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Luisa Antoniolli · Luigi Bonatti
Carlo Ruzza Editors
Highs and Lows

of European
Integration
Sixty Years After the Treaty of Rome
Highs and Lows of European Integration
Luisa Antoniolli • Luigi Bonatti • Carlo Ruzza
Editors
Highs and Lows of European

Integration
Sixty Years After the Treaty of Rome
Editors
Luisa Antoniolli Luigi Bonatti
School of International Studies School of International Studies
University of Trento University of Trento
Trento, Italy Trento, Italy
Carlo Ruzza
School of International Studies
University of Trento
Trento, Italy
ISBN 978-3-319-93625-3 ISBN 978-3-319-93626-0 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93626-0
Library of Congress Control Number: 2018953570
© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2019

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the
material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation,
broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information
storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology
now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication
does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant
protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this
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the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any
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claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
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The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
Contents
Introduction: The Current Crisis of the European Union, Its Origins

and Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Luisa Antoniolli, Luigi Bonatti, and Carlo Ruzza
Part I The External Dimension of the European Union: European

Development Aid, Enlargement Process in the Balkans,
and the External Sanctions System
At the Origins of European Foreign Policy: European
Exceptionalism and the Case of Development Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Sara Lorenzini
From Enlargement Perspective to “Waiting for Godot”? Has
the EU Lost Its Transformative Power in the Balkans? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Jens Woelk
The Challenges of a Sanctions Machine: Some Reflections
on the Legal Issues of EU Restrictive Measures
in the Field of Common Foreign Security Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Antonino Alì
Part II Institutional Change in the EU: The Rule of Law Crisis

and Differentiated Integration as a Possible Solution
The Multilevel Rule of Law System of the European Union:
Eked Out, Contested, Still Unassured . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Annegret Eppler, Andreas Hackhofer, and Andreas Maurer
“United in Diversity”? Differentiated Integration in an Ever
Diverse European Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
Luisa Antoniolli
v
vi Contents
Part III Populism and Nationalism in the EU: The Role

of Institutions and Civil Society, Tensions in Central
and Eastern Europe and Brexit
All Quiet on the Brexit Front? UK Civil Society Before and After
the UK’s Referendum on Membership of the EU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Louisa Parks
Populism, EU Institutions and Civil Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
Carlo Ruzza
The Crisis, Economic Patriotism in Central Europe and EU Law . . . . . 143
Mónika Papp and Marton Varju
Part IV Between Economic Divide and Social Cohesion: Features

that Bond the EU Together and Centrifugal Forces
Addressing the Core-Periphery Imbalances in Europe: Resource
Misallocation and Expansionary Fiscal Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
Luigi Bonatti and Andrea Fracasso
TARGET2: Understanding the Glue that Keeps the Euro Together . . . . 201
Nikolay Hristov, Oliver Hülsewig, and Timo Wollmershäuser
The Social Dimension: The Missing Glue of European Integration? . . . . 213
Ton Notermans
More or Less “Social Europe”? The Challenges of European Social
Policy After the Enlargement to Include Central and
Eastern Countries and the Recent Economic and Financial Crisis . . . . . 231
Matteo Borzaga
Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
Introduction: The Current Crisis
of the European Union, Its Origins
and Consequences
1 The Current Crisis of the European Union

and the Advantages of an Interdisciplinary Analysis: An
Introduction
The title of this volume—Highs and Lows of European Integration—focuses on

what many observers have described as a rollercoaster effect, to describe the long,
sinuous process that has changed the geopolitical character of Europe over the last
60 years, as it emerged from the second world war. A frequent interpretation of this
process is one of initial important achievements, but successive protracted uncer-
tainties, unreached goals and failed ambitions. It is often argued that the process of
European construction has guaranteed peace and prosperity for decades, but also that
it has been marred by a failed attempt to reach a sufficient level of political
legitimacy to be able to compete with the much more solid, long-lasting, and
resourceful structure of a (federal) Nation-State. Thus, despite the literature that
sometimes heralds the increasing weakness of States in an age of globalization, they
remain the main source of identity for most citizens, within the European Union as
well. This happens as States are also seen to carve out new guiding roles in the
economic domain and in several other policy areas. However, this reading often fails
to take sufficiently into account the multifarious factors, the complexity, and the
uneven aspects of the process of European integration and, therefore, the multiple
areas of progress that would have been unthinkable without the EU. They have taken
place, of course, alongside multiple failures. The nature of the EU is complex, and
only a multidisciplinary approach can help us to understand its evolving structure,
functions, internal and external conflicts, and long-term trends. After 60 years of
European integration, it is high time to pause and take stock. This is particularly
L. Antoniolli (*) · L. Bonatti · C. Ruzza

School of International Studies, University of Trento, Trento, Italy
e-mail: luisa.antoniolli@unitn.it
© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2019 1

L. Antoniolli et al. (eds.), Highs and Lows of European Integration,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93626-0_1
2 L. Antoniolli et al.
necessary and important in light of recent challenges, such as the financial crisis and
its aftermath, the populist upsurge in several Member States, and, more recently,
Brexit. This volume attempts to do this.
Unlike other books assessing the European project over time, which are mainly
written from the viewpoint of single disciplines—political science, history, law,
economics, etc.—this book takes a multidisciplinary approach. In this way, we strive
to grasp the broader multidimensional implications that this complex process entails.
The process of European construction is in fact a multidimensional development, in
which several variables interact in a context of political, legal, economic, sociolog-
ical, and cultural constraints that no single discipline can fully describe and explain.
Starting from this assumption, we focus on interpreting the direction of the current
process of European construction. The contributions to this book are written by
political scientists and political sociologists, economists and political economists,
lawyers, and historians, who share a common understanding of these issues and have
worked in a co-operative and coordinated manner, each applying the analytical tools
and methods of his or her own discipline.
2 Current Challenges to the European Project
An overall assessment of the state of the European Union after more than 60 years is
of course a monumental task. Consequently, of necessity we have focused on a few
key aspects we believe to be particularly relevant which provide an overview of the
state of the EU and of recent significant changes and future challenges. Before
briefly introducing the structure and contents of the following chapters, it is useful
to frame them in a more general context. First, it is important to note that 60 years
after the Treaty of Rome, the European Union has grown into such a large and
complex edifice of policies, institutions, and relations with other political entities,
that any summary assessment of its state would be too cursory. Regulation of some
policy areas has been extremely successful in terms of both effectiveness and
legitimacy, whilst other areas have remained problematic and have witnessed limited
progress. EU institutions have grown in terms of size and competences, but have
generally failed to achieve the necessary legitimacy that would make them compa-
rable to the Nation-State and its institutional make-up. The importance of the EU in
international relations has certainly grown, often characterized as a normative model
and a cohesive economic entity. However, notwithstanding the extensive disciplin-
ary disputes on the limits of the authority of the Member States in the EU, its
component units have clearly remained fundamental anchors of political power,
initiative, and identities. It is generally agreed that the EU remains more than a
trading bloc but less than a State and it is not going to become an integrated political
entity in the foreseeable future. Of course, it has often been argued that it was never
meant to develop into something else. However, it is also the case that its unique
status among international regimes is both the basis for consent among some of its
citizens, but also the result of long-standing discontent for many others, weary to call
Introduction: The Current Crisis of the European Union, Its Origins and. . . 3
for further integration in the light of several key unresolved and widely popularized
issues. An assessment of the European Union at 60 cannot avoid mentioning them,
even if only as key features of the general political context.
2.1 Geo-political Tensions (North-South, East-West)
At a broad geopolitical level, the EU is now more deeply split by tensions between
North and South and East and West—two key rifts which the subsequent chapters of
this book will elaborate. There are several dimensions to these splits, which should
now be set out. The first relates to different perspectives of the EU fiscal austerity
policy, which have been a feature of the Union for decades and became more
prominent during the 2007 financial crisis and its aftermath. The disastrous perfor-
mance of Greece during the crisis and the rigorist line adopted, sponsored in
particular by Germany, have translated into mounting inequality within the EU,
but also into significant and widespread tensions between these two countries and
more generally between the North and the South of the Union, which have
reawakened feelings of nationalism and undermined a shared European identity.
The second geopolitical divide is the opposition to the political culture of the
Visegrad countries with regard to the prevailing vision of the rest of the EU, notably
in matters such as migration, law and order policies, and the strengthening of
institutional checks and balances to shore up liberal democracy. At several points
in time, these countries have elected governments that are widely conceived as
populist and even incompatible with the democratic values held by other EU
countries and the EU institutions. Signals of criticism have been launched from
the European Union, such as the opening by the Commission of an Article 7 proce-
dure of the EU Treaty against Poland in December 2017, because of the risk of a
serious breach of the rule of law (amongst other, threats to independence of the
judiciary), which have highlighted the differences between two areas (and visions) of
the EU. So has the fact that, as of the beginning of 2018, Hungary and Poland have
accepted no refugees, while the Czech Republic has taken 12, resulting in a decision
establishing the infringement by the ECJ. These facts and the prominence of populist
parties in the Visegrad countries show the magnitude of the East-West divide on the
basic fundamental democratic principles on which democracies are currently based.
In addition to these geographical contrasting positions, a fundamental threat with
which the EU has struggled for decades and which still appears as insoluble as ever,
is the vexing question of the EU legitimacy. The populist movements that have
emerged in most EU countries, which have given political expression to both the
North-South and the East-West divide, originate in a fragmented and oppositional
conception of the demos. The denial of the existence of Europe as a community of
shared values is rooted in the opposition between European élites, perceived as
distant and self-serving, and an allegedly unified concept of ‘the people’. In this
context, the structures and principles of EU multi-level governance appear as
fundamentally illegitimate.
2.2 Future Directions for the EU
The EU institutions and Member States have gradually come to realize that the
synergetic effects of these flaws, together with the challenges at the international
level that also have an impact on Europe (such as uncontrolled migration flows,
security threats, environmental risks, etc.), are endangering not only the stability of
the European Union, but its very existence. As a consequence, in recent times, and
particularly after the start of the crisis, the EU institutions and States’ governments
have become much more proactive in discussing sweeping institutional and policy
reforms. While in some areas major changes have taken place (the most visible ones
being in the area of economic governance), a shared, wide-ranging vision of its
future structure is still clearly missing in Europe.
The 60th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome is an appropriate moment to promote a
new vision, but it must be acknowledged that even today, no major breakthrough
seems in sight. For example, the Commission’s White Paper on the Future of Europe,
published in March 2017, aims at comprehensively addressing the future scenarios for
the EU by 2025, asking: “What future do we want for ourselves, for our children and
for our Union?” (p. 7). Yet, the five options that it proposes are extremely indistinct
and ambiguous, and even the most advanced one (Scenario 5: “Doing Much More
Together”) fails totally to address the problems of legitimacy, democracy, and the rule
of law in a comprehensive way. On the contrary, it may even worsen them, by
enlarging the scope of EU action without devising adequate checks and balances
and without wholly redefining the EU’s structure. One statement in the opening
description of the possible scenarios is quite telling: according to the Commission,
“The five scenarios (. . .) deliberately make no mention of legal or institutional
processes—the form will follow the function” (p. 15). This path-dependent faith in
functionalism as the key to solving all problems seem to be an attempt to by-pass an
open—but likewise dangerous—discussion of the fundamental choices that must
underpin fundamental reforms of the EU. Unfortunately, as experience shows, short-
cuts can be slippery. . .
The same acute awareness of challenges, dangers, and urgency to take action is to
be found in the final document of the leaders of all Member States, the European
Council, the European Parliament, and the Commission, signed on the 25th of March
2017 for the celebration of the 60 years of the European Economic Community. The
document opens with the proud recognition of the historical achievements: all parties
“take pride in the achievements of the European Union: the construction of European
unity is a bold, far-sighted endeavour.” At the same time, they recognize that “The
European Union is facing unprecedented challenges, both global and domestic:
regional conflicts, terrorism, growing migratory pressures, protectionism and social
and economic inequalities.” The document boldly concludes: “We will make the
European Union stronger and more resilient, through even greater unity and soli-
darity amongst us and the respect of common rules. Unity is both a necessity and our
free choice.” Yet, unrest lurks under this commitment: “Taken individually, we
would be sidelined by global dynamics. Standing together is our best chance to
influence them, and to defend our common interests and values.” The existence of
cracks in this vision of unity is further clear when the declaration states that “We will
act together, at different paces and intensity where necessary, while moving in the
same direction, as we have done in the past, in line with the Treaties and keeping
the door open to those who want to join later”. This implies the acknowledgement of
the existence of a fundamental fragmentation among Member States, which chal-
lenges the unity of the system and requires mechanisms that, while allowing some
flexibility, do not endanger its existence. Consequently, the conclusive statement
“Our Union is undivided and indivisible” seems more an act of faith than a statement
of strong, determined will.
3 Structure of the Book
The volume is organized in four parts. Part I deals with some key aspects of the
external dimension of the European Union, namely the evolution of European
development aid, the current features of enlargement with specific reference to the
Balkans, and the sanctions system in the EU foreign and security policy. Part II
analyses some fundamental institutional changes in the EU, in particular the current
crisis regarding the rule of law and its disintegrative effects, and patterns of differ-
entiated integration as a possible response to the crisis. Part III focuses on populism
and nationalism in the EU, dealing with the role of institutions and civil society, both
in general terms and in two specific contexts, that of Brexit and of Central and
Eastern Europe. Part IV is devoted to some of the economic and social forces and
institutional arrangements that protect Europe from the risk of falling apart or—in
contrast—that create tensions and divisions among and within the member States.
3.1 Part I: The External Dimension of the European

Union—European Development Aid, Enlargement
Process in the Balkans, and the EU External Sanction
System
The first part of the book deals with the external dimension of the European Union
and focuses in particular on three key issues. By focusing on them, the book offers a
perspective of the process of European integration as a long-term political project.
The first chapter, by Sara Lorenzini, looks in detail at the impact of historical
exceptionalisms in the evolution of European development aid policies, which is
shaped by the strong input of French political culture on the European project.
Moreover, she also underlines the centrality of aid policy in shaping an emerging
European identity. The second chapter, by Jens Woelk, emphasizes EU ambitions to
exert a transformative role in border areas as well, with a special focus on the
Balkans. He highlights how these ambitions have not come to full fruition, engen-
dering what is described as “accession fatigue” in both candidate countries and the
EU. The third chapter, by Antonino Alì, focuses on the role of sanctions as a
powerful tool for EU foreign policy. Yet, while various types of sanctions are
frequently used to put pressure on States (as well as on individuals and groups),
their use raises several legal issues, which can clash with rule of law standards and
human rights, and in some cases lead to judicial review (as happened in the area of
fight against terrorism).
3.2 Part II: Institutional Change in the EU—The Rule

of Law Crisis and Differentiated Integration as a Possible
Solution
Part II of the book focuses on some important institutional changes that are currently
taking place in the EU. The chapter by Annegret Eppler, Hackhofer and Maurer
analyses the current rule of law crisis, which affects a number of crucial areas of the
EU, as well as the backlash in several Member States. It points to the
multidimensional nature of this crisis, which involves political, legal, economic,
and social aspects, further locating this crisis in a wider framework, where integra-
tive and disintegrative dynamics within the EU are analyzed and explained as
interrelated and simultaneous phenomena. In fact, the same factors are at play and
consequently need to be dealt with simultaneously. The following chapter, by Luisa
Antoniolli, focuses on differentiated integration as possible recipe for solving the
current EU “existential” crisis by introducing a general model of flexibility, whereby
EU policies would not be applied simultaneously in the same way in all Member
States. There have been significant instances of differentiated integration since the
foundational period, yet the contribution underlines the idea that the current exten-
sion of these mechanisms, together with the different features that they display (e.g.,
permanent vs. temporary, inside or outside the EU Treaties framework, etc.), may in
the end have both centripetal or centrifugal effects, i.e., they may either strengthen or
weaken integration within the EU. Consequently, there is a need to develop more
sophisticated theoretical models, as well as context-specific analysis and empirical
testing, in order to provide reliable assessments of their effects.
3.3 Part III: Populism and Nationalism in the EU—The Role

of Institutions and Civil Society, Tensions in Central
and Eastern Europe, and Brexit
The third part of the book is devoted to one of the main challenges to the European
project: the rise of populism and nationalism in the EU. It consists of a chapter by
Carlo Ruzza on the impact on EU institutions of “the populist turn”, a chapter by

Louisa Parks, which provides an analysis of the role of civil society organizations in
the Brexit process, and one by Papp and Varju on the increasing confrontational
stance of Central and Eastern European countries. Ruzza notes that the EU constitutes
an opportunity for populist forces to blame a higher level of government for a set of
ills, without paying electoral consequences. It is also a base from which they can
coordinate strategies, for instance through their ideological and policy interactions in
the European Parliament. However, the EU is also reacting to the impact of populist
parties, and this reaction is documented through an analysis of texts and interviews
with Commission officials and other EU institutions. The chapter also provides an
analysis of reactions to the success of populist parties by civil society groups active in
Brussels.
Several aspects of the populist mind-frame and the opposition by civil society
organizations are also at play in the Brexit process. This chapter notes how Brexit
was supported and opposed by very diverse coalitions of actors and differing visions
and how, for this reason, the end-state of this process is highly contested and to an
extent potentially malleable by progressive groups of civil society. The chapter
points to the monitoring role in the Brexit process that can be exerted by social
movements and civil society groups and examines obstacles and opportunities in
carrying out this task. In particular, it focuses on framing strategies and considers
them in the context of an ongoing debate on key issues, such as national identities
and alternative visions of the European project.
The relevance of populist coalitions as an emerging threat to the process of
European integration is also central to the chapter by Monika Papp and Varju. On
the basis of a set of case studies in Hungary and Poland, populist parties and
movements are seen as providing legitimacy and support not only to exclusionary
practices, which are incompatible with the values of the EU as, for instance, the
emphasis on the respect and protection of minorities affirmed in the Copenhagen
criteria. They are also indicted for condoning and even encouraging economic
nationalism and protectionism, to an extent that is increasingly incompatible with
the ethos and regulatory framework of the single market. As in the chapter by Ruzza,
this chapter documents the unease that marks the reactions of European institutions
as they face populist policies and related values. It also documents some of the
discursive and legal steps that have been adopted to counteract these developments.
3.4 Part IV: Between Economic Divide and Social

Cohesion—Features That Bond the EU Together
and Centrifugal Forces
What are the economic forces, the structural features, and the institutional arrange-
ments that may provide cohesion, and what are those that may divide and create
tensions among and within the EU’s member countries? This question is addressed
across different dimensions in the four chapters that make up part IV of the volume.
The first chapter—by Hristov, Hulsewig, and Wollmershäuser—focuses on TAR-

GET2, the intra-euro area payment system, whose “authentic” economic inter-
pretation has raised controversies among economists, arguing that it acts as a glue
that keeps the euro area together in case of financial crises. The second chapter is by
Notermans, who claims that the tensions and conflicts that are currently character-
izing the EU have their origin in the substantial lack—or minor relevance—of EU’s
social policy. The chapter by Bonatti and Fracasso explores another fault line
crossing the EU, namely the persistent—and in some cases—growing competitive
imbalances across regions and member countries. Finally, the contribution by
Matteo Borzaga analyzes the historical evolution of European social policy and
describes its high level of incoherence, resulting from a weak harmonization process.
4 Concluding Remarks
Taken together, all the contributions in this book point to a fragmented picture of the
EU as it turns 60. While at the time of its inception the EU project was uncertain and
ambivalent on many issues, but nonetheless ambitious and visionary; this ambi-
valence has become paramount today, with modest results and even glaring failures
coexisting alongside highly visible successes.
EU ambitions seem to be more muted today, although some EU leaders are attempting
to relaunch a bold vision of a more integrated Europe, able to gain center stage in a rapidly
changing world—a world tempted by a return to protectionist policies and increasingly
shaped by new powerful actors in the economy and in politics. Yet, as of today, there does
not seem to be a shared vision of the future direction of the European Union, both in terms
of its relationship with the Member States, and of its own fundamental values and goals,
as well as its institutional framework.
In this context, the principles that shaped the early years of the European Union
are as relevant as they were 60 years ago. Now, as then, they express and value the
concerted attempts to overcome narrow nationalisms and to ensure prosperity and
security for the world’s largest and most integrated regional bloc.
Acknowledgements The editors gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Autonomous
Province of Trento, which has generously funded various interdisciplinary research activities
undertaken by the School of International Studies of the University of Trento as part of a project
on “Institutional change, economic growth, and social development.”
Part I
The External Dimension of the European
Union: European Development Aid,
Enlargement Process in the Balkans, and
the External Sanctions System
At the Origins of European Foreign Policy:
European Exceptionalism and the Case
of Development Aid
Sara Lorenzini
“The European Community will only make the most of its opportunities if it remains
true to its inner characteristics. These are primarily: civilian ends and means and a
built-in sense of collective action, which in turn express, however imperfectly, social
values of equality, justice and tolerance . . . this implies a concern for social justice at
home spilling over in a revival of interest for the poor abroad . . . the European
Community must be a force for the international diffusion of civilian and democratic
standards or it will itself be more or less the victim of power politics run by powers
stronger and more cohesive than itself” (Duchêne 1973, p. 20). These words were
written in the early 1970s by François Duchêne, a former special assistant to Jean
Monnet in the European Coal and Steel Community, to explain the potential of a
common European foreign policy in an age of interdependence—the term
“interdependence” was used at that time instead of globalization. Duchêne defined
the essence of what he thought European exceptionalism was: the natural inclination
of the European Community to act as a “civilian power,” as an alternative to old-style
power politics, with the goal of making the world a better place. The area where the
action of Europe as a civilian power could be deployed to best effect was in the
economic and political relations with the Third World—“the poor abroad,” in
Duchêne’s words.
In the aftermath of the October 1972 Paris Summit, and on the eve of the 1973 first
enlargement, European leaders agreed on the fact that Europe had to make her voice
“heard in world affairs and making a creative contribution in proportion to her human,
intellectual and material resources and affirming her own concepts in international
S. Lorenzini (*)
Department of Humanities, School of International Studies, University of Trento, Trento, Italy
e-mail: sara.lorenzini@unitn.it
© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2019 11

L. Antoniolli et al. (eds.), Highs and Lows of European Integration,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93626-0_2
12 S. Lorenzini
relations, in line with her role in initiating progress, peace and cooperation.”1 One of the
fields where a strengthened unity was to express itself was in relations with Third World
countries. In the 1973 Declaration of European Identity, which ranked priorities in
European Community foreign relations, association, coupled with a “policy for devel-
opment aid on a worldwide scale” ranked on top, together with links with the Mediter-
ranean and African countries.2
In the early 1970s, Third World solidarity had acquired new strength, with the
discussion on the New International Economic Order during the Sixth Special
Session of the UN General Assembly in 1974. However, European Community
interest in developing countries was not a mere consequence of the new momentum
acquired by Third World issues. Civil society movements also played a role, with the
requests from the rebelling youth emerging since 1968, which suggested the adop-
tion of a strategy of paying attention to the Third World (Garavini 2007). The
particular attention with regard to Third World countries was also the product of a
long-lasting imperial legacy, in the genes of the European Economic Community
ever since its foundation, back in the 1950s.
This essay reviews the history of the European Union’s emerging sense of its
global role. It argues that much of the early effort in projecting a European Identity
abroad focused on the developing countries. It discusses the links between the notion
of the civilian power and the legacy of the old style imperial civilizing mission. It
then focuses on the rare kind of regionalism that was typical for EC “foreign policy”
toward the Third World, and it argues that the idea of thinking regional to act
globally is key to European exceptionalism in foreign policy (Lorenzini 2017,
pp. 233–266).
1 European Development Aid and Colonial Legacy
In their recent work Eurafrica, Peo Hanssen and Stefan Jonsson argue convincingly
that the colonial dimension was part and parcel of the projects of European con-
struction (Hansen and Jonsson 2014). In the 1950s, many European countries were
still empires and were not willing to renounce their colonial identity. Ever since the
earliest projects for a European customs union, relations with colonies and former
colonies were crucial, and an imperial ideology imbued the European construction.
The connection with colonial territories in Africa was part of the old plans for
Eurafrica, i.e., the concept of a homogenous bloc between Europe and Africa,
which had fascinated several intellectuals in France, Germany, and Italy in the
1920s and 1930s (Beckert 2017). In the interwar years, such schemes were imagined
1
“Meetings of the Heads of State or Government. Paris, 19–21 October 1972” (Paris Summit
Declaration), available at http://aei.pitt.edu/1919/2/paris_1972_communique.pdf
2
The text of the declaration is, among others, available at https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/
1999/1/1/02798dc9-9c69-4b7d-b2c9-f03a8db7da32/publishable_en.pdf
At the Origins of European Foreign Policy: European Exceptionalism and. . . 13
as ideal tests for European cooperation. In Coudenhove-Kalergi’s plans for

Paneuropa, for example, Eurafrica played an important strategic role, as a counter-
weight to the United States and the Soviet Union. This idea was discussed in the
League of Nations, too. In the 1930s many French thinkers and politicians, espe-
cially on the right side of the political spectrum, thought of Africa as a workshop for
Europe. Among them was Albert Sarraut, long-time minister of colonies and two
times prime minister (Montarsolo 2005).
After the Second World War, the idea of Eurafrica resurged. It was thought to be a
way to revive the European role, to promote Europe as a third force in the Cold War.
Tossed into the post-war negotiations by British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin, with
the aim of balancing the resource gap with the United States, the project of Eurafrica
did not seem viable at first, because of the differences in French and British colonial
traditions (Deighton 2005, 2006; Kent 1989, 1992). However, when the prospect of
a European Union took off in 1950, the Eurafrica model re-emerged.
How far were colonial territories to be involved in the European project at its
birth? This point was discussed during the negotiations for the European Coal and
Steel Community (ECSC) in 1950 and the Consultative Assembly of the Council of
Europe in 1952. In some countries, and especially in France, the issue was vital. On
the eve of the negotiations that led to the European Economic Community (EEC),
the French Overseas Minister, Gaston Defferre, stated that it was not acceptable for
France to sacrifice the African vocation for a European one (Migani 2008,
pp. 50–63; Dimier 2014, p. 11). Many European leaders saw in the Treaties of
Rome the continuation of Europe’s “grand and global civilizing mission”—these
words were used by the Dutch Foreign Minister Joseph Luns (Hansen and Jonsson
2014, p. 238). Agreement on the “association” of former colonies was achieved in
early 1957, and it entered as part IV of the Treaties signed in Rome.
The idea of association was based on complementarity between metropolitan
areas and dependencies. It was a legacy of the French tradition in the interwar years:
Albert Sarraut first used the term “association” in the 1930s, to describe relations
between France and its colonies. In 1946, “associationism” was built into the new
French Constitution. The regime of association included two elements: free trade and
the provision of aid. Associated territories were granted trade advantages
(a reduction of tariffs on the base of reciprocity) and special funding for their
economic development. Free circulation of labor and capital was also part of the
deal—but with significant limits. Funding was channeled through the European
Development Fund (EDF), which had to serve the purpose of incorporating the
colonies into the European project (Grilli 1993, pp. 5–8).
After decolonization, though, the Eurafrica scheme, together with the idea of
association, threatened to disintegrate. With independence, former colonies were not
bound to the Rome Treaties anymore. The association regime needed to be con-
firmed by a separate treaty signed with newly independent countries: the Yaoundé
Convention (1963). Relations with formerly dependent territories, previously issues
of domestic concern, had now suddenly become foreign policy. Would the EEC
institutions be able to take care of what had formerly been responsibilities of the
colonial government? In no time, decolonization had externalized erstwhile
14 S. Lorenzini
domestic issues of colonial administration and spurred the need for a common
foreign policy of the brand-new Community. Acknowledging this further need
was not automatic; the task of turning development into an embryonic foreign policy
toward the newly independent countries took some time.
2 Regional Versus Global: Working with French Traditions
The making of a European Community policy toward the South is well described
through the history of the DG8, the Direction Générale Développement (Directorate
General Development) (Dimier 2014). France more than other countries shaped the
architecture of relations with developing countries. Within the Community, two
approaches were confronting each other: a regional approach, identified with the
French tradition, and a world approach supported by the Germans and the Dutch.
The divergence between regional and world vision soon turned into a conflict within
the DG8 between the first architect of community development policies, the Devel-
opment Commissioner Robert Lemaignen, and his Director General, Helmut Allardt.
Allardt, who disagreed with French regionalism and requested an opening up to a
global perspective, was forced to resign within two years after his appointment
(Allardt 1979, pp. 187–188).3
The EEC trade and aid policy toward the associated territories and countries that
gained independence in the early 1960s was profoundly influenced by the general
setting. Shaped by specific colonial traditions, and primarily by the ideas of
Eurafrica, EEC strategy toward the South was filled with mainstream optimism on
the prospects for modernity. The Community followed the path inaugurated by
French national planning policies within the framework of FIDES (Fonds
d’Investissements pour le Développement Économique et Social). Projects for
fostering development were administered by EDF, which was described as a New
Deal for the Dark Continent (Muller 2005). This definition revealed some of the
leading features that were desired by its proponents, i.e., the picture of a develop-
ment plan strongly based on community development, like in the successful Amer-
ican precedent (Immerwahr 2015). At birth, EDF was endowed with EUA (the unit
of account) 581 million over 5 years. It became operational in 1959. Just like FIDES,
it did not follow rigid budget rules. Amounts were established on a 5-year basis, and
there was no strict financial control.4
Former colonial administrators dominated the newly constructed DG8. They
inevitably followed traditional methods, even though they now were not necessarily
acting in the interest of their country of origin. As a result, EEC policy toward the
3
In December 1959, Allardt suggested not to focus on the recipient, but instead on the donor. HAEU
BAC 25/1980 1034; see also the declarations of Allardt in Läuft Afrika der EWG davon?, in Die
Welt.
4
On the birth of EDF, see HAEU, BAC 25/1980 1034.
South was following plans and strategies inherited from the colonial administration.
It was a “sedimentation of empire” (Dimier 2014, p. 99). EC officers did not trust,
and often loathed, technocratic ideas typical of international organizations, which
they viewed as part of undesirable Anglo-Saxon culture. Robert Delavignette was
the main inspiration for most French officials and consultants in the DG8. One of the
most well-known French colonial officers in Africa (he served in Cameroon, Niger
and Upper Volta—now Burkina Faso), Delavignette was the long-time director of
the École Nationale de la France d’Outremer and, 1947–1951, the Director of
Political Affairs in the French Overseas Ministry. He praised traditional rural African
societies and could not stand planners who “played with statistics” and were guided
by what he considered a false myth of progress, the blind trust in technology and the
total neglect of local cultures (Delavignette 1946; Dimier 2014, pp. 33–34,
116–120). The notion that some knowledge of local situations was crucial to
designing effective aid plans became the tenet of the DG8. The head of the EDF,
Jacques Ferrandi, followed the same line. He held that development was not a
technocratic move. It was not about “applying a solution developed in a lab onto a
specific situation”, but instead about devising specific solutions to specific problems
(Ferrandi 1964, pp. 8–9). His views departed sharply from the ideas then prevailing
in the international system. He disdained industrial planning and dubbed it “not
desirable.” People in his team who had different thoughts on the role of industrial
development would have to grin and bear it. This was the case of Jean Durieux, for
example, an economist specializing in industrial policies. Durieux had started his
career in the Research Department at the DG8 and had become its adjunct Director
General in 1964. Community officers, he admitted, well knew that Africa was not
ready for industrial development and engaged in helping these countries create the
conditions for future industrial growth.5
EDF management under Ferrandi was opaque. Criteria adopted for choosing
projects could vary. Sometimes they rewarded expected profits. Occasionally the
condition of poverty of the recipients was prioritized. At other times, it was about
keeping old promises. The Cold War had a role to play, too. It was not possible to
deny African leaders their favorite projects, claimed Ferrandi, because they would
turn somewhere else (to the Eastern Bloc) to seek funds. The requests for more
objective criteria in the distribution of EC aid came from several places. From Great
Britain, when it entered the Community, but also from countries like Senegal or the
Côte d'Ivoire, which were critical of the amounts of aid provided to smaller and
weaker nations, like Gabon (Dimier 2014, p. 36). Notwithstanding all its flaws, EC
aid still had the positive transformative power of previous colonial practices (Rempe
2011). European bureaucrats needed to back their decisions with objective criteria;
thus they ended up financing projects that were qualitatively better, while the lower-
quality plans were left to bilateral aid channels. Similarly, trade policies were also
influenced by the rules of the EEC. The case of the peanut trade with Senegal,
described as a case of involuntary Europeanization, shows that the EC framework
5
Durieux to Ferrandi, 28 February 1973 in AEC/25/1980/2947.
16 S. Lorenzini
was likely to introduce positive incentives to the rationalization and modernization

of the entire production chain (Rempe 2012).
3 The Lomé Model as a Foundation of EU Global Strategy?
In the 1970s, with the entry of the United Kingdom into the European Economic
Community, the shape of EEC policies was bound to change (Gilbert 2011). How far
would that change go? Would it disrupt the principles of “old-style” regional policy,
based on the Eurafrica paradigm that had informed so many of the policies toward
the former colonies admitted to the exceptional link of association? The general
principle taking precedence over the rules for new members, i.e., the respect of the
acquis communautaire, made sure that the change would not be as radical. Still, it
was inevitable to rewrite the Yaoundé agreement and its aid and trade provisions,
given the importance of the Commonwealth countries in British identity and foreign
policy. Provisions for the so-called associables—i.e., former British colonies that
were likely to be associated to the EEC—had to be negotiated together with the
accession treaty. They were discussed in 1972 in what is called the “Protocol 22”
negotiation.
British accession was not the only factor that determined this change. The
emergence of Thirdworldism as a united voice in the international arena was
especially significant. In harmony with the requests of the newly independent
countries, aggregated since 1968 in the group of the 77 (G77), the EEC promised
to build a postcolonial development policy. Ideas on restructuring international trade
relations in the 1970s, including the project of the New International Economic
Order, made their way in the EEC more than in European Nation States. In 1971,
sooner than any other OECD country, the EEC conceded to the requests of Third
World countries and adopted the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). It was a
big leap forward—miles away from the reverse preferences typical of both colonial
and EC tradition. Under the impulse of the President of the European Commission
Sicco Mansholt, during the Paris Summit of 1972 the Community proclaimed itself a
“privileged partner” of developing countries and opened to global cooperation and
development policy, in addition to the African regional focus. The ability of the
European Community to leave to the Nation States the burden of opposing the
requests of the G77 was an incredible success story (Garavini 2013). The negotiation
of the Lomé Convention, signed on 28 February 1975 between the EEC and
46 former colonies, now regrouped under the more depoliticized brand “ACP
countries” (African Caribbean and Pacific Group of States), was both the symbol
and the main product of this change. The “Lomé revolution” implied a change in
discourse, in political vision, in people, in policies and, finally, in methods.
The Lomé Convention was not a simple extension of Yaoundé terms, but it
became a novel type of association. It focused on two policy areas: trade and technical
assistance. Compared to Yaoundé, there were innovations in both areas, particularly
in the trade policies. Agricultural and mining products would now enter Europe free
of duties, without any reciprocity clause. Commodities in competition with European

products were governed by quota systems negotiated separately—starting with the
sugar protocol. A unique innovation was Stabex (short for Système de Stabilisation
des Recettes d’Exportation), a mechanism for price stabilization of raw materials. It
was a sort of insurance that protected against price volatility by stabilizing revenues
from trade in primary commodities. As for aid, Lomé introduced new industrial
cooperation and funding for technical assistance amounting to three billion ECU
(European Currency Unit), the new unit of account. The specifics of the operation of
EDF were to be dealt with at a later stage.
Lomé was welcomed as the inception of a new season of European Community
relations with the South. The inputs of the new development commissioner Claude
Cheysson were fundamental in promoting the concept of Lomé as a diplomatic
revolution. A French diplomat known for his hostility to the old colonial school, for
his proximity to the newly independent countries, for good relations with the British
and for his working experience in the private sector, he caused a rupture in the
traditional administration of EEC development aid. In his plans, the new agreement
with the ACP countries was meant to form the bulk of a new European Foreign
Policy. It should embody European exceptionalism (Ferrari 2016). What made
Europe special, Cheysson maintained, was its unique attitude toward the former
colonial territories. European exceptionalism was articulated in a notion of Europe as
flanking the requests of Third World countries, with a more profound sense of social
justice that was mirrored in a revival of interest for the poor abroad and with taking
sides with the developing countries whenever possible (Duchêne 1973). This turned
out to be a new course for the EEC, which tended to support the Third World theses
for a “right to development.” Unlike the Nation States that were members of the
Community, the EEC was allegedly free from colonial legacies and did not represent
old political or economic interests.
Lomé was a method, a new way to deal with the South. It was based on the
recognition of the tremendous economic potential of the Third World and its
allegedly crucial role in international politics, which emerged within the UN system,
in the discussions on the New International Economic Order. The discourse around
Lomé affirmed the partnership principle between Europe and the South, stressing the
contractual and consensual nature of the relationship. This relationship included a
combination of aid, trade, and political cooperation. Lomé changed the terminology
associated with EEC relations with the South. Partnership substituted association.
The “Lomé as a method” rhetoric stressed interdependence between Europe and the
Third World, with particular emphasis on areas that were initially not part of the
story, but strategically of great importance in the years of the energy crisis—first of
all the Mediterranean. Traditionally, within the Community, the regional approach
and the world approach clashed against each other. But the European Commission
provided remarkable acrobatic thinking in the early 1970s, claiming that regionalism
and globalism were concepts that could work well together. The 1972 Paris Summit,
contended the Commission, had shown that globalism and regionalism, often
presented as conflicting visions, were not at all opposed. A global policy did not
imply the dilution of Community policy. Instead, the two reinforced each other. A
18 S. Lorenzini
comprehensive strategy, including general preferences, agreements on commodity

prices, and more and better aid, including industrial cooperation, would set new
standards to be first tried out in the Mediterranean. The Lomé Convention would
work as a specific, preferential regional policy.6 Lomé’s regional approach could
then be extended to other areas.
4 Replicating Lomé? The Mediterranean Dimension
The “Lomé as a method” formula meant exporting the characteristics of the agree-
ment to other settings, starting with the Southern shore of the Mediterranean: Algeria,
Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria. As early as 1969 the EEC had reached prefer-
ential agreements with the Maghreb countries—Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia.
Within the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP)—this was the name by which this
Mediterranean focus had been known since the 1972 Paris Summit—it negotiated a
series of bilateral trade and co-operation agreements with Third Mediterranean
Countries (TMCs), except for Libya and Albania. A particular regime of the accords
was spelled out for Greece, Turkey, Malta, and Cyprus, with a customs union or
eventual membership in mind. Dealing with the countries on the Southern shore of the
Mediterranean proved to be challenging from the very beginning. EC Member States
had differentiated attitudes and strategic priorities in the area. The predicament with
the political situation and specifically with the expediency—or otherwise—of taking
sides in the Arab-Israeli conflict, had poisoned EC foreign policy from the very
beginning. The Joint Statement on the Middle East, of 13 May 1971, the first of the
nascent European Political Cooperation, called for a just peace in the Middle East and
the approval of UN Security Council Resolution 242—asking for Israel’s withdrawal
to its 1967 borders. It was meant to be kept secret, given that it might cause an uproar
in Germany, where criticism of Israel was banned, due to the moral predicament of
German politics and public opinion as a consequence of the Shoah. At the outbreak of
the Yom-Kippur War, 6–26 October 1973, divergent views did not fail to emerge,
with France and Italy taking a pro-Arab stance. Their position finally prevailed, and
the resolution adopted by the Community on 6 November 1973 witnessed a clear
alignment to the position of the “littoral States of the South and East of the Mediter-
ranean,” which were linked to the European Community states by “ties of all kinds.”7
The Global Mediterranean Policy became the main road to be taken with the 1973
oil crisis, when a growing concern about securing energy sources emerged in Europe,
together with an increasing interest in obtaining predominance in the consumer goods
markets on the southern shore of the Mediterranean. Free circulation of goods was not
6
Ou en est la politique globale de coopération au développement à l’échelle mondiale. In HAEU,
BAC 25/1980 n.1897.
7
https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/a08b36bc-6d29-475c-aadb-0f71c59dbc3e/pub
lishable_en.pdf
enough to grant stability and security in the region; the key to stability was a
contractual relationship, patterned on the Lomé precedent, implying “consistent
actions in finance, technology, energy, employment, environment” (Trentin 2015,
p. 91). The environment had just entered the international discourse, after the 1972
Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment.
Within the framework of GMP, the European Community offered bilateral
agreements, all structured according to standard guidelines. Mediterranean agree-
ments included trade—with preferential treatment for both agricultural and industrial
products, economic and financial arrangements with new credit lines, cooperation in
social matters. The final goal was an Economic Community of the Near East, similar
to the EEC. All agreements contained three main chapters. The first was Commercial
cooperation. The Mediterranean country was granted preferential tariffs for agricul-
tural, agro-industrial and horticultural products, in quotas compatible with the
Common Agricultural Policy. Industrial products were exempt from customs duties,
except for textiles, footwear, and refined petroleum products, which were subject to a
quota system. The second chapter was Financial and economic cooperation: finan-
cial protocols specified the level of aid given to the TMCs, in the different forms
(grants, European Investment Bank loans at low-interest rates, and Commission
loans at a 1% interest rate). The third chapter was Social co-operation. Here, the EEC
pledged to improve the standard of living of immigrant workers, legalizing family
grouping and giving them social rights equal to those of European citizens. Many top
officers of the DG8 were assigned to the Mediterranean question. The talented
economist Durieux, for example, was in charge of industrial development and of
signing specific agreements with Israel and the Maghreb countries in 1976. The EEC
signed the first GMP agreement with Israel in 1975; then with Morocco, Algeria, and
Tunisia in 1976, and with Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria in 1977.
The Conference also discussed the prospects for an Economic Community of the
Near East for International Economic Cooperation or CIEC. Also known as North-
South Dialogue, the CIEC was held between December 1975 and June 1977 to deal
with oil, trade, development, and the financial crisis. Organized in thematic com-
missions, it did not achieve outstanding results, because each group had different
expectations. Developed countries wanted a permanent forum on energy while
developing countries thought of an UNCTAD-like agency, where they could
advance requests on industrial cooperation and technology transfer. This distance
meant that little was achieved. Europe was working for global leadership by setting
the Mediterranean at its center, Cheysson claimed, commenting on the ongoing
negotiations. If this was the goal, there was still a long way to go.
EEC strategy toward the Third World was described in the October 1974 publi-
cation Development Aid: Fresco of Community Action Tomorrow. Here, the Com-
mission listed a whole spectrum of policies.8 Commissioner Cheysson and Director
General Hans-Broder Krohn planned on extending the Lomé policy to the southern
8
“Development aid: Fresco of community action tomorrow; Communication of the Commission
transmitted to the Council on 5 November 1974,” COM(74) 1728, 30 October 1974, in Bulletin of
20 S. Lorenzini
shore of the Mediterranean, introducing the provision of food aid, and introducing an
emergency package for developing countries hit by the rise in oil prices: the Cheysson
Fund, endowed with ECU 500 million. They also planned a scheme to promote
technical cooperation in the Mediterranean via trilateral relationships that combined
technical abilities and easy access to European markets with oil producers’ money.
The Euro-Arab dialogue, as this was called, was a body built by experts with the aim
of creating “responsibility zones” between industrialized and developing countries, in
particular with member countries of the Arab League. Arising out of a French
initiative and launched at the European Council in Copenhagen in December 1973,
shortly after the Yom Kippur War and the oil embargo, the Euro-Arab Dialogue was
devised to secure oil sources by establishing closer relations with Arab countries.
Cheysson, whom the Arabs had considered a friend ever since his early support for
Algeria’s independence, was tasked with the negotiations. In the working paper
prepared by the Commission in 1975, EEC priorities stood out: harmonizing eco-
nomic development, avoiding overproduction and imbalances, addressing industrial
cooperation in the petrochemical sector, helping to differentiate industrial activities,
and finally extending training and technology for rural development.9 The UK
insisted on discussing alternative energy sources, too (Labbate 2016, p. 45). But
while Europeans prioritized economic issues, Arab countries were keen on discussing
politics, especially the Arab-Israeli conflict. The aid component, intended as projects
of trilateral cooperation, consisting of a transfer of technology and know-how from
Europe, with funding from the wealthy Gulf countries, made limited headway. Plans
for rural development in the Juba Valley in Somalia were agreed upon in 1977, and
resources went to pre-feasibility studies on potato development in Iraq and meat
production and marketing in Sudan (Allen 1977, p. 336).
The Mediterranean dimension of EEC foreign relations changed after the collapse
of dictatorial regimes in Greece, Spain, and Portugal, and the transition to democracy
of the three countries, which soon applied for EEC membership, between 1975 and
1977. The prospect of a southern enlargement on the one side boosted the Mediter-
ranean dimension of the Community but, at the same time, it hampered the full
unfolding of the GMP. In 1982, the Commission articulated a development plan for
Europe’s Mediterranean regions (given Greece’s entry in 1981 and that of Spain and
Portugal in 1986) and recommended that a new policy be adopted. The regional
priority would become to absorb the new members in the Community, while
sanctioning a de facto partition of the Mediterranean region as defined in the
GMP, given the lack of bridging mechanisms between the “ins” and the “outs”
(Bicchi 2009).
the European Communities, Supplement 8/74. Director general Hans-Broder Krohn describes the
new policy in his editorial in The Courier, no. 44, Jul.–Aug. 1977.
9
Document de travail des services de la Commission “Dialogue Euro-Arabe,” 28 January 1975,
HAEU, SEC (75) 415, Klaus Meyer 40.
5 Political Conditionality and Europe as a Normative

Power
Even though the success in extending the Lomè model to the Mediterranean had
meager results, Development Commissioner Cheysson was able to present his
efforts as a success. He was very active in selling Lomé as a model—or better, as
he preferred to say, given that he did not believe in models being applied indiscrim-
inately to different regions, as an example of a new social contract between North
and South.10 The EC was acting for the whole West, he insisted in the Trilateral
Commission, where he highlighted the European role in the Mediterranean and
North-South economic relations and discussed “the relative absence of the Soviet
Union and eastern European states from North-South dialogue and action”
(Cheysson 1976, pp. 10–11).
On the eve of the negotiations of a second Lomé Convention in 1978, a new issue
entered the agenda of North-South relations: human rights. In the 1970s, the
protection of human rights had become a new priority for Europe. Between 1973
and 1979, the European Parliament passed 530 resolutions on human rights and
wanted to become “the conscience and the critical voice of Europe” (Gfeller 2014,
p. 407). Both the Council and the Commission followed its lead. “Public opinion,
workers, and young people in our countries—declared Cheysson—would [. . .]
withdraw their support for a real joint development policy with the Third World”
in case of flagrant violations of human rights (Cheysson 1978). Third World
countries, continued Cheysson, had urged the EC to take up the question of
human rights, taking a stand against gross violations such as apartheid and torture
in South Africa: why would they not be willing to make of the respect of human
rights a general principle? In 1978, the European Community had adopted a “Code
of Conduct” for its companies operating in South Africa, which required that the
black workers should be treated the same as white workers.11 In siding with the
requests of the Third World on South Africa, European countries planned to avoid a
situation where the Soviet bloc could stand out as the champion of human rights in
the region. How to balance political sensitiveness was problematic, though. Should
the EEC officially endorse conditionality as a method to promote its values as a
civilian power in recipient countries of Asia, Africa, and also Latin America? “The
Commission does not believe that breaking off relations with our partners and
stopping aid are effective means of helping downtrodden populations that are denied
the most basic human rights,” argued Cheysson (Cheysson 1978, p. 23). This stance
against the use of political conditionality should not come as a surprise, given the
dubious record of political conditionality in the West German experience. The
10
Intervention de Monsieur Cheysson devant l’Assemblée Consultative ACP/CEE le 25 septembre
1980, p.6, available at http://aei.pitt.edu/view/eusubjects/H002004004.html (last access,
January 2017).
11
Interview with Claude Cheysson, in La Croix, 14 January 1978, available at http://aei.pitt.edu/
12710/ last access January 2017.
22 S. Lorenzini
Federal Republic of Germany had consistently adopted political conditionality as a

tool of its special kind of Cold War against East Germany, in the 1950s and 1960s.
According to the notorious Hallstein Doctrine, developing countries faced immedi-
ate retaliation, in the form of abrupt interruption of foreign aid, in case they
established formal relations with East Germany (Lorenzini 2003; Glenn Gray
2003). Political conditionality was progressively abandoned by the Germans at the
end of the 1960s, though, because of its many drawbacks.
Notwithstanding the abysmal record of political conditionality in the German
experience, and quite paradoxically, making development aid conditional upon a
minimum standard of respect for human rights became a fundamental feature of EC
identity as a normative power in the 1970s (Ferrari 2015). The issue of applying
conditionality was discussed thoroughly. The leading case was Idi Amin’s Uganda.
A member of the Lomé convention, Uganda was a source of concern for the
European countries, which were put under pressure from their public opinion and
the campaigns by NGOs such as Amnesty International. Given that Lomé did not
contemplate suspension of aid for political reasons, the European Council decided to
intervene ad hoc in 1977 against Uganda, suspending aid disbursements. Equatorial
Guinea in 1978, the Central African Republic in 1979, and Liberia in 1980 were
likewise sanctioned. The Commission ended up inserting a specific clause on
political conditionality into the new Lomé Convention, Lomé II (Ferrari 2016,
pp. 191–197). But instead of being formulated with particular reference to the case
of gross violations of human rights, the clause mentioned the respect of norms on
working conditions established by the ILO. No surprise, this was criticized from all
sides, in the European Parliament for starters.12
Before political conditionality finally made it as a constitutional principle of
European Development Aid, some years had to pass. The pledge for human rights
as part and parcel of good governance “the EU way” became a reality in the 1990s,
after the end of the Cold War. The provision for partial or total suspension of aid in
case of a violation of human rights was introduced in Lomé IV bis, (article 366a) and
confirmed in the Cotonou Agreement in 2000 (Dimier 2014, p. 160). This progress
toward an identity as a normative power went together with a stiffening of the rules
throughout, which has been characteristic of European governance after the 1992
Maastricht Treaty.
6 Conclusions
“EU development policy seeks to eradicate poverty in a context of sustainable

development. It is a cornerstone of EU relations with the outside world—alongside
foreign, security, and trade policy (and international aspects of other policies like
environment, agriculture, and fisheries). Providing over 50% of all global
12
On discussions in the European Parliament: HAEU, PE0 2955.
development aid, the EU and its member states are collectively the world's leading
donor.”13 This paragraph opens the official webpage of the DG8. It reflects the
picture that the DG8 intends to convey: an image where the attention to sustainable
development constitutes a cornerstone of EU identity and international strategy.
Solidarity with the developing countries is described here as an essential part of the
European project.
This chapter argues for the existence of a consistent nexus between the elabora-
tion of European development policy, the definition of a distinctive European
identity, and an embryonic European foreign policy. It claims that in the 1970s,
the concept of a European Identity, which is often studied as the product of
institutional dynamics, was importantly triggered by external factors, too. Relations
with the newly independent countries in Asia and Africa were channeled through
development aid. A European development assistance policy was there from the
very beginning and it reflected the imperial legacy of the countries participating in
the European project. Following the lead of the French tradition, European devel-
opment aid had a strong regional nature. For a long time, development aid strategies
evolved in a framework of path dependency. Political scientists have described them
as a textbook case of institutional layering, as an example of limited incremental
transformation in complex systems. In the early 1970s, scholars have argued the new
leadership in the DG8 was able to promote a significant change in discourse around
EC development aid, but this corresponded to just minimal institutional adjustments
(Thelen 2003). The limits of change have been criticized as sedimentation of empire,
where old colonial traditions are said to have survived both decolonization and the
crises of the 1970s, while perpetuating dependence. The story told here, however, is
quite clearly one of a successful transformation. In the late 1970s, the spirit of the
Lomé Convention became an example. Its nature, reminiscent of a contractual
agreement, based on formal respect of identity and political priorities, became
inspiring as a way to promote interdependence and global dialogue, starting from
specific, regional agreements. The political framework around development politics
turned into a progressive tool, a way to promote the role of Europe as a civilian
power, through aid and political conditionality in support of human rights. By
stressing the potential of their regional model, European institutions were able to
use the past as a way to plan the future, to learn from the past experiences while
introducing selective changes.
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13
https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/policies/european-development-policy_en
24 S. Lorenzini
Beckert, S. (2017). American danger: United States Empire, Eurafrica, and the territorialization of
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Some two or three, who will not touch the bloom
That is rubbed and questioned in the concert room.”
—And so the conversation slips
Among velleities and carefully caught regrets
Through attenuated tones of violins
Mingled with remote cornets
And begins.
“You do not know how much they mean to me, my friends,

And how, how rare and strange it is, to find
In a life composed so much, so much of odds and ends,
(For indeed I do not love it ... you knew? you are not blind!
How keen you are!)
To find a friend who has these qualities,
Who has, and gives
Those qualities upon which friendship lives.
How much it means that I say this to you—
Without these friendships—life, what cauchemar!”
Among the windings of the violins
And the ariettes
Of cracked cornets
Inside my brain a dull tom-tom begins
Absurdly hammering a prelude of its own,
Capricious monotone
That is at least one definite “false note”.
—Let us take the air, in a tobacco trance,
Admire the monuments
Discuss the late events,
Correct our watches by the public clocks.
Then sit for half an hour and drink our bocks.
II
Now that lilacs are in bloom

She has a bowl of lilacs in her room
And twists them in her fingers while she talks.
“Ah, my friend, you do not know, you do not know
What life is, you who hold it in your hands;”
(Slowly twisting the lilac stalks)
“You let it flow from you, you let it flow
And youth is cruel, and has no remorse
And smiles at situations which it cannot see.”
I smile, of course,
And go on drinking tea.
“Yet with these April sunsets, that somehow recall

My buried life, and Paris in the Spring,
I feel immeasurably at peace, and find the world
To be wonderful and youthful, after all.”
The voice returns like the insistent out-of-tune

Of a broken violin on an August afternoon:
“I am always sure that you understand
My feelings, always sure that you feel,
Sure that across the gulf you reach your hand.
You are invulnerable, you have no Achilles’ heel.

You will go on, and when you have prevailed
You can say: at this point many a one has failed.
But what have I, but what have I, my friend,

To give you, what can you receive from me?
Only the friendship and the sympathy
Of one about to reach her journey’s end.
I shall sit here, serving tea to friends....”
I take my hat: how can I make a cowardly amends

For what she has said to me?
You will see me any morning in the park

Reading the comics and the sporting page.
Particularly I remark
An English countess goes upon the stage.
A Greek was murdered at a Polish dance,
Another bank defaulter has confessed.
I keep my countenance,
I remain self-possessed
Except when a street piano, mechanical and tired
Reiterates some worn-out common song
With the smell of hyacinths across the garden
Recalling things that other people have desired.
Are these ideas right or wrong?
III
The October night comes down; returning as before

Except for a slight sensation of being ill at ease
I mount the stairs and turn the handle of the door
And feel as if I had mounted on my hands and knees.
“And so you are going abroad; and when do you return?

But that’s a useless question.
You hardly know when you are coming back,
You will find so much to learn.”
My smile falls heavily among the bric-à-brac.
“Perhaps you can write to me.”

My self-possession flares up for a second;
This is as I had reckoned.
“I have been wondering frequently of late
(But our beginnings never know our ends!)
Why we have not developed into friends.”
I feel like one who smiles, and turning shall remark

Suddenly, his expression in a glass.
My self-possession gutters; we are really in the dark.
“For everybody said so, all our friends,

They all were sure our feelings would relate
So closely! I myself can hardly understand.
We must leave it now to fate.
You will write, at any rate.
Perhaps it is not too late.
I shall sit here, serving tea to friends.”
And I must borrow every changing shape

To find expression ... dance, dance
Like a dancing bear,
Cry like a parrot, chatter like an ape.
Let us take the air, in a tobacco trance—
Well! and what if she should die some afternoon,

Afternoon grey and smoky, evening yellow and rose;
Should die and leave me sitting pen in hand
With the smoke coming down above the house-tops;
Doubtful, for quite a while
Not knowing what to feel or if I understand
Or whether wise or foolish, tardy or too soon ...
Would she not have the advantage, after all?
This music is successful with a “dying fall”
Now that we talk of dying—
And should I have the right to smile?
PRELUDES
I
he winter
evening settles
down
With smell of
steaks in
passageways.
Six o’clock.
The burn-out
ends of smoky
days.
And now a
gusty shower
wraps
The grimy
scraps
Of withered
leaves about
your feet
And newspapers from vacant lots;
The showers beat
On broken blinds and chimney-pots,
And at the corner of the street
A lonely cab-horse steams and stamps.
And then the lighting of the lamps.
II
The morning comes to consciousness

Of faint stale smells of beer
From the sawdust-trampled street
With all its muddy feet that press
To early coffee-stands.
With the other masquerades

That time resumes,
One thinks of all the hands

That are raising dingy shades
In a thousand furnished rooms.
III
You tossed a blanket from the bed,

You lay upon your back, and waited;
You dozed, and watched the night revealing
The thousand sordid images
Of which your soul was constituted;
They flickered against the ceiling.
And when all the world came back
And the light crept up between the shutters,
And you heard the sparrows in the gutters,
You had such a vision of the street
As the street hardly understands;
Sitting along the bed’s edge, where
You curled the papers from your hair,
Or clasped the yellow soles of feet
In the palms of both soiled hands.
IV
His soul stretched tight across the skies

That fade behind a city block,
Or trampled by insistent feet
At four and five and six o’clock;
And short square fingers stuffing pipes,
And evening newspapers, and eyes
Assured of certain certainties,
The conscience of a blackened street
Impatient to assume the world.
I am moved by fancies that are curled

Around these images, and cling:
The notion of some infinitely gentle
Infinitely suffering thing.
Wipe your hand across your mouth, and laugh;

The worlds revolve like ancient women
Gathering fuel in vacant lots.
RHAPSODY ON A
WINDY NIGHT
welve o’clock.
Along the
reaches of the
street
Held in a lunar
synthesis
Whispering
lunar
incantations
Dissolve the
floors of the
memory
And all its clear
relations,
Its divisions
and precisions,
Every street
lamp that I
pass
Beats like a fatalistic drum,
And through the spaces of the dark
Midnight shakes the memory
As a madman shakes a dead geranium.
Half-past one.
The street lamp sputtered,
The street lamp muttered,
The street lamp said, “Regard that woman
Who hesitates toward you in the light of the door
Which opens on her like a grin.
You see the border of her dress
Is torn and stained with sand,
And you see the corner of her eye
Twists like a crooked pin.”
The memory throws up high and dry

A crowd of twisted things;
A twisted branch upon the beach
Eaten smooth and polished
As if the world gave up
The secret of its skeleton,
A broken spring in a factory yard,
Rust that clings to the form that the strength has left
Hard and curled and ready to snap.
Half-past two,
The street lamp said,
“Remark the cat which flattens itself in the gutter,
Slips out its tongue
And devours a morsel of rancid butter.”
So the hand of a child, automatic,
Slipped out and pocketed a toy that was running along the
quay.
I could see nothing behind that child’s eye.
I have seen eyes in the street
Trying to peer through lighted shutters,
And a crab one afternoon in a pool,
An old crab with barnacles on his back,
Gripped the end of a stick which I held him.
Half-past three,
The lamp sputtered,
The lamp muttered in the dark.
The lamp hummed:
“Regard the moon,
La lune ne garde aucune rancune,
She winks a feeble eye,
She smiles into corners.
She smoothes the hair of the grass.
The moon has lost her memory.
A washed-out smallpox cracks her face,
Her hand twists a paper rose,
That smells of dust and old Cologne,
She is alone
With all the old nocturnal smells
That cross and cross across her brain.
The reminiscence comes
Of sunless dry geraniums
And dust in crevices,
Smells of chestnuts in the streets,
And female smells in shuttered rooms,
And cigarettes in corridors
And cocktail smells in bars.”
The lamp said

“Four o’clock,
Here is the number on the door.
Memory!
You have thè key
The little lamp spreads a ring on the stair,
Mount.
The bed is open: the tooth-brush hangs on the wall,
Put your shoes at the door, sleep, prepare for life.”
The last twist of the knife.

MORNING AT THE WINDOW
hey are rattling
breakfast
plates in
basement
kitchens
And along the
trampled edges
of the street
I am aware of
the damp souls
of housemaids
Sprouting
despondently
at area gates.
The brown
waves of fog
toss up to me
Twisted faces from the bottom of the street,
And tear from a passer-by with muddy skirts
An aimless smile that hovers in the air
And vanishes along the level of the roofs.
CONVERSATION GALANTE
observe: “Our
sentimental
friend the
moon!
Or possibly
(fantastic, I
confess)
It may be
Prester John’s
balloon
Or an old
battered lantern
hung aloft
To light poor
travellers to
their distress.”
She then:
“How you
digress!”
And I then: “Some one frames upon the keys

That exquisite nocturne, with which we explain
The night and moonshine; music which we seize
To body forth our own vacuity.”
She then: “Does this refer to me?”
“Oh no, it is I who am inane.”
“You, madam, are the eternal humorist,

The eternal enemy of the absolute,
Giving our vagrant moods the slightest twist!
With your air indifferent and imperious
At a stroke our mad poetics to confute—”
And—“Are we then so serious?”
AUNT HELEN
iss Helen
Slingsby was
my maiden
aunt,
Miss Helen
Slingsby was
my maiden
aunt,
And lived in a
small house
near a
fashionable
square
Cared for by
servants to the
number of four.
Now when
she died there
was silence in heaven
And silence at her end of the street.
The shutters were drawn and the undertaker wiped his feet
—
He was aware that this sort of thing had occurred before.
The dogs were handsomely provided for,
But shortly afterwards the parrot died too.
The Dresden clock continued ticking on the mantelpiece,
And the footman sat upon the dining-table
Holding the second house-maid on his knees—
Who had always been so careful while her mistress lived.
COUSIN NANCY
iss Nancy
Ellicott
Strode across
the hills and
broke them,
Rode across
the hills and
broke them—
The barren
New England
hills—
Riding to
hounds
Over the cow-
pasture.
Miss Nancy
Ellicott smoked
And danced all the modern dances;
And her aunts were not quite sure how they felt about it,
But they knew that it was modern.
Upon the glazen shelves kept watch

Matthew and Waldo, guardians of the faith,
The army of unalterable law.
MR. APPOLINAX
Ω τῆς καινότητος. Ἡράκλεις, τῆς παραδοξογιας.
εὺμήχανος ἄνθρωπος.
hen Mr.
Apollinax
visited the
United States
His laughter
tinkled among
the teacups.
I thought of
Fragilion, that
shy figure
among the
birch-trees,
And of Priapus
in the
shrubbery
Gaping at the
lady in the
swing.
In the palace of Mrs. Phlaccus, at Professor Channing-
Cheetah’s
He laughed like an irresponsible fœtus.
His laughter was submarine and profound
Like the old man of the sea’s
Hidden under coral islands
Where worried bodies of drowned men drift down in the green
silence,
Dropping from fingers of surf.
I looked for the head of Mr. Apollinax rolling under a chair,
Or grinning over a screen
With seaweed in its hair.
I heard the beat of centaurs’ hoofs over the hard turf
As his dry and passionate talk devoured the afternoon.
“He is a charming man”—“But after all what did he mean?”—
“His pointed ears ... he must be unbalanced,”—
“There was something he said that I might have challenged.”
Of dowager Mrs. Phlaccus, and Professor and Mrs. Cheetah
I remember a slice of lemon, and a bitten macaroon.
THE BOSTON
EVENING TRANSCRIPT
he readers of
the Boston
Evening
Transcript
The readers of
the Boston
Evening
Transcript
Sway in the
wind like a field
of ripe corn.
When evening
quickens faintly
in the street,
Wakening the
appetites of life
in some
And to others bringing the Boston Evening Transcript,
I mount the stairs and ring the bell, turning
Wearily, as one would turn to nod good-bye to
Rochefoucauld,
If the street were time and he at the end of the street,
And I say, “Cousin Harriet, here is the Boston Evening
Transcript.”
LA FIGLIA CHE PIANGE
O quam te memorem virgo...
tand on the
highest
pavement of
the stair—
Stand on the
highest
pavement of
the stair—
Lean on a
garden urn—
Weave, weave
the sunlight in
your hair—
Clasp your
flowers to you
with a pained
surprise
Fling them to
the ground and turn
With a fugitive resentment in your eyes:
But weave, weave the sunlight in your hair.
So I would have had him leave,

So I would have had her stand and grieve,
So he would have left
As the soul leaves the body torn and bruised,
As the mind deserts the body it has used.
I should find
Some way incomparably light and deft.
Some way we both should understand,
Simple and faithless as a smile and shake of the hand.
She turned away, but with the autumn weather

Compelled my imagination many days,
Many days and many hours:
Her hair over her arms and her arms full of flowers.
And I wonder how they should have been together!
I should have lost a gesture and a pose.
Sometimes these cogitations still amaze
The troubled midnight and the noon’s repose.
THIS EDITION OF 264 COPIES IS THE FIRST BOOK

PRINTED BY JOHN RODKER AND WAS COMPLETED
DEC: 10ᵗʰ 1919.
OF THE EDITION:—
10 Copies unnumbered are for review.
4 Copies on Japan Vellum numbered 1-4 & not for sale.
30 Signed Copies numbered 5-34
220 Copies numbered 35-255
The Initials & Colophon by E.A.Wadsworth.

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Highs and Lows of European

Integration: Sixty Years After the Treaty

The economy of Ghana sixty years after independence

The PDA Paradox The Highs and Lows of My Life on a

The Economics of UK-EU Relations: From the Treaty of

Race Equity and Education Sixty Years from Brown 1st

What Market, What Society, What Union?: The Treaty of

European Citizenship after Brexit Freedom of Movement

Local Integration of Migrants Policy : European

The Impact of European Integration on West European

Highs and Lows

Highs and Lows of European

ISBN 978-3-319-93625-3 ISBN 978-3-319-93626-0 (eBook)

Library of Congress Control Number: 2018953570

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2019

Introduction: The Current Crisis of the European Union, Its Origins

Part I The External Dimension of the European Union: European

Part II Institutional Change in the EU: The Rule of Law Crisis

Part III Populism and Nationalism in the EU: The Role

Part IV Between Economic Divide and Social Cohesion: Features

Luisa Antoniolli, Luigi Bonatti, and Carlo Ruzza

1 The Current Crisis of the European Union

The title of this volume—Highs and Lows of European Integration—focuses on

L. Antoniolli (*) · L. Bonatti · C. Ruzza

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2019 1

2 Current Challenges to the European Project

2.1 Geo-political Tensions (North-South, East-West)

2.2 Future Directions for the EU

3 Structure of the Book

3.1 Part I: The External Dimension of the European

3.2 Part II: Institutional Change in the EU—The Rule

3.3 Part III: Populism and Nationalism in the EU—The Role

Carlo Ruzza on the impact on EU institutions of “the populist turn”, a chapter by

3.4 Part IV: Between Economic Divide and Social

The ﬁrst chapter—by Hristov, Hulsewig, and Wollmershäuser—focuses on TAR-

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2019 11

1 European Development Aid and Colonial Legacy

as ideal tests for European cooperation. In Coudenhove-Kalergi’s plans for

2 Regional Versus Global: Working with French Traditions

was likely to introduce positive incentives to the rationalization and modernization

3 The Lomé Model as a Foundation of EU Global Strategy?

of duties, without any reciprocity clause. Commodities in competition with European

comprehensive strategy, including general preferences, agreements on commodity

4 Replicating Lomé? The Mediterranean Dimension

5 Political Conditionality and Europe as a Normative

Federal Republic of Germany had consistently adopted political conditionality as a

“EU development policy seeks to eradicate poverty in a context of sustainable

“You do not know how much they mean to me, my friends,

Now that lilacs are in bloom

“Yet with these April sunsets, that somehow recall

The voice returns like the insistent out-of-tune

You are invulnerable, you have no Achilles’ heel.

But what have I, but what have I, my friend,

I shall sit here, serving tea to friends....”

I take my hat: how can I make a cowardly amends

You will see me any morning in the park

The October night comes down; returning as before

“And so you are going abroad; and when do you return?

“Perhaps you can write to me.”

I feel like one who smiles, and turning shall remark

“For everybody said so, all our friends,

I shall sit here, serving tea to friends.”

And I must borrow every changing shape