully lead to a new look at “how have we come to be what we are
today?”
16 1 Introduction

1.2.4 Substantive Conflicts—Does the Nation Seem Fair

to All?

An article in Weekly Digest (22 May 1995) contrasted two figures: one million
people, out of the 1.2 billion in China, had achieved the status of millionaires or
above, while another 70 million people were still struggling below the poverty
line, not counting the 12 million urban poor. News appeared frequently in the
popular media such as evening newspapers and entertainment magazines on how a
few individuals rose to stardom overnight, while millions of hard workers who till
the field and work the assembly lines remained obscure. It is no longer news now
to see new towns being established in the generally prosperous coastal provinces,
while the livelihood of the residents in the generally backward inland regions and
provinces is being threatened by deserts inching towards them, their economic
development hampered by lack of advantages exclusively enjoyed by the coastal
provinces. That was one main reason why, in the year 2000, the central govern-
ment called for a major development of Western China in the twenty-first century.
Increasing social inequality, a natural result of economic reform, is yet increas-
ing as the newly unleashed market force gathers momentum. In the absence of an
economic equaliser, resentment arises from the population formerly conditioned
by planned economy and accustomed to egalitarianism. Geographically or socially
disadvantaged, the poorer sectors of the population air a loud cry for fulfilment of
basic needs. Maintaining the psychological equilibrium of the nation becomes a
pressing task. The question is how it can be done.
The official policy of fine tuning the relationship between “reform, develop-
ment, and stability”, which has become a household phrase, though referring to
both political and social stability, has a stronger emphasis on the latter. The pro-
nounced guideline for national propaganda through the official media was set in
1993 to cultivate a sense of national unity (CCTV news, 1 January 1993).
What symbol, what action, what spirit, could be used by the media as a vehicle
to “unite” the prosperous and the poor, the greater and the lesser, the advanced and
the backward, for national development, a goal being attained under the leadership
of the current government which eagerly seeks allegiance?
From a daily record kept of national media events over a period of years since
1992, three cases emerged that are relevant to this study. To recapitulate, they
include the bid for Year 2000 Olympics in 1993, the commemoration of Mao’s
100th birthday at the end of the same year, and the celebration of the 50th anni-
versary of victory in anti-Fascist war. Here are superficial rationales before further
analysis. The first case involved the entire nation in concerted action, the media
being the centre stage presenting China acting as a nation. For the second case, the
media were both a locale and a stage for the re-enactment of the national memory
of a great man who made the great nation (a little overstatement, but symbolically
justified). The third case was a special national occasion staged through the media
for the purpose of reinterpreting history to serve the present and revive the national
spirit of unity against adversity, with which the population might be equipped for
the future.
1.2 In Search of China’s National Soul: Is the Nation Falling Apart? 17

Could it be mere coincidence that, defined in relation to history, the witness,

memory, and reminder functions of the media were prominently projected in the
three respective cases? For the Bid, the media served as a national witness in addi-
tion to playing other roles. For the second case, the media served the three func-
tions combined, though the memory function seemed more evident, in that Mao’s
image and person and works and exploits, while being presented through the
media and projected through expressions of public sentiments, were being stored
in the media record. For the third case, the reminder function was most manifest
in the fact that historical facts were reinterpreted in view of the current need for
national spiritual unity. This designation is rather superficial, and has yet to find
proof in the evidence rallied under the three cases.

1.3 Reaching the Soul of the Nation: Empirical

Justification for Study

China as a nation is never indifferent towards its ideological and spiritual crises.
On the part of the intelligentsia, according to Lin (1994), national soul searching
involved voluntary confessions about weaknesses in China’s national character,
lamentations about such defects, heightened concerned consciousness about the
welfare of the nation, and reorientation of China’s “soul” towards modern human-
ism. All of these tend to be reflected in the intellectual discourse exploring the
identity and destiny of China. Such a quest has its historical antecedents in the last
part of the nineteenth century after China’s desperate military defeat in the hands
of strong foreign powers, which provoked the Chinese intellectuals to search for a
strong “core” to prop up the nation. The quest, on and off, took a winding path in
the century that followed, depending on the changing relationship between intel-
lectuals and the state.
On the part of the public, a spontaneous Mao Craze, especially in the way of
mass popularity with songs and souvenirs from Maoist era in the early 1990s, has
been interpreted as a sign of nostalgia for the Maoist days, even for the Maoist
ideology which stressed equality in distribution (Liu 1992; Cheng 1994). To
stretch the interpretation a bit further, it might be said that the Chinese people
were groping for a point of purchase to fill their spiritual void.
On the part of the state, one after another round of non-political campaigns
have been launched since the early 1980s when the crisis of belief was first posed
as a serious challenge to the nation. The pronounced goals were to either weed
out undesirable external influences on the ideological atmosphere of the nation or
to strengthen the domestic bond of affection and devotion to the nation (Gregor
1995; Rosen 1993; Shi and Zhang 1991).
No clear evidence suggests a distinct policy formation process for the current
national patriotic education campaign involving the media, the government, edu-
cational institutions and others. But there was a deluge of concerted calls from all
sectors of society through the media in the beginning of each year since 1993 that
18 1 Introduction

marked the national start of the programme. The role of communication and how
it interacted with national integration during the three campaigns selected is the
central concern of this book. But it must be noted again that no claim was made
by the state or the media that any of the three campaigns was a planned part of
the programme. Meanwhile, several other campaigns have been launched since the
time this study was conducted, and they will be duly but briefly examined in the
Epilogue.
The four areas of tension previously discussed are areas in which the country
might be torn apart spiritually. The government may not conceive of the issues in
these terms. But it makes sense to say that national integration can be conveni-
ently translated into creating a sense of oneness of the nation among the entire
population. For China, it may encompass one official ideology (the theory of
building socialism with Chinese characteristics), one overarching policy (market
economy), one official sacred canon (Deng Xiaoping’s works), one (set of) pre-
dominant ideology (patriotism, socialism, collectivism), one national goal (pros-
perity for all), etc.
But above all, a sense that the nation is spiritually united in perfect strength for
a unified mission may be more directly relevant to integration. The media can play
a part in injecting such a sense into the people by presenting carefully selected
stories in favour of this theme. But presumably, a more effective way is to organ-
ise national campaigns or events in which certain national symbols can be readily
used as universal appeals to the whole population. Further, such campaigns/events
must invite the participation by virtually the entire population. So in the first place
there must be some elements about the campaigns to which every citizen can
relate himself. Then of course these elements must have a direct bearing on the
Chinese nation, be it history, culture, economic strength, political sovereignty, or
whatever else. Needless to say, such campaigns must have a strong and distinct
spiritual dimension, since they in part serve to divert the population from an obses-
sion with material pursuits.
In other words, these events, organised mostly through the media, in part by the
media, and in part for the media, could serve as foci of national attention and par-
ticipation, which ideally should give the people a strong sense of being an integral
part of the nation.
The background for all these events is the larger ongoing patriotic education
campaign, and one baseline belief supporting the theory to be advanced through
this study is this: one main purpose and/or effect of the campaign is to generate
and propagate knowledge about the nation. How does it work? Before approach-
ing these questions, a reflective look at the existing literature on relevant topics is a
must, as well as is an attempt at theory building.
References 19

References

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Another random document with
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 Inhoudsopgave

VOORWOORD. VII
GEBEZIGDE LITTERATUUR. XI
INHOUD. XIII
LIJST VAN ILLUSTRATIES. XV
VERBETERINGEN. XVI
I. INDIANEN-BEVOLKING VAN WEST-INDIË. 1
Inleidende beschouwingen. 1
Inhoud der verhalen 7
Lijst der in dezen bundel opgenomen mondelinge
overleveringen der Indianen. 14
Indianen-Vertellingen. 66
1. De sage van Haboeri (W.) 66
2. De oorsprong der eerste menschen (C.) 73
3. De oorsprong van het menschdom (W.) 75
4. De oorsprong der Caraïben. (C.) 76
5. Hoe de Caraïben gekweekte planten leerden
kennen. (C.) 77
6. De dochter van den geestenbezweerder. 79
7. Hoe lichaamspijnen, dood en ellende in de wereld
kwamen. (C.) 81
8. Het hoofd van den Boschgeest en de nachtzwaluw.
(A.) 83
9. De vrouw, die een Boschgeest nabootste. (A.) 84
10. De Geest van een schimmelplant* redt een 86
Indiaansch meisje. (C.)
11. Een jagoear, die in een vrouw veranderde. (A.) 89
12. De man met een Baboen-vrouw. (A.) 91
13. Schildpad, die Boschrat er in liet loopen. (C.) 94
14. De bedrieger bedrogen. (C.) 95
15. Tijger en Miereneter. (C.) 96
16. Hariwali en de Wonderboom. (A.) 98
17. De legende van den Ouden man’s val. 103
18. Amanna en haar praatzieke man. (C.) 105
19. De zon en zijn beide tweelingzoons. (C.) 107
20. De Legende van den Vleermuis-berg. (M.) 111
21. De Uil en zijn schoonbroeders vleermuis. (W.) 112
22. De Lichtkever en de verdwaalde Jager. (C.) 114
23. De bina, de weder in het leven geroepen vader en de
slechte vrouw. (W.) 116
24. Hoe een jong Warrau-Indiaantje uit de handen der
Caraïben ontkwam. (W.) 119
25. Sluit de oogen en doe een wensch. (C.) 121
26. De gelukspot. (W.) 122
27. De honigbij en de zoete drank. (W.) 124
28. De piaiman en de stinkvogels*. (A.) 125
29. Hoe het ongeluk over de menschen kwam. De
geschiedenis van Maconaura en Anoeannaïtoe. (A.) 131
30. De kolibri, die tabak brengt aan den eersten piaiman.
(W.) 140
31. Het ontstaan der vrouwennaties. 145
32. Het gebroken ei. 146
33. De geest van den pasgeborene. 146
34. De huid van den Reuzenslang of Hoe de vogels hun 147
 tegenwoordig gevederte kregen.
35. Een waarschuwing voor de vrouwen. (A.) 148
36. Hoe een man van zijn luiheid genezen werd. (W.) 155
37. Zwarte Tijger, Wau-oeta en de gebroken boog. (W.) 157
38. De Legende van Letterhoutstomp. 162
39. De Legende van Arimoribo en Jorobodie. (C.) 165
40. Uitdrijven van een priester uit den Indiaanschen
hemel. 170
41. Uitdrijving der Indianen uit den Hemel der Paters. 174
42. Bezoek van Caraïben aan Macoesiland. (C.) 178
43. Legende van Paramaribo. 179
44. De Legende van Post Sommelsdijk. 180
45. Einde van den Indiaanschen broederoorlog. (A.) 182
46. De groote bloedzuigende vleermuis. (A.) 183
47. Legende van Mapajawari of de uitroeiing der
menscheneters. (C.) 184
48. Migratie-legende van den Kasi’hta-stam der Creek-
Indianen, 189
II. West-Indische neger-folklore. 197
Inleidende beschouwingen. 197
De Surinaamsche Anansi-tori’s en hare oorsprong. 203
LIJST DER NEGERVERTELLINGEN. 235
Inhoud der Surinaamsche Negervertellingen. 237
De anansi-tori en het bijgeloof. 246
VERTELLINGEN DER SURINAAMSCHE
STADSNEGERS. 258
1. Anansi, die een half dorp verovert. 258
2. Spin en de Prinses. 266
3. Het huwelijk van Heer Spin. 271
4. Anansi, Tijger en de doode Koe. 273
 5. Anansi en zijn kinderen. 276
6. Hoe Spin zijn schuldeischers betaalt. 277
7. Een feest bij de Waternimf. 281
8. Anansi en Kat. 282
9. Spin en Krekel. 285
10. Heer Spin als Geestelijke. 286
11. Heer Spin als roeier. 287
12. Spin neemt Tijger gevangen. 289
13. Heer Spin en Hond. 291
14. Tijger’s verjaardag. 293
15. Spin voert den Dood in. 295
16. Spin wedt, Tijger te berijden. 297
17. Verhaal uit het leven van vriend Spin. 299
18. Anansi als Amerikaan verkleed. 303
19. Heer Spin en de Waternimf. 305
20. Anansi, Hert en Kikvorsch. 306
21. Heer Spin als landbouwer. 308
22. Anansi en de Bliksem. 310
23. Ieder volwassen man moet een rood zitvlak hebben. 315
24. Hoe Anansi aan schapenvleesch wist te komen. 318
25. De geschiedenis van Fini Foetoe, Bigi bere en Bigi
hede. 321
26. Legende van Leisah I. 323
27. Legende van Leisah. II. 325
28. Verhaal van het land van „Moeder Soemba”. 327
29. Boen no habi tangi. 330
30. Geschiedenis van Kopro Kanon*. 332
31. De Meermin of Watramama. 335
32. De Boa in de gedaante van een schoonen jongeling. 337
 33. Het huwelijk van Aap. 339
DE ANANSI-TORI DER SURINAAMSCHE
BOSCHNEGERS. 342
Hoe Heer Spin door zijn bekwaamheid als
geneesheer de mooie dochter van den Landvoogd
wist te krijgen. 345
NEGER-VERTELLINGEN UIT HET WEST-INDISCHE
EILANDENGEBIED. 350
Curaçaosche Negervertellingen. Cuenta di Nansi. 350
Nansi en Temekóe-Temebè. 354
Creoolsche folk-lore van St.-Eustatius. 360
Braha- Nanci en Braha-Toekema. 362
Neger-vertellingen van Jamaica. Nancy-Stories. 367
1. Annancy in Krabbenland. 371
2. Reiger. 373
3. Annancy, Poes en Rat. 377
BIJVOEGSELS. 379
I. NEGER-SPREEKWOORDEN. 379
Suriname. 379
West-Afrika. 381
II. AVOND OP HET WATER in Sierra Leone 384
Spin, Olifant en Hippopotamus. 389
III. DIEREN-FABEL, 393
Wie zijn Krokodil’s verwanten? 393
VERKLAREND REGISTER. 396
A. 396
B. 397
C. 399
D. 400
E. 400
F. 400
G. 401
H. 401
I. 402
J. 402
K. 403
L. 406
M. 407
N. 408
O. 408
P. 409
R. 411
S. 411
T. 413
V. 414
W. 415
Y. 416
Z. 416
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Titel: Mythen en
sagen uit
West-Indië
Auteur: Herman Info https://viaf.org/viaf/45474713/
van
Cappelle
Jr. (1857–
1932)
Illustrator: Willem Info
Antonius https://viaf.org/viaf/3295167202597667930008/
Josef
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XIII, 350,
350 St. Eustachius St.-Eustatius 3
XVI wreedzaam wreedzame 2
XVI vreedzaam vreedzame 2
XVI, 26,
46, 58,
158, 203,
253, 276,
287, 328,
356, 403,
405, 406,
410, 410,
412 , . 1
2 wreedzame vreedzame 1
4, 76, 76 wêer weêr 2/0
5 hebben heb 3
7 nêergelegd neêrgelegd 2/0
7 geïdialiseerd geïdealiseerd 1
8 Mythen-cathegorie Mythen-categorie 1
9, 207 beinvloed beïnvloed 1/0
11 met [Verwijderd] 4
12 beinvloeden beïnvloeden 1/0
13 Travells Travels 1
14, 92,
119, 222,
276, 287,
329, 355 — 1
17 af komstig afkomstig 1
17 voor voort 1
20, 165,
214, 214,
243, 334 . , 1
24 lichamspijnen lichaamspijnen 1
25 Anoeannaitoe Anoeannaïtoe 1/0
28 verweringskorst verweeringskorst 1
28 Indiaaan Indiaan 1
29, 409 over dag overdag 1
29, 164,
165 Caraiben Caraïben 1/0
31 demaan de maan 1
Passim. [Niet in bron] „ 1
Passim. Penard’s Penards 1
33 Caraibische Caraïbische 1/0
33 de de de 3
33 heuvel hemel 2
33 19 20 2
34 van daan vandaan 1
39 hebben heeft 4
40, 106,
106, 122 broer broêr 1/0
Passim. [Niet in bron] ” 1
41 jaguar jagoear 2
44 ,* *, 2
45 kalabassen kalebassen 1
47 Indíaansche Indiaansche 1/0
54 Missisippi-stroom Mississippi-stroom 1
55, 189 Ogleterpe Oglethorpe 2
55 Tchikili Tchikilli 1
56 mais maïs 1/0
60 Tot In 3
61 bij hij 1
62 Natuur Natur 1
63, 72 papagaai papegaai 1
66 Pallissade-palm Palissadepalm 2
69 antwoorde antwoordde 1
72 Onmiddelijk Onmiddellijk 1
74 gopend geopend 1
76 weér weêr 1/0
78, 125,
183, 184,
229, 264,
283, 294,
313, 321,
332, 336,
354 .* *. 2
78 lotgenoten lotgenooten 1
78 Allepäntepo Allepántepo 1/0
81 Jorokas Joroka’s 1
81, 117,
128, 233,
410 , [Verwijderd] 1
84 ”. .” 2
84, 148,
314, 314 mee meê 1/0
86 broers broêrs 1/0
96 lachtte lachte 1
97 Tamanoe Tamanoea 1
112 schoonbroeder schoonbroeders 1
112 broêr broêrs 1
114 schoonbroers schoonbroêrs 1/0
117 vermoordde vermoorde 1
121 hadden had 3
122 verweringsprodukten verweeringsprodukten 1
123 çassave-gerecht cassavegerecht 2/1
124, 364,
391 „ [Verwijderd] 1
127 van een van een van een 8
128 weer weêr 1/0
131 Agouti Agoeti 1
133, 141 schreidde schreide 1
133 Anoennaïtoe Anoeannaïtoe 1
134 uw Uw 1
135 Kakoutji Kaikoutji 1
137 wraken wrake 1
139 Anoeannitoe Anoeannaïtoe 2/1
142, 142 hem hen 1
142 zij hij 1
142 zouden zou 3
150 probeerden probeerde 1
151 weefpatroon vlechtpatroon 5
157 Tobe-heroanna Tobe-horoanna 1
158, 255,
264, 269,
269, 276,
376 [Niet in bron] , 1
158 tijger Tijger 1
159 ”* *” 2
162 niet [Verwijderd] 5
163, 164 Caraibisch Caraïbisch 1/0
164 Marorwijne Marowijne 1
164 Corantyn Corantijn 2
164 Marorvijne Marowijne 2
166 slotten slotte 1
170, 340 ” [Verwijderd] 1
183 Nu nu 1
184 uitroeiïng uitroeiing 1/0
185 zijn’s zijn 2
188 vluchtten vluchten 1
189 kanibalen kannibalen 1
189 achtiende achttiende 1
189 Kanibalenstam Kannibalenstam 1
189 Kanibalen Kannibalen 1
189 Giorgia Georgia 1
196 Ogletherpe Oglethorpe 1
198 dède hóso déde-hóso 2/1
201 negervertelingen negervertellingen 1
202 - [Verwijderd] 1
207 Neger-engelsche Neger-Engelsche 1
210 [Niet in bron] in 3
212 lostte loste 1
212, 239 Jamaïca Jamaica 1/0
220 Boesi-gramman Boesi-granman 1
229 Python’s Pythons 1
229 synonym synoniem 2
230 Aequtoriaal Aequatoriaal 1
231 Rabit Rabbit 1
233 Sierre Sierra 1
236 Temekoe-Temebe Temekóe-Temebè 2/0
239 Awarì-bang Awari-bángi 3/1
240 Negerengelsch Neger-Engelsch 2
243 Je Je 0
244 von van 1
246 lachtten lachten 1
246 anansi tori’s anansi-tori’s 1
247 kreool Creool 1
247 déde hóso déde-hóso 1
251 déde-hoso déde-hóso 1/0
251 arratta aratta 1
252 wachvrouw waschvrouw 1
252 Idiaansche Indiaansche 1
253, 296,
363 neer neêr 1/0
254 abormalen abnormalen 1
256, 256,
256 u U 1
267, 268 Jou Jouw 1
268, 277, jou jouw 1
284
269 „ ” 2
269 ” ,„ 2
272 anansi’s Anansi’s 1
276 Ma’ ’Ma 2
276 julie jullie 1
278 [Niet in bron] Vos 4
282, 295 anansi Anansi 1
282 anansì Anansi 2/1
282 Pína Pina 1/0
296, 304,
310, 311,
312, 312,
314, 314 Anansí Anansi 1/0
299, 307 anansí Anansi 2/1
303 broeders Broeders 1
303 zusters Zusters 1
303 Kosi Kósi 1/0
303 [Niet in bron] ,” 2
307, 338 wordt word 1
310, 310 10.000 10,000 1
311 . : 1
311 ! ? 1
313 buikpuin buikpijn 2
314 . ? 1
319 korsten kortsten 1
320 huigelachtige huichelachtige 2
322 broertjes broêrtjes 1/0
324 moeder Moeder 1
324 Vader’s Vaders 1
324 vaders Vaders 1
326 schuim Schuim 1
329, 329 Ma ’Ma 1
331 uit uit uit 4
332 ! : 1
333, 334,
334 Minimini Mininimi 2
334 patient patiënt 1/0
334 Kapro Kopro 1
338 wij Wij 1
338 er Er 1
340 gebruike gebruikelijke 5
344 Hoevell Hoëvell 1/0
345 spin-vertelling spinvertelling 1
348 verergde verergerde 2
348 hoelanger hoe langer 1
349 Spin’s Spins 1
350 voornaamsche voornaamste 2
350 dagens dagen 1
354 papiemento papiamento 1
357 guyave guave 1
365 St. Eustatius St.-Eustatius 1
370 kamplaats kampplaats 1
370 banencultuur bananencultuur 2
373 vrienden vriend 2
376 hollandsche Hollandsche 1
379 zachtzinige zachtzinnige 1
380 Iffi iffi 1
381 Houd Houdt 1
381 okro okra 1
381, 381 houd houdt 1
383 zend zendt 1
386 melodiën melodieën 1
390 houdt houd 1
394, 394 veèren veêren 1/0
396 Neger-engelsch Neger-Engelsch 1
396 Amalavica Amalivaca 2
399 [Niet in bron] : 1
399 Eunctus Eunectus 1
399 Piaaiman Piaiman 1
400 Mrs Mrs. 1
400 Dokoen Dokóen 1/0
400 Dokoenboom Dokóenboom 1/0
401 NE. N.E. 1
401 donkerebruinen donkerbruinen 1
402 Auruba Aruba 1
402 Dominico Dominica 1
402 Onca onca 1
403 Anacardicum Anacardium 1
405 Kopra Kanon Kópro Kanón 3/1
405 ,) ), 2
405, 416 [Niet in bron] - 1
406 kankantree kankantrie 1
407 Maconoura Maconaura 1
407 waarmêe waarmeê 2/0
408 Massoewa Masoewa 1
408 Winnamoeroe Winnamoroe 1
409 Ooloekwa-toelala Oeloekwa-toelala 1
409 [Niet in bron] ( 1
409 Okro Okra 1
409 ( [Verwijderd] 1
409 ) [Verwijderd] 1
410 Ipomaea Batatas Ipomoea batatas 2
413 [Niet in bron] L. 3
414 Verweerings-korst Verweeringskorst 1
414 Zuid-America Zuid-Amerika 1
415 Blondii blondii 1
415, 416 N.-E. N.E. 1
416 Magroveboomen Mangroveboomen 1

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