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The European Commission and Europe's Democratic Process: Why The EU's Executive Faces An Uncertain Future 1st Edition Stuart A Brown (Auth.)
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THE EUROPEAN
COMMISSION AND
EUROPE’S
DEMOCRATIC
PROCESS
Why the EU’s Executive
Faces an Uncertain
Future
Stuart A. Brown
The European Commission and Europe’s
Democratic Process
Stuart A. Brown
The European
Commission and
Europe’s Democratic
Process
Why the EU’s Executive Faces an Uncertain Future
Stuart A. Brown
London School of Economics
London, UK
References 97
Index 109
CHAPTER 1
REFERENCES
Bauer, M., & Becker, S. (2014). The unexpected winner of the crisis: The
European Commission’s strengthened role in economic governance. Journal of
European Integration, 36(3), 213–229.
Bickerton, C. J., Hodson, D., & Puetter, U. (2015). The new intergovernmentalism:
European integration in the post‐Maastricht era. Journal of Common Market
Studies, 53(4), 703–722.
Hooghe, L., & Kassim, H. (2012). The Commission’s services. In The institutions
of the European Union (The new European Union series, pp. 173–198).
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2009). A postfunctionalist theory of European inte-
gration: From permissive consensus to constraining dissensus. British Journal of
Political Science, 39(1), 1–23.
Szczerbiak, A., & Taggart, P. (2008). Opposing Europe?: The comparative party
politics of Euroscepticism (Comparative and theoretical perspectives, Vol. 2).
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
CHAPTER 2
Abstract This chapter assesses how the Commission’s role in the integra-
tion process has been understood in existing studies and outlines the main
approach adopted in the book. It considers the traditional functions of the
Commission and why the institution remains vital to the success of EU gov-
ernance. Finally, it examines how the status of the Commission can mean-
ingfully be analysed in terms of both available metrics for determining its
influence and effectiveness and reference points for tracing its development.
Second, the Commission is not only the arbiter of the integration pro-
cess but must also play an active role in setting the agenda at the European
level. Traditionally regarded as the ‘motor’ of the integration process, it is
the Commission’s responsibility to drive forward initiatives as the institu-
tion given sole authority to initiate proposals in most policy areas. With
this stated, agenda setting in the EU is far from an exclusive domain for
the Commission. Even within the legislative process, it has long been rec-
ognised by scholars that the impetus for proposals may ultimately lie out-
side of the Commission: either from the member states and the Parliament
(Peters 2001; Princen 2007) or more broadly from external actors, such as
interest groups (Greenwood 2003).
Beyond formal legislative proposals, the European Council also has
an important role in setting the direction of integration. Article 9 of the
Lisbon Treaty makes this clear in stating that the European Council shall
‘provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development and
shall define the general political directions and priorities thereof’. Similarly,
as the work of Tallberg (2003) illustrates, the country holding the presi-
dency of the Council of the European Union fulfils a parallel function in
principle, coordinating the work of the Council and driving the agenda—
albeit there remains significant scepticism in the existing literature as to
how effective the presidency is in this regard (see, for instance, Hayes-
Renshaw and Wallace 1997: 146).
While these qualifiers to the Commission’s role as the ‘motor’ of inte-
gration are important, it would be a step too far to claim that the pro-
cess could function effectively without a strong Commission. Certainly,
the large-scale projects and initiatives that have characterised the EU’s
recent history would have been impossible to realise without an institu-
tion like the Commission providing the impetus for agreements, and the
Commission had a pivotal function in the establishment of both the single
market and the single currency (Jabko 1999). As such, while it would be
feasible for the EU to exist without the Commission pushing the process
forward, it would be a very different kind of Union. Moreover, a Union
in which proposals all initiated from the interests of national governments
could quickly be undermined if it became dominated by larger, more pow-
erful states.
Finally, a strong Commission is vital for ensuring the effective manage-
ment of the EU’s finances and expenditure. The resignation of the Santer
Commission illustrated the dangers of a weak Commission that lacks the
resources to deal with the increasingly diverse array of administrative
ASSESSING THE COMMISSION 9
tasks which have been assigned to it. The chief defects uncovered by the
Committee of Independent Experts, which was set up to examine the
allegations of fraud and mismanagement made against the Commission,
related primarily to the Commission’s loss of control over subcontrac-
tors and the willingness to take on new responsibilities without having
adequate resources to manage them effectively. As the Committee stated,
the principal failing was ultimately ‘undertaking a commitment in a new
policy area without the Commission possessing all the resources to carry
out its task’ (Committee of Independent Experts 1999: para 9.2.9).
Although other examples could well be added to this list, these three
elements in particular—the Commission’s status as an arbiter between
states, its role as the motor of the integration project, and its administra-
tive responsibilities, chiefly in managing the EU’s finances and expendi-
ture—are sufficient to illustrate the importance of a strong Commission
to the EU’s system of governance. Without this, it is difficult to imagine
the EU functioning effectively in its current form, far less responding suf-
ficiently to the multiple challenges it now faces: from the Eurozone crisis
to foreign conflicts on its borders such as those in Ukraine and Syria, the
refugee crisis that emerged in 2015, or the wider problem of navigating
the growth of Asian economies and the need to ensure competitiveness in
global markets.
combined with its capacity to initiate proceedings against states that fail to
uphold their commitments, allows the Commission to exert considerable
influence over both EU legislation and the wider system of EU governance
(Dehousse 2011). The Commission, as a collection of staff working
exclusively on European issues, also possesses a key advantage in terms of
technical expertise over other actors, notably national governments, who
have broader mandates focused on both the European and domestic levels.
The Commission’s influence depends to a large extent on its ability to
mobilise these factors to exert authority over EU decision-making.
For the Commission to be effective, it must efficiently use its existing
resources, particularly its staff, to perform the tasks assigned to it under its
mandate. Here, the culture of audits and oversight from other institutions,
particularly the European Court of Auditors and European Parliament, pro-
vides a solid grounding for assessing the effectiveness of the Commission
over time. Indeed, the level of scrutiny the Commission operates under is
arguably far greater than that of any national administration. In the area
of financial management, the Court of Auditors audits EU revenue and
expenditure, performs checks on individuals and organisations handling EU
funds (including spot checks on the Commission itself), reports suspected
instances of fraud to the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), and pro-
duces an annual report on the Commission’s handling of the EU budget, in
addition to other special investigations, largely related to the Commission’s
management of particular projects.1 The Commission is also subject to
the European Parliament’s budgetary control committee, which draws on
some of the information compiled by the Court of Auditors. As such,
there is a rich body of evidence available upon which the effectiveness of the
Commission in performing its tasks can be assessed.
Second, in addition to metrics, a clear reference point is required if
we are to assess the question of the Commission’s trajectory as an insti-
tution. If the Commission is an organisation in decline, then when did
this decline began and under which circumstances did the Commission
previously functioned more effectively? A common answer to this ques-
tion in previous studies has been to cite the Commission under the presi-
dency of Jacques Delors, who served as President for ten years over three
terms, beginning in 1985. Perhaps more precisely, this ‘golden age’ of
the Commission could be limited to the period between 1987 and 1992,
ending at the signing of the Maastricht Treaty. Although there is often a
tendency in such discussions to overlook the real problems faced by the
Commission during this period, the Commission under Delors has never-
ASSESSING THE COMMISSION 11
1999, and Romano Prodi from 1999 until 2004—were both beset by prob-
lems, most notably the resignation of the Santer Commission. The crisis
itself has been analysed in several studies (e.g., Cram 2001; Ringe 2005),
as has the extensive reform effort pursued in the aftermath under the guid-
ance of Neil Kinnock (Kassim 2008); however, even before the crisis, the
Commission’s status had already begun to diminish.
As Kassim and Menon (2010) illustrate, the growth of the Commission’s
influence under Delors was initially interpreted by some scholars as a
‘turning point’ from which the Commission, and supranational actors
in general, might slowly acquire unprecedented levels of autonomy from
member state governments. Moreover, as authors such as Sandholtz and
Stone Sweet (1998) argued, once this path to greater supranationalism
had begun, it was assumed to be difficult, if not impossible, for national
governments to roll back the power of supranational actors and reassert
their authority over the integration process. The concept of ‘institutionali-
sation’ developed by Sandholtz and Stone Sweet (1998: 19), for instance,
posited that as shifts to new supranational forms of decision-making
occurred, they would be ‘institutionalised’ in the EU’s body of rules
defined by the Treaty framework—with the European Court of Justice,
as an additional supranational actor operating alongside the Commission,
empowered to interpret and enforce these new modes of governance.
In practice, however, these predictions have proved unrealised. Far
from leading a gradual shift towards supranationalism, the institution
inherited by Jean-Claude Juncker in 2014 lay at the epicentre of several
existential crises. This trend is borne out in the views of Commission staff
members themselves. Kassim et al.’s (2013) detailed study of Commission
staff members found that no less than 61.7 % of respondents thought the
EU has lost ground to national capitals, 58.7 % believed power had been
usurped by the European Parliament, and a majority viewed the Delors
years as a ‘golden era’ in which the Commission set Europe’s agenda
(Kassim et al. 2013: 133). The perception of an institution whose best
days are behind it is clearly evident in these figures.
However, while the Delors Commission acts as a useful reference point,
it is important to note that a strong and influential Commission is not
necessarily an effective one. Both Delors and Walter Hallstein, in particu-
lar, who served as Commission President between 1958 and 1967, are
frequently held up as examples of successful ‘strong’ presidents; yet, there
is an important distinction between Commissions that had distinctively
‘presidential’ approaches, where the President exercised high levels of
ASSESSING THE COMMISSION 13
NOTES
1. See the Court of Auditors’ collection of ‘Special Reports’ available at the
following link: http://www.eca.europa.eu/en/Pages/AuditReports
Opinions.aspx
REFERENCES
Committee of Independent Experts. (1999, September 10). Second report on
reform of the Commission: Analysis of current practice and proposals for tackling
mismanagement, irregularities and fraud.
Coombes, D. (1970). Politics and bureaucracy in the European Community.
London: George Allen and Unwin.
Cram, L. (1993). Calling the tune without paying the piper? Social policy regula-
tion: The role of the Commission in European Union social policy. Policy and
Politics, 21, 135–146.
Cram, L. (1994). The European commission as a multi‐organization: Social policy
and IT policy in the EU. Journal of European Public Policy, 1(2), 195–217.
Cram, L. (2001). Whither the Commission? Reform, renewal and the issue-
attention cycle. Journal of European Public Policy, 8(5), 770–786.
Dehousse, R. (2008). Delegation of powers in the European Union: The need for
a multi-principals model. West European Politics, 31(4), 789–805.
Dehousse, R. (Ed.). (2011). The community method: Obstinate or obsolete? London:
Palgrave Macmillan.
Dehousse, R., & Thompson, A. (2012). Intergovernmentalists in the Commission:
Foxes in the henhouse? Journal of European Integration, 34(2), 113–132.
Drake, H. (2000). Jacques Delors: Perspectives on a European leader. Hove:
Psychology Press.
14 S.A. BROWN
Grant, C. (1994). Delors: Inside the house that Jacques built. London: Nicholas Brealey.
Greenwood, J. (2003). Interest representation in the European Union. Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan.
Hartlapp, M., Metz, J., & Rauh, C. (2014). Which policy for Europe? Power and
conflict inside the European Commission. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hayes-Renshaw, F., & Wallace, H. (1997). The Council of Ministers. Basingstoke:
Macmillan.
Hooghe, L., & Kassim, H. (2012). The Commission’s services. In The institutions
of the European Union (The new European Union series, pp. 173–198).
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jabko, N. (1999). In the name of the market: How the European Commission
paved the way for monetary union. Journal of European Public Policy, 6(3),
475–495.
Kassim, H. (2008). ‘Mission impossible’, but mission accomplished: The Kinnock
reforms and the European Commission. Journal of European Public Policy,
15(5), 648–668.
Kassim, H., & Menon, A. (2003). The principal-agent approach and the study of
the European Union: Promise unfulfilled? Journal of European Public Policy,
10(1), 121–139.
Kassim, H., & Menon, A. (2010). Bringing the member states back in: The supra-
national orthodoxy, member state resurgence and the decline of the European
Commission since the 1990s. Paper presented at Conference of Europeanists of
the Council for European Studies, Montreal, Canada.
Kassim, H., Peterson, J., Bauer, M. W., Connolly, S., Dehousse, R., Hooghe, L.,
et al. (2013). The European Commission of the twenty-first century. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Kelemen, D. (2002). The politics of “Eurocratic” structure and the new European
agencies. West European Politics, 25(1), 93–118.
Michelmann, H. J. (1978). Multinational staffing and organizational functioning
in the Commission of the European Communities. International Organization,
32, 477–496.
Moravcsik, A. (2008). The myth of Europe’s democratic deficit. Intereconomics,
November–December, 331–340.
Nugent, N. (2001). The European Commission. London: Palgrave.
Peters, B. G. (2001). Agenda-setting in the European Union. In J. Richardson
(Ed.), European Union power and policy-making (2nd ed., pp. 77–94). London:
Routledge.
Peterson, J. (1999). The Santer era: The European Commission in normative,
historical and theoretical perspective. Journal of European Public Policy, 6(1),
46–65.
Pollack, M. (1997). Delegation, agency and agenda setting in the European
Community. International Organization, 51(1), 99–134.
ASSESSING THE COMMISSION 15
Roy Jenkins (Spirenburg 1979). The basic concern has always been that
expanding the number of Commissioners carries the potential of weak-
ening the overall cohesiveness of the Commission as an institution, in
addition to causing a number of organisational problems with regard to
coordinating the work of the Commission’s services. Keeping the number
of Commissioners to a strict minimum was, therefore, traditionally viewed
as an important element in allowing the Commission to speak with a strong
voice in the EU’s political system and to perform its role as efficiently as
possible. The Spierenburg Report stipulated that, in practice, there should
be no more than ten Commissioner portfolios assigned.
Despite these recommendations, it took until the Treaty of Nice in
2001 to generate consensus among the member states on how to solve the
problem. The Treaty of Nice stipulated two key reforms: first, that there
should never be more than one Commissioner drawn from any one state
(at the time, there were two Commissioners from each of the five largest
states) and second, that when the EU reached 27 members, the number of
Commissioners should be less than the number of member states (though
the treaty left the question of precisely how many Commissioners there
should be open to a future European Council decision). This principle was
then built on in the Convention on the Future of Europe, which produced
the Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe in 2003, stipulat-
ing that the number of Commissioners should correspond to two-thirds
of the number of member states and be drawn from states on an equal
rotation basis. This provision remained in the subsequent Lisbon Treaty,
following the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty’s ratification in the
French and Dutch referendums of 2005.
The fact that it took the best part of three decades to produce a coher-
ent solution to this problem provides some indication of the opposition
within certain national governments to reducing the Commission’s size.
As Laffan (2002) notes in the case of Ireland, the ‘one Commissioner per
state’ rule was largely seen as non-negotiable among Irish politicians up
until the Treaty of Nice on the basis that the Commission was perceived
by senior political figures within the country as being the defender of small
states within the EU system. Yet in the end it was not the Irish government
which ultimately put pay to attempts to reform the size of the Commission,
but the Irish electorate’s decision to vote against the ratification of the
Lisbon Treaty in the referendum held in 2008.
The Irish referendum has come to hold a special place in Eurosceptic
arguments. For the EU’s opponents, the rejection of the treaty and
CRITIQUES OF THE COMMISSION: FROM THE RISE OF EUROSCEPTICISM … 21
En mer, 29 septembre.
En mer, 2 octobre.
Il est midi. Un fort courant marche avec nous. Ce n’est plus une
vitesse de dix nœuds qu’a la Junon, mais bien de quatorze nœuds
et plus. Les falaises à pic qui bordent les rives ont bientôt disparu, et
nous entrons dans un second bassin de forme elliptique, semé de
quelques bancs laissant entre eux un large et facile passage. La
physionomie du pays est à peu près la même, cependant moins
aride. Les falaises, toujours assez basses, sont couronnées de
plaines à peine ondulées ; quelquefois nous passons devant de
simples plages sablonneuses, dont la pente presque insensible
semble se continuer sous les eaux. Par tribord, c’est l’extrémité
méridionale des vastes pampas, qui s’étendent ainsi depuis le pays
des palmiers jusqu’à celui des glaces éternelles ! Mais où ai-je vu
quelques-uns de ces aspects ? En traversant les steppes de la
Hongrie, sur les bords du Danube, entre Pesth et Belgrade.
Un promontoire, qu’on nomme le cap Gregory, marque l’entrée
du second goulet, un peu plus large que le premier. Nous le
franchissons en une demi-heure ; la violence du courant est devenue
très grande, et le commandant fait mettre deux hommes de plus à la
barre du gouvernail. A la sortie du second goulet (il est trois heures
et demie), un passage difficile se présente. Le détroit en ce point a
bien dix milles de large, mais il est barré par un groupe d’îles,
entourées de récifs, auprès desquels les courants portent dans des
directions variées. Plusieurs routes existent pour passer entre ces
dangers ; nous choisissons celle qui est connue sous le nom de
chenal de la Reine, et qui longe de très près l’île de Sainte-
Élisabeth. En ce moment, nous nous dirigeons vers le sud, ayant à
notre droite le massif de la grande presqu’île de Brunswick, qui
s’enfonce comme un coin dans la Terre-de-Feu et donne à la forme
générale du détroit de Magellan celle d’un gigantesque V majuscule.
A quatre heures et demie, les îles, les récifs sont derrière nous ; il
ne reste plus que dix milles à faire pour atteindre le mouillage ;
l’ordre est donné de ralentir, le commandant descend de la
passerelle, et nous allons tous dîner avec un appétit qu’excuse
suffisamment notre station de toute la journée sur le pont, et notre
satisfaction d’avoir si heureusement commencé cette traversée
délicate.
Le soleil était déjà caché derrière de hautes collines boisées,
lorsque nous arrivâmes à Punta-Arenas, capitale de la Patagonie
chilienne… ou argentine, puisque le différend n’a pas encore été
tranché, mais plutôt chilienne, puisque le Chili en a pris possession,
qu’une corvette chilienne y tient station, qu’un médecin chilien a bien
voulu déclarer officiellement que nous n’avions aucune maladie
contagieuse, ce qui nous a permis de faire une visite au gouverneur
de la localité, qui aurait pu être Chilien aussi, mais qui préférait être
Anglais, ce qui est un point sur lequel je ne disputerai pas.
La Junon doit appareiller le lendemain à l’aube ; aussi, malgré la
nuit noire et le froid vif, tout le monde se précipite dans les canots
pour fouler la terre patagonienne. On espère vaguement voir
quelques-uns de ces sauvages géants décrits dans les récits des
premiers explorateurs et contestés par notre siècle prosaïque. On a
aussi quelque curiosité à l’égard du dernier établissement civilisé au
sud du monde. L’officier de la santé a promis son canot pour le
retour des retardataires. En route !
Nous abordons dans l’obscurité au pied d’un petit môle, sur
lequel nous grimpons en nous aidant d’un escalier dépourvu de la
plupart de ses marches. Arrivés sur la plate-forme, nous trébuchons
à travers les rails d’un chemin de fer, qui doit conduire, je pense, à
un dépôt de charbon. Décidément, le progrès ne laisse ici rien à
désirer, qu’un peu d’éclairage des voies publiques. Pendant que nos
marins s’en vont par groupes se… réchauffer dans une petite
maison basse où nombre de flacons scintillent sous les feux d’une
lampe à pétrole, nous nous avançons à travers « la capitale. » Nous
arpentons deux rues, peut-être bien les seules, absolument
désertes, bordées çà et là de maisons en bois, composées d’un
simple rez-de-chaussée. Voici une église, toute petite, plus que
modeste et en bois comme les autres constructions ; voici enfin la
maison du gouverneur, auquel nous sommes autorisés à présenter
nos hommages.