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what is this thing
called knowledge?
What is knowledge? Where does it come from? What kinds of knowledge are there?
Can we know anything at all? What is the practical relevance of learning about
epistemology?
This lucid and engaging introduction grapples with these central questions in the
theory of knowledge, offering a clear, non-partisan view of the main themes of epis-
temology. Both traditional issues and contemporary ideas are discussed in twenty
easily digestible chapters, each of which conclude with a useful summary of the
main ideas discussed, study questions, annotated further reading and a guide to
internet resources.
Each chapter also features text boxes providing bite-sized summaries of key concepts
and major philosophers, and clear and interesting examples are used throughout.
The book concludes with an annotated guide to general introductions to episte-
mology, a glossary of key terms, and a summary of the main examples used in
epistemology. This is an ideal first textbook in the theory of knowledge for under-
graduates coming to philosophy for the first time.
The fourth edition has been revised and updated throughout and features four new
chapters on applied epistemology, covering the relationship between the theory of
knowledge and technology, education, law, and politics. In addition, the text as a
whole has been refreshed to keep it up to date with current developments.
Duncan Pritchard FRSE is Chancellor’s Professor of Philosophy at the University of

California Irvine, USA, and Professor of Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh,
UK. His main research area is epistemology, and he has published widely in this
field. His monographs include Epistemic Luck (2005), The Nature and Value of
Knowledge (with A. Millar and A. Haddock, 2010), Epistemological Disjunctivism
(2012), and Epistemic Angst (2015). In 2007 he was awarded a Philip Leverhulme
Prize for his research. In 2011 he was elected to a Fellowship of the Royal Society
of Edinburgh. In 2013 he delivered the annual Soochow Lectures in Philosophy, in
Taipei, Taiwan.
What is this thing called?
The Routledge What is this thing called? series of concise textbooks have been
designed for use by students coming to a core and important area of philosophy
for the first time. Each volume explores the relevant central questions with clear
explanation of complex ideas and engaging contemporary examples. Features to aid
study include text boxes, chapter summaries, study questions, further reading and
glossaries.
What is this thing called Ethics? Second edition

Christopher Bennett
What is this thing called Global Justice?

Kok-Chor Tan
What is this thing called Knowledge? Fourth edition

Duncan Pritchard
What is this thing called Metaethics?

Matthew Chrisman
What is this thing called Metaphysics? Third edition

Brian Garrett
What is this thing called Philosophy of Language? Second edition

Gary Kemp
What is this thing called Philosophy of Religion?

Elizabeth Burns
What is this thing called Emotion?

Dorothea Debus
What is this thing called Philosophical Methodology?

James Andow
Other titles in the series can be found at www.routledge.com/What-is-this-

thing-called/book-series/WITTC
BY DUNCAN PRITCHARD
what is this
thing called
knowledge?
Fourth edition
Fourth edition published 2018
by Routledge
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and by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
 2018 Duncan Pritchard
The right of Duncan Pritchard to be identified as author of this work
has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or
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Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks
or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and
explanation without intent to infringe.
First edition published by Routledge 2006
Third edition published by Routledge 2010
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Pritchard, Duncan, author.
Title: What is this thing called knowledge? / Duncan Pritchard.
Description: Fourth edition. | New York : Routledge, 2018. | Series: What
is this thing called? | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2017049523| ISBN 9781138225794 (hardback :
alk. paper) | ISBN 9781138225800 (pbk. : alk. paper) | ISBN
9781351980326 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: Knowledge, Theory of.
Classification: LCC BD161 .P749 2018 | DDC 121—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017049523
ISBN: 978-1-138-22579-4 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-1-138-22580-0 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-351-98032-6 (ebk)
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by Swales & Willis Ltd, Exeter, Devon, UK
For Mandi, Ethan, and Alexander
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CONTENTS
Preface to the fourth edition xi

How to use this book xii
PART I: WHAT IS KNOWLEDGE? 1
1 Some preliminaries 3
TYPES OF KNOWLEDGE 3
TWO BASIC REQUIREMENTS OF KNOWLEDGE: TRUTH AND BELIEF 4
KNOWING VERSUS MERELY ‘GETTING IT RIGHT’ 5
A BRIEF REMARK ON TRUTH 7
2 The value of knowledge 10

WHY CARE ABOUT KNOWLEDGE? 10
THE INSTRUMENTAL VALUE OF TRUE BELIEF 10
THE VALUE OF KNOWLEDGE 12
THE STATUES OF DAEDALUS 14
IS SOME KNOWLEDGE NON-INSTRUMENTALLY VALUABLE? 15
3 Defining knowledge 19
THE PROBLEM OF THE CRITERION 19
METHODISM AND PARTICULARISM 20
KNOWLEDGE AS JUSTIFIED TRUE BELIEF 22
GETTIER CASES 22
RESPONDING TO THE GETTIER CASES 25
BACK TO THE PROBLEM OF THE CRITERION 27
4 The structure of knowledge 30

KNOWLEDGE AND JUSTIFICATION 30
THE ENIGMATIC NATURE OF JUSTIFICATION 30
AGRIPPA’S TRILEMMA 32
INFINITISM 33
COHERENTISM 33
FOUNDATIONALISM 35
viii • contents
5 Rationality 41
RATIONALITY, JUSTIFICATION, AND KNOWLEDGE 41
EPISTEMIC RATIONALITY AND THE GOAL OF TRUTH 42
THE GOAL(S) OF EPISTEMIC RATIONALITY 44
THE (UN)IMPORTANCE OF EPISTEMIC RATIONALITY 45
RATIONALITY AND RESPONSIBILITY 46
EPISTEMIC INTERNALISM/EXTERNALISM 48
6 Virtues and faculties 54

RELIABILISM 54
A ‘GETTIER’ PROBLEM FOR RELIABILISM 55
VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY 57
VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE EXTERNALISM/INTERNALISM
DISTINCTION 59
PART II: WHERE DOES KNOWLEDGE COME FROM? 65
7 Perception 67
THE PROBLEM OF PERCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE 67
INDIRECT REALISM 69
IDEALISM 71
TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM 72
DIRECT REALISM 73
8 Testimony and memory 77

THE PROBLEM OF TESTIMONIAL KNOWLEDGE 77
REDUCTIONISM 79
CREDULISM 81
THE PROBLEM OF MEMORIAL KNOWLEDGE 83
9 A priority and inference 88

A PRIORI AND EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE 88
THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF A PRIORI AND EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE 89
INTROSPECTIVE KNOWLEDGE 90
DEDUCTION 91
INDUCTION 92
ABDUCTION 93
10 The problem of induction 98

THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION 98
RESPONDING TO THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION 100
LIVING WITH THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION I: FALSIFICATION 100
LIVING WITH THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION II: PRAGMATISM 103
contents • ix
PART III: WHAT KINDS OF KNOWLEDGE ARE THERE? 109
11 Scientific knowledge 111

WHAT IS SCIENCE? 111
SCIENCE VERSUS PSEUDO-SCIENCE 113
THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 119
CONCLUDING REMARKS 121
12 Religious knowledge 124

IS THERE ANY RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE? 124
THE EVIDENTIALIST CHALLENGE TO RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE 125
NATURAL THEOLOGY 126
FIDEISM 130
REFORMED EPISTEMOLOGY 131
13 Moral knowledge 139

THE PROBLEM OF MORAL KNOWLEDGE 139
SCEPTICISM ABOUT MORAL FACTS 139
SCEPTICISM ABOUT MORAL KNOWLEDGE 142
THE NATURE OF MORAL KNOWLEDGE I: CLASSICAL
FOUNDATIONALISM 145
THE NATURE OF MORAL KNOWLEDGE II: ALTERNATIVE
CONCEPTIONS 147
PART IV: HOW CAN THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

BE APPLIED TO PARTICULAR DOMAINS? 153
14 Technology 155
OUR INCREASING DEPENDENCE ON TECHNOLOGY 155
EXTENDED KNOWLEDGE? 157
INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE AND EXTENDED KNOWLEDGE 159
15 Education 165
THE EPISTEMIC GOALS OF EDUCATION 165
INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE AND EDUCATION 168
TECHNOLOGY AND EDUCATION 169
16 Law 173
THE EPISTEMIC GOALS OF THE LAW 173
ADVERSARIAL VERSUS INVESTIGATORY TRIALS 176
LEGAL EVIDENCE 177
x • contents
17 Politics 182
DEMOCRATIC POLITICS AND INFORMED CITIZENS 182
BULLSHIT 184
‘POST-FACT’ POLITICS 185
EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE 187
PART V: DO WE HAVE ANY KNOWLEDGE? 191
18 Scepticism about other minds 193

THE PROBLEM OF OTHER MINDS 193
THE ARGUMENT FROM ANALOGY 194
A PROBLEM FOR THE ARGUMENT FROM ANALOGY 195
TWO VERSIONS OF THE PROBLEM OF OTHER MINDS 196
PERCEIVING SOMEONE ELSE’S MIND 197
19 Radical scepticism 201

THE RADICAL SCEPTICAL PARADOX 201
SCEPTICISM AND CLOSURE 204
MOOREANISM 205
CONTEXTUALISM 209
20 Truth and objectivity 214

OBJECTIVITY, ANTI-REALISM, AND SCEPTICISM 214
TRUTH AS THE GOAL OF INQUIRY 215
AUTHENTICITY AND THE VALUE OF TRUTH 217
RELATIVISM 218
General further reading 222

Glossary of terms 227
Glossary of key examples 244
Index 247
PREFACE TO THE FOURTH EDITION
One of the main things that I wanted to achieve with What is this thing called
Knowledge? was to offer a genuinely introductory textbook that nonetheless covered
the very latest developments in contemporary epistemology. Given the fast-moving
nature of the debate in epistemology, this meant that one couldn’t wait too long
before producing a second edition, then a third edition, and now a fourth edition,
for fear that this virtue of the book would be lost (and as I put the fourth edition to
bed, I am already pondering what the fifth edition might look like). A good exam-
ple of the importance of keeping the book fresh is the tremendous growth in recent
years in the range of free online materials in epistemology. Those working their
way through this fourth edition are thus far better served when it comes to finding
additional readings and research resources.
The fourth edition also sees an important structural change, in that four completely
new chapters have been introduced, as a new part which deals with the application
of the theory of knowledge to specific domains. The new chapters are concerned
with the relationship between the theory of knowledge and, respectively, technology,
education, law, and politics. Given that much of the focus of recent epistemology has
been on how to apply epistemology to practical questions, this makes the book as a
whole much more representative of the cutting-edge of contemporary epistemology.
Let me close by offering a particular thanks to all the students who have taken
introductory courses in epistemology with me over the years. They have helped me
to refine my ideas about what a good introductory text on this topic should cover,
and how it should cover it (many of them appear in the text in terms of the names
I have chosen for protagonists in certain examples). In a very real sense, they have
helped to make – and, as the book goes from edition to edition, continue to make –
this book what it is.
HOW TO USE THIS BOOK
This book has been designed to make it as user-friendly as possible, so that it can
guide you through the theory of knowledge with the minimum fuss. It is composed of
twenty short chapters, which fall into five main sections.
The first part (Chapters 1–6) explores general topics in the theory of knowledge,
particularly concerning the nature and value of knowledge. In Part I we look at
such issues as the Gettier problem, the nature of rationality, and the relevance
of epistemic virtues to knowledge. The second part (Chapters 7–10) looks at
where our knowledge comes from, and considers the role of, for instance, percep-
tion and memory in helping us to acquire, and retain, knowledge. The third part
(Chapters 11–13) asks what kinds of knowledge there are, and considers in this
regard moral, religious, and scientific knowledge. The fourth part (Chapters 14–17)
examines how we can apply what we have learnt from the theory of knowledge to
specific domains, such as technology, education, law, and politics. The fifth part
(Chapters 18–20) examines the scope of our knowledge, and to that end considers
sceptical arguments that purport to show that the possession of knowledge – or at
least the possession of certain kinds of knowledge at any rate – is impossible.
Each chapter closes with a summary of the main points made in that chapter and
some questions for discussion. For those who wish to explore the topic discussed in
that chapter further, there is also a section recommending additional introductory
and advanced reading. A further section identifies free internet resources that are
relevant to that chapter. (If you want some general further reading on the theory
of knowledge as a whole, there is a section towards the back of the book with
bibliographic details.) Within each chapter you’ll find text boxes that give further
information relevant to what is being discussed in the main text, such as more infor-
mation about a historical figure who has been mentioned.
Although terminology is avoided where possible, you don’t need to worry if
you come across a technical word that you don’t understand, since all terminol-
ogy is explained at the back of the book in a glossary. (Technical words that have
corresponding entries in the glossary are identified in the text by being in bold at
first mention.) Finally, at the very end of the book, there is an index.
Part I
what is knowledge?
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1
some preliminaries
•• Types of knowledge
•• Two basic requirements of knowledge: truth and belief
•• Knowing versus merely ‘getting it right’
•• A brief remark on truth
TYPES OF KNOWLEDGE
Think of all the things that you know, or at least think you know, right now. You
know, for example, that the earth is round and that Paris is the capital of France.
You know that you can speak (or at least read) English, and that two plus two is
equal to four. You know, presumably, that all bachelors are unmarried men, that it
is wrong to hurt people just for fun, that The Godfather is a wonderful film, and that
water has the chemical structure H2O. And so on.
But what is it that all these cases of knowledge have in common? Think again of
the examples just given, which include geographical, linguistic, mathematical, aes-
thetic, ethical, and scientific knowledge. Given these myriad types of knowledge,
what, if anything, ties them all together? It is this sort of question that is asked by
those who study epistemology, which is the theory of knowledge. The goal of this
book is to introduce you to this exciting field of philosophy. By the end of this book,
you should be able to count yourself as an epistemologist.
In all the examples of knowledge just given, the type of knowledge in question is
what is called propositional knowledge, in that it is knowledge of a proposition. A
proposition is what is asserted by a sentence which says that something is the case –
e.g. that the earth is flat, that bachelors are unmarried men, that two plus two is four,
and so on. Propositional knowledge will be the focus of this book, but we should also
recognise that it is not the only sort of knowledge that we possess.
There is, for example, ability knowledge, or know-how. Ability knowledge is clearly
different from propositional knowledge; I know how to swim, for example, but I
do not thereby know a set of propositions about how to swim. Indeed, I’m not
altogether sure that I could tell you how to swim, but I do know how to swim
nonetheless (and I could prove it by manifesting this ability – by jumping into a
swimming pool and doing the breaststroke, say).
4 • what is knowledge?
Ability knowledge is certainly an important type of knowledge to have. We want

lots of know-how, such as to know how to ride a bicycle, to drive a car, or to
operate a personal computer. Notice, however, that, while only relatively sophis-
ticated creatures like humans possess propositional knowledge, ability knowledge
is far more common. An ant might plausibly be said to know how to navigate its
terrain, but would we want to say that an ant has propositional knowledge, that
there are facts which the ant knows? Could the ant know, for example, that the
terrain it is presently crossing is someone’s porch? Intuitively not, and this marks
out the importance of propositional knowledge over other types of knowledge like
ability knowledge, which is that such knowledge presupposes the sort of relatively
sophisticated intellectual abilities possessed by humans.
TWO BASIC REQUIREMENTS OF KNOWLEDGE:

TRUTH AND BELIEF
Henceforth, when we talk about knowledge, we will have propositional knowledge
in mind, unless explicitly stated otherwise. Two things that just about every episte-
mologist agrees on are that a prerequisite for possessing knowledge is that one has a
belief in the relevant proposition, and that that belief must be true. So if you know
that Paris is the capital of France, then you must believe that this is the case, and
your belief must also be true.
Take the truth requirement first. In order to assess this claim, consider what
would follow if we dropped this requirement. In particular, is it plausible to
suppose that one could know a false proposition? Of course, we often think that
we know something and then it turns out that we were wrong, but that’s just to
say that we didn’t really know it in the first place. Could we genuinely know a
false proposition? Could I know, for example, that the moon is made of cheese,
even though it manifestly isn’t? I take it that when we talk of someone having
knowledge, we mean to exclude such a possibility. This is because to ascribe
knowledge to someone is to credit that person with having got things right, and
that means that what we regard that person as knowing had better not be false,
but true.
Next, consider the belief requirement. It is sometimes the case that we explicitly
contrast belief and knowledge, as when we say things like, ‘I don’t merely believe
that he was innocent, I know it’, which might on the face of it be thought to imply
that knowledge does not require belief after all. If you think about these sorts of
assertions in a little more detail, however, then it becomes clear that the contrast
between belief and knowledge is being used here simply to emphasise the fact that
one not only believes the proposition in question, but also knows it. In this way,
these assertions actually lend support to the claim that knowledge requires belief,
rather than undermining it.
As with the truth requirement, we will assess the plausibility of the belief require-
ment for knowledge by imagining for a moment that it doesn’t hold, which would
some preliminaries •5
mean that one could have knowledge of a proposition which one did not even
believe. Suppose, for example, that someone claimed to have known a quiz answer,
even though it was clear from that person’s behaviour at the time that she didn’t
believe the proposition in question (perhaps she put forward a different answer to
the question, or no answer at all). Clearly we would not agree that this person did
have knowledge in this case. Again, the reason for this relates to the fact that to say
that someone has knowledge is to credit that person with a certain kind of success.
But for it to be your success, then belief in the proposition in question is essential,
since otherwise this success is not creditable to you at all.
KNOWING VERSUS MERELY ‘GETTING IT RIGHT’

It is often noted that belief aims at the truth, in the sense that when we believe a
proposition, we believe it to be the case (i.e. to be true). When what we believe
is true, then there is a match between what we think is the case and what is the
case. We have got things right. If mere true belief suffices for ‘getting things right’,
however, then one might wonder why epistemologists do not end their quest for an
account of knowledge right there and simply hold that knowledge is nothing more
than true belief (i.e. ‘getting things right’).
There is in fact a very good reason why epistemologists do not rest content with
mere true belief as an account of knowledge, and that is that one can gain true belief
entirely by accident, in which case it would be of no credit to you at all that you got
things right. Consider Harry, who forms his belief that the horse Lucky Lass will
win the next race purely on the basis of the fact that the name of the horse appeals
to him. Clearly this is not a good basis on which to form one’s belief about the win-
ner of the next horse race, since whether or not a horse’s name appeals to you has
no bearing on its performance.
Suppose, however, that Harry’s belief turns out to be true, in that Lucky Lass does
win the next race. Is this knowledge? Intuitively not, since it is just a matter of luck
that his belief was true in this case. Remember that knowledge involves a kind of
success that is creditable to the agent. Crucially, however, successes that are merely
down to luck are never credited to the agent.
In order to emphasise this point, think for a moment about successes in another
realm, such as archery. Notice that if one genuinely is a skilled archer, then if one
tries to hit the bullseye, and the conditions are right (e.g. the wind is not gusting),
then one usually will hit the bullseye. That’s just what it means to be a skilled archer.
The word ‘usually’ is important here, since someone who isn’t a skilled archer might,
as it happens, hit the bullseye on a particular occasion, but she wouldn’t usually hit
the bullseye in these conditions. Perhaps, for example, she aims her arrow and, by
luck, it hits the centre of the target. Does the mere fact that she is successful on this
one occasion mean that she is a skilled archer? No, and the reason is that she would
not be able to repeat this success. If she tried again, for example, her arrow would in
all likelihood sail off into the heavens.
Having knowledge is just like this. Imagine that one’s belief is an arrow, which is
aimed at the centre of the target, truth. Hitting the bullseye and forming a true
belief suffices for getting things right, since all this means is that one was successful
on that occasion. It does not suffice, however, for having knowledge any more than
hitting the bullseye purely by chance indicates that you are skilled in archery. To
have knowledge, one’s success must genuinely be the result of one’s efforts, rather
than merely being by chance. Only then is that success creditable to one. And this
means that forming one’s belief in the way that one does ought usually, in those
circumstances, to lead to a true belief.
Harry, who forms his true belief that Lucky Lass will win the race simply because
he likes the name, is like the person who happens to hit the bullseye, but who is not
a skilled archer. Usually, forming one’s belief about whether a horse will win a race
simply by considering whether the name of the horse appeals to you will lead you
to form a false belief.
Contrast Harry with someone who genuinely knows that the race will be won by
Lucky Lass. Perhaps, for example, this person is a ‘Mr Big’, a gangster who has fixed
the race by drugging the other animals so that his horse, Lucky Lass, will win. He
knows that the race will be won by Lucky Lass because the way he has formed his
belief, by basing it on the special grounds he has for thinking that Lucky Lass cannot
lose, would normally lead him to have a true belief. It is not a matter of luck that
Mr Big hits the target of truth.
The challenge for epistemologists is thus to explain what needs to be added to mere
true belief in order to get knowledge. In particular, epistemologists need to explain
what needs to be added to true belief to capture this idea that knowledge, unlike
mere true belief, involves a success that is creditable to the agent, where this means,
for example, that the agent’s true belief was not simply a matter of luck.
As we will see, it is in fact surprisingly difficult to give an unproblematic account of
knowledge which meets this requirement. This has led some commentators to be
doubtful about the whole project of defining knowledge. Perhaps there just is noth-
ing that ties all cases of knowledge together, or perhaps there is such an essence to
knowledge, but it is so complex that it is a futile task to seek an account of it.
In this book, however, we will proceed with optimism on this score. Even if an
unproblematic definition of knowledge is unavailable, there are a number of
plausible accounts on offer, even though none of them is entirely uncontentious.
Moreover, the very practice of evaluating these different views about knowledge
itself casts light upon what knowledge is, even if it does not result in a neat defini-
tion of this notion.
In any case, while the project of elucidating knowledge is central to epistemology
(it is the principal focus of Chapters 1–6), it is important not to overstate its impor-
tance. As this book testifies, there is more to epistemology than the quest to define
knowledge. One can examine the different ways in which knowledge is acquired
and retained, for example, such as via our perceptual faculty of sight and our faculty
of memory (see Chapters 7–10 on the ways in which knowledge is acquired and
retained). Or one can examine the different kinds of knowledge there are, such as
religious, scientific, or moral knowledge (see Chapters 11–13). Or one can consider
how the theory of knowledge applies to specific practical domains, like technol-
ogy, education, law, and politics (see Chapters 14–17). Finally, there are sceptical
challenges to be engaged with, challenges which purport to show that knowledge
is impossible to possess however we define it (Chapters 18–20 deal with sceptical
challenges and related issues).
A BRIEF REMARK ON TRUTH

I want to end this chapter by commenting a little more on truth (note that I’ll be
saying more about truth at the end of the book). After all, the reader might
be tempted to observe that it is odd that we have taken our understanding of truth as
given and gone straight ahead to examine knowledge. Do we really have a better
grip on what truth is than on what knowledge is?
It is true (if you’ll forgive the pun) that I’m taking a certain common-sense concep-
tion of truth for granted here. In particular, I’m going to assume that truth is objec-
tive in the following sense: at least for most propositions, your thinking that they are
true does not make them true. Whether or not the earth is round, for example, has
nothing to do with whether or not we think that it is, but simply depends upon the
shape of the earth.
Most of us uncritically take this conception of truth as obvious, but there are some
philosophers who think that this view of truth is unsustainable. I think that their
reasons for rejecting this account of truth rest on a number of interrelated mistakes,
and when I return to this issue at the end of the book I will explain what some of
the core mistakes are. For now, however, it is enough that this conception of truth
is intuitive. If you also think that it is intuitive, then that is all to the good. If, on the
other hand, you don’t, then I urge you to set this matter to one side until later on.
CHAPTER SUMMARY
•• Epistemology is the theory of knowledge. One of the characteristic questions
of epistemology concerns what all the myriad kinds of knowledge we ascribe to
ourselves have in common: What is knowledge?
•• We can distinguish between knowledge of propositions, or propositional knowl-
edge, and know-how, or ability knowledge. Intuitively, the former demands a
greater degree of intellectual sophistication on the part of the knower than the
latter. Our focus in this book will be on propositional knowledge.
•• In order to have knowledge of a proposition, that proposition must be true and
one must believe it.
•• Mere true belief does not suffice for knowledge, however, since one can gain mere
true belief purely by luck, and yet you cannot gain knowledge purely by luck.
•• In this book I will be assuming a common-sense objective view of truth which
holds that (for the most part at least) merely thinking that something is true does
not make it true.
STUDY QUESTIONS
1 Give examples of your own of the following types of knowledge:
•• scientific knowledge;
•• geographical knowledge;
•• historical knowledge;
•• religious knowledge.
2 Explain, in your own words, what the difference between ability knowledge and
propositional knowledge is, and give two examples of each.
3 Why is mere true belief not sufficient for knowledge? Give an example of your
own of a case in which an agent truly believes something, but does not know it.
4 Think about the ‘objective’ and ‘common-sense’ view of truth that I described at
the end of this chapter. Is this view of truth a matter of common sense to you? If
so, then try to formulate some reasons that someone might offer in order to call
it into question. If, on the other hand, it is not a matter of common sense as far
as you are concerned, then try to explain what you think is wrong with this view
of truth.
INTRODUCTORY FURTHER READING

Blackburn, Simon (2005) Truth: A Guide for the Perplexed (Harmondsworth: Allen
Lane). A very readable introduction to the issues as regards the philosophy of
truth. This is a good place to start if you want to learn more about this topic.
Lynch, Michael (2010) ‘Truth’, The Routledge Companion to Epistemology,
S. Bernecker & D. H. Pritchard (eds), Ch.1 (New York: Routledge). An accessi-
ble and completely up-to-date survey of the main issues as regards the philosophy
of truth.
Shope, Robert K. (2002) ‘Conditions and Analyses of Knowing’, The Oxford
Handbook to Epistemology, P. K. Moser (ed.), pp. 25–70 (Oxford: Oxford Univer
sity Press). See pp. 25–30 for a good clear discussion of the need for the truth
and belief conditions in a theory of knowledge, and of why knowledge isn’t just
mere true belief.
ADVANCED FURTHER READING

Lynch, Michael (2005) True to Life: Why Truth Matters (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT
Press). A very readable introduction to the issues as regards the philosophy of
truth.
Pritchard, Duncan (2005) Epistemic Luck (Oxford: Oxford University Press). A
recent in-depth discussion of the idea that knowledge is incompatible with luck.
Ryle, Gilbert (1949/2002) The Concept of Mind (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago
Press). This is the classic discussion of ability knowledge, in contrast to proposi-
tional knowledge (see especially §2).
FREE INTERNET RESOURCES
Dowden, Bradley & Shwartz, Norman (2006) ‘Truth’, Internet Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, www.iep.utm.edu/t/truth.htm. A neat and comprehensive overview of
the philosophical discussions regarding truth. Note that it can be a little demanding
for the beginner in some places.
Glanzberg, Michael (2013) ‘Truth’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth/. A sophisticated overview of the literature on
the philosophy of truth. Not for the beginner.
Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins & Steup, Matthias (2017) ‘The Analysis of Knowledge’,
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-
analysis/. An excellent overview of the recent work on the theory of knowledge.
Truncellito, David (2007) ‘Epistemology’, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, www.
iep.utm.edu/e/epistemo.htm. Read up to the end of §2.b for more on the basic
requirements for knowledge.
2
the value of
knowledge
•• Why care about knowledge?
•• The instrumental value of true belief
•• The value of knowledge
•• The statues of Daedalus
•• Is some knowledge non-instrumentally valuable?
WHY CARE ABOUT KNOWLEDGE?

One question that is very rarely asked in epistemology concerns what is perhaps the
most central issue for this area of philosophy. It is this: why should we care about
whether or not we have knowledge? Put another way: is knowledge valuable and, if
so, why? The importance of this question resides in the fact that knowledge is the
primary focus of epistemological theorising. Hence, if knowledge is not valuable
then that should give us cause to wonder whether we should rethink our under-
standing of the epistemological enterprise.
In this chapter we will examine this issue in more detail and discover, perhaps
surprisingly, that the value of knowledge is far from obvious.
THE INSTRUMENTAL VALUE OF TRUE BELIEF

One way of approaching the topic of the value of knowledge is to note that one can
only know what is true, and truth in one’s beliefs does seem to be valuable. If truth
in one’s beliefs is valuable, and knowledge demands truth, then we may be at least
halfway towards answering our question of why knowledge is valuable.
Truth in one’s beliefs is at least minimally valuable in the sense that, all other things
being equal, true beliefs are better than false ones because having true beliefs enables
us to fulfil our goals. This sort of value – a value which accrues to something in vir-
tue of some further valuable purpose that it serves – is known as instrumental value.
the value of knowledge • 11
Think, for example, of the value of a thermometer. Its value consists in the fact that
it enables us to find out something of importance to us (i.e. what the temperature is).
This is why a working thermometer is valuable to us, but a broken thermometer
isn’t (unless, of course, it serves some other purpose, such as by being a handy
paperweight). In contrast, some things seem to be of non-instrumental value, in that
they are valuable for their own sake, and not simply in terms of some further useful
purpose that they serve (like thermometers). Friendship, for example, is valuable in
this way. For while friendship is undoubtedly useful, and therefore of instrumental
value, one would be missing out on something important if one didn’t appreciate
the fact that having friends is good for its own sake. Indeed, someone who only
values their friends because it serves their wider interests arguably doesn’t have any
real friends.
In order to see the instrumental value of true belief, think about any subject matter
that is of consequence to you, such as the time of your crucial job interview. It is
clearly preferable to have a true belief in this respect rather than a false belief, since
without a true belief you’ll have difficulty making this important meeting. That is,
your goal of making this meeting is best served by having a true belief about when
it takes place rather than a false one.
The problem, however, lies with the ‘all other things being equal’ clause which
we put on the instrumental value of true belief. We have to impose this quali-
fication because sometimes having a true belief could be unhelpful and actually
impede one’s goals, and in such cases true belief would lack instrumental value. For
example, if one’s life depended upon it, could one really summon the courage to
jump a ravine and thereby get to safety if one knew (or at least truly believed) that
there was a serious possibility that one would fail to reach the other side? Here, it
seems, a false belief in one’s abilities would be better than a true belief if the goal in
question (jumping the ravine) is to be achieved. So while true belief might generally
be instrumentally valuable, it isn’t always instrumentally valuable.
Moreover, some true beliefs are beliefs in trivial matters, and in this case it isn’t at
all clear why we should value such beliefs at all. Imagine someone who, for no good
reason, concerns herself with measuring each grain of sand on a beach, or some-
one who, even while being unable to operate a telephone, concerns herself with
remembering every entry in a foreign phonebook. In each case, such a person would
thereby gain lots of true beliefs but, crucially, one would regard such truth-gaining
activity as rather pointless. After all, these true beliefs do not obviously serve any
valuable purpose, and so do not seem to have any instrumental value (or, at the
very least, what instrumental value these beliefs have is vanishingly small). It would,
perhaps, be better – and thus of more value – to have fewer true beliefs, and pos-
sibly more false ones, if this meant that the true beliefs that one had were regarding
matters of real consequence.
At most, then, we only seem able to marshal the conclusion that some true beliefs
have instrumental value, not all of them. As a result, if we are to show that knowl-
edge is valuable then we need to do more than merely note that knowledge entails
truth and that true belief is instrumentally valuable. Nevertheless, this conclusion
need not be that dispiriting once we remember that while knowledge requires truth,
not every instance of a true belief is an instance of knowledge (as we saw in the
previous chapter, for example, some true beliefs are just lucky guesses, and so not
knowledge at all). Accordingly, it could just be that those true beliefs that are clearly
of instrumental value are the ones that are also instances of knowledge.
The problem with this line of thought ought to be obvious, since didn’t our ‘sand-
measuring’ agent know what the measurements of the sand were? Moreover, didn’t
our agent who was unable to jump the ravine because she was paralysed by fear fail
to meet her goals because of what she knew? The problems that afflict the claim that
all true beliefs are instrumentally valuable therefore similarly undermine the idea
that all knowledge is instrumentally valuable. There is thus no easy way of defend-
ing the thesis that all knowledge must be valuable.
There is also a second difficulty lurking in the background here, which is that even
if this project of understanding the value of knowledge in terms of the value of true
belief were to be successful, it would still be problematic because it would entail
that knowledge is no more valuable than mere true belief. But if that’s right, then
why do we value knowledge more than mere true belief?
THE VALUE OF KNOWLEDGE

So we cannot straightforwardly argue from the instrumental value of true belief that
all knowledge must therefore be instrumentally valuable. That said, we can perhaps
say something about the specific value of knowledge that is a little less ambitious
and which simply accounts for why, in general and all other things being equal, we
desire to be knowers as opposed to being agents who have mostly true beliefs but
lack knowledge (or, worse, have mostly false beliefs). After all, if we want to achieve
our goals in life then it would be preferable if we had knowledge which was relevant
to these goals since knowledge is very useful in this respect. The idea is, therefore,
that while not all knowledge is instrumentally valuable, in general it is instrumen-
tally valuable and, what is more, it is of greater instrumental value, typically at least,
than mere true belief alone (thus explaining our intuition that knowledge is of more
value than mere true belief).
Consider the following case. Suppose I want to find my way to the nearest restau-
rant in an unfamiliar city. Having mostly false beliefs about the locale will almost
certainly lead to this goal being frustrated. If I think, for example, that all the restau-
rants are in the east of the city, when in fact they are in the west, then I’m going to
spend a rather dispiriting evening trudging around this town without success.
True beliefs are better than false beliefs (i.e. are of more instrumental value),
but not as good as knowledge. Imagine, for instance, that you found out where
the nearest restaurant was by reading a map of the town which is, without your
realising it, entirely fake and designed to mislead those unfamiliar with the area.
Suppose further, however, that, as it happens, this map inadvertently shows you
the right route to the nearest restaurant. You therefore have a true belief about
where the nearest restaurant is, but you clearly lack knowledge of this fact. After
all, your belief is only luckily true, and as we saw in Chapter 1, you can’t gain
knowledge by luck in this way.
Now one might think that it is neither here nor there to the value of your true belief
whether it is also an instance of knowledge. So long as I find the nearest restaurant,
what does it matter that I don’t know where it is but merely have a true belief about
where it is? The problem with mere true belief, however, is that, unlike knowledge,
it is very unstable. Suppose, for example, that as you were walking to this restaurant
you noticed that none of the landmarks corresponded to where they ought to be on
the fake map in front you. You pass the town hall, for instance, and yet according
to the map this building is on the other side of town. You’d quickly realise that the
map you’re using is unreliable, and in all likelihood you’d abandon your belief about
where the nearest restaurant was, thereby preventing you from getting there.
In contrast, imagine that you form your belief about where the nearest restaurant
is by looking at a reliable map, and thereby know where the nearest restaurant is.
Since this is genuine knowledge, it would not be undermined in the way that the
mere true belief was undermined, and thus you’d retain your true belief. This would
mean that you would make it to the restaurant after all, and thereby achieve your
goal. Having knowledge can thus be of greater instrumental value than mere true
belief since having knowledge rather than mere true belief can make it more likely
that one achieves one’s goals.
Plato (c.427–c.347 bc)

Bodily exercise, when compulsory, does no harm to the body; but knowl-
edge which is acquired under compulsion obtains no hold on the mind.
Plato, The Republic
Plato is one of the most influential philosophers who ever lived. He resided for
most of his life in the city of Athens, in Greece, which is where he came under
the influence of Socrates (470–399 bc) and where he in turn influenced the
philosophical development of Aristotle (384–322 bc). After Socrates’ death –
an account of which is offered in Plato’s book, The Apology – Plato founded
‘The Academy’, a kind of early university in which a range of topics were
taught, but principally philosophy.
Plato’s writing was often in the style of a dialogue between Socrates, the
mouthpiece of Plato, and an imagined adversary (or adversaries) on topics
of vital philosophical importance. In The Republic, for example (perhaps his
most famous work), he examines the question, central to political philosophy,
of what the ideal political state is. Of more interest for our purposes, however,
is his book The Theaetetus, in which he discusses the nature of knowledge.
THE STATUES OF DAEDALUS

The previous point picks up on a famous claim made by the ancient Greek
philosopher Plato (c.427–c.347 bc), regarding knowledge. In his book, The Meno (see
§§96d–100b), Plato compares knowledge to the statues of the ancient Greek sculp-
tor Daedalus which, it is said, were so realistic that if one did not tether them to the
ground they would run away. Plato’s point is that mere true belief is like one of the
untethered statues of Daedalus, in that one could very easily lose it. Knowledge, in
contrast, is akin to a tethered statue, one that is therefore not easily lost.
The analogy to our previous discussion should be obvious. Mere true belief, like an
untethered statue of Daedalus, is more likely to be lost (i.e. run away) than knowl-
edge, which is far more stable. Put another way, the true belief one holds when one
has knowledge is far more likely to remain fast in response to changes in circum-
stances (e.g. new information that comes to light) than mere true belief, as we saw
in the case just described of the person who finds out where the nearest restaurant
is by looking at a reliable map, as opposed to one who finds out where it is by
looking at a fake map.
Of course, knowledge isn’t completely stable either, since one could always acquire
a false, but plausible piece of information that seems to call one’s previous true
information into question; but this is less likely to happen when it comes to knowl-
edge than when it comes to true belief. In the example given earlier, suppose that
the map is indeed reliable, and thus that you do know where the nearest restaurant
is. Nevertheless, there might still be further misleading counter-evidence that you
could come across which would undermine this knowledge, such as the testimony
of a friend you bump into who tells you (out of mischief) that the map is a fake. In
the light of this new information, you’ll probably change your belief and so fail to
get to the restaurant after all.
Even so, however, the fact remains that knowledge is more stable than mere true
belief. In the case just described, for example, the fact that the map had been work-
ing so far would give you good grounds to continue trusting it, and so you might
naturally be suspicious of any testimony you receive to the contrary. Suppose a
perfect stranger told you that the map was a complete fake. Would that lead you
to change your belief given that it has been reliable so far? Probably not. A friend’s
testimony carries more weight than a stranger’s, but even this testimony might be
ignored if you had reason to think your friend might be playing a trick on you.
If you merely had a true belief about where the nearest restaurant was, in contrast,
and had no good reason in support of that true belief, then all kinds of conflicting
information would undermine that belief. As we saw, as soon as you start walking
on your journey and you notice that none of the landmarks correspond to their
locations on the map, then you would be liable to tear the map up in despair, even
though the map is, in the one respect that is important to you (how to get to the
nearest restaurant), entirely reliable.
There is a good reason why knowledge is more stable than mere true belief, and
this is because knowledge, unlike mere true belief, could not easily be mistaken.
Imagine, for instance, a doctor diagnoses a patient by (secretly) tossing a coin,
thus leading the patient to form a particular belief about what is wrong with her.
Suppose further that this diagnosis is, as it happens, correct. Clearly the doctor does
not know what is wrong with the patient, even though she happened to get it right
on this occasion, and neither does the patient know what is wrong with her given
that she acquired her belief by listening to the doctor. The problem here is that it
was just a matter of luck that the doctor chanced upon the right answer, and thus it
is also a matter of luck that the patient formed a true belief about what was wrong
with her. In both cases they could so easily have been wrong.
Compare this scenario, however, with that in which a doctor forms her diagnosis
of the patient’s illness in a diligent fashion by using the appropriate medical proce-
dures. This doctor will (in most cases at least) end up with the same correct diagno-
sis as our irresponsible doctor, and thus the patient will again acquire a true belief
about the nature of her condition. This time, though, the doctor and the patient
will know what the correct diagnosis is. Moreover, there is no worry in this case that
this verdict could so easily have been mistaken; given that the doctor followed the
correct procedures, it is in fact very unlikely that this diagnosis is wrong. Here we
clearly have a case in which our goal of correctly determining the source of some-
one’s illness is better served by the possession of knowledge rather than the pos-
session of mere true belief because of the instability of mere true belief relative to
knowledge (i.e. the fact that mere true belief, unlike knowledge, could so easily be
wrong). In this sense, then, knowledge is more valuable to us than true belief alone.
For the most part, then, if one wishes to achieve one’s goals it is essential that one
has, at the bare minimum, true beliefs about the subject matter concerned. True
belief is thus mostly of instrumental value, even if it is not always of instrumental
value. Ideally, however, it is better to have knowledge, since mere true belief has an
instability that is not always conducive to success in one’s projects. Since knowledge
entails true belief, we can therefore draw two conclusions. First, that most knowl-
edge, like most mere true belief, is of instrumental value. Second, and crucially, that
knowledge is of greater instrumental value than mere true belief.
IS SOME KNOWLEDGE NON-INSTRUMENTALLY

VALUABLE?
At this point we might wonder whether the value of knowledge is only ever instru-
mental. That is, we might wonder whether the value of knowledge is always
dependent upon what further goods, such as gaining relief from your illness, which
knowledge (in this case of the correct diagnosis of your illness) can help you attain.
Are there kinds of knowledge which have non-instrumental value (i.e. the kind of
value that we saw friendship as having above)?
In order to see how knowledge could be non-instrumentally valuable, think of

those types of knowledge which are very refined, such as wisdom – the sort of
knowledge that wise people have. Wisdom is clearly at least instrumentally valu-
able since it can enable one to lead a productive and fulfilled life. Crucially, how-
ever, it seems that knowledge of this sort would still be valuable even if, as it
happens, it didn’t lead to a life that was good in this way. Suppose, for instance,
that nature conspires against you at every turn so that, like the biblical character
Job, you are subject to just about every dismal fate that can befall a person. In
such a case one’s knowledge of most matters may well have no instrumental value
at all because one’s goals will be frustrated by forces beyond your control regardless
of what you know.
Nevertheless, it would surely be preferable to confront such misfortune as a wise
person, and not because such wisdom would necessarily make you feel any better or
enable you to avoid these disasters (whether wise or not, your life is still wretched).
Instead, it seems, being wise is just a good thing, regardless of what further goods it
might lead to. That is, it is something that is good for its own sake; something which
has non-instrumental value. And notice that this claim marks a further difference
between knowledge and mere true belief, since it is hard to see how mere true belief
could ever be of non-instrumental value.
There may be stronger claims that we can make about the value of knowledge, but
the minimal claims advanced here suffice to make the study of knowledge
important. Recall that we have seen that knowledge is at least for the most part
instrumentally valuable in that it enables us to achieve our goals, and that it is
more instrumentally valuable in this respect than true belief alone. Moreover,
we have also noted that some varieties of knowledge, such as wisdom, seem to
be non-instrumentally valuable. Clearly, then, knowledge is something that we
should care about. Given that this is so, it is incumbent upon us as philosophers
to be able to say more about what knowledge is and the various ways in which we
might acquire it. These are the goals of epistemology.
CHAPTER SUMMARY
•• One of the central tasks of epistemology is to explain the value of knowledge. But
while it is obvious that we do value knowledge, it is not obvious why this is the
case, nor what the nature of this value is.
•• One way of accounting for the value of knowledge is to note that if you know a
proposition, then you have a true belief in that proposition, and true beliefs are
clearly useful, and therefore valuable. In particular, true belief has instrumental
value in that it enables you to achieve your goals.
•• One problem with this proposal is that it is not obvious that all true beliefs are
instrumentally valuable. For one thing, some true beliefs are so trivial that it
seems that they have no value at all. For another, sometimes it is more useful to
have a false belief than a true belief.
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not been too delicate to handle firearms in the defense of their lives
and their homes. Why should she be less resolute than they.... There
was the story of the great-great-aunt who had killed an intruding
savage with an ax!... If those things were heroic in pioneer days, why
were they so unthinkable to-day? If women could display resolution,
high courage, and perform awful acts of fortitude in 1771, why was
not the woman of 1921 capable of conduct as praiseworthy?
Then, too, there was a specious unreality about the affair, something
of play-acting. Carmel could not dispel the reflection that it was not
so. She was making believe. No drunken men were actually
approaching with sledge hammers. Her plant and her person were in
no danger. It was playing with other toys substituted for dolls. She
drew closer to her the cold barrel of the toy she clutched in her
fingers.
“The safety’s on,” said Simmy, practically.
“The safety?”
“Yes, ’m, so’s nobody kin shoot himself. You have to take off the
safety before the trigger’ll pull.”
“How do you do it?”
“You push this here dingus,” said Simmy.
Carmel promptly pushed it.
Far down the street she heard a single shout, a few maudlin words
of a lumber-camp song. She stepped to the door and peered up the
shadowy thoroughfare. Across the Square and perhaps two blocks
away she made out a number of dark figures, straggling toward her
in midstreet. She could not count accurately, but estimated there
were ten or a dozen of them. She crouched in the recess of the
doorway and waited. Unreality was dispelled now. She was
cognizant of fact—literal, visible, potent fact.
Her sensation was not fear, but it was unpleasant. It resembled
nothing in her experience so much as the feeling one has in the pit of
his stomach when descending rapidly in an elevator. She could feel
her knees tremble. Always she had heard this spoken of as a symbol
of cowardice, and she tried to restrain their shaking.... The men
approached noisily.
“Light the lights,” she said to Simmy when the men were some fifty
yards distant. This was instinct—the instinct for surprise. It was
excellent strategy. The men had their directions how to proceed, but
in these directions no account was taken of lights turning on
unexpectedly. They had been led to expect a deserted office and no
resistance. They stopped abruptly and gathered in a knot to inquire
the meaning of this phenomenon.
Carmel did some calculation for the first time. To reach the office the
men would have to cross the area of light passing through its
windows. She, herself, was in the darkness beyond. This, she
thought, was as it should be.... Presently the men surged forward
again, keeping closely together. Carmel stepped out of the shadows
into the light, where she and her weapon must be plainly visible, and
paused.
“Stop,” she called, sharply.
They stopped, then somebody laughed. The laugh touched the fuse
leading to the magazine of Carmel’s anger. She blazed with the
explosion of it. The laugh was a slight thing, but it caused the
difference between a mere young woman holding a gun in her
hands, and a young woman holding a gun in her hands which she
would shoot. She stepped backward into the shadows where she
could not be seen.
“Go away,” she said.
“Li’l’ girl with li’l’ shotgun,” somebody said, in a tone of interest.
“I’m going to count ten,” said Carmel. “If you haven’t gone then I’ll
shoot.”
“Li’l’ girl kin count to ten,” said the same voice. “Hain’t eddication
hell!”
“One,” she began, “two, three, four——”
There was a forward movement, raucous laughter, inebriated
comments. She hastened her counting—“five, six, seven, eight, nine,
ten....” They were still moving forward slowly, evidently viewing the
situation as humorous. She lifted the heavy gun and pointed its
muzzle at the mass of approaching legs.... Her acquaintance with
twelve-gauge automatic shotguns, and with the dispositions thereof,
was rudimentary. She did not know what to expect, nevertheless she
tugged at the trigger. There was a tremendous report which
frightened her as nothing had frightened her that night. She felt as if
one of those men had thrown his sledge and struck her shoulder.
Dazed, bewildered, she all but lost her balance.
But, steadying herself, keeping her finger on the trigger, she
maintained a readiness for what might come next. Howls of agony
emanated from the men. Two of them were rolling on the sidewalk
clutching shins and cursing. But for this there was silence. Humor
had departed from the situation, for even the smallest bird shot,
discharged from a shotgun at less than a hundred feet, are not to be
disregarded by those who shun pain.
“She’s shot my leg off.... My Gawd!...”
This exclamation of agony trailed off into curses and incoherent
ejaculations.
“Now go away,” Carmel called. “Next time I’ll shoot higher.”
The shot, the suddenness, the unexpectedness of it, had cleared
tipsy brains. It had created angry, dangerous men.
“’Tain’t nothin’ but bird shot. All rush her to wunst,” shouted a voice.
But before they could resolve into action Carmel fired again, and
then again.... It was rather more than such a collection of humanity
could endure. With shouts and cries of pain they broke and ran.
Carmel advanced, ready for another discharge, when, suddenly,
there was a diversion. The attackers were taken in the rear, by whom
Carmel could not determine. She saw at least two men, arms
swinging clubs right and left with rare indiscrimination. The retreat
became a rout. These unexpected reserve forces definitely turned
the tide of battle, and in a time so brief as to make its recording
difficult, the street was again deserted save for Carmel—and the
reserves.
They ran to her, Tubal and Evan Bartholomew Pell. It was the
professor who reached her first, and stood inarticulate, trembling, his
face working. His eyes searched her face and in them was such an
expression as she had never seen turned upon her by human eyes
before.... Nevertheless she recognized it.
“Carmel,” he said—“Carmel—are you—all right?”
“Perfectly,” she said, endeavoring to maintain an attitude of
aloofness toward the whole episode.
“If anything had happened to you—if one of those beasts had
touched you—even with the tip of his finger....”
He stopped suddenly, stared at her. It was as if his scholarly mind
had once more come into its own, had seen, classified, cross-
referenced his actions and sensations. His face mirrored
astonishment, then apprehension, embarrassment. It completed the
series by becoming that of a man utterly nonplused.
“My goodness!” he said, breathlessly, “I believe I’ve fallen in love
with you.”
She made no reply, such was her own astonishment at the manner
of this announcement. He glared at her now, angry reproach in his
eyes.
“It’s absurd,” he said. “You had no business permitting me to do so.”
With that he turned on his heel and stalked into the office. Carmel
gasped....
“Lady,” said Tubal, “you better pass me that gun. You ’n’ a shotgun
fits each other about as suitable as a plug hat.... If you was to ask
me I’d say right out in meetin’ that you ’n’ a gun is doggone
incongruous.”
“I shot it, anyhow,” she said.
“Dummed if you didn’t,” he exclaimed, admiringly. “Dummed if you
didn’t. Them fellers’ll be pickin’ bird shot out of the bosoms of their
pants fer a month to come.” Then he paused to give rhetorical effect
to the moral he was about to draw.
“If you hadn’t went off half cocked with that whisky piece of your’n,”
he said, “this here ol’ gun wouldn’t have had to go off at all.”
But she was not thinking of Tubal nor of pointed morals. She was
considering the case of Evan Bartholomew Pell and what she would
do with him.
CHAPTER XIV
THE days which succeeded that night’s adventure were placid.
Carmel awoke in the morning as one awakes after a singularly
realistic dream. It was a dream to her, unreal, impossible. She could
not imagine herself doing what she had done; in short, she knew she
had never done it. That she should have let off a firearm at human
beings was an act so impossible as to make it seem laughable.
She went to the office with apprehension. What would happen? How
would Gibeon receive the news? Her apprehensions were needless.
Gibeon received the news apathetically. In the first place, the town
did not know exactly what had happened and was inclined to place
little credence in rumors. Most of it strolled past the office before
noon, seeking with wary eye for evidences of the war, and finding
none. A scanty few passed through the door to speak with Carmel
about it. Apparently Gibeon was not interested.
Somehow this hurt Carmel’s pride. Girl-like, she felt herself to be
something of a heroine, and wanted folks to recognize her
eminence. But even her own staff seemed not to take that view of
the matter. Tubal was sullen; Simmy was silent and frightened; Evan
Bartholomew Pell failed to revert to the matter at all. He had retired
more deeply than ever within his shell of pedanticism, and his
supercilious air was more irritating than ever before. Carmel was
hurt.
She did not know how shaken Evan Pell was, nor the effect upon
him of his discovery that a woman could be of such importance in his
life as he found Carmel to be. With women he had no dealings and
no experience. They had been negligible in his life, existing only
academically, so to speak. Women and fossil specimens and
remnants of ancient civilizations and flora and fauna had occupied
somewhat similar positions in his experience, with women in the
least interesting position. He did not know them as human beings at
all. They had never troubled him in the least. Nothing had ever
troubled him greatly. He had always considered them in the mass, as
a genus, to be studied, perhaps, as all created things should be
studied. But never until Carmel’s advent had he entertained the idea
that one of them might become personally important to him. Evan
would have been no more astonished to find himself involved with a
diplodocus than he now was to discover his throbbing personal
interest in an individual woman.
He was angry with Carmel. Somehow she had done something to
him. He was affronted. He had been taken advantage of, and now he
was considering what action to take. Decidedly Carmel must be put
in her place, once for all, and the disagreeable situation with all its
dreadful possibilities must be terminated with finality.
Evan turned in his chair and felt for his glasses, which were absent.
“Miss Lee,” he said, in his most pedagogical voice, “may I have your
attention briefly?”
Carmel faced him with some trepidation.
“Last night,” he said, “moved by an excitement to which I fancied
myself immune, certain words were surprised from me.”
“I don’t remember,” Carmel said, weakly.
“Pardon me,” he said, “you do remember. Your manner toward me
assures me of your complete recollection.”
“Indeed!”
“However, in order to avoid misapprehensions I shall refresh your
memory. My words, and I remember them exactly, were as follows: ‘I
believe I’ve fallen in love with you.’”
“Oh, that,” said Carmel, as if the matter were of no moment.
“That.... Exactly. Er—your physical peril aroused in me an
excitement and apprehension most distasteful to me. I have been
puzzled for some time with respect to yourself and the strange effect
your presence has upon me. The matter became clear last night. I
said I believed I was in love with you. That was inaccurate. I knew I
was in love with you.”
“But——” Carmel began. Evan held up his hand as to an interruption
in a classroom.
“If you please.... I discovered a fact, and one must deal with facts. I
slept little last night for considering this one. I have reached a
definite and final conclusion, and wish the matter to be understood
between us once for all, and so disposed of.”
“Mr. Pell——” Again he imposed silence upon her.
“I am unable to perceive how this distressing condition came into
being. It was wholly without intention on my part—against my every
instinct. I do not wish to be in love with you.”
“Indeed!” said Carmel.
“Quite the contrary. Therefore I wish to impress upon you that
nothing can come of it.”
“And do you suppose——” Once again Carmel essayed to speak;
once more he interrupted.
“Be so good as to allow me to finish. Please understand my words to
be final. I will not marry you. In no circumstances will I make you my
wife. I do not want a wife.... It is no fault of mine that I am in love with
you, and therefore I shall not permit myself to suffer for what I cannot
help. I shall take measures to affect a cure, for the thing, as I see it,
is a species of mental ailment.... Therefore, let me repeat, in spite of
the condition in which I find myself, you need not expect me to
become your husband.... The matter is closed between us.”
He turned from her abruptly and became much occupied with the
papers upon his desk.
As for Carmel, she was in a state of mind. The thing manifestly was
an outrage, an indignity, a humiliation, and she was angry. On the
other hand, it was absurd, impossibly absurd, inhumanly absurd, and
the laughter which struggled to come was only repressed by a wave
of pity. The pity engulfed both anger and laughter. Poor, dryly
crackling man! What must his life be without human warmth and
human emotions! She was able to see the thing impersonally—the
dreadful abnormality of his existence, so that when she spoke it was
without rancor and gently.
“Mr. Pell,” she said, “you need have no apprehensions. I do not wish
to marry you. I am very, very sorry if you have fallen in love with
me.... And I cannot tell you how sorry I am for you.”
“For me?” he said, bristling.
“For you. You are the most pathetic man I have ever known.”
“Pathetic!”
She nodded. “I have no experience with life,” she said, gently, “but
certain knowledge is born in most of us. We know that life—real life
—consists only of suffering and happiness. All other things are only
incidents. All the good in life is derived either from sorrow or joy. If
you pass through life without experiencing either, you have not lived.
And, Mr. Pell, the greatest source of grief and of happiness is love. I
do not know how I know this, but you may take it as the truth. I have
never loved, but if I felt I never should love, I think I should despair. I
want to love some man, to give him my life, to make him my life. I
want him to be my world.”
“It is useless to argue,” said Evan Pell.
Carmel flamed.
“Argue!” she said. “Mr. Pell, let me tell you this, and as you said to
me a moment ago, it is final. If you and I were the sole survivors
upon the earth, I could do nothing but pity you. I am not sure I could
do that. You are abnormal, and the abnormal is repulsive.... You
rather fancy yourself. You are all ego. Please try to believe that you
are of no importance to anybody. You are negligible. Whether you
live or die can be of no importance to any living creature.... You are
accustomed to look down upon those who surround you. Don’t you
see how people look down upon you? You think yourself superior.
That is absurd. You are nothing but a dry running little machine,
which can go out of order and be thrown upon the junk pile at any
time without causing the least annoyance to anybody. Why, Mr. Pell,
if you should die to-night, who would care? What difference would it
make? What do you contribute to this world to make you of value to
it?”
He had turned and was regarding her with grave interest. Manifestly
her words did not humiliate nor anger him, but they interested him as
an argument, a statement of a point of view.
“Go on, please,” he said. “Elucidate.”
“Only those who give something to the world are important to the
world. What do you give? What have you ever given? You have
studied. You are so crammed with dry knowledge that you crackle
like parchment. What good does it do anybody? What good does it
do you? Did you ever help a living creature with your knowledge? I
cannot imagine it. You study for the sake of increasing your own
store, not with the hope of being able to use all your knowledge to do
something for the world. You are a miser. You fill your mind with all
sorts of things, and keep them there. It is utterly selfish, utterly
useless. Think of the great men whose work you study, the great
thinkers and scientists of all ages. Why did they work? Was it to
hoard knowledge or to give it to the world in order that the world
might live more easily or more happily? They are important because
they were useful. You—Why, Mr. Pell, you are the most
conspicuously useless human being I have ever encountered.”
He regarded her a moment before speaking. “Is your thesis
complete?” he asked, gravely.
“It is.”
“I shall give it my best consideration,” he said, and turned again to
his work.
It was not easy for Carmel again to concentrate upon the books of
the Free Press, which, with only a limited knowledge of the
bewildering science of bookkeeping, she was examining.
Bookkeeping is a science. It is the science of translating simple
financial facts into abstruse cipher in order that nobody may
understand them except an individual highly trained in cabalistics.
The reason for this is clear. It is a conspiracy among bookkeepers to
make bookkeepers necessary and thus to afford themselves with a
means of livelihood.... Carmel was reading the cipher in order to
determine if the Free Press were in worse or better case for her
ownership of it.
Love and bookkeeping are subjects which do not blend, for, as
anybody knows, love is not an exact science. Also it is a
characteristic that love meddles with everything and blends with
nothing. It is intensely self-centered and jealous. Therefore, as may
be supposed, Carmel had difficulty in arriving at conclusions.
An ordinary declaration of love must be somewhat upsetting, even to
the most phlegmatic. A declaration such as Evan Pell had just
uttered would have disturbed the serenity of a plaster-of-Paris Venus
of Milo. Carmel wished to compare circulation figures; what she
actually did was to compare Evan’s declaration with the declaration
of love of which she, in common with every other girl, had visualized
in her dreams. It would be idle to state that Carmel had never
considered Evan as a possible husband. It is doubtful if any
unmarried woman ever encounters an available man without
considering him as a possible husband—or if any married woman,
no matter how virtuous, ever passes an hour in the society of a
gentleman without asking herself if this is the individual with whom
she may have the great love affair of her life. Love, being the chief
business of all women from six to sixty, this is natural and proper.
Here was a variant of the common situation. Carmel was informed
she was loved, but that she need expect nothing to come of it. No
woman could like that. It was a challenge. It was an affront. A gage
of battle had been cast, and it is to be doubted if there is a woman
alive who would not feel the necessity of making Evan alter his
views. Carmel did not want him in the least. Quite the contrary; but,
now he had spoken his mind so brusquely, she would never be able
to live in ease until he came to want her very much and wore his
knees threadbare begging for her. This was wholly subconscious.
Carmel did not know it, but, nevertheless, she had determined to
make Evan Pell pay fully in the coin of the transaction for the
damage done by his ineptitude.
With part of her mind on the figures and the rest on Evan Pell, she
arrived at certain information. Unquestionably the Free Press had
been gaining in circulation. That much she had accomplished. Her
policy of reckless disclosure could have no other result, and
therefore it must have been good journalism. As for advertising
patronage—there, too, she had made progress. Her personal
solicitation brought in some few new advertisers and resulted in old
patrons enlarging somewhat their space. Also she had taken some
business from Litchfield, the largest adjoining town, and, on a visit to
the near-by city, she had induced a department store to use half a
page weekly. How much of this she could hold was a problem. It
became more of a problem within the hour, when no less than three
of her patrons called by telephone to cancel. The Busy Big Store
canceled a full page which Carmel had labored hard to get; Lancelot
Bangs, photographer, and Smith Brothers’ grocery ceased to be
assets—and no one of them assigned a reason. It worried her to
such an extent that she dropped her work and went to see about it.
Her first call was upon the proprietor of the Busy Big Store. This
gentleman was embarrassed, and consequently inclined to bluster,
but Carmel, being a persistent young person, cross-examined him
ruthlessly.
“I got to borrow from the bank,” he said, finally. “No merchant kin git
along without accommodation. Bank says I’m wastin’ too much
money advertisin’, and it can’t back me if I keep on.”
“So you take orders from the bank?” she asked, hotly, out of her
inexperience.
“You kin bet your bottom dollar I do,” he said.
Carmel bit her lip. “Abner Fownes is a stockholder in the bank, isn’t
he?”
“One of the biggest.”
Carmel turned away and left the store. She had run down her fact.
No more was necessary. She knew why merchants were canceling
their contracts with her—it was because Abner Fownes issued
orders to do so. For the first time he showed his hand in overt act.
The question now was: How many merchants in Gibeon could Abner
Fownes control? How long could he continue to dictate to them?...
What good was circulation increase if advertising patronage failed?
She returned to the office in lowest spirits and considered her case.
It was not pleasant consideration.
She had arrived in town a few weeks before, a stranger, without
friends. She was unacquainted with Gibeon and with its peculiarities,
and at the very beginning had made an enemy of its leading citizen,
a man ostensibly possessed of great power to blight her prospects.
She had made no friends, had not sought to strengthen her position
by alliances. Frankly, she knew almost as little about Gibeon to-day
as she knew the hour of her arrival. Her acquaintance was altogether
with the melodramatic side of the town’s life, with the disappearance
of its sheriff; with illicit dealings in liquor; with its political trickery. She
did not know who were its solid, dependable, law-respecting citizens.
It might have been well to go to the trouble of finding who of
Gibeon’s residents were in sympathy with her campaign of
disclosures, but she had not done so. She stood alone, without the
approval of those who worked with her.
She saw how she had plunged into things with her habitual
impulsiveness, without giving consideration to facts or
consequences. Without intending it to be so, she had so arranged
matters that the battle stood as the Free Press against the world.
How much better it would have been to move cautiously; to be sure
of her ground; to know she could rely upon powerful support. She
wondered if it were too late....
At this stage in her reflections, George Bogardus, undertaker,
darkened her door. George was not a youth, but he simulated youth.
He wore the sort of clothes one sees in magazine illustrations—with
exaggerations. He wore spats. A handkerchief with a colored border
allowed its corner to peer from his breast pocket, and useless
eyeglasses hung from a broad black ribbon. If George were seen
standing in the window of some clothing store catering to the trade of
those who dress by ear rather than by eye, he would have been
perfection. Once George saw a play in Boston, and since that day he
had impersonated a young English nobleman who had been its hero.
His speech was a quaint mingling of New England intonation and
idiom with what he could remember of the inflections and vocal
mannerisms of Lord Algernon Pauncefote.
“Aw—I say,” he began, lifting his eyeglasses to his nose. “Aw—Miss
Lee.”
“Yes, Mr. Bogardus.”
“I say—this is the day we kin start depositin’ our votes, hain’t it?...
What?”
“In the Handsomest-Man contest?”
“Er—precisely. Y’understand—aw—have no interest myself. Not the
least.” This was Lord Pauncefote at his best. “Buy m’ friends. What?
Cheerio! Eh?”
“Of course, Mr. Bogardus.”
“Er—say, who else has got any votes in?”
“Nobody, as yet.”
“Satisfactory, very. Yes, yes.... Lance Bangs hain’t entered yit?”
“Not yet.”
“I fawncy ’e will be,” said Mr. Bogardus. “Aw—permit me to—er—
deposit with you—aw—eighteen of these so-called coupons....
Guess that’ll give me as good a start as any, seems as though.”
“Yes, indeed, Mr. Bogardus. Good luck to you.”
“Er—notice anything?” He toyed with the ribbon on his eyeglasses
and cast an arch glance upon Carmel.
“Oh yes, indeed! How distinguished it makes you look!”
He purred. “That’s the way I calc’late to look. How was it that feller
said it in French. Seems like I can’t twist my tongue around
French.... Eh?... Oh, dis-tan-gay. Sounds kind of, don’t it. Say.”
He turned toward the door, but paused. “Heard the news?” he asked.
“What news?”
“Aw—fawncy an editor askin’ that. Fawncy!... They’re goin’ to declare
the office of sheriff vacant and git the Governor to appoint Jenney to
the job.”
“Are you sure?”
“It’s bein’ talked all over. Jenney says so himself. Rippin, eh? What?”
So they dared go as far as that—to appoint to the high office of
sheriff of the county a man such as Deputy Jenney! The thought was
not without its pleasant facets. If she had forced them to take such a
step it must mean she was reckoned as dangerous.... She hugged
that thought to her breast.
CHAPTER XV
EVAN BARTHOLOMEW PELL was thinking. He had been thinking
for hours, and according to present rate of progress, it would be
hours more before he arrived at a conclusion. He had found an
interesting subject—one discovered rather later in life than by most
people, but, perhaps, all the more interesting for that reason. The
subject was himself.
It is a fact that never until to-night had he thought about himself as
the ordinary run of human beings think. When he had given
consideration to himself it had been a sort of aloof, impersonal
consideration. He had often thought about Evan Pell’s mind—as one
thinks of a warehouse—and much consideration had been given to
filling it with intellectual merchandise. No consideration whatever had
been given to moving away any of that merchandise out of the
warehouse and distributing it.
His requirements had been of the simplest—food, shelter, and an
opportunity to lay in intellectual goods, wares, and merchandise.
With pleasure he had been unacquainted, and hence felt no desire
to possess it. Sorrow was unknown to him. On the whole, he was
rather like a chess-playing automaton, except that his range was
somewhat wider and more complicated.
But now he had discovered himself as an individual. The discovery
was wholly due to Carmel Lee. He had fallen in love with her, which
was a monstrous thing, but potent to prepare the soil of his mind for
undesired crops. Then she had spoken to him about himself with
frankness and logic. He was not disturbed by the frankness, but his
antecedents rendered him apt to perceive the logic. That had
impressed him. What was the use of himself, anyhow? Such was the
question he considered. His object was acquisition, not
dissemination. Had he been mistaken in choosing that object? This
led further. What were human beings for? Why had people to be
born, and to live? He recognized the necessity of utility. Was he
inutile?
It was ten minutes after midnight when he admitted he was inutile, or
nearly so. What followed? There followed immediately a
disagreeable sensation, a sense of humiliation. He, a representative,
undoubtedly, of the highest order of human beings, was not useful.
Members of much lower orders were useful. The ditch digger was
useful; the man who collected the garbage was useful. In that event
diggers and garbage men must be of more value to the world than
himself.
This was intolerable. He could not allow such a state of affairs to
persist, but the method of abolishing it was not manifest. Mentally he
tabulated the attributes of such patently useful things as he could
remember, looking for their lowest common denominator. It appeared
to be something like what Carmel Lee declared it to be—namely,
improving some aspect of life upon this planet. If one could touch
any phase of life and render it more efficient, he was useful. He
wondered what aspect of life he could improve. And then he came to
the most important and far-reaching discovery of his life. This
discovery came at exactly ten minutes past one in the morning.... In
order to find how one might be useful to life, one must know life! That
was the discovery, and it quite overturned his conception of how he
would live and die.
Inexorably his mind forced him to a corollary. In order to know life,
one must know human beings. He elaborated on this. It meant
mingling with human beings, taking part in their lives, watching and
comprehending the significance of the ramifications of their actions
and emotions. It was something one could not derive from books,
unless, as he had heard vaguely, works of fiction depicted these
things with some degree of verity. But he never read fiction.
All of this led to another alarming discovery. This came at two o’clock
in the morning. It was this—that learning, simply as learning, was not
worth a tinker’s dam. Of course this is not his phraseology, but it
expresses his thought. Learning stored in the mind’s warehouse is
like gold not taken from the mine. It is no good even to the
possessor. You have to mine and smelt gold before it takes on a
measurable value. It has to be put into circulation in some form. The
same was true, necessarily, of knowledge.
This meant the overturning of his whole life, for Evan Pell, besides
being logical, possessed another quality of greater value—when he
perceived that any act was the act to be done, he set about doing it
to the best of his ability. This was not courage; it was not resolution;
it was natural reaction.
At three o’clock he retired. It was with a sense of humiliation he lay
down on his bed. Instead of being, as he had fancied, a wonderful
and superior being, he was negligible. His resolution, taken with
characteristic finality, was that in the morning he would begin to be
the thing he was not. This was very fine, but it possessed one defect:
It was purely academic. It emanated wholly from the head, and not in
any fraction whatever from the heart. Emotionally he did not give a
hoot what became of humanity.
He awoke to a strange world in the morning—felt like a fresh arrival
in a strange planet. His duty was to find out what the planet was
about and, so to speak, make preparations to take out naturalization
papers. How to begin?... Well, he must eat, and therefore it was
essential to continue at his present employment. He thought about
his present employment superciliously until he caught himself at it;
then he considered his employment logically. Hitherto he had taken
no interest in it, except as it offered a challenge to his intelligence.
Carmel had doubted his ability to do the work, and, in irritation, he
had essayed to prove he could do that as well as anything else. The
thrashing he had taken from the fists of Deputy Jenney had reached
deep enough to touch his latent manhood—to blow upon the ember
derived from some sturdy ancestor.... Now he considered briefly the
business of news purveying, and was able to see how serviceable it
was to mankind. The business of a newspaper, as he saw it, was to
give to the community the agenda of the world, and, by editorial
argument, to assist in the business of directing public opinion.... This
was a worthy business.... More specifically he gave thought to the
Free Press and what it was trying to do. Carmel, rushing in where
angels feared to tread, was endeavoring to cure a definite, visible
sore on the public body. For the first time he viewed the activities of
Gibeon’s liquor smugglers as a matter of right and wrong, and not as
a problem set in a textbook. If he could help to abolish this malignant
sore he would be performing real service.... That aspect of matters
interested him. He found that the mere mental exercise of thinking
about humanity gave one an emotional interest in humanity.... He
was progressing.
One could not attain to results in a laboratory without intimate
contact with specimens; one could not attain to results in the world
without intimate contacts with human beings. Therefore Evan made
up his mind to procure for himself a mantle of sociability.... He wore it
to the office, and Tubal was the first human being to see it exhibited.
Tubal was mystified.
“Good morning, Tubal,” said Evan, with painstaking courtesy. “How
do you do this morning? Er—we must become better acquainted,
Tubal.... I trust I make myself clear. Yes, yes. I wish, at your leisure,
to converse with you—er—regarding—ah—many things. Yes,
indeed.... I wish to obtain your viewpoint.”
Tubal stared, and reared back on his heels mentally.
“Don’t feel dizzy or nothin’, do ye?” he asked.
“I am perfectly well. Why do you ask?”
“Aw—nothin’.... Say!... Looky here. Viewpoint, is it? Aw....”
“What I wish to convey,” said Evan, and he unmasked a smile which
was decidedly to his credit, “is—that I wish to be friends.”
Tubal regarded him suspiciously, but Tubal’s eyes were keen and his
perceptions keener. He saw embarrassment in Evan’s smile, and
sincerity, and something else which might have been called pitiful.
“I’m doggoned!” he exclaimed.
Evan sighed. This business of making human contacts was more
difficult than he imagined. “I—you know—I fancy I like you,” he said.
Tubal waved his hands, a fluttering, distracted sort of waving. “’Tain’t
licker,” he said to himself. “Must be suthin’ he et....”
“Er—we will resume the subject later,” said Evan, “when both of us
have more leisure.... Ah, good morning, Simmy. I trust you slept
well.... The weather is—ah—satisfactory. Do you not find it so?”
Tubal leaned against the press and swallowed three several
convulsive times. Then he turned upon Simmy fiercely. “Go wash
your face,” he shouted.
Evan backed away a step and then beat a retreat. He sat down at
his table and leaned his head on his hands. Obviously the thing had
not been properly done. The results were quite other than he
desired, but why? He had unbent. He had been friendly, made
friendly overtures. What was wrong?
At this unsatisfactory juncture Carmel entered, looking very young
and fresh and dainty. Evan forgot his disappointment for the moment
in his delight at seeing her. He stared at her as a hungry child stares
in a bakery window. The sensation was highly pleasurable. He
detected this and took immediate measures to suppress it.
“Miss Lee,” he said, with some hesitation, “I gave careful
consideration to your yesterday’s arraignment of myself.”
“I’m sorry. I had no intention to wound you, Mr. Pell. I—I hope you
will forgive me.”
“You did not wound me. Er—quite the contrary.... As I say, I reflected
upon what you said. I slept little. Unquestionably you were right.... I
have lived in error. My estimate of myself was mistaken. I have, in
short, been of negligible value to the world.”
“Mr. Pell!”
“If you please.... I have reached a determination to revolutionize my
life. I shall no longer stand aloof. No. I shall participate in events....
Indeed, I have made a beginning—not altogether auspicious. I
essayed to make friends with Tubal this morning, but he seemed not
to comprehend my meaning. However, I shall persist.... As to
yourself—we are not friends, you and I. You do not rate me highly....
I wish to correct this.” He paused. “As I have been compelled to
inform you, I have fallen in love with you.... This moment, as you
entered, I glowed with pleasure.... Yesterday I informed you you

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What Is This Thing Called Knowledge

What is this thing called Knowledge 3rd Edition Duncan

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Duncan Pritchard FRSE is Chancellor’s Professor of Philosophy at the University of

What is this thing called Ethics? Second edition

What is this thing called Global Justice?

What is this thing called Knowledge? Fourth edition

What is this thing called Metaethics?

What is this thing called Metaphysics? Third edition

What is this thing called Philosophy of Language? Second edition

What is this thing called Philosophy of Religion?

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ISBN: 978-1-138-22579-4 (hbk)

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Preface to the fourth edition xi

PART I: WHAT IS KNOWLEDGE? 1

2 The value of knowledge 10

4 The structure of knowledge 30

6 Virtues and faculties 54

PART II: WHERE DOES KNOWLEDGE COME FROM? 65

8 Testimony and memory 77

9 A priority and inference 88

10 The problem of induction 98

PART III: WHAT KINDS OF KNOWLEDGE ARE THERE? 109

11 Scientific knowledge 111

12 Religious knowledge 124

13 Moral knowledge 139

PART IV: HOW CAN THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

PART V: DO WE HAVE ANY KNOWLEDGE? 191

18 Scepticism about other minds 193

19 Radical scepticism 201

20 Truth and objectivity 214

General further reading 222

Ability knowledge is certainly an important type of knowledge to have. We want

TWO BASIC REQUIREMENTS OF KNOWLEDGE:

KNOWING VERSUS MERELY ‘GETTING IT RIGHT’

A BRIEF REMARK ON TRUTH

INTRODUCTORY FURTHER READING

ADVANCED FURTHER READING

WHY CARE ABOUT KNOWLEDGE?

THE INSTRUMENTAL VALUE OF TRUE BELIEF

THE VALUE OF KNOWLEDGE

Plato (c.427–c.347 bc)

THE STATUES OF DAEDALUS

IS SOME KNOWLEDGE NON-INSTRUMENTALLY

In order to see how knowledge could be non-instrumentally valuable, think of

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