Researching Lived Experience Human

Science for an Action Sensitive

Pedagogy Second Edition. Edition Max
Van Manen
Visit to download the full and correct content document:
https://textbookfull.com/product/researching-lived-experience-human-science-for-an-a
ction-sensitive-pedagogy-second-edition-edition-max-van-manen/
More products digital (pdf, epub, mobi) instant
download maybe you interests ...

The Lived Experience of Climate Change Knowledge

Science and Public Action 1st Edition Dina Abbott

https://textbookfull.com/product/the-lived-experience-of-climate-
change-knowledge-science-and-public-action-1st-edition-dina-
abbott/

An Education in Evil Implications for Curriculum

Pedagogy and Beyond Cathryn Van Kessel

https://textbookfull.com/product/an-education-in-evil-
implications-for-curriculum-pedagogy-and-beyond-cathryn-van-
kessel/

Lived theology : new perspectives on method, style, and

pedagogy 1st Edition Azaransky

https://textbookfull.com/product/lived-theology-new-perspectives-
on-method-style-and-pedagogy-1st-edition-azaransky/

Researching Subcultures, Myth and Memory Bart Van Der

Steen

https://textbookfull.com/product/researching-subcultures-myth-
and-memory-bart-van-der-steen/
Teaching and Researching Speaking Applied Linguistics
in Action 3rd Edition Hughes

https://textbookfull.com/product/teaching-and-researching-
speaking-applied-linguistics-in-action-3rd-edition-hughes/

Process, Action, and Experience 1st Edition Rowland

Stout

https://textbookfull.com/product/process-action-and-
experience-1st-edition-rowland-stout/

The Embodied Mind Cognitive Science and Human

Experience Francisco J. Varela

https://textbookfull.com/product/the-embodied-mind-cognitive-
science-and-human-experience-francisco-j-varela/

Researching Gender Violence and Abuse Theory Methods

Action 1st Edition Nicole Westmarland

https://textbookfull.com/product/researching-gender-violence-and-
abuse-theory-methods-action-1st-edition-nicole-westmarland/

A Sociology of Place in Australia: Farming, Change and

Lived Experience 1st Edition Claire Baker

https://textbookfull.com/product/a-sociology-of-place-in-
australia-farming-change-and-lived-experience-1st-edition-claire-
baker/
Researching Lived Experience
Second Edition
Page Intentionally Left Blank
Researching Lived Experience
Second Edition

Human Science for an Action Sensitive Pedagogy

Max van Manen

Originally published by The Althouse Press.

First published 2015 by Left Coast Press, Inc.

Published 2016 by Routledge

2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017, USA

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

Copyright © 1997 by Max van Manen.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or

utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now
known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any
information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from
the publishers.

Notice:
Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and
are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.

Library of Congress Cataloguing-in-Publication Data available from the publisher

ISBN 978-1-62958-416-4 paperback

Page Intentionally Left Blank
voor mijn moeder
 Table of Contents

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . 1x
Preface to the 2nd Edition . XI
1 Human Science . . . . . . 1
Introduction . . . . . . . 1
Why Do Human Science Research? 4
What Is a Hermeneutic Phenomenological Human Science? 8
What Does it Mean to Be Rational? . 13
What a Human Science Cannot Do . . . . . . . . . 21
Description or Interpretation? . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Research-Procedures, Techniques, and Methods 27
Methodical Structure ofHuman Science Research . 30

2 Turning to the Nature of Lived Experience . 35

The Nature of Lived Experience . . . . . . . . 35
Orienting to the Phenomenon . . . . . . . . . 39
Formulating the Phenomenological Question 42
Explicating Assumptions and Pre-understandings . . 46

3 Investigating Experience as We Live It . . . . . . . 53

The Nature of Data (datum: thing given or granted) . 53
Using Personal Experience as a Starting Point . 54
Tracing Etymological Sources . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Searching Idiomatic Phrases . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Obtaining Experiential Descriptions from Others . 62
Protocol Writing (lived-experience descriptions) . 63
Interviewing (the personal life story) . . 66
Observing (the experiential anecdote) . . . . . . . 68
Experiential Descriptions in Literature . . . . . . 70
Biography as a Resource for Experiential Material . 71
Diaries, Journals, and Logs as Sources of Lived Experiences . 73
Art as a Source of Lived Experience . . . . 74
Consulting Phenomenological Literature . . 74

4 Hermeneutic Phenomenological Reflection 77

Conducting Thematic Analysis . 78
Situations . . . . . . 80
Seeking Meaning . . 86
What Is a Theme? . 87
 The Pedagogy of Theme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Uncovering Thematic Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
Isolating Thematic Statements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
Composing Linguistic Transformations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Gleaning Thematic Descriptions from Artistic Sources . . . . . . 96
Interpretation through Conversation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Collaborative Analysis: The Research Seminar/Group . . . . . . 100
Lifeworld Existentials as Guides to Reflection . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Determining Incidental and Essential Themes . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5 Hermeneutic Phenomenological Writing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Attending to the Speaking of Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Silence-the Limits and Power of Language . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
Anecdote as a Methodological Device . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
The Value of Anecdotal Narrative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
Varying the Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
Writing Mediates Reflection and Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
To Write is to Measure Our Thoughtfulness . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
Writing Exercises the Ability to See . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
To Write is to Show Something . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
To Write is to Rewrite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
6 Maintaining a Strong and Oriented Relation . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
The Relation Between Research/Writing and Pedagogy . . . . . 135
On the Ineffability of Pedagogy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
"Seeing" Pedagogy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
The Pedagogic Practice of Textuality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
Human Science as Critically Oriented Action Research . . . . . 154
Action Sensitive Knowledge Leads to Pedagogic Competence . . 156
7 Balancing the Research Context by Considering Parts and Whole 161
The Research Proposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
Effects and Ethics of Human Science Research . . . . . . . . . . 162
Plan and Context of a Research Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
Working the Text . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
Preface

This book is an attempt to introduce and explicate a hermeneutic

phenomenological approach to human science research and writing.
Influenced by the spirit of the European movements as well as by certain
North American developments, the text offers a pedagogically ground-
ed concept of research that takes its starting point in the empirical realm
of everyday lived experience. The notion underlying this approach is
that interpretive phenomenological research and theorizing cannot be
separated from the textual practice of writing. Thus, a semiotics in-
spired dimension is part of this research approach, while the practical
nature of the pedagogic lifeworld demands that this form of educational
inquiry does not convert into armchair philosophizing or abstract
theorizing.
I came to the human sciences, phenomenology and hermeneutics,
in my studies of pedagogy in theNetherlands. During the nineteen-six-
ties the predominant orientation to teacher education was an approach
that was called Geisteswissenschaftliche Piidagogik in Germany and
Fenomenologische Pedagogiek in the Netherlands. The German tradi-
tion of "human science pedagogy" (the Dilthey-Nohl School) employed
an interpretive or hermeneutic methodology and the Dutch movement
of "phenomenological pedagogy" (the Utrecht School) was more des-
criptive or phenomenological in orientation. This text reflects aspects
and features derived from both traditions. However, a characteristic of
the European approach to pedagogy was its almost total unconcern with
questions of method. Those who engaged in interpretive phe-
nomenological research in education (such as Langeveld, Beets, and
Bollnow) often wrote sensitively reflective studies of the pedagogic
lifeworld that parents and teachers share with their children and stu-
dents. But questions of method or how to partake in such scholarship
(x) Researching Lived Experience

were simply not raised. During the late sixties the German hermeneuti-
cal pedagogy movement and the Dutch phenomenological tradition
declined as a result of certain ideological and social pressures; on the
one hand from influences of North American behaviorism, and on the
other hand from emerging social critical theories in education in Ger-
many. More recently a resurgence, although in different forms, of the
earlier human science impulses is noticeable.
In pursuing this project I have benefitted from discussions with
colleagues and friends Ton Beekman, Bas Levering, Antoinette Oberg,
Helmut Danner, Robert Burch, Alan Blum and others. And I have been
particularly stimulated by the students I have worked with in these past
years. Many of them have become good friends and colleagues. I like
to mention especially David G. Smith, Vangie Bergum, Carol Olson,
Rod Evans, Stefan Baldursson, Kim Krawchenko, Chizuko Maeda,
Mikio Fujita, and Stephen Smith who, in their own unique ways, have
helped to make the Human Science Pedagogy project such a fascinating
endeavour. I thank Geoff Milburn for his confidence and encourage-
ments to publish this text.
The author and publisher wish to express their gratitude to Dr.
Phyllis Chesler for granting permission to re-print an extract from With
Child: A Diary of Motherhood (New York: Crowell, 1979), which
appears on pages 72-73 of this book.
 Preface (xi)

Preface to the 1997 Edition

Researchers in professional domains such as education, nursing,
medicine, law, psychiatry, counselling and psychology increasingly
are becoming aware of the importance of interpretive models that
place human situatedness central and are based on the belief that we
can best understand human beings from the experiential reality of
their lifeworlds. How do we experience the lifeworld? On the one
hand it is already there; on the other hand we take part in shaping and
creating it. In other words, the world is given to us and actively
constituted by us: reflecting on it phenomenologically, we may be
presented with possibilities of individual and collective self-under-
standing and thoughtful praxis.
Although this 1997 edition remains unchanged, this new preface
allows me to make a few comments about questions that have been
raised by readers of this text. Some questions are related to the
difficulty that hermeneutic phenomenological method does not offer
a procedural system; rather, its method requires an ability to be
reflective, insightful, sensitive to language, and constantly open to
experience. Other questions are prompted by the interests of differ-
ent research perspectives.
The field of research is susceptible to cycles. When this book
was written, ethnography, biography, content analysis, feminist his-
tory, gender studies, action research, constructivism and critical
theory were dominant in the field of qualitative research; and post-
structuralism, psychoanalytic readings of contemporary culture, me-
dia studies, cultural studies, deconstructionism, and narrativity were
about to become de rigueur amongst a broader contingent of quali-
tative researchers. As we tum the millenium, some of these ap-
proaches are now on the wane, and others have been incorporated
into existing methodologies.
Many of the sustaining contributions of these developments have
their roots in the tradition of human science and attest to the vitality
of concerns with reflective interpretation, experience-sensitive un-
derstanding, the textuality of meaning, and humanistic impulses. For
example, deconstructionism has demonstrated the complexity of
(xii) Researching Lived Experience

refractive relations between meaning and text; (auto)biography

brings home the value of the uniqueness of personal experience and
the priority of the self; narrative inquiry has shown the power of story
to shape personal and collective history; feminism and cultural
studies prove the importance of contextualizing interpretive mean-
ing; and poststructuralism makes us more pointedly aware of the
subjective and intersubjective roots of meaning. Thus, seemingly
divergent inquiry models serve to make us aware of enduring and
shared human science concerns.
Questions prompted by the influences of poststructuralism, gen-
der studies, and so forth are legion. Some show that we need to
radicalize more profoundly themes such as the subjectivity of under-
standing, the complexity of the lifeworld, the importance of other-
ness, the commitment to truly listen to the voices of the vulnerable,
and that we need to guard against polemical moral self-righteousness.
Themes that often emerge have to do with the uniqueness of experi-
ence, the assumptions of essentialism, the (in)commensurability of
cultural and gender studies, and the relation between language and
experience. I will touch briefly on each of these issues.

The Theme of Uniqueness. This text offers a method that begins with
a tum to the lifeworld, and requires that we approach experience in
a manner that is as unbiased as possible: we must dislodge and
confront our unexamined assumptions. But what is this experience
to which we tum? And how do I know that I experience things in the
same way as does someone else? Is each of our experiences not
unique, even though we may use the same words to describe those
experiences? To be sure, there is no guarantee that our subjectively
felt experiences are identical to those of other people. For example,
ifl experience pain or anxiety, then it seems as ifthis inner experience
is so special and so undeniably mine that no other person could
possibly understand and describe exactly what I have undergone.
Adjectives fail to capture the way in which I experience this anxiety.
Even for myself! can never fully give an account of what I experience
in a particular moment or place. What belongs to my inner life seems
 Preface (xiii)

quite beyond words. The most carefully crafted poem falls short. No
one can quite feel what I feel. No one can quite see what and how I
see, no matter how hard he or she may try. This means that in any
particular situation we may not understand things as does the person
next to us. And yet, within certain cultural limits and contexts we
use the same words and the same language to describe our experi-
ences. What, then, does language describe?
One answer is that language is simply inadequate in describing
experience. 1 Ultimately words miss the fullness and the uniqueness
of our private worlds. Words fall short because language is essen-
tially social. It is only through the collectivity of language that we
can access experience, the experience of others as well as our own.
And so the essentially unique and private qualities of inner experience
will ultimately be beyond our linguistic reach. But while our spoken
or written words may never coincide with the actual sensibility of our
lived experiences, it may still be possible and worthwhile to try to
emulate our prereflective life by means of lifeworld-sensitive texts.
In this sense human science can practise the paradox of theorizing
the unique.
Another answer is that language creates and describes an inter-
subjective lifeworld. By learning a language we learn to live in
collective realms of meanings. This means that language has impli-
cations for our experiential possibilities. A person who is at home in
several languages knows that one can say some things in one lan-
guage that one cannot quite say in another language. Thus, we
recognize differentiated possibilities of meaning that adhere to the
socio-cultural context to which a given language belongs. Moreover,
our lifeworlds are made up of different experiential regions that
border each other, partially overlap, and are nested within each other.
Wittgenstein tried to show that these different forms oflife have their
own circumscribed regions of meaning. Through phenomenological
language we explore these experiential possibilities and we navigate
lifeworlds and their hermeneutic horizons.
A third answer is that language lets us know what is experience-
able. Through language we discover our inner experiences, just as
(xiv) Researching Lived Experience

we can say that through experiences we discover the words to which

they seem to belong. It is true as well that certain words or certain
expressions may hold personal meanings for an individual that no
one else can ever fully grasp. In these senses hermeneutic phenome-
nology employs a heuristic of discovery: we discover possibilities
ofbeing and becoming.
A fourth answer is that hermeneutic phenomenology employs
modes of discourse that try to merge cognitive and non-cognitive,
gnostic and pathic ways of knowing. By these terms we mean that
not only do we understand things intellectually or conceptually, we
also experience things in corporeal, relational, enactive, and situ-
ational modalities. Thus, hermeneutic phenomenological method
tries to "explicate" meanings that in some sense are implicit in our
actions. We know things through our bodies, through our relations
with others, and through interaction with the things of our world.
Phenomenological research/writing succeeds when we can make
these meanings recognizable.

The Theme ofEssences. Do things have essences? Can we speak of

the specific whatness of something? For example, is it correct to
speak of the essence of humanness, the essence of language, the
essence of thinking, the essence of music, the essence of a flower?
the essence of poetry? Is it not simplistic to think that things have
essences? This is an important question because "essence" and
"essentialism" have become the ugly words of qualitative research,
especially amongst poststructuralists. But why? What is wrong with
the notion of essence? It would seem that the danger of the concept
of essence lies primarily in the moral significance that is attached to
it.
When we speak about the essence of poetry, for example, all we
mean to say is that in some respects poetry has certain qualities or
properties that make it distinguishable from other literary forms such
as novels, plays, or essays. In other words, without these qualities or
properties poetry would no longer be experienced as poetry. And this
 Preface (xv)

is true for almost anything. And so we can ask what properties belong
to flowers such that a flower would no longer be a flower if one were
to take these properties away.
On the one hand, someone who argues that there are no essences
seems to be taking an extremist position. A poem differs from a short
story, a flower differs from a tree, pain differs from comfort, trust
differs from distrust. There is little controversy about this way of
speaking about essences. This is not to deny that the line between
poetry and prose sometimes is difficult to draw; or that a poetic text
sometimes is indistinguishable from prose text. The essence of
things depends precisely on the play between difference and same-
ness, and Wittgenstein has shown that these shifts of meaning are
reflective of our forms of life and family resemblances of meaning.
As Eagleton points out, "For something to display certain essential
properties does not necessarily mean that we always know for sure
where it ends and another object begins. A field with uncertain
boundaries can still be a field." 2
On the other hand, phenomenologists know that the notion of
essence is highly complex and that the early Husserlian view tended
towards simplifying the search for essences in some of his followers.
Essence is not a single, fixed property by which we know something;
rather, it is meaning constituted by a complex array of aspects,
properties and qualities-some ofwhich are incidental and some of
which are more critical to the being of things. The term essence de-
rives from the verb to be-by definition a profoundly existential no-
tion. It asks what something "is" for the one who asks the question.
Essence asks for what something is, and without which it would no
longer be what it is. And it asks this question while being aware of
context, (inter)subjectivity, language, and so forth. It is for this rea-
son that human science is such a fascinating project: every interpre-
tation can be called into question; every inquiry we can begin anew;
every hermeneutic phenomenological conversation is unending.
Anti-essentialists have provided an important service. By argu-
ing that essences are illusory, they have drawn attention to the danger
of confusing culture with nature, and of reification in the humanities
(xvi) Researching Lived Experience

and the social and human sciences. Anti-essentialists have criticized

philosophical and cultural outlooks that define, for example, the
nature of womanhood, childhood, or ethnicity, and that subsequently
draw moral conclusions from these definitions: for instance, the
notion that women are inherently weak or emotional and therefore
ill-suited for leadership, or that children are by nature sinful and
therefore must be rid of their inborn inclination towards evil, or that
certain ethnic groups possess innate properties from which cultures
or nations must be cleansed. Anti-essentialists have shown that there
are essentialist perspectives that reduce social phenomena to immu-
table categories and social groups to fixed types. Essentialism of this
categorical variety shares with positivism the reification of experien-
tial phenomena into external objects. Categorical essentialism is
dangerous in that it tends to see things in absolute terms, and from
these fixed properties one derives moral convictions.

The Theme of (In)Commensurability. The most frequently raised

issue concerning (in)commensurability has to do with the relation
between culture studies and phenomenology. Of course, it goes
without saying that experience is personal and is influenced by factors
such as gender, culture, etc. For example, is the phenomenological
attitude compatible with the feminist one? The best answer is prob-
ably both yes and no-since there is not one kind of feminism and
not a singular phenomenological method. Some feminists have
pointed out that certain themes-such as the idea of essence in
philosophy, the epoche in the early Husserl, the objectifying look of
Sartre, or the notion of embodiment in Merleau-Ponty-have been
rather insensitive to contextual factors of culture, gender, and lan-
guage in the constitution of meaning.
But, on balance, one could probably argue that there are many
important epistemological and ontological themes that phenomenol-
ogy and gender studies have in common: (a) there is Husserl's
critique of naturalism in the positive sciences which is reminiscent
of the critique of the hegemony of scientific truth, objectivity and
neutrality~ (b) the phenomenological program of reclaiming lived
 Preface (xvii)

experience is important for women who want to ask how the experi-
ences of women or young girls may differ from those of men or boys;
(c) the phenomenological method of radically questioning one's
assumptions is compatible with the reflective unravelling of male
prejudice in language and in the institutions and practices of everyday
life; (d) the phenomenological emphasis on suspending theoretic
biases also may serve to make us aware of the patriarchal roots of
many theoretic concepts, linguistic structures, and methods in sci-
ences such as medicine, psychoanalysis, and education; (e) beth
phenomenology and gender studies entail turning to experience as
we live it rather than as we represent it in abstract theory and in binary
oppositions like thinking and feeling, cognition and emotion, action
and reflection; (f) both attempt to find modes of discourse, voice, and
expression that can reveal felt meaning that goes beyond the prevail-
ing paradigm of logic, cognition, prediction, and control. In this
sense hermeneutic phenomenology seems to be quite amenable to
feminine forms of knowing, inquiring, and writing.

The Theme of Language. The person who begins a hermeneutic

phenomenological study soon discovers that this form of inquiry is
not a closed system. There are many paradoxes that mark the routes
of a human science journey. As one develops a focus on the phe-
nomena of lived experience, it soon appears that these phenomena
are highly elusive and problematic. If I focus on an experience that
strikes me as particularly interesting but that is not easily captured in
language, then I may wonder: what word(s) do I use to describe this
experience? Sometimes a story may help: "Has something like
this ... ever happened to you?" Sometimes a scene from a movie or a
few lines from a poem may help to communicate the topic of our
inquiry. And yet, experience is always more immediate, more enig-
matic, more complex, more ambiguous than any description can do
justice to. The human science researcher is a scholar-author who
must be able to maintain an almost unreasonable faith in the power
(xviii) Researching Lived Experience

of language to make intelligible and understandable what always

seems to lie beyond language.
I am moved by an evocative musical passage. I feel strengthened
by an encouraging hand on my shoulder. I recall a frightful childhood
experience. I am struck by the loveliness of someone I meet. I
wistfully reminisce on a holiday adventure. I exchange a meaningful
glance with someone. How do we capture and interpret the possible
meanings of such experiences? The things we are trying to describe
or interpret are not really things at all-our actual experiences are
literally "nothing." And yet, we seem to create some-thing when we
use language in human science inquiry.
What then is the relation between language and experience? It
seems that with words we create some-thing (concepts, insights,
feelings) out of no-thing (lived experience), yet these words forever
will fall short of our aims. Perhaps this is because language tends to
intellectualize our awareness-language is a cognitive apparatus.
What we try to do in phenomenological research is to evoke under-
standings through language that in a curious way seem to be non-cog-
nitive. This matter is important because many professions (such as
pedagogy, nursing, healing, counselling) seem to require not only
trainable skills and specialized bodies ofknowledge but also abilities
that have to do with discretionary, intuitive, pathic, and tactful
capacities. It seems that in these directions lie the relevant and
continuing contributions of hermeneutic phenomenology for the
epistemology of professional practice. 3

Notes
1. See Patricia De Martelaere, Een verlangen naar ontroostbaar-
heid. Amsterdam: Meulenhoff, 1966.
2. See Terry Eagleton, 1he illusions ofpostmodemism. Oxford:
Blackwell, 1996, p. 98.
3. See Max van Manen (forthcoming), Meaning and Method.
CHAPTER 1

Human Science

Introduction
It may be useful to state at the outset what the intention of this book
is and what interest a reader may have in it. On the one hand, this text
describes a human science research approach, showing a semiotic
employment of the methods of phenomenology and hermeneutics. And
on the other hand, the text engages the reader in pedagogic reflection
on how we live with children as parents, teachers, or educators.
So one may read this work primarily as a methodology, as a set of
methodological suggestions for engaging in human science research and
writing. But in the human sciences, as conceived in this text, one does
not pursue research for the sake of research. It is presumed that one
comes to the human sciences with a prior interest of, for example, a
teacher, a nurse, or a psychologist. This book attempts to be relevant
to researchers in nursing, psychology, and other such professions. But
the fundamental orientation in here is pedagogic.
The various examples provided throughout this text will often in-
volve an investigation of the meanings of teaching, parenting, and
related pedagogic vocations-not assuming, of course, that teaching
and parenting are identical phenomena. And so when we raise ques-
tions, gather data, describe a phenomenon, and construct textual inter-
pretations, we do so as researchers who stand in the world in a pedagogic
way.
One can distinguish a variety of approaches in the field of the human
sciences. A research method is only a way of investigating certain kinds
of questions. The questions themselves and the way one understands
the questions are the important starting points, not the method as such.
2 Researching Lived Experience

But of course it is true as well that the way in which one articulates
certain questions has something to do with the research method that
one tends to identify with. So there exists a certain dialectic between
question and method. Why then should one adopt one research ap-
proach over another? The choice should reflect more than mere whim,
preference, taste, or fashion. Rather, the method one chooses ought to
maintain a certain harmony with the deep interest that makes one an
educator (a parent or teacher) in the first place.
The human science approach in this text is avowedly phe-
nomenological, hermeneutic, and semiotic or language oriented, not
just because that happens to be the particular interest or prejudice of
the author but rather because pedagogy requires a phenomenological
sensitivity to lived experience (children's realities and lifeworlds ). Ped-
agogy requires a hermeneutic ability to make interpretive sense of the
phenomena of the lifeworld in order to see the pedagogic significance
of situations and relations of living with children. And pedagogy re-
quires a way with language in order to allow the research process of
textual reflection to contribute to one's pedagogic thoughtfulness and
tact.
Pedagogy is the activity of teaching, parenting, educating, or
generally living with children, that requires constant practical acting in
concrete situations and relations. The knowledge forms generated by
a human science methodology as described in this text are meant to
serve the practical aims of pedagogy. The term "human science" is
employed more narrowly in this text than it might be encountered
elsewhere. Here, "human science" is often used interchangeably with
the terms "phenomenology" or "hermeneutics." This usage is not
inconsistent with the hermeneutic phenomenological tradition as found
in Germany (from about 1900 to 1965) and in the Netherlands (from
about 1945 to 1970). The present text intends to be a modern extension
of certain aspects of that tradition of "Human Science Pedagogy."
To the extent that the European traditions are sources for this text,
an attempt has been made to do a methodological reading of the work
of German and Dutch authors. A distinguishing feature of the German
Geisteswissenschaftliche Piidagogik and the Dutch Fenomenologische
Pedagogiek has been that there was a marked unconcern with methods
and epistemology. Students of outstanding scholars such as Nohl, Litt,
Flitner, Bollnow, Langeveld, van den Berg, and Buytendijkwere meant
to learn the process by osmosis or apprenticeship, which the Germans
 Human Science 3

would sometimes callBildung. Only the most talented succeeded. One

said of Dutch scholars who worked in the phenomenological tradition
that there was no mediocrity in their research: the work was either very
good or very bad. And, of course, only the good studies have survived-
which is one criterion of their quality.
In his book Truth and Method (1975) the philosopher Gadamer
argues that the preoccupation with (objective) method or technique is
really antithetical to the spirit of human science scholarship. He shows
that the preoccupation of Dilthey or later Husserl to develop an objec-
tive human science led them to programs that are alienated from the
actual content of the concept of life. The irony in this argument is that
the reference to "method" in the title of Gadamer's book, Truth and
Method, may have contributed to its immense popularity among scholars
in North America. At any rate, in this text I hope to show that there is
a way to deal with methodological concerns that is decidedly un-
methodological in a purely prescriptive or technocratic sense. The
fundamental thesis of this approach is that almost anyone who is serious-
ly interested in human science research can benefit from an examination
of its methodological dimensions. There is no guarantee, however, that
all students of the human sciences will be able to produce work that is
"very good." One needs to be constantly on guard against the seductive
illusions of technique (Barrett, 1978).
In North America, the field of the human sciences (which includes
symbolic interactionism, phenomenological sociology, ethnography,
ethnomethodology, critical theory, gender study, semiotics, etc.) con-
sists of approaches to research and theorizing that have certain roots in
continental sources while other developments are indigenous to North
America. The distinction of "Human" Science versus "Natural"
Science is often attributed to Wilhelm Dilthey. Dilthey developed the
contrast between the Natwwissenschaften (the natural or physical
sciences) and the Geisteswissenschaften into a methodological program
for the latter. For Dilthey the proper subject matter for the Geisteswis-
senschaften is the human world characterized by Geist-mind, thoughts,
consciousness, values, feelings, emotions, actions, and purposes, which
find their objectifications in languages, beliefs, arts, and institutions.
Thus, at the risk of oversimplification one might say that the difference
between natural science and human science resides in what it studies:
natural science studies "objects of nature," "things," "natural events,"
and "the way that objects behave." Human science, in contrast, studies
4 Researching Lived Experience

"persons," or beings that have "consciousness" and that "act purpose-

fully" in and on the world by creating objects of "meaning" that are
"expressions" of how human beings exist in the world.
The preferred method for natural science, since Galileo, has been
detached observation, controlled experiment, and mathematical or
quantitative measurement. And when the natural science method has
been applied to the behavioral social sciences, it has retained proce-
dures of experimentation and quantitative analysis. In contrast, the
preferred method for human science involves description, interpreta-
tion, and self-reflective or critical analysis. We explain nature, but
human life we must understand, said Dilthey (1976). Whereas natural
science tends to taxonomize natural phenomena (such as in biology) and
causally or probabilistically explain the behavior of things (such as in
physics), human science aims at explicating the meaning of human
phenomena (such as in literary or historical studies of texts) and at
understanding the lived structures of meanings (such as in phe-
nomenological studies of the lifeworld).
The starting point of this text is the belief that human science
research in education done by educators ought to be guided by
pedagogical standards. The fundamental model of this approach is
textual reflection on the lived experiences and practical actions of
everyday life with the intent to increase one's thoughtfulness and
practical resourcefulness or tact. Phenomenology describes how one
orients to lived experience, hermeneutics describes how one interprets
the "texts" of life, and semiotics is used here to develop a practical
writing or linguistic approach to the method of phenomenology and
hermeneutics. What is novel to this text is that research and writing are
seen to be closely related, and practically inseparable pedagogical ac-
tivities. The type of reflection required in the act of hermeneutic
phenomenological writing on the meanings and significances of
phenomena of daily life is fundamental to pedagogic research. Thus,
this text has pedagogic ambitions at two levels. It offers a research
approach that is fundamental to the process of pedagogy, and it tries to
practise what it preaches by orienting itself to questions of pedagogy in
the discussion of method.
Why Do Human Science Research?
"Whoever is searching for the human being first must find the
lantern," Nietzsche said once (Buytendijk, 1947, p. 22). In this aphoris-
 Human Science 5

tic reference to the philosopher Diogenes, Niet~che raised two ques-

tions: What does it mean to study the human being in his or her
humanness? And, what methodology is required for this kind of study?
Diogenes was a Greek philosopher living in the fourth century BC and
now known to us as an unconventional thinker of a cutting wit and
repartee who taught his feilow citizens largely by pantomimic gesture
and example. One day Diogenes was reported to have gone about the
city in clear daylight with a lit lantern looking about as if he had lost
something. When people came up to ask what he was trying to find he
answered: "Even with a lamp in broad daylight I cannot find a real
human being," and when people pointed to themselves he chased them
with a stick, shouting "it is real human beings I want." Of course, most
people laughed at this demonstration. But the anecdote survived be-
cause it did bring some to reflect on the most original question contained
in Diogenes' pantomimic exercise: What is the nature of human being?
And what does it mean to ask this question? Diogenes' demonstration
was meant as well to jar the moral consciousness of those who settle for
easy answers-a human being is not just something you automatically
are, it is also something you must try to be. And apparently Diogenes
implied that he had great trouble finding some good examples. The
bizarre prop of the lit lamp in bright daylight was his way of saying that
he could not "see" any human beings. He felt the need to throw some
light on the matter; or perhaps more appropriately, with his lamp
Diogenes showed a commitment, not to fancy abstract philosophical
discourse, but to practical reflection in the concreteness and fullness of
lived life.
From a phenomenological point of view, to do research is always to
question the way we experience the world, to want to know the world
in which we live as human beings. And since to know the world is
profoundly to be in the world in a certain way, the act of researching-
questioning-theorizing is the intentional act of attaching ourselves to
the world, to become more fully part of it, or better, to become the world.
Phenomenology calls this inseparable connection to the world the
principle of "intentionality." In doing research we question the world's
very secrets and intimacies which are constitutive of the world, and
which bring the world as world into being for us and in us. Then research
is a caring act: we want to know that which is most essential to being.
To care is to serve and to share our being with the one we love. We
desire to truly know our loved one's very nature. And if our love is
6 Researching Lived Experience

strong enough, we not only will learn much about life, we also will come
face to face with its mystery.
The Austrian psychologist, Ludwig Binswanger (1963, p. 173), has
shown that the reverse is true as well. We can only understand some-
thing or someone for whom we care. In this sense of how we come to
know a human being, the words of Goethe are especially valid: "One
learns to know only what one loves, and the deeper and fuller the
knowledge is to be, the more powerful and vivid must be the love, indeed
the passion" (1963, p. 83). I do not suggest that love or care itself is a
way or method for knowing, but as Frederik Buytendijk said in his 1947
inaugural lecture, love is foundational for all knowing of human exist-
ence. That knowing is not a purely cognitive act is a principle to which
we nod occasionally in educational research. Contemporary phe-
nomenologists like the Frenchman Emmanuel Levinas (1981) have
attempted to demonstrate the deep philosophical truth of this insight.
Especially where I meet the other person in his or her weakness,
vulnerability or innocence, I experience the undeniable presence of
loving responsibility: a child who calls upon me may claim me in a way
that leaves me no choice. Most parents have experienced this moral
claim and many teachers and other educators who are involved in
pedagogic relationships in a self-forgetful manner have experienced this
effect of children in their lives. When I love a person (a child or adult)
I want to know what contributes toward the good of that person. So the
principle that guides my actions is a sense of the pedagogic Good (van
Manen, 1982b); at the same time I remain sensitive to the uniqueness
of the person in this particular situation.
Hermeneutic phenomenology is a human science which studies
persons. In research terminology one often uses "subjects" or "in-
dividuals" to refer to the persons involved in one's study. But, as
W. H. Auden once said, "individual" is primarily a biological term to
classify a tree, a horse, a man, a woman; while the term "person" refers
to the uniqueness of each human being. ·~ persons, we are incom-
parable, unclassifiable, uncountable, irreplaceable" (1967). One might
make a partisan claim for the sphere in which hermeneutic
phenomenological research is (or should be) conducted. In the sense
that traditional, hypothesizing, or experimental research is largely inter-
ested in knowledge that is generalizable, true for one and all, it is not
entirely wrong to say that there is a certain spirit inherent in such a
research atmosphere. Actions and interventions, like exercises, are
 Human Science 7

seen as repeatable; while subjects and samples, like soldiers, are replace-
able. In contrast, phenomenology is, in a broad sense, a philosophy or
theory ofthe unique; it is interested in what is essentially not replaceable.
We need to be reminded that in our desire to find out what is effective
systematic intervention (from an experimental research point of view),
we tend to forget that the change we aim for may have different
significance for different persons.
What first of all characterizes phenomenological research is that it
always begins in the lifeworld. This is the world of the natural attitude
of everyday life which Husser! described as the original, pre-reflective,
pre-theoretical attitude. In bringing to reflective awareness the nature
of the events experienced in our natural attitude, we are able to trans-
form or remake ourselves in the true sense of Bildung (education).
Hermeneutic phenomenological research edifies the personal insight
(Rorty, 1979), contributing to one's thoughtfulness and one's ability to
act toward others, children or adults, with tact or tactfulness. In this
sense, human science research is itself a kind of Bildung or paideia; it is
the curriculum of being and becoming. We might say that hermeneutic
phenomenology is a philosophy of the personal, the individual, which
we pursue against the background of an understanding of the evasive
character of the logos of other, the whole, the communal, or the social.
Much of educational research tends to pulverize life into minute ab-
stracted fragments and particles that are of little use to practitioners.
So it is perhaps not surprising that a human science that tries to avoid
this fragmentation would be gaining more attention. Its particular
appeal is that it tries to understand the phenomena of education by
maintaining a view of pedagogy as an expression of the whole, and a
view of the experiential situation as the topos of real pedagogic acting.
The approach described in this text takes seriously a notion that is
very self-evident and yet seldom acknowledged: hermeneutic phe-
nomenological research is fundamentally a writing activity. Research
and writing are aspects of one process. In a later chapter the pedagogi-
cal significance of the reflective nature of writing is explored and
articulated. Hermeneutics and phenomenology are human science
approaches which are rooted in philosophy; they are philosophies,
reflective disciplines. Therefore, it is important for the human science
researcher in education to know something of the philosophic tradi-
tions. This does not mean, however, that one must become a profes-
sional philosopher in an academic sense. It means that one should know
8 Researching Lived Experience

enough to be able to articulate the epistemological or theoretical

implications of doing phenomenology and hermeneutics-not losing
sight of the fact that one is interested in the pedagogic praxis of this
research; more accurately, it means that human science research prac-
tised by an educator is a pedagogic human science.
The end of human science research for educators is a critical
pedagogical competence: knowing how to act tactfully in pedagogic
situations on the basis of a carefully edified thoughtfulness. To that end
hermeneutic phenomenological research reintegrates part and whole,
the contingent and the essential, value and desire. It encourages a
certain attentive awareness to the details and seemingly trivial dimen-
sions of our everyday educational lives. It makes us thoughtfully aware
of the consequential in the inconsequential, the significant in the taken-
for-granted. Phenomenological descriptions, if done well, are compell-
ing and insightful. The eloquence of the texts may contrast sharply with
the toil, messiness, and difficulties involved in the research/writing
process. '~d this took that long to write, you say?" ·~ter seven
drafts!?"
It all seems somewhat absurd until we begin to discern the silence
in the writing-the cultivation of one's being, from which the words
begin to proliferate in haltingly issued groupings, then finally in a
carefully written work, much less completed than interrupted, a blush-
ing response to a call to say something worth saying, to actually say
something, while being thoughtfully aware of the ease with which such
speaking can reduce itself to academic chatter.

What Is a Hermeneutic Phenomenological Human Science?

What is hermeneutic phenomenology? There is a difference be-

tween comprehending the project of phenomenology intellectually and
understanding it "from the inside." We tend to get a certain satisfaction
out of grasping at a conceptual or "theoretical" level the basic ideas of
phenomenology, even though a real understanding of phenomenology
can only be accomplished by "actively doing it." As a first orientation,
the philosophical idea of phenomenology will be sketched around a few
introductory remarks, and then a fuller more active description of the
nature of hermeneutic phenomenological research and writing will be
attempted.
 Human Science 9

Phenomenological research is the study of lived experience.

To say the same thing differently: phenomenology is the study of
the lifeworld-the world as we immediately experience it pre-reflective-
ly rather than as we conceptualize, categorize, or reflect on it (Husserl,
1970b; Schutz and Luckmann, 1973). Phenomenology aims at gaining
a deeper understanding of the nature or meaning of our everyday
experiences. Phenomenology asks, "What is this or that kind of ex-
perience like?" It differs from almost every other science in that it
attempts to gain insightful descriptions of the way we experience the
world pre-reflectively, without taxonomizing, classifying, or abstracting
it. So phenomenology does not offer us the possibility of effective
theory with which we can now explain and/or control the world, but
rather it offers us the possibility of plausible insights that bring us in
more direct contact with the world. This project is both new and old.
It is new in the sense that modern thinking and scholarship is so caught
up in theoretical and technological thought that the program of a
phenomenological human science may strike an individual as a break-
through and a liberation. It is old in the sense that, over the ages, human
beings have invented artistic, philosophic, communal, mimetic and
poetic languages that have sought to (re )unite them with the ground of
their lived experience.

Phenomenological research is the explication ofphenomena

as they present themselves to consciousness.
Anything that presents itself to consciousness is potentially of inter-
est to phenomenology, whether the object is real or imagined, empiri-
cally measurable or subjectively felt. Consciousness is the only access
human beings have to the world. Or rather, it is by virtue of being
conscious that we are already related to the world. Thus all we can ever
know must present itself to consciousness. Whatever falls outside of
consciousness therefore falls outside the bounds of our possible lived
experience. Consciousness is always transitive. To be conscious is to be
aware, in some sense, of some aspect of the world. And thus
phenomenology is keenly interested in the significant world of the
human being. It is important to realize as well that consciousness itself
cannot be described directly (such description would reduce human
science to the study of consciousness or ideas, the fallacy of idealism).
Similarly, the world itself, without reference to an experiencing person
10 Researching Lived Experience

or consciousness, cannot be described directly either (such approach

would overlook that the real things of the world are always meaningfully
constituted by conscious human beings, the fallacy of realism). So, in
cases when consciousness itself is the object of consciousness (when I
reflect on my own thinking process) then consciousness is not the same
as the act in which it appears. This also demonstrates that true intro-
spection is impossible. A person cannot reflect on lived experience
while living through the experience. For example, if one tries to reflect
on one's anger while being angry, one finds that the anger has already
changed or dissipated. Thus, phenomenological reflection is not intro-
spective but retrospective. Reflection on lived experience is always
recollective; it is reflection on experience that is already passed or lived
through.
Phenomenological research is the study of essences.
Phenomenology asks for the very nature of a phenomenon, for that
which makes a some-"thing" what it is-and without which it could not
be what it is (Husserl, 1982; Merleau-Ponty, 1962). The essence of a
phenomenon is a universal which can be described through a study of
the structure that governs the instances or particular manifestations of
the essence of that phenomenon. In other words, phenomenology is
the systematic attempt to uncover and describe the structures, the
internal meaning structures, of lived experience. A universal or essence
may only be intuited or grasped through a study of the particulars or
instances as they are encountered in lived experience. (By intuition we
do not mean the kind of "problematic" intuition which becomes ques-
tionable when someone claims "intuitively" to have known that Mr.
Jones was a crook.) From a phenomenological point of view, we are
less interested in the factual status of particular instances: whether
something actually happened, how often it tends to happen, or how the
occurrence of an experience is related to the prevalence of other
conditions or events. For example, phenomenology does not ask, "How
do these children learn this particular material?" but it asks, "What is
the nature or essence of the experience of learning (so that I can now
better understand what this particular learning experience is like for
these children)?" The essence or nature of an experience has been
adequately described in language if the description reawakens or shows
us the lived quality and significance of the experience in a fuller or
deeper manner.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
Hartog, on Rotifera, 197 f.;
on Gastrotricha, 231 f.;
on Kinorhyncha, 236 f.
Haswell, on Temnocephalidae, 53;
on Phoronis, 451
Hatschek, on affinities of Polyclads, 28 n.;
on nature of Cestodes, 76;
on Trochophore, 229;
on development of Gephyrea, 419, 447
Head, of Nereis, 246, 248;
of Polychaeta, 259 f.;
regeneration of, 283;
of Tomopteris, 315;
of Aphrodite, 260;
of Chlorhaemidae, 334;
of Eunice, 262;
of Nephthys, 262;
of Phyllodoce, 262;
of Polydora, 261;
of Polynoid, 262;
of Sabella, 261;
of Sabellaria, 263;
of Syllid, 262;
of Trophonia, 262
Hedruris, 163
Hekaterobranchus, 326
Heliodrilus, 359, 380
Heliopora, containing Polydora, 298
Heller, on human parasites, 139
Hemichordata, 462
Hemilepidia, colour of, 292
Hemistomum, 73
Hemitubifex, 378
Henlea, 369
Hermadion, 299
Hermaphrodite, Nemertinea, 109;
Polychaeta, 273 f.
Hermellidae, 258, 341
Hermelliformia, 258, 306, 341
Hermione, 312;
chaetae, 266, 267
Hermionina, 309, 311
Herpobdellidae, 407
Hertwig, O., on Chaetognatha, 187 n.
Hesionidae, 258, 308;
segments, 258;
head, 263;
swim-bladder, 272;
genital organs, 274;
parasitic, 297
Hesperodrilus, 352 f., 369, 378 f.
Hesse, on nervous system of Nematoda, 127
Heterakis, 131, 139
Heterocotylea, 73
Heterodera, 155, 160, 164
Heterogamy, 66 n.
Heteronemertini, 113
Heteronereid phase, 276 f.;
chaetae, 246, 276;
parapodia, 276, 277
Heteronereis, 276, 281—see Heteronereid
Heteropora, 520 n.
Heterosyllis, 278, 279, 281
Hexacotyle, 73
Hexarthra, 223, 226
Hibernaculum, 501, 502
Hincks, on Polyzoa, 475, 500, 508, 516, 519, 523
Hippothoa, 528
Hippuraria, 533
Hirudinea, 241, 392 f.;
external characters, 392;
British species, 393;
eyes, 395;
branchiae, 395;
 alimentary canal, 396;
vascular system, 396;
body-cavity, 397;
nephridia, 399;
reproductive organs, 401;
cocoons, 404;
classification, 405
Hirudiniculture, 393
Hirudo, 393, 396 f., 399, 403, 405, 407;
nephridium, 400
Hislopia, 492
Histioderma, 302
Histriobdella, 242 n.
Histriodrilus, 242 n.
Holloway, on Rotifers, 227
Holomyarii, 137
Holostomatidae, 63, 64, 73
Holostomum, 73;
H. excavatum, 63
Holothurian, as host, 298
Homalogaster, 73
Hood, of Sabellaria, 263, 306
Hooks, of Trematodes, 53, 56, 57;
of Cestodes, 75, 85;
of Cestode-larvae, 87, 88;
taxonomic value in Cestodes, 90 f.
Hoplonemertea, 106, 109, 110;
auditory organs, 106, 110;
British species, 110;
characters, 110;
development, 113;
proboscis, 110
Hornera, 518, 532
Horse, parasites of, 68, 83, 90, 125, 140, 142, 163
Horse-leeches, 393 f.
Horst, on Oligochaeta, 354
Hubrecht on Nemertinea, affinities, 120;
 classification, 109;
excretory system, 108;
nervous system, 105
Hudson, on Rotifera, 197, 198, 215 n., 220 n., 223 n., 228
Hudsonella, 224
Huxley, on Rotifers, 198, 229;
on Polychaeta, 246;
on Molluscoidea, 475
Huxleya, 525, 527
Hyalinoecia, 299, 318, 319;
tentacles, 262;
composition of tube of, 290
Hydatina, 199, 200, 202, 204, 213, 224, 226, 228
Hydatinidae, 224
Hymenolepis, 91;
generic characters, 91;
H. diminuta (= Taenia flavopunctata), life-history, 83;
specific characters, 91;
H. murina (= Taenia murina), 70;
life-history, 83, 89, 91;
H. nana, 80;
life-history, 83;
specific characters, 91
Hyocrinus, as host, 342
Hyperiodrilus, 363 f.;
reproductive organs, 363
Hypodermic impregnation, 27, 218
Hypodermis (= Epidermis) of Gordius, 165;
of Rotifera, etc., 205, 232
Hypophorella, 478, 518, 533;
larva, 510
Hyporhynchus, 49
Hystrichis, 147, 149, 163

Ichthydium, 235
Ichthyobdellidae, 406
Ichthyonema, 131, 147, 149, 163
Ichthyotaenia, 91
Ichthyotaeninae, 85, 91
Idmonea, 518, 532
Iguana, parasites of, 142
Iijima, on yolk-glands, 38 n.
Illoricata, 223
Ilyodrilus, 378;
chaeta, 350
Ilyogenia, 388
Imogine, 19
Inarticulata, 517, 518
Incudate, 210, 211
Incus, in Rotifers, 210
Inermia, 445
Infusoriform embryos, 93
Insects, parasites of, 142, 150, 152, 153, 154, 160, 163, 179,
183, 184, 185
Internal sac, 509, 511
Internode, 525
Interproglottidal glands, 90
Intertentacular organ, 469, 473, 508
Introvert, in Polychaeta, 249, 250;
in Gephyrea, 412, 424
Investing membrane, in ectoparasitic Trematodes, 57;
in Cestodes, 85
Ioda, form of head, 278
Isacis, 163

Jammes, on skin of Nematoda, 126

Jaws, of Nereis, 248, 250, 270;
of Polychaeta, 269 f.;
of Eunicidae, 270;
of Polynoid, 270;
of Autolytus, 270;
fossil, 302;
of Glycera, 270
Jelly, Miss, on Polyzoa, 523
Jensenia, 50
Jimenez, on Leeches, 407
Joblot, on Rotifers, 197
Johnston, on Hirudinea, 393
Joliet, on development of Rotifers, 218;
on Polyzoa, 508
Jungermanniaceae, inhabited by Rotifers, 227
Jurassic, Serpulids, 301;
Polyzoa, 520 f.

Kaiser, on Acanthocephala, 177

Kamptoderm, 469, 470
Keferstein, on Polycladida, 7, 10
Kennel, von, on Nemertinea, 108;
on Malacobdella, 101 n., 119
Kerria, 384
Kinorhyncha, 236 f.
Kleinenberg, on Trochophore, 229
Koellikeria, 73
Kölliker, on Distomum okenii, 71
Koren and Danielssen, on Gephyrea, 442, 443
Kowalevsky, on Hirudinea, 397;
on Phoronis, 458
Kraepelin, on Polyzoa, 493, 502
Krause, on parasites, 163
Krohn, on Nemertine development, 99
Krohnia, 186;
species, 192, 194;
American species, 534
Krukenberg, on haemerythrin, 416
Kynotus, 386

Labrorostratus, 297
Lacinularia, 200, 213, 215, 221, 226
Lacrymaria, 235
Laetmonice, 312
Lagenipora, 528
Lamarck, on Gephyrea, 411
Land, Planarians, 4, 30, 33, 34, 36;
Nemertines, 101, 117;
Oligochaeta, 347 f.;
Leeches, 408
Lang, on Polyclads, 7, 17, 21 f., 27, 28 n.;
on nature of Cestodes, 76
Lanice, 328;
Hypophorella in tubes of, 478, 533
Lankester, on Trochosphere, 229;
on Earthworms, 347;
on Hirudinea, 397;
on Gephyrea, 430, 437, 439;
on Podaxonia, 461
Larva, Müller's, 29;
of Polystomum, 59;
of Diplozoon, 60;
of Gyrodactylus, 61;
of Holostomatidae, 63, 64;
of Distomum 64, 65, 67;
hosts of larvae of digenetic Trematodes, 71 f.;
of Calliobothrium, 77;
of Cestodes, 79 f.;
table of Cestode larvae, 83, 85, 87;
of Schistocephalus, 84;
of Bothriocephalus, 87;
of Dipylidium (Cysticercoid), 83, 88 f.;
of Mesozoa, 92, 93;
of Nemertinea, 113;
Trochosphere, 229, 274, 439, 510;
of Polygordius, 245;
of Polychaeta, 274, 275;
of Chaetopterus, 325;
of Myzostoma, 344;
of Gephyrea, 419, 439;
of Phoronis, 458;
of Polyzoa, 466, 509, 511, 520
Lateral organs, of Capitellidae, 343—see also Ciliated pits
Laurer's Canal (= Laurer-Stieda canal), 57, 87
Leaena, 300, 327 n.
Lecanocephalus, 131, 133
Leckenby, on Priapulus, 433
Leeches, 241, 392 f.—see also Hirudinea
Leeuwenhoek, on Rotifera, 197
Legrain, on Nematodes in deserts, 156
Legros, on Trichina, 146
Lehnert, on Bipalium, 36, 37
Leidy, on Rotifers, 198
Leimacopsis, 37, 42
Lemnisci, 176
Lepas, as host, 298
Lepidasthenia, 293, 311
Lepidoderma, 235
Lepidonotus (subgenus of Polynoe), eye, 255
Lepralia, 516, 518, 528, 530, 531 n.;
L. foliacea, 478, 527;
larva, 511
Leprea, 328
Leptodera, 129, 131, 133, 160
Leptoplana, 7, 8, 9, 11, 14, 17;
British species, 19;
habits, 8 f.;
anatomy, 11 f.
Leptoplanidae, 19
Leptostoma, 396
Lesson, on Polyclads, 24
Leuciscus, parasites of, 173, 182
Leuckart, on Platyhelminthes, 6, 64 f., 70, 76;
on Nemertinea, 99;
on Nematoda, 136, 139, 140, 142, 146, 163;
on Hirudinea, 395
Leucochloridium, 65, 66
Leucocytes, of Polychaeta, 252
Leucodore—see Polydora
Leydig, on Rotifers, 198
Lias, Serpulids in, 301
Libyodrilus, 364, 385, 386
Lichenopora, 518, 531
Life-history, of Trematodes, 4;
of Polystomatidae (Polystomum, Diplozoon, Gyrodactylus), 58
f.;
of digenetic Trematodes, 63 f.;
table of, 71;
of Cestodes, 5 f., 87;
table of life-histories of Cestodes, 83;
of Dipylidium, 88;
of Dicyemidae, 93;
of Nematoda, 159;
of Gordius, 170;
of Acanthocephala, 179—see also Development
Ligula, 91;
occurrence, 85
Ligulinae, 91
Lim Boon Keng, on Earthworms, 349
Lima, nests of, 298
Lime, secreted by Serpulidae, 290
Limnaea truncatula, host of larvae of Distomum hepaticum, 67,
72
Limnatis, 407
Limnias, 205, 221;
early description of, 197
Limnodrilus, 378
Lineus, 111;
L. marinus (= L. longissimus), 99, 100, 111, 114;
Borlase on, 99;
size of, 100;
L. gesserensis (= L. obscurus = L. sanguineus), recuperative
powers of, 116
Linguatulida, affinities of, 344
Linnaeus, on Cestodes, 78;
on Gephyrea, 411;
on Polyzoa, 474
Linstow, von, on classification of Nematodes, 137;
 on life-history of Ascaris lumbricoides, 140;
on parasitism, 162;
on Gordius, 166, 171, 173
Lip, lip-membrane, lip-processes, of Sabellidae, 261, 337
Lipobranchius, 334;
shape of body, 259
Lipochromes, in Polychaeta, 292
Lister, on Polyzoa, 497
Lithodomous, Polychaeta, 287
Lithographic slate, fossil Polychaeta from, 301, 302
Liver, -fluke, 51;
-rot, 68
Locomotion, of Planarians, 9, 10, 36;
of Polyclads, 22 f.;
of Nemertinea, 114, 115;
of Chaetognatha, 190;
of Rotifers, etc., 206, 235;
of Dinophilus, 243;
of Phylactolaemata, 496
Looss, on Trematoda, 62 n., 66, 70
Lopadorhynchina, 314
Lopadorhynchus, 314;
L. erythrophyllum, colour of, 292
Lophochaeta, 351;
chaeta, 350
Lophohelia, with Eunice, 298, 319
Lophophore, in Phoronis, 453;
in Polyzoa, 476, 476, 495
Lophopus, 494, 499, 504, 505, 518, 519;
movements, 496, 497;
fission, 496, 506;
statoblast, 502, 503
Lorica, in Rotifers, 205
Loricata, 205, 224
Lota, parasites of, 182
Loxosoma, 489 f., 489, 490, 506, 518;
on Polychaeta, 299, 489;
 on other animals, 489;
buds, 489, 490, 506;
larva, 509
Lug-worm, castings of, 285;
as bait, 297
Lumbricaria, 302
Lumbricidae, 362, 371 f., 388
Lumbricobdella, 392
Lumbriconereis, 318, 320;
from fresh water, 284
Lumbriconereites (misprinted in text), 302
Lumbriculidae, 350, 361, 379
Lumbriculus, 379;
as host of Rotifer, 211 n.
Lumbricus, 349, 351, 356, 367, 368, 371, 389 f., 403 f.;
generative organs, 362;
cocoon, 365
Lunulites, 518;
vibracula, 487
Lurg, 317
Lycoridae, 315
Lysidice, 297, 320

MacGillivray, on Polyzoa, 519

M‘Intosh, on Nemertinea, 110 n., 115, 116;
on Phoronis, 454
Macraspis, 73
Macrobdella, 393, 406;
sense-body, 394
Macrorhynchus, 44, 47;
British species, 49
Macrostoma, 44, 47;
British species, 49
Macrostomatidae, 49
Magelona, 325;
haemerythrin in, 252
Magelonidae, 258, 325
Main-gut, of Leptoplana, 8, 13;
of Polyclads, 17
Malacobdella, 101;
description of, 119;
M. grossa, 110, 119;
excretory system of, 108
Malacocotylea (= Digenea), 73
Maldanidae (= Clymenidae), 258, 332;
shields, 259;
anal funnel, 259;
chaetae, 266, 267, 268;
colour, 293
Male, of Rotifers, 199, 200, 217, 223 n.;
of Echiuroids, 438
Malleate, 210
Malleoramate, 210, 211
Malleus, 210
Mammals, Trematodes of, 62, 63, 67-70, 71 f.;
Cestodes of, 77-84, 89-91;
Nematodes of, 163;
Acanthocephala of, 183, 184
Man, Trematode-parasites of, 63, 68-70;
Cestodes of, 74, 78-81, 83, 89 f.;
Nematodes of, 125, 139, 140, 143, 145, 147, 163;
Gordius of, 173;
Echinorhynchus of, 183
Man, De, on free-living Nematodes, 157
Manayunkia, 284, 339 n.
Mandible, of avicularium, 482, 524
Manson, on Filaria, 149
Manubrium, 210
Marginal groove, of Leptoplana, 15
Maricola, 30, 32, 42
Marine, Rotifers, 226;
Oligochaeta, 366;
Leeches, 406
Marphysa, 276, 319;
 as bait, 297;
as host, 297
Mastax, of Rotifers, 199, 210
Masterman, on Chaetognatha, 190;
on Phoronis, 461
Mastigocerca, 225
Mastigophora, 518, 529;
vibraculum, 484
Mastobranchus, gill of, 268, 331
Matzdorf, on Leeches, 369
Maupas, on Rotifers, 217
Mbalolo, 297
Meckelia asulcata, 111
Mecynostoma, 49
Median pore, in Cheilostomata, 484, 524
Megadrili, 373, 374, 380 f.
Megalotrocha, 221
Megapora, 530
Megascolex, 351, 372, 381, 383
Megascolides, 349, 358, 372, 382;
body-wall and nephridia, 357
Mégnin, on parasites, 164
Meissner, on Polyzoa, 493
Melania, Coabangia in shell of, 284
Melanin, 292
Melicerta, 202, 205, 206, 210, 215, 218, 219, 221, 226;
early description of, 197
Melicertaceae, 203, 221
Melicertidae, 201, 203, 205, 211, 213, 221
Melinna, 330
Membranipora, 481, 492, 518, 519, 523, 528, 530;
phosphorescence, 478;
function of aperture, 500;
larva, 509, 510;
variation, 516
Membraniporella, 518, 524, 528
Menipea, 518, 526, 527
Mermis, 131, 150, 160, 163
Mermithidae, 150, 163
Meromyarii, 129, 137, 142
Mertens, on Polyclads, 6, 23
Mesobdella, 407
Mesocestoides, 91;
M. lineatus, life-history, 84;
specific characters, 90
Mesonemertini, 112
Mesostoma, 44, 45;
reproduction, 48;
British species, 49
Mesostomatidae, 49
Mesotrochal larva, 325
Mesozoa, 92 f.
Metamerism, 249
Metamorphosis, in Polycladida, 16, 28;
in Trematodes, 5, 66 f.;
in Cestodes, 5, 74, 76, 87-89;
in Phoronis, 459;
in Polyzoa, 512
Metanemertini, 112
Metastatica (= Holostomatidae), 73;
life-histories, 64
Metopidia, 200, 225
Metschnikoff, on Orthonectida, 94;
on Nemertines, 99;
on Chaetosomatidae, 158
Meyer, on Polychaeta, 261
Michaelsen, on Earthworms, 349, 353, 359, 370 f., 375, 385
Microchaeta, 362
Microcodides, 224
Microcodon, 202, 215, 224, 230
Microcodonidae, 202, 220 n., 224
Microcotyle, 73;
eggs of M. labracis, 58
Microcotylinae, 73
Microdrili, 373, 374 f.
Microplana, 34, 42
Micropora, 518, 530;
zooecium, 523
Microporella, 516, 518, 519, 529;
avicularia, 484, 485;
median pore, 501
Microscolex, 372, 382, 383, 384
Microstoma, 44;
asexual reproduction, 44;
sexual organs, 47;
British species, 49
Microstomatidae, 49
Micrura, 101, 114;
British species, 111
Migrations, of Trematode-larvae, 5, 52, 63 f.;
of Cestode-larvae, 5, 74, 83, 87
Millson, on Oligochaeta, 368, 387
Millsonia, 382 f.
Milne-Edwards, on Polyzoa, 475
Mimicry, in Polychaeta, 293 f.
Mimosella, 518, 532;
movement of zooecia, 481
Molluscoidea, 475
Molops, host of Gordius, 172
Monhystera, 160
Moniez, on Cestodes, 84 n., 85;
on Earthworms, 369
Moniezia, 83, 91;
characters of genus, 90;
M. alba, M. benedeni, M. denticulata, 90;
M. expansa, 83, 90;
M. neumani, M. oblongiceps, M. planissima, M. trigonophora,
90
Moniligaster, 359, 380, 402
Moniligastridae, 361, 373, 380
Monkey, parasites of, 145
Monocotyle, 73
Monocotylinae, 73
Monogenea (Monogenetic Trematodes), 5, 53;
classification, 73
Mononchus, 154
Monoophorum striatum, 50
Monopora vivipara, 117
Monoporus rubropunctatus, 49;
reproductive organs of, 47
Monostomatidae, 73
Monostomum, 71, 73;
life-history, 72
Monostyla, 225, 226
Monotidae, 50
Monotus, 36;
British species, 50;
M. fuscus, 45;
habits, 46
Monozoa, 91
Montgomery, on Stichostemma eilhardii, 118
Monura, 225
Morren, on Earthworms, 347
Moseley, on Land Planarians, 7, 35 n., 37;
on Pelagonemertes, 101, 114
Movements, in Rotifers, etc., 206, 235
Moxon, on Rotifers, 198
Mucro, 522, 525
Mucronella, 518, 522, 528, 529, 530, 531
Müller, F., on Triclads, 37;
on Polyzoa, 493
Müller, O. F., on Turbellaria, 6;
on Rotifers, 197;
on Oligochaeta, 348, 352
Müller's larva, 16, 28, 29
Muscles, of Leptoplana, 12;
of intestine in Polyclads, 24;
of Nemertinea, 102, 103;
 of Nematoda, 128;
of Gordiidae, 165;
of Chaetognatha, 187;
of Rotifers, etc., 206, 233, 237;
of Nereis, 247, 249 f.;
of Polyzoa, 469, 470, 472, 499, 500—see also Body-wall
Musculo-glandular organ, in Triclads, 39, 40
Myrianida, 280, 308;
gemmiparity, 279, 280;
markings, 293
Myrianites, 302
Mytilia, 225, 226
Myxicola, 338;
tori uncinigeri, 268;
eyes, 272;
otocyst, 273;
tube, 285;
supposed mimicry, 294
Myzostoma, anatomy, 342 f.;
M. cirriferum, 343;
M. glabrum, 342
Myzostomaria, 241;
structure and affinities, 342 f.
Myzostomatidae, 342

Naidomorpha (= Naididae and Naids), 348, 352, 375 f., 377,

378, 400;
chaetae, 350, 367;
reproductive organs, 361;
asexual reproduction, 281, 377
Nais, 348, 377;
chaetae, 350
Nannodrilus, 382 f.
Natatory chaetae, of Nereidae, 277;
of Syllidae, 278, 307
Nathusius, on parasites, 63, 163
Nauphanta, 314, 315
Nebalia, Rotifers parasitic on, 225
Nectochaeta, 291
Nectonema agile, 164, 168, 169, 173
Nemathelminthes, 123 f., 168
Nematobothrium, 4, 55, 71, 73
Nematoda, 123;
anatomy, 124 f.;
embryology, 135;
classification, 136;
life-history of, 159 f.
Nematogen, 94;
Secondary Nematogen, 94
Nematomorpha, 123, 164 f.
Nematoxys, 139, 142, 161, 163
Nematozoa, 137
Nemertes, British species, 110;
deposition of ova and spermatozoa in, 116
Nemertinea, affinities, 119;
anatomy, 102;
body-wall, 102;
breeding, 116;
cephalic slits and cerebral organs, 107, 273;
circulatory system, 106, 107;
classification, 109 f.;
colour, 102;
contractility, 102;
development, 113;
diagram, 104;
digestive system, 103;
excretory system, 108, 108;
external characters, 101;
food, 115;
fresh-water forms, 101, 118;
generative organs, 109;
geographical distribution, 117;
habitat, 100;
habits, 114;
 land forms, 101, 117;
locomotion, 114, 115;
nervous system, 105, 106;
parasitic forms, 101, 119;
pelagic forms, 101, 114;
proboscis, 100, 101 f., 103, 104, 110, 115;
regeneration, 115;
sense organs, 101, 106, 107;
size, 100
Nemertodrilus, 360
Nemertoscolex, 444
Neodrilus, 384
Neorhynchidae, 184
Neorhynchus clavaeceps, 178, 181, 184;
N. agilis, 184
Nephelis, 392 f., 397, 399, 401, 403, 405
Nephridium, of Archiannelida, 243, 244;
of Nereis, 253;
of Arenicola, 253, 254;
of Polychaeta, 253;
dimorphism of, in Polychaeta, 269;
thoracic, of Sabelliformia, 306;
of Terebellidae, 327;
of Chlorhaemidae, 334;
of Myzostoma, 344;
of Oligochaeta, 356 f., 381 f., 400;
of Leeches, 399;
of Gephyrea—see Brown tubes;
of Phoronis, 456
Nephthydidae, 258, 317
Nephthys, 317;
nephridium, 254;
prostomium, 259, 260;
head, 262;
tentacles, 262;
peristomium, 263;
parapodium, 264, 265;